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Justice and Prospering: Ancient Debates, Disagreements, and Dilemmas

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*Justice and Prospering: Ancient Debates, Disagreements, and
Dilemmas*

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Abstract

The role that morality plays in the good life has been a topic of persistent interest for philosophers throughout the ages. Hobbes' fool said that justice does not exist and that every person should act in the way that conduces to their own felicity, but long before the dawn of modern philosophy the Greek sophists had claimed that justice does not really exist and that those who are rational will throw off the yoke of conventional morality and act to serve their own self-interest. In this dissertation, I evaluate the earliest theoretical challenges posed to morality as well as the responses these challenges elicited.

In the first half of the dissertation, I argue that there was a lively yet poorly-understood debate about justice and happiness (which I call 'prospering') well before the time of Socrates and Plato. I begin at the beginning: the Traditional View of Justice as articulated by the didactic poet Hesiod. I then show that later figures sought to undermine the central tenets of this Traditional View by arguing that justice does not truly exist and, to the extent that it does, that it does not serve the ends of the intelligent agent. Finally, I argue that another group of early moral thinkers responded to those who sought to challenge justice and defended the life of justice as the best and happiest life.

In the second half of the dissertation, I draw on this early debate to offer a new and historically informed interpretation of Plato's own defense of justice in the *Republic*. Engaging with a thorny scholarly debate centering on the division of goods in Book II, I argue against the now-standard interpretation according to which Plato understands justice to be primarily intrinsically valuable. I show instead that he saw justice as contributing to one's prospering through certain effects that it has on the just agent's soul. My historically-informed interpretation of the *Republic* reveals that Plato's conception of

justice is both compelling and philosophically profound, although it is not a conception of justice as an intrinsic good.

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Introduction

We do not yet know whether it is good to be good. One sometimes hears people praise moral behavior as prudent and censure immoral behavior as imprudent – e.g., ‘virtue is its own reward’, ‘what goes around comes around’, ‘good things come to those who wait’. Yet an equal number of catchy slogans present the cynical view that bad behavior is better – e.g., ‘only the good die young’, ‘no good deed goes unpunished’, ‘if it feels good it can’t be bad’. These statements attest to a problem as old as philosophy itself: we are perennially unable to decide whether living a morally commendable life ultimately contributes to our own happiness, or whether our self-interest is better served through less scrupulous means. My dissertation is about the earliest philosophical discussions regarding the role that morality plays – if any – in the happy human life.

At least two things about the ancient Greeks’ theorizing about the relationship between morality and happiness are likely to strike contemporary readers as a little alienating. The first is the particular approach they adopt in addressing this relationship. Instead of asking the abstract question ‘what is the relationship between being a good person and living a happy life?’, the earliest Greek thinkers tended to ask the much more practically oriented question ‘is it profitable to be a just person?’ The second alienating feature is the focus on justice. The Greeks could have focused on the relationship between being good and being happy – for they had such vocabulary – but instead they focused on the relationship between justice and happiness. It is true that their conception of justice is much more robust than our own – many things that are now normally thought to fall under the scope of morality fell, for the ancient Greeks, within the scope of justice. Nevertheless, even for the Greeks justice is only one of many virtues. It is not equivalent to our term ‘morality’.

Unfortunately, these two features have contributed to a number of pernicious scholarly prejudices about ancient ethical theory. Some have endorsed Cicero's sentiment that 'Socrates brought philosophy down from the clouds' and defended the position that real moral philosophy did not exist prior to Socrates and Plato. Arthur Adkins, for example, thought that early poetic and sophistic discussions of the virtues were far too narrow and primitive to capture the full range of moral phenomena.¹ Others have gone farther by arguing that even Plato himself failed to do moral philosophy (or if he was doing it, then he was doing it in a hopelessly misguided way). In "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake," H.A. Prichard famously argued that Plato made a fundamental error in asking whether justice is profitable. According to Prichard, considerations of the agent's own interests are totally out of place in moral philosophy: the true moralist asks only what is right and then does it, whether or not it contributes to their well-being.²

Like many others, I believe that both these positions are far too simplistic. Though Adkins and Prichard each call attention to genuine features of philosophical thought as it was practiced by the ancients, they are too quick to draw damning conclusions from these features. Unlike a few others, however, I will not respond to their views directly.³ This is not the place to help those still in the grips of old scholarly prejudices. I do, though, want to address these two strange features of ancient Greek ethical thought and suggest that what at first strikes one as alienating can turn out to be interesting and liberating.

In this dissertation, I offer a historically informed discussion regarding the fundamental question of ancient Greek thought: why should I be just? By approaching this question in

¹ Adkins (1960).

² Prichard (1912).

³ The most notable critic of the views held by Adkins and Prichard is Williams (1993).

an historical spirit, I hope to show how the concept of justice becomes so central to the Greek tradition. Thus in my first chapter, I offer a close analysis of Hesiod's highly influential poem, *Works and Days*, which contains one of the earliest systematic discussions of justice in Western literature. A close reading of this poem allows us to better appreciate what the Greek tradition understood justice to be as well as why it was such a central virtue for later authors. Further, by illustrating the fact that there was a lively debate regarding the question 'why be just?', I hope to convince my readers of how unfair it is to make blanket condemnations of Greek ethical thought in the way that Prichard does. By attending to the fact that the Greeks actively debated the question of whether one should be good or not, the careful reader will find that the ancient world contained a rich tapestry of subtly and not-so-subtly different ethical views. Some of these views may remain strange to us, but there should be nothing strange about philosophers disagreeing over ethical positions. Some of the positions advocated for are similar to others still held today. If we finally come to appreciate and respect Greek thought in general, attending to the stranger views may start to open new vistas for our own moral thinking.

The structure of my dissertation is as follows. My first chapter begins with a discussion of Hesiod's great poem, *The Works and Days*. Hesiod's poem contains five theses regarding justice, making up what I call the Traditional View of Justice. They are: 1) Zeus gave justice to humankind; 2) the gods reward those who are just and punish those who are unjust; 3) justice is therefore beneficial to the just agent; 4) the rewards received are External Goods; 5) it is thus prudent for humans to be just, given that justice results in more goods than injustice. Aside from providing information about the nature of justice as conceived of by the Greeks, these theses are important because they indicate that, according

to the Traditional View, one must be just in order to achieve the highest human good, which I call an individual's *prospering*.

I then argue that a number of 5th century sophists sought to challenge the Traditional View of Justice. The "Sisyphus Fragment", the remaining fragments of the sophist Antiphon, and important sophistic material in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and Thucydides' *History* are analyzed in detail. Each of these texts, I argue, takes issue with various theses of the Traditional View. By introducing powerful considerations about human nature as well as new analyses of social institutions, these authors suggest that it is the selective and intelligent practice of injustice that serves the individual's prospering. Taken as a whole, these texts indicate the existence of an intellectual movement that challenged the profitability of justice and brazenly defended the life of injustice.

In my second chapter, I turn to a relatively neglected group of texts. Through a close analysis of the "Anonymous Iamblich", Prodicus' "Choice of Heracles", and the remaining fragments of Democritus, I show that another group of 5th century thinkers offered arguments designed to respond to the views discussed in the first chapter. In these arguments, we find a secularized and modernized version of Hesiod's Traditional View of Justice. By positing their own theories of human nature and social institutions, these authors defend the view that justice and virtue are indispensable for the prospering of the individual and thus occupy a crucial role in the best human life.

The investigation conducted in the first two chapters has two upshots. In the first place, it has considerable philosophic and historical interest in its own right. Although scholars generally acknowledge that some 5th century sophists challenged the life of justice, it is not always recognized that other pre-Platonic authors responded to these challenges. These

chapters demonstrate that there was a genuine *debate* about the merits and demerits of justice before Socrates ‘brought philosophy down from the clouds’. Moreover, some of the arguments put forward by the defenders of justice anticipate the views and arguments of later thinkers. This leads to the second upshot of the investigation. Achieving some clarity about the 5th century debate regarding justice allows us to better understand the thought of later thinkers, and, above all, Plato.

In the second half of my dissertation, I argue that Plato was aware of the 5th century debate, and I exploit the discussion in my first two chapters to offer a historically informed interpretation of Plato’s *Republic*. My interpretation has the potential to resolve some longstanding disputes in the secondary literature. For over 80 years now, scholars have questioned whether Plato’s position is that justice is both intrinsically and instrumentally good, or whether what Plato calls justice’s value ‘because of itself’ and its value ‘because of the things that arise from it’ identify two different ways that this cardinal virtue is good. I argue against the standard interpretation and defend the view that Plato was not working with the concepts of intrinsic and instrumental value. An appreciation of his intellectual predecessors suggests that his dichotomy captures two different respects in which justice has value and contributes to the prospering of the just individual.

My third chapter offers a close textual analysis of Plato’s famous division of goods. I argue that to say justice is valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’ is to say that justice derives value from the social and divine rewards that the putatively just agent receives on account of being recognized as just. I call these the Reputational Rewards of Justice. Although to value justice for its Reputational Rewards is to value justice instrumentally, these rewards do not exhaust the valuable effects of justice. Therefore, they

do not exhaust the instrumental value of justice. For this reason, it is a mistake to interpret ‘the things that arise from justice’ as a bit of terminology pointing towards our notion of instrumental value. After responding to two important objections, I conclude that Plato allows other valuable effects of justice to contribute to the value that justice possesses ‘because of itself’.

In chapter four, I flesh out this conclusion by providing a novel interpretation of Socrates’ analysis and defense of justice ‘because of itself’. Socrates’ argument in the *Republic* depends on the fact that justice is acknowledged to have a unique *dunamis* – a Greek word meaning ‘power’ or ‘capacity’. The characteristic activity of a *dunamis* is to do something or to have some effect on the object it is directed towards. Since justice is a power directed at the soul, I argue that, according to Plato, justice contributes to the highest human good by producing certain valuable effects in the soul. I call these effects the Authentic Rewards of Justice. It is on account of these Authentic Rewards, I claim, that Plato holds justice to be valuable ‘because of itself’.

Plato’s *Republic* remains one of the seminal philosophical texts discussing the role that morality plays in the prosperous life. This is so not in spite of the fact that Plato failed to exploit the conceptual distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value in this dialogue, but rather because he does not use these familiar concepts. His text offers us the possibility of thinking about value and carving up goodness in a different way, which may be fruitful in our own investigation of how best to live.

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I should like to end by acknowledging my mother, Iris Turcott, who died while I was writing this dissertation. I inherited from her my drive to learn the truth and to be right. Although we often fought and disagreed, she always pushed me to be better and was very proud of me – probably too proud. I’m sorry that she did not live long enough to visit me at Princeton, see me graduate, or start my career. It would have meant the world to her.

Prefatory Note

I have often been asked whether I am writing a ‘three-paper dissertation’ or ‘manuscript dissertation.’ Both styles are very common today in North American philosophy departments, so I tend to surprise my interlocutors when I tell them that my dissertation fits neither model. The four chapters of this dissertation are not distinct investigations loosely tied together by a common theme, nor are they four parts of a tightly unified, book-length study. Rather, they are four halves of two scholarly investigations, each of which explores the contributions made to an important philosophical debate by different ancient thinkers. Between these bounded-covers, then, my reader will find a work twice divided: two halves each torn in two.

Although I did not put a great deal of forethought into the question of how to organize the chapters while I was writing them, I must admit that the current structure strikes me as quite fitting. For it is in the very nature of debate that the parties privy to it be divided among themselves: one side arguing for, the other arguing against. I like to think of the divisions among my chapters as mirroring the division among the ancient philosophers who bravely marshaled allies, crafted arguments, readied their pens, and fought in defense of what they thought to be right. They recognized the urgency in the contest over the question of how one should live one’s life; and so should we.

Let the fight begin...

In memory of my mother.

I love you. I miss you.

Chapter One

The 5th Century Challenge to Justice

Thou, nature, art my goddess. To thy law my services are bound. Wherefore should I stand in the plague of custom, and permit the curiosity of nations to deprive me, for that I am some twelve or fourteen moon-shines lag of a brother? Why bastard? Wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well compact, my mind as generous, and my shape as true, as honest madam's issue? Why brand they us with base? With baseness? Bastardy? Base, base?...Well then, legitimate Edgar, I must have your land. Our father's love is to the bastard Edmund as to the legitimate: fine word – legitimate! Well, my legitimate, if this letter speed, and my invention thrive, Edmund the base shall top the legitimate.

-William Shakespeare, *King Lear*

In this chapter, I begin to outline an important debate over the merits and demerits of following justice in ancient Greek thought.⁴ The relevant question is: Is it ultimately beneficial for the individual to behave justly or does it serve their self-interest to practice injustice instead? I start with a close reading of some early didactic poetry presenting a traditional view about the relationship between justice and well-being. According to this view, the existence of the gods ensures that an individual must be just to live the best, most satisfactory life. After a brief survey of some historical developments, I then introduce a challenge posed to this poetic view in the 5th century. Two extant sophistic texts, the ‘Sisyphus Fragment’ of unknown authorship and Antiphon’s ‘On Truth’, are relevant to this challenge. These texts show that there was a distinct and identifiable current of thought running through the 5th century, which maintained that an individual concerned to live well should practice a calculated, albeit selective sort of injustice. Two non-sophistic texts attest to the power of this challenge to the traditional understanding of justice and the broad impact that the sophists had on popular Greek thought at this time.

⁴ The work of Jacqueline de Romilly and Rachel Barney has greatly influenced my understanding of the sophists and the sophistic movement. See Romilly (2002) and Barney (2006). These two texts are particularly important for my thinking in this chapter and the next.

One cautionary note before we begin. In attempting to explicate this polemical and provocative current of thought, I will naturally stress the theoretical and argumentative similarities shared by the sophistic thinkers discussed in this chapter. The reader should take care, however, to resist drawing the conclusion (once common among students of ancient philosophy) that there was one philosophical or ethical position shared by all the sophists. How false this is will become obvious in the next chapter, where I discuss another group of sophists who reacted to the views discussed in this chapter. Yet not even the texts and positions treated in this chapter can be said to present one unified position: their authors disagree on too much. What they agree upon, however, is that behaving in a scrupulously just manner does not serve the individual's true interests. Instead, they claim, the selective and intelligent pursuit of injustice is the most prudent way for an individual to live.⁵

1 - The Traditional View

1.1. *The Works and Days* (WD)

In many ways, Hesiod lays the theoretical foundation for the 5th century discussions concerning justice and the central debate over its place in the successful human life.⁶ He

⁵ Here and throughout I use “prudent” to mean “rationally advisable”. The most prudent way for an individual to live, then, is the way a fully reasonable person concerned to live the best life would live. Oftentimes the prudent thing to do will be to pursue the best of all possible lives, although it is important to note that this need not be the case. It is possible for the pursuit of the best life to be sufficiently difficult and for the costs of failure to be sufficiently high that such a life will be, all things considered, imprudent to pursue. It is an interesting feature of the Greek debate regarding justice that this possibility generally does not play a significant role. For the most part, both those who endorse justice and those who endorse injustice as a way of life are at pains to argue that following their advice will result in the best possible life – regardless of how difficult such a life may be to achieve.

⁶ For the sake of simplicity, I use the name ‘Hesiod’ to refer to the author of the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony*. I will not take a stand on the much-debated question of whether it was one author who composed these poems, whether they were compiled at some later date from diverse oral traditions, or whether they were assembled in some other way entirely. I do, though, assume

was the first to clearly articulate and canonize what I call the Traditional View of Justice, according to which it is best or most profitable for an individual to follow justice [δίκην] or to act regularly and consistently justly.⁷

Dikē in Hesiod has at least two distinct meanings. One common expression in WD is ‘following justice,’ which is used to describe the behavior of someone who follows the laws of their society and acts appropriately and fairly towards the other members of their community. When used in this expression, *dikē* is clearly a normative concept.⁸ The bare

that each poem is a complete and polished work offering a coherent treatment of its subject matter. Thus, I treat WD as a text offering a developed account of the nature of *dikē* and its effects on individuals and communities.

⁷ Hesiod is very concerned to identify the place justice has in the best political community and the best human life. In this respect, he is an important precursor to the later philosophic tradition.

⁸ Some have doubted that *dikē* has any normative force in WD. Michael Gagarin (1973) has argued that *dikē*, “may mean ‘law’, in the sense of a process for the peaceful settlement of disputes,” but further insists that, “*dikē* does not apply to actions outside of this narrow area of law and does not have any general moral sense” (81). I should note that I am not primarily concerned with WD itself or what it claims about justice. I am much more concerned with how this work laid the foundation for later discussions about justice – and it is absolutely clear that later thinkers took Hesiod’s statements about *dikē* to be statements about justice and, for that reason, to be directly applicable to their own normative projects. Plato quotes WD 232-3 in the *Republic* to show that poets only praise specific effects of just behavior, not justice itself (363b-c). Although Plato’s is obviously a normative work and although he uses a different word for ‘justice’, he can without hesitation offer WD as directly relevant to his own treatment of δικαιοσύνη.

This fact aside, Gagarin’s argument about the meaning of *dikē* in WD is rather unconvincing. He first draws the distinction between the noun *dikē* and the adjective ‘δίκαιος’ along with its substantive use, ‘τό δίκαιον’. He concedes that the adjective often means ‘proper behavior’ in some normative sense, but he tries to show that the noun cannot. On the basis of etymological evidence and a close reading of certain passages in the *Odyssey* and *Illiad*, Gagarin concludes that in Homer the noun *dikē* “has two separate areas of meaning.” On the one hand it can mean ‘characteristic’ and can be used of a person or a group of people, and on the other hand it can mean ‘legal settlement’ (87). Turning to WD, Gagarin finds no uses of the noun that can mean anything like ‘characteristic’, and from this infers that *dikē* in Hesiod must mean settlement or legal process. He is careful to add that, “the meaning is not extended to include any sense of justice or morality or punishment for improper behavior in general” (88). In support of this claim, he later points out that neither homicide nor any other immoral act is ever spoken of as a violation of *dikē* or an act of ὕβρις.

For a number of reasons, I find Gagarin’s argument unsatisfactory. First, he has not successfully shown that while the adjective *dikaio*s may mean ‘proper behavior’ or some other normative concept, the corresponding noun does not. Zeus is often said to punish or take vengeance on those who violate *dikē*. On Gagarin’s account, this must mean that Zeus punishes those who break the

noun itself can also refer to the abstract quality of the lawful and fair treatment of others, in which case it too is a term loaded with normative significance. At other times, however, the word may refer to specific features of the legal system, such as the result of an arbitration or settlement process. In these cases, it is merely descriptive. Nonetheless, the word certainly can and frequently does carry normative force in WD. The precepts of justice include what the written law legitimately requires of its subjects as well the norms prescribing fair and appropriate behavior towards the gods and other people.⁹

rules of the legal system – nothing more. Yet in another passage Zeus is also said to punish those who practice unjust works (ἔργων ἀδίκων) (334). Here an adjective is used and it is explicitly used to refer to acts beyond the scope of the law and within the scope of propriety and impropriety, such as violating the guest-host relationship. Although the noun *dikē* is not used in this passage, we are invited to conclude that it is importantly related to the adjective when Zeus punishes unjust works in the same way that he punishes the violations of *dikē* itself. Moreover, Gagarin himself notices that *dikē* is essentially opposed to *hubris* in the work (90), but he does not seem to notice that Hesiod freely contrasts the adjective *dikaios* with *hubris* as well (190-1). This too suggests that there is a tighter connection between *dikē* and *dikaios* than Gagarin is willing to admit.

Gagarin may be right to say that neither homicide nor any other wicked act is *explicitly* spoken of as a violation of *dikē*, but he is simply wrong to conclude that Hesiod does not present such acts as violations of *dikē*. In a crucial passage (to be discussed below) Hesiod contrasts humans, who live with *dikē*, to animals, who live with violence (276-9). Contrasts such as these serve to illustrate the broader significance of the terms used in this poem, as David Claus makes clear in his article on this topic: “Hesiod regularly uses direct and implied antitheses to develop his ideas and enlarge his capacity of his language” (1977, 75). In the relevant passage, the animals who lack *dikē* are said to eat and kill one another, but humans who have justice are expected not to. We should infer that if humans were to kill and eat one another they would be violating *dikē*. Thus, improper behavior can be a violation of *dikē* as well.

Finally, it is worth noting that the major commentaries produced after Gagarin’s article have assumed or argued that *dikē* means justice in WD and is, accordingly, a normative term (West 1978 and Most 2010). I cannot accept Gagarin’s position (re-asserted in his 1974 article) that *dikē* only means law or legal settlement in WD.

⁹ Because of the many apparent meanings of the word, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive characterization of what kind of behavior might legitimately fall under the scope of *dikē*. It is possible, for example, that Hesiod might allow some wiggle room for *dikē* to differ from community to community – what is lawful in one society need not necessarily be lawful in the next. But this in no way impinges on its normative status. Hesiod was presumably not aware of those laws from far away cultures that would later introduce some doubts about the rectitude of the Greek mores and customs.

The proem of WD provides a succinct statement of the central themes of the work and deserves to be attended to carefully (1-10):

μοῦσαι Πιερίηθεν ἀοιδῆσι κλείουσαι
δεῦτε, Δί' ἐννέπετε, σφέτερον πατέρ' ὑμνείουσαι·
ὄν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε,
ῥητοὶ τ' ἄρρητοί τε Διὸς μέγαλοιο ἔκητι.
ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάνοντα χαλέπτει,
ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,
ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.
κλῦθι ἰδὼν αἰὼν τε, δίκη δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας
τύνη· ἐγὼ δέ κε, Πέρση, ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην.

Muses, from Pieria, glorifying in songs:
Come here, tell in hymns of your father Zeus,
Thanks to whom mortal men are unfamed or renowned alike
And named and unnamed by the will of great Zeus.
For easily he strengthens, and easily he crushes the strong, easily
He diminishes the conspicuous and increases the inconspicuous,
And easily he straightens the crooked and withers the proud—
High-thundering Zeus, who dwells in the highest mansions.
Give ear to me, watching and listening, and straighten verdicts with
Justice, you! As for me, I will proclaim truths to Perses.¹⁰

It is significant that Hesiod starts by invoking the muses. In his other great poem, the *Theogony*, we learn that Hesiod was visited by these divine songstresses while he was just a poor farmer and that they gave him the power to sing about what has happened in the past and what will happen in the future (22-34). By invoking the muses at the beginning of WD, Hesiod is channeling this power once again. Accordingly, the reader is to understand that the contents of the poem have the stamp of divine approval and must be true.

¹⁰ Translations of Hesiod follow Most (2010), sometimes silently altered by my hand.

Next, we are introduced to the most important figure of the work: Zeus.¹¹ The first thing mentioned is his superlative strength and his dominion over humanity. It is by the will of great Zeus that we acquire renown or remain unmentioned, “for easily he strengthens, and easily he crushes the strong” (5). The focus in lines three through six is the strength of Zeus and our helplessness in the face of his power. He may do with us what he wants. The audience, though, still has not been told how the god exercises his overwhelming might. The next line provides this information. Zeus is said to straighten the ‘crooked’ [σκολιόν] and wither the ‘proud’ [ἀγήνορα] (7). Both these words have strongly negative connotations.¹² We are thus led to believe from the outset of the poem that Zeus is basically fair and good. Next, Hesiod uses two imperatives and demands that he be attended to and that crooked verdicts be straightened with justice. This is best understood as Hesiod pleading with Zeus to correct the affairs of the world and to order everything in accordance with justice.¹³ The passage raises one of the most important themes of the text: the necessity for human affairs to be ordered and governed by justice.

Finally, we learn that Hesiod is going to proclaim useful truths to his brother, Perses. These truths are nothing other than the contents of the poem, which is here cast as divinely inspired advice for Perses. That being said, it is clear that the advice in the poem is perfectly general. WD ends: “Prosperous [*eudaimôn*] and blessed is the one who knows all these things and does their work without giving offense to the immortals,

¹¹ Havelock (1978, 209): “The entire *Works and Days* can be viewed as a ‘Zeus-poem,’ insofar as it continually presents the lives and deeds of mankind as taking place under his superintendence and subject to his superior purpose.”

¹² σκολιόν is used to describe the crooked or deceitful words that disreputable characters use to harm their betters (WD, 194) and ἀγήνορα is used twice in the first book of the *Odyssey* to describe the suitors (I, 106 and 144).

¹³ The standard English commentaries make this clear. See Most (2010, 87) and West (1978, 141). The latter calls κλῶθι a ‘solemn imperative’, frequently addressed to the gods.

distinguishing the birds and avoiding trespasses” (826-9).¹⁴ The poem counts as divinely inspired advice for Hesiod’s brother because it counts as divinely inspired advice for everybody.

The proem, then, reassures the reader of the power and fairness of Zeus as well as the importance of justice for humanity. It further reveals the intention to offer advice on how one may best live and guarantees the veracity of this advice by invoking the divine. Many topics are addressed in the work but the issues raised in the introduction remain a focal point, structuring much of the poem. For our purposes, we are told five particularly important things, which I will call the five theses of the Traditional View.¹⁵ According to WD:

- 1) Zeus gave justice to humanity.
- 2) The gods reward those who are just and punish those who are unjust.

¹⁴ This is the first extant use of the adjective εὐδαίμων in Greek literature. Already in Hesiod it appears to identify the person living the good or successful life. The end of the poem thus promises the ‘good life’ to the reader who follows its recommendations. By the end of the 5th century, the noun ‘εὐδαιμονία’ becomes the standard term used in sophistic and philosophic discussions to express the highest human good. In the 4th century, Plato and Aristotle adopt this word as well. Although it is standard practice to translate this word with the English word ‘happiness’, this seems to me a mistake. By and large our word happiness as well as the adjective happy are used to refer to subjective and transitory states of positive feeling. It makes perfect sense to respond to a friend’s inquiry about how I feel today by saying, ‘I’m quite happy today, even though I was miserable yesterday’. So far as I can tell, there is no author in the ancient world who would use *eudaimôn* in this way. To be *eudaimôn* is, rather, to have a set of non-relative goods that makes one’s overall life a success and worthy of admiration. Exactly what non-relative goods constitute *eudaimonia* may differ from thinker to thinker, and they certainly may include transitory experiences of pleasure, but on no thinker’s account can the whole package of goods be localized to how one feels on any given day. Here I translate *eudaimonia* as ‘prospering’ and *eudaimôn* with ‘prosperous’. Prospering may accurately describe a robust and successful life in English (even if this is not most natural expression to describe this) and the word does not, to my knowledge, carry any connotation of transitory feelings or emotions. It does carry connotations of material wealth – consider the word ‘prosperity’ – and this is quite appropriate in the Greek context. As we will see below, many early thinkers (including Hesiod) thought that material wealth was an important feature of or means to *eudaimonia*. And later thinkers, including Plato, who consciously adopt this word to refer to the highest human good, must have been aware that in common parlance it often connoted material wealth.

¹⁵ I do not claim that these are the five most important theses of the entire work, merely that these are the five most important theses regarding the nature of *dikē* and its role in the lives of humans.

- 3) Justice is therefore beneficial to the just agent.
- 4) The rewards the just receive are External Goods.
- 5) It is prudent for humans to be just, given that justice results in more goods than injustice.

Let us start with the first thesis. In a particularly important passage, Hesiod tells his readers about the origin of justice and explains how justice distinguishes humans from the animals (274-80):

ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσι,
καὶ νῦ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν.
τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,
ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς ἐσθήμεν
ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώποισι
δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη γίγνεται.

Oh Perses, do lay these things in your heart and
Give heed to justice. Put violence entirely out of your mind.
For this is the law that Kronos' son has established
For human beings: That fish and beasts and winged birds
May eat one another, since there is no justice among them,
But to humans he has given justice, which is best by far.

Our author tells Perses to attend to justice and to forget about violence. He then justifies this advice (*gar*) with the further claim that Zeus has established a law for humankind. Although the exact content of this law, as well as its precise relationship to justice, are underdeveloped in the poem, Hesiod's general point is clear enough.¹⁶ There

¹⁶ So far as I can tell, the possibilities for the content of the law are the following: 1) Animals do not have justice and may eat one another, while humans do and may not. 2) Animals do not have justice, while humans do. 3) Humans have justice. 3) seems to me unlikely, given that immediately after the mention of *nomos* we are told about the animals, but it is hard to determine whether 1) or 2) is the better interpretation of the text. I favor 2). If this is the correct reading, then the claim that animals may eat one another is not itself part of the content of the law. What is it? I suggest that it offers empirical evidence that Zeus' law is correct. If animals do not have the ability to practice justice, then they will naturally resort to violence. This plausibly explains why we do not hold it against animals that they kill and eat one another. But in most situations, we do hold it against other people if they kill and eat one another, and this must be because we assume that they ought to avoid these practices and live with justice.

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In this passage, Hesiod apparently presumes that humans already had some conception of what justice is before Zeus lays down his law. This is the only way Zeus could order humans to live with justice and expect them to follow his law. Although Hesiod is not as clear about this as one would like, I assume a two-stage process is in the background of the passage. First, Zeus gave justice to humanity and then he laid down a law that they must follow it. If this is correct, then the law referred to above does not include any of the content of justice. That was already established by Zeus' earlier gift.

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Justice and the law prescribing it are here presented as important privileges of humankind that distinguish it from the animal world.¹⁸ This is a central feature of the Traditional View, and it plays an important role in the later debates about justice. By having Zeus give justice to humans, Hesiod presents justice as a universal and permanent element of humanity's repertoire. It does not follow from this that on Hesiod's view every person will in fact be just at all times (to have Sondheim's "Being Alive" in one's repertoire does not mean one will perform it), but it does follow that humans – unlike the animals – always have the ability or potential to be just. This is an important fact that points towards Hesiod's understanding of our nature as human beings: we are *Homo Iustus*.¹⁹

The poem indicates that justice is not only distinctive to humankind but beneficial as well. This too is a crucial tenet of the Traditional View. What Hesiod means by claiming that justice is 'best by far' is that humans can secure the means of living a better life –

¹⁸A significant body of evidence attests to the fact that most Greeks (including those who were unaware of the 5th century debates discussed in this chapter) believed that it was the laws that distinguished humans from the animals. In his *Greek Popular Morality*, Kenneth Dover (1974, 74) tells us, "The difference between humans and animals lay, in the Greek view, not only in the obvious superiority of human reasoning," but also in the fact that humans formed "communities operating under laws for the restraint of aggression." He translates Demosthenes XXV, 20 as evidence: "If laws were abolished and each individual were given power to do what he liked, not only does our communal organization vanish but our very life would be in no way different from that of animals." Although Hesiod must have helped to cement this as an important part of the Greek worldview, he was not the first to connect our humanity to our laws. The cyclopes of the *Odyssey* (IX, 105-15) live in a sort of state of nature with no codified laws or social conventions. Homer's presentation of the cyclopes' unjust and offensive treatment of humans serves, among other things, to underscore the crucial connection the Greeks saw between their laws and their humanity. For a brief discussion of Homer's cyclopes, see Hernández (2000).

¹⁹I do not mean to insist that Hesiod had a robust or philosophic understanding of human nature. Nevertheless by saying that justice was a gift from the father of all gods, implying that justice could exist in every human community, and by indicating that justice distinguishes us from the animals, Hesiod means to suggest it lies in our nature as humans to act justly and live with justice. Thus West (1978, 226) very helpfully notes, "'Zeus made it so' is an early Greek way of saying 'it is a fact of nature.'"

indeed, the best life possible – if and when they collectively and individually follow justice. A number of considerations in WD that suggest this. In the first place, those who follow justice are freed from the cycle of violence perpetuated by those animals which resort to eating one another to stay alive. Hesiod presents this as obviously a very good thing, presumably because it is hard to live a prospering life when one is constantly at war with the cannibalizing members of one's species. But Hesiod also gives us other reasons – more heavily emphasized in WD – as to why justice is ultimately profitable. Chief among these is that Zeus punishes those who violate justice and rewards those who obey it.

We transition here to the second thesis – the claim that the gods reward the just and punish the unjust. The lines immediately following the ones quoted above run as follows (280-5):

εἰ γάρ τις κ' ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορευῶσαι
 γινώσκων, τῷ μὲν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς·
 ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσι ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόςσας
 ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,
 τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρῃ γενεῇ μετόπισθε λείλειπται·
 ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.

For if someone who recognizes the just things is willing to speak
 Them out publically – to him far-seeing Zeus gives fortune. But
 He who willfully swears a false oath and lies with his testimony,
 He is incurably hurt at the same time as he harms justice.²⁰
 In posterity his family is left more obscure, whereas the
 Family of the one who keeps his oath is better in posterity.

²⁰ The view that one who violates the dictates of justice is 'incurably hurt at the same time' sounds quite similar to the view Socrates advances in Plato's dialogues (e.g. *Grg.* 479c). Indeed, other passages in the WD make the Socratic-looking claim that the person who does wrong harms himself most of all. "A man contrives evils for himself when he contrives evil for someone else, and an evil plan is most evil for the planner" (265-6). Although some have found it surprising that authors earlier than Plato could have voiced such sentiments, I hope to show that this is to be expected. Plato is, in a way, adopting the Traditional View and working through it for himself in his dialogues.

Zeus gives wealth and other prizes to those who support justice; he harms those who harm justice. This is the most pressing reason Hesiod has for thinking that individuals are best off following justice. In an earlier section of the text, Hesiod spends a full twenty-three lines enumerating the rewards that Zeus confers on those who are just and the punishments he dispenses to those who are unjust (225-48). The rewards of justice enable those who possess them to live the good life (recall that Hesiod ends his poem by announcing that whoever follows his advice will be *eudaimôn*) and the punishments for injustice are clearly meant to be the sort of things that destroy lives and leave an individual in misery. The divine rewards of justice and injustice are, then, what recommend in favor of just and against unjust behavior. This is enough to establish the third thesis as well. Justice is beneficial for the just agent (primarily) because Zeus rewards justice while punishing injustice.

Attending closely to lines 225-48 is instructive because it gives the reader some precious insight into what Hesiod regarded as good for human beings. Since the divine rewards of justice are meant to lead to a prosperous life, Hesiod must take these rewards to have real value and to be truly beneficial to humans. Aside from wealth and the longevity of one's family tree, Hesiod here mentions: 1) peace in one's community; 2) freedom from wars, famine, and the need for seafaring; 3) an abundance of resources from the earth, including trees that bear acorns, bees that make honey, sheep that produce wool, and women who bear children resembling their fathers. The corresponding punishments awarded to the unjust are: 1) pestilence and death; 2) famine (the opposite of an abundance of resources); 3) women who do not give birth to legitimate offspring.

Three points are worthy of note. First, the list of goods (and corresponding bad things) can be helpfully divided, in effect, into what Hesiod regards as goods for the community and goods for the individual. The absence of civil strife, for example, is a good the proper subject of which is the city or community. An individual cannot be said to have or to lack civil strife. Of course, an individual can live in a community free from civil strife – and *that* certainly is good for the individual, but *that* is also something quite different from lacking the strife itself. Wealth, on the other hand, as well as a good reputation and a flourishing family lineage are goods for the individual.

Second, Hesiod is clear in this section that, “often even a whole city suffers because of a bad person who errs and devises wicked deeds” (240-1). This is rather a surprising statement. WD is elsewhere at pains to make the point that those who are just will be rewarded, while those who are unjust will be punished. Yet this statement is placed prominently at the beginning of the punishments incurred by unjust people and *poleis*, and it seems to allow for the possibility that blameless people may suffer because of the wicked actions of their neighbor. Does Hesiod think that the whole city is complicit in the evil of one wicked person? This is possible, especially if the person is the ruler in the city.²¹ Or does Hesiod consider the suffering to be the collateral damage of the duly deserved punishment of a wicked individual? It is not clear. What is clear, however, is that the possibility of suffering because of the unjust acts of others provided an incentive for every member of the community to ensure that every other member respected justice and acted in an appropriate way. A collective self-interest leads everyone to try to ensure that their neighbors practice justice.

²¹ Later thinkers make this claim. See the *Anonymous Iamblich* DK89, B1, 7.14.

Finally, note that many of the things described as goods are distinct, material objects, such as acorns or wool, which are valuable insofar as they help individuals pursue their own ends and prosperity. Some others, such as good reputation or fertile wives, are not material objects to be used in the same way we use clothes, but they too have value insofar as they contribute to a satisfying life full of family, esteem, and contentment. For this reason – and here we come to the fourth thesis – I call them ‘External Goods,’ though this is not a term Hesiod himself uses. It should be clear why things such as nuts and sheep count as External Goods, but a good reputation and a successful family legacy should also be considered External Goods for two reasons. First, their presence depends primarily on sources other than the person who enjoys them: they come from sources external to the agent. My reputation, for example, derives essentially from the other people who hold me in high or low esteem. Second, these goods have no immediate and inevitable effect on the soul or psychological experiences of the agents who possess them. Acquiring a good reputation might provide me with some satisfaction *if* I have some antecedent appreciation for such a reputation, and this might, in turn, have an effect on my soul *if* my soul is what experiences satisfaction. But these effects are by no means immediate or inevitable. If they follow, they follow because of contingent features, which may differ from person to person.²²

²² I do not mean for these two conditions to be definitional of External Goods. They are meant to make clear why I consider reputation and a successful family lineage to be examples External Goods. Certain things may straddle the border between Internal and External Goods, such as shame or pride. The experience of these emotions frequently does immediately affect our mental or psychological well-being and we are sometimes in control of whether or not we experience them, although this control is necessarily limited in various respects. There is some slipperiness surrounding the distinction between Internal and External goods. Despite this slipperiness, though, Hesiod’s goods all appear to be External Goods.

Nothing the character of the goods we find in WD is important because it gives us some insight into Hesiod's view of the prosperous life. We can trace the outlines of such a life by attending to the gifts he says the gods bestow upon just individuals. It appears that prospering is characterized by a generally pleasant existence, which, although requiring plenty of physical labor and toil, includes the use of deservedly earned money and property as well as leisure to enjoy them. Furthermore, it includes a posterity of decedents and the acquisition of a good reputation. This is a rather simple picture of the good life derived from the 8th century rural farming communities of Hesiod's Boeotia, which leaves much to be desired. In particular, it is completely unclear what Hesiod considers the good-making feature of this life to be. Is it the pleasantness of existence, the appropriate enjoyment of social esteem, or some pluralistic mixture of different goods? I myself cannot find an answer from within WD and I admit that this question may strain the limits of my philosophical analyses of this poem. Luckily, however, the picture of a prosperous life found in Hesiod is separable from what I am calling the Traditional View. Many later defenders of justice will accept the main theses of the Traditional View while embracing their own, distinctive account of prospering.²³ What remains the same in the later thinkers is that humans are rewarded with what these thinkers regard as real goods – things of value, whatever valuable is taken to be – because of or through their just behavior.

I conclude my discussion of the Traditional View by turning to the fifth thesis, or the ultimate prudence of justice. This is the most crucial thesis of the Traditional View insofar as it answers the all-important question of how humans should orient themselves

²³ Indeed, we know that their conceptions of prospering differ partly because they identify different goods as contributing to the prosperous life.

towards justice if they wish to live the best and most profitable life. Hesiod's all-things-considered answer is that it is most profitable for humans to follow justice and act justly, *but only if doing so results in the acquisition of External Goods and the avoidance of harms*. This is a very important qualification and one that is stressed in the poem itself (270-3):

νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ μήτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος
εἶην μήτ' ἐμὸς υἱός, ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον
ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδίκωτερος ἔξει:
ἀλλὰ τὰ γ' οὕτω ἔολπα τελεῖν Δία μητιόεντα.

Right now I would not be just in dealings with men, neither
I myself nor a son of mine, since it is bad for a man to be just if the
More unjust man will get a greater settlement. But I do not
Anticipate that the counselor Zeus will let things end up this way.²⁴

The word for 'bad' here (*kakon*) must mean harmful. It is no benefit to anyone to be just (δίκαιον) if the more unjust individual (ἀδίκωτερος) gets the greater settlement, or greater reward (μείζω δίκην).²⁵ The playful and paradoxical construction of this sentence emphasizes the importance of its message and reveals that Hesiod's ethical presuppositions are perhaps closer to our own than Socrates' or Plato's, for here Hesiod seems to admit the possibility of justice coming apart from self-interest.²⁶ It is a rather

²⁴ This is a rather difficult passage to faithfully and literally render into English. The last sentence is particularly challenging. I have reproduced Most's translation above, although it is a little loose. Gagarin and Woodruff (1995, 19) translate: "But I don't expect that Zeus in his wisdom is quite finished." Adkins (1972, 32) translates: "But I think that counselor Zeus will not yet accomplish this." Havelock (1978, 209) offers a most literal translation: "however, these (things) not yet do I anticipate Zeus the counselor to accomplish." Although their translations differ, there is general agreement on the meaning. Zeus will not let the more unjust man get the better of the just man when push comes to shove.

²⁵ For those keeping track, this is one of the instances in which *dikē* is not used in a normative sense and, instead, must mean 'a settlement' or 'a verdict'.

²⁶ In a famous paper, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake" (1912), H.A. Prichard argued that Plato – and indeed all Greek philosophers following him – erred greatly in supposing that the morally right action would also promote the agent's own self-interest. According to Prichard, duty frequently conflicts with our own self-interest and the Greek tradition was deluded to think

remote possibility for Hesiod, though, since he has faith that Zeus will ensure that self-interest does not wander free for long and that those who dutifully attend to justice are eventually rewarded.²⁷ Nevertheless, Hesiod's qualification is important – it amounts to a concession that it would be imprudent to be just if this was an unprofitable way to comport oneself. This reveals that it is the profitability of the just life that is the ultimate consideration recommending it on Hesiod's view. Those who later sought to challenge justice would exploit this fact to show that the Traditional View contained within itself the seeds of its own demise.

As for WD itself, it indicates that it is a divinely inspired text and, for that reason, must contain the truth. Hesiod himself evinces little doubt about the justice of Zeus. He is confident that the god will intervene to order the world fairly and make sure that those who deserve it are duly punished, while the others are duly rewarded. For this reason, the possibility of a successfully unjust life could never be more than a theoretical or fleeting one. According to the Traditional View, the gods themselves act as the guarantors of the ultimate profitability of justice by ensuring that the just individual prospers while the unjust individual flounders.

otherwise. Whatever one thinks about Prichard's own view, he forcefully articulates a major difference between our contemporary moral intuitions, which clearly allow that the right or just action can (and frequently does) come apart from our self-interest, and the moral thought of Plato and those who followed him. As this passage reveals, Hesiod and the other pre-Socratic moral thinkers are in a way more modern than Plato, precisely because they can see the conflict between the demands of ethics and those of our own prospering.

²⁷ As I understand the poem, this line helps to explain the imperative addressed to Zeus in the proem. The poet thinks the world is currently inhospitable to the good and just individual, although he is confident that this will change sooner rather than later. We should understand the imperative in line 9 as inviting Zeus to set the world in order so that it is hospitable to the just individual.

1.2 Transition to the 5th Century

Before we move into the 5th century, two relevant facts must be noted about the period between the composition of WD and the emergence of the sophists. The first is that Hesiod became a very important figure in the Greek cultural inheritance. WD achieved a canonical status, especially regarding matters of politics and social justice, and exerted a huge influence on later Greek thought. Second, critical speculation about the gods took off in the late 6th century. By the second half of the 5th century, when the sophists thrived, many intellectuals had come to doubt the existence of interventionist gods and some were likely closeted atheists. These two facts resulted in some tension for the Traditional View. On the one hand, the increased prestige that Hesiod enjoyed made his view a very powerful and respected one. On the other hand, the new skepticism about the existence of the gods made it hard to accept certain central theses of the Traditional View.

Poetry occupied an extremely important position not only in the everyday life of the 5th century Greeks, but also in their formal education as well. Homer and Hesiod were by far the most important poets and much of Classical Greek education would have been based on their poetry. Plato explains their authority as teachers like this: “Some people say that poets know all the crafts, all human affairs concerned with virtue and vice, and about the gods as well” (*Rep.* 598d-e).²⁸ Although Plato is not always fair to his predecessors, he seems to be basically correct here. Regarding virtue and vice, Aristotle

²⁸ Translations of Plato follow Cooper (1997), sometimes silently revised by my hand.

reports the view that in poetry people are depicted “as they ought to be” (*Poetics*, 1460b33). For this reason, poems were used as educational models for the young. In the eponymously named dialogue, Protagoras stresses that poetry is an important part of education both for children and the more intellectually advanced.²⁹ About the young he says, “they are given the works of good poets to read at their desks and have to learn them by heart...so that the child is inspired to imitate them and become like them” (*Prt.* 325e-326a). Authors other than Plato make much the same point.³⁰ And regarding Greek religion, it is sufficient to mention Herodotus’ famous statement to show how authoritative the work of Homer and Hesiod was (*Histories* II,53): “They are the makers of a theogony for the Greeks, and they gave to the gods their several epithets, and they divided their honors and arts.” Thus there is ample reason to think that Hesiod – second only to Homer of all the poets – exerted a huge influence on 5th century culture.

Yet as recent scholarship has shown, Hesiod was substantially more influential than Homer on a number of topics, particularly in matters to do with political justice and the ‘soft’ social virtues, such as temperance and generosity. A number of later political and moral thinkers were heavily indebted to Hesiod’s poems. Chief among them is Solon.³¹ The verbal and thematic continuity between the two is undeniable, and it is all but certain that the Athenian reformer was drawing on the Traditional View of the WD when he

²⁹ This very likely reflected the historical Protagoras’ own practice. For decades now, Paul Woodruff has been working on the historical Protagoras within Plato’s dialogues and he persuasively argues that the sophist in fact used poetry as a didactic device. On this particular topic, I have profited from hearing his (yet unpublished) “Why Did Protagoras use Poetry in Education?” at the 7th Annual Toronto Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, 2015.

³⁰ See, for example, Xenophon’s *Symposium*, III, 5.

³¹ See, for example, Havelock’s section in *The Greek Concept of Justice* (1978, 256-8) called “Solon and Hesiod.” Hugh Lloyd-Jones notices the similarities as well in his *The Justice of Zeus* (1971, 44), where he says, “there is no point in trying to distinguish a Hesiodic Dike...and a Solonian Dike.”

wrote about political justice. As Hugo Koning notes, through Solon and various 5th century authors Hesiod was “reborn as an authority on polis-bound justice” (2010, 175). This was surely due to the fact that *Works and Days* and *Theogony* were believed to contain better advice regarding the administration of cities than Homer’s poems. The *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* offers a convincing demonstration of this.³² In this text, the two poets compete with one another in a contest of wits and then a poetic recital. Despite the fact that the audience thought that Homer was the superior poet, the king judging the contest gave the award to his competitor believing that Hesiod’s recital promoted peace and prosperity and had salutary effects on society. The general influence and prominence that Hesiod had in matters to do with the *polis* and the social virtues make him the most important poet for understanding the later sophistic discussions about justice.

Turning now to the second point, we have evidence indicating that numerous intellectually inclined Greeks became unable to trust in the existence of helpfully interventionist gods, and even some evidence suggesting that a few were outright atheists in the 5th century. By the end of the 6th century, philosophers had started to reject the gods of Homer and Hesiod. Xenophanes famously rebuked the poets’ gods as anthropomorphic and highly immoral (DK21, B11, and B15). These criticisms raised the implicit question (it would be made explicit soon) of why we should trust immoral gods to fairly distribute rewards for just behavior and punishments for unjust behavior? We do

³² This little-known text can be found in West’s Loeb edition *Homeric Hymns, Homeric Apocrypha, Lives of Homer* (2003), from which I quote. Due to a reference to the Roman Emperor Hadrian, the transmitted text was surely composed in the 2nd century AD. In 1870, though, Friedrich Nietzsche argued on the basis of two verses of the larger work in which *The Contest* is found that our text derived (at least in large part) from Alcidas’ 4th century work, the *Mouseion*, and that the contents of the story may have been centuries older still. Two papyri discovered later substantiate Nietzsche’s suggestion, so we may fairly use this text as a resource for understanding the Classical Period.

not know what Xenophanes would have answered to this question, but we can say that he appeared to waver between believing there to be only one god – totally un-human and probably unconcerned with humanity – and advancing the skeptical view that we cannot know about the god(s) at all.³³

Bolstered by the advent of atomism, this skeptical train of thought gained momentum in the 5th century.³⁴ Traditionally, the gods played a fundamental role in creation-myths describing the origin of the universe. Yet the rise of scientific theories in the 5th century challenged the idea that the gods were required for satisfactory explanations of the world. These developments led to some radical 5th century views, which interestingly came in two broad types, corresponding rather neatly to the two positions Xenophanes seemed to waver between. Some thinkers advanced the skeptical view that humans are unable to know about the gods, the most famous being Protagoras. He notoriously said, “about the gods I am not able to know, neither that they exist nor that they do not exist, nor what sort of form they take” (DK80, B4). Others apparently maintained that the gods exist, but that they care little for humans or their affairs. The historical Thrasymachus is reported to

³³ B23 is our evidence that Xenophanes thought there was only one god: “There is one god (θεός), greatest among gods (θεοῖσι) and men, in no way similar in form to men nor in thought.” The monotheism of this fragment likely derives from several sources. First, the pre-Socratics were often concerned to identify the first principle (ἀρχή) of the material world. Because this *archē* was thought to be everlasting and the source of the material world, it was often associated with the concept of the divine. (For an accessible discussion of this feature of the pre-Socratic thought, see Broadie (1999)). If Xenophanes was following in the footsteps of his pre-Socratic predecessors, then his monotheism may have developed, in part, from their own search for the *archē*. Second, as Kirk, Raven, and Schofield have perceptively noticed (1991, 169-70), Xenophanes’ god is the complete antithesis of the gods described by Homer and Hesiod. His positive account of the god may, then, have been motivated by his criticisms of the poets. B34 is the evidence for thinking that Xenophanes harbored serious doubts regarding the possibility of knowing about the gods at all: “No man has seen the clear truth, nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods or everything about which I speak...Seeming is found over everything.”

³⁴ For an old but insightful discussion of the atomists and their gods (or lack thereof), see Vlastos (1995, 381-408). To Vlastos’ observations, I would only add that Democritus never mentions piety as a genuine virtue in the extant fragments.

have said that, “the gods do not see the affairs of men. For they have not noticed the greatest of the goods for men – justice” (DK85, B8). Finally, we should note the real possibility that some intellectual figures were outright atheists. We know that Prodicus offered a genealogical account of how men came to believe in the Olympian gods according to which pre-historic humans deified the helpful features and people of their world (DK84, B5).³⁵ The deified individuals were originally mere mortals on Prodicus’ view, which strongly suggests that he offered an account of how people came to believe in the gods that implicitly denied their existence.³⁶

We saw in the previous section that the full justification of the Traditional View depends on the existence of interventionist gods who reward just citizens and cities while punishing unjust individuals and communities. Although the increasing cultural relevance of Hesiod made his view an important and influential one, it was not immune to criticism. At some point in the 5th century, a few astute critics started to ask themselves: if the gods can no longer be trusted to intervene on behalf of justice, might it not be profitable for me to practice injustice instead?

2 - The Challenge to Justice

2.1 “The Sisyphus Fragment” (SF)

³⁵ Our information about Prodicus’ account of the Greeks’ belief in the gods comes mainly from Philodemus’ *On Piety*. Unfortunately, *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker* does not contain all of the relevant testimonia and context, but the evidence has been collected and translated in Mayhew (2012). The evidence suggests that Prodicus held a theory according to which the Greeks came to believe in the existence of the gods by deifying certain features and individuals and of their primitive environment. If this is right, Prodicus could not have believed in the literal existence of the traditional gods. It is possible that he rejected the existence of the traditional gods but nevertheless believed in a deity of sorts, although this seems unlikely to me. On this see Richard Bett’s helpful discussion in “Language, Gods and Virtue”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (2013), 279-311.

³⁶ Although the point is somewhat controversial, Mayhew (2011) and Bett (2013) conclude that the balance of evidence supports the attribution of atheism to Prodicus.

SF is a 42-line fragment in verse, originating from a play written in the second half of the 5th century, quite possibly a satyr-play.³⁷ In it the speaker outlines a two-stage historical development that freed humanity from their frightful and disorderly natural condition. First, humankind (ἄνθρωποι, somehow acting as a group) created laws and instituted punishments in an attempt to prevent those beholden to them from wronging one another. Laws alone, however, could not prevent all acts of wrongdoing, because many continued to break the laws and harm others in secret. So, secondly, the belief in an omnipresent deity was manufactured and perpetuated to prevent secret crimes. Remarkably, the belief in the gods is explicitly said to have been produced by a ‘false account’ (ψευδεῖ λόγῳ). Given that the belief in the gods is said to be perpetuated by a lie and nothing else in the text indicates that the gods might exist, SF appears to be openly and unapologetically atheistic.

The fragment starts by offering a brief description of an original, brutish condition (1-4):

ἦν χρόνος ὅτ’ ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
καὶ θηριώδης ἰσχύος θ’ ὑπηρέτης,
ὅτ’ οὐδὲν ἄθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν
οὔτ’ αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίγνετο.

There was a time when the life of humans was
Disordered – both beastly and the servant of strength.
Back then there was neither a prize for the good
Nor again punishment forthcoming for the wicked.

Next, it reports humankind’s first attempt to escape the wild struggle for existence (5-8):

³⁷ Unfortunately, it is impossible to know who wrote our text or what larger work it came from. The debate over the author of the fragment began in antiquity, with it variously being attributed to the Athenian politician Critias and the tragedian Euripides. Scholars today continue to debate the issue. Dana Sutton (1981) argues that Critias is the author, Albrecht Dihle (1977) argues that it was Euripides, and recently David Sedley (2013) has suggested that the text was written and produced anonymously and subsequently attributed, erroneously, to Critias or Euripides.

κάπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους
θέσθαι κολαστάς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ᾗ <.....>
τὴν θ' ὕβριν δούλην ἔχῃ·
ἐζημιούτο δ' εἴ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.

And thereafter it seems to me that people set up
Laws as punishers, so that *Dikē* would be tyrant
And would have *Hubris* as a slave.
And they were punished if someone did wrong.

These eight lines remind us of a number of features from Hesiod's WD and can plausibly be understood as a commentary on the Traditional View.³⁸ A number of scholars have noted that the discussion of *dikē* holding *hubris* as her slave appears to allude to WD, which faithfully maintains that *dikē* will eventually triumph over *hubris* (190-1, 213-8, 238-9).³⁹ Although Hesiod focused on the External Goods won from just behavior, I argued above that he also offered living peacefully with justice as a good as well, regardless of the divine gifts won through just behavior. In SF we are offered a vivid account of why peaceful life is so valuable. Without justice, life is a disorderly, costly crucible of strength. It is no surprise that the *Urmenschen* of SF wanted out or that they tried to escape by establishing laws, for in WD the justice backed by Zeus' law distinguished humans from the animals. In both texts, then, it is *nomos* that is intended to bring it about that human affairs are governed by *dikē*. Moreover, in both texts living with *dikē* must include not just following the laws but also treating others fairly and appropriately.⁴⁰ Finally, one should note that, according to SF, life in this pre-*nomie* state

³⁸ I do not mean that SF must have been responding directly to WD. It may have been responding to some other 5th century work itself influenced by Hesiod and now lost to us or, alternatively, to widespread ideas ultimately inherited from Hesiod's influence.

³⁹ See, for example, the commentary on SF in Gagarin and Woodruff (1995, 261).

⁴⁰ I have already offered considerations for why this must be the case in WD. Turning to SF, note that the condition of humankind governed by justice is meant to contrast with the early state characterized not only by a lack of punishments but also by a lack of prizes for good behavior. No doubt an effective legal system should punish crimes, but the mention of prizes for good

is beastly (θηριώδης) and governed by (βία). This is a rather remarkable echo of the important Hesiodic passage discussed earlier, which contrasts men with the beasts (θηρσί) which lack justice and systematically practice violence (βίης, 274-80). The opening of SF thus appears to be a sort of enlightened criticism or correction of WD. Our text implies that humans were very much like the animals in the beginning and it goes on to suggest that they attempted to invent justice by their own initiative.⁴¹

Unfortunately, the creation of laws was not enough to solve all of humanity's problems (9-15):

ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τὰμφανῇ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
ἀπεῖργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βία,
λάθρα δ' ἔπρασσον, τηνικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
<.....> πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς ἀνὴρ
≤θεῶν≥ δέος θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρεῖν, ὅπως
εἴη τι δεῖμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, κἂν λάθρα
πράσσωσιν ἢ λέγωσιν ἢ φρονῶσί ≤τι≥.

Then, since the laws kept them from openly
Accomplishing wicked deeds by force but people
Continued to accomplish them in secret – it was at this
Point, it seems to me, that some clever and wise man
Invented the fear of the gods for mortals so that there
Would be some fearful prospect for the bad people
Even if they did or said or thought something in secret.

Laws alone only prevented our ancestors from wronging one another in plain sight; at least some of them continued to practice injustice and break the laws in secret. Therefore,

individuals plausibly takes us outside of mere legal system into considerations of fairness or appropriate distribution of honors and goods. I take it that the appropriate distribution of honors and goods is a normative question and not merely a legal one.

⁴¹ This enlightened correction derives from the sophistic practice of investigating social institutions by studying their historical developments, a practice influenced by the pre-Socratic's search for the *archē* of the universe. The sophists attempted to search for the original principle of social institutions and they assumed, as the pre-Socratic did, too, that discovering this principle would provide some fundamental insight into the subject investigated. For a discussion of the sophists as historical 'social scientists', see Bett (2002, 254-8).

a further and more robust deterrent was required to prevent this covert, unjust behavior. For this reason, some ‘clever and wise’ man (NB: not humankind itself, this time, but some individual) instituted the fear of the gods.⁴² It also implies that the belief in the gods operated as a deterrent by convincing the citizens that secret wrongdoing was to be punished as consistently as open criminal behavior. This is clear from the mention of ‘fear’ and ‘fearful prospect’ in the quote above. Recall that the laws were earlier called ‘punishers.’ They operated to prevent acts of open lawlessness through the fear of imminent retribution that they promised. We should understand that the fiction of omnipresent gods allowed the ‘clever and wise’ inventor to extend the threat of retribution beyond the limited scope of the laws to all spheres of life. The belief in gods thus served as a projection of the deterrence of the human-made laws onto a cosmic scale.

This is important because it brings out the extent to which the position in our text differs from the position found in Hesiod. By implying that the gods are a sort of functional extension of the laws, SF sets the Traditional View of Justice on its head. Zeus did not give law to humankind; rather, humankind invented the gods to make their own laws more effective. This shows that SF rejects what I have called the first thesis of the Traditional View, namely that Zeus gave justice to human beings. By implication, SF

⁴² The text reveals that the gods were invented so as to be believed not only to see and hear everything, but also to know the individual’s thoughts as well. That the text specifically mentions thought is noteworthy. Why was it necessary to police the thoughts of people as well as their actions? Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, the text may be presupposing that having certain thoughts can itself constitute a violation of justice. Alternatively, the power to recognize thoughts may have been attributed to the gods in order to nip the real problem at the bud. On the assumption that thoughts often result in actions, the inventor may have hoped to prevent unjust actions by policing one of their principal causes. I don’t know which possibility is correct, but it is worth pointing out that if the text implies that having certain thoughts constitutes a violation of justice, then justice extends beyond the scope of the laws.

rejects the second thesis as well. No god rewards the just or punishes the unjust – only people do that.

It is clear from the rest of this short text that the ‘clever and wise’ man’s intervention was ultimately successful. The text later calls his words “the sweetest of lessons” (25) and the penultimate lines of the fragment announce that this man “quenched lawlessness with laws” (40). The two-stage development initiated by the establishment of laws and later extended through the fiction of divine retribution did the trick: people’s life became tolerably ordered and governed by *dikē*. We must ask what this all means.

Until recently, scholars generally argued that SF was a wholly subversive text endorsing a sort of irreligious hedonism. About 20 years ago, Charles Kahn gave voice to this view when he said that SF “is the most extreme expression of this atmosphere of moral cynicism, documented in the Antiphon fragments and caricatured in the *Clouds*” (1997, 259). On Kahn’s interpretation, we are to understand SF’s rediscovery of godlessness as justifying the most wicked and self-interested behavior. Once the oversight of the gods had been done away with, nothing remained to prevent anyone from secretly satisfying their wildest whims. The laws are no more than hurdles to one’s own satisfaction, to be surmounted or swept aside whenever possible. Since the gods don’t exist, everything is permitted.

Several newer scholarly treatments, however, have attempted to save the fragment from such an interpretation, which their authors regard as too cynical. Patrick O’Sullivan (2012) and Klaus Hoffmann (1997) both stress the many crucial functions that the laws and the belief in the gods serve in SF. Our text implies, for example, that it is only because of the establishment of the laws and the fear of the gods that our ancestors were

able to overcome their original brutish condition. This is surely a good thing, not least of all because those ancestors were said to institute laws so that *dikē* would rule as a tyrant and so that they could escape their animal existence. Moreover, the text calls the man who first invented the fear of gods ‘clever and wise,’ which certainly sounds like high praise. Why would the author praise this man if he did not recognize his intervention as good or beneficial in at least some important respect? These authors invite us to see his false account not as pernicious perjury, but as fanciful fibbing, which, like Plato’s noble lie, ultimately makes society a better place. According to O’Sullivan and Hoffman, then, SF endorses and supports the laws and the fictional account of the gods that make a life of justice possible.

Both views get something right. As we will see, SF has clear and demonstrable affinities with Antiphon’s fragments and the *Clouds*. More importantly, the atheism advanced in our text does seem to me to make viable the possibility of profitably practicing injustice. It is also true, though, that the character speaking in this fragment clearly recognizes the importance of the laws and the fear of gods for the optimal functioning of society, and I can see no reason to doubt that the author’s praise of the ‘clever and wise’ man is genuine. Is there a way to accommodate both these insights? In the previous paragraph, I noted that our ancestors wanted to escape their disorderly natural condition. Presumably, they wanted out because they thought that living in an orderly society would have been better or more profitable for them, and indeed the text bears this presumption out. Extinguishing lawless behavior is later called ‘noble’ and the language used clearly points to this being a good thing (39-40). Nevertheless, even after the laws were first instituted, our text indicates that some people continued to practice

injustice in secret (11). Why? We should understand this passage to indicate that although people wanted to live in an orderly society, some hoped to derive extra advantages and goods by stealing from, assaulting, or wronging others. True, these pre-historical humans did not want to live in anarchy and preferred to live in a world governed by justice and fair dealing; yet some preferred even more a world where others were fair and just, but where they could get the better of their neighbors through secretly practicing injustice.⁴³

Unfortunately, this preference was not a realistic one for the early humans of SF. One cannot pilfer another's cake and expect to eat it in peace, too. Enough wrongdoing continued to be perpetrated even after the establishment of the laws to make an orderly life impossible. Before order could be established, citizens needed to be convinced that every injustice, whether open or hidden, would inevitably be punished. This explains why the false account of the gods was introduced. It also shows that the laws and belief in the gods play a vital role in the maintenance of society and a generally tolerable existence for all.

But we should ask how much secret wrong-doing must have been perpetuated after the introduction of laws to make life so intolerable that the skies needed to come alive. If the answer is (as one suspects) a fair bit, then the text leaves open the possibility that

⁴³ This makes the SF look like an important precursor to Glaucon's contractarian account of justice (*Rep.* 358e-359b). According to Glaucon, the laws were instituted because no one wanted to live in a condition where everyone harmed one another. These people settled for a condition in which no one harms anyone, although they would (or rationally, should) prefer a state where no one harms them but they may harm others. One notable difference between these two texts is that people become attached to the idea of lawfulness and fairness in the *Republic*. (On this, see the important article of John Cooper's (2013, 629-51), who, developing a suggestion of Michael Frede's, shows that in Glaucon's account of justice, law and equality become revered by all.) I find no indication of this reverence in SF. This difference aside, however, the similarities with Glaucon's account are remarkable, and they suggest to me that what the people sought after in SF when they broke the laws were, as in the case of the *Republic*, External Goods. It is money and property that can be stolen or taken when breaking the laws in secret. So perhaps SF accepts the fourth thesis of the Traditional View, although this must remain a speculative suggestion.

some amount of secret injustice could be perpetrated without reducing society to an intolerably disorderly condition. Of course, the wrongdoing would have to be localized to a smaller segment of the population than it was when only the laws served as deterrents; but still, a select few could get away with it. The few people who discovered (or learned from SF) that the gods were mere fictions would be the ideal population to practice this sort of selective injustice. Those who appreciated the text's lessons would know that there would be no divine punishment for any covert criminal behavior, but they would also know that they must be careful and selective about breaking the laws since too much injustice threatened disaster for all. These enlightened few could plausibly achieve what, according to the subtle suggestions of the text, so many hoped to achieve. They could enjoy the stability of an ordered society while at the same time taking advantage of others.

I admit that this last set of reflections goes beyond the text of SF. The fragment nowhere says that a select few can or should practice injustice. Nonetheless, it should be clear from the preceding that the text is compatible with such an interpretation and, even if it does not require it, perhaps winks at it. This is why an earlier generation of scholars concluded that implicit in SF was a denunciation of conventional justice and a corresponding glorification of the ruthless pursuit of one's own self-interest. Further evidence for this suggestion comes from a recent article written by David Sedley, which persuasively argues that SF is representative of the genuine atheistic movement in 5th century Athens alluded to in Plato's *Laws*. He writes, "The bracketing of gods and the norms of justice suggests that the underlying idea of the Sisyphus fragment is owned by the atheist authorities cited in *Laws* 10: religion, like justice, is a political fiction, aimed

at cajoling the population at large into law-abiding behaviour” (2013, 344). This is an important insight because in the *Laws* we get a much fuller account of the views and commitments of the members of this atheistic movement. According to the Athenian Stranger, these atheists maintained that the naturally correct way to live one’s life is to reject the authority of the laws and to dominate others (890a). If our text was associated with this movement, we can see how these views and commitments might find expression in the text of SF. Those who understood that the belief in the gods was a political fiction could escape legal enslavement by selectively breaking the laws and taking advantage of others in the process.

One cannot establish beyond all doubt that the SF implicitly endorses the practice, where desirable, of breaking the laws and practicing injustice in secret, but I do maintain that the balance of evidence favors this interpretation. If this is correct, we can ask the all-important questions: does the author of SF (or perhaps the speaker represented as speaking it) consider justice to be beneficial and what is his all-things-considered attitude towards justice? The answer is not as straightforward as the answer we find in Hesiod. The text of SF suggests, naturally enough, that humans need to live in an orderly and relatively peaceful society. To the extent that individuals must themselves be just in order to secure this end, practicing justice is certainly beneficial. Otherwise, society and those within it are ‘punished’ with the plague of disorder. So there is a sort of superficial agreement with Hesiod and the third thesis of the Traditional View: in at least one important respect, justice is beneficial to the just individual. But this superficial agreement masks a deeper, rather profound point of disagreement. Because the individuals in SF are themselves neither punished nor rewarded for any of their behavior

by the gods, a few savvy individuals could profitably be unjust by breaking the laws and taking advantage of others in secret. To those few, selectively unjust behavior would be more profitable than scrupulously just behavior. At those times when they would surely be punished for their wrongdoing or when they might threaten adverse effects on society, these few would be just. At other times, however, being unjust would be the most prudent and profitable course of action.

I conclude, then, that the balance of evidence suggests that SF considers intelligent injustice to be the most profitable and prudent course of action while admitting that this is not a possibility available to most people. Thus, the text rejects the fifth thesis. By denying that justice is ultimately prudent, SF, once again, turns the Traditional View on its head.

2.2 “*On Truth*” (OT)

OT is a philosophical work written by the sophist Antiphon.⁴⁴ The longest fragment preserved from OT is known as fragment B44, after its position in Diels-Kranz. In it, we find the most sophisticated and explicit attack on the conventional understanding of justice preserved from the 5th century. As I understand the fragment, Antiphon offers two

⁴⁴ It is unclear whether the author of OT was the same person as the Athenian politician and oligarch also named Antiphon. The debate over whether the sophist and the politician were the same person (or two people with the same name) began in antiquity and has become rather vigorous in contemporary scholarship. Gerard Pendrick is the champion of the separatist camp, arguing that the sophist named Antiphon was a different Antiphon than the famous orator and politician. Beyond his excellent edition of the fragments (2010), see his (1987) and (1993). For an articulation of the opposing view, see Michael Gagarin’s (1990) and his (2002), and also Harry Avery (1982). See also Paul Woodruff’s review of the Pendrick-Gagarin debate (2004). The evidence we have perhaps slightly favors the unitarian position, but my discussion is mostly limited to one fragment, which is universally agreed to have been written by the sophist. I therefore make no assumptions about the relationship between the sophist and the orator.

different yet mutually reinforcing challenges. First, in 44(a), Antiphon argues that following justice is not always in one's true interest.⁴⁵ Second, in 44(c), he argues that in addition to its lack of utility for the self-interested agent, the conventional understanding of justice is theoretically unstable. Antiphon is explicit that it is most advantageous for an individual to practice selective and intelligent injustice. To this extent, OT endorses the practice of opportunistic intelligent injustice.

The text of 44(a) becomes legible at a point where Antiphon offers a statement about the nature of justice (I.5-11):

... Δικα[ι]οσ[ύ]νη [δ' οὐ]ν τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα [ἐν
ἧ] ἂν πολι[τε]ύηται τις μὴ [παρ]αβαίνειν

...Justice, then, is to not transgress the laws of
whichever city in which one is a citizen.

It is important to note that '*nomima*' here means not only the written law but also the norms and conventions governing appropriate and proper behavior.⁴⁶ Thus, the opening characterization of justice is very similar to the accounts discussed earlier in this chapter.⁴⁷ To be just is to follow the written laws and to treat others appropriately as well.

⁴⁵ This particular fragment was discovered on three pieces of papyrus in the early part of the 20th century. The papyri are often corrupt and there are many lacunae. Because of the difficult state of the text, I follow rather closely the recent edition of the fragments edited by Pendrick (2010), although I freely alter his translation where I think it appropriate or expedient. I also follow his helpful division of the text and adopt his reference scheme of 44(a), 44(b) and 44(c).

⁴⁶ Later in 44(a) Antiphon mentions treating one's parents well (even if they have treated you poorly) as a requirement of the *nomima*. This was not a strict legal requirement, but a traditional custom or convention dictating how children should behave towards their progenitors. Presumably, other traditions or customs would have been included in the *nomima* as well, for which reason we must understand them to include not only laws but customs or conventions as well. So Pendrick (2002, 319) in his commentary: "The expressions οἱ νόμοι, τὰ νόμιμα, and τὰ τῶν νόμων – which are used interchangeably throughout F44(a) – must be taken in a broad sense, as referring to written laws as well as to customs, conventions and unwritten norms of conduct."

⁴⁷ If Antiphon is employing essentially the same concept as Hesiod and the author of SF why does he use the word '*dikaioṣunē*' rather than '*dikē*'? And why does *dikaioṣunē* become the preferred word for later authors such as Plato and Aristotle more generally? I am not yet sure, although this is a question that is worth studying in more detail. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I

This is the justice that Antiphon criticizes in our fragment. In 44(a) he offers two separate arguments to prove that it is not inevitably profitable to obey the laws and conventions of the city – or, in other words, to be just. His first complaint is that the *nomima* often force us to do things that are contrary to our nature, and therefore, contrary to our ultimate well-being as well. His second complaint is that the *nomima* also fail to protect us from the harm and injury we might receive from others. In short, justice demands that we frequently forgo the pursuit of our own self-interest for the sake of others, yet it is unable to stop others from harming us in the pursuit of their own prospering.

To see why following the laws, norms, and conventions (hereafter just laws) can be detrimental to our interests, we must note the sharp distinction Antiphon draws between nature and convention. He insists that our nature as human beings, including what profits us and leads to our prospering, is both fixed and inescapable, while the laws and other social institutions are a creation of convention, neither fixed nor necessary: “For the laws are imposed, but the things of nature are necessary; and the laws are not born but agreed upon, whereas nature is not agreed upon but born” (I.23-II.1). Natural things exist spontaneously and are necessarily constituted as they are. Yet because the laws were produced through agreements made at some point in the past, they are neither necessary

don't think the answer matters much because we have good evidence that the words could be used more or less interchangeably. Certainly, later authors writings about *dikaiosunē* could reference people who earlier spoke about *dikē* as treating essentially the same subject. I have already cited one instance of this phenomenon in footnote 4 – Plato quotes one of Hesiod's passage about *dikē* in his *Republic*. Perhaps a more telling example is Protagoras, who, in the Platonic dialogue named after him, starts by mentioning *dikē* in the mythological section of his presentation and then switches over to *dikaiosunē* in the argumentative without any indication that these virtue terms differed in any way (322c7-d1 and then 323b2). The terms, then, can be used more or less interchangeably.

nor fixed. Humans might have never convened to produce laws at all, or they could have produced substantially different ones.⁴⁸

Already we can see some interesting connections between the theoretical presuppositions of OT and the line of thought presented in SF. Up to this point in the text, Antiphon is telling us a version of the same historical development outlined in the opening lines of our satyr-play. Once upon a time, a group of our ancestors came together and created laws in order to regulate the behavior of the people living in their community...⁴⁹ This account of the development of the laws presupposed by Antiphon is crucially important for his view, since he explicitly defines justice as not transgressing these laws. As in SF, Antiphon implies that justice itself was established with the creation of laws.⁵⁰ He is, then, also like SF, implicitly rejecting the first thesis of the Traditional View; it was not Zeus who gave humanity law and justice but humans themselves. Unlike SF, however, OT expresses many reservations about humanity's self-legislated *nomima*.

In fact, Antiphon is clear that he is pursuing his investigation in OT because he has found most of the laws hostile to our nature as human beings (II.23-30):

Ἦσσι δὲ πάντων ἔνεκα τούτων ἡ σκέψις, ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ
τῶν κατὰ νόμον δικαίων πολεμίως τῇ φύσ[ει] κεῖται.

This investigation is for the sake of all this: that the majority
of what is just according to the law is hostile to our nature.⁵¹

⁴⁸ In 44(b), Antiphon shows awareness of the Herodotean insight that different peoples had wildly different laws and customs. He had the resources to realize that his own laws and customs could have developed differently than they did.

⁴⁹ For a survey of the evidence regarding ancient social contract theories, including further evidence that Antiphon subscribed to this position, see Kahn (1981).

⁵⁰ See the similar account voiced by Glaucon: "They began to make laws and covenants, and what the law commands they call lawful and just. This, they say, is the origin and essence of justice" (359a).

⁵¹ The majority of commentators agree that 'nature' in this passage refers to human nature. Kerferd (1957) was the first to argue for this position and he was followed by Furley (1981), who felt Kerferd's earlier view had not been appreciated as it should have been. Most now accept that

Antiphon later gives examples of hostile *nomima* and then proceeds to explain in what way they are hostile to us: “For there is present in these things more pain when less is possible; less pleasure, when more is possible; and suffering, when it is possible not to suffer” (V17.24). It is because the laws frequently require us to forgo pleasure or submit to suffering that they are hostile to our nature. Antiphon assumes throughout his work that pleasure is naturally good for us and pain naturally bad.⁵² This does not commit Antiphon to thinking that pleasure is the *only* good (although a number of commentators have labeled him a hedonist).⁵³ The evidence we possess suggests that Antiphon acknowledges goods others than pleasure, and that he probably accepted the standard gambit of External Goods, including wealth, property, and even honors.⁵⁴ In any case, Antiphon concludes that the laws and customs of society are often hostile to our nature because they require individuals to take less pleasurable courses of action and to suffer

human nature is meant here, including those who are otherwise unsympathetic to Kerferd’s interpretation of Antiphon. e.g., Riesbeck (2011).

⁵² As do his other fragments. In F49 – the largest fragment preserved from Antiphon’s other philosophic work, *On Concord* – Antiphon shows himself to be somewhat preoccupied with pleasure. Within ten lines he mentions ‘pleasure’, ‘pleasant’, or ‘sweeter’ six times.

⁵³ Nill (1985, 106.n29), in an otherwise admirable treatment, supposes Antiphon to be a hedonist.

⁵⁴ Other passages in 44(a) suggest that Antiphon valued freedom of movement as a good. In B49 and B54 honors, prizes, wealth, and possessions are named as goods. I do not deny that the freedom to move, possessing wealth, and acquiring honor can be or lead to pleasurable experiences. A hedonist could instrumentally value all these things and even call them genuinely good insofar as they contributed to the experience of pleasure, so nothing I have said here rules out the possibility that Antiphon was a hedonist. There are however other reasons to resist attributing hedonism to Antiphon. For one, we have no evidence that any 5th century figure took the important step of distinguishing one ultimate source of value from which other goods acquired derivative value. This appears to have been a 4th century development, probably first explicitly accomplished by Plato in *Philebus*. We should not superimpose this sophisticated philosophic structure onto Antiphon. Given that he implies pleasure is a good and calls things such as wealth and possessions goods too, we should instead assume that he understood each of these things to be good and valuable. Of course, Antiphon may have believed that pleasure was a greater or more important good than all the others – just as I value my best friend more than my other friends. It obviously would not follow from this that wealth and honors derive their value from pleasure, any more than most of my friends derive their value from the value my best friend has to me.

more than they otherwise might. This unfortunate fact about the laws is meant to produce the inference in self-interested individuals that scrupulously following the laws and being just is not the best way to promote their own prospering.

At the end of this fragment, Antiphon appears to anticipate a possible objection that would block the above inference. The objection is the following: even granting that following the laws sometimes requires individuals to adopt courses of actions that do not immediately benefit them, it is ultimately more profitable for self-interested individuals to respect the laws than not. This is because the laws demand that *everyone* refrain from wronging others and, therefore, they protect every self-interested individual from suffering at the hands of other.

Although this is an initially compelling and intuitive attempt to promote respect for the laws, Antiphon will have none of it. He thinks it is obvious that the laws are impotent and cannot be trusted to consistently protect their subjects from others (V.25-VI.9):

εἰ μὲν οὖν τις [τ]οῖς τοιαῦτα προ<σ>[ῖ]εμένοις
ἐπικού[ρ]ησις ἐγίγνε[το] παρὰ τῶν νό[μ]ων, τοῖς δὲ μὴ
[π]ρο<σ>ῖεμένοις, ἀλλ' [ἐ]ναντιουμέ[ν]οις, ἐλάττωσις,
οὐκ ἀν[ω]φελὲς ἂν ἦν τ[ο] τοῖς νόμοις πεί[θεσθαι· νῦν]
δὲ φαίνε[ται] τοῖς προσιεμ[έ]νοις τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ ἐκ νόμου
δίκαι[ον] οὐχ ἰκανὸν ἐπικουρεῖν.

So if the laws provided some protection for those submitting to these kinds of things,⁵⁵ and provided some loss for those who do not submit but resist, then to obey the laws would not be unprofitable. But now justice which derives from the law appears to be incapable of coming to the aid of those who submit to these kinds of things.

⁵⁵ 'τ]οῖς τοιαῦτα προ<σ>[ῖ]εμένοις' and 'τοῖς προσιεμ[έ]νοις τὰ τοιαῦτα' must refer to those people who submit either to the *nomima* or – what comes to much the same thing – the restraints imposed by the *nomima*. Thus Pendrik (2002, 344) in his commentary on this passage: “Most likely it means accept or submit to the laws.” And Nill (1985, 63): “Antiphon’s argument, then, requires that ‘such things’ refer to *nomos*-imposed restraints...”

The *nomima* alone, says Antiphon, are not the sort of things that can protect anyone from harm. They are merely written or unwritten laws, which on their own are totally impotent to prevent any sort of harmful action at all. Of course, the fear of punishments may (as in SF) prevent some people from breaking the laws, but Antiphon quickly points out that not everyone will fear the laws and, even if they do, this is not always sufficient to prevent wrongdoing. People can commit crimes in secret, and even when caught or accused, there is no guarantee they will be convicted or punished. Those with honeyed tongues may sweet-talk their way out of their bitter deserts. Thus, there is no guarantee that the laws will prevent others from harming any individual citizen and, because of this, the law does not deserve the full allegiance of a self-interested individual. By anticipating and responding to this objection Antiphon not only buttresses his earlier argument, but also presents another consideration against the utility of the laws. He shows that the laws do very little to prevent us from suffering at the hands of others. Together, these two complaints show how thoroughly problematic following justice can be for the self-interested agent.

All this suggests that Antiphon would reject the third and fifth theses of the Traditional View, or that justice is rewarded with External Goods and that the practice of justice is ultimately the prudent way to live. Indeed, he certainly did reject the third thesis and he nearly explicitly rejects the fifth as well (I.12-23):

χρῆτ' ἂν οὖν ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ
 συμφ[ε]ρόντως δικαιο[σ]ύνην εἰ μετὰ μὲν
 μαρτύρων τ[ο]ὺς νόμους μεγάλ[ο]υς ἄγοι·
 μονούμενος δὲ μαρτύρων, τὰ τῆς φύσεως.

Thus, a man would make use of justice most
 beneficially for himself if he considered the laws as
 great when in the presence of witnesses and the

things of nature [as great] when there are no witnesses.

Antiphon announces that someone would act most beneficially if they seriously considered breaking the laws in private but obeyed them in public. Strictly speaking, Antiphon here does not say an individual *should* do these things. As Jonathan Barnes (1979, 211-2) points out, the text was written: “as a statement of fact and not as a suggestion for action.”⁵⁶ This is true enough, but if Barnes also thought that Antiphon was content to leave his treatise merely as a statement of fact, and did not himself endorse these practices, he thought wrong.⁵⁷ It is quite unlikely that Antiphon would have stopped short of endorsing the practice of the behavior that he argued was most profitable. As I have indicated above, the whole fragment is oriented towards the way in which an individual might live most profitably. The sort of investigation conducted in 44(a) is not meant for detached, theoretical speculation; it is meant to influence the way we think and act.⁵⁸ The lines following this text suggest a practical orientation as well (II.3-10):

⁵⁶ Barnes (1979, 211-2)

⁵⁷ Barnes later raises the possibility that Antiphon’s text was intended to be read in just this way (1979, 408): “Perhaps he offered his observations with no practical recommendation in mind: his book, after all, is *On Truth*: it was not primarily a practical tract.” Below I offer considerations about why this possibility is quite unlikely, but I should point out here that there is no compelling reason to think that Antiphon himself named his own treatise ‘*On Truth*’. For a brief discussion of the name of this work see the introductory sections of Pendrick’s commentary (2002, 32-3).

⁵⁸ It is an unfortunately common interpretative strategy to assume that the sophists would offer theoretical considerations about practical questions without endorsing the corresponding practical course of action. I suspect that this sort of interpretation arises from a not-totally-unreasonable focus on the sophistic practice of *antilogikē*, or arguments on both sides. Like the skeptics after them, some sophists would offer arguments for and against a position. This practice could be used for skeptical or merely theoretical ends, but it need not be restricted to these purposes. One can offer arguments for and against the utility of a practice in order to determine its utility in a reasonable way. As we shall see in Chapter II, another group of sophists vigorously argued against those who challenged justice and tried to show that the just life is the profitable life. It is very difficult to understand why other 5th century authors were so concerned to defend the profitability of justice if no one had seriously maintained the contrary view. Therefore, when Antiphon announces that one will act most profitably if one does X, we should assume he endorses that practice of X, at least for those who are able to succeed in that practice.

τὰ οὖν νόμιμα παραβαίνων, ἐάν λάθῃ
τοὺς ὁμολογήσαντας καὶ αἰσχύνῃς
καὶ ζημίας ἀπήλλακται, μὴ λαθὼν δ' οὔ·

When a man transgresses the laws, then, he is free from
shame and punishment if he escapes the notice of those
who agreed on them; but if not, then he is not.

Avoiding shame and punishment are not topics of abstract theoretical reflection. They are matters of pressing practical concern for almost every person concerned to live a prospering life.

Note that a literal interpretation of this passage entails that an individual is free of all punishment and shame if their injustice escapes the notice of other members of their city. This is rather compelling evidence that Antiphon rejected the possibility of the gods intervening to punish violations of justice and, by implication, that he rejected the possibility of their rewarding just behavior as well. Antiphon, then, rejected the second thesis of the Traditional View, or that the gods reward individuals for their just behavior. Recall that in WD, the threat of divine punishment is what recommends avoiding the practice of injustice and that in SF it was taken for granted that some individuals would freely commit crimes and harm others if they were not stayed by the threat of legal or cosmic sanction. This is important. It shows that early ethical thinkers tended to assume that individual agents would pursue their own material self-interest and that they would harm others in this pursuit, if they could do so without suffering any harm in turn. The same, I suggest, is true for Antiphon, who was clearly a member of this early tradition. When he says that wrongdoers will be free from punishment and shame if they commit their crimes in secret, he is inviting his discerning readers to consider doing just this. He trusts, in other words, that they will hear the call to arms that Barnes has missed.

Antiphon rejects the third and fifth theses of the Traditional View. On his account,

behaving justly is frequently harmful to one's own interest and the prudent way to live one's life is to selectively and intelligently violate the *nomima* of one's *polis* – or to be selectively and intelligently unjust.

This view sounds radical and it surely is, but two further points must be made. First, Antiphon says only that one should *consider* (ἄγοι) the things of nature as great absent any witnesses.⁵⁹ This does not mean one should inevitably break the laws when in private or follow the laws in public, nor does Antiphon ever claim that following the laws is always hostile to our nature and true advantage. He says only that *most* (τὰ πολλὰ) of the laws are hostile to our nature. Presumably, he would have no reason to advise that anyone break benign laws, even if they could do so without being caught. Moreover, the reason it is best to avoid breaking the laws in public is that one will be punished or shamed by one's community if discovered – results that are obviously best avoided. It is not always possible to escape punishment or shame by committing a crime in secret, though. An investigation can reveal the perpetrator of a crime committed out of the public's gaze. Where one risks discovery, it may not be prudent to break the laws. Antiphon's point is not that we should break the laws of our city as much as possible, but that – as a general principle – we should think about what will ultimately be in our best interest, where this is understood in terms of what is beneficial to our nature.⁶⁰ In many cases, this may mean following the laws to avoid punishment.

⁵⁹ David Riesback has perceptively noted this fact (2011, 271): “To ‘consider great’ does not mean simply ‘to observe’ or ‘to obey.’ It means, rather, to attach a greater precedence...” In other words, we should weigh the natural things more heavily in our practical deliberations when we are alone. But they need not trump all other considerations.

⁶⁰ Interestingly, this leaves open the possibility that it may be prudent, at times, to break the laws and suffer the consequences if the crime is profitable enough to offset the disvalue of punishment. Antiphon does not develop this possibility in the text that we have (I doubt he did in its full form), but he should have recognized it as a live option.

To conclude our discussion of 44(a), let me return to the following passage:

εἰ μὲν οὖν τις [τ]οῖς τοιαῦτα προ<σ>[ῖ]εμένοις
ἐπικού[ρ]ησις ἐγίγνε[το] παρὰ τῶν νό[μ]ων, τοῖς δὲ μὴ
[π]ρο<σ>ῖεμένοις, ἀλλ' [ἐ]ναντιούμε[ν]οις, ἐλάττωσις,
οὐκ ἀν[ω]φελὲς ἂν ἦν τ[ο] τοῖς νόμοις πεί[θε]σθαι· νῦν]
δὲ φαίνεται τοῖς προσιεμ[έ]νοις τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ ἐ[κ] νόμου
δίκαι[ον] οὐχ ἰκανὸν ἐπικουρεῖν.

So if the laws provided some protection for those
submitting to these kinds of things, and provided some loss
for those who do not submit but resist, then to obey the laws
would not be unprofitable. But now justice which derives
from the law appears to be incapable of coming
to the aid of those who submit to these kinds of things.

Antiphon allows that it might be profitable and prudent to follow justice and obey the laws *if* the laws were able to protect their citizens and *if* those who broke the laws always suffered some loss. Since the laws do sometimes succeed in protecting individuals and since he must have known this, Antiphon presumably means that following justice would be profitable if the laws *always* protected citizens and if those who broke them *always* met with some punishment. This reveals that Antiphon is not concerned with what generally promotes the well-being of the individual, but what benefits the individual in every act and at every time. As Nill puts it, Antiphon is not a rule-egoist but an act-egoist.⁶¹ It is precisely because following the laws does not inevitably and invariably serve an individual's true interest that Antiphon suggests that rational, self-interested individuals should sometimes break them.

Antiphon's concession about the state of affairs under which it would be profitable to follow the laws is the mirror image of the concession Hesiod makes near the end of his own discussion of *dikē*. As we noted above, at WD 270-3 Hesiod admits that it

⁶¹ Nill (1984, 57-58).

would be better to practice injustice if doing so resulted in more good things and fewer bad things than did injustice, although he maintained that successful injustice was not a realistic possibility. Compare this to the passage currently under discussion. Antiphon admits that practicing justice could be profitable if the laws were powerful enough to prevent others from harming us but concludes that, since they cannot prevent this, selective and intelligent injustice is more profitable. Whether Antiphon was aware of his trick or not (and I happen to think he was), he has turned the Traditional View on its head and presents the opposite conclusion about how the self-interested individual should engage with their society's laws. This shows how far we have come from Hesiod's world of Zeus-enforced justice; and yet, at the same time, it indicates that Antiphon was reacting to Hesiod and still very much part of his inheritance.

Lack of space prevents me from discussing 44(c) in detail, but in this fragment Antiphon extends his critique of conventional justice and argues that the justice discussed in 44(a) is theoretically incoherent. In a rather 'Socratic' argument, Antiphon demonstrates that (what are assumed to be) two distinct yet legitimate principles of justice can demand of an agent that they both ϕ and $\sim\phi$. Assuming that no acceptable understanding of justice can tolerate these conflicting demands, Antiphon infers that, of the two principles, "it is necessary that either one of them be just, or that both be unjust" (II.22-5). Absolutely no help is given within the fragment for deciding between these two principles of justice or resolving the practical contradiction in which they result for the agent. Instead, the reader appears to be left in *aporia*! What's worse, at the end of the fragment, Antiphon shows that the conflict produced by the incompatible principles of justice is ubiquitous: it manifests itself in all forms of judging and legal procedures. By

drawing the reader's attention to the potential instability of the legal system, Antiphon seeks to undermine the very coherence of conventional justice.

The argument in 44(c) should be understood as the theoretical side-kick to the argument in 44(a). In 44(a) we learn that following justice and consistently obeying the *nomima* of one's city is often harmful to our true interests and should not be countenanced by the rational deliberator. In 44(c) we are told that justice is internally incoherent and that it collapses from its own contradictions. Antiphon leaves his reader with the impression that conventional justice is a bad bargain: sold at too dear a price and thoroughly broken.

2.3 Two Corroborating Texts

In this section, I will briefly discuss two other 5th century texts that testify to the sophistic challenge to justice. While they are not themselves the products of sophists, the first openly parodies sophistic thought and the second clearly bears the stamp of their influence. They offer corroborating evidence that a current of intellectual thought resolutely opposed the Traditional View and endorsed the practice of selective injustice. We can draw insight from these texts as to how and why a number of 5th century sophists argued that the life of injustice was (in one form or another) the most profitable and prudent life.

The first text is Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Three-quarters of the way through the play, two personified *logoi* come on stage and each gives a speech to convince a prospective student, Pheidippides, to follow their own educational regime and preferred way of life. The first – the just *logos* – advocates a traditional education and represents an older, rather venerable perspective about the proper way for youths to conduct themselves. The

other – the unjust *logos* – is said to offer new and exciting, albeit corrupting, ideas and arguments about the same topics. This *logos* boasts that its students become clever sophists (1111). Both the hype surrounding the ideas of the second *logos* and the promises it makes to its students connect the dramatized speech with the historical sophists. This does not mean that Aristophanes attempted to faithfully represent the arguments of a particular historical sophist in his *Clouds* – on the contrary, the unjust *logos* is ridiculous and grotesquely hilarious, and no one thinks it faithfully represents the views of any historical figure. Yet as we shall see, the content of the unjust speech, the sorts of arguments used in it, and even the form of the confrontation between the two *logoi* all display sophistic influence.⁶² Although Aristophanes was not reproducing the exact views of any sophist, he was surely parodying some genuine doctrines and positions.

I will here mention just a few arguments made by the unjust *logos* and Pheidippides, who later adopts this *logos*'s teachings for his own purposes. Near the very outset of their confrontation, the just *logos* boasts that it will carry the day by speaking honorably about the good and just things (τὰ δίκαια). To this the unjust *logos* replies that his opponent is throwing the debate by attempting to speak about justice, “for I say that justice in no way

⁶² The *logoi* present arguments for and against the conventionally just way of life. They give a sort of dramatization of the sophistic practice of *antilogikē*, or arguments-on-both-sides. According to Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras initiated this practice (DK79, A1.51), although it is most prominently presented in the sophistic work known to us as the *Dissoi Logoi* (DK90, B1). This practice appears to have been prominently applied to ethical questions, and particularly to the question of how one should live one's life. We shall see in the next chapter that the sophist Prodicus wrote a speech in which Virtue and Vice, both personified as women, come to Heracles and argue that he should follow their own way of life. In a way, even the whole of the *Republic* is a lopsided *antilogikē* about the profitability of justice and injustice, as Rachel Barney has suggested to me. Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus argue that injustice is the most profitable way of life in Books I and II, and then Socrates argues for the opposite position in Books II-X.

exists” (902). In response to the protests of the just *logos*, the unjust *logos* makes this brief argument (904-6):

πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὔσης ὁ Ζεὺς
οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ’ αὐτοῦ
δήσας;

If Justice exists, how, then, was Zeus
Not destroyed after binding his
own father?

Having discussed WD earlier in the chapter, we are in a position to appreciate what this response means. The unjust *logos* assumes that the traditional account of justice is being invoked here: the gods ensure that justice will rule, and they ensure that those who violate its precepts get their due punishment. By pointing out that Zeus was not punished for harming his father, the unjust *logos* draws on the traditional stories about the gods in order to show that no one should trust that injustice will always be punished. To harm one’s father was unquestionably a terribly unjust thing; to escape punishment for this shows that not all terrible acts are punished. And the fact that Zeus committed this injustice packs an extra punch – as we saw in Hesiod, it was Zeus who was traditionally thought to ensure that violations of justice were punished. Yet certainly no self-respecting Greek, the unjust *logos* implies, could really expect someone who enslaves his father to fairly punish others. If the stories about Zeus and Kronos are true, then there is reason to doubt in reliable divine sanction for violations of justice. If the stories are not true, then perhaps we have reason to doubt that the gods exist at all.

Much like SF and OT, the unjust *logos* recognizes that, with the gods out of the picture, the only credible threat deterring us from practicing injustice comes from the other members of one’s city. It is for this reason the *logos* stresses that there will not

always be punishments for those who get caught breaking the laws. In what reads as a sort of exaggerated caricature of Antiphon's position, we are told that one need not worry about these sanctions so long as one can speak cleverly and come up with sophisticated justifications or excuses for one's behavior. In fact, the unjust *logos* advises his students to actively break the laws, which are presented as obstacles to the satisfaction of their natural desires, so that they can attain what is really good. The silver-tongued students need not fear suffering from their crimes because they can argue themselves out of punishment (1075-82). Implicitly, the *logos* presents the laws and conventions as hostile to the satisfaction of human nature and prospering.⁶³ Finally, we note that the speech promotes gross hedonistic and egoistic behavior (1071-4):

σκέψαι γὰρ ὃ μείράκιον ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν ἅπαντα
 ἄνεστιν, ἡδονῶν θ' ὅσων μέλλεις ἀποστερεῖσθαι,
 παίδων γυναικῶν κοττάβων ὄψων πότων κιχλισμῶν.
 καίτοι τί σοι ζῆν ἄξιον, τούτων ἐὰν στερηθῇς;

Consider, oh lad, all the things that go into being temperate
 and how many pleasures you will give up: boys, women
 drinking games, delicacies, boozing, and laughing. And yet
 what good is life to you, if you are robbed of these things?

The unjust speech thus offers a rather succinct, if exaggerated, challenge to the Traditional View. Humans did not get justice from the gods, and neither will any god reward us for our just behavior or punish us for our unjust behavior. This is tantamount to rejecting the first and second theses of the Traditional View. Moreover, to the extent that it exists, justice is an obstacle to the satisfaction of our true natures and, at least for those who can cleverly argue their way out of punishments, the prudent way to live one's life is

⁶³ Of course, this reminds us of Antiphon. Interestingly, in this same passage the unjust *logos* tells its students to recognize no shame at all. This goes beyond the position maintained by Antiphon, who only argued that if we escape detection we will escape shame, but the two positions are clearly part and parcel of similar philosophical positions.

to behave unjustly and take advantage of others. This is a rejection of the third and fifth theses. The only possible point of agreement with WD is the unjust *logos*’ assumption that pleasures and External Goods are truly valuable and important for the prospering of human beings. Even here, though, we should note an important difference. Hesiod praises hard work and the enjoyment of the simple pleasures, whereas the unjust *logos* eschews hard work and glorifies in the base, hedonic, and luxurious.

Two arguments made later by Pheidippides must also be mentioned here. After the student develops his own argumentative acumen, he, full of bravado from the new sophistic thinking, dares to strike his father for ridiculing Euripides. His father is shocked and rebukes his son by invoking the law that prohibits children from assaulting their parents. We then get a very interesting response (1421-24):

οὐκ οὖν ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸν νόμον θεῖς τοῦτον ἦν τὸ πρῶτον
ὥσπερ σὺ καὶ γὰρ, καὶ λέγων ἔπειθε τοὺς παλαιούς;
ἦ ττόν τι δῆτ’ ἔξεσσι κάμοι καινὸν αὖ τὸ λοιπὸν
θεῖναι νόμον τοῖς υἱέσιν, τοὺς πατέρας ἀντιτύπτειν;

Was it not a man – just like you and me – who was
The first to establish the law? Why, then, is it in no
Way permissible for me to once again establish a new law for
Sons to come, that they return their father’s beatings?

This is not likely to impress as a response to a father’s impassioned and well-meaning attempt to discipline his child, but Pheidippides’ questions point towards a rather sophisticated philosophical insight. According to the Traditional View of Justice, Zeus himself set down laws for human beings. Believing that the laws ultimately derived from the father of all gods has the effect of bestowing a certain dignity and power onto these laws, not least of all because it implies that all people are permanently subject to them. By pointing out that they are just another human creation, like a pot or a book,

Pheidippides effectively strips them of this dignity and power. A mere mortal introduced the law prohibiting the beating of one's father a short time ago! This allows Pheidippides to question what normative force this law should have, and indeed why he ought to follow any existing law rather than the laws of his own devising.

Pheidippides gives one other argument to support flogging his father (1427-9):

σκέψαι δὲ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ βοτὰ ταυτί,
ὥς τοὺς πατέρας ἀμύνεται: καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν
ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνοι, πλήν γ' ὅτι ψηφίσματ' οὐ γράφουσιν;

Consider how the roosters and the other animals
Repay their fathers: and yet in what way do they differ
From us, except of course that they don't write decrees?

Here the son provocatively suggests that we may look to animals as exemplifying appropriate or suitable patterns of behavior for us to follow. Animals attack their fathers, so why shouldn't humans? The question would have flabbergasted Hesiod. In WD, he takes it for granted that humans are importantly distinct from animals and, moreover, that this is a good thing. The violence of the animals was presented as particularly pernicious – indeed, it was a feature of their lives that was highlighted as one that we should be most anxious to be rid of. Yet Pheidippides here puts pressure on the idea that humans are ethically distinct from the animals and should avoid similar behavior for that reason. By citing them as a model for human behavior, he closes the gap the Traditional View placed between us and the animals.

These two little arguments provide important insight into the thought and – in particular – the method of argumentation used by the 5th century sophists. Again: we are not to think that anyone ever used these exact two arguments to justify the maltreatment of their father. The sophists had, I hope to have shown, much more serious concerns than

defending the propriety of beating one's parents. We must assume instead that Aristophanes is parodying some arguments he thought were particularly pernicious and – by putting them into the mouth of a childish and outrageous horse-lover – running them through a dramatic *reductio ad absurdum*. Yet at least two considerations suggest that these arguments are the sort a 5th century sophists would have employed. First, we can detect how deeply they resonate with the texts discussed in this chapter. Both Antiphon and SF point out that humans, not gods, made the laws that we all follow. Whatever else the account of the development of laws was meant to accomplish, unearthing the historical and conventional nature of the laws serves to debunk the laws and to remove them from a place of dignity and power. This sort of debunking allows people to think that there might really be occasions when the laws should be broken, or that they are not normatively absolute.⁶⁴ This line of thought lies in the background of Pheidippides' first argument above. By asking why the laws shouldn't be broken or remade, he cleverly shifts the burden of responsibility to the defenders of justice and challenges them to explain and demonstrate the authority of the laws. This is a reasonable request if one assumes that the laws are merely one among many human creations. (As we shall see in the next chapter, at least one defender of justice attempted to meet this challenge and establish the authority of *nomos* without presuming divine authorship.)

⁶⁴One can detect Thrasymachus using a similar strategy in Plato's *Republic* (338d-341a). Thrasymachus' central thesis is that practicing justice is not profitable for individuals but for the rulers they serve and that it would be in our best interest to break the laws and practice injustice. In the process of arguing for this thesis, he presents an elaborate and realistic account of how the laws originated, according to which all laws were created by self-interested rulers who design them to advance their own interests – not those of the citizens. This 'genealogy' of the laws strips them of the dignity and honor in which citizens might hold them. For more on this, see Anderson (2016).

Second, when removed from the ridiculous context Aristophanes has placed them in, these arguments presuppose a rather sophisticated philosophical methodology – and this is particularly true of the second argument, which includes an appeal to animal behavior. After Pheidippides argues that the laws do not have the normative status they are often thought to have, he then appeals to the behavior of animals to provide some evidence that it is not natural for humans to follow the principles of justice as they were conventionally understood. I find these two moves are quite powerful. For how else does one intelligently respond to someone who says, ‘these are the ethical norms that exist, and they must be followed,’ than by first pointing out that no one has yet legitimately established the authority of these norms and then by arguing that they are anyhow not appropriate for the sort of creatures that we are? The appeal to nature should be seen as an attempt to offer empirical evidence about what humans are naturally like free from the education and customs that shape our behavior. This sort of consideration can be quite philosophically powerful in combatting prejudicial ethical beliefs, even today.⁶⁵ This suggests to me that, lying behind the comic irreverence of Pheidippides, is a rather sophisticated set of ideas and methodology.

This is all good reason to think the statements made by the unjust *logos* and Pheidippides had genuine sophistic inspiration. Given how much of the material in *Clouds* resonates with the views we have seen earlier in this chapter, and given that

⁶⁵ Many who have recently opposed the religious or natural-law position that homosexuality is unnatural, and therefore wrong, have appealed to the fact that most animal species have homosexual members, often in a comparable frequency to humans. In response to dogmatic claims that human homosexuality is unnatural, the appeal to other animal species is, I think, quite powerful and persuasive. The sophists were – to the best of my knowledge – the first who looked to the way animals acted in order to raise important challenges to (what they saw as) the prevailing prejudices of ethical thought. Questioning the authority of our norms and looking to other cultures or other species is a good way to liberate ourselves from the tyranny of custom.

Aristophanes himself says the *unjust logos* produces sophists, we should infer that their thought permeates his play.

The final text we must discuss is the so-called ‘Melian Dialogue,’ from Book V of Thucydides’ *History*. In this text, Thucydides dramatizes an encounter between the leaders of the small island-*polis* of Melos and a group of Athenian envoys, who have landed on Melos and are preparing to sack the city with an overwhelming force. In form and detail, the conversation bears considerable similarities to the debate between the two *logoi* in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*. Thucydides presents his readers with a debate over how *poleis* may act most prudently, and it includes a rather intense and belabored disagreement about the value of just behavior in which one party advances the view that justice is profitable and the other party challenges this. As in *Clouds*, the debate takes place behind closed doors, a point Thucydides somewhat uncharacteristically calls attention to. Since they fear that the envoys’ ‘seductive arguments’ might deceive the citizens, the Melians prevent the Athenians from speaking in front of the general population (V, 85). These are hints that the speeches will be peppered with seductive sophistic insights and influences – the sort which appealed to Pheidippides.⁶⁶

The envoys tell the Melians they must choose between submitting to the Athenians’ yoke and being annihilated. The Melians initially reject both options as unjust

⁶⁶ Some have suspected that the Athenian envoys are not allowed to speak in front of the masses because of political or ideological reasons. In his commentary, Hornblower says (2008, Vol. III, 230): “Perhaps the oligarchs did not feel sure of carrying their fellow-citizens with them, and this is part of the reason for their secret negotiations.” On this reading, the fact that the Athenians were democratic – and might appear sympathetic to the majority of the Melians – explains why the Melian leaders choose to have secret negotiations. This suggestion is attractive and there must be something to it, but it fails to account for the mention of the Athenian envoy’s ‘alluring and irrefutable’ speech. Part of their consideration presumably also included the fear of the Athenians’ seductive argumentative tactics.

and unfair. They have done nothing to harm the Athenians and do not deserve such treatment; accordingly, they ask to remain unmolested. Their request appears to be a fair one. The Athenians are the aggressors, and in attacking an insignificant state that has done them no harm they are violating one of the most fundamental principles of Pan-Hellenic just war theory.⁶⁷ All the same, the envoys inform the Melians that remaining neutral is not an option: their only choice is to live as tributary subjects of the Athenians or to die as their enemies. But the Melians do not budge. Despite the overwhelming force they are faced with, they trust that their innocence and upright behavior will be their salvation in battle: “Nevertheless we trust we shall have no less fortune from the gods, because we stand as god-fearing men [ῥῆσαιοι] against unjust men [οὐ δίκαιους], and that what we lack in power will be made up by the allegiance of the Spartans, who are bound, if only for shame, to come to the aid of their kindred” (V,104).⁶⁸ To this, the Athenians offer a surprisingly candid response (V,105.2):

ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς
διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίᾳς, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν.

We believe of the gods and we know of humans that in all times they, by a natural necessity, rule wherever they can.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ See Woodruff (2002), where he argues that ‘do not wage aggressive war’ was “one of the two principal requirements of virtue that is thought to be universal, in Thucydides” (201-202). At II, 74.2 the King, Archidamus, calling on the gods, prays: “Graciously accord that those who were the first to offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by those who would righteously inflict it.” The second principle is: ‘do not kill prisoners of war.’

⁶⁸ Translations follow Robert B. Strassler’s in his *The Landmark Thucydides* (1996), but with some silent alterations.

⁶⁹ This need not be restricted to ruling in the sense of the brute domination of other. As Melissa Lane has recently argued in her 2018 Carlyle Lectures (not yet published), the noun ἄρχή can refer to political office or authority and the verbal form, ἄρχειν, can refer to holding political office and fulfilling the responsibilities of the office. It is possible that this use of ἄρχειν informs what the Athenian envoys mean here – they do want the Melians to submit to their political authority. But here the word must also carry something of the brute sense as well. The Athenians are clear that they will do with the Melians as they wish and they seem to reject that they have any duties to the Melians to exercise any sort of office over them responsibly.

“Words to make the blood of any Greek run cold,” Cornford remarked long ago.⁷⁰ And indeed, the envoys’ position is quite shocking. Not only do the Athenians reject the idea that gods will intervene to defend the just Melians, they also appear to maintain that it is not even in Athens’ own power to refrain from unjust conquest. A necessity of nature forces the Athenian’s cold hands towards coercive rule, as it does too, the gods’, if they exist, who therefore cannot be relied upon by the Melians for aid.⁷¹ As it was for Antiphon, human nature is here presented as at odds with justice. Yet unlike in OT, the Athenians hold that there is no possibility of betraying nature in order to treat the weak city of Melos with justice. Justice, as the envoys elsewhere tell us, is something that can only exist between equals or those who have the power to harm one another. In all other relationships, the strong will do what they want and the weak will suffer what they must (V, 89).⁷²

The Melians’ invocation of shame in the above quote is notable, for in other authors advocating a traditional view of political communities we find shame paired with justice

⁷⁰ Cornford (1907, 182).

⁷¹ So Orwin (1994, 106) says of the Athenians that, “they deprive [human beings] of such freedom as tradition had held them to possess, that of transgressing or not, of choosing ‘blamelessness’ over ‘injustice’.”

⁷² Thucydides may have expected this statement to remind his readers of a famous passage in WD, where Hesiod presents a fable about the hawk and the nightingale, c.f. Hornblower (2009, Vol III, 243). The hawk takes the nightingale by force and in response to her cries says: “Silly bird, why are you crying out? One far superior to you is holding you. You are going wherever I shall carry you,” and later, “stupid is he who would wish to contend against those stronger than he is: for he is deprived of victory, and suffers pains in additions to his humiliations” (206-11). This last point is one the Athenians make to the Melians as well (V,101). So there are notable parallels between these two passages. In Hesiod, however, the fable is intended, at least in part, to illustrate how animals, who live with violence, act towards one another. This is precisely the sort of behavior that humans should avoid through their own practice of justice. From the Hesiodic perspective, the Athenians are acting like animals and stepping outside of their humanity.

as the ethical glue that holds human communities together.⁷³ Yet after laughing at their faith in justice, the Athenians respond to the Melians' mention of shame with pity: "But when we come to your notion about the Spartans, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly" (V,105.4). They go on to explain that what cities look for in allies is not a kindred folk or similar political constitution, but those who can contribute force and help in wartime struggles: it is utility that holds alliances together. Consequently, the Melians should not expect the Spartans to risk an encounter with the Athenians to save a small island ally. Moreover, much like justice, shame is an emotion whose proper place is in contests among equals – each of whom can reasonably hope for success (V,101). Lambs should not feel shame when faced with the lion's jaws and neither should the Melians before the greatest naval power in existence. This is important, too. Recall that Antiphon had instructed his readers to dispense with justice in the pursuit of self-interest, and here the Athenians instruct the Melians to do the same with shame. In both OT and the speech made by the Athenian envoys, self-interest or advantage is what should guide practical deliberations.

The Athenians later provide a plausible reason why nature opposes the principles of justice and, indeed, would prevent anyone from following justice in similar circumstances (V, 107):

τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν μετ' ἀσφαλείας εἶναι,
τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι

Benefit is found with security,
But to practice justice and honor comes with danger.

⁷³ In the 'Great Myth' of the *Protagoras*, shame (αἰδώς) is spoken of as a bond of friendship for humanity. There we are told that Zeus "sent Hermes to bring justice and a sense of shame to humans, so that there would be order within cities and bonds of friendship to unite them" (322c).

Nature compels all individuals and cities to forgo just behavior because it is not ultimately beneficial, or in their rational self-interest. The prudent course is to strive for security, which, in the case of Athens, means subduing as many cities as possible, even if this strategy is manifestly unjust. Thus, the envoys flatly reject the fifth thesis of the Traditional View. At least in the current case (and one gets the feeling reading the envoy's statements that they hold this to be a general truth), the prudent course of action is the course of rank injustice. And what of the Melians? Were they rewarded for their just behavior in their confrontation with the Athenians? In an amazingly – almost appallingly – matter-of-fact way, Thucydides ends book V by noting that after a futile resistance, “the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves” (V,116.3-4). Neither the Spartans nor the gods came to their aid.

The sophists are nowhere mentioned in this bit of text, but one can recognize a number of signs pointing to their influence. We have already noted that the Athenian envoys were reputed to use seductive arguments, something often attributed to the sophists. More telling than this is the sharp distinction the envoys draw between nature and the precepts of justice, which points towards the sophistic challenge to justice, especially because the invocation of nature here is used to explain why the conventional principles of justice will be violated. Beyond this, we should note that the envoys raise a number of considerations that bear a remarkable affinity to the arguments that Glaucon and Callicles use in Plato's dialogues. The claim that justice exists only between relative equals anticipates the position Glaucon puts in Book II of the *Republic* (358e-359b). Moreover, in the *Gorgias* Callicles tells Socrates that one should look to how states act in

international relations to discover the most natural way for humans to act. Callicles points out that strong states act to subdue the weak, ignoring any considerations of conventional justice (483d). If these Platonic positions were inspired by real sophistic views (as they are often thought to be),⁷⁴ we can see more affinities between Thucydides work and sophistic thought. All these considerations point to a current of sophistic influence in Thucydides' presentation of the Athenian envoys.

Of course, none of this shows that Thucydides himself accepted the position of the envoys. It is rather difficult to discover Thucydides' own considered opinion of the difficult philosophical positions raised in his speeches. Some interpreters have felt that Thucydides must have found the sentiments voiced by the envoys completely abhorrent.⁷⁵ I myself do not pretend to know what Thucydides' considered view was. All I maintain is that the arguments and considerations given by the Athenian envoys point towards and provide evidence about a 5th century current of thought, which maintained that injustice is more profitable and prudent than justice.

Though I could mention other texts, enough has been said by now to make my point.⁷⁶ A number of sophists disagreed with the Traditional View of Justice and

⁷⁴ See the insightful discussion in Barney (2017). For a more extensive discussion of the sophistic themes in Glaucon's discussion, see Anderson (2016).

⁷⁵ Some scholars believe that Thucydides used tragic tropes in his *History* and that we are supposed to recognize the actions of the Athenians at Melos as the hubristic *hamartia* that leads to the Sicilian disaster. So Cornford (1907, 185) says of the Athenian envoys: "In the impious exaltation of strength he is unaware of the haunting Spirit of Delusion at his side, who will be known for what she is only in the moment of Athens' fall...he is smitten with madness – blind."

⁷⁶ Much, in particular, could be said about tragedy. Josh Billings has suggested that the Odysseus of Sophocles' *Philoctetes* deserves close study in this connection. In poetry, Odysseus is often depicted with characteristics popularly associated with the sophists – he is quick-witted, two-faced, and manipulative. At one point in Sophocles' play, he explains his deceptive and unfair behavior this way (1050-1053): "As the occasion demands, such a one am I. When there is a competition of people just and good, you will find none more just than myself. What I seek in everything is to win." In other words, he is just when it is to his advantage and dispenses with

challenged various theses of it in the 5th century. SF and OT both argue that it was human beings themselves, rather than the gods, that created and established justice for humanity. Further, the authors of both these texts explicitly rejected that the gods intervene to reward the just or punish the unjust, thus rejecting the second thesis and problematizing the third. Finally, we have seen that every text discussed in this chapter includes serious and, in many cases, quite powerful considerations against Hesiod's claim that justice is ultimately profitable because it results in more of the things necessary for the individual's prospering. Several other 5th century authors parodied or otherwise exploited these arguments in their own works, which not only gives us more insight into the arguments used, but also shows how big a splash these arguments made in the culture of elite Greeks. This was indeed a serious challenge to the Traditional View of Justice.

Another group of sophists fervently disagreed with the positions advanced by the sophists discussed in this chapter. They responded to the challenge that had been posed to justice and sought to defend a more traditional understanding of justice and its place in the lives and communities of humans. We turn to these figures in Chapter II.

justice when this is to his advantage. This has important resonances with the position put forward in OT and merits further exploration.

Chapter Two

The 5th Century Defense of Justice

The key to human moral nature, I suggest, lies in coordination broadly conceived. The need for complex coordination stands behind much of the way language works in our thoughts, in our feelings, and in social life. It figures centrally in our emotional dispositions, especially for such morally significant emotions such as outrage, guilt, shame, respect, moral admiration, and moral inspiration...Primitive human life is intensely social. In the conditions under which we evolved, anyone's prospects for survival and reproduction depended crucially on the beneficial human bonds he could cultivate.

-Alan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*

In the previous chapter, I introduced one side of an important 5th century debate regarding the merits and demerits of following justice. In order to develop the background of this debate, I offered a close reading of some important passages from Hesiod's WD and argued that this poem contains five theses about *dikē*, which together constitute the Traditional View of Justice. According to Hesiod, 1) Zeus gave justice to humankind; 2) the gods reward those who are just and punish those who are unjust; 3) justice is therefore beneficial to the just agent; 4) the rewards the just receive are External Goods; 5) it is thus prudent for humans to be just, given that justice results in more goods than injustice. This Traditional View exerted great influence on Greek thought. Later thinkers agreed with Hesiod's guiding presupposition that thoughtful individuals would be concerned with and pursue their true self-interest. In the 5th century, the central question became 'what promotes the individual's self-interest—justice or injustice?'

As we saw in the last chapter, a number of sophists answered that the selective practice of injustice most effectively promotes the individual's self-interest. Having rejected the religious presuppositions of Hesiod's account, this group denied that scrupulously just behavior would be rewarded or injustice punished. In a world free of helpfully interventionist gods, the case for such injustice was a powerful one. Even

Hesiod had to concede that it would be more profitable to practice injustice *if* doing so ultimately resulted in greater goods.

There was, however, another group of 5th century sophists, who maintained that practicing justice and being virtuous was the only way to prosper truly. Accordingly, they argued that it was profitable and prudent for the individual to pursue the just or virtuous life rather than the selectively unjust life. It is clear from their texts that these thinkers were directly responding to the view that the unjust life was ultimately profitable—and in all likelihood, they were responding to the authors and the texts discussed in the previous chapter. By rejecting the views of those who had challenged justice, this second group of thinkers endorsed a sort of return to and defense of the Traditional View. For this reason, I will refer to this group as the defenders of justice and their project as the defense of justice.⁷⁷

In this chapter, I offer a discussion of these defenders of justice. I analyze two 5th century sophistic texts, the “Anonymous Iamblich” and Prodicus’ “Choice of Heracles”; the remaining ethical and political fragments of the philosopher Democritus, who, although not normally grouped with the sophists, clearly contributed to the general defense of justice in the 5th century; and finally, I briefly discuss the ‘Great Speech’ of

⁷⁷ Of course, I do not intend to suggest that every defender of justice accepted every feature of the Traditional View. Most (quite possibly all) of the figures discussed in this chapter would have rejected Hesiod’s more dogmatic claims concerning the gods. Moreover, there were disagreements and differing emphases among the defenders of justice. I remind the reader that I am attempting to highlight one common strand in the thought of these thinkers and, in so doing, I will stress the continuities between their views. One should not infer from this that these sophists were a homogeneous group. We have enough biographical information about the figures discussed in this chapter to know that they were independent and intellectually promiscuous thinkers, some of whom were distinguished philosophers in their own right. Especially in the case of Democritus, it would be quite inappropriate to assimilate his views to those of his justice-loving allies, Prodicus and the author of the “Anonymous Iamblich”.

Plato's *Protagoras*. I am particularly concerned to accomplish two things in the following discussion. First, I hope to show that each thinker discussed in this chapter argued that the just and virtuous life was more profitable than the life of selective injustice. Second, I will argue that these texts should be understood as part of a genuine *debate* about the merits and demerits of justice and its role in the prosperous human life.

3-The Defense of Justice

3.1 "The Anonymous Iamblichus" (AI)

The AI is a short and wonderful (if understudied)⁷⁸ text, which has been preserved in the twentieth chapter of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*. Unfortunately, the Neo-Platonist does not identify the author of our text: thus its customary name, the "Anonymous Iamblichus". There is no doubt, however, that the author was either a prominent sophist himself or intimately familiar with the sophistic movement of the 5th century. Indeed, this has seemed so obvious that over the past 150 years there has been a race among preeminent scholars to pin the authorship of this text on virtually every known sophist. Critias, Hippias, Protagoras, Antiphon and even Democritus all have their adherents in the literature.⁷⁹ It is unlikely that any one of these conjectures will ever establish itself

⁷⁸ I know of only three insightful, peer-reviewed articles that offer sustained discussions highlighting the significance of AI: Thomas Cole (1961), Jacqueline de Romilly (1980), and Michelle Lacore (1997). These papers do a fine job drawing connections between the AI and other (roughly) contemporaneous works. Sadly, though, these authors do not spend much time interpreting the arguments of the text or analyzing the moral and political ideas contained within it. Although my primary concern in this section is to show that AI offers an important contribution to the 5th century debate regarding justice, I also hope to convince my readers that there are interesting and important philosophic considerations within the text that warrant further study.

⁷⁹ Wilamowitz (Vol 1 1920, 58) argues that Critias is the author, Untersteiner (1954, 591-611) argues for Hippias, Cole (1961, 155) argues for Democritus, Dillon and Gergel (2003, 310-1) cautiously suggest Protagoras, and Blass (1889) argues for Antiphon. It seems impossible to me that Antiphon was the author of our text, and unlikely that Critias was. If one judges from philosophic considerations alone, the most likely candidate from this list is Protagoras. AI is,

sufficiently to win universal approval, so I will make no assumptions in the following discussion about whom Iamblichus was quoting. But the fact that he quoted this text in a *Protrepticus* is worthy of note. Standardly, a protreptic text – that is, an exhortation to philosophy – operates by arguing that the practice of philosophy contributes to the success of one’s life in one way or another.⁸⁰ That Iamblichus could so easily include AI (which was written before philosophy attained the self-identity as a way of life) in his *Protrepticus* suggests that our text was concerned to discuss how an individual could secure a successful—or perhaps the most successful—life.

We have good *prima facie* reason, then, for assuming that the question guiding our text is ‘how should an individual act in order to prosper?’⁸¹ The author answers that an individual should behave justly and, in some cases, virtuously as well (I will discuss the difference between justice and virtue below), because this is the profitable way to live. The text gives two broad arguments for this claim. First, our author argues that it is only through virtuous behavior and benefaction that any individual can hope to achieve the sort of good reputation that produces an immortal good name, which, the author assumes, is an important part of any successful life and something everyone holding a prominent position in society in fact wants to have. Second, the author argues that humans are the sort of creatures that require a properly-functioning community if they are to live

however, written in a different dialect from Protagoras’ other known works, which makes this attribution doubtful.

⁸⁰ The two ‘Socratic’ sections of Plato’s *Euthydemus* are the best example of a (full) extant protreptic text (277d-283b and 288b-293a). In these discussions, Socrates progressively reveals to his interlocutor that the pursuit of philosophy contributes to the best life. This is because only the pursuit of philosophy can produce wisdom and wisdom, in turn, is the only possession that enables one to reliably act in the ways that lead to prospering.

⁸¹ Thus, correctly, Dillon and Gergel (2003, 310) note about AI: “The topic appears to be, broadly speaking, ‘How to Succeed in Life’ – a subject central to the project of all [the sophists].”

prosperously and, moreover, that such a community cannot exist unless its citizens behave justly. I begin by discussing the second argument and then move on to the first.

After a brief and general discussion of how an individual can attain mastery in any practice or *technē*, we are told that those who perfect their craft should use their skills for just and lawful ends because this is the only way one will become ‘completely good’ and live well. After a small digression, AI presents and responds to the possible objection that being completely good is not the most profitable and prudent way to live (DK89, 6.1):

ἔτι τοίνυν οὐκ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν ὀρμᾶν δεῖ, οὐδὲ
τὸ κράτος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ πλεονεξίᾳ ἡγεῖσθαι ἀρετὴν
εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῶν νόμων ὑπακούειν δειλίαν· πονηρ-
στάτη γὰρ αὕτη ἢ διάνοιά ἐστι, καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πάντα
τὰναντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεται, κακία τε καὶ βλάβη.

And moreover, one should not aim at *pleonexia* nor think that power based on *pleonexia* is virtue, while obedience to the laws is cowardice. For this very attitude is worst of all, and from it comes everything opposed to what is good, both vice and harm.⁸²

The first three lines of this passage introduce an outsider’s position to which our text attempts to respond. In its response, AI states that the belief that virtue is nothing more than ‘pleonectic’ power is both vicious and harmful. This is important since the mention of harm confirms that AI is committed not just to maintaining that taking more than one deserves is bad in some ethically loaded sense but also that it is harmful to the vicious agent. In other words, these lines announce AI’s commitment to the view that it is unprofitable to pursue *pleonexia*. In the following passages, our author begins an argument designed to defend this commitment.

⁸² Translations of AI are my own, but I have profited from consulting Dillon and Gergel (2003).

I quote the first part of the argument in its entirety here (6.1):

εἰ γὰρ ἔφυσαν μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀδύνατοι καθ’
ἓνα ζῆν, συνῆλθον δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῇ ἀνάγκῃ
εἰκόντες, πᾶσα δὲ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῖς εὖρηται καὶ τὰ
τεχνήματα πρὸς ταύτην, σὺν ἀλλήλοις δὲ εἶναι
αὐτοὺς κἂν ἀνομίαι διαιτᾶσθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε (μείζω
γὰρ αὐτοῖς ζημίαν <ᾶν> οὕτω γίγνεσθαι ἐκείνης τῆς
κατὰ ἓνα διαίτης), διὰ ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς ἀνάγκας
τόν τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεύειν τοῖς
ἰσχυροῖς καὶ οὐδαμῇ μεταστῆναι ἂν αὐτά·
φύσει γὰρ ἰσχυρὰ ἐνδεδέσθαι ταῦτα.

For [1] if men are naturally unable to live in isolation,
and [2] if they – yielding to necessity – joined together,
and [3] if this whole way of life as well as the means for
it was discovered by them, and [4] if men are not able to
be with one another if they live their lives in lawlessness
(for to live thus would be a greater punishment for people
than an isolated way of life) – [5] well then, because of these
necessities both the law and justice are king among people,
[6] and they can in no way be set aside. For these
are firmly fixed among us by nature.

Because the structure and length of this passage make it difficult to understand, I have added numbers to facilitate its interpretation. Before discussing the content of this text, we must briefly consider its form. The majority of the passage is one long conditional sentence with a four-part protasis and a two-part apodosis. The form of the conditional is an atypical version of what the grammarians call a ‘simple past condition’, which in this case includes a potential optative to indicate that an inference is in the apodosis.⁸³ It is also important to note the tenses of the verbs used in this passage. Until this point in the AI, our author has preferred the present and future tenses, yet the protasis of this long sentence switches to the aorist and the perfect before returning to the present in the apodosis. This, I suggest, is because the indicative verbs in the first half of the sentence

⁸³ Smyth, 2300

express what the author takes to be historical truths, from which he later draws inferences about the ways things hold in the present. I take this to be crucial because it suggests that our author is presupposing some sort of historical narrative in this passage.⁸⁴ He is, in other words, presenting the sort of historical story we saw in SF and OT and drawing moral conclusions from it.

The content of this passage is very rich and deserves to be studied carefully. Our author offers four considerations about human nature, humanity's original condition, and the eventual development of communities. According to the author of AI, our ancestors first existed as isolated individuals and it was only when they were forced by necessity (presumably, the necessity of escaping the hardships of living alone) that they entered into social intercourse in order to save themselves. Naturally, the transition from living as isolated individuals to living in a community was wholesale: the text indicates that this transition resulted in a totally new mode of existence, or a whole new way of life (πᾶσα ἡ ζωὴ). This new way of life was better for our ancestors, provided one crucial fact held. Our author is careful to point out that living with other human beings in a condition of lawlessness would in fact be a greater punishment for the individual than the isolated life that people were trying to escape. In order for this new social life to have been profitable for our ancestors, it needed to be cooperative and stable. It needed to be just and lawful.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that law and justice reign over humanity and that their rule is fixed into our very nature. It is important to get clear on what this means and why the author believes he is entitled to this claim. As I understand the text, AI is arguing that it is natural for human beings to follow laws and be just because this is

⁸⁴ A similar point is made in Cole (1961).

the only way individuals – and so too the human species – can live tolerably well. This argument is justified by the account of human nature and human history presupposed by AI. According to our author, humans are the sort of creatures that are unable to live successfully as isolated individuals. Since they are unable to live on their own and require a community, they are, the author implies, social by nature. Additionally, because the required community must be a stable and cooperative community, which, our author assumes, must in turn be lawful and just, he concludes that we are by nature the sort of creatures that are appropriately ruled by law and justice.⁸⁵

We find this sort of account in a number of later texts.⁸⁶ It was influential because it plausibly explained why the laws of a society and the conventional rules of justice are required by our very nature as human beings. Unlike the challengers of justice, who saw these conventional rules as historical developments that hampered the free exercise of our pre-existing nature, AI offers an account according to which laws and customs are eminently natural and entirely appropriate for us as social creatures. Moreover, the historical account AI offers to support its view is (and was surely intended to be) better than those made by the challengers of justice. The account presented in SF and presupposed in OT features a natural condition in which humans harm one another, one

⁸⁵ Unfortunately, our author is not more explicit about why exactly humans need just and lawful societies or why such societies constitute an advance over living as isolated individuals. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine what he had in mind. He must have thought that only co-operative and lawful societies could provide people with the means to live well. This presumably included protection from other humans and the basic tools for living well, such as clothing and houses, but it likely also included the sort of luxury goods that could only be produced by joint and peaceful enterprises. It is hard to imagine isolated individuals or those living in broken societies enjoying the use of exercise facilities, benefiting from a formal education, or even sitting down to an artfully prepared meal.

⁸⁶ We shall see below that a similar account was put in the mouth of Protagoras in Plato's *Protagoras*.

that already includes social interaction among human beings. The account offered in AI takes an extra step back in time to explain how it was that humans came together and interacted, positively or negatively, in the first place. This gives AI's account more explanatory power and makes it more complete.⁸⁷ By arguing that humans are not the sort of creatures who can live well – one is tempted to say, live as humans – absent a community governed by laws and the principles of justice, AI shows that they require these laws.

This line of thought succeeds in responding to the simplistic claim that laws and conventions are no more than harmful restraints on the full expression of human nature, but it has a few significant limitations. It cannot establish that any particular set of laws or principles of justice are natural for human beings. As long as a community's laws and customs function well enough to protect its citizens and to allow them to live successful lives, AI has no theoretical resources to object. Moreover, although this argument may convincingly show that human beings generally do better in lawful societies, it cannot establish that any particular person would most effectively promote their own interests by acceding to the laws and customary requirements of their society. Any challenger of justice could give up the claim that the laws are essentially hostile to human nature and still perfectly consistently maintain that it is in their own interest to break the laws and practice injustice. In order to show that the scrupulous practice of justice is always profitable for the self-interested individual, AI must do more.

⁸⁷ Later philosophers clearly regarded as more satisfactory those accounts which explained how isolated humans came together to form communities in the first place. In his *Politics*, for example, Aristotle takes it to be true that the most satisfying account of the nature of human society will explain not only what the first communities were like, but why individuals entered into communal relationships (1252a24-b9).

Our author may have recognized this as the following lines offer an otherwise unexpected argument to the effect that no individual can profitably break the laws in public and openly flout the requirements of justice (6.2-5):

εἰ μὲν δὴ γένοιτό τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσιν τοιάνδε
ἔχων, ἄτρωτος τὸν χρῶτα ἄνοσός τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς
καὶ ὑπερφυῆς καὶ ἀδαμάντινοςτό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν
ψυχὴν, τῷ τοιούτῳ ἴσως ἂν τις ἀρκεῖν ἐνόμισε
τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ πλεονεξίᾳ κράτος (τὸν γὰρ τοιοῦτον τῷ
νόμῳ μὴ ὑποδύνοντα δύνασθαι ἀθῶιον εἶναι), οὐ
μὴν ὀρθῶς οὗτος οἶεται· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοιοῦτός τις εἴη,
ὥς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, τοῖς μὲν νόμοις συμμαχῶν καὶ τῷ
δικαίῳ καὶ ταῦτα κρατύνων καὶ τῇ ἰσχύι χρώμενος
ἐπὶ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπικουροῦντα, οὕτω μὲν
ἂν σώιζοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐκ ἂν διαμένει.

But if there were someone born having this nature
from birth – invulnerable, free from disease and suffering,
superhuman in strength, adamant in both body and soul
—one might then think the power based on *pleonexia*
would befit such a person (for such a person might
be able to remain immune, even without submitting to the law)
but one would not think correctly. For if, *per impossibile*,
such a person existed they would be saved if they
allied themselves with the laws and justice and if they used
their strength to strengthen them as well as what serves
them. Otherwise, they would not survive.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ It is in this passage that one can most clearly detect the traces of another thinker’s argument intruding into the AI. I conjecture that the earlier passage endorsing *pleonexia* and the thought experiment about the adamant man together made up a roughly contemporaneous view, to which the author of AI wished to respond. There are a number of reasons to think this. First of all, both this passage and the one quoted above break the train of thought presented in the text. Far from following from the preceding arguments, they read more like responses to interjections that the author anticipated his readers might make. Second, it seems rather improbable that the author of AI, or any defender of justice for that matter, first developed a thought experiment featuring this adamant ‘super villain’. Both Glaucon in the *Republic* and Calicles in the *Gorgias* introduce thought experiments featuring a strong-man who breaks the laws and violates the precepts of conventional justice in his *pleonectic* pursuits (359a-b, 483e-484c). One suspects Plato would not have put these examples into the mouths of his greatest critics of morality if they were first introduced and promulgated by a defender of justice. It is much more likely that originally a challenger of justice came up with this thought experiment and both Plato and the author of AI felt the need to respond to it. We saw in the previous chapter that a number of 5th century figures did, as a matter of fact, argue that individuals would better serve their own interests by breaking the

Not even a person of superhuman strength could profitably flaunt their injustice. In 6.4 we are told that every other citizen would stand opposed to an adamant person and would defeat them because of their need to live in a lawful and just society. *A fortiori*, then, neither can any regular person successfully flaunt their injustice, since they too will be stopped and brought to ruin more easily than this person of superhuman strength. Of course, if this argument is successful, it can only show that *openly* flouting the laws and taking more than one deserves cannot be a prudent way to behave. In order for the citizens to organize themselves and make war against the adamant villain, they must, of course, have recognized some villainy. Therefore, the argument cannot show that the practice of selective and secret injustice is always unprofitable. Nonetheless, this argument may not have been totally ineffective. The unjust *logos* of the *Clouds* encouraged its students to openly break the laws and try to escape punishment through wiles or strength. The preceding considerations might be enough to show that such conduct was inadvisable. If AI was correct to suggest that just and lawful individuals would band together to oppose those who break the laws, then it would be very difficult to derive advantage through public displays of unjust behavior.

laws and taking advantage of others when not observed. This all suggests that the AI is here responding to a contemporary position which endorsed the unjust life of *pleonexia*. But whose position was it? It reads like the historical sentiments behind the character Callicles, but perhaps we can try to be more specific. It is unlikely to have been Antiphon's because he clearly stresses the physical similarities and basic equality among humans, whereas this thought experiment trades on the existence of someone of superhuman strength. For a similar reason, we should rule out the author of SF. A more likely candidate would be whoever is being satirized in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. There is little suggestion in the unjust *logos*' speech of an individual being cautious in their unjust behavior. Instead, the *logos* assumes that some people will be able to break the laws and practice injustice openly and still remain unscathed. Similar thoughts are found in the speech made by the Athenian envoys in Thucydides' Melian Dialogue. They maintain that justice exists only between states or people of relatively equal power, whereas the strong will do what they want and inflict their will on the weak, be it in public or in private. This line of thought is akin to the objection considered in the AI.

As further support for this argument in defense of justice, AI gives one final set of considerations. Our author gives a lengthy enumeration of the benefits that accrue to lawful and just societies and a corresponding enumeration of the misfortunes that plague lawless and unjust ones. We are told that in a just and lawful society the citizens trust and help one another, and because of this there is always aid forthcoming for those in need (7.1). In this well-ordered society, individuals needn't attend to public problems, and they can focus on what really matters to them, their personal affairs, instead (7.4). Moreover, these individuals go to bed without any anxieties and with minds full of pleasant thoughts and high hopes. "All this," the author states, is due "to lawfulness" (7.5). In a lawless and unjust society, the opposite is the case. Citizens have no trust in one another and there is no help for those who need it; citizens are unable to focus on their private affairs, but must waste their time on public problems (7.8); their society is torn apart inside and out by war (7.10); finally, the citizens go to bed with anxious thoughts and fears (7.11).

This list is worth highlighting because of the resemblance it bears to Hesiod's enumeration of the rewards and punishments that Zeus bestows upon just and unjust cities (WD 225-48). A number of the rewards and punishments named in WD appear in AI and the overall tone of the two passages is quite similar.⁸⁹ This serves to underscore the extent to which AI defends a traditional understanding of justice. It also reveals that AI accepts much of the standard gamut of External Goods, and so that it is in substantial agreement with the fourth thesis of the Traditional View. The most significant difference between the two enumerations is that the gods are completely absent from AI's passage – indeed, they are absent from the whole text. The rewards and punishments for justice and

⁸⁹ Peace and prosperity are presented as rewards in both, war with external enemies as a punishment as well.

injustice in AI are explained not by divine intervention but by (rather sophisticated) economic theory and psychological insights.⁹⁰ Although AI accepts a notably traditional account of justice and endorses the third thesis of the Traditional View, explanation of how the benefits of justice accrue to individuals has been secularized and modernized.

Yet, as the reader will already have realized, absent gods who reliably punish and reward individuals for their behavior, none of the considerations raised above can establish that it is inevitably disadvantageous for the individual to behave unjustly, that justice is always more profitable than injustice. AI even tacitly concedes this in the final paragraph of the transmitted text. While arguing that the worst of all evils, tyranny, is also caused by lawlessness and injustice, our author nods: “For whenever everyone turns towards vice, then [tyranny] occurs, since men are not able to live without laws and justice. Thus, whenever these two – law and justice – depart from the crowd, the rule and guard over them withdraws [ἀποχωρεῖν] to one man” (DK89, 7.13-14). The point is that the citizens need to remain lawful and just to avoid the terrible fate of being subjected to a tyrant. But it is crucial to note that our author says that when *everyone* turns to vice, a tyrant emerges.

Let us concede that no self-interested citizen could live a decent life if they lived under a tyrant. If our author reasoned correctly, this shows that no self-interested agent should want to live in a society that was totally lawless and unjust. They should prefer instead to live in a generally lawful and just community. But it simply does not follow

⁹⁰ As Dillon and Gergel correctly note (2003, 404n17), the author of AI seems to have understood that it is the rate of circulation rather than the absolute volume of money that produces wealth in a community. Thus, our author explains that there will be more money available for everyone (even the poor) in a state where the citizens freely spend their money than in a city where the citizens refuse to spend their money and in which there is little circulation of funds.

from this that self-interested agents must behave justly themselves. It is impossible to believe that every member of a community needs to be scrupulously just for that society to enjoy the benefits of general lawfulness and justice or to avoid the burdens of rampant lawlessness and injustice. A fair bit of injustice can be practiced before the threat of a tyrant looms large.⁹¹

Therefore, AI's first argument ultimately fails to show that the practice of injustice is inevitably harmful to an individual's true interest or that the practice of justice is always profitable. Nevertheless, this argument does a fair bit. It offers a compelling response to one important strand of the challenge to justice. By maintaining that humans are the sort of creatures that need communities to live in, AI shows that although laws and conventions may be relatively recent human inventions, they are not, in virtue of this fact, opposed or hostile to human nature. On the contrary, they should be thought of as part of the fulfillment of our social nature. Furthermore, our text correctly maintains that it is generally profitable for an individual to live in a just and lawful society and, moreover, that in such a society most citizens need to behave justly most of the time. Finally, our text argues that no one, however strong, could profitably live in a community while openly breaking the laws and acting unjustly. None of this proves that it is unprofitable to break the laws and perpetrate injustice when doing so goes unnoticed and does not threaten the stability of society. It is unclear whether our author thought such injustice was a realistic possibility. If he did not, he may have been confident that he had

⁹¹ The same surely holds for the benefits of living in a generally just and lawful community. It is unimaginable that the injustice of a single individual – or even a few, intelligent individuals – could destroy the benefits of living in such a community. It would be absurd to maintain, for example, that the injustice of one or two bad apples would prevent all other citizens from enjoying peaceful sleep, especially if these individuals practiced their injustice in secret.

adequately responded to the challengers of justice. If he did recognize covert injustice as a real possibility, however, he may have thought the possibility was so remote that the cumulative force of his arguments would be enough to convince most of his readers that justice is the only reasonable strategy.

AI's second argument makes the case not only for a life of justice but for a life of complete virtue as well. I assume in what follows that the life of complete virtue goes beyond the merely just life insofar as it mandates supererogatory action not required for behaving justly, which one can accomplish by merely following the laws and treating others fairly. I suppose too that no one can live virtuously without also behaving justly.

As already mentioned, AI begins by offering advice to people who wish to attain mastery in a *technē* and it goes on to explain how one should behave if one hopes to gain a good reputation through this mastery. As it turns out, gaining good repute and avoiding the envy of others is a tricky task because people generally resent those they recognize as superior to them in any way. According to the author of AI, one must take every precaution in order to avoid the hatred of one's peers and to win the good reputation merited by one's accomplishments. To this end, it is particularly important to start training at a young age. Others are especially apt to bear grudges against those who win great success in a short amount of time with little work. So an individual must train over a long period of time to win a good reputation and avoid hatred (2.4-5). Another thing such aspiring experts must do is to use their craft for good and noble ends. Others are less likely to resent those who use their talents to benefit everyone than those who use them for their own self-aggrandizement. In fact, our author suggests that the best way to win a

good reputation is by using one's talents to pursue complete virtue (ἀρετή). He explains (3.3):

Τόν τε αὖ ἀρετῆς ὀρεγόμενον τῆς συμπάσης
σκεπτέον (εἶναι), ἐκ τίνος ἂν λόγου ἢ ἔργου ἄριστος
εἴη· τοιοῦτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ πλείστοις ὠφέλιμος ὢν.

We must also consider what word or deed would enable one
who desires complete virtue to be most excellent.
He would be such if he was useful to as many people as possible.

The person with complete virtue is one who is useful to as many people as possible. This alone suffices to make virtuous behavior more difficult and demanding than just behavior: one can serve many people only if one becomes a servant “to the laws and to justice, for this is what establishes and holds together both men and cities” (3.6).⁹² Yet to follow justice, one needs merely to respect the laws and treat others fairly.

What an individual who truly desires a good reputation must do, according to AI, is to strive for the excellence described above. Our author assumes that the desire for such a

⁹² Our author does not explain what exactly he thinks it means to achieve complete virtue by serving the laws and justice. How might doing this make one useful to as many people as possible? One simplistic answer would be to understand ‘ὁ πλείστοις ὠφέλιμος ὢν’ simply as a claim about the number of people the virtuous person benefits. If all the citizens are benefited through the laws and through justice (and our author certainly believes that they are), then to serve the laws and justice is – in a way – to be useful to every citizen of one's society. But it is hard to believe this is the whole story the author meant to tell. Suppose I am a hardworking and diligent employee of the Athenian courts. Suppose further that on a number of occasions I go beyond my duties and happily work overtime because I believe the courts are a useful, indeed fundamental, institution for my fellow citizens and their well-being. No doubt this is an admirable thing to do, but it would seem strange to say that I had achieved complete virtue, even though I am doing more than justice requires (no law says I must work overtime) and I am (by hypothesis) helping every citizen in Athens. As we shall see in a moment, complete virtue can, on AI's account, secure one's immortal good name. Sadly, my extra administrative work is not the stuff of eternal repute. Who aside from my family will remember it after I am gone? We must assume that our author means to highlight individuals who not only benefit all citizens, but who do so in truly remarkable and memorable ways, like the lawgiver Lycurgus or Heracles, the savior of cities. Very few people acquire immortal reputations.

reputation is what motivates all good people (indeed he applauds this motivation),⁹³ and he very cleverly appeals to this desire in making his second argument. We are told a little later (5.2):

ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει τῷ βίῳ μηχανομένῳ τό τε γῆρας
κάκιον ὃν ἀνθρώποις καὶ μὴ ἀθάνατον εἶναι, καὶ [ή]
ἀμαθία ἥδη ἐστὶ μεγάλη καὶ συνήθεια πονηρῶν λόγων
τε καὶ ἐπιθυμημάτων, ταύτην περιποιεῖν ἐπὶ δυσκλείαι,
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀθάνατον ἀντ' αὐτῆς λείπεσθαι <κλέος>,
ἀντὶ θνητῆς οὐσης εὐλογίαν ἀέναον καὶ ἀεὶ ζῶσαν.

But since what happens in a prolonged life is old age—quite an evil for humans – and not immortality, it is indeed a great stupidity and a perversion due to wicked arguments and desires to do all one can for this life at the cost of infamy and not leave behind instead of this mortal thing something immortal, an eternal and ever-living good repute.

It would be a great stupidity, our text announces, to accept certain wicked arguments tempting us to prolong our life in infamy rather than to win a hallowed immortality based on praise and enduring reputation.⁹⁴ Interestingly, here AI simply assumes that the life winning an immortal good name is better and therefore more choice-worthy than the life of wicked and ill-reputed pleasures. No arguments are given in support of this assumption. Given the assumption, however, our author can produce a neat argument in favor of the just and virtuous life. For if the only way an individual can win the sort of recognition that produces an eternally good name is by serving the laws and justice (and

⁹³ “He is the truly good man, who does not hunt for reputation by donning another’s finery [*kosmos*], but by his own virtue” (DK89, 4.6). The truly good man in AI is rather bluntly said to hunt for a good reputation.

⁹⁴ The mention of wicked arguments and desires suggests, once again, that our author has another person’s views in his sight. We can understand this second argument as a response – however loosely – to some sort of objectionable suggestion about what ends to pursue. More on this in section 3.2.

thereby being useful to one's society) then self-interested agents who care about their reputation must pursue complete virtue.

Three things should be said about this argument. First, it must be admitted that in the above passages our author simply presupposes and implies that no one will win a reputation for virtue unless they do, in fact, behave completely virtuously and are useful to a great number of their contemporaries. This might strike some people as dubious, but we can easily come up with some intuitive support for this assumption. Consider what I shall call the Bob Marley Principle: "you can fool some people sometimes, but you can't fool all the people all the time."⁹⁵ Our author clearly took it for granted that no one could dupe all their contemporaries by merely seeming to be virtuous throughout their lifetime. This assumption is very much in keeping with the bleak picture of human psychology to which the author of AI subscribes. Recall that the initial sections of AI focus on how one may attain a good reputation without incurring the envy of one's fellow-citizens. According to AI, people's default reaction is to be upset at the successes of others because they feel that any honor credited to another's ledger is debited against their own.⁹⁶ AI explicitly maintains that we are so inherently suspicious that most of the time we will be convinced that others are hunting for reputation through deceptive means. Incredulous citizens must, we are told, be *forced by necessity* to grant to others the reputation they deserve (DK89, 2.3-4) – and even then they do so unwillingly! Our author

⁹⁵ One might also call this the Abraham Lincoln Principle. Lincoln reportedly expressed much the same sentiment when he said, "You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time."

⁹⁶ It must be admitted that this claim sits a little uneasily with the later sections of the text discussed above. In paragraph 7, AI argues that a lawful and just society produces trust among the citizens. One wonders how this trust is produced in such innately distrustful creatures. More work needs to be done to try and construct an interpretation of this whole text. Doing so here would, unfortunately, take us too far away from the focus of this chapter.

is apparently convinced that no one could be revered for virtue without being anything less than completely virtuous.

Second, note that this argument will only have traction on those who antecedently care about winning a good reputation or a posterity of praise. I do not mean to suggest that this is necessarily a flaw with the argument, but rather to draw attention to its limits.

⁹⁷ Unless one counts the bare assertion that it would be stupid not to care about one's posthumous reputation, I can find no text that even attempts to argue that a reputation or eternal good name is something good or really worth striving for. AI seems rather to assume that most everyone will find reputation and an afterlife of praise good. It then exploits this fact to argue that the rewards of the virtuous and just life make it the prudent life to lead.

Finally, one can detect in this argument a small yet notable shift in values, which distinguishes AI from the challengers discussed in the previous chapter. AI encourages its readers to avoid wicked desires and to pursue a good reputation and posthumous fame. This sort of encouragement presupposes a devaluation of certain crude External Goods – such as money, food, and things associated with sensual pleasures – and a corresponding appreciation of more refined External Goods, like good repute or various honors.⁹⁸ This shift in value leads to a problem that I will call 'The Problem of the Plurality of Goods'. So long as one is concerned only to get as many crude External Goods as possible, the

⁹⁷ The real problem (as Plato notices in the *Republic*) is the claim that only a genuinely virtuous person can win a reputation for virtue or justice. There is no reason to believe that a cunning expert could not win a reputation for justice even if they were unjust through and through – especially with a magic ring of invisibility!

⁹⁸ This shift in value was an important step in the philosophical consideration of the human good. We will see later that Democritus sought to downgrade the importance of External Goods even further. This downgrading of External Goods continued with Plato and arguably culminates with the Stoics, who thought that they were not goods at all and of negligible value.

attempt to live the good life may be practically difficult but it is theoretically simple. One knows what is good and what contributes to a successful lifestyle – one must simply go and get it. But if the pursuit of honor is both truly valuable and incompatible with a grossly hedonistic life, as AI implies, then one encounters a theoretical problem about which goods to pursue. Should one go all-in for reputation and forsake gross pleasures, or revel in sensual pleasures even at the cost of infamy, or instead take some middle route? The question is not satisfactorily resolved in AI; we shall return to it in the following sections.

The two arguments presented in AI offer a powerful defense of a traditional understanding of justice. Our author clearly accepted the fifth thesis of the Traditional View—his text attempts to show that the just life is both natural and profitable, and, in addition, that the life of virtue reaps the sort of rewards that make one's life prosperous. In the process of arguing for these claims, AI calls out and explicitly responds to a number of arguments challenging the Traditional View of Justice. Both the construction and substance of AI suggest that these arguments were real ones voiced by a genuine, historical challenger of justice. Indeed, one can detect from the seriousness and fervency with which AI responds to these challenges that its author was deeply concerned to defend his own views about humanity's relationship with justice. The text is, then, was offered as a contribution to a live debate regarding the merits and demerits of the just life.

Unfortunately, the author's defense of justice ultimately falls short. The two arguments in this short text are unable to demonstrate that the just life is also the most profitable life. It can only show that it is profitable to live in a generally just and lawful society, and that, for those who have an antecedent attachment to winning a good

reputation and afterlife of praise, the just and virtuous life is a very good, and perhaps indispensable, means to this end.

3.2 – “*The Choice of Heracles*” (CH)

CH is purportedly an *epideixis*, or a display speech, written by Prodicus the sophist. The text that has been transmitted to us is found in the second book of Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, which was composed in the 4th century and is not itself a sophistic work. Nonetheless, in this work Xenophon’s Socrates claims to present a speech earlier made by Prodicus in order to exhort his own interlocutor, Aristippus, to practice moderation and to pursue virtue. Socrates introduces the speech by remarking, “the wise man Prodicus in his work on Heracles, which he presented to very many people, gave an account of virtue, speaking – as far as I can remember – like this” (2, 1.21/DK84, B2.21).

⁹⁹ He marks the end of the speech by saying, “Prodicus described the education of Heracles by Virtue in this way, although he dressed his thoughts with still more splendid words than I have now done” (2, 1.34/ B2.34). The speech is thus presented as authentically Prodician.

No one doubts that Prodicus wrote a speech about Heracles in the 5th century. A scholion to Aristophanes’ *Clouds* tells us the original speech was found in a larger work of his, *Horai* (Seasons or Times of Life), which contained other philosophic material (B1). But scholars disagree on how accurately the speech given by Socrates represents the original words and thoughts of Prodicus. I adopt the majority opinion of recent scholarship and assume that what we have in Xenophon’s text fairly represents the

⁹⁹ Translations are my own, but I have profited from consulting Mayhew (2012).

thoughts and general argumentation of Prodicus' original work, without necessarily representing all its precise wording.¹⁰⁰ This, in any case, is what Xenophon's presentation of the speech would lead one to believe and, as we shall see, the philosophic considerations raised in this text are akin to the second argument of the AI. Even if the text as we have it was written in the 4th century, there is little reason to doubt that the arguments of the text are within the scope of genuine 5th century sophistic thought.

The speech begins with the introduction of an adolescent Heracles, who has just reached the age of maturity and independence. Having retired to a place of peace in order to consider what sort of life he should lead, he has a vision in which two tall and beautiful women approach him. Each tries to convince Heracles to adopt a certain way of life. The first rushes up to him and eagerly tries to sell him on a life of hedonistic indulgence made possible by taking advantage of others; the second advocates a life of virtue made possible only by self-sacrifice and working for the benefit of others. The women not only try to persuade Heracles that their own preferred way of life is the best, they also argue with one another. What we have in this *epideixis*, then, is another example of an *agōn* in speech about whether an individual should live an unjust life or a more traditional just and virtuous life.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Some believe that Socrates' speech is a more or less verbatim reproduction of Prodicus' original work. See, for example, Sanson (2004). Others believe that Xenophon gives his readers a faithful version of the thoughts and argumentation of the original work, without, however, reproducing its precise wording. On this see Mayhew (2012). (Although it may not seem so at first glance, a great deal depends on whether Xenophon uses the exact wording of the original. We know from elsewhere that the historical Prodicus was famous for his precise use of and his fine distinctions between words. It would thus be of great significance for the study of Prodicus and Greek philosophy more generally if the speech turned out to include the exact words used in the original.) Still others suspect that Socrates' speech in the *Memorabilia* is so loose that we cannot be confident that it accurately represents the thought presented in the original. For this view, see Gray (2006) and Dorion (2008).

¹⁰¹ It is remarkable how closely this *epideixis* mirrors the *agōn* between the just and unjust *logoi* in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. In both cases we have personified figures present arguments in front of a

The first woman begins her sales pitch like this (B2.23):

Ὅρῳ σε, ὃ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποίαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν
βίον τράπη. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος, ἐπὶ τὴν
ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥάστην ὁδὸν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν
οὐδενὸς ἄγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος διαβιώση.

Oh Heracles, I see you are wondering to which sort of path you
should turn your life. If you will make me your friend, I will
lead you to the sweetest and easiest path. No pleasure will go
untasted and you will live your life knowing no hardships.

She mentions, in particular, the pleasures of food, drink, and young boys (B2.24-25).¹⁰²

Moreover, she promises Heracles that he will never have to concern himself with political
affairs, nor worry that he might have to work hard in order to experience these pleasures.

Others will toil and he will take from them.¹⁰³ Once her initial presentation is complete,

Heracles asks this champion of lazy indulgence her name (B2.26):

Οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ

prospective protégé, and in both cases these figures advocate the way of life that they (literally, by name) represent. In each text, one figure praises a traditional life of virtue and the other praises a life of hedonistic indulgences. The similarities are so remarkable that it is tempting to think Aristophanes was parodying Prodicus in *Clouds*. This would not be impossible, for Prodicus is poked fun at in the play (360-4). Still, it would be hasty to think that Aristophanes' sole inspiration for the contest between the *logoi* was Prodicus. Presenting considerations on both sides of an argument was a general sophistic practice. It is safer to assume that Aristophanes was parodying this general method, although it is not impossible that he used Prodicus' text as a model for his own parody.

¹⁰² Again, the list resembles the list of benefits the unjust *logos* gives in the *Clouds* (1068-82). Each begins with an account of the goods to be won through inappropriate behavior, and both particularly stress the pleasurable activities, such as sex and drinking, that such behavior makes available. Both end with an assurance (it is explicit in CH, implicit in the *Clouds*) that the goods are simple to acquire, since they are acquired through easy, illegitimate means.

¹⁰³ DK84, 2.25: οὐ φόβος μή σε ἀγάγω ἐπὶ τὸ πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσῃ, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἂν δυνατόν ᾖ τι κερδαίνειν. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ συνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἐγὼ παρέχω. The use of ὠφελεῖσθαι here is interesting. The first woman says that Heracles can help himself to what others produce. Later, the second will say that Heracles must help (ὠφελητέον) his city. This is the same word the author of AI uses when he informs the reader that he must help as many people as possible in order to achieve complete virtue. It appears to be something of a trope that the virtuous man helped others, whereas the vicious selfishly and unfairly helped himself to the work of others.

δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν.

My friends, she said, call me Prospering, but those
who hate me play with terms and name me Vice.

This passage is worth dwelling on for a moment. The remainder of the text reveals that this woman is tempting Heracles down a vicious path that is both ethically bankrupt and that will eventually prove disastrous to his enlightened self-interest. We learn this from the last line of the *epideixis*, where the second woman, Virtue, informs Heracles that he will be able to attain τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν (the most blessed prospering) only if he follows her advice and takes the virtuous path. This was the take-away lesson Prodicus hoped to convey in CH (B2.33). Despite this fact, though, both women attempt to convince Heracles to follow their own way of life. Moreover, each realizes that by following their advice Heracles must reject the advice of the other. Even still, each suggests that he will win *eudaimonia* only if he follows her and not the other. It should be clear that this speech presents two distinct and independent conceptions of prospering. The first glorifies the sensual pleasures of food, drink, and sex, and shuns hard labor and public involvement. The second glorifies glory itself and openly acknowledges that an individual must forgo sensual pleasures and must labor in the pursuit of virtue.

The reader should recognize this as an iteration of the Problem of the Plurality of Goods I introduced in the previous section. 5th century thinkers were starting to understand that a number of different pursuits had at least *prima facie* claim to real value and might be thought of as good. Sensual pleasures were among these, so too were honor and reputation. Moreover, these thinkers also realized that practical necessity dictated that an individual might have to choose between pursuing one set of goods or the other. This added depth to the problem of how one should orient oneself towards justice in order to

live the good life. In WD, Zeus bestowed both material prosperity and good reputation to both cities and individuals who followed justice. There, a religious commitment ensured that both pleasures and honors were given to the just. No longer. In the 5th century, people came to realize that one had to establish what counted as the most important and genuine good before confidently pursuing it.¹⁰⁴

I will say nothing about what is, in fact, really good or valuable. I raise this problem not as an outstanding philosophical puzzle to be addressed here but mention this 5th century development as a historical fact, which had the effect of giving the debate regarding justice a theoretical depth it lacked beforehand. This depth allowed the defenders of justice to come up with a new response to a number of those who challenged the Traditional View of Justice. The defenders were now able to point out that that the pursuit of crude External Goods often encouraged shameful action that led one into disrepute.¹⁰⁵ We can see this sort of response prominently on display in CH. For before

¹⁰⁴ One can find indications of this problem in 4th century philosophic texts as well. Plato admits that people have different conceptions of prospering in the *Republic*. “If a guardian seeks to prosper in a way that he is no longer a guardian and isn’t satisfied with a life that’s moderate, stable, and – as we say – best, but a silly, adolescent idea of prospering seizes him and entices him to use his power to take everything in the city for himself, he’ll come to know the true wisdom of Hesiod’s saying that ‘the half is worth more than the whole.’” (466b). This adolescent idea of prospering is akin to the one advanced by Vice in CH. The guardian who is seized by this account of prospering will steal and take for himself as much property and wealth as he wants to and can. Note that Socrates’ response to this other conception of prospering is a direct appeal to Hesiod’s WD. He cites the major authority of the Traditional View.

¹⁰⁵ Is this an implicit concession that vicious people may actually succeed in winning more crude External Goods than the virtuous? Strictly speaking, it is not. In CH, for example, Virtue takes pains to remind Heracles that the life advocated by Vice will achieve immediate gratification only at the expense of greater pains and losses later (B2.31). No arguments are given to support the claim that those who indulge now must suffer later, however, and it reads as little more than a rank rationalization. There is no reason to think that sensual indulgences in youth inevitably lead to a miserable old age. Moreover, one should note that Virtue admits that if Heracles follows her life he will have to forgo many pleasures and endure many hardships through his labors. I suspect that some of the defenders of justice were starting to realize that the vicious life could be less laborious or even more hedonistically satisfying than the just life. They were pushed to come up with other considerations to show that the unjust life was not the best life.

Virtue offers considerations in favor of her own way of life, she responds to the claims made by Vice. Consider the following tirade that Virtue launches at Vice (B2.31):

ἀθάνατος δὲ οὐσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων
ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζει· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος,
ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου
θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρόποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον
καλὸν τεθέασαι. τίς δ' ἂν σοι λεγούσῃ τι πισεύσειε;
τίς δ' ἂν δεομένη τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς ἂν εὖ
φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι;

Immortal though you are, you've been cast out from the
gods and dishonored by good human beings. Of praise of
oneself – the sweetest sound of all – you're unhearing. And of
the sweetest sight of all, unseeing. For you've never yet seen
an honorable deed of your own. Who would trust anything
you say? Who would assist you if you required anything?
Who in their right mind would dare keep company with you?

The avatar of virtue calls her counterpart so base and ignorant that she cannot even recognize what is truly good and valuable – hearing about and seeing one's own fine deeds. According to Virtue, Vice is so far gone that she cannot even recognize what contributes to the true well-being of herself or others. The rhetorical questions in this passage clearly imply that Vice has no place in decent society. The obvious message to Heracles and the reader of CH is that those who follow Vice's way of life will suffer the same fate as its disgraced personification. They risk disenfranchising themselves from decent society, and by becoming infamous they risk rendering themselves untrustworthy and unfit for friendship.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Note the similarity between what Virtue says here and what the author of AI says in the later sections of his text. There, lawlessness and unjust behavior produce a society in which trust among citizens is impossible and in which citizens do not bother to help one another (DK89, B1 7.1-7.8). Here, the individual's practice of vice leads him to be untrustworthy and thrown out of a decent sort of society in which people help one another.

Of course, this line of thought is as much an argument in favor of the virtuous or just life as it is an argument against the unjust life. To make oneself a welcome member of decent society and to see one's own honorable accomplishments, Virtue implies that one must follow her path. It is worth noting that Prodicus is very open about the fact that the person who hopes to achieve virtue will have to forgo many pleasures and work to benefit others. Virtue begins her own pitch by informing Heracles that, "Of those things that are really good and noble, the gods give none of them to men without labor and care" (B2.28). Indeed, Virtue particularly stresses that if Heracles wishes to be loved by his friends, he must aid them (εὐεργετητέον); if he wishes to be honored by his city, he must help it (ὠφελήτέον); and if he wishes all of Greece to admire his virtue, he must try to do good (εὖ ποιεῖν) for all of Greece. Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Yet what an individual can hope to win through their hard work is of the greatest value. Virtue ends her speech by remarking that for those who follow her way of life (B2.33):

δι' ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι
δὲ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δὲ δῇ ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος,
οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κείνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν
ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνοῦμενοι θάλλουσι. τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ
τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ
τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτήσθαι.

Because of me they are dear to the gods, loved by their friends
and honored by their fatherland. And indeed when they come
to their fated end, they do not lie dishonored and forgotten, but
they blossom through memory and are sung about for all time.
Oh Heracles, child of good parents, if you cultivate yourself
as I have described, you may win the most blessed prospering.

Those who follow the virtuous path can look back on their life with pride, enjoy their old age, and are respected by others. Most important of all, once they die they are not

forgotten or slandered. Instead, they are remembered and honored for all time. This is how one wins the most blessed prospering.

It must be noted that this is not just the end of Virtue's speech, it is the end of Prodicus' whole *epideixis* – the climax of Virtue's lesson to Heracles is also the climax of Prodicus' lesson to his audience. This suggests that Prodicus endorses Virtue's account of the most blessed sort of prospering. So too does Prodicus' use of the figure of Heracles. As every member of the audience would have very well known, Heracles completed twelve great labors and saved Greece from terrible miseries. According to Aelian, he cleared the Greek land and sea of monsters, thus rendering Hellas safe for its inhabitants and became, consequently, one of the great benefactors of the Greeks.¹⁰⁷ Because of his benefaction, he – true to Virtue's words – continues to be remembered, praised, and honored to this very day. He is proof of Virtue's promise that those who follow her way of life can win an undying fame. Finally, one should also remember that in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Socrates uses Prodicus' speech in order to exhort his interlocutor to a moderate and virtuous way of life. Thus, we have both direct and indirect reason to believe that Prodicus himself endorsed the sort of life and education endorsed by Virtue.

Let us also note how deeply CH resonates with the second argument discussed in AI. There we are told that an individual can achieve an immortal good name only if they first develop complete virtue and benefit as many people as possible by promoting or defending the laws and justice. Here, Virtue tells Heracles that he will be sung about and praised for all time if he follows her way of life and puts in the hard work required to

¹⁰⁷ *Varia Historia*, 5.3

benefit others. Moreover, in AI we saw that the individual who would win an immortal name must reject the wicked arguments and wicked pleasures that result in dishonor. The arguments and desires are not spelled out in AI, but CH presents us with a set of arguments and desires which could reasonably be thought of as wicked. It seems likely that they are the same sort of base arguments and desires to which AI alludes. In any case, both AI and CH stress that an individual can win immortal fame through virtuous behavior and this fame is presented as a reward for virtue. In this respect, these two texts are similar to Hesiod's WD, which also presented honor and other goods as rewards for just behavior. Both accept the third thesis of the Traditional View – that justice is beneficial to the just agent. Indeed, Virtue in CH explicitly maintains that only just and virtuous behavior can make us prosperous. It thus accepts the ultimate prudence of just and virtuous behavior, and the fifth thesis of the Traditional View with it.

These similarities aside, it seems to me that Prodicus' view is somewhat more radical than the one found in AI. In order to see why, we must work through an objection to my interpretation of CH. The objection takes its cue from the fact that in CH, Virtue refers to traditional-sounding gods a number of times. We have seen this above. Virtue tells Heracles that nothing good is given to humans from the gods without hard work and care (B2.28); she says that Vice has been cast out from the immortal gods (B2.31); and finally, she says twice that her life and those who follow it are dear to the gods (B2.32, 33). We have, however, independent evidence that Prodicus gave a genealogical account of how humanity came to believe in the Olympian gods. This account was likely atheistic, but

even if it did not completely deny the existence of all gods there is no place in it for anything approximating the traditional gods mentioned in CH.¹⁰⁸

The objection, then, is that we should not accept that Virtue's speech represents the true view of Prodicus. Virtue frequently refers to traditional-sounding, interventionist gods in CH but we have good independent reason for doubting that Prodicus believed in them. This shows that there is something of a gap between Virtue's and Prodicus' positions. Although I agree completely that the historical Prodicus could not have literally believed in the statements his Virtue makes about the gods, I do not think it follows from this that he did not endorse her account of the best life or what is ultimately beneficial and profitable to the individual.

Consider first that CH is an *epideixis* couched in the form of a mythological parable. Parables do not normally function by presenting what their author regards as literal truths. Instead, they use stock characters in order to convey an important lesson. The audience of CH was not given to understand, I take it, that Heracles literally sat himself down on a rock and was visited by two apparitions who engaged in a philosophical debate over which life he should live. Was this a real event or was it fabricated? Obviously, the answer doesn't much matter.¹⁰⁹ Likewise, Prodicus could well have endorsed Virtue's general view while rejecting some non-essential details of her speech. This would have been rather convenient, I suspect, since this speech was obviously intended for the general public of its time, who believed in the existence of interventionist gods. Prodicus

¹⁰⁸ See footnote 31 in Chapter I.

¹⁰⁹ Indeed, the very language of the text itself is rather vague. It says that two women 'appeared' to approach and the Greek here uses φαίνομαι with an infinitive which may express doubt about whether the appearance was in fact true. On this, see Smyth (2002), 1314.

could have happily adopted the language of ‘the person on the street’ in order to convey his message.

As David Sedley has recently reminded us, 5th century intellectuals had to be quite careful about advertising their heretical commitments. According to Sedley, intellectuals and philosophers of this time often published works anonymously or, if they wrote plays, had disreputable characters voice objectionable sentiments as a safeguard to protect themselves.¹¹⁰ Whether one understands Prodicus as a complete atheist or simply as a radical revisionist, he certainly would have been someone who needed to exercise caution in not advertising his religious beliefs. We have reports that many 5th century intellectuals, such as Anaxagoras and Protagoras, were tried for impiety for holding less radical beliefs than Prodicus likely held.¹¹¹ It could have been dangerous for him to openly state that the gods did not exist, and so he may have welcomed the opportunity to pay lip-service to the traditional gods in his mythological parable.

CH’s veneer of piety is, in fact, compatible with a deeper and more subversive interpretation of the text. To the best of our knowledge, the historical Prodicus maintained that the Greeks came to believe in the Olympian gods after their ancestors deified the prehistoric individuals who bestowed great services upon humanity and who greatly improved the lives of others. The woman who first discovered agriculture, for example, was called Demeter and revered in posterity as a goddess; the first man to make

¹¹⁰ Sedley, 2013.

¹¹¹ Admittedly, it is difficult to know if the reports about such trials are accurate and even if they are, whether concerns about impiety were the motivating force behind the accusations. For a helpful discussion of freedom of speech and the real risks run by 5th century intellectuals, see Dover (1974). In whatever way one interprets the reports of such trials, though, it is fair to infer that voicing radical statements could have landed 5th century intellectuals in uncomfortable circumstances that were best avoided.

wine was called Dionysus and was later worshiped at festivals named in his honor.

Humanity eventually forgot that the true origins of their belief in the gods were mortals like themselves, and in this way the standard catalog of gods came to be canonized. What is particularly striking about this explanation of the development of religion is how well it fits with the text of CH. As I shall explain presently, this is, I believe, no coincidence.

Prodicus wrote CH to contain two different, yet compatible and reinforcing, interpretations of his text: one superficial and easily understood, the other more profound and accessible to the clever.¹¹²

Those in the audience who had no knowledge of Prodicus' other works could understand Virtue to be maintaining that, upon their death, virtuous individuals might be remembered and sung about by those who knew them and, perhaps if they were particularly virtuous, by their city as well. On the face of it, Virtue promises no more (neither does the author of AI in his own version of the argument). Those, however, who were clever and who knew something about Prodicus' genealogical account of the development of the belief in the gods could hear a different promise made by Virtue. They might hear Virtue whispering between the lines that an individual might literally become revered as a god after their death. For if those now revered as Olympian gods were merely mortal benefactors in the past, there is no principled reason why another mortal could not become so revered in the future. According to Prodicus' account, the

¹¹² If I am right about this, then there is an interesting similarity between the view of Prodicus and the challengers of justice. We saw in the previous chapter that a number of challengers probably drew a distinction between regular people and the intelligent individuals who could knowingly practice selective injustice. On my interpretation, Prodicus also writes, at least in part, to give advice for the few intelligent individuals.

gap between humankind and the gods was one of degree, not of kind. It should be possible to attain an immortality of sorts via an apotheosis fueled by repute.¹¹³

This, of course, goes much farther than anything we found in AI. Even still, the structure of the argument in CH and the second of AI's arguments are at bottom the same: both appeal to the same human desire for a good reputation that outlives our ephemeral bodily incarnation. The unjust life is unprofitable and imprudent because it leads individuals into disrepute and estranges them from decent society. The virtuous life

¹¹³ This interpretation of CH might sound farfetched. Note, though, that if Prodicus really did wish to inform his audience that a supremely virtuous individual could become revered as a god in posterity, he could never have said so directly. This is not only because he might have been punished for voicing such heretical views. It is also because the Greeks who revered and honored the gods thought they actually existed – and thought they actually existed *qua* immortal-and-living-gods not *qua* mortal-and-dead-benefactors. If Prodicus were to convince the Greeks that his account of the belief in the gods was correct, he would destroy the possibility of their accepting the existence of the gods at the same time. This is yet another reason why we should not infer from the fact that Virtue prominently mentions the gods that Prodicus did not ultimately endorse her account. Prodicus needed to superficially perpetuate the belief in these gods if he hoped that exceptional individuals could be revered as gods in the future.

Second, one should consider again Prodicus' choice of Heracles as a subject for this *epideixis*. As I have already noted, Heracles would seem to be a fitting figure insofar as any audience listening to CH would have known that Heracles did, in the end, decide to follow the virtuous way of life and won a great reputation for this. But Heracles would also seem to be a fitting figure for someone who wished to hint that the gods were nothing more than deified projections of the exceptional mortal men and women who had once conferred great benefits on humanity. Every member of Prodicus' audience would surely have known that, according to the myths, Heracles was also born a mortal and that it was only at the time of his death, having been recognized as the greatest of all Greek heroes, that he was made immortal and elevated to the rank of a god, when immolated at the peak of Mt. Oeta in central Greece. It seems unlikely that this is all a coincidence. Within the religious stories, there existed one figure who illustrated, in mythological form, the very truth of Prodicus' account of the Greeks' belief in the gods, and this is exactly the figure that Prodicus chose to use.

Finally, one should note that by encouraging others to pursue virtuous ways of life, Prodicus could very well have believed that he was himself conferring a great benefit to all of Greece. If he subscribed to Virtue's account of the successful life, CH can be read as Prodicus' own attempt to win the most blessed prospering. Every Greek he convinced to be virtuous would contribute to his own good name and repute. Note that at one point in CH, Virtue says to Heracles, "if you would turn onto my path, you certainly may become a good performer of noble and reverent deeds, and moreover I may become more honored and appear more distinguished for my goods" (2.27). By performing CH Prodicus was himself playing the role of Virtue to his audience. Just as Virtue hopes that Heracles would make her more honored and distinguished, Prodicus too surely hoped that he would become more honored and distinguished by portraying Virtue for all of Greece.

is profitable because only this life is rewarded with honor and, possibly, some sort of immortal good repute after death. For this reason, Hesiod was right to have argued that justice is the prudent way to live one's life. Of course, just as AI arguably failed to respond to all the challenges to justice, so too does CH. Indeed, in CH Virtue says explicitly that it is only *if* Heracles wants to be honored and remembered by posterity that he must adopt the virtuous way of life. For anyone who does not have such an aspiration or antecedent desire to be honored or remembered, the argument of CH will have very little purchase. Notably, Prodicus gives us a character who may have remained unmoved by Virtue's arguments: Vice herself appears to care only about pleasure and sensual indulgence. It is hard to imagine that all those challengers of justice who sympathized with Vice would have been convinced by Virtue's account of prospering and the best way of life. Yet for those not utterly corrupted by the basely hedonic lifestyle championed by Vice, Virtue's own promises and rebukes against her counterpart might have been enough to draw them down the correct path and convince them of the ultimate profitability of justice.

3.3 Democritus' Fragments

It may seem out of place to include Democritus in a chapter on sophistic discussions of justice. Democritus is best known as the pre-Socratic champion of atomism and is often studied as an important cosmologist or epistemologist. Given the importance of atomism, its influence on Epicurus and – through Epicurus – Lucretius and early modern science, this is not totally surprising. But it is surprising that Democritus has not been popularly recognized as an important ethical and political thinker as well. The vast majority of his verbatim fragments are ethical or political in nature; very few say

anything at all about metaphysics or cosmology.¹¹⁴ Yet there has been relatively little work done on his ethics and even less on his politics.¹¹⁵ Given that I here treat Democritus not as corroborating evidence that a philosophic position was maintained in the 5th century – as I earlier treated Aristophanes and Thucydides – but as an important player in the defense of justice in his own right, a few words of justification are in order.

The biographical evidence we have indicates that Democritus would have had ample opportunity to familiarize himself with the central debates regarding justice. We have reports that he traveled extensively to learn all that he could from anyone that would teach him, and we have his own words that he spent time in Athens, though without being recognized as an important intellectual there, the center of our debate.¹¹⁶ Moreover, we have reason to believe that he was familiar with the work of his fellow Abderite Protagoras, whose epistemological views our evidence suggests he attacked, and who almost certainly was a major voice in 5th century discussions about justice, society, and the individual's place within it.¹¹⁷ Finally – and most importantly – an unprejudiced

¹¹⁴ In his edition of the fragments, nine of the fragments Taylor (1999) prints as genuine are epistemological in nature, only eight can (loosely) be classified as cosmological or natural, while 139 concern ethics or politics (DK includes an additional hundred genuine Democritean ethical fragments). The status of the ethical fragments has proven to be an insoluble problem. Although we have solid ground for considering a number of them *ipsissima verba* of Democritus, our evidence for most of the fragments is much less secure. A large number of the fragments printed in DK are gnomic one-liners and many of the longer, more substantive fragments come from Stobaeus' anthology and are attributed either to Democritus or 'Democritus'. I do not rely on any of the gnomic fragments in this dissertation, though I do make use of Stobaeus' fragments, including those attributed to 'Democritus'. It seems clear that many of these fragments ultimately derive from authentic Democritean work. For this reason it is generally thought reasonable to use these fragments to support a line of interpretation based on the more trustworthy fragments, although it is better not to use these fragments alone to substantiate a claim or a view.

¹¹⁵ Two notable exceptions to the dearth of work on his political thought are Nill (1985) and Procopé (1989/1990).

¹¹⁶ On the reports of his travelling, see DK68, A1. For his own words, B116.

¹¹⁷ The relationship between Democritus and Protagoras is a matter of some trouble. We have reports that Democritus took Protagoras as a student. This is very difficult to believe, though, given that Protagoras was Democritus' elder by about 25 years. Indeed, it is unclear if they ever knew

reading of his work reveals that Democritus was responding to (what he saw as) the pernicious views of those who had challenged justice and advocated for injustice.¹¹⁸

Recall that Antiphon argued that it was profitable to act unjustly if one could escape both the punishment (ζημία) and the shame (αἰσχύνη) that normally followed from criminal behavior – he thought that this was possible if one practiced injustice in secret. Democritus was aware of this sort of view and opposed it. Responding to this issue, he explains, “for it is probable that the one barred from injustice by law will do wrong in secret, but that the one urged to do what should be done by persuasion will do nothing unfitting either in secret or openly” (DK 68, B181).¹¹⁹ Democritus recognized that those who are deterred only by the punitive power of the law may commit crimes in secret, just as Antiphon had suggested they should. Yet those who have received a proper ethical education, Democritus was confident, would refrain from breaking the laws even when they could do so without getting caught. “Even if you are alone, neither say nor do anything wicked; but learn to feel shame (αἰσχύνεσθαι) before yourself much more than before others” (B244). After receiving an appropriate education and developing a robust

each other personally, although they probably were aware of one another’s work. Sextus quite plausibly reports that Democritus argued against Protagoras’ epistemological views (A8). For a discussion of Democritus’ criticism of Protagoras, see the relevant sections of Mi-Kyoung Lee’s book *Epistemology after Protagoras* (2008), 181-251. If Democritus was aware of Protagoras’ epistemological views, he was in all likelihood familiar with his political views as well. The picture we get from Plato’s dialogues suggest that Protagoras’ epistemology could not be understood in isolation from at least some of his political views.

¹¹⁸ In fact, an unprejudiced reading of his fragments reveals that Democritus was interested in many different ethical and political issues, including psychology and the importance of an ethically rich education. The fragments suggest to me that he was the most sophisticated of all the 5th century defenders of justice. I will not be able discuss the full breadth of his interest in or his contributions to Greek ethics and politics in this chapter.

¹¹⁹ λάθρηι μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἡγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρηι οὔτε φανερώς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές. Translations of Democritus are my own, although I have profited by consulting Taylor (1999).

sense of shame, one becomes pained at the prospect of acting unjustly and thereby refrains.¹²⁰

In this fragment Democritus uses an infinitive (αἰσχύνεσθαι) derived from the noun Antiphon used in OT (αἰσχύνη). Given that both these texts are very brief and that both address the consequences one may or may not suffer from breaking the laws and acting unjustly, one is tempted to see one fragment as a response to the other. This possibility becomes more likely when we realize that although the noun αἰσχύνη was common in the 5th century, the verbal forms of it are not.¹²¹ Democritus' choice of this infinitive may reflect his opposition to the specific sort of view advanced by Antiphon, or some other writer using the same terminology. If this is on the right track, we should understand Democritus as invoking his concept of shame-before-oneself to expose the Antiphontic position as too simple. We may imagine him saying: 'Look here, you knave. Even if we escape feeling shame before others, we will not escape feeling shame before ourselves. There are other punishments for injustice besides punitive sanctions and popular opprobrium. We must still be just!' And what is true of this fragment is true of the others: when read in context, the fragments reveal a writer who was concerned to respond to the same views as the other 5th century defenders of justice discussed in this chapter.

A thorough reading of all the fragments reveals that Democritus attempted to defend a broadly traditional account of justice according to which the individual is benefitted through just behavior and ultimately has compelling, self-interested reasons to behave

¹²⁰ On shame in Greek thought in the period prior to Plato, see the wonderful discussion in Bernard Williams' *Shame and Necessity* (1993). It is quite surprising that Williams did not include a discussion of Democritus, for whom shame is an absolutely crucial feature of our ethical capacity as humans.

¹²¹ A TLG search revealed that outside of Democritus there are fewer than ten 5th century examples of the verb.

justly. Democritus makes (at least) two different types of arguments and, like AI, one of these arguments focuses on how important a properly functioning society is for the well-being of the citizens within it. The atomist vigorously argues that it is imprudent for an individual to practice injustice because their injustice threatens the proper functioning of the state, on which they and their prospects of prospering depend.¹²² We have already admitted that this general line of defense is fraught with difficulties. Although it may be true that an individual must live in a peaceful and ordered society if they are going to live well, it does not follow that they themselves need to be peaceful or orderly. Hence, here we leave this strategy behind and turn to Democritus' other strategy defending the just life.

In another argument, Democritus attempts to locate the success of the individual's life not in terms of External Goods but in terms of their psychological or mental well-being. He argues that External Goods – and above all, wealth – are not vital to the prospering of any individual. Along with this debunking of the importance of External Goods, one finds a corresponding appreciation of the internal life of the individual: one's mental or psychological states determine the quality of one's life. Democritus provides powerful and persuasive considerations to show that the practice of justice is conducive to

¹²² Consider Democritus' most important political fragment (B252): "How the city's affairs will be well-managed ought to be considered as the greatest of all things, and one ought not be contentious beyond what is reasonable, nor increase one's own strength beyond the common utility. For the city's being well-managed is the greatest source of success; and everything depends on this. And if this is preserved, everything is preserved. And if this is destroyed, everything is destroyed." This fragment advances what Procopé (1989, 310) calls "the primacy of the common good." Democritus advises that his readers not pursue any personal advantage that might threaten the city because he thought that without a properly functioning city, no individual could live a decent life. This advice appeals to the self-interest of the individual, who is supposed to recognize that harming the common good ultimately threatens their own good.

everyone's mental and psychological health, and therefore that justice, in contrast to injustice, advances their true self-interest.

To see that Democritus denied External Goods any great value, we must attend to his criticisms of (what he took to be) a vulgar conception of prospering held by some of his contemporaries. We can do this by attending to his use of the word 'εὐδαιμονία'. Bear in mind that before Plato's time this word did not have the philosophically rich meaning that we often ascribe to it. In WD, the word seemed to pick out the life full of divinely bestowed material riches as well as favorable social recognition and it retained its connotation with material wealth well into the 5th century. In Herodotus' *Histories*, for example, the *eudaimōn* people are explicitly contrasted with the poor, or πένητες (I, 133.1).¹²³ In this context, the word just serves to refer to the rich and this, as several commentators have already noted, is in keeping with the common use of the word at that time. So Arthur Adkins tells us, "in common usage the idea of material prosperity is much more evident in εὐδαιμονία than 'happiness' would suggest."¹²⁴ This is not to deny that it meant something like 'prospering', for the word certainly did mean just that. I mean only to say that it was often taken for granted that having External Goods and favorable social recognition was necessary for, and probably was even an important part of, the good and prosperous life.

We can see Democritus actively responding to this use of the word in B251, where he mockingly refers to a rich yet despotically run city as possessing καλεομένα εὐδαιμονία, before announcing that it would be much preferable to live in a poor democracy than under such despotism. The use of 'καλεομένα' in the fragment indicates Democritus'

¹²³ There are similar uses in Thucydides as well. See, for example, II 97, 5.

¹²⁴ See Adkins (1960, 257). What Adkins calls 'happiness', I call 'prospering'.

sincere doubt that wealth contributes to the well-being of the despotically run city. According to this fragment, money is not what makes a city truly prosperous; the same, naturally, was true for individuals as well. In fact, a surprisingly large number of the extant fragments are devoted to giving arguments or considerations to show that material possessions are not necessary for the good life and can even be harmful to an individual's true self-interest.¹²⁵

What, then, makes for the good life on Democritus' view? In yet another fragment emphasizing the fact that External Goods do not bring about a person's prospering, Democritus argues that it is the state of one's soul that determines whether one lives a successful and prosperous life. "Prospering [εὐδαιμονία] does not reside in herds or gold; the soul is the dwelling-place of the *daimôn*" (B171). Yet when one tries to specify what psychological state might lead to prospering, one discovers that this is in one way easy to do and in another way very difficult. The easy part comes from the first part of B189:

ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν βίον διάγειν ὥς
πλεῖστα εὐθυμηθέντι καὶ ἐλάχιστα ἀνηθέντι.

The best thing for a person is to live life as *euthumos* as possible and as least despondent as possible.

The best state of the soul is the state in which it is maximally *euthumos*. Unfortunately, though, it is not at all clear from the extant fragments how exactly Democritus conceived of *euthumia* (εὐθυμία), and the later doxographical reports do not settle the matter. What does it mean to be as *euthumos* as possible? This is the sense in which our question is

¹²⁵ I cannot discuss all the relevant fragments here, but several of the arguments one can reconstruct from them are quite persuasive, and at least one seems to anticipate the arguments Socrates makes against Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*. On Democritus' general view of money, External Goods, and the desire for them, see B224, B281 and B284. From fragments B219, B235, B283, and B284, one can reconstruct an argument against the pursuit of money and the pleasures it serves that very much anticipates Socrates' responses to Callicles.

very difficult. Some progress can be made by 1) noting that, etymologically, *euthumia* must mean having one's *thumos* (θυμός) in a good condition and 2) attending to earlier uses of the word.

Thumos is an important and frequently studied (if not well understood) feature of Homeric psychology. The word has a bewildering number of seemingly distinct, although presumably connected, uses in Homer's poems.¹²⁶ It is unclear whether *thumos* is one distinct and discrete element of an individual's psyche, or whether the term is merely one among many that can all refer to the same unified set of psychological functions.¹²⁷ An individual's *thumos* may motivate them: Homeric heroes often vocalize what their *thumos* urges them to do and they do this.¹²⁸ Yet other times heroes object to what their *thumos* 'says' and compels them to do, which suggests that the *thumos* is importantly distinct from the seat of deliberation and in some crucial respects operates independently of the agent that possesses it.¹²⁹ Elsewhere the *thumos* responds to heroes immediate surroundings in a way that is not evident to their conscious thinking.¹³⁰ The concept is quite nebulous and hard to pin down. Yet for all the lack of clarity around the word's meaning and precise referent, it is tolerably clear that the *thumos* is particularly important

¹²⁶ In *A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic* (1990, 2), Caroline Caswell analyzes all the occurrences of the word *thumos* in Homer and Hesiod and distinguishes five main categories of use. "The categories are as follows: 1) loss of consciousness/death 2) the cognitive or intellectual function, 3) the emotive function, 4) the deliberative function, and 5) the function of motivation."

¹²⁷ In *The Discovery of the Greek Mind* (1951), Bruno Snell influentially argued that the Homeric individual had no essential psychological unity. According to Snell, *thumos* was one discrete and distinct element of an individual's psychological make-up. A number of later scholars have challenged Snell's view, most notably Williams (1993), leading some to argue that *thumos* and Homer's other main psychological terms are not only not essentially different, but completely interchangeable.

¹²⁸ *Il.* XI, 403-410; XVII, 90-105; XXI, 552-570; XXII, 98-130. Pelliccia (1995) includes a helpful and very thorough treatment of the speech capabilities of the organs in Homer.

¹²⁹ *Il.* XXII, 122 and 385.

¹³⁰ Holmes (2010, 58-64).

for the emotions – one grieves, rejoices and seethes in the *thumos* – and that it serves as a dynamic force motivating individuals to act.

Moving forward towards the 5th century, the Greek psychological vocabulary in surviving texts becomes more precise and clear. *ψυχή*, for example, becomes the most important psychological term. It refers to the whole soul, which is contrasted with *σῶμα*, the body, and is understood to be the animating force in living beings.¹³¹ Later texts recognize *θυμός* as a part of the soul, retain its associations with emotion and motivations, and also expand the term's meaning by adding various other uses as well. In the lyric and elegiac poets, the *thumos* is closely associated with the true personality and ethical character of its agent. There is increasing agreement that to live a pleasant and contentful life an individual must possess a *thumos* that reacts appropriately to the world and external events, even when they are not hospitable to the agent's own interests and wishes.¹³² Following from the Homeric association with the emotions, later poets understand *thumos* as the seat of emotions and other subjective feelings, which an individual experiences in response to external stimuli. There seems to be a general consensus that a person with an undisturbed *thumos* will live more contentedly than others.

Democritus' use of *euthumia* (and the adjective *euthumos*) appears to be consonant with this earlier poetic tradition. As we shall see below, Democritus clearly understood *euthumia* to be closely associated with one's ethical character: my *thumos* responds to external events in negative or positive ways and this reflects well or badly on me. The

¹³¹ The first sharp distinction drawn between the body and soul is in Gorgias's "Encomium of Helen." See DK82, B11 and, for a helpful discussion, chapter two of Long (2015).

¹³² See the helpful discussion of the poets in Shirley Sullivan (1995, 59-67).

thumos can also be trained and nurtured into a better condition. *Euthumoi* individuals have used reason to cultivate their *thumos* appropriately (B236). Having thus trained their *thumos*, they experience less emotional turmoil and generally have a cautiously optimistic attitude towards the outside world (B3, B191). As in the poets, thumotic responses are understood to be subjective (by which I mean both that they vary depending on the subject and that the subject is somehow aware of them): they are emotions or feelings – whether positive or negative – elicited by external events. Another set of fragments stress the connection between *euthumia* and motivation (B159, B191). The *euthumoi* have a positive, forward-looking motivation and a strong sense of agency because, having understood their place in the world, they know what they are and are not able to accomplish. Taking this all together, we can say that *euthumia* is a psychological condition characterized by a confident and even joyful outlook about one's place in the world.

Crucial to this picture of *euthumia* is that it must prominently include a sort of positive appreciation or feeling about what one has done, what one will do, and how one gets on in the world. This feature of Democritus' concept explains why it has traditionally been translated by the English word 'cheerfulness'. This translation accurately captures the positive and subjective aspects of *euthumia*, but it may otherwise be misleading. It does not reflect the fact that achieving *euthumia* is an accomplishment: one must engage in training and nurturing to achieve this condition. Cheerfulness is also too trivial or superficial a word to capture the state Democritus is referring to, since, as we just saw, he thinks being as *euthumos* as possible is the best thing there is for a

human.¹³³ Democritus' term *euthumia* is better translated by the English word 'happiness'. This word is commonly used to refer to a subjective feeling or appreciation, it describes a robust and positive attitude towards one's place in the world, and it is certainly thought to be the sort of thing that can make our lives successful if we have sufficient quantity sustained over a long enough period of time. Hence, I suggest we translate *euthumia* as happiness (understanding this term according to our contemporary ideas about happiness) and understand the *euthumos* person as the one who has a full appreciation of their powers, rejoices at their active role in the world and is generally pleased with how their life is going.¹³⁴

Now consider Democritus' characterization of the *euthumos* individual (B174):

ὁ μὲν εὐθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ
νόμιμα καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ
ἀνακηδής ἐστιν· ὃς δ' ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῇ καὶ τὰ
χρή ἐόντα μὴ ἔρδῃ, τούτῳ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη,
ὅταν τευ ἀναμνησθῇ, καὶ δέδοικε καὶ ἑωυτὸν κακίζει.

The *euthumos* is impelled towards just and lawful deeds. They rejoice in sleep and wakefulness and are strengthened and free from worry. But the one who disregards justice and doesn't do what ought to be done, this person is pained at all such things when they remember them and fear and reproach themselves.

¹³³ This must be true of the word outside Democritus as well, as can be seen by attending to opposite of *euthumia*, *δυσθυμία*. At *Medea*, 691, this word is used to describe the dire emotional state that Medea is in. Medea believes that she has been wronged by her husband and ultimately kills the children she bore to him as part of her revenge. Her state is one of profound distress and sadness, not just a lack of cheer. The verb *δυσθυμέω* is used in similar ways. At Herodotus VIII, 100.3, Xerxes is deeply grieved and pained after losing a sea battle. Fearing that he will be punished because of his master's great distress, to which he has contributed by giving bad advice, one of Xerxes' advisers urges him: "μηδὲ δυσθύμεε". The emotion pinpointed by these words must be something like despondency or despair.

¹³⁴ *Euthumia* must not, of course, be confused with *eudaimonia*, though the latter has traditionally been translated with 'happiness'. I have argued in Chapter I that *eudaimonia* should be translated by 'prospering'.

It is important to note that here Democritus says that *euthumoi* are impelled or carried towards just and lawful deeds (note the passive *ἐπιφερόμενος*).¹³⁵ Their just and lawful behavior is, I think, conceived of by Democritus as an expression of their own natural impulses. The sense in which one could naturally be impelled towards just and lawful deeds is elucidated in Democritus' discussion of education. "Nature and teaching are similar. For even teaching reshapes the man, and by reshaping it makes a second nature" (B33). When appropriately and successfully educated, individuals' characters are formed to such an extent that they come to accept and internalize the precepts that they learn. Once this education is complete, they so identify with these precepts that their actions ultimately become expressions and affirmations of them.

The education that Democritus hoped individuals would receive derived from many places. He expected that formal teaching, friends, and even the laws would educate the citizens of a well-run city. It is clear that this education was expected to make the citizens better people and, ultimately, lead them towards just behavior and virtue (B179, B242). Yet beyond just making the citizens ethically upstanding individuals, the virtue imparted through education was supposed to profit them as well. "The laws wish to help people's lives and they are able to whenever people wish to do well. For they display their virtue to those who obey" (B248).¹³⁶ The virtue imparted from civic education benefits the

¹³⁵ I admit that one need not take *ἐπιφερόμενος* as a passive. Taylor (2002, 19) takes this as a middle and translates, "the cheerful man who undertakes right and lawful deeds". This is linguistically possible, but given its coordination with *εἰς* the passive translation seems preferable to me. Note that the passive does not require us to understand an external agent operating on the *euthumos* individual. We should understand one feature of the agent's psychological make-up – perhaps their *thumos* – as impelling them towards the just and lawful deeds that they do.

¹³⁶ There is an important ambiguity in the Greek here. The text says that the law shows *τὴν ἰδίην ἀρετὴν* to those who obey the law. This could mean the law shows its own virtue to those who obey it or, alternatively, that the law shows the individual their own virtue. Unfortunately, without the larger context of the fragment there is no sure way to decide the meaning here. My own

individual, whom it makes better and more prosperous. This explains why the *euthumoi* rejoice and are free from care. Having become virtuous, they naturally pursue just and lawful ends, and because they endorse the pursuit of these ends, they rejoice in this pursuit.

Democritus' remarks on civic education, *euthumia*, justice and virtue all lead to the conclusion that he believed the virtuous life was the best life, because (in some unspecified way) the virtuous person has the most appropriate mental and psychological states. This conclusion derives further support from a number of other fragments, which, although not discussing *euthumia* or virtue directly, address how an individual may live the best life and avoid the worst life. Consider the very remarkable B45:

ὁ ἀδικῶν τοῦ ἀδικουμένου κακοδαίμονέστερος.

The one doing injustice is more miserable than the one suffering it.

Some commentators have found the content of this fragment so Platonic that they have doubted its authenticity. Yet the considerations adduced are not at all convincing.¹³⁷ We

suspicion is that Democritus meant to say that the laws demonstrate the individual's own virtue to themselves. On this reading, the law helps to lead individuals to become virtuous by mandating good and edifying behavior and, in this way, cultivates the individual's own virtue. That being said, I am not sure it matters all that much how we translate these three words. For Democritus, the process of being educated involves internalizing a certain sort of socially sanctioned standard. If the law reflects these standards and demonstrates its own virtue, this may be so that those who follow them ultimately come to accept this virtue as their own.

¹³⁷ Guthrie thought the fragment was "astonishingly Socratic or Platonic", and therefore that it could not be truly Democritean. See his *History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol II (1965, 490). But why not? It is of course true that the sentiment is similar to the Socratic view advanced in the *Gorgias*, but to assume that either the historical Plato or Socrates must get the credit for first articulating such a view is a mistake. In fact, we have already seen that hundreds of years before Plato wrote, Hesiod had said much the same thing: "A man makes evil for himself when he makes evil for another. An evil plan is most evil to the one who plans it" (WD 266-67). It is true that both Democritus and Plato use participles formed from the verb ἀδικέω while Hesiod uses nouns and adjectives derived from κακός, but this is of no great importance. Philosophic thinkers like Democritus and Plato were willing to adapt poetic sentiments to fit their own purposes. Guthrie's grounds for suspicion seem to me no grounds at all.

have seen that Democritus believed individuals were benefited through virtue and just behavior; it would have been no great leap to think that individuals are harmed by the opposite sort of behavior. If this is correct, the practice of injustice is conceived of by Democritus as ultimately harmful to the unjust agent's well-being, and this would be a strong consideration in favor of the just life.

A number of other fragments indicate in what sense those who practice injustice might harm their soul and true self-interest through their unjust behavior. Consider the following two fragments, B262:

καὶ οἱ φυγῆς ἄξια ἔρδουσιν ἢ δεσμῶν, ἢ θωπῆς
ἄξιοι, καταψηφιστέον καὶ μὴ ἀπολύειν· ὃς δ' ἂν
παρὰ νόμον ἀπολύῃ κέρδει ὀρίζων ἢ ἡδονῇ,
ἀδικεῖ, καὶ οἱ τοῦτο ἐγκάρδιον¹³⁸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

And those who do things deserving exile or imprisonment, or
those who deserve a punishment, must be tried and not set free.
The one who, desiring profit or pleasure, frees them contrary to law
does injustice. And it is necessary that this weigh on their heart.

And B264:

μηδέν τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτοῦ
μηδέ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει
μηδεὶς εἰδῆσθαι ἢ οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι· ἀλλ' ἑωυτὸν
μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ
καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδέν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον.

Don't feel any more shame before other people than before
oneself; be no more willing to do something wicked if no one or
everyone will know it. Rather, be ashamed before yourself
most of all, and establish this law in your soul – so that

¹³⁸ This is a rare word in Classical Greek: a TLG search revealed only two extant examples in 5th century texts. The word seems to be related to a set of words combining an element of the human psychology with the prefix 'ἐν' in order to express a painful emotional state. On this, see Dover (1994), 220, who suggests these words be translated by some phrase including 'conscience.' I prefer to avoid this terminology because of the strong connotation conscience has with feelings of guilt, an emotion the Greeks may not have been familiar with, but I accept Dover's basic point.

you do not do anything unfitting.¹³⁹

The first of these fragments begins with a statement of the necessity of punishing those who do wrong. Democritus believed criminal acts threatened the stability and the proper functioning of the state. Because of this, he thought it was very important that punitive measures were in place to punish those who had committed injustices. Interestingly though, Democritus does not threaten punitive sanctions against those jurors who commit the injustice of releasing criminals from their due punishment. Instead, he insists they will suffer from psychological or emotional distress. The pleasure-seeking jurors have to live with the fact that they have perverted justice for their own trivial gains and committed the sort of injustice that could possibly harm the city, upon which they and their loved ones' own prospering ultimately depends. This sort of knowledge could 'weigh' on their heart, or (as we might say) make them feel terrible. The end of fragment B174 suggests that these jurors might also be anxious about having their own injustice discovered by others. All this, Democritus would have us understand, causes the sort of psychological distress that undermines an individual's *euthumia* and, consequently, their chance at prospering as well.

We have already seen the position of the second fragment anticipated in Democritus' earlier rejection of the Antiphontic-sounding position that anyone can escape shame and punishment if they practice injustice in secret. Both here and in the earlier fragment, Democritus insists that individuals should do no wrong and in both fragments, he

¹³⁹ What is the law that Democritus refers to? It cannot be that one must not do anything unfitting since this is the result or consequence of setting up the law (note the ὥστε). Presumably, then, τοῦτον νόμον refers backward and picks out the earlier part of the fragment. The law is that we should not be any more willing to do anything wicked if no one would know about it than if everyone would.

introduces the very important concept of shame as the psychological mechanism that will prevent unjust behavior. To understand the role of shame, one must recall how important education is in Democritus' philosophy. We have seen that once an individual has accepted and internalized the community's norms and precepts, these become features of their very nature. Democritus' great insight was to realize that the person tempted to violate these norms would – in being so tempted – be moved to violate a principle with which they identified. Hence, Democritus' focus on shame *before oneself*. Such a person would be psychologically divided or at odds with their own self, and, Democritus suggests, this psychological division would cause a great amount of distress. One might, for example, desire to acquire Midas' gold by assaulting him and taking it from him. Yet one may also sincerely believe that violent theft is wrong – perhaps one has even been infuriated and indignant at another who has assaulted a friend and stolen their possessions in the past. Having realized that one desires to do something that has produced such negative emotional responses in the past, shame will manifest itself and, in addition, if the agent nonetheless gives into temptation their integrity will be compromised.

It is entirely likely that Democritus saw shame operating both as a prospective deterrent against the general practice of injustice and as a retrospective punishment for having committing specific acts of injustice.¹⁴⁰ If properly educated, anyone tempted to commit injustice would be ashamed of their desire to do wrong. This would cause mild

¹⁴⁰ This might explain why Democritus uses the two most important shame-verbs, αἰσχύνεσθαι and αἰδεῖσθαι, at different points in his fragments (B179, B264, B244). One could serve to identify the prospective, 'deterrent' aspect of shame, the other to identify the painful, retrospective aspect of the emotion. Although the issue is complex and by no means uncontroversial, there is some scholarly support for thinking that generally speaking *aidōs* was used in the Classical Period as forward-looking and inhibitory whereas *aischunē* was used to pick out a backward-looking feeling that made people feel regret and experience pain over what they had done. See Konstan (2003).

psychological distress, but Democritus clearly hoped it would also prevent actual injustice. Shame would also presumably function as a punishment for those who had succumbed to their wicked temptations and actually dared to commit an injustice. Democritus apparently thought that these people would suffer a greater sort of psychological distress insofar as they realized that they have compromised their own integrity and betrayed their ethical commitments.

We can now see how shame operates as a ‘punishment’ for unjust and wicked actions. This, in turn, explains how Democritus could have maintained that the one who commits injustice is more miserable than the one who suffers it. The unjust person turns out to be the agent of their own psychological distress and assumes responsibility for their own lack of integrity. This, one might reasonably think, is a terrible and awful fate to suffer. As I understand Democritus, this is his most philosophically profound and psychologically astute response to those who had challenged justice. He begins by offering a battery of arguments designed to show that External Goods are not crucially important for the successful and prosperous life. He then argues that a person’s soul and mental state determine whether they will live prosperously. Finally, he offers his subtle psychological reflections to motivate the point that injustice serves to undermine the condition that makes a person confident, pleased by one’s place in the world, and which ultimately leads to prospering. Shame is the characteristic emotional indicator that an individual has violated their own principles. The painful expression of this psychological division is, according to Democritus, a sort of punishment one can expect for wrongdoing.

Following justice and endorsing the ethical precepts of one's education and society, on the other hand, produces a good *thumos* and the appropriate psychological state for living well. The *euthumoi* are impelled towards just and lawful deeds, feeling no shame at all. They feel a robust sort of integrity and do what is correct and right; they live by constantly actualizing the ethical principles that they have come to internalize and accept, rejoicing in their own behavior, actions, and place in the world. It is easy to see how attractive the life of the *euthumos* is when contrasted with the psychologically divided, unjust individual. In his own way, then, Democritus thought the just life was profitable and ultimately the prudent life to live. He accepted the third and fifth theses of the Traditional View.

It should be obvious that this defense of justice is more akin to the later philosophical tradition, initiated by Socrates and Plato than to the tradition treated in this chapter. Democritus spurns the value of External Goods and instead locates prospering in the condition of the individual's soul. This relocating of value, or this reconceptualization of the human good, also allowed Democritus to offer a solution to the Problem of the Plurality of Goods, which I introduced in section 3.1. For him there is no need to choose between the pursuit of External Goods and the pursuit of the goods of the soul, since External Goods lack value absent the sort of psychological condition that would allow anyone to use these goods profitably. Democritus can claim that anyone would do best to ignore the siren's call of illicit riches or bodily pleasures and instead turn to the care of their soul. By taking this approach to the individual's prospering, Democritus goes further than the positions discussed earlier in this chapter. Indeed, he largely rejected the fourth thesis of the Traditional Goods – that what individuals get from just behavior is

External Goods – that was more or less accepted by AI and CH. This surely put some distance between his own view and the views of the average 5th century Greek, but it also gave his view a theoretical advantage over other defenders. It allowed him to resolve the Problem of the Plurality of Goods and give a univocal answer about how an individual should be oriented towards justice if they hoped to live the best life.

Yet for all its subtlety, Democritus' defense does have its problems. The greatest of them is that his argument presupposes the validity and appropriateness of a certain sort of ethical education. Only those who have learned to internalize the norms and precepts of their community will experience the 'punishment' of a divided psyche and the painful experience of shame when they go in for injustice and break the laws. Anyone educated to ruthlessly pursue their own interest would not, one assumes, feel similarly ambivalent about forsaking *dikē*. Yet why should we grant that the former sort of education is any better or more natural than the latter? In the extant fragments, Democritus offers no answer to this question. He seems to simply assume the validity of this sort of education, probably because it was similar to the way in which the Greeks actually educated their citizens and, I suspect, because he thought that cultivating the emotion of shame would promote the harmony and efficiency of the *polis*. This is not, however, enough to justify the appropriateness or rightness of one particular educational practice, as Plato realized. In the *Gorgias*, Callicles complains that the Greeks educate people to believe in equality and to accept conventional justice (484a). But this, Callicles claims, is an affront to what nature reveals to be the proper way for 'the best and strongest' to act, which is to prey on the weak and to expand and then gratify their every desire. Although we might find this picture repellent or disgusting, we cannot simply ignore Callicles' advice or the

philosophical commitments. Rather, one needs to defend the system of education that produces an attachment to the laws and the consequent feeling of shame when one acts unfairly.

For this reason, Democritus owes us a defense of the education that one finds so prominently in his fragments. In order to meet the Calliclean objection, this defense must show that such an education is correct, just, or in some other way better than the alternative.¹⁴¹ Without such a defense, one might accuse Democritus' thought of a vicious circularity. It may be profitable and therefore prudent for individuals to avoid practicing injustice once they have received an education that causes pain when one goes in for injustice, but it was open to the challengers to respond that this is only because they were educated to feel that way. Any challenger could reject Democritus' argument and continue to maintain that, absent an early brainwashing, the practice of intelligent injustice is the most prudent and profitable way to live one's life.

3.4 An Honorary Inclusion

At a number of points, I have mentioned the earliest and most influential of the sophists, Protagoras, and his role in the 5th century debate regarding justice. I want briefly to consider Plato's presentation of him in the dialogue *Protagoras*, where he delivers a 'Great Speech' that, among other things, includes a powerful defense of justice. This

¹⁴¹ Melissa Lane has suggested to me that the resources for such a defense are contained within the Democritean fragments. Her thought is the following: if 1) humans naturally pursue their own prospering and do so by entering into political communities, and 2) by educating themselves to develop the social emotions they will cohabit more peacefully and productively, then 3) there is a sense in which the education may be seen as serving the natural aim we all have of prospering. I do not deny that Democritus had the resources to make such an argument, but I cannot find any evidence in the fragments that he did make an argument along these lines. In particular, 3 strikes me as something Democritus would not have said and, therefore, I hesitate to attribute the argument to him,

defense bears some remarkable similarities to AI, CH, and to the views advanced in Democritus' fragments. Attending to the speech will be useful for two reasons. First, a growing number of scholars feel confident that we can find the views of the historical Protagoras in the Great Speech.¹⁴² (Although I am broadly in agreement with these scholars, I will not try to defend this view here.)¹⁴³ Those who are sympathetic to this scholarly trend will find in the *Protagoras* evidence of another authentic 5th century defense of justice. Yet even those who are uncomfortable using Plato as evidence for the sophists' thought and refuse to recognize the historical Protagoras in this dialogue will concede that Plato was drawing from earlier sophistic sources when he wrote the *Protagoras*. The similarities between the Great Speech and the views of the genuine defenders of justice are too remarkable to be coincidental. This shows that Plato was aware of these defenses of justice – a fact important to establish in its own right. It also allows us to read Socrates' response to Protagoras as a Platonic response to the sophistic defenses that inspired the Protagorean sections of this dialogue.

We first note that the account of humanity's original condition and their transition into society contained within the mythological part of Protagoras' Great Speech is rather similar to the account presented in AI. Indeed, the broad outlines are so similar that the two must be considered two versions of the same theory. Just like AI, Protagoras

¹⁴² An early example of a recent scholar who argues for the basic fidelity of the Great Speech is Michael Nill (1985; chapter two, particularly pages 14-22). The attempt to reconstruct the accurate views of the historical Protagoras from Plato's work was invigorated with the publication of Edward Schiappa's *Protagoras and Logos* (1989, particularly 180-7). For an up-to-date treatment of the historical fidelity of Protagoras' speech, see Ophuijsen et al. (2013).

¹⁴³ Not only would such a defense take too long, it would distract from the focus of these chapters. I have taken pains to show that we are able to reconstruct the 5th century debate regarding justice in a fairly robust way without having recourse to any 4th century, post-sophistic figures who are commenting on this debate.

maintains that human beings are not the sort of creatures who can live successfully as isolated individuals or in isolated families. He explains that in their original condition, animal predators destroyed isolated humans because they were weaker than animals in every relevant way (322a-b). In order to survive and defend themselves, our ancestors had to become social and enter into political communities. This, of course, parallels AI's contention that early humans were forced by the yoke of necessity to enter into communal life. According to Protagoras, though, humanity's first attempts to save themselves failed because humans had not yet acquired justice or learned how to live successfully with one another (322b):

ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις:
ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες
τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην

They sought to assemble and save themselves by founding
cities, yet when they assembled they were unjust to one
another because they did not have the political craft.

Thus, they scattered [σκεδαννόμενοι] out of communities and suffered great hardships yet again (322b). This parallels – and perhaps even dramatizes – AI's claim that to live in an unjust society is worse than living in isolation. Presumably, these early humans 'scattered' into relative isolation after failing to found a successful political community, because they preferred to live alone than to live in a state of unjust aggression. Protagoras is clear that humans needed to acquire justice, as well as other social traits, before they could successfully form the sorts of political communities that provide security from the animals and allow individuals to live well (322c). Thus, as in AI, not just any sort of political community will do: what is needed is a political community where everyone is oriented towards justice and behaves in a generally co-operative way.

The upshot of this part of the Great Speech is similar to the one drawn in AI as well. Protagoras takes himself to have shown both that it is necessary for every individual in a community to behave justly and that justice is beneficial for the individual (324e-325a). This provides the justification for Protagoras' contention that justice is profitable to the individual. Since following justice is a precondition of membership in the sort of political community that affords people an opportunity to live a prosperous life, justice is profitable insofar as it is an indispensable means to living well. I have remarked on a number of occasions that this particular strategy for defending justice is fraught with difficulties. It simply is not true that every member of a community must behave justly in order for the community to function well enough to protect the members within it, and Plato's Protagoras was wrong to imply otherwise. That the view in the Great Speech shares the same defect with the view found in AI, however, further suggests that these are two versions of the same theory.

Moving on to the second half of the Great Speech, Protagoras abandons his mythological style of presentation and offers an argument to show that everyone believes "all humans have a share of justice and the rest of civic virtue" (323a). In the course of this argument, he gives a detailed explanation of how he thinks ethical education works, which bears many affinities to Democritus' own understanding. I have already called attention to the fragments in which Democritus suggests that the laws inculcate virtue into their citizens and help promote a prosperous existence (B242 and B248). Consider also this important Democritean fragment (B179): "Children who are allowed not to suffer pains...would not learn letters or music or athletics or, what maintains virtue above all, feeling shame [τό αἰδεῖσθαι]; for it is especially from these things that shame [αἰδώς]

tends to arise.” In his own discussion on the subject, Protagoras also speaks of a process of civic education that is ultimately designed to produce virtue in its students (323c-326e); he mentions music (326a-b), physical exercise (326b-c), and laws (326d) as educational devices that help cultivate virtue in their citizens; and he even compares the whole process of learning from the laws to learning one’s letters. Just as writing teachers sketch out the letters so that the students may trace over them and learn their pattern, so the laws present models of behavior that the citizens are expected to follow in order to become mature ethical agents (326d-e). The similarities are obvious.

It is not merely the process of education that is similar to the one developed in Democritus’ fragments: the goal of this sort of education and the emotional mechanisms by which this goal is accomplished are also very similar. In both treatments, virtue is the stated end of this educational process and in both treatments, shame is stressed as a crucial linchpin of this virtue. In the mythological section of the Great Speech, Protagoras tells his listeners that in order for communities to function properly every member must have a developed sense of ‘αἰδώς’. We are told that those who cannot partake in shame must be put to death as “a pestilence to the city” (322d). In the non-mythological and argumentative section of his presentation, Protagoras switches from using *aidōs* and instead adopts the terminology of temperance [σωφροσύνη]. Since he treats these words as functionally equivalent, we can use the latter to elucidate his earlier claim that a city cannot function unless its citizens partake in shame. His point must be that people who are going to be members of a functioning community require the sort of emotive or affective responses that will prevent them from engaging in intemperate actions. The person who feels shame experiences a strong psychological check that hinders them from

overindulging, taking more than they should, or from over-stepping the limits of their station. If this is correct, *aidōs* functions as a deterrent to inappropriate behavior for Protagoras and closely parallels the prospective function of shame that we identified in Democritus' thought. Here is yet another link to Democritus' understanding of the ethical emotions.

This brief discussion is enough to show that there are significant links between the substance of Protagoras' account and the defenders of justice discussed earlier in this chapter. I will conclude this discussion by also mentioning the form of Protagoras' speech. In the first half of his speech, Protagoras tells a mythological story designed to convey an account of how human beings originally left their isolated natural state and why we alone of all the animals can behave virtuously. Two things are notable about the mythological medium. First, it is arguably the same medium used in CH. Prodicus used a recurrent literary trope and a traditional mythical framework to present his own views regarding the best human life.

Unlike Prodicus, though, Plato's Protagoras does not use the figure of Heracles to make his point. Instead, he uses the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus, which is told at length in the *Theogony* (507-613) and mentioned in an adumbrated form in WD (42-68). In addition to this, Protagoras' myth also makes reference to Zeus giving justice to human beings so that they would not be destroyed by the violent animals. This part of his myth obviously draws inspiration from an important section of WD, discussed at some length in Chapter I, where Zeus establishes a law that all humans should follow justice. In my commentary on that passage, I argued that we should understand it as WD's way of indicating that justice was natural to humanity. It comes as no surprise, then, that

Protagoras holds that an individual is not fully human without a share in justice (323c). Plato's Protagoras presents a myth that is steeped in Hesiodic imagery, ideas, and parallels, although his own view is best understood as a non-mythological version of this myth. By having Protagoras use Hesiodic lore to convey the central parts of his defense of justice, Plato is, I think, hinting that this sophistic defense – and probably sophistic defenses of justice more generally – should be understood as secularized and modernized developments of Hesiod's original view.¹⁴⁴ This lends extra support to the attempt offered in this chapter to read these defenders as offering a modernized-yet-substantially-Hesiodic account of the Traditional View of Justice.

In closing, I would like to briefly discuss Socrates' response to the Great Speech as a way of accessing Plato's evaluation of Protagoras' defense of justice.¹⁴⁵ In the later parts of the dialogue, Socrates argues both for the unity of all the virtues and for the thesis that acting virtuously is always beneficial to the agent, whereas acting unjustly and viciously is always harmful. Given that his Great Speech offered a defense of justice, one would

¹⁴⁴ There is, of course, also another important reason for Protagoras to use the myth for his own purposes in the dialogue. His myth can be read as yet another response to certain claims made by the challengers of justice. I argued in the previous chapter that the challengers posited a certain picture of human nature, complemented by an account of humanity's development into communities governed by norms and rules, as a part of their attempt to overturn the traditional account of justice. For these challengers, laying out the history of our species' development that they believed was hidden by Hesiod's religious framework was supposed to contribute to a critique that would allow the reader to see that injustice was the path leading to the most External Goods and the prosperous life. In Protagoras' Great Speech, a different yet equally non-religious account of humanity's history is presented, which is intended to support the Traditional View. Thus, the defense of justice presented in Protagoras' Great Speech can be read as an attempt to show that the Traditional View of Justice did not totally depend on the existence of the gods in the way Hesiod and the challengers of justice believed it to.

¹⁴⁵ I can only begin to scratch the surface of this topic here. A complete analysis of Plato's reaction to the account of justice presented in Protagoras' Great Speech would require an article-length treatment. To my knowledge, no such treatment exists. There is a short discussion of this issue in Nill (1985, 42-50), which I have profited from reading. See also J. Cooper (2004), 252-3. Still, this topic deserves more sustained study.

imagine that Protagoras should be sympathetic to Socrates' view. Yet he is quite skeptical of many points Socrates makes and he has to be dragged against his will to agree with Socrates. Protagoras finds it very difficult, for example, to agree that the courageous person benefits themselves by going to war, whereas the coward is harmed by refusing to fight (359c-e). At one point, Socrates even appears to bring Protagoras to the point where he is willing to admit that people can be benefitted through unjust action (333d). I assume this is intentional on Plato's part: he exploits the drama of the dialogue to make an important point about Protagoras' claims regarding the profitability of virtue. His responses to Socrates' own position reveals that he is not the champion of the virtues he presents himself to be.

Indeed, I take it that one of the purposes of the second half of *Protagoras* is to demonstrate dramatically how the defense of justice contained within the Great Speech fails. This defense operates on the assumption that the possession of justice is a necessary precondition of membership in the sort of community that can facilitate the life that allows for human prospering. As we have seen above, there are a number of problems with this view. It is implausible that every individual actually needs to behave justly in order to be part of such a community: unjust free riders can cohabit with just citizens without society crumbling. In addition, even if this defense of justice succeeds on its own terms, it can only show that some of the effects of justice are profitable. It is completely compatible with thinking that the practice of justice is harmful by its own nature. By juxtaposing Protagoras' position with Socrates' position, which truly is committed to the view that right and just action always benefits the just agent, and having Protagoras shudder at accepting Socrates' conclusions, Plato is registering his doubts that

Protagoras' view is in any position to defend the Traditional View of Justice.¹⁴⁶ Even before Plato wrote his *Republic*, he was aware of the problems with defending justice by arguing that some of its effects were beneficial to the individual.

Plato's diagnosis of the failures of Protagoras' Great Speech complements our own, independent analyses of the defenses found in the sophistic works AI, CH, and Democritus' fragments. Each of these thinkers made powerful arguments attempting to show that it is profitable and prudent for the individual to live in a just society. Each successfully landed some blows on the challengers of justice and responded effectively to certain claims made by them. Yet none was able to completely justify the life of justice. None decisively showed that following justice was the profitable and prudent way for individuals to live their life. For those who were concerned to demonstrate that the just life was the best life for the individual to live, more work was left to do. Plato took up this work in the following century.

¹⁴⁶ This is not only true of justice: it is also true of shame. I have stressed above that Protagoras' account of shame and its place within the political community paralleled the arguments made in Democritus' fragments. But as we have seen, shame in Democritus is understood to be a painful emotion – at times it is even understood as a punishment of sorts. There is no reason to think that shame as conceived of by Protagoras did not have the painful, divisive, and even punitive features that it had in Democritus' account. Although it functioned as a crucial emotion binding the members of society together, it could also be a painful and harmful emotion to experience. Thus, shame might be in-itself harmful, even if it is necessary for membership in a successful political community.

Chapter 3

Plato's Defense of Justice: The Division of Goods

Part 1

Introduction

The central question of Plato's *Republic* is: Will the just individual always live a more prosperous life than the unjust individual? Is justice more profitable than injustice? In Book I, Socrates answers in the affirmative and defends his position against the sophist Thrasymachus, who boldly argues that injustice is more profitable than justice. Yet by the end of this book no one – not Thrasymachus, nor any member of the audience, nor Socrates himself – finds his defense of justice satisfactory.

Book II begins with Glaucon announcing his dissatisfaction. Socrates, he claims, has not persuaded his listeners that “it is in every way better to be just than unjust” (357b1-2).¹⁴⁷ Glaucon then articulates the famous division of goods in order to inject some much-needed conceptual clarity into the disagreement between Thrasymachus and Socrates. He distinguishes and describes three kinds of goods.

The first (Kind-A; 357b5-8) is the kind which:

δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι, οἷον τὸ χαίρειν

¹⁴⁷Translations of Plato are my own and follow Burnet's edition of the Greek text (1902). Because previous discussions of the division of goods have floundered on terminological confusions, I translate rather literally.

καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα
χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

We would choose to have, not desiring the things coming from it, but welcoming it for the sake of itself: rejoicing, for example, and the pleasures that are harmless and from which – because of themselves – nothing comes to be afterwards other than rejoicing.

The second (Kind-B; 357c1-c3) is that which:

αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ
γιγνομένων, οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ
ὕγιαίνειν. τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι’ ἀμφοτέρα ἀσπαζόμεθα.

We prize both on account of itself and the things that arise from it – knowing, for example, and seeing and being healthy. For I suppose we welcome such things because of both of these.

The final kind (Kind-C; 357c5-d1) is introduced in the following way:

τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ
ιάτρευσις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός. ταῦτα γὰρ
ἐπίπονα φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν
ἑαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν
τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.

There is athletic training and being treated while suffering and practicing medicine as well as the other money-making activities. For we would say these are onerous, but that they benefit us, and we would not choose to have them for the sake of themselves, but on account of the wages and the other things that arise from them.

When asked in which category he thinks justice belongs, Socrates answers that it belongs to the second kind. Anyone hoping to live a blessed life ought to prize justice both because of itself (δι’ αὐτό) and because of the things that arise from it (διὰ τὰ γυγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, 358a1-2). According to Socrates, justice is good because it contributes to one’s prospering in these two distinct respects.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Some have denied that the goods are to be understood in light of their contribution to the individual’s prospering. Most recently, Devereaux (2004) has maintained that Glaucon’s division applies to all goods, both those that are good insofar as they contribute to one’s well-being and

According to Glaucon, however, most people do not think about justice in this way. Like Thrasymachus, they place justice in the third class of goods: those that are good only because of what arises from them. To convince Socrates to respond to this view a second time, Glaucon and his brother Adeimantus offer a series of speeches arguing that the successful life of injustice is the most profitable life anyone can live. Their defense of injustice is so ordered, elegant, and powerful that it deserves to be classed among the greatest challenges to morality ever penned. But this bold defense of immoralism is meant only as a friendly test for the moralist. The brothers want to see justice win the day, we are told, and they have argued so powerfully in praise of vice only so that Socrates can respond to the strongest possible defense of injustice, and in this way show definitively that justice is the most profitable way of life. This has come to be known as the ‘challenge’ they make to Socrates in the *Republic*.¹⁴⁹

those that are good *simpliciter*. This interpretation of the division cannot be right. In the first place, it has the obnoxious consequence (owned by Devereaux) that Socrates’ project in the *Republic* is threefold: he must show that justice is (1) good in-itself, independently of any of its effects, (2) good in-itself because it has the effect of making the just agent prosper, and (3) good instrumentally because it wins the wages and reputations of justice. But Socrates’ project is clearly a two-part affair: he shows only that justice is good δι’ αὐτό and then that it is good διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, and he claims to do nothing more (I will have more to say about this below).

Yet another problem for Devereaux’s view is that already in Book I, Socrates indicates that the question being addressed in the dialogue is whether justice is profitable (344e1-3 and 347d8-e7), where this is meant as a question about the individual’s prospering (354c2-3). So when Glaucon opens Book II with the complaint that Socrates has not yet persuaded his audience that justice is better (ἀμείνων) than injustice, we are clearly meant to understand this as picking up the question of what contribution justice makes to our prospering. This is confirmed by Socrates’ response to Glaucon’s question about justice: he answers that justice is a Kind-B good by explaining that the person who wants to live well must care about justice (358a1-3). This shows that the division concerns only those goods that contribute to human prospering.

¹⁴⁹ It has become standard to call this “Glaucon’s Challenge” ever since Christopher Kirwan’s 1965 article by the same name. But his terminology is quite infelicitous. The expression encourages the idea that Glaucon is the only, or in any case the most important, interlocutor Socrates is responding to in the dialogue. And a number of scholars following Kirwan have thought just this: they have variously interpreted Adeimantus’ contribution to Book II as unimportant or as inconsistent with the position maintained by his brother. These interpretations

Socrates spends the remainder of the dialogue responding to this challenge and defending justice from the brothers' attacks. The greater part of books II through IX are given over to his demonstration that justice is valuable δι' αὐτό, and the second half of Book X is devoted to the value justice has διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Thus the structure of the *Republic* takes its cue from the division of goods that Glaucon makes at the outset of Book II. There is no doubt that properly understanding the division of goods and its relationship to the argument that follows is crucial for a full appreciation of the dialogue.

The Puzzle

Unfortunately, due to a number of dramatic, textual, and philosophic difficulties, it is not obvious how the division of goods is to be understood in relation to the argument that follows. One dramatic difficulty is that it is Glaucon, not Socrates, who initially carves up the distinction and, together with Adeimantus, exploits it to pose a philosophical challenge to Socrates. But already in Book I, Glaucon shows himself unable to follow everything Socrates says (347a7-b1), and, as the central parts of the dialogue indicate, both Glaucon and Adeimantus are lacking – indeed, are currently unable to acquire – all the information they need to appreciate the ultimate goodness of justice – or of anything else, for that matter (504b1-7 and 506d8-e5). Though Socrates agrees that the three kinds of goods mentioned are genuine goods, the dramatic cues of the dialogue suggest that

should be resisted. There is clear evidence that Plato intended Adeimantus' speech to be fully consistent with his brother's pronouncements. His contribution is introduced as an important continuation of Glaucon's earlier arguments (362d1-9 and 362e2-4), and at two points during his speech Adeimantus identifies his position with the one earlier taken by his brother (366d5-367a4 and 367b3-7). Moreover, neither Socrates nor Glaucon suggests that anything Adeimantus says is in tension with anything Glaucon says. We must offer an interpretation of the dialogue that respects this evidence, and if we retain the terminology of "challenge," we should call this passage "Glaucon and Adeimantus' challenge."

Glaucón's initial division might not be perfect. We must leave open the possibility of some misalignments or disagreements about how any particular good should be classified and why.

The division of goods poses even greater philosophical difficulties. More often than not, scholars have read Glaucon's division in such a way that it captures the familiar distinction between things valued as ends, which possess intrinsic goodness, and things valued as means, which possess only instrumental goodness. Consider the following account of intrinsic goodness: "Something is intrinsically valuable if it would be properly valued or desired or chosen for its own sake, when considered independently of its consequences." The same account holds that other things are instrumentally good when they are properly desirable "for reasons beyond themselves, usually their effects."¹⁵⁰ To many it has seemed obvious that Glaucon's example of pleasure is an example of an intrinsic good and the example of money-making activities is an example of an instrumental good. Thus it has become standard – even among non-specialists – to understand Kind-A goods as intrinsic goods, Kind-C goods as instrumental goods, and Kind-B goods as hybrid-goods, valued both intrinsically and instrumentally.¹⁵¹ Plato is

¹⁵⁰ Brandt (1961, 18-19). Although the concept of "intrinsic" continues to elicit significant scholarly controversy, Brandt's account of intrinsic and instrumental goodness is both important and relatively unobjectionable.

Since I don't believe they are relevant, I will ignore the distinction between intrinsic/extrinsic and final/instrumental value articulated by Korsgaard (1983) and take Brandt's account to be definitive of intrinsic goodness in the rest of this chapter.

¹⁵¹ Contemporary moral philosophers relish attributing these distinctions to Plato. For just one example chosen almost at random, consider the opening lines of Ben Bradley's "Extrinsic Value" (109): "In *Republic* 357, Plato distinguishes three kinds of goods . . . intrinsic goods, instrumental goods, and goods that are both intrinsic and instrumental."

often admired for first articulating these distinctions that have proved so influential in the history of philosophy.¹⁵²

This interpretation of the division runs into significant problems, however, as one can see by attending to Glaucon and Adeimantus' challenge. They argue that injustice is more profitable than justice partly because the successful unjust agent can, by maintaining a façade of virtue, win the rewards that come from being recognized as just. To isolate the value justice itself has, the brothers ask Socrates to show that the just person will be more prosperous than the unjust person even if the former has a reputation for injustice and incurs all the punishments of unjust behavior. They thus implore Socrates to ignore the things that arise from justice and demonstrate that the just life is more profitable by praising justice on account of itself (αὐτοῦ χάριν), for the sake of itself (αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα), because of itself (δι' αὐτό), or all on its own (αὐτὸ καθ'αὐτό).¹⁵³

Glaucon and Adeimantus offer a number of requests about how Socrates should show that justice itself – and not injustice – contributes to our prospering. For example, at one point Glaucon asks Socrates to praise justice by explaining what power it has all on its own (τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ'αὐτό, 358b5); elsewhere Adeimantus asks Socrates to show what justice and injustice do by their own powers (τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει τί δρᾷ) to the

¹⁵² Although it is not always explicit in their work, scholars have clearly admired the division of goods for just this reason. Bernard Williams's "Plato's Construction of Intrinsic Goodness" (2006) is a good example. Williams's discussion is characteristically deep, wide-ranging, and at times critical of Plato, but he is nonetheless impressed by Plato's project of showing that justice has final and intrinsic goodness.

¹⁵³ These prepositional expressions are used of justice or in the division of goods at 357c1, 357b6, 358a1, and 358b5 respectively. They are always used to identify the value or properties something has on its own, or in contrast to the value or properties it has due to what results from it. Although there may be some subtle differences in their meanings, Plato seems to use them interchangeably (at least when applied to justice in the *Republic*). I will use them interchangeably here.

one who possesses them, such that the former is the greatest good and the other is the greatest bad for a human (366e5-9); and finally, Adeimantus asks to be shown that justice is one of the goods valued for the sake of itself (αὐτῶν ἕνεκα) by being shown that justice all on its own aids the one who possesses it (αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησιν, 367c4-d4). In these passages, the brothers ask Socrates to show that justice is good by pointing to what it can and does do for the just agent.

The problem is that these requests all are requests for Socrates to praise justice because of itself, but none of them appears to be a request for him to praise justice as an intrinsic good. Consider Glaucon's desire to hear what the power of justice is while it is in the soul of the just agent. Because powers *do things*, he appears to be asking to be shown what justice does in a soul, or to be shown what effects it has. Similarly, when Adeimantus asks to hear what justice does by its own power, he seems to be asking to hear what effect justice itself has on the just agent. And the natural (although not the only) way to understand justice's "aiding" the one who possesses it is to understand that justice brings about some effect that is beneficial or helpful to the person in question.

These passages cast some doubt over the standard interpretation of Glaucon's division of goods. When Socrates categorizes justice as a Kind-B good he is thought to commit himself to the view that justice is both:

- 1) good intrinsically, or δι' αὐτό, and
- 2) good instrumentally, or διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἅπ' αὐτοῦ.

Yet when Glaucon and Adeimantus ask Socrates to show that justice is good δι' αὐτό they apparently want him to show that justice is valuable for the effects it produces in the soul of the just agent. But to value justice in virtue of the fact that it produces beneficial

effects on the soul is not to value justice as an intrinsic good. So the standard interpretation of the division of goods looks to be at odds with the explicit requests Glaucon and Adeimantus make in their challenge.

We are left to wonder whether the brothers expect Socrates to praise justice as intrinsically valuable or valuable because of its effects and, moreover, to wonder how we should understand Plato's project in the rest of the *Republic*. This is the puzzle that will occupy us for the remainder of this chapter and the next. How can we give a coherent interpretation of the division, the challenge, and the rest of the dialogue that also provides a satisfactory account of how Plato understands the contribution justice makes to εὐδαιμονία?

Two Possible Solutions

Two broad strategies for resolving our puzzle have been proposed in the literature. The first and historically dominant strategy accepts that Glaucon's division of goods articulates the familiar distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. According to this interpretation, Socrates' defense of justice δι' αὐτό does not invoke any causal consequences or effects of justice and Plato's project in the *Republic* is, therefore, to show that justice is intrinsically valuable. The second strategy takes seriously the statements made by Glaucon and Adeimantus in the course of their challenge and offers a reading of the division of goods informed by the request that Socrates praise justice by showing what justice does to the soul of the just agent. Accordingly, it allows that Socrates may include some consequences of justice in his praise of justice as good αὐτοῦ χάριν or δι' αὐτό. Thus, this second strategy denies that Plato is concerned with showing

that justice's value is primarily intrinsic. For reasons that will become clear in the next section, I will call these the 'No-Effects' and 'Yes-Effects' strategies.¹⁵⁴

Proponents of the No-Effects strategy include Mabbott (1937), Kirwan (1965), Reeve (1988), and Irwin (both 1977 and 1995). According to these scholars, during the defense of justice proper (in Books II-IX) Socrates may not include any of the causal consequences of justice in his demonstration that the just life is better than the unjust life.

According to the most sophisticated version of this strategy, Plato is to defend justice by showing that – properly understood – justice is a dominant part of prospering:

We can therefore sum up the claims that Plato is committed to in his defense of justice: (1) Justice is identical to a part of happiness. (2) It therefore contributes non-causally to happiness by being a part of it. (3) The nature of this non-causal contribution makes justice a dominant part of happiness. (4) It contributes causally to the other parts of happiness.¹⁵⁵

What it means to be a dominant part of prospering is helpfully illustrated by an analogy with health.¹⁵⁶ No one would be called perfectly healthy if they had a lame foot, so it is fair to say that possessing healthy feet contributes (however little) to one's overall health. But it does not do this by *causing* health – it sounds very strange to say my foot,

¹⁵⁴ For a number of reasons, the line between these two strategies cannot be drawn hard and fast. Some of the parties involved seem to disagree about what constitutes a consequence or what counts as an intrinsic good, which can blur otherwise clear lines and make their positions difficult to classify. There are also disagreements within each camp over how certain features of the division or later argument operate, but I will not discuss these inter-camp disagreements in what follows. One additional complication is that some scholars have advanced a hybrid-strategy, as I mentioned in footnote 2. Annas (1981) and Devereux (2004) hold that in the *Republic*, Socrates argues that justice is good δι' αὐτό both independently of its effects and for some of its effects, and in addition that it is valuable διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. I will limit my discussion of this view to the footnotes.

¹⁵⁵ See Irwin (1995, 193). Reeve (1988, 31) has a similar view, according to which Socrates is to demonstrate that the just life is better than the unjust life by showing that justice is a homoiomerous essential component of prospering.

¹⁵⁶ Irwin (1995, 193) mentions bodily health to illustrate his view. So too does Reeve in a later publication (2008, 73).

no matter how wonderful, causes my good health; rather, it contributes insofar as having perfect health includes a healthy foot as one of its constitutive parts. That being said, a healthy foot is not a dominant element of health in the way that justice is said to be a dominant part of happiness. To be a dominant part of health, something must be able to outweigh the ill-health of the rest of the body, and this is clearly not true of a foot. Someone who has a healthy foot but also suffers from terminal cancer is not all-things-considered healthy. Plausibly, however, the joint possession of a healthy brain and heart might be a dominant feature of our health. Even if the rest of my body is in tip-top shape I will not be as healthy as you, sickly though your extremities might be, if you have a healthy heart and brain while I do not.

For the sophisticated No-Effects theorist, justice contributes to prospering in the way that a healthy heart and brain contribute to one's health. It is a non-causal and dominant contribution *in virtue of the fact that it is a necessary and preponderant component of what it is to be prosperous*. Let an unjust person be well-off in all other respects and nonetheless, according to the No-Effects theorist, without justice in their soul they will be miserable, or at least more miserable than the person who has suffered every kind of misfortune but maintains a healthy and just soul. This theorist sees Socrates' project in Books II–IX of the *Republic* to be the demonstration that justice is the dominant element of our prospering. And because prospering is certainly intrinsically valuable, they can maintain that Plato holds justice to be intrinsically valuable as well. Of course, this theorist grants that Socrates may, in the second part of his argument, appeal to the beneficial causal consequences of justice; they only deny that these consequences are included in the praise of justice αὐτοῦ χάριν or δι' αὐτό.

On the face of it, the No-Effect strategy is very appealing. It respects the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value that Glaucon's division seems to articulate, and it relies on an analogy between justice and health that it draws from the dialogue itself (444c5-444e6). Nevertheless, close attention to the structure and argument of the *Republic* reveals that this strategy is highly problematic. One major problem is that – contrary to what one might expect on this interpretation – Socrates' defense of justice all on its own does not end with the analogy to health presented at the end of Book IV. In fact, most of the defense occurs after Book IV and much of what is added in Books V–IX seems to appeal to various consequences of justice.

There is a second and more significant objection to this strategy. If the No-Effects view is right, the whole of the *Republic* risks becoming an argumentative failure. As we have seen, this interpretation hinges on the fact that justice is a dominant part of εὐδαιμονία. It is therefore strange that Socrates never once attempts to define or even robustly characterize prospering, nor does he articulate a pre-theoretical conception of the good life that he could exploit for the purposes of explicating its relationship with justice. In fact, the reader of the *Republic* is left largely in the dark about the precise theoretical relationship between prospering and justice. If Plato intended to demonstrate that justice is more profitable than injustice because justice is itself a dominant part of prospering, he surely incurs the obligation to show *that* and *how* justice is a component of εὐδαιμονία. That Socrates never even attempts to do this is a significant problem for the No-Effects strategy. The proponent of this strategy seemingly must admit that the argument of the *Republic* is at best incomplete and at worst ill-conceived.

The main impetus behind the Yes-Effects strategy has derived from a recognition of the problems saddling earlier attempts to respond to our puzzle. Proponents of this strategy include Foster (1937), Sachs (1963), White (1984), Heinaman (2002), and Payne (2011). These scholars have been struck by the fact that both Glaucon and Adeimantus ask Socrates to praise justice by explaining what it does in the soul of the person who possesses it. Accordingly, they allow that Socrates may include a certain number of justice's consequences in his praise of justice itself for itself. Moreover, they tend to be suspicious of the idea that Plato was working with our own concept of consequence or intrinsic value, so they encourage us to try to understand Plato's work on its own terms.

At first glance, this strategy appears to face some difficulties. It must reject the standard interpretation of Glaucon's division of goods, which has *prima facie* plausibility, and it risks appearing rather arbitrary. Plato has Socrates say that justice is valuable both δι' αὐτό and διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. But if some consequences or effects of justice may be included in the discussion of its value δι' αὐτό, which ones are these? And why are others included in τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ?

Nevertheless, this strategy has many virtues. It paves the way for a reading of the initial division that is consistent with Glaucon and Adeimantus' challenge, and this lets it explain Socrates' strategy for defending justice in the remainder of the *Republic*. Moreover, a close analysis of Glaucon's division reveals that the standard interpretation is by no means uncontroversial and encounters considerable textual difficulties. Finally, if one accepts that the praise of justice itself for itself may include some of the consequences of justice, one can more easily reconstruct from the *Republic* a complete

argument in defense of the just life than the proponents of the No-Effects strategy can offer.

In this chapter and the next, I offer a new version of this strategy. I start by determining what the τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ relevant to justice are. This has not been the practice of scholars in the past: both No-Effects and Yes-Effects theorists have tended to focus on the value justice possesses in itself, but the *Republic* offers more numerous and explicit indications of the nature of the τὰ γινόμενα ἀπὸ justice than of the value justice has all on its own. Clearly articulating the results of justice allows one to better understand the initial division and, I will argue, shows that Glaucon never intended his goods to be understood along intrinsic and instrumental lines. To strengthen my interpretation, I then respond to two major objections. Finally, I offer a provisional argument that Socrates includes some of the consequences or effects of justice in his praise of justice δι’ αὐτό.

A Terminological Interlude

I have used the terminology of consequences or causal consequences above because this “consequence-terminology” is so prevalent in the literature. Indeed, recent contributors to this subject have self-consciously identified themselves as adherents of one of the two positions I have been calling the ‘No-Effects’ or ‘Yes-Effects’ strategies, and although the names given to these strategies differ, everyone agrees that there are two major positions in the literature and that these positions are divided on whether Plato permits the causal consequences of justice to be invoked in the defense of justice Socrates

offers in Books II–IX.¹⁵⁷

Nevertheless, I find this consequence terminology cumbersome, and I don't think it facilitates a deep appreciation of the philosophic issues at stake.¹⁵⁸ Except where I am referring to the views or positions of another author, I adopt "effect-terminology" and speak of justice's effects in what follows. Doing so has two benefits. First, it facilitates a clear distinction between my own view and those discussed above. Second, I hope that it facilitates an interpretation of Plato's dialogue that is unadulterated by familiar modern philosophical ideas. It seems to me that speaking about "valuing something's consequences" tends to prejudice interpretations in favor of the No-Effects strategy because this terminology elicits the expectation that we are discussing instrumental value. I suspect this has led many people to assume that intrinsic value, understood as the value something possesses independently of any consequences, must be lurking somewhere nearby. Therefore, I drop consequence-terminology in favor of the more neutral language of effects. For a similar reason, I avoid speaking of the defense of justice "itself for the sake of itself", or of the value justice possesses "itself." Although these may be more or less literal translations of αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ χάριν or the emphatic particle αὐτή when it is paired with δικαιοσύνη, they are too closely associated with contemporary discussions of intrinsic value. Instead, I speak of the defense of justice because of itself (δι' αὐτό) or the value justice has all on its own (αὐτὸ καθ'αὐτό).

¹⁵⁷ Payne (2011, 61), for example, says, "The crucial question for deciding between the inner-nature and the external-nature interpretation of Socrates' task is whether any of the consequences of justice are relevant to the task of praising justice for itself."

¹⁵⁸ I am in complete agreement with White's (1984, 394 and 404) criticisms of earlier views. He points out that many commentators have been misled by using the terminology of consequences, and he offers a number of valuable reasons to doubt that Plato would have been operating with the post-Humean conception of cause presupposed by many discussions in the literature.

A Different Starting Point

In this section, I argue that the explicit constraints placed on Socrates' defense of justice δι' αὐτό prohibit the invocation of only a certain, restricted class of justice's effects – namely, those deriving from the social and divine recognition of one's virtue. This allows that Socrates may invoke other effects in his defense.

Let us begin by asking a question that is not asked often enough. What are the *τά ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα* of justice? Because Socrates considers justice to be a Kind-B good, one that is valuable both because of itself and for the things that arise from it, we can give a preliminary and formal answer. The *τά ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα* are what Socrates must exclude from his defense of justice because of itself. Of course, this is not particularly helpful and we would do well to give a more substantive answer as well.

The following passage gives us a first indication of the flavor of what exactly must be excluded from Socrates' defense of justice δι' αὐτό (361b8-c3):

εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ
δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιοῦτόν εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ
δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος
εἴη. γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης.

If [the individual] will seem to be just, honors and gifts will accrue to the one seeming-to-be-so. It would then be unclear whether it was on account of justice or the gifts and honors that they were thus. So let them be naked of everything except justice.

As this passage suggests, Plato is particularly concerned to prevent the social rewards associated with being just from infecting his evaluation of justice. Consequently, these rewards must be entirely eliminated from the investigation of Books II–IX to ensure that justice's value is appreciated all on its own. In fact, there is an abundance of evidence – both within the *Republic* and without – that we should understand the *τά ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*

γυγνόμενα of justice to be the rewards and privileges bestowed upon an individual in virtue of recognition by gods and by other people. For this reason, I call them the ‘Reputational Rewards of Justice’. In this section, I offer two arguments showing that the Reputational Rewards exhaust the value justice has because of the things that arise from it. The first is based on a close reading of the *Republic* and the second on a comparison of Plato’s strategy for defending justice with the strategy used by his predecessors and contemporaries.

The argument from the evidence within the dialogue itself is straightforward and compelling. From Book II onward, at nearly every crucial juncture of the text either Socrates himself, Adeimantus, or Glaucon stresses that the prospering of the just individual must be evaluated independently of any considerations depending on social or divine recognition. In particular, Socrates is required to show that the just individual prospers even if their justice is not recognized by the citizens of their city or by the gods on high.

- 1) In the final lines of his speech, Adeimantus sums up the brothers’ challenge as follows (367e1-5):

μη οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη
ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν
ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι’ αὐτήν, ἐάντε λανθάνῃ ἐάντε μὴ θεοῦς
τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἢ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακόν ἐστι.

So then don’t only show by argument that justice is stronger
than injustice, but show too what each does because of itself to the
one possessing it. Show that the one is good, the other bad
whether or not one escapes the notice of gods and humans.

Adeimantus demands that the recognition of one’s justice or injustice be excluded from the defense of justice proper. He assumes that only by removing the social and

divine benefits associated with being just can one isolate and appreciate the value of justice all on its own for humans.

2) After the challenge is made, Socrates introduces the city–soul analogy so that the investigation into justice can be conducted more expeditiously. Once he has founded the city-in-speech, he returns to justice in the individual and exhorts his interlocutors to consider (427c6-d7):

ἐάν πως ἴδωμεν ποῦ ποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ
ποῦ ἡ ἀδικία, καὶ τί ἀλλήλοιν διαφέρειτον, καὶ
πότερον δεῖ κεκτηῖσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα
εἶναι, ἐάντελ' ἀνθρώπων ἐάντε μὴ πάντας θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους.

Whether somehow we might see wherever justice and
injustice are, and how they differ from one another, and
which those who are going to be prosperous ought to
possess, *whether or not they escape the notice of all gods and humans.*

Note how Socrates adopts the language used in Adeimantus' request and appears to be respecting the conditions imposed on him. He will investigate what justice and injustice do to the individual independently of any considerations related to their being noticed by humans or the gods.

3) Once Socrates has identified the nature of justice and injustice, he announces that what remains to be done is to consider which of the two will make the individual more prosperous (444e7-445a4):

Τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι
πότερον αὖ λυσιτελεῖ δίκαιά τε πράττειν καὶ καλὰ
ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἐάντε λανθάνῃ ἐάντε
μὴ τοιοῦτος ὢν, ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι, ἐάνπερ
μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος.

The remaining thing, then, as is likely, is for us to investigate again whether doing just things and practicing fine ones and being just is profitable – *if one goes unnoticed or not as such a person* – or if practicing injustice and being unjust is –

if one doesn't pay for it nor, by being punished, becomes better.

Although neither the gods nor other people are mentioned here, the repetition of *ἐάντε λανθάνῃ ἐάντε μὴ* is sufficient to show that Socrates means to exclude considerations based on the just person being recognized as just. The prospering of this person is to be compared to that of the unjust person, who must similarly be evaluated independently of anything they receive on account of being recognized as unjust.

4) After Socrates offers the first of his three proofs that the life of the just individual is better than the life of the unjust individual, we get a rather emphatic reminder of how important it is that this conclusion holds whether or not the just individual has been noticed by the gods or other humans (580b8-c8):

Μισθωσώμεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς
ἀνείπω ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸς τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ
δικαιοτάτον εὐδαίμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ'
εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὐτοῦ, τὸν
δὲ κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τοῦτον
δὲ αὖ τυγχάνειν ὄντα ὃς ἂν τυραννικῶς ταῖς
ἐαυτοῦ τε ὅτι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς πόλεως;
Ἀνειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη.
ἼΗ οὖν προσαναγορεύω, εἶπον, *ἐάντε λανθάνωσιν
τοιούτοι ὄντες ἐάντε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς;*

Should we hire a herald then, I said, or shall I myself
announce that the son of Ariston judged the best and most
just person to be most prosperous – the one who is most
kingly and king over themselves – and the worst and most
unjust person to be most miserable – the one who happens to
be most tyrannical and is most of all a tyrant over themselves and their city?
Let it be announced, he said.
Then should I announce it, I said, *whether or not they escape
the notice of all humans and gods as being such?*

In this passage, we are reminded that Socrates has respected the demand imposed on him. He has shown that the just person is more prosperous than the unjust person not

because of any social or divine rewards they may win from other people or the gods, but simply in virtue of the justice in their souls.

5) Finally, when Socrates is summing up his defense of justice in Books II-IX he says (612c7-d1):

Ἔδωκα ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν
ἄδικον δίκαιον· ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἡτεῖσθε, καὶ εἰ μὴ δυνατόν
εἶη ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὅμως
δοτέον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα, ἵνα αὐτὴ δικαιοσύνη
πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη.
I gave to you the just person seeming-to-be-unjust and the
unjust seeming-to-be-just. For you were thinking that even if
it would not be possible for such things to escape the notice
of gods and humans, *nevertheless this needed to be granted*
so that justice itself could be compared to injustice itself.

These passages all occur at crucial junctures of the *Republic*'s main argument. They either flag what we should expect to follow or summarize what has been argued, and for this reason they carry significant interpretive weight. We learn that the unnamed gods and humans play an important role in the dialogue; even though very little explicit discussion is devoted to these nebulous figures, they are always present in the background. They mediate the relationship between the seeming-to-be-just individual and the rewards and privileges that the many see as the reason to be just. The dichotomy between gods and humans also adds structure to a number of parts of the dialogue.¹⁵⁹ More relevant to our

¹⁵⁹ In Glaucon's contribution to the challenge, the rewards won by the unjust person are divided into those from other people and those from the gods (362c6-8). Adeimantus' main contribution is to evaluate the speeches that are currently made on behalf of justice, and he also carefully divides his discussion between the speeches that praise the benefits of justice coming from people (362e4-363a5) and those coming from the gods (363a5-363d5). Similarly, during Socrates' discussion of the stories to be told to young children in the just city, he first treats the stories that should and should not be told about the gods and heroes (377b11-392a2), and then turns to stories about humans (392a3-393b10). Finally, when Socrates turns to the wages and reputations of justice in Book X, he too divides his discussion of the rewards of virtue given to those who are

purposes, however, is the way the above passages expose the threat that social and divine recognition poses to an investigation of justice. Plato makes it absolutely obvious through these speeches that, to properly evaluate justice and injustice and understand their relationship to the prosperity of the individual, the consensus among the interlocutors is that one must exclude any divine or social rewards from bleeding into the value that justice possesses all on its own.

I take this to be crucial. There are no indications that Socrates objects to the constraints imposed on him by Plato's brothers. If anything, he finds very helpful their demand that he show the just individual to be more prosperous than the unjust individual whether or not they are recognized as just by any god or human. This presumably indicates that Plato himself wholeheartedly endorses this methodological constraint. Because there are no other effects of justice that Plato so systematically excludes from Socrates' defense of justice δι' αὐτό, we should conclude that the evidence within the *Republic* favors an interpretation that takes the τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα of justice to be exhausted by the benefits the just agent receives from the divine and social recognition they enjoy. This leaves open the possibility that the effects of justice independent of social or divine recognition are permitted in the defense of justice all on its own, running from Book II-IX.

Let us now turn to my second argument. At 366d3-367a4, Adeimantus makes a number of shocking claims relevant to our discussion. He says, to start, that the first of his contemporaries to come into the power of practicing injustice with impunity will be the first to practice injustice to the best of their ability. This is the current state of affairs,

still alive into a discussion of the divine ones first (612e2-613b8), and then the merely humans ones (613b9-613e5).

he says, because no one has yet praised justice without appealing to the wages, reputations, and honors of justice, or to the ignominy and punishments to which injustice normally leads. Yet Glaucon and Adeimantus have already argued that such considerations cannot convince intelligent youths such as themselves.¹⁶⁰ It is possible, after all, for an individual to indulge in the sweet fruits of injustice while claiming the rewards of virtue if they maintain a façade of righteousness. Interestingly though, Adeimantus concludes this part of his speech with the thought that he and his contemporaries would have spent their lives being scrupulously just, if they had only been taught earlier that justice is the greatest good a human can possess.

It is unclear why Plato has a relatively young interlocutor make such sweeping claims about early moral education. But one plausible way to read this passage is to detect Plato's own voice attempting to contrast the *Republic's* preferred method for defending justice with the method that he believed other authorities employed. The fact that a philosophically untrained youth can recognize the problems in previous attempts to defend the just life shows how urgently a better and more satisfying defense of justice is needed. I am suggesting, in other words, that through Adeimantus Plato is here announcing his intention to offer a *new* and *better* argument in defense of the just life.

¹⁶⁰ 368a1-5 indicates that shortly before the dramatic date of the *Republic*, Glaucon (1) had distinguished himself in battle and (2) had been eulogized by his *erastēs*, and thus was himself an *erōmenos*. Athenian citizens were unable to fight before the age of 18 or 20, depending on the location of the battle. Because Glaucon fought abroad, he must have been at least 20 during the battle, and thus older still at the time of his discussion with Socrates. Greek males, however, were not thought fit to be *erōmenos* once their beards became full. Although the age at which this happened varied, it is unlikely that Glaucon could have remained the appropriate object of affection for an older man long after his return from battle. He was, then, in his early (or maybe mid-) twenties during this dialogue. Adeimantus was probably a few years older (see Nails, 2002, 2-3 and 154-156). So the two brothers are still relatively young during the discussion of the *Republic*, and were certainly far from reaching their intellectual prime.

Where others have appealed to divine and social rewards, which could succeed only as a defense of apparent, not of real justice, he will defend justice by appealing to its true nature in the individual's soul.

Leaving aside for the moment the argument of the *Republic*, I would like to turn to Plato's implied claims about how his predecessors and contemporaries have defended justice. The extant evidence suggests that Plato is basically correct: previous defenders in fact appealed to the rewards, wages, gifts, and honors that an individual or community could win by being just, and goods that derive from social and divine recognition are particularly salient in their treatments. Beyond the examples Adeimantus gives, consider the evidence adduced in Chapter I showing that Hesiod praised justice as good primarily because it resulted in divinely bestowed wealth and reputation. Even though the gods dropped out of the picture in later defenses of justice, I argued in the previous chapter that both the "Anonymous Iamblichi" and Prodicus' "Choice of Hercules" maintain that justice pays largely because of reputation one acquires from acting virtuously. Both the Traditional View of Justice and the 5th century developments of it require that the just individual be recognized as just and rewarded for this.

The one possible exception to this sweeping claim about Plato's predecessors is Democritus. His thought does not seem to be as vulnerable as the others to Adeimantus' charges. The extant fragments do not defend the profitability of justice by appeal to any rewards, gifts, or honors an individual might win by being recognized as just. Rather, Democritus argues that the practice of injustice unsettles one's soul and leads one to experience shame and other disruptive emotions, all of which prevent one from living the best sort of life. As I suggested in Chapter II, this defense of justice was – much like

Socrates' in the *Republic* – rooted in an analysis of the soul of the just individual.

Perhaps, then, Plato is wrong to imply that all his predecessors defended the just life by appealing to the social and divine rewards of justice.

But two points must be noted. First, Democritus regularly helps himself to the claim that the unjust life is unprofitable partly because injustice is frequently discovered and punished. So even if his defense of justice does not rely on the recognition of gods or humans, he does seek to deter people from practicing injustice by invoking social and legal punishments, which manifestly require some recognition of unjust behavior.

Second, Plato never mentions Democritus in his writings, and as far as we can tell he was unaware of the sophistication of Democritus' ethical thought. It is possible that Plato had no exposure to Democritus' ethical works, and *a fortiori* that he had no exposure to Democritus' views about justice.¹⁶¹ Given these two facts, we might excuse Plato for implying that his strategy is novel and for indicating through Adeimantus' speech that his predecessors had all praised justice by appeal to wages, gifts, and honors resulting from social or divine recognition.

¹⁶¹ Many scholars find it incredible that Plato would not have known at least some of Democritus' works. Aristotle discusses Democritus and the atomists' scientific views extensively and apparently wrote a whole treatise on Democritus (now lost to us). This makes it likely that Democritus' texts would have been available for Plato's perusal at some point in his lifetime, and it is difficult to believe Plato would not have taken the opportunity to read them were they available. It is therefore surprising that Plato never mentions Democritus in his dialogues, and indeed many ancient authors were also perplexed by this fact. Diogenes' account of Democritus' life mentions a number of ancient authors who speculated about this conspicuous lacuna in Plato's corpus; one even suggested that Plato must have scrupulously expunged the atomist's name from his work out of sheer animosity (DK 68 A1). This is all wild guesswork, of course. The sad fact is that we are unlikely ever to know how much of Democritus' corpus Plato had access to. But even if we concede that Plato must have been aware of some of Democritus' philosophy, it does not follow that he must have known all of it. It is a notable fact that Aristotle never discusses Democritus' moral philosophy; he only ever discusses his natural philosophy. And in general, it was his physical theories that Democritus was best known for in the ancient world. This makes it reasonable to suppose that Plato might have been unaware of Democritus' ethical views.

Let us turn to Plato's contemporaries. Thinkers in the 4th century continued to praise justice by appeal to the social and divine rewards it or its appearance produces. To give just one striking example, consider Plato's philosophical and academic rival, the orator Isocrates. He extolls the practice of justice in a way strikingly similar to Adeimantus' discussion in Book II (*On the Peace*, 33 and *Antidosis*, 282):

Θαυμάζω δ' εἴ τις οἶεται τοὺς τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ
τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀσκοῦντας καρτερεῖν καὶ μένειν
ἐν τούτοις, ἐλπίζοντας ἔλαττον ἔξειν τῶν πονηρῶν,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡγουμένους καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ'
ἀνθρώποις πλέον οἴσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων.

I am astonished if anyone believes that those practicing piety and justice preserve and persist in them because they hope to have less than the wicked, rather than that it is because they suppose that they will carry away more than others from both gods and men.

χρὴ δὲ καὶ νῦν πλέον ἔχειν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι
νομίζειν παρὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν τοὺς εὐσεβεστάτους καὶ
τοὺς περὶ τὴν θεραπείαν τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιμελεστάτους
ὄντας, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἄριστα πρὸς τούτους
μεθ' ὧν ἂν οἰκῶσιν καὶ πολιτεύωνται δια κειμένους,
καὶ τοὺς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς εἶναι δοκοῦντας.

And you ought now suppose that they get more and, further, consider that those who are most pious and most careful in their service to the gods will continue to get more, and they get and will continue to get more from people who, because they are best disposed towards those with whom they live and practice politics, have the best reputation.

Parallels between these passages and Adeimantus' criticisms of contemporary moral educators are immediately apparent. Isocrates is working with the same dichotomy of gods and humans that operates in the *Republic* and is highlighted in Adeimantus' critique. Moreover, these Isocratean passages reveal their author's belief that someone will profit if they are in fact recognized as just or virtuous by others, and the author seemingly

recommends the cultivation of virtue for just this reason.

We should conclude, then, that Plato justifiably conceived of himself as doing something importantly different from all other attempts to defend the life of justice. He understood that his project contrasted with those of his predecessors and contemporaries, who standardly appealed to the social and divine rewards of just behavior, and to make it clear to his readers that his approach really differs from those others, he emphasizes that none of these rewards will figure in his own defense of the just life. One of the functions of Adeimantus' speech in Book II, and of Socrates' later echoes of it, is to advertise and emphasize all this: Plato's project in the *Republic* was different from and better than the projects undertaken by his predecessors and contemporaries.

Why is this important? I hope it is clear by now that Plato did not need to exclude all the effects of justice from his own defense in order to be doing something novel, important, and philosophically profound. He did not, in other words, need to prove that justice was an intrinsic good in order to improve upon the arguments made by his predecessors and contemporaries. He had already made a major advance in philosophy by arguing that justice benefits the individual independently of the social rewards and divine gifts that other Greeks thought of as the fruits of justice's labors. Because I can find no evidence that Plato believed himself not just to be excluding the gamut of goods standardly invoked by others, but also to be taking further steps to advance beyond their views, I conclude that he conceived of his own project as going beyond others' only insofar as it attempted to show that justice contributes to the just agent's prospering without invoking the effects of any sort of recognition. I take this, in turn, to corroborate and confirm my earlier argument, based on evidence internal to the dialogue, that the τὰ

ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα are exhausted by the Reputational Rewards of Justice.

The preceding has important implications for our understanding of Glaucon's division of goods and the argument of the *Republic*. My two arguments show that the only effects that must be excluded from Socrates' defense of justice all on its own are the Reputational Rewards. This is important because understanding the value that justice possesses διὰ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα gives us crucial insight into what Socrates understands justice's value δι' αὐτό to be. Because the two ways that Kind-B goods possess value are presented as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the goods' value, we can conclude that it is only the Reputational Rewards of Justice that are relegated to the things that arise from justice. Excluding divine and social rewards, though, leaves open quite a lot of conceptual space for other effects to be included in the praise of justice all on its own. I have not yet argued that such effects are in fact deployed in Socrates' praise of justice in Books II–IX, but I do take myself to have shown that there is a strong presumption in favor of thinking these beneficial effects, if there should be any, would be permitted in Socrates' defense.

Objections and Replies

I expect that readers sympathetic to the No-Effects strategy will object to this conclusion. Someone might say, “Your analysis can't be right. Glaucon's division of goods is a general schema intended to articulate the way we value goods, so the τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα must refer to all the beneficial effects of justice because that's how goods are divided up and valued!” This reaction is rather common in my experience, although it is less an objection to my argument than a denial of the possibility of the conclusion I am advancing. Nonetheless, a response is owed.

The first thing to say is that this objection simply ignores the evidence presented above. Plato consistently has his characters say, or in other ways indicate, that justice must be shown to be profitable whether or not it is recognized by others. This makes perfect sense if he hopes to exclude from his defense the particular social and divine benefits that accrue to those who are thought to be just. It would be very strange, and quite possibly misleading, if he so greatly emphasized the necessity of excluding those specific effects of justice when he actually meant to exclude all of justice's effects from consideration.

Perhaps more importantly, it is not at all obvious that Glaucon's division of goods was ever intended to isolate all the beneficial effects of Kind-B goods in the τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα. Consider that Kind-C goods are also valued (in this case, exclusively) because of the things that arise from them. The beneficial effects of the Kind-C goods are clearly supposed to parallel the τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα of the Kind-B goods.¹⁶² Yet the Kind-C goods are said to be valuable *on account of their wages* (τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν). If Glaucon means to give an account of valuing something for its general effects, the word “μισθός” is completely out of place. Outside the *Republic*, Plato uses this word almost exclusively to refer to monetary fees: a *misthos* is the remuneration one receives for one's work. There is absolutely no Platonic precedent for the word to refer to anything very

¹⁶² As Devereux (2004, 279) rightly notes (using his preferred translations): “Presumably the expressions ‘valued for themselves’ and ‘valued for their consequences’ have the same meaning as applied to the different types of goods.” Note that this only means that the value Kind-B goods possess on account of τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα is the same *in kind* as the value that Kind-C goods possess τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν. It does not follow that the valuable results will be the same or even of a similar magnitude. Book X makes clear that the things arising from justice are much more valuable than what arises from the Kind-C goods Glaucon describes in Book II. Nevertheless, I argue that both depend on divine or social recognition: they are the same *in kind*.

general and abstract, such as generic effects.¹⁶³ Thus it is not at all obvious – indeed, it seems to me positively unlikely – that even in the division of goods the Kind-C goods are presented as valued for all their beneficial results rather than for one restricted class of effects. And because the restricted class of effects that make the Kind-C good valuable clearly parallel the second type of value Kind-B goods possess, I deny that the τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γινόμενα include all the beneficial effects of the Kind-B goods as well.

I don’t pretend that this response will settle the issue. It is true that Glaucon says that we value Kind-C goods for their wages *as well as for the other things that arise from them*. It seems to me that the most natural way to understand these other things is as referring to other valuable results of the Kind-C goods that are similar in kind to wages (such as honor or reputation); nonetheless, my opponent could bite the bullet and insist that this clause refers more generally to all the possible beneficial effects of the good in question. I admit that the text of the division of goods is indeterminate here and does not decisively support either proposal.¹⁶⁴ But this means that any interpreter must argue for their preferred reading. It may be that dividing goods along instrumental and intrinsic

¹⁶³ A TLG search of the uses of μισθός in all cases and numbers yielded 72 instances in the Platonic corpus. Three of these occur in the spuria. Of the remaining 69, 32 appear in the *Republic* and 37 in the *Apology*, *Euthyphro*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Laws*. Outside the *Republic*, Plato uses this word to refer to money paid for services rendered. The majority of cases refer to money paid to teachers, and quite often to sophists. In one exceptional case (*Laws* 921e1), *misthoi* is used to refer to honors given as “pay” to those in the military. But none of the cases plausibly refers to the generic beneficial effects of an action, practice, or procedure.

¹⁶⁴ Incidentally, this is true of the Kind-A goods as well. Though scholars have been quick to assume these goods are valued independently of their consequences, the Greek does not straightforwardly support this assumption. In fact, the example of harmless pleasures is said to be valuable though nothing arises from them *except* rejoicing (μηδὲν διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα). My own view is that even Kind-A goods do have certain effects, such as rejoicing, though I will not argue this here. I mention this only to point out that the Greek does not clearly support the standard interpretation of the Kind-A goods either.

lines seems appropriate or natural to us, but it may not have seemed so to the Greeks. My No-Effects objector must give a substantive argument for interpreting Glaucon's division of goods in their preferred way. It is not enough to simply presume the correctness of a familiar conceptual distinction and then object to my interpretation for failing to respect this distinction.

Perhaps what I have just said will convince my objector that the initial division of goods does not, contrary to initial appearances, support their preferred reading. Yet, they will claim that in responding to the last objection I have opened myself up to an even greater one. I have insisted that the *τά ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα* of the Kind-B goods are valuable in the same way as the things that arise from the Kind-C goods. I have also argued at length that the *τά ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα* of the Kind-B goods are restricted to the divine and social rewards an individual can win by being recognized as just. On pain of incoherence, then, I must agree that the beneficial results of Kind-C goods also depend on divine and social rewards. But the examples Glaucon gives of Kind-C goods are athletic training (*τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι*), medical treatment while sick (*τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι*), and the practice of medicine and other money-making arts (*ἰατρειαὶς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός*). These examples are normally assumed to have as their constitutive ends and corresponding "wages" bodily fitness (or perhaps health), the restoration of good health, and monetary compensation. Yet neither fitness nor good health is a divine or a social reward, and neither of the processes that produce them normally depends on recognition of any kind. Thus my objector will claim that I have undermined my own view.

I grant that this is a serious objection. If I cannot offer a satisfactory response, my

interpretation of the division of goods will be far less plausible.¹⁶⁵ But I believe there is a response: we should deny that the constitutive ends of these practices furnish the wages that make them valuable. I argue that, according to Glaucon, people undergo athletic training for the sake of prizes and honors, they undergo medical treatment while sick in order to pursue other ends, such as making money or winning honor, and they practice medicine in order to receive a salary or to win social esteem – all beneficial effects that depend on divine or social recognition.

To facilitate my discussion, I begin with a close analysis of 357c5-d1, the initial presentation of the Kind-C goods. Here, again, is the text:

Τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, [1] ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ [2] ἰατρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; [3] ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, [4] τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ [5] τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.

Do you see some third sort of good [1] which includes athletic training and being treated while sick and [2] practicing medicine as well as the other money-making activities? [3] For we would say these are onerous, but that they benefit us, and we would not choose to have them for the sake of themselves, [4] but on account of the wages and [5] the other things that arise from them.

First, consider the structure of the passage. The text following my [1] and [2] presents three activities, practices, or procedures that Glaucon presents as *bona fide* Kind-C goods. I say three, rather than four, because the “τε καὶ” linking “practicing medicine”

¹⁶⁵ Yes-Effects theorists have not done a good job of meeting this objection in the past. Payne’s (2011) view, for example, seems to me to collapse in the face of it. He believes that (what I call) the Kind-B goods are valuable all on their own because of their “criterial benefits” and that (what I call) the Kind-C goods are valued for the same criterial benefits. Thus he takes the value Kind-B goods have “αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ χάριν” to be parallel with the value Kind-C goods have “τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.” But this, as the objection above correctly points out, is clearly wrong. We want the things that arise from the Kind-C goods to be parallel to the things that arise from the Kind-B goods.

and the “other money-making” activities in [2] indicates that these are meant to be taken as one unit. The “ἄλλος χρηματισμός” is almost epexegetic of “ἰατρεισίς”: it indicates that the money-making aspect of medicine is in the spotlight. For this reason, this example must have as its corresponding benefit the wages (understood in the standard monetary sense) mentioned in [4]. The two other examples mentioned in [1], athletic training and medical treatment, are meant to be read fairly closely together as well, although not as one unit. The “τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι” and “τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι” are both passive infinitives contrasting with the active practices of doctoring and the other money-making arts. Both have the physical condition of the body as their object, and neither athletic training nor medical treatment typically results in pay for the patient. The benefits arising from these activities and procedures are, then, not the wages of [3] but the “other things” mentioned in [4]. 357c5-d1 is thus perfectly chiasmic. The text of [2] collocates with that of [4], and [1] collocates with [5].

Turning to the substance of the passage, I understand the “ταῦτα” in [3] to refer backward. It has as its antecedents the athletic training, medical treatment, and doctoring of [1] and [2]. All of [3] justifies (γάρ) the claim that each example is, in fact, valuable in some sense, and therefore that they are all genuine *goods*. Glaucon’s point is that because “we” choose to engage in these practices for the wages and other things that arise from them, they must be desirable in some way. Even though they are themselves onerous, the fact that they are freely chosen indicates that the people choosing them recognize them as valuable and good.

The final thing to note about this passage is the two instances of verbs in the first person plural. Glaucon says that “we” say that each of these examples is beneficial and

would choose them for the sake of what results from them. This “we” in which he counts himself presumably includes individuals who think and feel like Glaucon. But who are these individuals?

As noted above, Glaucon is a relatively young interlocutor. He comes from a wealthy family and has all the characteristics of an entitled, aristocratic Athenian gentleman. He is repeatedly characterized as preoccupied with honor and glory, and as highly “spirited” as well – a condition associated with being quick to anger at perceived insults, robustly appreciating one’s own reputation, and having a penchant for war. Indeed, his own brother likens him to the victory-loving timocrat of Book VIII, who is dominated by love of victory and war-time pursuits. Although Socrates insists that Glaucon is better than the timocrat in a number of respects, the rest of the dialogue reveals that there is more than a grain of truth to Adeimantus’ appraisal (548d8-9). The first time Glaucon is mentioned in Book II, he is marked out as exceptionally courageous (357a2-3); a few pages later we learn that he distinguished himself in battle (368a2-3); and his righteous aristocratic anger flares when Socrates makes the provocative suggestion that the citizens of their city-in-speech should subsist on food normally reserved for livestock (372d4-5). In fact, Glaucon’s response to this suggestion is the proximate cause of *Kallipolis* needing to go to war (372c2-373e3). Unsurprisingly, the only constitutional suggestion Glaucon himself makes for the city is a law that encourages valorous behavior in war (468b12-c4). Over and over again Glaucon is presented as akin to the timocratic character. I assume, therefore, that the “we” Glaucon speaks on behalf of is the upper-class, Athenian gentleman with timocratic tendencies.

Socrates, on the other hand, is clearly characterized as having a philosophic

temperament (496a11-c5). This should not be thought to preclude his having a fruitful and interesting discussion with Glaucon. Far from it, in fact: they are obviously able to profit from their mutual exchange. Noting the difference in their characters, however, is the thin edge of the wedge that undermines the inviolability of Glaucon's own classification of the goods. For this introduces the real possibility that Socrates might disagree on small details of the division, or even that Glaucon and Socrates might disagree on the classification of any individual good and the reason for it. Indeed, we will see a concrete example of such a disagreement in the example of athletic training.

Enough with preliminaries: now to my response. Let us begin by noting that, sadly, the three examples of Kind-C goods are never elaborated on; nor are the precise effects on account of which each is valued specified. Glaucon quickly lists three practices or procedures, apparently expecting his interlocutors to understand his point, and then gives a general statement about how they possess value. This leaves us with precious little guidance on how we should think about these examples. Fortunately, though, we are later given a highly developed discussion of one Kind-C good: justice as the many conceive of it. In fact, this deserves to be regarded as the paradigmatic Kind-C good, not just because of the lengthy discussion it receives (four pages), but because Glaucon introduces the division of goods precisely to facilitate a resolution to Socrates' disagreement with Thrasymachus and the Thrasymachean many, who are explicitly said to place justice in the third class of goods. For this reason, Glaucon must have meant the three examples of Kind-C goods to be valued in the same way as the many value justice. Therefore, we can use the detailed discussion of 358a4-362c8 as a model to understand the examples of Kind-C goods given in the division itself.

According to Glaucon's elaboration of the many's view, justice originated in a sort of social contract. At one point, there was no justice and everyone wronged everyone else. Realizing that the gain to be had from harming others did not make up for the losses incurred from being harmed in turn, our ancestors collectively agreed neither harm nor be harmed. This, Glaucon tells us, is the essence of justice: it is "in the middle of what is best, harming and not paying the penalty, and the worst, being harmed and being unable to revenge oneself" (359a5-7). If we extrapolate from this account of justice's origin and essence, we can say that the end of justice is saving oneself from being harmed by others, or perhaps securing a co-operative and peaceful social existence for all. Yet it is perfectly clear from Glaucon's discussion that the feature of justice that the many claim to value is not that it preserves their bodily integrity or keeps the peace. Valued, instead, are the wages, rewards, and good reputation that result from being thought just, such as marrying one's children to whomever one wants, ruling in the city, and becoming dear to the gods (362b1-c5).¹⁶⁶ In fact, Glaucon begins his discussion by telling Socrates that the many believe justice to be a Kind-C good, one "of the onerous kind, which ought to be practiced *for the sake of wages and reputations*" (358a4-5); and his contribution is bookended with a similar point. He tells Socrates that the unjust individual who manages to seem just will win a good life *from the gods and other humans* (παρά θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, 362c6-7).

According to Glaucon, then, the many do not value justice for its proper end. They value it for the wages and other benefits arising from a reputation for justice. It does not

¹⁶⁶A version of this list is repeated at 613c8-e3, where Socrates finally gives his own discussion of the Reputational Rewards of Justice. Thus we can be confident that these are the wages really desired by the many.

follow that the many could not also come to value justice on account of its proper end – presumably, they would come to appreciate this if they were shown how terrible it is to live in the sort of lawless and unjust society experienced by their ancestors. But I take Glaucon’s speech to indicate that when the many ask themselves why it is good to practice justice, they answer in terms of the benefits they receive by being recognized as just by the gods or their fellow citizens. This is a promising finding. It suggests that we need not understand the wages of Kind-C goods to be their constitutive ends; we may look instead for other effects that make them valuable.

So what of the example *ιάτρευσις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός*? The point must be that neither the activity of healing another nor the activities involved in any other money-making practice are valued on their own. But then why did any Greek voluntarily practice *ιάτρευσις*? Practicing medicine was in many ways an unpleasant and unfortunate profession in ancient times. The Hippocratic treatise *Epidemic* reads as a catalog of disgusting injuries and excruciating deaths. Treating sufferers of such afflictions would have been very taxing, as ancient doctors themselves insisted. The author of the Hippocratic *Breaths* points out that although medicine is a great good for a society, it is often a great imposition on doctors themselves, who must see many terrible sights and touch many unpleasant things.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, practicing medicine could be dangerous. In Thucydides’ account of the plague, the historian goes out of his way to note that doctors died earlier and in larger numbers than the general population.¹⁶⁸ The question then is a pressing one: why would a Greek decide to practice medicine? Glaucon’s answer is that

¹⁶⁷ See *Breaths*, 1.

¹⁶⁸ *History* II, 47.

doctors practice medicine for the sake of monetary wages, and perhaps to a lesser extent for the social prestige doctoring brings.

What I have said so far is relatively uncontroversial, but we must unearth two important points lying just below the surface of this example. First, money-making is not the constitutive end of *ιάτρευσις*. In an attempt to convince Thrasymachus that the good political ruler does not rule in order to advance his own self-interest, Socrates makes a critical argument that the end of every craft is the benefit of whatever that craft is set over (341c4-342e11). Then in a second argument, Socrates further insists that the craftsman is in no way benefited by practicing their craft, but only by receiving a wage, which strictly speaking is the result of a secondary craft – the wage-earning craft (346d1-3):¹⁶⁹

οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστῳ αὕτη ἡ ὠφελία ἐστίν,
ἢ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι,
ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν.

Then this benefit, taking wages, is not from the practitioner's craft in each case. But if we ought to consider precisely: the doctoring craft produces health and the wage-making craft wages.

This shows that the constitutive end of medicine is not producing wealth for the doctor, but rather health for the patient.

Second, note that although healing a patient does not depend on social recognition of any kind, receiving wages for one's medical practice does in a number of ways. Doctors are paid only once they are recognized as having completed their task, often only when they have completed it successfully. Moreover, having the status of “doctor” or “healer” itself conferred a certain social recognition and status. Given the demands of medicine for the poor and sick, for example, Athens employed state-appointed doctors to serve the

¹⁶⁹ For a very helpful discussion and taxonomy of Socrates' arguments in Book I, see Barney (2008, 44-62).

city, a position that conferred significant prestige.¹⁷⁰ In addition, there were religious cults dedicated to both Asclepius and Health, and doctors could derive status and esteem from being inheritors of Asclepius' art or as the servants of Health.¹⁷¹

These two points directly bear on our investigation. Glaucon does not think his contemporaries value *ιάτρευσίς* for the practice itself or even for its constitutive end. The activities involved in treating others were often taxing or even dangerous, and although restoring a patient to health would no doubt have been recognized as beneficial for the patient and for society more generally, this neither made the practice of medicine worthwhile for individual doctors nor constituted their main motivation to work. Glaucon's answer to why the Greeks practiced medicine is clear: they were motivated by monetary wages, and perhaps social esteem.¹⁷² Presumably, Glaucon thought this was true for the other crafts as well. One person becomes a house-builder to earn a salary and another enters politics because they desire praise and honor. In each case, the activities are valued for the money and esteem that arise from them. For the practitioner of a craft, then, the ultimate value of their craft is not its constitutive end, but depends in one way or another on being recognized by others.

This too is a promising finding. Glaucon's examples of *ιάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός* can be interpreted in light of our discussion of the many's understanding of

¹⁷⁰ See Nutton (2004), 87, and the sources mentioned there.

¹⁷¹ On the cult of Health, see Emma Stafford's treatment of its importance in ancient Greece (2005, 120-135). Plato himself remarks that doctors possess a certain status because of their connection with Asclepius, at 405c7-408c4.

¹⁷² Some non-Platonic texts suggest that Glaucon is correct and that money is what doctors were really after. Aristophanes has one of his characters in *Plutus* say that where there are no *misthoi*, there are no doctors. The implication is clearly that wages are the reason doctors practice medicine (407-8):

τίς δῆτ' ἱατρός ἐστι νῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μισθὸς οὐδὲν ἔσται οὔθ' ἡ τέχνη.

justice. This vindicates the model developed above and our attempt to interpret the Kind-C goods as valuable for effects that depend on recognition of one sort or another. I turn now to apply our model to the remaining examples.

Although Plato no doubt believed that τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι produces strong bodies, in Book III the proper end of such training is said to be a well-conditioned spirited part and the overall good of the soul (410b1-c6 and 411e4-412a2). It is very unlikely that Glaucon included τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι in his division of goods on the grounds of the normatively-loaded assumption that the beneficial results of athletic training include a properly attuned spirit. Evidence from elsewhere in Plato's dialogues suggests that many Athenians assumed that athletic training served two distinct ends: training children in general physical education (which would have included basic training for war) and preparing youths for athletic competition.¹⁷³ One passage in Isocrates' *Antidosis* even suggests that the production of competitive athletes may have been the true concern of those who γυμνάζειν others, which has led at least a few scholars to make a different claim about the craft of athletic training.¹⁷⁴ Kyle, for instance, writes "A γυμναστής was a more specialized trainer, hired to prepare an athlete for competition, supervising his

¹⁷³ See, for example, *Laws* 764c5-7: "The fitting thing to do after this would be to establish officials for music and athletic training – and two for each of these: those for the sake of education in them and those for the sake of competition." See also *Politics* 1288b10-19, where Aristotle holds that the athletic trainer has the expertise to train students for competition, and Prichard (2003, 306): "The manifestly close relationship between physical education and athletic competition suggests that historians of ancient sport...give a rather one sided account of Greek athletics. As Plato spells out in what appears to be a descriptive rather than prescriptive passage of his *Laws* (764c-d), *gymnastikē* (athletics) consists of two parts: *paideia* (education) and *agōnia* (competition)."

¹⁷⁴ *Antidosis*, 183-4: "When they take on pupils, physical trainers instruct their students in the positions that have been discovered for competitions, and those whose concern is philosophy pass on to their pupils all the structures which speech employs. When they have given them expertise and detailed knowledge of these, they again exercise (πάλιν γυμνάζουσιν) the students and make them accustomed to hard work" (trans. Lee Too, 2000).

exercises and diet” (1987, 142). If this is correct, athletic training was more properly concerned with producing competitive athletes than with educating or edifying. In any case, τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι certainly could refer to the sort of training that produced competitive athletes.

This is important to realize because “etymologically and historically, ‘athletics’ presupposed prizes (*athla*) and ‘prize-givers’ (*athlothetai*). In short, Greeks could not imagine life without athletics, nor athletics without prizes.”¹⁷⁵ As this quotation indicates, the connection between athletics and rewards was so intimate for the Greeks that it was embedded in language itself. Where you find the former, the latter was assumed to follow. Plato himself often presupposes that his readers possess a nuanced understanding of the connection; for example, when he has Socrates suggest that he should be “punished” with free meals in the Prytaneum – a reward normally reserved only for Olympic champions – Plato is trusting that his educated audience will know that this honor was one of the greatest an Athenian citizen could ever receive, and therefore that Socrates’ statement is highly inflammatory.¹⁷⁶ His readership also presumably knew how valuable the prizes for athletic victories could be. Winners of premier events could receive hundreds of amphorae of oil, which would have been worth a considerable sum.¹⁷⁷ And the winners of the Olympic Games were crowned with wreaths thought to be gifts from the gods bearing divine favor.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Kyle (1996, 106).

¹⁷⁶ *Apology*, 36d1-e2. The dialogue would lose much of its rhetorical and comic force if readers did not understand the cultural facts and stereotypes that Plato is playing with and, in many cases, mocking. Both the brazenness and humor of Socrates’ speech are lost unless one realizes that free meals in the Prytaneum was a great reward, not a punishment.

¹⁷⁷ See Miller (2006, 132-145).

¹⁷⁸ Kyle (1996, 106).

These gifts, prizes and honors are just the sort of things with which a spirited youth like Glaucon would be preoccupied. I suggest that these are the benefits that he assumes make τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι valuable. In a passage from Plato's *Statesman*, which appears to represent a historical truth rather than a philosopher's idiosyncratic views about the purpose of athletic training, Plato reveals the reason many elite males would train under experts in athletics (294d3-8):

Οὐκοῦν καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶ τινες οἷαι καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις
πόλεσιν ἀθρόων ἀνθρώπων ἀσκήσεις, εἴτε πρὸς
δρόμον εἴτε πρὸς ἄλλο τι, φιλονικίας ἕνεκα;
Καὶ πάνυ γε πολλάί.
Φέρε νῦν ἀναλάβωμεν πάλιν μνήμη τὰς τῶν τέχνη
γυμναζόντων ἐπιτάξεις ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀρχαῖς

Well then, are there not also among your people the sort of
training of large groups that there are in other cities – either
for racing or anything else – and this for the sake of love of victory?
Indeed, there are very many.
Come now and let us call back to mind the orders of
the expert athletic trainers in these circumstances.

These groups train φιλονικίας ἕνεκα. “ἕνεκα” is, of course, the preposition Glaucon uses in his discussion of the Kind-C goods to describe the end that makes them valuable. And “φιλονικία” is used frequently in Books VIII and IX to describe one of the ambitions of the timocratic individual, who pursues honor and glory.¹⁷⁹ Because these people train on account of their love of victory, if asked they would presumably claim that they do not value the training itself or even the bodily fitness it produces, but rather the triumph in competitions and the honor and glory that attend it. And this is not a quirk of the *Statesman*; in the *Republic*, too, athletes are presented as leading lives dominated by the

¹⁷⁹ See 548c6, 551a7, 555a4 and 586c9.

pursuit of honors, which they think will make their lives successful (620ab5-7). Prizes and honors are the ultimate ends of their behavior and plans.

This is compelling evidence. The Greeks trained for the sake of the valuable rewards that could be won through competition. This is why Glaucon can so casually offer the example of τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι and trust his interlocutors to understand that its value derives from the prizes offered at athletic competitions and the great honor the bearer of these prizes can boast.

It is notable, then, that Socrates values the practice of athletic training primarily for its effect on the trainee's soul. This is an obvious instance of Socrates considering a practice good for one of its effects, when Glaucon and his contemporaries value it for a completely different effect. In other words, Glaucon and Socrates disagree over the good-making feature of athletic training. Presumably, Socrates expresses Plato's own considered view: we must, then, be careful to avoid taking Glaucon's own statements as Platonic doctrine. In any case, both the winning of prizes in athletic competition and the honor of victory are social through and through, as they both depend for their operation and very existence on social recognition.¹⁸⁰ And because these are what ultimately make τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι valuable, we may conclude that this example also fits our model quite nicely. Much like the many who practice justice, those who undergo athletic training do not value the constitutive end of this training. They value the prizes, honors, and other results of athletic training, all of which depend on social or divine recognition of athletic performance and virtue.

¹⁸⁰ As noted above, the victory wreaths in the Panhellenic games were thought to be divine prizes. So in the example of τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, divine recognition may play a role as well.

We turn now to the last example, τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι. Unfortunately, the terms κάμνειν and ἰατρεύεσθαι have a very wide range of application. The former can refer to anything from being tired to dying from a lethal disease, and the latter can refer to almost any type of medical treatment.¹⁸¹ Any attempt to specify the details of this example is bound to be somewhat speculative. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the constitutive end of τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι is the restoration of good health (346d1-3). To interpret this example following our model, we must be able to present medical treatment as valuable not for the end of health, but for some other benefits that depend on divine or social recognition. This possibility strikes me as not at all strange: we are all familiar with stories of famous singers who undergo radical medical treatments just so they can return to the stage and enjoy the limelight once again. People who are sick are often unable to act in the ways necessary to accomplish their goals; if those goals depend on recognition, like the adoration of the crowd to which the singer is addicted, these individuals will value treatments for the benefits they produce via recognition.¹⁸²

Consider the case of heroes at war. In pursuit of revenge and glory, Achilles sacrifices health and life, thinking that neither is worth much on its own; Ajax chooses to kill himself rather than live in dishonor. The Greeks frequently pledged allegiance to the ideal of disregarding one's own safety and health in battle to win the rewards of honor and

¹⁸¹For κάμνειν, see Euripides' *Andromache*, 816, where the word means being tired or wearied; see also Thucydides II.51, 4, where it describes someone suffering from the Athenian plague. On ἰατρεύεσθαι, see Nutton (2004).

¹⁸²While I was writing this paper, Roger Federer won his eighth Wimbledon title. Because he had suffered an injury in the preceding season and needed knee-surgery to return to competition, he was asked about his health in a post-tournament interview. His response was instructive: "It's all based on health...I put myself in a good physical state so that I could compete with the best." He openly acknowledged that returning to good health was necessary in order to achieve his goal of winning another title and then added that he now, "cannot wait to savor and enjoy" being Wimbledon champion once again.

fame.¹⁸³ Indeed, Glaucus asks Apollo to heal him so that he can rally in defense of Sarpedon's armor, a great prize of war. Glaucus' monologue is perfectly unambiguous: the hero does not want to be healed for the sake of health – indeed, he does not mention the word – but so that he can rejoin the battle and win glory.¹⁸⁴ A more pertinent example comes from Xenophon's treatise *Oeconomicus*. In this work, Socrates engages in dialogue with a gentleman named Ischomachus, who, though somewhat older than Glaucon, is an aristocratic male equally concerned with war and his station in society. Announcing an interest in learning from Ischomachus how he might become more virtuous, Socrates asks his interlocutor about his daily affairs and practices. Ischomachus responds in a way characteristic of an Athenian gentleman, telling Socrates that since he recognizes that even diligent and hardworking individuals need the gods' blessings to succeed, he begins each day by praying to the gods so that he may "acquire health, strength of body, honor in the city, good will among friends, noble safety in war, and noble increase of wealth" (11.8).¹⁸⁵

Although there is little doubt that Ischomachus conceives of each item in his prayer as valuable for itself, the order in which he presents them – with wealth as the capping stone – suggests that money is the most salient and important of these goods. So too does the context of this passage and the chapter itself, both of which include wealth as a prominent theme. Immediately prior to our passage Socrates tells a comic story about Nicias' famous but poor horse, which is meant to underscore the fact that most people (wrongly) assume that money is required to be a good and prosperous individual (11.3-6). In

¹⁸³ Dover (1994, 230).

¹⁸⁴ *Iliad* XVI, 514-529.

¹⁸⁵ Trans. Carnes Lord in Strauss (1971).

response to Ischomachus' statement about praying to the gods, Socrates calls the value of money into question. After pointing out the great troubles that are required to amass wealth, he asks his interlocutor to forget about wealth for a moment and focus on the other goods he mentioned: health, strength of body, and success in war. Ischomachus' response is extremely revealing for our purposes (11.12):

Ἄλλ' ἔστι μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Ἰσχόμαχος, ὥς γε ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ,
ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀκόλουθα ταῦτα πάντα ἀλλήλων. ἐπεὶ
γὰρ ἐσθίειν τις τὰ ἱκανὰ ἔχει, ἐκπονοῦντι μὲν ὀρθῶς
μᾶλλον δοκεῖ μοι ἢ ὑγίεια παραμένειν, ἐκπονοῦντι δὲ
πολέμου κάλλιον σφύζεσθαι, ὀρθῶς δὲ ἐπιμελομένῳ καὶ
μὴ καταμαλακιζομένῳ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οἶκον αὔξεσθαι.

‘But it seems to me, Socrates’, said Ischomachus, ‘these things all follow on one another. For when someone has enough to eat, he stays healthier, it seems to me, if he works it off in the right manner, and in working it off, he also becomes stronger. If he trains in military matters, he can save himself more nobly, and if he is diligent in the right manner and doesn’t grow soft, it is likely he will increase his household.’

By rejecting the request to focus on health, bodily strength, and success in war, Ischomachus calls into question Socrates' implicit assumption that the value of these three goods can be understood or appreciated independently of the wealth that they allow an individual, such as Isomachus, to achieve. Indeed, the Athenian gentleman says that the acquisition of wealth follows (ἀκόλουθα) from the other goods, a point that Xenophon's syntax reinforces. The datives indicating the activity of the agent – ἐκπονοῦντι, ἐκπονοῦντι, ἀσκοῦντι, ἐπιμελομένῳ, and καταμαλακιζομένῳ – give a sense of necessity to the progression from health to the acquisition of money, which suggests that all these activities lead to riches. If this is right, then an important and valuable feature of health is that it facilitates and contributes to the enrichment of the healthy individual. This is about as explicit a statement of the instrumental value of health that one can hope

to find in an ancient, non-philosophical texts. Although Ischomachus never says it in so many words, he presumably would value returning to good health to the extent that this allowed him to acquire a greater reputation in society and to amass more wealth.

These examples show that warriors could desire medical treatment for the sake of other valuable things and that Athenian gentlemen could value health as a means to wealth. But they also point towards an important fact about the Greek milieu: a good bodily condition was not always valued for itself; even for the lay individual, medical treatment could be valued for the sake of further ends and projects.¹⁸⁶ Consider the following passage about doctors prescribing regimens for manual workers from Book III of the *Republic* (406d3-e2):

ἐὰν δέ τις αὐτῷ μακρὰν δίαιταν προστάτῃ...ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι
οὐ σχολὴ κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσιτελεῖ οὕτω ζῆν, νοσήματι τὸν
νοῦν προσέχοντα, τῆς δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα.
καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα χαίρειν εἰπὼν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἱατρῷ, εἰς
τὴν εἰωθυῖαν δίαιταν ἐμβάς

And if someone prescribes a long regimen for them...quickly
they say that they have no time to be sick, nor does it profit
them to live thusly: fixating on their disease and neglecting
their appointed work. And after these things they dismiss the
doctor and embark on their accustomed regime.

The lines following this passage indicate that the reason manual laborers need to get back to work is to make their living. Though the rich may have the leisure to undergo lengthy treatments, most people want to return to their employment in a timely fashion (407a1-5). They desire this in order to receive their wages, to win the social prestige

¹⁸⁶ Interestingly, Nietzsche, the modern philosopher most profoundly influenced by the pre-Platonic Greeks, incorporated the instrumentality of health into its very definition: “For there is no health as such, and all attempts to define such a thing have failed miserably. Deciding what is health even for your *body* depends on your goal, your horizons, your powers, your mistakes, and above all the ideals and phantasms of your soul” (Gay Science 120, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff).

associated with being a good worker, and perhaps in the case of the convalescent, to avoid the obloquy that may follow from being perceived as lazy.¹⁸⁷ The *Republic* itself gives us the resources to understand how workers could value medical treatment for the beneficial effects that depend on social recognition.

Although by no means uncontroversial, thinking about medical treatment along these lines is intuitive. We certainly do value our body insofar as it helps us pursue goals, and should these goals be sufficiently salient in our thought we may well conceive of medical treatment as no more than another step to be climbed in the pursuit of fortune or everlasting fame. I suggest that this is how Glaucon is thinking of medical treatment when he introduces it as an example of a Kind-C good. He comes from an aristocratic family that could easily regard proper bodily functioning as a means to pursuing glory or wealth, and he recognizes that the less well-off members of Greek society value medical treatment so that they can return to work, earn wages, and win their own modicum of social esteem. Thus, I suggest that even τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι is presented as valuable for the sake of wages, honors, prizes or esteem – all of which depend on divine or social recognition.

My analysis does have one counter-intuitive consequence. On my view, Glaucon presents health as a Kind-B good, valuable both on its own and for the things that arise

¹⁸⁷ A long tradition, stretching back at least to Hesiod, stressed the need for Greeks to be industrious and hard working. Being called lazy or idle could be a significant reproach. At *Works and Days*, 298-319, Hesiod explains the importance of hard work and notes the reproaches and misfortunes an individual may suffer if they are lazy (ἀργός), including losing favor with the gods. In a similar vein, Thucydides records Pericles as saying that the Athenians do not regard poverty as shameful, although they do consider being idle and failing to work in order to escape poverty as shameful (II.40,1). Even Aristotle pays deference to this general attitude when he invokes the fact that it would be ridiculous for humans to be without a work (ἀργός) in the *Nicomachean Ethics*'s famous function argument (1079b28-33).

from it, but τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι, which has health as its constitutive end, is valued not for its end but for other effects. Glaucon presumably has it in mind that those who are sick think about the distant goals they desire to attain, and therefore value treatment as a means to those. This might sound strange, but a few facts make it more plausible.

First, the model developed from the many's account of justice, which nicely elucidates the other two examples of Kind-C goods, requires us to interpret Glaucon's example of τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι in this way, or at least some similar way.

Second, we have seen that in the division of goods, “τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι” is paired closely with “τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι” and both are valued for the same ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν, which suggests they share the same sort of status as goods. Elsewhere in the *Republic* too, medical treatment and athletic training are also presented together as sister arts, akin in their end and their use (389c1-4). This pressures us to offer an interpretation that presents both of them as valuable in the same way. Given how strong the case is that athletic training is presented as valuable for effects that depend on divine and social recognition, we should offer an interpretation of τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι as valued for similar reasons.

Finally, we must not forget the many's view of justice. According to this view as outlined by Glaucon, the end of justice is something like security from the mistreatment by others. Although this makes no direct reference to health, an agreement that frees one from the wrongdoings of others effectively protects one's health, insofar as it protects one from outside aggression. It would not be too great a stretch to say that the original social contract was designed partly to secure the health and safety of its signatories. And yet this sort of justice is valued by the many for its social rewards rather than for its proper end;

this makes it easier to see how Glaucon could present medical treatment as valuable for its mediated effects rather than its constitutive end.

Although my readers might still feel some residual awkwardness, this should not be thought to mitigate in favor of the No-Effects view, for the No-Effects theorist faces a parallel interpretive difficulty with the Kind-B goods. Recall that on the sophisticated version of this view, the τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα of the Kind-B goods include all the beneficial effects of the good in question. Yet we have seen an abundance of textual evidence that, at least in the case of justice, it is only a small class of the beneficial effects that Plato excludes from the praise of justice δι' αὐτό. The No-Effects theorist faces the considerable difficulty of explaining what has become of the other effects of justice. Did Plato think that all of justice's beneficial effects depend on divine or social recognition, or did he just neglect to speak about the other beneficial effects in the *Republic*? Neither possibility seems possible. This difficulty seems much greater to me than conceding that Glaucon implies that medical treatment is valuable for effects deriving from social recognition, even though health is good all on its own. Perhaps, in the end, Plato includes this slight infelicity to remind attentive readers that it is Glaucon speaking, rather than the more sophisticated Socrates, and to hint at Glaucon's intellectual shortcomings, which are suggested in the early books and announced explicitly in Book VI.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ One might still wonder, though, what the relationship is between the beneficial results of the Kind-C goods and the constitutive ends of the practices mentioned, which seem not to feature prominently in my interpretation of these examples. In fact, I take it that the proper end of these practices plays an important, albeit unspecified role in the examples. In the discussion of justice as the many conceive of it, I pointed out that the many would come to value justice for its true end were they to experience a world without it. I now want to make the stronger claim that justice's true end must actually be achieved (at least to a fairly high degree) in order for the many to be in a position to enjoy the social rewards and wages they take to be the reason to practice justice. No individual can truly enjoy social honors or esteem if they are fighting every day for life and limb, and no society can have the infrastructure necessary to allow for established

The vast majority of the *Republic* indicates that the $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \alpha\pi'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\iota\gamma\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ of justice are the divine and social rewards that one can win by being recognized as virtuous. Nonetheless, many have felt that this cannot be correct because the initial division, and the Kind-C goods in particular, will not accommodate this interpretation. In this section, I have defended the intuitive understanding of the things that arise from justice against two important objections. I conclude that the value justice possesses on account of the things that arise from it derives from one restricted class of justice's effects, the Reputational Rewards of Justice.

The Importance of Book IX

I have argued that Socrates is prohibited only from invoking a specific class of the effects of justice in his praise of justice $\delta\iota'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, namely the Reputational Rewards of Justice. It must be admitted that this prohibition is compatible with his defense making reference to no effects of justice whatsoever. Although it would be a little contrived, one could tell a story about why Plato has Glaucon and Adeimantus ask Socrates to exclude

positions of rule absent general peace and lawlessness. So even though the many may not recognize this fact, the true end of justice must be met in order for them to enjoy the wages and other benefits they value. The same is true of Glaucon's three examples. At least in most cases, doctors and other money-making practitioners must exercise their craft in order to receive the wages they desire. No doubt this is particularly true for those who desire a distinguished reputation for their craft in addition to a living wage. Similarly, athletes must train and actually achieve a certain level of fitness in order to compete in athletic *agons*. And finally, wounded warriors must be successfully treated if they are to stand a chance of winning martial glory. Not even an injured Achilles could defeat Hector in battle.

Although they remain in the background, the constitutive ends of the practices are presupposed by the examples Glaucon gives. In this respect, they nicely parallel the $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \alpha\pi'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\iota\gamma\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ of justice according to the official account of the *Republic*. After completing his defense of justice all on its own, Socrates turns to the beneficial results of justice and explains that individuals are only recognized as just by gods and humans if they are in fact just (612c7-d9). For Plato too, then, one can only enjoy the beneficial results of justice if one in fact practices justice successfully.

the divine and social rewards of justice, but nonetheless has Socrates argue that justice is valuable irrespective of any effects whatsoever. Perhaps the brothers are very proud to have discovered that their predecessors erred in praising justice by invoking rewards and, not wanting to hurt their pride by explicitly pointing out the insufficiency of excluding these rewards, Socrates praises justice absent any of its effects without calling attention to this fact. If this were the case, the main argument of the last two sections might offer some interesting observations, but would leave the heart of the No-Effects view unchallenged. To show that this is not the case, I here offer a preliminary argument, expanded in the following chapter, that Socrates invokes other effects of justice in his defense.

About three-quarters of the way through Book X Socrates signals the end of his defense of justice proper and transitions to the discussion of the Reputational Rewards of Justice (612a8-b5c2):

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν
ἐστὶν πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ
καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅσους τε καὶ οἷους
τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν,

Well then, I said, oh Glaucon, can there now be any
objection to, beyond these things, returning the wages –
the full number and kind furnished for the soul both from
people and gods – to justice and the rest of virtue?

This passage indicates that the defense of justice δι' αὐτό has already ended and marks the beginnings of the defense of justice διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. It is strong – in my opinion, decisive – evidence that the entire treatment of justice prior to this passage

must be understood as part of the defense of justice all on its own.¹⁸⁹ It follows that the three proofs of justice's superiority over injustice, each concluded in Book IX, should be understood as part of the defense of justice δι' αὐτό. But all these proofs depend on or invoke some of the effects of justice. Thus we have no choice but to understand Socrates' praise of justice all on its own as including some of justice's effects. Let me flesh this argument out.

The trajectory of Socrates' argument in the *Republic* is incredibly sophisticated, but its structure is well-delineated and (almost) equally well-marked. It basically follows Glaucon's argument in defense of injustice. While preparing to state the view of the Thrasymachean many, Glaucon offers a roadmap of what is to come. He says that he will explain (358c1-6):

- 1) (a) Where justice comes from and (b) what its essence is [accomplished at 358e3-359b5]
- 2) That all those who practice justice do so unwillingly [accomplished at 359b6-360d7]
- 3) That they are right to practice it unwillingly, since the life of the unjust man is far better than the life of the just man [accomplished at 360e1-362c7].

Importantly, the third leg of this argument includes two distinct steps. Glaucon first describes what the just and the unjust person are like (360e1-361d3), then he compares their respective lives, and on the basis of this comparison he concludes that the unjust

¹⁸⁹ This is one of the passages that causes great difficulties for all versions of what I earlier called the hybrid-view, which holds that Socrates' project in the dialogue is to show that justice is valuable (1) intrinsically, (2) for the "natural consequences" of justice on the soul, and finally (3) for the Reputational Rewards of Justice. According to this view, Socrates' project is divided into three parts. But in this passage and elsewhere Socrates speaks of his project as only involving two parts: showing that justice is good δι' αὐτό and good διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

person is more prosperous (361d7-362c8). This is the end of his (Thrasymachus-inspired) attempt to show that injustice is more profitable than justice.¹⁹⁰

Making the structure of this defense of injustice explicit is important because Glaucon tells Socrates that he is making his argument in part to show “in what way I want to hear you blame injustice and praise justice” (358d4-6). Though it is not often recognized, Socrates respects this request by structuring his own defense of justice after Glaucon’s model.

He begins his defense with the suggestion that the interlocutors jointly found a city-in-speech. In this way they might see how its justice and injustice originate (369a5-8). This section of Socrates’ argument pretty obviously corresponds to (1a) above. The founding covers the better part of two books, and it is not until the end of Book IV that we arrive at the essence of justice and injustice (the end of this search is formally marked at 444a4-6). This part of the defense corresponds to (1b) above. Shortly after, Socrates indicates that only now are he and his interlocutors in a position to investigate whether the just or unjust life is more prosperous: “The remaining thing, then, as is likely, is for us to investigate again whether doing just things and practicing fine ones and also being just is profitable” (444e7-445a1).

This shows that the analysis of what justice is must be kept separate from the evaluation of justice and its contribution to prospering. This should come as no surprise;

¹⁹⁰ Note that Glaucon’s argument is manifestly incomplete without this last step. Although we learn from (1) that injustice is naturally sweet and justice naturally sour, this is not enough to let us conclude that the unjust life is the better of the two. For we also learn that most of those who practice injustice suffer injustice in turn, and that the harm resulting from suffering injustice is enough to make the life of doing and suffering injustice a difficult life. It is only after the additional information included in (3) that Glaucon can conclude that successful injustice really is more profitable than justice.

it is a basic Socratic principle, enunciated earlier in the *Republic* and elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, that one can only understand what something is like if one first knows what that thing is.¹⁹¹ Though some commentators see Socrates' articulation of what justice is as the essential move in his defense of justice all on its own, this cannot be right. In Glaucon's argument, the conclusion that the unjust life is best is kept separate from the articulation of what justice and injustice are. So too for Socrates: at the end of Book IV, the work showing whether justice or injustice profits the individual – in other words, what each of them are like – remains to be done.¹⁹²

Though Socrates does not take time to argue on independent grounds that those who practice justice do so willingly (or that those who practice injustice do so unwillingly), he is confident that demonstrating the great value of justice all on its own will settle this matter. And with good reason: Adeimantus already conceded in Book II that if he and his peers were convinced that justice was the greatest good, they would do everything in their power to avoid injustice (367a1-4). This reveals Adeimantus' acceptance of a fundamental principle of Plato's philosophy, later articulated at 505d5-9. No one is

¹⁹¹ Socrates concludes Book I by pointing out that he does not yet know if justice is better for humans than injustice *because* he does not yet know what justice is (354b1-c3). This "priority of definition" principle is also stated at the outset of the *Meno* and is absolutely central to the philosophical project of the dialogue (71b1-b8).

¹⁹² It is at the end of Book IV that Socrates calls justice a sort of health of the soul and then compares it to bodily health. Many interpret this analogy as the crucial basis for reconstructing a full defense of justice. The argument usually runs, "Because health is intrinsically good and we now see that justice is a sort of health, it too must be intrinsically good." I will not respond directly to this argument here; in a way, this whole chapter is intended to offer a response. Instead, I will note my own understanding of the analogy between justice and health, which has been substantially informed by Nicholas White's excellent discussion of the issue in "The Ruler's Choice" (34-41). The comparison of justice to health is part of Socrates' attempt to elucidate what justice is like, but it is not yet a defense of justice. To properly defend the life of justice, Socrates must do much more work. Part of this will be comparing the just life to the unjust life, and part will be working more fully through the effects of justice on the soul. None of this is completed until the end of Book IX.

satisfied with having things that are merely thought to be good or that merely appear to be good. Everyone desires things that *are in fact good*. This explains why Adeimantus can so confidently assert that had he been taught that justice was good, he would have been just: he could not contemplate going in for injustice if he found out that justice was the only route to true prospering. The principle also confirms Socrates' commitment to his own analog of (2) above. Because justice is in fact good and injustice is in fact bad, Socrates must think that no one who understands the nature of justice would willingly be unjust. Thus he can imply that only those who do not understand justice criticize it (589c3-4), and two lines later state that the unjust person is unjust unwillingly (589c6).

Socrates explicitly presents an argument parallel to step (3) above. Just as Glaucon first describes the lives that the perfectly just and unjust person will live, and then compares them in order to judge which is more prosperous, Socrates presents models to elucidate the sorts of lives the just and unjust person will live and then, only after this and various supplementary materials, asks for an explicit comparison of them.

The models are, of course, the virtuous and vicious cities. After spending a little more than two books founding the just city-in-speech and then offering the famous argument from the principle of opposites, Socrates and his interlocutors conclude that the soul of the just individual is structured like this city, and that the just person lives like this city does as well (441c4-444a9). Socrates uses the model of the tyrannical city, discussed in Book VIII (562a4-569c9), to elucidate the nature of the tyrannical and unjust individual in Book IX (571a1-580a8). On the basis of an explicit comparison with the tyrannical city (577d1-d5), Socrates argues that the unjust soul is full of slavery, because the best part of it is enslaved to the worst part; he further argues that the unjust individual does

not do what they want; is full of regret; is poor and insatiable; is full of fear; is prone to wailing, groaning, and lamenting; and suffers from convulsions and pains till their dying days (577e1-579e7).

It is immediately after this description of the most completely unjust person that Glaucon is asked to compare the just life with the unjust life. He judges that the most unjust person lives the most miserable life and that the most just person lives the most prosperous life. Socrates calls this the first proof of the superiority of justice over injustice (580c9).¹⁹³

Our question is whether any effects of justice are invoked in this proof. Although I admit that Plato's discussion of the just and the unjust individual is presented in rather metaphorical language, it nevertheless seems hard to deny that some effects are in the mix. This is easiest to see in the case of the unjust life. If Plato means for the fear, groaning, or regret experienced by the tyrant to somehow be explained by the presence of injustice in the tyrant's soul, and thus to be relevant to the evaluation of justice and injustice, it could not be because these pathological emotions are constitutive or definitional elements of injustice.¹⁹⁴ Rather, they must be among its effects. Consider regret: Plato presumably means to point out that the unjust individual, dominated as they are by their indiscriminate whims, will at different times impede the satisfaction of some

¹⁹³ This first proof clearly picks up on Glaucon's earlier argument in defense of the unjust life. In Book II, Socrates coyly suggests that Glaucon's elaborate description of the just and unjust individuals is an attempt to prepare them for judgment (κρίσιν, 361d4-6). After Socrates' own description of the two lives, he asks Glaucon in Book IX to play the judge and make the judgement (κρίσιν) about the respective happiness of the two (580a9-b4). This is yet another indication – from Socrates himself – that his own argument closely follows Glaucon's.

¹⁹⁴ Dominic Scott (2015, 71) has recently pointed to the “empirical character of the argument” that Plato uses to show that the tyrant lives a miserable life. Socrates stresses the need for an investigation into how the tyrant lives by emphasizing that only the person who has sufficient experience of the unjust individual in action can know how unhappy they really are.

of their desires by acting to satisfy others. They will experience regret because their undisciplined appetitive part motivates them in such a way that, as a result of acting on their motivation, they are later unable to satisfy their other desires. The regret and pain are clearly an effect of having an unjust and disordered soul. Injustice's effects on the soul, then, are invoked in an evaluation of the (dis)value injustice has all on its own (444e7-445a4). By parallel reasoning, the same types of considerations must be relevant to the evaluation of justice all on its own as well. We can conclude that some effects are invoked in the first proof of the superiority of justice.

This is enough to prove my point: Socrates is permitted to invoke the effects that justice all on its own has on the soul of the just agent. It is even more obvious that the effects of justice must be invoked in the second and third proofs, which purport to show that the just individual lives more pleasantly than the unjust individual. I will have more to say about these proofs in the following chapter, but for the moment I will rest my case on the intuition that the greater and truer pleasures experienced by the just individual cannot be constitutive features of justice. In truth, the arguments about pleasures clearly depend on a whole host of other considerations, a rather robust account of human psychology, and causal mechanisms that explain how justice gives rise to these pleasures.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ I know of no one who argues that the pleasures discussed in Book IX are somehow part of the very nature of justice. Those who think that Plato is attempting to demonstrate that justice is valuable independently of its effects instead argue that the second and third proof are not crucial to the defense of justice all on its own. Richard Kraut (1992, 312-314), for example, argues that it is only on the first proof that Plato really stakes his defense. On his view, the second and third proofs only show that those who live justly needn't sacrifice a pleasant existence. But this view cannot be sustained. Not only must we read all of Book IX as part of the defense of justice proper, nothing in Book IX suggests that the second and third proofs occupy a subordinate role or are any less important than the first proof. For an adequate response to Kraut's argument, see Butler (1999, 37-48).

Making explicit the trajectory of Socrates' argument in the *Republic* yields important insights into how his defense of justice operates. Although Socrates is explicitly prohibited from invoking the effects of justice that depend on divine and social recognition, he is presented as freely and legitimately invoking a number of justice's other effects in his three proofs that justice is more profitable than injustice. I will call these other effects the Authentic Rewards of Justice. Because the three proofs appearing in Book IX are part of the defense of justice δι' αὐτό, we must conclude that some of justice's effects contribute to the value it has all on its own. As we shall see in the following chapter, the Authentic Rewards of Justice are permitted because they follow from the nature of justice itself when it is present in the soul; they in no way depend on recognition of any kind.

Conclusion

We are now in a good position to solve our initial puzzle. When Socrates responds to Glaucon's famous division of goods by announcing that justice is a Kind-B good, valuable both δι' αὐτό and διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτο, he is not claiming that justice is good independently of any of its effects, on the one hand, and for the sake of its beneficial effects, on the other. When Socrates says that justice is valuable "because of itself" or "all on its own", he is not, in other words, praising it as intrinsically valuable. Although the terminology is reminiscent of our contemporary concept, a close reading of the *Republic* reveals that we must resist the temptation to attribute the concept of intrinsic value or goodness (at least as 21st century moral philosophers use the term) to Plato. As I argue at length in the following chapter, Plato allows Socrates to include in his defense the Authentic Rewards of Justice, which are the effects of justice that arise nearly

immediately and inevitably from the nature of justice when it is present in the soul. I offer a more thorough analysis of the nature of justice and its effects by taking seriously Glaucon and Adeimantus' suggestion in Book II that Socrates identify the power (δύναμις) of justice.

Chapter 4

Plato's Defense of Justice: The Division of Goods

Part 2

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I introduced a scholarly debate regarding the division of goods and Socrates' subsequent defense of justice. According to the standard interpretation – which I called the 'No-Effects' strategy – Glaucon's three kinds of goods are best understood as goods that are (1) intrinsically valuable, (2) both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, and (3) instrumentally valuable. Since Socrates' task in Books II-IX is to defend justice as valuable *δι' αὐτό*, scholars who subscribe to this view believe that Socrates must show that justice is an intrinsic good, without any of justice's effects featuring in the central argument. Another group of scholars – adherents of what I called the 'Yes-Effects' strategy – object to this reading and maintain that Socrates may include some of justice's effects in his praise of justice all on its own. Accordingly, they deny that Socrates' project in Books II-IX is to show that justice is intrinsically

valuable. In the remainder of the chapter, I began a new argument against the ‘No-Effects’ strategy. I showed that the τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ of justice cannot be understood as all the beneficial effects of justice, as the standard interpretation takes them to be, but only as those which depend upon the recognition of other agents. For this reason, I called them the Reputational Rewards of Justice.

Though Socrates must exclude these Reputational Rewards of Justice from his praise of justice δι’ αὐτό, these rewards make up only one small class of justice’s effects. Consequently, a considerable amount of conceptual ‘wiggle room’ remains for other effects to feature in the demonstration of the value that justice possesses δι’ αὐτό. I ended the previous chapter by offering a preliminary argument to motivate the possibility that Socrates invokes some direct effects of justice in his praise of justice δι’ αὐτό—effects I called the Authentic Rewards of Justice. In this chapter, I elaborate on this argument and demonstrate not only that some of justice’s effects are featured in Socrates’ praise of justice δι’ αὐτό, but also that they are crucial to the argument. Indeed, I will argue that these effects—and not any intrinsic feature of justice—are responsible for the contribution justice makes to the virtuous agent’s well-being. Together with the findings of the previous chapter, the claims in this chapter constitute a compelling response to the dominant ‘No-Effects’ interpretation. Further, by identifying and explicitly articulating the effects of justice that contribute to the prospering (εὐδαιμονία) of the just agent, I offer a fuller and more complete version of the ‘Yes-Effects’ interpretation than is currently available in the literature.

Book IV and the Virtues

To understand the effects of justice that Plato takes to be so important to the argument of the *Republic*, we must turn to the discussion of the virtues in Book IV. There Socrates offers a full treatment of each of the ethical virtues as they appear in the *Kallipolis* and then a shorter yet parallel account of them in the individual. As part of the larger discussion regarding the

Kallipolis, Socrates explicates the natures of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, and gives a functional characterization of each of them. The functional characterizations of the virtues contain the resources needed to explain the value that the virtues have for the city or the individual interested in prospering. Considerations of space prevent me from discussing all of them here: I restrict myself to a brief discussion of courage and then a lengthier, more robust discussion of justice. But one general point must be mentioned at the outset. My discussion will make much of the fact that the virtues of courage and justice each have a unique *dunamis*. This is crucial because, as a famous passage from Book V makes abundantly clear, *dunameis* essentially *do* things (ὁ ἀπεργάζεται, 477c6-d6). Because there is a unique *dunamis* for courage and justice, they too will do certain things, and the effects of these doings, I shall argue, are the true source of their value.

One quick note: I do not intend my discussion of courage to be a significant contribution in its own right, but rather to pave the way for my subsequent discussion of justice. For this reason, my discussion will be somewhat dogmatic. Though I accept the claims I make, I will not take the space to motivate and defend the more interesting or controversial ones.

The following are the most illuminating statements made about the nature of ‘political courage’ in *Kallipolis* (429b8-c3):

Καὶ ἀνδρεία ἄρα πόλις μέρει τινὶ ἐαυτῆς ἐστὶ, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἔχειν δύναμιν τοιαύτην ἢ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, ταῦτά τε αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τοιαῦτα, ἃ τε καὶ οἷα ὁ νομοθέτης παρήγγελλεν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ.

Then the city would be courageous because of a part of itself that has within it a sort of power which preserves through everything the opinion about fearful things—both that they exist and what sort of things the lawgiver commanded as such during education.

Having been asked what sort of preservation he means, Socrates responds (429c7-d1):

Τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας

γεγονυίας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν ἃ τέ ἐστι καὶ οἷα· διὰ
παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπαις
ὄντα διασῶζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ
ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν.

The preservation of the opinion which came to be by law
through education about fearful things—both what they
are and what sort of things they are. And I meant by ‘a preservation
of it through everything’ the maintaining and not discarding of the
opinion while caught in pleasures, pains, appetites, and fears.

The city is courageous because its auxiliary class has a certain power (δύναμιν τοιαύτην)
which preserves (σώζει) a class of opinions about what is to be feared. This is not an immediately
intuitive account of courage in a city. To understand Socrates’ point better we should identify 1)
what exactly the auxiliary class preserves, 2) in what this ‘preservation’ consists and 3) what
purpose the preservation serves.¹⁹⁶

It seems clear that the auxiliary class is meant to preserve *practical* or *action-oriented*
opinions. In other dialogues discussing courage, ‘*ta deina*’ indicates things that call out for action:
they ought to be avoided in action (eg., *La.* 195c7-d2). Courage’s connection with action is
preserved in the *Republic* as well; the auxiliary class is the class that acts on behalf of the city and
wars with external enemies (429b1-3). The opinions they are supposed to preserve are opinions
about what is to be avoided in action. The emphasis on action also helps to answer the question 2)
in what this preservation consists. I suggest that what it means for the auxiliaries to preserve these
opinions is for these opinions to remain salient *as action-guiding opinions* in circumstances that,
due to various emotional impulses or responses, would cause others to lose these opinions. A later
passage informs us that ideally the auxiliary class holds onto these opinions even in the face of
great dangers, pains, or pleasures which would cause other people to abandon their opinions
about what is properly fearful (430a1-b2). The result of preserving these action-guiding opinions

¹⁹⁶ I have profited from reading Wilburn (2015) and Carelli (2015). The following discussion has
been influenced by these articles.

is a corresponding motivation in the city to act in a certain way and, at least in typical cases, the performance of the action.

Note also that the auxiliary class preserves the correct opinions *in the face of difficulties, fears, or pleasures*. These circumstances are all stimulus conditions that activate dispositions to preserve the appropriate opinions, as is indicated by the elaborate analogy Socrates draws between courageous warriors and color-fast clothes (429d4-e6): Just as good dyers pick appropriate fabric and treat it in such a way that the color they produce in it remains even when the clothes are washed with soaps, detergents, or lye, so good rulers educate their auxiliary class to retain their opinions in the face of dangers or pleasures, the most potent of all detergents for these opinions. The natural way to understand Socrates' example is to understand that the dyers produce clothes that resist losing their color when presented with stimulus conditions that normally cause other clothes to lose their hue. Similarly, the auxiliary class is raised and educated through music and gymnastics in such a way that dangerous situations will not lead them to give up the action-guiding opinions that the rulers have instilled in them. Socrates' official account of 'political courage' is given immediately after the analogy with dyers and incorporates the dispositional nature of this analogy.¹⁹⁷

The purpose that this preservation serves is to enable the city to act effectively on its plans and decisions. Since the opinions that the auxiliary class preserves are said to be handed down from the lawgiver, they must ultimately derive from the wise, ruling part of the city. We know from earlier in Book IV that the wise and politically dominant class deliberates about and decides on what is best for the entire city. We are invited to believe that these decisions will correctly

¹⁹⁷ The closest Socrates comes to defining political courage is at 430b2-3. Courage is called 'τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς.' Unfortunately, translations frequently mistranslate this sentence by downplaying the presence of 'dunamis'. For example, Reeve's revised Grube translation is: "this power to preserve through everything the correct opinion..." It is better to render 'δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν' by two distinct nouns and take the καὶ as epexegetic. A preferable translation would be: "courage is such a power, i.e. the preservation of the correct opinion through all..."

attend to the well-being of the whole city – both as it should act with regards to itself and also to other cities – precisely because the rulers of the *Kallipolis* are wise (428a11-429a3). Deciding or planning to do something is, however, not the same as doing it, and fortitude may be required to execute such plans and decisions in the face of the difficulties tossed up by a hostile world. The role of the auxiliary class is to provide this fortitude for the city. They sustain the city's affective commitment to the decisions made by the guardian class in the face of violent struggles, pains and losses, or other temptations, and they do this (in a way that remains somewhat unclear) by preserving the opinions that have been handed down to them by the ruling of the city. The ability to sustain this commitment is crucial to the proper functioning and well-being of the city. Courage allows the city to actualize its own projects and achieve effective self-determination in a world that may be difficult to navigate. It also allows the city to police the unruly and potentially harmful factions within it.¹⁹⁸

Courage in the individual operates similarly.¹⁹⁹ The function of the spirit is to sustain affective commitment to a course of action by preserving certain opinions handed down from the rational part of the soul. The person who does so is courageous and will act in accord with their reason's decisions even in the face of fears, disruptive temptations, physical pain, or other threats to the implementation of their rationally-determined plans. Once again, it is clear why courage is beneficial for the individual concerned with living a prosperous life. Those who lack courage will be unable to actualize their plans in a world of resource-scarcity, time restrictions, and other self-interested agents; they will be unable to overcome their own fears, appetites and other weaknesses.

¹⁹⁸ For an insightful discussion that highlights the external/internal contrast of courage, see Brennan (2012).

¹⁹⁹ Although Socrates' discussion of courage in the individual is much shorter, it clearly parallels courage in the city: "And in this case I think we will call each one courageous by that part, whenever the spirit maintains through pains and pleasures that which was said by reason to be fearful and not" (442b11-c3).

Plato's account, however, leaves open the possibility that a city or individual may fail to be completely courageous in at least two importantly distinct ways. In the first, a city or an individual might lack the *dunamis* of courage—the psychological capacity required for the virtue. I once knew a student who deliberated rather carefully about which professor he should work with. Yet having confidently decided that he would be best served to work with a certain professor (who I suspected would have been very happy to work with him), he found himself unable to approach the professor in question. Every time he tried to knock on the door, he was unable to muster enough emotional strength, broke down into tears, and ran away. The admittedly groundless fear of being turned away and the psychological pain caused by imagining this rejection prevented the student from following through with his plans. We can take this as a rather vivid illustration of Platonic cowardice explained by the fact that the student was unable to preserve his opinions about what should and should not be feared, which resulted in him unfortunately abandoning the plans he had made, we may assume, through a flawless use of his deliberative capacity.

Thus, a city or an individual can fail to be courageous by lacking the ability to preserve their opinions about what ought to be feared. But a city or an individual can also fail to be courageous in another way. One might have the appropriate *dunamis* – spirited part perfectly able to both retain the opinions transmitted by the ruling part of the soul and preserve these opinions in the face of pains, pleasures, or fears – and yet not exercise this *dunamis* properly. This is arguably the problem with the timocratic character described by Plato in Book VIII. Although noble and well raised, this individual “[hands] over the rule in themselves to the middle and victory-loving part, or the spirited-part, and [becomes] a high-spirited and honor-loving individual” (550b5-7). Timocrats lack perfect virtue because their spirited soul-part contributes to decision-making on behalf of the whole soul, rather than subordinating itself to the plans and decisions of the rational soul-

part as it should. Interestingly though, Socrates' presentation of the timocrat gives no suggestion that the spirited part of this individual is unable to preserve the opinions that have been established by the ruling part of his soul. On the contrary, we are invited to see the timocrat's spirit as robust and powerful; Socrates even explicitly announces that both the rational and the spirited part of the timocrat's soul are trained and strengthened in his youth along with his appetitive desires (550b1-3). This suggests that their spirit has the *dunamis* to preserve the opinions given to it.²⁰⁰ The real problem of the timocrat is rather that their spirit fails to restrict itself to its own function insofar as it contributes to ruling the whole soul in addition to working to preserve the opinions that it has had a hand in establishing. This is a major problem because Plato denies that the spirited part of the soul has the capacity to make correct decisions about the well-being of the whole soul. What the spirited part is naturally suited to do is to serve the rational part and, with its help, control the appetites. The spirited part, then, cannot perform its own function, nor can the individual ever be properly courageous, if it is not subordinate to the rational part.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ As Jessica Moss has helpfully pointed out to me, the timocrat's spirited part will eventually lose the ability to preserve the correct opinions by its attempting to rule. An important passage in Book IV tells us that just action reinforces the order and proper functioning of the soul (444c5-d11); we are to assume that unjust action destroys that order and the ability for the soul to function properly. If this is correct, then the injustice of the spirit ruling in the timocrat's soul will corrode the soul until it cannot function properly anymore.

²⁰¹ It is an interesting question whether the timocratic individual is at all courageous. In a way, it seems wrong to deny that they completely lack courage – for they do preserve the opinion established by the ruling element in their soul. They will presumably stand their ground in battle and not succumb to fears, if that is what they have been instructed to do. Pearson (2014, 121) suggests that such a person might count as fully courageous. I think that this goes too far, for this person will not preserve the *correct* opinions about what is to be feared, which is what will truly benefit them. For this reason they will not be fully courageous, though they may be in a state similar to courage, albeit one that is defective in a crucial respect.

I have shown that there are at least two ways that the part of the soul in which courage resides can fail to perform optimally and that either of these failures produces an individual who is less than perfectly courageous.²⁰² Only if one has the power required for courage and then deploys it appropriately will one truly profit from courage. Nonetheless there is good reason to believe that the second failing, although it implicates the part of the soul which should be the seat of courage, should not be called cowardice. At least for Plato, this second failing is primarily a failing of justice.

²⁰² I will later raise the possibility of a third way an individual may fail to be courageous, but this need not concern us presently.

Consider the following characterization of justice in the city (433b7-c2):

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν
ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως,
τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχευ
ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν
παρέχειν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνῇ. καίτοι ἔφαμεν δικαιοσύνην
ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν.

It seems to me, I said, that the thing remaining in the city once moderation, courage, and wisdom have been searched out is this: it provided the power to all the other [virtues] so that they may be born in [the city], and it ensures the preservation of the others once they have been born in for just as long as it is in [the city]. And surely we were saying the thing which remained would be justice.

The choice of words here is, of course, crucial, since earlier in Book II Glaucon and Adeimantus asked Socrates to identify the *dunamis* of justice and to explain what its power does to the soul of the just agent (358b4-6 and 367a5-8). Socrates is here making some suggestive and provocative remarks which we will investigate shortly, but note for the moment that this is only the first of three passages in Book IV where Socrates uses the word *dunamis* in connection with justice. The second use is found while Socrates is investigating which of the four virtues is most beneficial for the city (433d7-9):

Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε
σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ
ἑκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

Then it seems likely that the power of each in [the city] to do their own work is, with respect to the city's virtue, a rival to its wisdom, temperance, and courage.

The third use is found after Socrates has applied his account of justice to certain non-philosophic tests and shown that the just individual will not commit crimes or mistreat others. He then asks of Glaucon (443b4-5):

Ἔτι τι οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ ταύτην τὴν

δύναμιν ἢ τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις;

So are you still searching for justice to be something other than the power which produces such people and cities?

Two things are worth noting. The first is that ‘δύναμις’-language is more prominent in the discussion of justice than in the discussions of any of the other virtues. This is explained by the fact that the brothers had earlier asked Socrates to elucidate what power justice has in the soul of the just individual. Only by distinguishing justice from the other virtues can Socrates isolate its power and show what it does to the soul of the just agent. By first discussing the other three virtues and then offering an account of justice that prominently features its *dunamis*, Socrates takes a necessary step in discharging his duty to Glaucon and Adeimantus. Second, these passages raise the interesting possibility that justice not only *has* a unique power but that it essentially *is* a power. The third passage explicitly calls justice a power and the second one comes very close to making an explicit identity claim. Since it is enough for the purposes of this chapter that justice has a unique power that accomplishes something, and since the text of the *Republic* clearly shows this much, I will restrict myself to claiming that the virtue possesses a *dunamis* here and merely mentioning the interesting possibility that justice essentially is a *dunamis*.²⁰³

In any case, it is clear from what has been said so far that the just agent has an ordered soul with their soul-parts arranged appropriately. The city-soul analogy suggests as much – the city is just insofar as its three classes do their own work and do not meddle with one another. Hence, the individual should be just only if their three soul-parts do their own work and do not meddle with one another. Further and more explicit evidence

²⁰³ In another project, I make the case to understand all the ethical virtues as *dunameis*. In footnote 2, I argued that Socrates’ official account of courage presents it as a *dunamis* as well.

comes from 441d8-442b3. After announcing that the individual is just only when their soul-parts each do their own work, Socrates asks if it isn't fitting for the rational part to rule because it is wise, or for the spirited part to watch over the unwieldy appetitive part. Announcing the work of each of the soul-parts immediately after the introduction of justice in the individual serves to specify how exactly justice operates in human beings, who have souls with three distinct parts (not three distinct political classes, 441d13-e2).

Still, even before we can adequately discuss the value of justice, a number of questions remain. What is the *dunamis* of justice, and what does it allow the soul to accomplish? Is justice, like courage, to be understood as entailing certain dispositions? What is its relationship to the other virtues? The first of the three passages above suggests an answer to the last question. It says that justice provides the power to all the other virtues so that they may come to be in the soul. One might think this indicates that anyone who becomes just will – at the very same time – acquire the *dunamis* of courage and the capacities required for wisdom and temperance as well. If this were so, acquiring justice would cause one to become courageous, wise and temperate. But we should resist any interpretation along these lines. Plato nowhere suggests that becoming just causes or in some other way produces the psychological ability to preserve the correct opinion about what is to be feared and not, nor any of the other virtues for that matter.

But then what is the passage getting at? The answer comes into focus once we notice that Socrates' discussion of justice comes after the discussion of wisdom, courage, and temperance. By the time he discusses justice in the city, the *Kallipolis* has the other virtues. This indicates that Socrates believes complete justice in the city presupposes that the three political classes already have the capacities required for the other virtues. What justice does

in addition to this is to structure the mechanisms already in place and order the city or the soul so that each of its parts will do what it is naturally suited to do. In other words, justice brings it about that the rational part will rule, the spirit will be reason's ally, and the appetite will duly subordinate itself to the other two parts. This structure ensures that each other part will perform its function to the best of its ability.

This explains why the timocratic individual or city evinces a lack of justice: their spirited parts go beyond their function, trying both to give orders to the whole soul as well as to preserve what it has ordered, instead of merely preserving the correct opinions about what is to be feared. Justice does not give the spirit its own power; it instead orders the three soul-parts in such a way that the *dunamis* of courage is reliably and rightly deployed by the spirited part. It provides the assurance that the other virtues of the city or the individual will shine consistently bright and true. In less metaphorical language, the virtue of justice provides the organizational structure so that the other soul parts stick to their own work and accomplish their own function.²⁰⁴

Becoming completely just thus presupposes that the powers required for the other virtues already be present in the city or soul, and the full realization of justice logically entails the full realization of the other virtues. Although nothing I have said so far implies that the other virtues also entail justice, it is possible that Plato's position in the *Republic*

²⁰⁴ The passage also suggests that justice will order the soul-parts as long as it is in the soul. We are told later in Book IV that the just individual only acts after assuring themselves that their action will preserve and reinforce the order and harmony of their soul (443c9-444a2). Every action undertaken by the just individual thus either more perfectly establish the proper relationship between the three soul parts or strengthens their already ordered soul. If this individual also has the capacities required for temperance, courage, and wisdom, then, barring any major catastrophes, they will continue to have these virtues as well. This is the sense in which justice's presence in the soul will preserve the individual's other virtues.

was similar to the one held by his teacher, who maintained that no one could have any of the virtues without possessing all of them.²⁰⁵ We can already see that no individual could be properly courageous if they are not also wise, for only a properly functioning rational part of the soul is able to consistently discover the truth and pass down correct opinions to the spirited part. It is somewhat less obvious whether an individual could be wise or courageous while lacking the virtue of temperance. Socrates characterizes the virtue of temperance as ‘similar-thinking’, or an agreement throughout the whole soul regarding which of the three parts ought to rule (431e10-432a9). One can certainly imagine a person whose reason decides properly and whose spirit helps to preserve reason’s decisions, but whose appetite does not agree to this state of affairs and thus does not calmly acquiesce to the two other superior soul-parts.²⁰⁶ If Plato allowed that such a person might exist, one could perhaps possess the other virtues without being temperate. Yet it is likely that throughout Books IV, VIII, and IX Plato presupposes that the appetitive part is so large and powerful that absent the virtue of temperance it will upset the proper functioning of one’s reason and spirit.²⁰⁷ If this were the case, then temperance

²⁰⁵ It is also possible that Plato maintained the Socratic belief that wisdom alone was sufficient for all the other virtues. For a general statement to this effect, see Irwin (1995, 237): “We have strong reason for believing that [Plato] takes bravery, temperance, and justice to be inseparable, and that he takes all of them to be inseparable from wisdom. We have less strong, but still plausible, reasons for believing that he takes wisdom to be sufficient for the other reasons.”

²⁰⁶ Indeed, this is the picture of the tripartite soul that is represented in the chariot allegory of the *Phaedrus*. In this myth, the black horse representing appetite struggles violently against the charioteer and the noble white horse, who represent the rational part of the soul and the spirited part respectively (253c7-255a1).

²⁰⁷ Certain passages from Books VIII and IX suggest this possibility. See, for example, 590c2-6: “Because of what do you think the mechanical and manual crafts bear reproach? Or do we say it is because of anything else than whenever someone has their best part weak by nature, so that they are not able to rule over the beasts within him, but rather it serves them and is only able to learn the things that flatter them.” See also 553c4-d7 and Josh Wilburn’s (2015, 11-12) analysis of these passages: “What these passages show is that appetite’s “strength” in the soul consists in its ability to destabilize and corrupt rational judgement...Appetite ‘rules’ and ‘enslaves’

would be required for the soul to possess the other virtues. I will assume that to fully possess any one virtue one must possess all of them (though everything I say will apply to individuals who lack one or two of the virtues, assuming such people can exist).

The foregoing discussion has provided us with the resources to answer our earlier question about justice's *dunamis* and what it accomplishes in the individual: this *dunamis* orders each of the parts of the soul to operate in the way they are naturally suited to operate. Just as the virtue of courage has the power to preserve the correct opinions about what is to be feared, justice has the power to preserve the appropriate order and structure of the soul. Justice ensures that the soul-parts do their appropriate work, which entails that – in the case of the fully just soul – the individual will also be wise, courageous and temperate. Justice is the virtue that enables the tripartite soul to fulfill its function, operating as one, unified unit.

The fact that courage gives rise to dispositions to act and feel in certain ways suggests that the other virtues, including justice, will give rise to similar dispositions as well. And indeed one crucial text in Book IV provides a compelling support that justice will give rise to such dispositions. At 443e1-444a2, Socrates explains how justice concerns the internal action of the agent and that just actions aim to harmonize the soul-parts and produce an individual who is a friend to themselves. Socrates goes on to say that this individual identifies which of all the possible actions will promote or strengthen the appropriate ordering of their soul, then calls this action the just action and performs it. The context of the passage strongly suggests that such an action is desirable and chosen for the sake of harmonizing and ordering the soul. If so, then justice in the soul gives rise

reasoning, in other words, not by forcibly dragging it along, but rather by leading it astray. *That is the threat of appetite...*"

to dispositions to act in ways that contribute to the internal harmony of the soul, or – we might say – to act justly.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that Plato anticipated Aristotle in identifying virtue as a *hexis* or a state as a first actuality. It is true that Socrates twice calls justice a *hexis* in Book IV (433e12 and 443e6), but he clearly does not conceive of justice as Aristotle conceives of the ethical virtues. In NE I.8, giving the example of an individual who is asleep, Aristotle argues that virtue is a state and not an activity because one can be virtuous but inactive. Even if we were to assume that this person is virtuous, Aristotle holds that their virtue is not doing anything good for the agent while they are still asleep; it is dormant or inactive (1098b34-1099a3). The *Republic*, however, presents justice as constantly active, benefiting the just individual in ways that Aristotle would not allow. In Book IX, for example, Socrates makes the point that a just individual's rational part continues to function during sleep and that while asleep it considers what has been, what is, and what will be. The strong implication is that the individual's justice is responsible for the fact that this person's reason continues to be active while they are asleep (571d6-572b1). I take Plato's view to be that in ideal circumstances one's justice is continuously active, therefore continuously benefiting the agent.

Strange though it may seem to us, justice as Plato conceives of it gives rise to a disposition to 'act' in certain ways even during sleep. Indeed, I will argue in the Appendix that justice continues to be active and to give rise to certain dispositions in the afterlife. If this is right, we must understand justice to be ever-active and to give rise to its characteristic dispositions through its constant activity. This is a description of a virtue different from the ones we find in Aristotle, but it is by no means unintelligible.

What are the Beneficial Effects of Justice?

Our discussion suggested that courage and justice enable the city and soul to accomplish certain tasks required for their prospering. This is a positive finding. In the famous ‘*ergon* argument’ from Book I (352d8-354a9), Socrates argues that everything with a function also has a unique virtue that allows it to accomplish its function well. This general conception of virtue is presupposed in later books and, I think, applies to the ethical virtues as well. Courage in the city, for example, is the virtue that allows the auxiliary class to fulfil its function excellently: by preserving correct opinions about what is to be feared, the auxiliary class produces a city willing to confront its enemies, to control the unruly elements of its citizenry, and to actualize its plans in the external world. So too with courage in the individual. Identifying the role that the virtue plays and the function it allows the city or soul to accomplish are the keys to understanding the value it has.

Any successful account of the ethical virtues must be able to explain their value and the contribution that each of them makes towards the prospering of the city or the individual. Note that Socrates explicitly raises the possibility of comparing the value of the different virtues (433c4-6):

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρίναι τί τὴν πόλιν
ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάζεται ἐγγενόμενον,
δύσκριτον ἂν εἴη.

And moreover, I said, if one really had to judge which
of [the virtues], once having come to be in our city, will most
of all make our city good, it would be tough to judge...

By asking his interlocutors to consider which of the four ethical virtues makes the greatest contribution to the goodness of the city, Socrates implies that one can, at least in

principle, distinguish and then evaluate the respective contributions that each makes to the city (and, by implication, to the individual as well). To judge in favor of any one of the virtues would be to judge that it deserves more credit for the prospering of the city than any of the others. Unfortunately, Plato does not explicitly articulate how to evaluate the various virtues, nor does he give an answer to the question he implicitly raises: which virtue in fact does most good for the city? He does, however, have Socrates very clearly state that injustice does the greatest harm to the city and that it is rightly called vice most of all (434c1-2). This suggests that justice does the greatest good for the city and for the individual as well, which, given the overall project of the dialogue, is unsurprising. The task for the interpreter is to identify why exactly this is the case.

In the central sections of Book IX, Socrates offers three proofs of the superiority of justice over injustice. The first is expressed in Glaucon's own explicit judgement that the most just life is the most prosperous life and the most vicious life is the most miserable life (580a9-c8);²⁰⁸ the second proof establishes that those who are truly just experience more pleasurable pleasures than those who are less just (580c9-583a11); and, finally, the third proof establishes that the just also enjoy better or 'more real' pleasures than others (583b1-588a5). Any defensible interpretation of the *Republic* must admit the importance of these three proofs and their significance for Plato's final judgement regarding the

²⁰⁸ There is room for intelligent disagreement about where the first proof begins. 580a9 is the point at which Glaucon is asked to reflect upon the lives led by the kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical individual and to make his decision about who lives the best life. I have marked this bit of text as the beginning of the proof because it explicitly moves us from a description to an evaluation of these lives. But this is a little artificial – Socrates' 'description' of these lives in the preceding books is full of evaluation and clearly forms the basis of Glaucon's judgement in favor of the just life. Someone else might reasonably decide that (some of) Socrates' account of these other lives needs to be formally included as part of the first proof.

value of justice all on its own, for it is right after the third and final proof that Socrates announces he can, at last, conclude his defense of justice δι' αὐτό (588b1-11):

Εἶεν δὴ· ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ
πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρ' ἤκομεν. ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον
λυσitteλεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελέως μὲν ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζομένῳ
δὲ δικάϊῳ· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη;
Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Νῦν δὴ αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα
τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἦν ἐκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν.

Now since we've reached this point in the argument, let's
return to the earlier discussion that brought us here. For I
thought it was said that being unjust profits the completely
unjust individual if they are reputed to be just. Wasn't that said?
—Yes, just that.
So now let's discuss with whoever said that, since we have
agreed on what powers being unjust and acting justly have.

Placing this text immediately after the final proof is a very powerful indication that the three proofs are crucial for concluding the central argument of the dialogue, and therefore crucial, too, for understanding the value that justice all on its own possesses. In addition, the last two lines of the text strongly suggest that the whole defense of justice δι' αὐτό makes crucial reference to the *dunamis* of justice.

Indeed, this passage underscores the necessity of attending to the power of justice – something which many scholars, unfortunately, neglect to do. Recall that in Book II, Glaucon asks Socrates to defend justice by explaining what justice is and what power it has all on its own (358b4-7). Adeimantus makes a similar request later, though he drops the request to hear what justice is, asking only to hear what it does by its own power and how it benefits the just individual (366e5-6). In the passage currently under discussion, Socrates flags that he has accomplished what Glaucon and Adeimantus requested of him in Book II. Now that all the interlocutors have agreed on the powers of justice and injustice, they can conclude the defense of justice δι' αὐτό. To complete the project of the

Republic, all that will remain to show is that justice is also valuable *διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἅπ’ αὐτοῦ*, which Socrates accomplishes at the end of Book X when he returns to the Reputational Rewards of Justice.

I claim that each of the three proofs highlights a different effect of justice that contributes to the prospering of the just individual. The first effect is familiar from our previous discussion: justice has the effect of producing a soul that functions as well as possible. In the ordered soul, each part does what it is naturally suited to do; as a result, the just individual decides correctly about what is advantageous for their soul, preserves the correct opinions about what is to be feared, acts to fulfill its plans, and keeps their appetites in check. The just individual has an optimally functioning soul – something which Plato clearly regards as an immense benefit, as is evinced by the fact that it is the sort of thing Socrates appeals to in his final attempt to convince Thrasymachus that the just individual will live more prosperously than the unjust individual. In Book I, Socrates argues that the possession of justice—here identified as *the* virtue of the soul—ensures that the soul rules, manages, and deliberates well, all of which is taken to be sufficient for prospering (353d2-345a9). This is an earlier version of the first proof of the superiority of justice over injustice. As I tried to indicate with my italics, though, Socrates’ argument in Book I mentions justice as the only virtue of the soul. In light of the richer conception of psychology presented in Book IV, the argument of Book I must be revised and qualified. Indeed, the later sections of the dialogue provide compelling reason to doubt the status of the final argument Socrates makes to Thrasymachus. It cannot be true according to the Book IV picture, for example, that justice is completely responsible for the individual deliberating well (*βουλεύεσθαι*; 353d2-7), because wisdom is the virtue that allows us to

deliberate well (428b6-d3). Yet arguably even according to the more nuanced and other-virtue-friendly account of Book IV, justice can take some credit for good deliberation insofar as it ensures that the rational part does its own work and prevents the appetites or spirit from disrupting the exercise of reason.

In any case, Socrates does not explicitly argue in Book IV, as he does in Book I, that justice is sufficient for prospering.²⁰⁹ Instead he claims something more modest and less all-encompassing. We are told that the soul of a just agent will be harmonious and unified and that the just individual will think and act in a whole-hearted and confident manner (443d1-e1):

τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν
αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ
καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς
ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης,
καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα
συνδῆσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἓνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν.

[They] set their own affairs in order and rule over and order themselves and become a friend to themselves. And they fit together their three parts—just like three notes in a harmony—lowest, highest, and the middle, and if there are any others that happen to be in between. They bind all of these together and become completely one from many.

The language of becoming friends with oneself is, of course, metaphorical, as is the analogy with musical harmony. Though it is not immediately clear what genuine feature

²⁰⁹ One might object at this point that justice is shown to be sufficient for prospering at the end of Book IV by the comparison with bodily health. Doesn't Glaucon concede that a life with a corrupted, unjust soul is not worth living (444e7-445b4)? He does, but I do not think we are meant to regard Glaucon's judgement as definitive. Socrates responds Glaucon's judgement by saying that the question of which individual lives the best life still needs to be explicitly addressed (445b5-7). And at two points later in Book VIII, we are reminded that we need to consider the defective cities and individuals to complete the investigation of justice and its relationship to prospering (544a2-b3 and 545a2-b2). For Socrates at least, justice all on its own is not successfully defended, nor is its relationship with prospering demonstrated, until Book IX.

of the just soul these metaphors are supposed to capture, at least two points seem relatively certain. First, such a soul is maximally unified and, second, its parts all work together for the same end. Presumably, this is what the metaphor of harmony is getting at. Just like a chorus composed of a number of different parts, including a conductor, must work together to produce a single, beautiful song, so the soul has multiple parts and a leader, each of which needs to do its own work in order for the soul to function well as a single unit. I think we can also assume that a person with such a soul will ‘sense’ the friendship among the various soul-parts and derive satisfaction and pleasure from this fact. At least their rational part, which understands how the other parts function and what they need, will realize the good state of the soul and be pleased on account of it.

This description of the just individual must be contrasted with the later discussion of the completely unjust individual – the tyrant described in Book IX. Like the democratic individual discussed in book VIII, the tyrannical individual is won over by the many different appetites that arise in their soul; yet unlike the democratic individual, their desires are amplified by an overwhelming ἔρως. This erotic longing causes their desires to become completely insatiable and ultimately drives the tyrant into madness and lawless behavior (572b10-573b4). What results from the mad pursuit of aberrant pleasures is not so much the agency of one person, but the schizophrenic determination of a shattered and disturbed psyche. Rather than being governed by a rationally-ordained and forward-looking plan, the strongest desires at any given time determine the conduct of the tyrant. One might imagine that, given the total domination of appetite, the tyrant might possess a soul so fully enslaved by appetite that their reason and spirit would become loyal servants to the lowest part of their soul, and in this way achieve a sort of

inverted ‘harmony’ or ‘wholeheartedness.’ Apparently, Plato does not allow for this possibility. He holds that since reason is by nature fit to rule, it can never be totally subordinated to the other soul-parts; reason inevitably registers the perversion of the unjust soul (577d1-5).²¹⁰ Thus the tyrannical individual’s soul is never truly harmonious or unified, which Plato regards as a significant failing, though it is only the beginning of the tyrant’s woes. By zealously indulging every appetitive whim, the despot ends up thwarting many of the deep and long-term interests of the other soul-parts, such as the spirit’s desire to be respected by others or reason’s attempt to secure physical safety from external enemies. This leads the unjust individual experiencing regret and fear, which manifest themselves as painful affective marks of their psychological disorder (577e1-588b2).

The contrast with the unjust individual illustrates how valuable harmony of the soul and wholeheartedness really are. As I hope to have brought out in my discussion, there is a distinctive emotional or affective hue coloring the lives of the just and unjust. The radically different conditions of these two psyches and their corresponding experiences form the basis for the first proof of the superiority of the just life over the unjust life. It is indeed immediately after the discussion of the tyrant that Socrates asks Glaucon to judge which individual is most prosperous. Glaucon judges the completely just individual to live the most prosperous of lives and the completely unjust individual to lead the most miserable life. Socrates calls this judgement the first proof of justice over injustice. The proof is itself based on justice’s *dunamis* because justice’s *dunamis* is what produces a

²¹⁰ I take this point from Richard Perry (2007). Speaking of the tyrannical individual, he says, “Although degraded, reason still has some sense that the soul is not what it should be. As a consequence, we are not the unwitting victims of appetitive forces; they may drag us about but we can still be tragically aware of what is happening” (402).

soul with properly ordered soul-parts which in turn constitutes the harmony and friendship found in the soul. Therefore, justice's power ought to get the credit for this effect.²¹¹

The second proof purports to demonstrate that the just individual experiences are more pleasant life than the unjust individual. For this argument, Socrates provides important background information regarding the three soul-parts and what they naturally pursue as pleasant. We are told that the appetitive part of the soul takes as its characteristic pleasure 'the love of gain', and so is called the gain-loving part; the spirited part takes as its characteristic pleasures, mastery, victory, and reputation, and so is called the victory or honor-loving part; and the rational part of the soul takes as its characteristic pleasure the learning of the truth, and so is called the learning-loving part (580d7-581b10). Moreover, the part of the soul that rules in each individual determines the sort of pleasure that they pursue in their life. Since each of the three character-types is partial to the pleasures they themselves pursue, a disagreement arises as to which of the three sorts of lives is the most hedonically satisfying (581e6-582a2):

Ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἐκάστου τοῦ
εἶδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ
κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον,
ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον, πῶς ἂν
εἰδεῖμεν τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει;

But then when, I said, the pleasures and the very life of each

²¹¹ We must distinguish this effect from making correct decisions about how one should act, as these decisions are the providence of wisdom. Note that being well-ordered and wholehearted in one's deliberation and decision making is distinct from making the right decisions. This is clear when we compare an individual who makes the right decisions amidst a great deal of psychic turmoil and resistance with an individual who makes the right decisions without doubting or second-guessing themselves. Of course, because full justice entails all the other virtues, the fully just individual will necessarily make the right decisions wholeheartedly, but we should also be able to recognize that wholeheartedness and confidence are goods all on their own – just as being complete psychological fracture is a bad all on its own.

of these forms are disputed over—not over living more finely or shamefully, or better or worse, but over the pleasant and painful themselves—how would we know which of them speaks most truly?

Socrates argues that only the individual who is ruled by the rational part of their soul can adequately evaluate which of the three lives is most pleasant. This is because only the individual ruled by reason has in fact experienced each of the three characteristic pleasures and, second, because only they have any familiarity with argumentation, the very tool by which one must evaluate the claims made by the three lives.²¹² Since the individual ruled by reason in fact believes the pleasures of learning are the most pleasant, Socrates concludes that the lovers of learning live the sweetest of all lives (583a1-3):

Τριῶν ἄρ' οὐσῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ τούτου τοῦ μέρους
τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ μανθάνομεν ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ
ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἡδιστος;

Therefore of the three real pleasures, the one belonging to the part of the soul by which we learn would be the most pleasant and in those of us that this part rules, their life is the most pleasant.

²¹² Socrates also points out that the individual ruled by reason experiences each of the characteristic pleasures μετὰ φρονήσεως (581d4-5). It's not clear why *phronēsis* is required in addition to experiencing the three pleasures nor why being adept in the arguments evaluating claims about pleasure is required. One possibility is that *phronēsis* allows the individual ruled by reason to experience the characteristic pleasures of others *as an individual who is dominated by those pleasures would experience them*. This would block an objection raised by Cross and Woosley (1964, 265-6), who claim that Plato takes, “the unwarranted step of concluding that because the philosopher enjoys philosophy more than he enjoys either of the other lives, and because neither of the other two men knows anything of the pleasures of philosophy and is therefore not competent to judge, the life of philosophy is more enjoyable. To which the answer is that while it may be more enjoyable to the philosopher, it does not follow either that it is more enjoyable to him than the pursuit of power and wealth are to the other men.” If the individual ruled by reason can step into the shoes of the other individuals, as it were, and experience pleasures as others experience them, then they would be well placed to evaluate the pleasantness of each of the lives after all. This would require reading μετὰ φρονήσεως to mean something like, ‘with purpose’. Admittedly, this is not the normal meaning of the word in Plato, but it is one of the LSJ's primary (A.1) translations for the word.

In what way does this proof depend on the *dunamis* of justice? Because justice orders the soul-parts appropriately and because reason is naturally suited to rule in the soul, the just individual will have a soul in which reason dominates. Socrates infers that since reason rules over the tripartite soul-complex, it is free to adopt and successfully pursue the pleasures for which it has such an affinity. His reasoning seems to be: if this soul-part is able to command over the other soul-parts and dictates the best course of action for the whole soul conceived of as one unit, it has the liberty to pursue its own pleasures and pursuits. In other words, it is the boss in the soul and so can do what it wants to do in its spare time. One might wish to challenge this inference, but if it succeeds Socrates can indeed conclude that the just individual will enjoy the pleasures of learning the truth and that they will, therefore, experience sweeter pleasures than others. Moreover, he can additionally explain why justice is responsible for the pleasantness of this individual's existence. It is only because justice makes the soul-parts do the work for which they are naturally suited that the just individual can savor the finest pleasures of learning.

It is worth comparing this proof to the first. Whereas the first proof relies only on the nature of the soul and the nature of justice, the second proof relies on a significant number of other considerations, including some regarding additional, contingent features of human psychology: one must know the ends that each of the soul-parts pursue, for example, or which activities and pursuits are more pleasant and satisfying for human beings. We may also have to assume the existence of certain external circumstances in order to properly compare the pleasures championed by the representatives of each life. Those dominated by the love of gain need to live in a time and place that allow for money-making or the acquisition of wealth; and the pursuit of honor depends on the sort

of social infrastructure that incorporates sport, structured combat, or other competitive activities. Since the just individual must compare all the pleasures to know that the pleasures of the rational part of the soul are the most pleasurable, they must have some experience of or access to these lesser pleasures. This would not be possible unless certain social circumstances prevailed. The first proof, on the other hand, demonstrates that the just individual will be better off than the unjust individual no matter what external circumstances they find themselves in or how they experience pleasure. Whether in an evil regime or on a desert island, the just person will act to preserve the harmony of their soul to the best of their ability and will reap the rewards of wholeheartedness and psychic unity. Not so for the second proof, as it depends on facts about what causes pleasures and the way humans come to experience them.

The third proof shows that the just individual experiences truer or ‘more real’ pleasures; apparently, it leads to the demonstration that the perfectly just individual lives 729 times more pleasantly than the perfectly unjust individual (587d12-e4). Although the proof is notoriously unclear and difficult to interpret, it is at least clear that it purports to show that the pleasures experienced by the just individual are ‘more real’ than or superior to those experienced by others.²¹³ Socrates’ argument is based on the claim that pleasure is a filling or restoration of sorts. The pleasure of eating while hungry is, ontologically speaking, just the restoration of a bodily equilibrium through the intake of food. Similarly, learning is a filling of our cognitive treasure chest, which was less full before we acquired the new knowledge, and this filling is too a pleasure (585b6-10):

Οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ’ ἂν ὁ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων;

²¹³ My discussion of the third argument has been informed by David Wolfsdorf’s analysis offered in his *Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (2013, 63-74).

Πῶς δ' οὐ;
Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἥττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος;
Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον.

Then would the one become full who partakes of
nourishment and also the one who takes intelligence?

—Of course.

Is the truer fullness the fullness of that with less or more being?
Clearly, that with more being.

At the end of this exchange with Glaucon, Socrates appeals to the metaphysical considerations raised in Books V-VII to claim that knowledge has more being than food. This is because knowledge is more akin to the Forms than is food, an object of the material world; the former may be stable and unchanging (it might even be eternal, *Meno* 81c4-6), whereas the latter is perishable and changes with time. Then follows the inference that the soul being filled with knowledge is a truer filling than the body being filled with food, which establishes what Socrates needs in order to conclude that acquiring knowledge is a particularly true and real sort of pleasure (585d11-e4):

Εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ
ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον
μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ
ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἥττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον
ἥττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ
ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἥττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι.

If, then, being filled with what is akin to its nature is sweet, then the thing filled more with what really has being would produce rejoicing-in-a-true-pleasure more really and truly. But that which partakes of what has less being would be filled less truly and securely, and it would partake of unreliable and less true pleasure.

The fact that the soul being filled with knowledge is significantly more pleasurable is explained by two facts. First, it is fitting for our soul, which is immortal and incorporeal, to be filled with something akin to its nature. Yet this affinity is not unique to the

relationship knowledge has with the soul. Since the body is both mortal and material, it is appropriate to fill it with perishable and physical nourishment, as we do when we eat or drink. What is special about filling one's soul with knowledge depends on this second fact which contributes to knowledge's higher status: knowledge partakes of more being than things like food or drink. Plato apparently believes that this makes learning a more real and truer pleasure than eating. In any case, this allows Socrates to conclude that the just individual will experience more real – or perhaps qualitatively better – pleasures than the unjust individual.

In addition to this, the just individual is said to experience the best kinds of pleasures as well, because the person who is ruled by reason will allow the spirited and appetitive parts of their soul to indulge in only those pleasures that are appropriate and fitting for them, which, in virtue of their appropriateness, are said to be the best pleasures for them (586e4-8). The unjust, on the other hand, pursue pleasures that are not appropriate for any of their soul-parts, because they are led astray by the overreaching appetitive or spirited parts. They will thus experience alien and untrue pleasures (587a3-5).

In what way is the *dunamis* of justice responsible for truer and better pleasures experienced by the just agent? As was the case in the previous proof, Socrates is presupposing that the just individual will be ruled by reason and therefore will philosophize. And the activity of philosophizing is the proximate cause of filling their soul with knowledge, which is itself pleasure.

I will not discuss the many philosophical or linguistic difficulties posed by this argument, but as with the last proof it is instructive to note that this proof operates at some distance from the nature of justice all on its own. As Dominic Scott has recently

pointed out, this proof depends on the metaphysical and epistemological material developed and elaborated in Books V-VII.²¹⁴ It also requires accepting a rather controversial account of the ontology of pleasure. Certainly knowing the nature of justice and the function it allows the soul to accomplish is manifestly not enough to establish what the final proof purports to establish. This shows is that the third proof is not only based on the *dunamis* of justice, but also *other relevant facts about human psychology and metaphysics*. Facts about the nature of pleasure could, one supposes, have been different. And if they had been different, it may not have turned out that the just individual will live 729 times more pleasantly than the unjust individual.

I have argued that we can identify at least three Authentic Rewards of Justice highlighted within the *Republic*, one exploited by each of the three proofs for the superiority of the just life over the unjust life: the harmony and whole-heartedness of the soul, the most pleasant experiences, and the greatest and most real pleasures. These are the benefits of justice which make it the most valuable of the four ethical virtues discussed in the *Republic*. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that Plato believed these three effects of justice were enough to mount a full defense of justice all on its own – for after presenting the third of his proofs, Socrates explicitly suggests that the interlocutors return to the issue that prompted the whole investigation, namely the suggestion that practicing injustice is profitable if one maintains the reputation for justice (588b1-4). And a few pages later, all parties agree that there is no reasonable way to maintain that practicing injustice is profitable for any individual (591a5-b7). Socrates has demonstrated

²¹⁴ Scott (2015, 78): the third proof “deploys the same tripartite psychology set out in Book IV, and then supplements our understanding of the activity of the rational part by borrowing metaphysical claims from Books V-VII.”

to the satisfaction of Glaucon and Adeimantus that justice is a greater good than injustice δι' αὐτό, and that only justice truly contributes to human prospering by its own nature.

This marks the formal end of the first – and by far the greatest – part of Socrates' defense of justice. What follows in Book X is the defense of justice διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

We must now return to the question of what sort of value Plato ascribes to justice in his defense of it δι' αὐτό. As I have indicated above, Plato's argument in Books II-IX depends on justice's power as well as the beneficial effects produced by it. This reveals that the demonstration of justice's value is not a demonstration that it has intrinsic value (at least not in the standard way of understanding intrinsic value today).

In his influential paper on intrinsic goodness, Moore argued that nothing can be intrinsically valuable if it would lack its value in a world with different natural laws. Consider his argument that the evolutionary account of 'goodness', according to which one species is better than another if and only if it is more successful at reproducing and surviving, cannot be an account of intrinsic goodness: "For if you say that to call type A "better" than type B means merely that it is more favored in the struggle for existence, it follows that the being "better" is a predicate which does *not depend merely on the intrinsic nature of A and B respectively*. On the contrary, although here and now A may be more favored than B, it is obvious that under other circumstances or with different natural laws the very same type which, under one set of circumstances, is better than B, would, under another set, be worse."²¹⁵

Now consider the second and third proofs from Book IX. They show that the just individual lives a life richer than the unjust individual in both the intensity and 'realness'

²¹⁵ Moore, 1922, 256.

of pleasure. But this can only be plausibly maintained if certain other facts about the world and the agents in it are held constant. If the natural laws were radically different, then perhaps the just and philosophic individual would not live most pleasantly of all. Indeed, we need not go so far as to imagine radically different natural laws; were human psychology, hedonic preferences, or the nature of pleasure to vary sufficiently in different times and places, then it would not necessarily be the case that just and philosophical individual will experience the most pleasant of all lives. Justice had certain hedonic effects in Plato's world, perhaps, but it does not follow that it would have these same effects in all worlds.

Note that nothing I have said so far commits us to thinking that Plato did not in any way regard justice as good in itself – that is to say, what we sometimes understand by 'in itself', considered in isolation from any of its effects. Plato may well have thought that an ordered soul is good totally independent of any of the effects it has on the individual's actions, feelings, or prospering. Presumably, the Form of the Good is eminently intrinsically valuable. I have always suspected that, on Plato's account, the just soul exhibits goodness by approximating the maximally unified and stable transcendent Forms. If this is correct, justice will also possess non-instrumental goodness. To the extent that it instantiates unity and stability it will be intrinsically valuable, though this need not have any effect whatsoever on the prospering of the just individual. I do not deny that Plato regarded justice as valuable irrespective of any of its effects. What I deny is, first, that to value justice 'all on its own' in the sense discussed by Glaucon in his division of goods means to value it irrespective of any effects; and second, I deny that the

goodness justice possesses irrespective of these effects is sufficient to defend justice against the challenge made at the beginning of Book II.

Indeed, once we reject the view of the sophisticated ‘No-Effects’ theorist and deny that justice is a constitutive element of the individual’s prospering, it becomes relatively clear that any intrinsic goodness that justice may possess is not directly relevant to the main argument of the *Republic*. For, as far as I can see, being a constitutive component of prospering is the only way justice can be intrinsically valuable and directly contribute to the just agent’s well-being. And as I argued in the previous chapter, Glaucon’s division of goods only considers those things which directly contribute to our prospering as goods. Therefore, I conclude that the intrinsic value of justice plays little or no role in the argument of the dialogue.²¹⁶

Our analysis of Book IX has shown that the effects of justice are indispensable for demonstrating the value that justice has for the person who hopes to attain prospering and, moreover, that these effects proceed from the *dunamis* of justice. Plato believes that taking these effects into account is permissible in the praise of justice all on its own, and we can now see why. These Authentic Rewards of Justice do not hinge on any sort of appearance manifested by the just agent; they are completely independent of the recognition of outside agents, be they gods or other humans. Although one may reap the social and divine rewards of justice by merely appearing to be just, one cannot enjoy any

²¹⁶ I thus agree with the hybrid-theorists mentioned in the previous chapter to a certain extent. Plato does consider justice to be a good in three different ways: (1) as an intrinsic good, (2) as contributing to the prospering of the just individual δι’ αὐτό on account of the Authentic Rewards of Justice and (3) as contributing to the prospering of the just individual on account of the τὰ γυγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ of justice, the Reputational Rewards of Justice. I disagree with the hybrid-theorists in that on my view the main argument of the *Republic* is focused only on those goods that contribute to the agent’s prospering. Justice in the soul may be intrinsically good, but this is not relevantly discussed in our dialogue.

of the effects discussed in this chapter without being truly just. The optimal functioning of the soul is the result of justice's *dunamis*. The whole-heartedness and confidence that characterizes the just agent, therefore, follow directly and immediately from the power of justice. The effects discussed in the second and third proofs do not necessarily follow from the nature and power of justice alone, but they do follow when we accept certain facts Plato held fixed about human psychology and our world. Assuming that Plato is right about human psychology and pleasure, the just individual will live a more hedonically satisfying life than the unjust individual. The Authentic Rewards of Justice, then, follow rather closely upon the *dunamis* of justice and the ordering of the three soul-parts. Justice is good δι' αὐτό in virtue of doing certain things that directly contributing to the prospering and well-being of the just agent. The reality of justice – and not merely its appearance – is truly beneficial for humans.

Should scholars of ancient philosophy be troubled by the fact that Plato does not rely on the intrinsic value of justice in his *Republic*? I do not think so. There is no good reason to assume that Plato was particularly attracted to the conception of intrinsic value or goodness with which contemporary moral philosophers operate. In fact, I believe Plato's concept of valuing something δι' αὐτό does a better job of capturing the way we value things for themselves than does our concept of intrinsic value. We are rarely so theoretically-inclined as to ask ourselves whether a prized possession or loved one would still be valuable were the laws of nature different. Much more frequently, we ask ourselves whether a thing will be good for us absent any sort of reputation we might acquire because of it than whether it would be good for us in distant possible worlds. Witness the common advice given to children that they should not care so much about

what other people think about their accomplishments, but instead that they should care about their own value as a person. We need not fault Plato for failing to employ the contemporary philosopher's concept of intrinsic goodness. We should, however, reject interpretations of the *Republic* that read Kind-B goods as valuable, first, for themselves and independently of any effects, and then second, for all their effects.

Conclusion

Shortly after presenting the division of goods, Glaucon announces (358b4-7):

ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα
ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς
δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἑᾶσαι χαίρειν.

For I desire to hear both what [justice and injustice] are and what
power each has all on its own while it is in the soul. Bid
farewell to the wages and the things that arise from them.

Socrates' job is to praise justice all on its own, or, as I have argued, to praise it without invoking the Reputational Rewards that are normally associated with justice. He accomplishes this over the course of the remaining nine books, most prominently in Books IV and IX, where we are told what justice is, what power it has, and what beneficial effects it produces in the just agent. I have argued that Plato is above all concerned with three distinct beneficial effects for the just agent, which directly contribute to their prospering. Since these are what make justice valuable all on its own, the standard 'No-Effects' interpretation of the *Republic* must be abandoned in favor of a 'Yes-Effects' interpretation. In this chapter and the last, I have tried to develop a viable version of this strategy.

Appendix to Chapter 4

The Two Faces of Justice in Book X

In this appendix, I show that my interpretation of the *Republic's* central argument provides the resources to address an unresolved textual and philosophical difficulty in Book X. Showing this will, I hope, provide further reason to accept the central thesis of my third and fourth chapters.

Book X begins with Socrates reflecting on how well *Kallipolis* has been founded and, in particular, praising his interlocutors for their earlier censorship of poetry. The tripartite psychology developed in Book IV and the metaphysical doctrines elaborated in Books VI and VII have provided indispensable insight into the dangers of poetry, which can now be incorporated into the *Republic's* second and final attack on the art form. Following a philosophically rich discussion of poetry in the first half of Book X, Plato returns to the main argument of the dialogue and the Reputational Rewards of Justice that have hitherto been set aside. Mixed up in the discussion of these Reputational Rewards is a proof for the immortality of the soul and the famous Myth of Er, which purports to give an account of what our souls experience in the afterlife.

Book X's composition has often been regarded as vastly inferior to the rest of the *Republic* or, even worse, an unfinished addition to the self-contained unit of Books II-IX. In his influential *History of Greek Philosophy*, C.C.W. Guthrie says, "The resumption of the attack on art with which Book X begins seems ill timed, and it is commonly referred to as a sort of appendix (Crombie calls it a coda), and the second part of the book, on the rewards of virtue, is introduced abruptly and, it is said, shows signs of having been left in

an unfinished state.”²¹⁷ I do not have space to discuss all the reasons that have contributed to the scholarly disapproval of this final book of the *Republic*, but in what follows I do want to address one passage that has proven to be particularly problematic.

At least as concerns the central argument of the dialogue, the purpose of the second half of Book X is, as Guthrie indicates, to discuss the τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γινόμενα of justice. Having completed his main task of defending the value of justice δι’ αὐτό at the end of Book IX, Socrates returns to the wages of virtue and argues – contrary to what Glaucon and Adeimantus had earlier suggested – that only the truly just individual reliably enjoys the rewards that come from being recognized as just by the gods and other people (612b7-c3). In the discussion that follows, Socrates mentions than three types of rewards that the truly just individual receives. The first are the rewards the just agent receives from gods while they are still alive (612e2-613b8) and the second are the rewards the just individual receives from other people while they are still alive (613b9-614a3). So far, this is exactly what we should expect given my earlier analysis of the τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γινόμενα of justice as those effects that are enjoyed by the individual due to their being recognized as just by gods and other people. Socrates even ends his presentation of the first two types of rewards by saying that, “beyond the good things which justice itself provides...these would be the prizes and wages and gifts that arise for the just agent from the gods and humans while they are alive” (613e6-614a3). Socrates is once again contrasting the effects that come from justice’s nature absent a reputation for justice with the rewards that come from being recognized as just. To these two types of wages, he

²¹⁷ Guthrie (1975, 544).

adds a third: the wages distributed to the souls of just individuals after they die (614a4-616b1). We will return to this third type below.

But to see the problem that has troubled scholars, we must back up to an earlier point. At 608b4-8, in the process of transitioning back to the topic of justice, Socrates encourages Glaucon to avoid the siren call of money, honor, political office and poetry, all of which are liable to lead one to forsake justice. Glaucon responds enthusiastically to the encouragement and informs Socrates that he has already been convinced by what has been said earlier that justice is more important for his well-being than any amount of money, honor, office, or even poetry, and that he will not let any of these things lead him astray. This is the response we expect from Glaucon, but Socrates' response to this is very striking. He says to Glaucon (608c1-2):

Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς
καὶ προκείμενα ἄλλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν.

And yet, I said, we have not gone through the greatest
rewards or proposed prizes of virtue.

Socrates appears to be suggesting that the following discussion will introduce even greater benefits of justice than were introduced earlier in the *Republic*, though what follows is the discussion of the Reputational Rewards of Justice summarized above. Accordingly, Socrates seems to be suggesting that justice is more valuable *διὰ τὰ γγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* than *δι' αὐτό*.

It would be truly disastrous to the argument of the dialogue if the considerations adduced in Books II-IX were in the end less significant than the esteem and social prizes the just individual receives from their fellow citizens and the gods. One might resist this problematic implication by pointing out that at 608c1-2 Socrates refers only to hitherto unmentioned *rewards* and *prizes* of justice. Socrates would not regard the benefits of

justice discussed in Books II-IX as *epixeira* or *athla* and would instead regard them as the salutary effects of a properly ordered soul in which reason, spirit, and appetite do their own work. We have already seen that Plato reserves the use of some terms, such as ‘*misthos*’, for the benefits of justice *διὰ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ*. One natural response to the problem raised above, then, is to deny that the passage in question has any bearing on the earlier defense of justice by insisting that the ‘rewards and prizes’ refers only to the benefits of virtue that depend on divine or social recognition, or the Reputational Rewards of Justice.

Unfortunately, this response will not work. Socrates must here be using *epixeira* and *athla* in such a way that they do refer to the benefits of justice all on its own. For Glaucon responds to Socrates by saying (608c3-4):

Ἀμήχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος,
εἰ τῶν εἰρημένων μείζω ἔστιν ἄλλα.

You are speaking about some extraordinary greatness, if there
are other things greater than what we have spoken about.

What are the things that have already been spoken of? Since neither *epixeira* nor *athla* were used in any earlier discussion pertaining to justice we cannot identify the things referred to by searching for the relevant terminology. Nonetheless, it seems tolerably clear that Glaucon must be referring to the results of the defense of justice conducted in Books II-IX; more specifically, he is likely thinking about the three proofs demonstrating the superiority of justice over injustice. Having occurred in Book IX, these proofs come close enough to 608c1-2 that Glaucon could easily refer back to them without any difficulty. (In contrast, note that the last discussion of the Reputational Rewards of Justice occurred more than seven books earlier). Even more significant is the fact that these proofs apparently demonstrate that justice has such a great value that it

makes the just life better than even the life of the most powerful tyrant. This must be what Glaucon thinks Socrates is referring to, for only this could explain why he is so surprised to hear Socrates suggest that there might yet be greater benefits of justice. The *epixeira* and *athla* of virtue mentioned by Socrates at 608c1-2 must, then, refer to the valuable effects of justice δι' αὐτό.²¹⁸

This leaves us in a real bind. All the evidence indicates that at 608c1-2 Socrates genuinely maintains that at least some of the benefits of justice discussed later in Book X are more valuable than those discussed in the previous seven books, even though what follows are the Reputational Rewards summarized above. This threatens to destabilize any straightforward interpretation of the *Republic* according to which justice possesses two sources of goodness, the first and more decisive being the goodness it possesses αὐτὸ καθ'αὐτό and the second being διὰ τὰ γιννόμενα ἅπ' αὐτοῦ. For precisely this reason, this passage has troubled many scholars, prompting them to make radical suggestions about the construction of Book X in an attempt to do away with this problem. As great an interpreter as Nettleship thought that our passage shows that the contents of this book are out of order. As Adam notes in his commentary, “Nettleship thinks τῶν εἰρημένων can only refer to ‘the rewards of justice on earth’, in which case we must suppose that this

²¹⁸ To this suggestion it will be objected that Plato would not use the words ‘μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἄθλα’ to refer to the beneficial effects of justice δι' αὐτό. I grant that this is strange language, but Socrates makes his statements about the *epixeira* and *athla* of virtue at the end of his discussion of poetry. Immediately before this passage, Socrates reminds his interlocutors why poetry is so dangerous and he adds for good measure honor, money and offices as other temptations that might lead one to neglect justice (608b6-7). Note that these are paradigmatic examples of *epixeira* and *athla*. And it is in response to these examples of genuine wages and prizes that we must understand Socrates' point about the wages and prizes of virtue. To remind his interlocutors that it is not worth losing justice in order to secure money, honor, or offices, Socrates engages in a bit of word-play and asks the interlocutors to think that the great ‘rewards and prizes’ of virtue dwarf the other rewards and prizes that might tear them away from virtue.

passage and the argument for immortality which it introduces were written by Plato after 612a-613c.”²¹⁹ Admittedly, Nettleship’s suggestion that 608c1-2 was somehow transposed to a place in the text it was not originally intended to be is a radical one, but it serves to show how problematic our passage is.

To avoid this difficulty, we must turn our attention to what I earlier called the third kind of virtue’s wages – the prizes that the just soul receives after its embodied life has ended. We should begin by noting that these posthumous prizes are highlighted as particularly important. Not only are they virtually the last topic that the dialogue discusses, but Socrates introduces them in an emphatic way that clearly marks them as distinct from and more important than the first two kinds of wages. At 614a5-6, Socrates says that the rewards received while the just agent is alive, “are nothing in size or magnitude compared to those which await each person after death.” The mention of the great magnitude (*megethei*) of the wages received after death clearly picks up on Glaucon’s earlier statement that the prizes and rewards yet to be mentioned must be of an enormous magnitude (*megethos*). We can, then, confidently conclude that it is only in the discussion following 614 that the greatest benefit(s) of justice will be mentioned.

What follows is, of course, the Myth of Er. I will now argue that we find in this myth a division of the value of justice in the afterlife that parallels the division of the value of justice while we are alive. Just as Books II-IX respect the sharp distinction drawn in the division of goods between the beneficial effects that come from the nature of justice itself

²¹⁹See Nettleship (1897, 355) and Adam’s (1907, 402-3) commentary on the passage in question.

and those that come from being recognized as just by other agents, so too does this myth.²²⁰

In the first stage of the myth, we learn that when people die their souls are transported to some ‘demonic place’ (614c1), where they meet judges who, after having evaluated the disembodied souls, reward those that were good in their previous life with one thousand years of wonderful experiences and punish those that were bad with one thousand years of torture (614c3-615c4). Because the rewards that the just soul receives are explicitly said to result from judgements made on the basis of evaluations, which one assumes (even in the case of otherworldly arbitrations) must include at least a rudimentary recognition of the character or past behavior of the souls, these rewards clearly count as Reputational Rewards of Justice. Indeed, this is emphasized in the text itself as the souls are said to have signs on their backside indicating all they did in their previous life (614c4-d1). Confirmation that the results of this judgement are to be classified as the τὰ γινόμενα ἀπό of justice and injustice comes during Er’s account of the punishment suffered by the unjust souls. The souls which in their previous lives were

²²⁰ After writing the first version of my Appendix, I learned that Rachana Kamtekar (2016) wrote an article on Plato’s myths which made this very point. In the course of arguing that what happens in the afterlife promotes the moral improvement of the soul, she says, “we will need a distinction between artificial and natural consequences that is most easily seen in the *Republic*...I will argue that in the afterlife accounts, the punishments of a disembodied soul, e.g. suffering in Tartarus following a divine judgement, is an artificial consequence of vice, which, as it turns out, serves a corrective function. By contrast, a person’s reincarnation is a natural consequence of her vice or virtue: it is due to her desire or choice, and as such is a manifestation of her character” (115-116). Although I came to my understanding of the myth without consulting Kamtekar’s paper, the argument I make here depends on a very similar distinction. Of course, my purpose in writing this Appendix is different from hers. Nonetheless, I have profited from reading her paper and discussing this issue with her in person. Though I was not able to re-write this Appendix after learning about her work and meeting with her, I have incorporated some of her suggestions through my editorial process.

impious or did not care for their parents are said to receive worse *wages* (μισθοός) than the souls convicted of less heinous crimes (615c2-4).

At 616a8-b1, Socrates clearly concludes the first part of the Myth of Er when he says, “such things, then, are the penalties and punishments, and again the rewards matching these.” This statement marks the transition to the section which, among other things, demonstrates that justice remains valuable all on its own in the afterlife.²²¹ Once each soul has completed its thousand-year journey of beatitude or torture, they journey through the celestial spheres to a place where they encounter the three divine Fates. All the souls then draw lots and each takes its turn inspecting a panoply of lives from which they must choose one to which they will be bound by necessity. Having chosen their new lives, the souls pass through the Plain of Forgetfulness and drink from the River of Neglect, which causes them to forget their past life and everything they have seen and heard in the afterlife. At this point, they are reborn into their next life.

What needs to be noted about this section of the dialogue is how important Socrates regards the choice of lives. The supreme importance he places on this part of Er’s story is most vividly indicated by the fact that he breaks from recounting the myth during the choice of lives in order to address Glaucon directly. Interrupting a narrative or speech is a dramatic device that Plato uses to highlight the importance of a philosophic point, especially when he offers commentary to clarify the point, as he does here.²²² In this context, Socrates is particularly keen to explain that only the individual who was just during their embodied life reliably selects a good life for their reincarnation (618d5-e2):

²²¹ Kamtekar also notes the importance of this passage (2016, 119).

²²² The best example of this device occurs at *Euthydemus* 290e1-293b6. The jarring break from the narrative is an indication to the reader to pay careful attention.

ἐξ πάντων αὐτῶν δυνατόν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι,
πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τὸν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν
ἀμείνω βίον, χείρω μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκεῖσε ἄξει, εἰς
τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαιοτέραν.
τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἑάσει·

Looking to the soul's nature, they are able to calculate and
choose from all these things the worse and better life. They
call the life worse which leads the soul to where it becomes
more unjust, better the one that leads it to be more just,
and they bid farewell to the other things.

This passage is extremely revealing and, I think, suggests rather strongly that any
benefit derived from the choice of lives is going to count towards the value justice
possesses δι' αὐτό. The just souls are said to look at the lives available to them and
choose the best of the bunch. The give-away clue that this is an activity of justice all on
its own is how closely the language of this passage parallels earlier speeches in the
Republic. The 'τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἑάσει' recalls Glaucon's request that Socrates
bid farewell (ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν) to justice's wages and other results in his praise of justice as
valuable all on its own (358b4-7). More significant still is Socrates' suggestion that the
just soul looks only to which life will make it become even more just. This is almost a
paraphrase of what he had said about the just individual in Book IV, who (443e5-7):

ηγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πράξιν
ἢ ἂν αὐτὴν τὴν ἑξὶν σφύζῃ τε καὶ συναπεργάζεται, σοφίαν
δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην

considers and names the action 'just' and 'fine' which preserves
and completes this possession [of justice], and 'wisdom' and
'knowledge' that which is set over this action.

The Book IV passage indicates that the (still living) just individual is able to identify
the action that will preserve the order in their soul, and then acts in this way. The
disembodied just souls of Book X appear to do the same thing: they discover (note the
mention of calculation) which choice of lives will contribute to their immortal soul's

justice and select it for themselves. Correctly choosing one's next life is, I suggest, yet one more instance or application of the general disposition of the just individual (or soul) to act so as to perfect or perpetuate the proper ordering of their soul. This is significant because, as we have seen above, this disposition arises from the power of justice all on its own – any result of it is not a Reputational Reward of Justice, but an Authentic Reward.

Indeed, the myth's dramatic segue into the choice of lives confirms this interpretation. Just before the assembly of souls choose the life they are soon to lead, they are given the following instructions (618a1-5):

οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε.
πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν πρῶτος αἰρείσθω βίον ᾧ συνέσται ἐξ
ἀνάγκης. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων
πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἔξει. αἰτία
ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος.

A *daimōn* will not select you, but you will choose a *daimōn*.
Let them who drew the first lot first choose the life to which
they will be joined by necessity. Virtue has no master. But
honoring or dishonoring it, each will have more or less of it.
The responsibility lies with the one choosing – god is blameless.

Whatever we want to say about the actions of the just and unjust individuals whose souls are evaluated in the afterlife, the divine judges who decide if any given soul is to receive rewards or punishments clearly bear some responsibility for the fate of the soul during their thousand-year. The fact that the gods are explicitly said to lack any responsibility for the choice of lives shows that if the just soul's appropriate choice of life is to be considered a benefit, it is a benefit that comes from their possession of justice itself. And Plato clearly believes that the appropriate choice of one's next life is a great benefit. He even has Socrates suggest that the souls who choose correctly can secure perpetual prospering for themselves. "They ought always to know to choose the mean of

such lives, and to flee excesses in both cases – in this life as far as possible and in everything in the afterlife, for an individual becomes most happy in this way” (619a5-b1). Socrates stresses the continuity of choosing the just things in this life as well as in the next, adding that in each case this is what will make the individual most prosperous. Since in this life justice makes us prosper all on its own, we must understand Socrates here to be referring to the power justice has all on its own in the afterlife as well.

Let me quickly summarize the preceding discussion. At 608c1-2, Socrates makes a difficult and confusing statement which seems to imply that we have yet to encounter the most valuable *epixeira* and *athla* of virtue. Then, from 608c3-612a7, Socrates offers a proof of the soul’s immortality and a rough characterization of its true nature separated from the body. Next, at 612a8-612e1, we are reminded that the defense of justice all on its own was completed in the previous book and that it is now permissible to return to the Reputational Rewards of Justice. 612e2-613b8 explains that only the truly just individual will be recognized as such by gods while they are alive, and for this reason only they will be rewarded by the gods for their virtue. 613b9-614a3 explains that only the truly just individual will be recognized as such by other people while they are alive, and for this reason only they will be rewarded by these people for their virtue. Then, at 614a4-8, Socrates transitions to the benefits that come from justice after we die, emphasizing that these wages are greater than any a just individual wins while they are still alive. From 614b8-616b1, Socrates recounts Er’s story of the rewards and punishments allotted to the disembodied souls by the divine judges in the afterlife. The good things the just soul receives at this point are manifestly the Reputational Rewards of Justice because these judges are said to evaluate what the soul did in the previous life as well as its true

character. At 616a8-b1, the section of the myth discussing these rewards and punishments concludes, and only then, from 617d6-621b7, are we told of the choice of lives and the supreme prospering that a just soul can secure if they choose correctly. Finally, from 621b8-d3, Socrates summarizes the take-away message of Er's story at which point the dialogue abruptly ends.

We can now resolve the difficulty raised earlier. I have argued that in the problematic passage with which we began, Socrates says that we have yet to mention the greatest *epixeira* and *athla* of virtue. To what does this refer? Certainly, this cannot be any of the Reputational Rewards a just individual receives while they are still alive; Socrates is very clear that the greatest effects of justice occur over the whole of time. But nothing Socrates says commits him to maintaining that all of the benefits that the just individual receives after they die are so great as to dwarf the considerations raised in the defense of justice all on its own.

The solution to our problem passage is to see that at 608c1-2 Socrates is referring to the Authentic Rewards of Justice won when the just person correctly chooses his or her next life. It is of course clear why Plato thinks such a choice is more valuable than any Reputational Reward of Justice; but it also more valuable than the Authentic Rewards of Justice that a just individual experiences during their embodied life. Choosing one's next life correctly ensures that a just soul will live justly in their next life, and if they live justly in their next life they will be able to choose their following life correctly, and so on, and so on. The choice of lives, then, offers the promise of eternal prospering for the soul, whereas the discussion of Books II-IX only promise prospering in this life.

We do not, then, have to resort to radical proposals, such as Nettleship's, to make sense of Socrates' remarks at 608c1-2. Understood in light of my reading of the division of goods, the transmitted text is in relatively good order and makes fine sense. Plato consistently presents the Authentic Rewards of Justice as more valuable than the Reputational Rewards of Justice. The mistake made by previous scholars was to neglect the possibility that, alongside the Reputational Rewards of Justice found in the afterlife, there are also Authentic Rewards of Justice. Seeing that the choice of lives points towards the value of justice δι' αὐτό should dispose of many worries regarding the structure of Book X. (Admittedly, it remains somewhat obscure why Socrates doesn't wait until after discussing the wages of virtue that the just individual receives while they are still alive to offer the proof of the immortality of the soul that is so important for the third kind of virtue's wages. But this is a minor infelicity, if it is an infelicity at all).

In any case, it is a significant virtue of my interpretation that it allows us to see the logic of Plato's argument in Book X and to save him from the scholarly charge of clumsiness or careless writing. To the extent that my overall thesis suggests a way to understand Plato's argument in an obviously more satisfactory way than those suggested by others, it should be regarded as superior. In this Appendix, I have shown how my interpretation of the *Republic* suggests a way to understand that argument of Book X that is immune to a difficulty that has plagued other interpretations of the text.

Conclusion

Much more could have been said in this dissertation. When I began this project, I had the lofty aspiration of producing a dissertation that addressed three different topics. First, I wanted to analyze a significant number of sophistic texts in order to show that there was a 5th century debate regarding justice, which I felt was neglected by scholars. Next, I wanted to analyze Plato's engagement with this debate in his 'Socratic' dialogues. And, finally, I hoped to give my own analysis of Plato's defense of justice in his philosophical masterpiece, the *Republic*. Due to time constraints, the scholarly controversies that I felt I needed to take into consideration, and the follies of my own ambition, I was only able to address the first and third topic in this dissertation. Nevertheless, I am convinced now more than ever that certain substantive links between the 5th century debate and Plato's dialogues merit further scholarly investigation. In addition, I now believe more work needs to be done on the concept of '*dunamis*', which is important for Plato's moral philosophy and his philosophical project more generally. Let me briefly elaborate on these two promising areas of research.

As I argued in my first chapter, the 5th century challengers to justice seem to have hypostatized a state of nature in which people were in perpetual conflict and strife. Such a condition is explicit in SF, implicit in Antiphon's OT. I further argued that presupposing this original condition was crucial to their argument that justice is opposed to unrestrained human nature. Everyone naturally wishes to take advantage of their neighbor, so the story goes, and this explains why everyone harms one another. Because the people of this hypostatized state dislike suffering at the hands of one another and living in anarchy, they agree not to harm anyone else so long as they themselves remain

free from harm. To enforce their agreement, laws and customs are set up to punish those who violate its terms. Although the laws that enforce this agreement are generally profitable, they prohibit each individual from pursuing the natural impulse they have to take from and harm others. Insofar as they prohibit the behavior that might lead to the consummation of an agent's natural desires, they are seen as genuinely inimical to human nature and are interpreted as restraints on that nature.

In my second chapter, I argued that parts of the 'Anonymous Iamblich' should be understood as a response to this position. AI implies that the laws not only benefit humans, but also are expressions of their true nature. The author hypostatizes a different account of humanity's original condition and nature in order to support his view.

According to AI, humans are not born in conflict with one another. Rather, the author suggests that humans were initially isolated and lacked any sort of social existence at all. He further suggests that it was only once our ancestors realized that they could not live well as isolated individuals that they joined together in social commerce. Laws, we are told, were required for creating and sustaining social communities. Because the laws make communal existence possible, which itself makes possible a successful human life, AI argues that the laws are enabling conditions of a successful human life. As such, they can be seen the culminating expression of the natural human impulse to live well. With this theoretical structure, the author of AI attempts to show that justice and the laws ought to be respected and followed.

These are both intelligible theories about our nature and the origins of our legal system. Moreover, each theory is rooted in a plausible account of humanity's prehistory and the development of co-operative society. Since the ethical pay-off of each text rests

on its account of our nature and the development co-operative society, it is important to judge the merits of these theories independently of their purported ethical pay-off. How might a 5th century Greek judge the historical, empirical, or explanatory merits of each of these theories? As I argued in chapter two, the author of AI clearly offers (and surely intended to offer) a better and more explanatory theory. Recall that the original condition of humanity explicit in SF and presupposed by AI is condition in which everyone is already in conflict – in other words, in which everyone is already social, although in a rather rudimentary way. AI tacitly criticizes this account by emphasizing the importance of going farther back in time to reach a truly natural, pre-social condition. Humanity's entrance into society and their transition into genuine social interaction must itself be explained. For AI, the most plausible explanation of this transition also indicates that the laws are to be understood as friends to our nature and our prospering as human beings.

If this is right, AI offered a more satisfying theory of humanity's nature and history than the challengers of justice. I now want to suggest that the dialectic between these two positions parallels the dialectic between Glaucon and Socrates in Book II of the *Republic*. In this book, Glaucon presents an account of the origin of political society that is explicitly offered as part of his argument in defense of the unjust life. He tells Socrates to argue on behalf of justice in the same way as he has argued on behalf of injustice. And sure enough, later in Book II Socrates presents his own theory of humanity's natural condition and their transition into co-operative society. Thus, Book II presents us with two opposed accounts of humanity's development into communal society, each of which constitutes an important part of their respective defenses of injustice and justice.

Glaucón's theory, although worked out in considerably more detail, looks to be a version of the theory presented in OT. There are a number of clear parallels, including but not limited to: the fact that Glaucon starts his discussion by describing a primitive state in which humans harm one another (358e3-358a7); the fact that Glaucon explicitly says that the laws are restraints on our nature and its impulses (358e3-4 and 359b1-5); the fact that Glaucon stresses the need to keep one's injustice secret if one is to profit from it (360e6-361b5); and the fact that his theory is part of his larger endorsement of the intelligent practice of injustice. The substance of his account is so similar to earlier sophistic views that some editors have gone so far as to reproduce the whole of Glaucon's speech in an anthology of sophistic texts.²²³ While I seriously doubt that Plato had Glaucon represent the precise views of any sophist, it seems indisputable to me that the substance and methodology of Glaucon speech is steeped in sophistic influence.

It is important to realize that Glaucon's methods and views are influenced by the sophists, because he tells Socrates to argue that justice is valuable as he has argued that injustice is valuable. This request is one about method: Socrates is to defend justice in the same way that Glaucon defended injustice. And so Socrates does. Although his presentation is much longer and includes several digressions, one can discover in Socrates' presentation a view about humanity's original condition as well as a clear articulation of the origins of co-operative society. He begins by announcing that a city comes into being because no one is self-sufficient and everyone requires the security and commodities produced by communal living (369b5-7). This presumably presupposes the existence of a time where no individuals enjoyed the comforts of communal living – or a

²²³ Gagarin and Woodruff (1995, 309-10).

pre-social state. According to Socrates, the needs of isolated humans provide the explanation of why they enter into and remain in social life.

Socrates' developed view has many substantive links with the view of AI. Not only does it stress that humans must live in societies (369b5-7), he also explains that our natural weaknesses and needs give rise to our communal lives; like the AI, Socrates emphasizes that human beings work best if they spend a long time training at one craft (370b4-5); that the laws ultimately benefit the citizens and develop their true natures, rather than restrain them (590e1-591a3); and, of course, Socrates presents this as his account as part of his argument that justice is more profitable than injustice.

This is enough to suspect that Plato was drawing on the 5th century debate regarding justice while writing his *magnum opus*. My own suspicion is that Plato intended for Socrates' account of the origin of political society to be more explanatory and satisfactory than Glaucon's, and that he was inspired to argue in this way by his familiarity with sophistic thought. A full paper should be devoted to this topic. More generally, I feel confident that a closer comparison of these texts will lead to a greater appreciation of the *Republic* and its subtleties. I have stressed the similarities until now, but the differences between these texts may be just as informative – they may reveal the ways Plato made intellectual advances on his predecessors. For example, Glaucon and Socrates both attempt to isolate the essence or definition of justice in Book II. So far as I can tell, none of the sophists were concerned to identify the singular essence or definition of justice (or any virtue, for that matter). Yet Plato indicates time and time again how important it is to know what something is before one can know whether it is valuable or not. This appears to be a real difference between Plato and the sophists, and we can

confidently say that this is an innovation made by the former. It is no surprise that Plato made great advances on his predecessors, of course, but a better understanding of his predecessors will allow us to discover where he innovated and where he borrowed.

The second area of promising research concerns the concept of *dunamis*. While writing the last chapter of my dissertation, I realized that those who have thought or written about the *Republic* in the past have made a large and unfounded assumption about the nature of justice and the other virtues. Many treatments take it for granted that the ethical virtues are stable states of the soul that (somehow) ground dispositions to act in virtuous ways. This state-of-the-soul interpretation of the virtues remains dominant in the literature even today. According to this interpretation, Plato defines justice as the condition of the soul in which each of the three soul-parts do the work for which they are naturally suited. The just life is good for the individual, this interpretation holds, because happiness is literally constituted by having one's soul in a condition where each of its parts does what it is naturally suited to do.

This standard interpretation must be rejected if we hope to understand the virtues correctly. Plato rarely uses 'state' language while discussing justice or the other virtues. Instead, he much prefers the language of 'power' as he twice calls justice a power (433d and 443b), elsewhere uses the same word to describe courage (430b), and at three points in the dialogue also stresses how important it is for the investigation into the value of the just life that the 'power' of justice be identified and fully appreciated (358b, 366e, 588b). This strongly suggests that the virtues as conceived of by Plato are dynamic and causally efficacious forces in the soul rather than stable states of the soul.

Elsewhere in the *Republic*, Plato commits himself to realism about the powers when he says that the *dunameis* constitute, “one class of the things that are. They are those things by which we are able to do what we are able to do” (477c). He goes on to characterize them by specifying their two essential features. Powers are a class of beings that 1) have specific objects and 2) accomplish specific effects (477c-d). For the sake of clarification, consider Plato’s favorite example of a *dunamis* – the perceptual powers. The *dunamis* of sight is the power by which all humans and animals are able to see. It has as its specific objects the colors in the world (according to the dominant theory of optics of the 4th century) and effects our seeing those objects.

Shockingly, the full significance of this elaborate discussion of the powers has not been recognized. I am aware of no scholar who has attempted to offer an interpretation of the *Republic* according to which the ethical virtues are essentially *dunameis*, analogous to sight or hearing; indeed, too few discussions even make mention of the fact that Plato ever calls the virtues powers. This strikes me as a significant gap in the scholarly literature, and it is one I hope to fill. To do this I must answer two questions. First, what are the specific objects of the powers constituting the virtues? And second, what effect do these powers have on these objects? In the case of justice, as readers of this dissertation will know, my working hypothesis is that its objects are the rational, spirited, and appetitive soul parts, and that what justice does is to order the soul parts so that each does the work for which it is naturally suited. If this is correct, then it is a mistake to identify justice as a certain state of the soul; rather, justice is an active power which causes a state to come into being. Detailed work is required to show how this would work in the case of justice, and even more work is required to show that this can work in the case of the other virtues as well.

An investigation into the nature of *dunameis* and the role they play in Plato's metaethics could have profound and wide-ranging implications for our understanding of Plato's ethical theory. It is, I think, a promising investigation that badly needs to be undertaken. If all goes well, this is the topic that will animate my research in the near future. I still hope to write a paper highlighting the sophistic influence on the two theories of political justice presented in the *Republic*, but it is with the concept of *dunamis* that I anticipate struggling the most.

May the struggle begin!

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