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Doctoral Dissertations, 2011-2026 Psychology

2025

INSTITUTIONAL SIGNALING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ATTITUDES, NORM PERCEPTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR OF THE PUBLIC

Clark, Chelsey

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University

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INSTITUTIONAL SIGNALING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ATTITUDES, NORM PERCEPTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR OF THE PUBLIC

Chelsey Simone Clark

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF
PSYCHOLOGY

Adviser: Elizabeth Levy Paluck

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Abstract

When a prominent institution makes a decision on an important social issue, does the impact go beyond the material consequences of its actions to shape the public's attitudes, perceptions of norms, or behavior? In the present dissertation, I use a mix of quasi-experimental and experimental methods in online and field settings to evaluate the effects and underlying mechanisms of institutional signaling. Across two experiments using large original panel data, I show that the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) ruling on abortion and the *Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College* (2023) ruling on affirmative action were associated with changes in the public's social norm perceptions regarding abortion and affirmative action, respectively. Using objective and subject measures of the public's reactions to these rulings, I argue that Supreme Court rulings shape individuals' norm perceptions indirectly, by triggering observable reactions of the media and close others. I also show that in some cases, Supreme Court rulings can shape the public's attitudes: after the Court ruling on affirmative action, white Republican and white Democrat respondents' personal attitudes toward affirmative action, racism, and diversity politically polarized. I further test the behavioral effects of institutional signaling using a field experiment in a different domain: a private institution signaling information about its identity. I show that a small business signaling the racial identity of its ownership can have heterogeneous effects on customer spending based on customer race. Together, these studies show how institutions can shape the way people think and behave relative to important social issues as well as their perceptions of where society stands on these topics.

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that compassionate teaching can have on our students, and that a cute puppy can have on our collective well-being. And I would like to thank Roni Porat for being the most amazing mentor and friend to me and for making Princeton feel like home from the moment I arrived.

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Dedicated to the memory of my wonderful father, Terence G. Clark.

September 21, 1959 - February 12, 2023

Contents

Abstract **3**

Acknowledgments **4**

1 Introduction **26**

1.1 Institutions and Institutional Signaling 27

1.2 Theoretical Models of Institutional Influence Over Attitudes, Norm Perceptions, and Behavior 28

1.2.1 Direct Model of Institutional Influence 29

1.2.2 Indirect Model of Institutional Influence 31

1.3 The Role of Signal Source in Institutional Identity 32

1.4 Overview of Studies 33

2 The Effects of a US Supreme Court Ruling on Abortion on the Attitudes and Norm Perceptions of the Public **36**

2.1 Introduction 36

2.2 Methods 40

2.2.1 Sample 41

2.2.2 Survey Items 41

2.2.3 Analytic Strategy 43

2.2.4 Author Contribution Statement 45

2.3 Results 45

2.3.1 Summary of Findings 45
2.3.2 Norms: Perceptions of Americans' Abortion Opinions 46
2.3.3 Court Legitimacy and Court Reform 47
2.3.4 Personal Views on Abortion Constitutionality and Legality 50
2.4 Exploratory Analysis 54
2.4.1 Attention to Social Media Commentary on the Court 54
2.4.2 The Minimal Role of Traditional Media 55
2.4.3 State-level Heterogeneity 57
2.5 Discussion 57

3 The Effects of a US Supreme Court Ruling on Affirmative Action on the Attitudes and Norm Perceptions of the Public 60

3.1 Introduction 60
3.2 Methods 62
3.2.1 Sample 62
3.2.2 Survey Items 63
3.2.3 Analytical Strategy 65
3.3 Results 67
3.3.1 Summary of Findings 67
3.3.2 Perceptions of Norms Regarding Affirmative Action, Race, and Racism 68
3.3.3 Personal Attitudes Regarding Affirmative Action, Race, and Racism . 69
3.3.4 Simulated Behavioral Reactions to Anti-Affirmative Action Social Media Messaging 71
3.3.5 Attitudes Regarding Diversity and Affirmative Action Broadly 72
3.3.6 Impact of Rhetoric Surrounding the *SFFA* Case 75
3.3.7 Opinions of the Court 77
3.3.8 Tenor of Public Discourse Moderates Effects of the Ruling on Norm Perceptions 78

3.3.9 Persistence of Effects 79
3.4 Discussion 80

4 The Behavioral Effects of Signaling Institutional Identity: A Field Experiment 83

4.1 Introduction 83
4.2 Methods 85
4.2.1 Hypotheses 85
4.2.2 Sample 86
4.2.3 Dependent Variables 87
4.2.4 Analytical Strategy 87
4.3 Results 90
4.3.1 Summary of Findings 90
4.3.2 Customer Spending and Engagement with the Business 91

5 General Discussion 96

References 100

A Supplementary Information for Study 1 108

A.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 109
A.2 Data Collection Schedule and Sample Sizes 110
A.3 Variables 111
A.4 Main Results: Regression Tables 115
A.5 Heterogeneity by Partisanship 123
A.6 Within Group Analyses 133
A.7 Television Data 141
A.8 Twitter Analysis 142
A.9 Exploratory Source and Media Analysis 146

B Supplementary Information for Study 2 **157**

B.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 158

B.2 Data Collection Schedule 159

B.3 Variables 159

B.4 Main Results: Regression Tables 167

B.5 Heterogeneous Analyses: Regression Tables 199

B.6 Robustness Analyses: Regression Tables 213

B.7 Exploratory Analyses: Regression Tables 222

B.7.1 Built In Experiment 222

C Supplementary Information for Study 3 **226**

C.1 Treatment Materials 227

C.2 Sample Descriptive Information 228

C.3 Main Results: Regression Tables 229

C.3.1 Table-Level Analyses 229

C.3.2 Transaction-Level Analyses 231

C.3.3 QR Code Scans 233

C.4 Heterogeneous Analyses: Regression Tables 235

List of Figures

2.1 Abortion ruling effect on perceptions of norms. 48
2.2 Abortion ruling effect on Court legitimacy 49
2.3 Abortion ruling effect on personal attitudes toward abortion. 51
2.4 Abortion ruling effect on perceived constitutionality of abortion. 53
2.5 Engagement with abortion and abortion polls on Twitter 56

3.1 Affirmative action ruling effect on perceptions of norms regarding affirmative action 69
3.2 Affirmative action ruling effect on perceptions of norms regarding race and racism 70
3.3 Affirmative action ruling effect on attitudes toward affirmative action 71
3.4 Affirmative action ruling effect on attitudes toward race and racism 72
3.5 Affirmative action ruling effect on simulated behavior 73
3.6 Affirmative action ruling effect on attitudes toward organizational diveristy . 74
3.7 Affirmative action ruling effects on attitudes toward diversity rationales . . . 75
3.8 Affirmative action ruling effects on perceived POC advantage in admissions . 76
3.9 Affirmative action ruling effect on perceptions of the Court 78
3.10 Affirmative action ruling effect on norm perceptions moderated by tenor of public discourse 80

4.1 Proportion of Daily QR Code Scans by Experimental Condition 92
4.2 Cardholder race moderates the effect of self-presenting as a Black-owned business on customer spending. 93

A.1 Differences in television coverage of *Roe* and *Dobbs* 141

B.1 The effect of learning about the Court ruling on perceptions of norms regarding affirmative action 224

C.1 Treatment and Control Condition Materials 227

List of Tables

A.1 Descriptive Statistics of Sample 109
A.2 Panel Sample Sizes 110
A.3 Cross-Sectional Sample Sizes 110
A.4 Ruling Effects on Norm Perceptions Regarding Abortion Access 115
A.5 Ruling Effects on Norm Perceptions Regarding Abortion Morality 115
A.6 Ruling Effects on Attitudes Regarding Abortion Access 116
A.7 Ruling Effects on Attitudes Regarding Abortion Morality 116
A.8 Ruling Effects on Attitudes Regarding Fetal Viability 116
A.9 Leak and Ruling Effects on Attitudes Toward *Roe* Constitutionality 117
A.10 Leak and Ruling Effects on Attitudes Toward *Dobbs* Constitutionality 117
A.11 Leak and Ruling Effects on Perceived Court Legitimacy 117
A.12 Leak and Ruling Effects on Support for Increasing the Size of the Court . . . 118
A.13 Leak and Ruling Effects on Support for Establishing Term Limits 118
A.14 Leak and Ruling Effects on Perceived Court Ideology 118
A.15 Leak and Ruling Effects on Approval of the Court 119
A.16 Robustness Model: Leak and Ruling Effects on Attitudes Toward *Roe* Constitutionality 120
A.17 Robustness Model: Leak and Ruling Effects on Attitudes Toward *Dobbs* Constitutionality 120
A.18 Robustness Model: Leak and Ruling Effects on Perceived Court Legitimacy . 120

A.19 Robustness Model: Leak and Ruling Effects on Support for Increasing the Size of the Court 121
A.20 Robustness Model: Leak and Ruling Effects on Support for Establishing Term Limits 121
A.21 Robustness Model: Leak and Ruling Effects on Perceived Court Ideology . . 121
A.22 Robustness Model: Leak and Ruling Effects on Approval of the Court 122
A.23 The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion (perceptions of the norm), by party identification 123
A.24 The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' moral opposition to abortion (perceptions of the norm), by party identification 124
A.25 The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion, by party identification 124
A.26 The effect of the ruling on moral opposition to abortion, by party identification 125
A.27 The effect of the ruling on perceived age of fetal viability, by party identification 125
A.28 The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe*, by party identification 126
A.29 The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs*, by party identification 127
A.30 The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index), by party identification 128
A.31 The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court, by party identification 129
A.32 The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits, by party identification 130
A.33 The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court, by party identification 131

A.34 The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance, by party identification 132
A.35 The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the panel sample 133
A.36 The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the cross-sectional sample 133
A.37 The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' moral opposition to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the panel sample 133
A.38 The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' moral opposition to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the cross-sectional sample 134
A.39 The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion in the panel sample 134
A.40 The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion in the cross-sectional sample 134
A.41 The effect of the ruling on moral opposition to abortion in the panel sample 135
A.42 The effect of the ruling on moral opposition to abortion in the cross-sectional sample 135
A.43 The effect of the ruling on perceived age of fetal viability in the panel sample 135
A.44 The effect of the ruling on perceived age of fetal viability in the cross-sectional sample 136
A.45 The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe* in the panel sample 136
A.46 The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe* in the cross-sectional sample 136
A.47 The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs* in the panel sample 137

A.48 The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs* in the cross-sectional sample 137
A.49 The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index) in the panel sample 137
A.50 The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index) in the cross-sectional sample 138
A.51 The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court in the panel sample 138
A.52 The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court in the cross-sectional sample 138
A.53 The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits in the panel sample 139
A.54 The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits in the cross-sectional sample 139
A.55 The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court in the panel sample 139
A.56 The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court in the cross-sectional sample 140
A.57 The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance in the panel sample 140
A.58 The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance in the cross-sectional sample 140
A.59 Cable News Consumption and our Main Outcomes (Panel) 147
A.60 Post-leak attitudes by source of leak 149
A.61 Support for overturning *Roe* (Wave 2 Cross-Sectional) 150
A.62 Perceived support for abortion (Wave 2 Cross-Sectional) 151
A.63 Support for abortion (Wave 2 Cross-Sectional) 152

A.64 Source Models: Panel 153
A.65 Outcomes by swing state status 155
A.66 Outcomes by trigger law status 156

B.1 Sample Descriptives and Test for Differential Attrition 158
B.2 Sample Sizes 159
B.3 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' opinions regarding affirmative action 167
B.4 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' racial resentment . . . 168
B.5 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' colorblind racism . . . 168
B.6 Perceptions of Americans' opinions regarding affirmative action, by survey wave 169
B.7 Perceptions of Americans' racial resentment, by survey wave 169
B.8 Perceptions of Americans' colorblind racism, by survey wave 170
B.9 Republican vs. Democrat Perceived Support for Affirmative Action Before and After the Ruling 170
B.10 The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding affirmative action . . . 171
B.11 The effect of the ruling on personal racial resentment 171
B.12 The effect of the ruling on personal colorblind racism 172
B.13 Personal opinion regarding affirmative action, by survey wave 173
B.14 Personal racial resentment, by survey wave 173
B.15 Personal colorblind racism, by survey wave 174
B.16 The effect of the ruling on likelihood of "liking" a racially resentful social media post 175
B.17 The effect of the ruling on likelihood of commenting on a racially resentful social media post 175
B.18 The effect of the ruling on likelihood of reposting a racially resentful social media post 176

B.19 The effect of the ruling on likelihood of unfollowing the account that posted a racially resentful social media post 176
B.20 The effect of the ruling on likelihood of seeing a post like that on social media feed 177
B.21 The effect of the ruling on amount of Anti-AA posts like these observed on social media feeds 177
B.22 Likelihood of "liking" a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave . 178
B.23 Likelihood of commenting on a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave 178
B.24 Likelihood of reposting a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave 179
B.25 Likelihood of unfollowing the account that posted a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave 179
B.26 Diversity Principle-The effect of the ruling on belief it is important for organizations to be racially/ethnically diverse 180
B.27 Diversity Policy- The effect of the ruling on belief that organizations should consider race/ethnicity in hiring and promotions 180
B.28 Moral Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the moral reasoning for diversity 181
B.29 Instrumental Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the instrumental reasoning for diversity 181
B.30 Diversity Principle-The effect of the ruling on belief it is important for organizations to be racially/ethnically diverse, by survey wave 182
B.31 Diversity Policy- The effect of the ruling on belief that organizations should consider race/ethnicity in hiring and promotions, by survey wave 182
B.32 Moral Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the moral reasoning for diversity, by survey wave 183

B.33 Instrumental Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the instrumental reasoning for diversity, by survey wave 183
B.34 The effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Black applicant being admitted over a white applicant 184
B.35 he effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Asian applicant being admitted over a white applicant 184
B.36 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Black people 185
B.37 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Asian people 185
B.38 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward White people 186
B.39 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Black people 186
B.40 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Asian people 187
B.41 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward White people 187
B.42 The effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Black applicant being admitted over a white applicant, by survey wave 188
B.43 he effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Asian applicant being admitted over a white applicant, by survey wave 188
B.44 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Black people, by survey wave . . . 189
B.45 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Asian people, by survey wave . . . 189
B.46 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward White people, by survey wave . . 190
B.47 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Black people, by survey wave 190
B.48 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Asian people, by survey wave 191

B.49 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward White people, by survey wave 191
B.50 Relative Advantage of Being Black vs. Asian Pre and Post Ruling 192
B.51 The effect of the ruling on trust in the Court 193
B.52 The effect of the ruling on support for removing judges at odds with the people 193
B.53 The effect of the ruling on belief the Court is too independent 194
B.54 The effect of the ruling on belief the Court tries to influence politics 194
B.55 The effect of the ruling on perceptions of the Court (index) 195
B.56 The effect of the ruling on support for removing judges at odds with the people, by survey wave 196
B.57 The effect of the ruling on belief the Court is too independent, by survey wave 196
B.58 The effect of the ruling on trust in the Court, by survey wave 197
B.59 The effect of the ruling on belief the Court tries to influence politics, by survey wave 197
B.60 court_opinion_comp 198
B.61 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage 200
B.62 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage, by PID 201
B.63 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived coverage in conversations with others 202
B.64 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived conversation coverage, by PID 203
B.65 The effect of the ruling on attitudes regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage 204
B.66 The effect of the ruling on attitude regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage, by PID 205

B.67 The effect of the ruling on attitudes regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived coverage in conversations with others 206
B.68 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived conversation coverage, by PID 207
B.69 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media tenor 209
B.70 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media tenor, by PID 210
B.71 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived convo tenor 211
B.72 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived conversation tenor, by PID 212
B.73 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, lagged DV robustness analysis 214
B.74 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding racial resentment, lagged DV robustness analysis 214
B.75 The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding colorblind racism, lagged DV robustness analysis 215
B.76 The effect of the ruling on support for affirmative action, lagged DV robustness analysis 215
B.77 The effect of the ruling on racial resentment, lagged DV robustness analysis . 215
B.78 The effect of the ruling on colorblind racism, lagged DV robustness analysis . 216
B.79 The effect of the ruling on support for diversity in principle, lagged DV robustness analysis 216
B.80 The effect of the ruling on support for diversity policy, lagged DV robustness analysis 216

B.81 The effect of the ruling on moral rationale for diversity, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 217
B.82 The effect of the ruling on instrumental rationale for diversity, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 217
B.83 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Black people, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 217
B.84 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Asian people, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 218
B.85 The effect of the ruling on feelings toward White people, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 218
B.86 The effect of the ruling on perceived American feelings toward Black people, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 218
B.87 The effect of the ruling on perceived American feelings toward Asian people, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 219
B.88 The effect of the ruling on perceived American feelings toward White people, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 219
B.89 The effect of the ruling on perceived Black advantage in admissions, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 219
B.90 The effect of the ruling on perceived Asian advantage in admissions, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 220
B.91 The effect of the ruling on trust in the Court, lagged DV robustness analysis 220
B.92 The effect of the ruling on perception the Court is too independent, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 220
B.93 The effect of the ruling on perception the Court tries to influence politics, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 221
B.94 The effect of the ruling on support for removing judges, lagged DV robustness analysis . . . 221

B.95 Wave 3 Demographics for Experimental Sample 223
B.96 Effects of Built-In Treatment on Perceived Support for Affirmative Action . 225

C.1 Covariate Balance Across Conditions (Table-Level) 228
C.2 Estimated Cardholder Race Across Conditions (Transaction-Level) 228
C.3 Treatment Effect on Total Bill Amount, Table-Level Data 229
C.4 Treatment Effect on Total Tip Amount, Table-Level Data 230
C.5 Treatment Effect on Total Dining Duration, Table-Level Data 230
C.6 Treatment Effect on Total Bill Amount, Transaction-Level Data 231
C.7 Treatment Effect on Total Tip Amount, Transaction-Level Data 231
C.8 Treatment Effect on Dining Duration, Transaction-Level Data 232
C.9 Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR Code (Combined) 233
C.10 Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR code to leave Google Review . . . 233
C.11 Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR code to follow the business on Instagram 233
C.12 Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR Codes - Chi-Squared 234
C.13 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Total Bill Amount, Clustered by Day . 235
C.14 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Total Tip, Clustered by Day 236
C.15 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Dining Duration, Clustered by Day . . . 236

Chapter 1

Introduction

I don't know what most white people in this country feel. I can only conclude what they feel from the state of their institutions.

-James Baldwin (1969)

When a prominent institution makes a decision on an important social issue, does the impact go beyond the material consequences of its actions to shape the public's attitudes, perceptions of norms, or behavior? Through a process called institutional signaling, an institution can communicate information to members of the public about its identity, opinions, and values. Depending on characteristics of the institution, like its legitimacy, visibility, or perceived social identity, the factual and social information gleaned from its signals could influence how members of the public think about an issue and their perceptions of where others stand, each of which can have important implications for behavior [Christenson and Glick, 2015, Marshall, 1987, Dahl, 1957, Lane et al., 2023, Tankard and Paluck, 2016].

Understanding how institutions influence public opinion, behavior, and our collective sense of where society stands on social issues is critically important. In this dissertation, I develop and test theories of institutional signaling by evaluating the effects of institutional decisions on the attitudes, social norm perceptions, and behaviors of the public and the

underlying mechanisms of change. In the first part of this dissertation, I review the relevant literature from psychology, political science, and organizational science on institutional signaling and leading theories of the mechanisms of institutional influence. Then, in **Chapters 1 and 2**, I use large original public opinion datasets to test competing theories of change by asking if institutional signaling influences individuals directly, or indirectly by triggering the observable reactions of the public. By testing the effects of institutional signals on different social issues in real-world contexts, I make theoretical predictions about the conditions under which the public's attitudes and norm perceptions are likely to change. In **Chapter 3**, I shift focus from a public institution to a private one and present the findings of a field experiment on the behavioral effects of signaling institutional identity. Together, this dissertation explores whether institutional signaling affects individuals' attitudes, norm perceptions, and behaviors, how this change occurs, and what the effects of signaling are for the institution itself.

1.1 Institutions and Institutional Signaling

Institutional signaling describes the process by which an institution (the signaler) communicates information (the signal) to a group of individuals (the receiver) [Connelly et al., 2011]. In organizational science, institutional signaling is primarily discussed as a means of reducing information asymmetry between the institution and the receiver [Spence, 1978, Connelly et al., 2011, 2025]. For example, a company can signal firm quality to potential investors through a CEO's certification of public financial statements [Zhang and Wiersema, 2009], or in the aftermath of a scandal or poor performance, a company can signal "new beginnings" to shareholders by electing a woman CEO [Reinwald et al., 2023, Gangloff et al., 2016]. In this literature, institutional signaling is typically assessed with behavioral outcomes that either benefit or harm the institution.

In psychology and political science, institutional signaling is primarily discussed as a way

for an institution to persuade the public of a certain opinion or stance. For example, labor union endorsements can increase public support for political candidates [Fouirnaies, 2021], state-level expansion of marriage rights can reduce intergroup prejudice in that state [Ofosu et al., 2019], and university professors' inclusive teaching practices can increase minority students' sense of belonging [Endevelt et al., 2024]. In these literatures, institutional signaling effects are typically evaluated using attitudinal and behavioral outcomes relative to the issue or the institution.

The majority of empirical research on the effects of institutional signaling evaluates its direct effects on individuals' attitudes and behaviors. However, when a prominent institution signals on an important issue, like a federal court legalizing same-sex marriage or a global corporation terminating its diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programming, it often triggers a reaction from the public. Whether people show support for the decision through celebration, or opposition through protest, these public reactions to an institutional signal too have the potential to influence the public. Understanding how institutions influence the attitudes, norm perceptions, and behaviors of the public is of theoretical and practical importance and is one goal of the present dissertation.

1.2 Theoretical Models of Institutional Influence Over Attitudes, Norm Perceptions, and Behavior

Broadly, two classes of theory anticipate how a prominent institution can influence individuals through signaling. One predicts direct and positive effects: individuals' attitudes, behaviors, and norm perceptions shift with the institution toward the position it favors [Marshall, 1987, Dahl, 1957, Barak-Corren, 2021]. Whether by legitimizing or justifying its position, or positioning itself as a representative of a relevant group of people, an institutional signal could persuade the public of its stance [Christenson and Glick, 2015, Marshall, 1987, Dahl, 1957, Lane et al., 2023, Tankard and Paluck, 2016]. A second predicts indirect

and mixed effects: the signal triggers a reaction from the media or the public, and individuals either shift with the institution, against it, or their attitudes and perceptions crystallize [Franklin and Kosaki, 1989, Hoekstra, 2003, Johnson and Martin, 1998, Linos and Twist, 2016]. These two theoretical frameworks predict that the public will follow the direction of the signal, and it will polarize or move in an opposite direction of the signal, respectively.

1.2.1 Direct Model of Institutional Influence

Much of the research on institutional signaling examines institutional persuasion, or an institution's direct effect over the public's attitudes and behaviors. An institutional signal can persuade the public by tapping into individuals' informational or normative motivations to change. In the former, the individual learns a new fact about an issue and updates their attitudes. In the latter, the individual updates their attitudes based on information about the opinions, feelings, or expectations of others [Wood, 2000, Spears, 2021]. By offering information that is factual, social, or both, an institution can motivate an individual to change their mind on a topic.

Institutional persuasion will depend on the strength of the attitude. When an attitude is strongly held, it is more stable over time and resistant to persuasive messaging [Krosnick and Petty, 2014]. Attitudinal strength increases with attitude importance, accessibility, and certainty. Meaning, when an individual finds a topic interesting or important, can easily retrieve their evaluations of it, and their evaluations are low in ambivalence, their attitudes will be more resistant to persuasion [Crano and Prislin, 2006]. Attitudes that are rooted in one's core moral beliefs, like those regarding abortion, same-sex marriage, or the death penalty are among the most durable, resistant to change, and predictive of behavior [Bauman and Skitka, 2009].

Less understood are the effects of institutional signaling on social norm perceptions, or perceptions of what attitudes and behaviors are typical or desirable in society [Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004]. People update their norm perceptions as they survey the world, and these

subjective perceptions can have a secondary influence on their attitudes and behaviors [Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004, Cialdini et al., 1990, Miller and Prentice, 1996, Tankard and Paluck, 2016]. Because individuals rarely have access to information about the true prevalence of others' behaviors and attitudes (norms), they rely on other sources of normative information to infer the norm [Tankard and Paluck, 2016, 2017, Bursztyn et al., 2020]. Institutions, as collectives or representatives of individuals, can provide consensus information about the attitudes of a group through their decisions [Hogg, 2010, Tankard and Paluck, 2016, 2017]. Therefore, institutional signaling has the potential to affect not only how individuals think about or behave relative to an issue, but also their perceptions of what others think about the issue.

An institution's perceived legitimacy, or "diffuse support" from the public [Bartels and Johnston, 2013], can augment its normative influence. When a legitimate institution signals on an important issue, the public may infer high levels of support for the decision based on perceived high levels of support for the institution [Tankard and Paluck, 2016, Hogg, 2010]. Alternatively, a public signal from a prominent institution could influence norm perceptions through the meta-awareness that other people are also attending to the institution and engaging with its signal [Chwe, 2013, Tankard and Paluck, 2016].

An institutional signal that changes the public's attitudes or norm perceptions can have a secondary effect on the public's behavior. Psychological theories of cognitive dissonance, self-consistency, and impression management, among others, propose a causal relationship between attitudes and behaviors as a means of reducing the dissonance between one's opinions and actions [Aronson, 2019, Harmon-Jones and Mills, 2019]. However, a growing body of research suggests that attitude change is an unreliable predictor of behavior change [Wicker, 1969, Paluck et al., 2021].

In the absence of attitude change, behavior change can still proceed from shifting social norm perceptions [Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004, Cialdini et al., 1990, Miller and Prentice, 1996, Tankard and Paluck, 2016]. People are motivated to behave in ways consistent with

their perceptions of group norms, so strong signals of shifting norms can lead to changes in individuals' behavior [Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004]. When an institutional signal causes norm perceptions and personal attitudes to align, it can have a licensing effect over preferred behaviors, particularly in public forums [Miller and Prentice, 2013]. Consequently, these norm-consistent public behaviors are considered more acceptable by others and are less likely to be publicly sanctioned [Bursztyn et al., 2020].

1.2.2 Indirect Model of Institutional Influence

A model of indirect institutional influence weighs both the direct influence of the institutional signal and the influence of the media and the public's reaction to the signal. When a prominent institution signals, it can bring an issue into the public's attention and inspire discourse. The factual and social information communicated from this discourse can either reinforce the institutional signal or counter it. So, while individuals might be directly influenced by the signal, they could also be influenced by the way the media and other people react to it. Regardless of the content or tenor of the observed discourse, the attention paid to an institutional signal by the media and relevant others can legitimize the issue as an important social problem [Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988].

Although the potential for indirect institutional influence on public attitudes, norm perceptions, and behavior is sometimes acknowledged (see [Tankard and Paluck, 2017, Franklin and Kosaki, 1989, Hoekstra, 2003, Johnson and Martin, 1998, Linos and Twist, 2016]), experimental investigations of the theoretical model are lacking in the literature. This is partly due to the methodological challenges of separating the influence of an institutional signal from the influence of the public's reaction. Oftentimes, the public's reaction to a signal is immediate. Therefore, estimates of the effect of an institutional signal cannot easily be isolated from effects of the media and public discourse surrounding it, a necessary dissociation to evaluate the models against each other. Other times, like in the case of coordinated social movements, the public's reaction unfolds overtime, during which other relevant signaling

events can occur. To test these competing models in a natural setting, an institution would need to signal in an unpopular direction, and critically, the decision would need to receive swift and widespread coverage by the media and public discourse. Since signaling events that satisfy these conditions are rare, externally valid empirical tests of institutional models of influence are largely absent from the literature.

1.3 The Role of Signal Source in Institutional Identity

Institutions that are prominent, legitimate, and powerful and that govern, educate, or organize a reference group can be particularly effective sources of influence [Tankard and Paluck, 2016]. One such institution is the Supreme Court of the United States. Previous evidence shows both positive [Christenson and Glick, 2015, Deal, 2022, Johnson and Canon, 1984] and mixed or polarizing [Hoekstra and Segal, 1996, Johnson and Martin, 1998] influence of Supreme Court rulings on public opinion about policy issues like interracial marriage [Marshall, 1987, Schacter, 2008], LGBTQ prejudice [Ofosu et al., 2019, Charlesworth and Banaji, 2022, Flores and Barclay, 2016], and abortion [Franklin and Kosaki, 1989].

While the question of whether Supreme Court rulings affect the public's attitudes remains contested in the literature, less attention is given to its effects on norm perceptions (see [Tankard and Paluck, 2017]) or understanding how this institutional influence works. When the Supreme Court issues a controversial ruling, often expanding or restricting human rights, protections, or freedoms, it sparks widespread public reactions and discourse. This process creates an opportunity for members of the public to engage with the issue, as well as multiple sources of normative cues, and reassess their own attitudes and norm perceptions. For these reasons, the US Supreme Court is an optimal institution for developing and testing theories of institutional signaling.

When federal institutions like the US Supreme Court make public decisions, they have the potential to reach, and to influence, a broad reference group (i.e. Americans) at once.

However, institutional reach could present a tradeoff with strength of influence through weakened identification with the individuals making up the broad reference group. Research on social reference groups suggests that an individual's level of identification with the source of normative information moderates its influence over the individual's attitudes, norm perceptions, and behaviors [Tankard and Paluck, 2016, Prentice and Miller, 1993, Stangor et al., 2001]. A robust literature on prejudice and intergroup relations suggests that a particularly powerful source of attitudinal and behavioral change is exposure to consensus information about the attitudes of one's ingroup members [Wittenbrink and Henly, 1996, Pettigrew, 1958, Stangor et al., 2001, Sechrist and Milford, 2007]. Together, this research suggests that institutions more closely identified with an individual's ingroup could have greater influence over their attitudes, norm perceptions, and behavior relative to the signaling issue and to the institution itself.

1.4 Overview of Studies

In this dissertation, I test competing theoretical models of institutional signaling and evaluate the conditions under which institutions can influence the attitudes, norm perceptions, and behaviors of the public toward important social issues and toward the institution itself. Using a mix of quasi-experimental and experimental methods in online and field settings, I improve the estimation of immediate causal effects of institutional signaling as well as the measurement of the range of its potential effects on the public.

In **Chapter 2**, I test the theoretical models of institutional influence (direct versus indirect) using the U.S. Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) ruling that went against majority public opinion to overturn constitutional protections of abortion rights. Using an interrupted time-series approach with two original nationally representative datasets–a panel sample with repeat participants (N = 1,587) and a cross-sectional sample with unique participants (N = 12,240)–I estimate the effects of the leak of

the draft opinion and the announcement of the final ruling on respondents' norm perceptions and personal attitudes regarding abortion policy, views on abortion constitutionality, and perceptions of the Supreme Court. I show that after the ruling, respondents were more likely to perceive a norm of support for abortion rights among Americans. Using Twitter data, I provide evidence of a social media environment that could influence norm perceptions in this direction. The largest impact of the ruling was on perceptions of the Court itself, with Republicans perceiving the Court as significantly more legitimate after the leak and the ruling, whereas Democrats perceived the Court as less legitimate. I show limited evidence of the Court ruling influencing personal attitudes, with the exception of small decreases in perceived abortion constitutionality and age of fetal viability. The majority of the evidence comports with a model of indirect influence whereby the Court rules in a salient case, the media and the public react, and individuals update their norm perceptions based on the observed public reaction.

In **Chapter 3**, I build on the previous chapter by testing the indirect model of institutional influence in a new policy domain: racial and ethnic inequality in America. Using an interrupted time-series design, I estimate the effects of the U.S. Supreme Court *Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College* (2023) ruling that effectively banned race-based affirmative action in college admissions on white Democrat and Republican respondents' (N = 2,694) attitudes and norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, as well as race, racism, and diversity more broadly. I show that after the ruling, white Republican and Democrat respondents aligned in perceiving Americans as less supportive of affirmative action than before the ruling. Meanwhile, their personal attitudes toward affirmative action, racism, and the importance of diversity polarized. However, the ruling affected white Republican and Democrat respondents' attitudes similarly in two instances–by decreasing their perceptions of Asian students' advantage over white students in college admissions due to affirmative action, as well as their reported likelihood of unfollowing someone who posts an anti-affirmative action message on social media. Subjective positivity of the

media and local discourse around the ruling moderated its effect on norm perceptions, lending further support for the model of indirect institutional influence through public discourse. Consistent with previous findings, I show an overall decrease around the ruling in positive perceptions of the Court, with underlying heterogeneity by political party identification.

In **Chapter 4**, I explore the behavioral effects of institutional identity signaling using a different kind of institution: a small business. I present the findings of a cluster randomized controlled trial testing the effects of a restaurant signaling its racial minority ownership on customer spending and other forms of engagement. On days assigned to the treatment condition (N = 71 days), marketing materials on each table presented the restaurant as a "Black-owned business". On control days (N = 70 days), the materials did not include information about ownership identity. I show that the treatment did not significantly affect customer spending, tipping, or dining duration, but it did significantly increase the odds of a customer scanning a QR code to follow the business on social media or leave a Google review. Using cardholder names, I estimate customer race and test for treatment effect heterogeneity by customer likelihood of being white. I find evidence of a significant negative interaction between treatment assignment and estimated cardholder race on total bill amount, suggesting that the identity signal increased non-white customers' spending by $5.60 on average, but decreased white customers' spending by $5.30 on average. Building on the previous chapters' findings of politically heterogeneous effects of signaling on perceptions of the Court, this study finds heterogeneity in consumer spending by shared racial identity with the business.

Finally, in **Chapter 5**, I discuss the theoretical and practical contributions of this work, as well as the implications for future research and application.

Chapter 2

The Effects of a US Supreme Court Ruling on Abortion on the Attitudes and Norm Perceptions of the Public

This chapter is adapted from an article co-authored by Clark, C. S. (lead and corresponding author), Paluck, E. L., Westwood, S. J., Malhotra, N., Sen, M., & Jessee, S. and published in Nature Human Behaviour [Clark et al., 2024].

2.1 Introduction

In this study, we ask how the Supreme Court influences the public when it issues a major ruling against prevailing public opinion *and* restricts rights rather than expands them. When the Court is curtailing rights, does the Court's power of persuasion cause attitudes, norm perceptions, and ideas about legality/constitutionality to follow the direction of its ruling, as suggested in prior work [Marshall, 1987, Dahl, 1957]? Or does a contraction of citizen rights drive a retrenchment in attitudes and perceptions among people who disagree with the ruling? And finally, does an unpopular ruling that restricts rights affect the perceived legitimacy of the Supreme Court and support for institutional reforms? We answer these questions in the context of the 2022 Supreme Court ruling in *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's*

Health Organization. In contrast to most Court rulings previously studied in relation to public opinion, *Dobbs* rolled back (as opposed to expanded) constitutional rights when it overruled *Roe v. Wade* (1973), the well-known case that established a constitutional right to an abortion. Importantly, the ruling also went against prevailing public opinion supporting legal access to abortion [Pew Research Center, 2022a].

Previous evidence shows both positive [Christenson and Glick, 2015, Deal, 2022, Flores and Barclay, 2016, Johnson and Canon, 1984] and mixed or polarizing [Franklin and Kosaki, 1989, Hoekstra and Segal, 1996, Johnson and Martin, 1998] influences of the Court on public opinion about policy issues, but the causal relationship remains difficult to establish because little research collects data in a time series fashion designed to capture the immediate effect of the Court's ruling, separate from the effects of legislative changes that follow. Instead, survey responses are often collected months following the ruling, and researchers resort to identification strategies such as comparing people who report knowing vs. not knowing about the ruling (e.g., Franklin and Kosaki [1989], Unger [2008], but also see Christenson and Glick [2019, 2015], Johnston et al. [2014]). While the typical approach of cross-sectional surveying across long periods of time can illuminate long-term trends in public opinion, repeated measurement within tight time intervals surrounding a major event are better for capturing the immediate impact on the public. Some studies use this inference strategy, but then only measure personal attitudes and not perceived norms and ideas about legality/constitutionality (see [Christenson and Glick, 2019, 2015]).

The present study aims to improve the estimation of immediate causal effects of a Supreme Court ruling as well as the measurement of the range of its potential effects on the public. We track the effects of the leaked and final *Dobbs* ruling on attitudes, perceived norms, and ideas about the constitution in two nationally representative YouGov surveys, one panel and one cross-sectional. Both types of surveys we deploy capture reactions to the Court's ruling in the days following the leaked draft and the official ruling, a strong research design given that the precise date of each was unknown to the public beforehand.

A fair critique of this strategy is that there is always public anticipation of a ruling's announcement date in June. Thus, our research is further strengthened by the fact that we are able to capture the effect of the leaked draft of the ruling on May 2, 2022, published on the website *Politico*, which was a genuine surprise to the public and to members of the Court itself. Our survey effort is unique in that we were in the field shortly before the unanticipated leak. Because we measure outcomes collected at three different times — (1) before the leak, (2) after the leak but before the final ruling, and (3) after the ruling — we can directly assess the impact of the as-if randomly-timed leak and ruling. We collected the two samples, panel and cross-sectional, to leverage the strengths of each. The panel design contrasts with most public opinion polling in that it allows for fixed effects estimation that is less prone to sampling bias. However, in panel designs with repeated questions, respondents may come to suspect and be influenced by their perceptions of the researcher's hypotheses, or may drop out of the panel based on factors related to the topic. Cross-sectional designs are less susceptible to these critiques. The two analytic approaches, therefore, have unique strengths and limitations, and also serve as a built-in replication of findings.

The specifics of *Dobbs* provide a uniquely powerful opportunity to study the impact of Court rulings on public opinion. First, *Dobbs* is well-positioned to affect public opinion due to the salience of the issue and of the case. Abortion is central to the American political landscape, and the pursuit of overturning *Roe* became a key policy objective of the Republican Party. If Americans are able to name any Supreme Court case, the vast majority name *Roe v. Wade* [csp, 2009]. So, while few people closely follow the Supreme Court and its rulings, the leaked draft ruling indicating the Court's intention to overturn *Roe* was heavily covered by the press. Second, *Dobbs* is positioned to study meaningful opinion change because many individuals have well-structured and even morally-grounded opinions about abortion, given its centrality to American political and religious discourse. Third, *Dobbs* rolls back rather than expands constitutional rights, which is a different kind of landmark ruling than has been studied in the past (e.g., gay and transgender rights), and it goes against majority public

opinion [Pew Research Center, 2022a], meaning that any positive persuasion effects are not easily explained by pre-existing trends in public opinion. All of these factors make *Dobbs* a good test case, even compared to other cases that have rolled back rights—including *Shelby County County v. Holder* (2013) (voting rights), *Koramatsu v. U.S.* (1944) (racial discrimination), and *Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission* (2018) (LGTBQ rights), which were less discussed by the media and public discourse.

We thus test two theories at play in the literature on the Supreme Court and its influence: (1) the Court will have a direct positive effect on personal attitudes, perceptions of norms, and views on abortion legality/constitutionality in the direction of its ruling, (2) the Court will have an indirect effect on personal attitudes, perceptions of norms, and legal/constitutional views by provoking media coverage and public discourse that causes individuals to crystallize or polarize their previous stance or to be influenced by the direction of media and public discourse. To further evaluate this hypothesis, we supplement our survey data with media content analysis that captures online engagement with abortion public opinion polling and television coverage of the Court case. Finally, we test whether perceptions of Court legitimacy, or "diffuse support" for the Court [Bartels and Johnston, 2013] change when the Court rules in a less popular direction.

Our interdisciplinary approach brings together dependent variables studied by psychologists (attitudes and norms perceptions), political scientists (institutional support and policy attitudes), and legal scholars (perceptions of legitimacy and legality/constitutionality). This holistic approach allows us to capture various nuances of how the public responds to monumental Court decisions, and to shed light on social psychological responses to institutions more broadly.

2.2 Methods

The data for this project were collected in the United States by local scholars. IRBs at Princeton (IRB 11816), Stanford (IRB 55200), Harvard (IRB 21-0341), Dartmouth (IRB 00032522), and University of Texas (IRB 00002888) approved our research design. All surveys were administered online by YouGov. Participants provided informed consent to participate in each survey wave. YouGov awards points for participation, which can be exchanged for different rewards. We awarded 1,000 points for participation in each wave. Panelists received an additional 3,000 points for returning to participate in wave 2 and an additional 4,000 points for returning for wave 3.

We used an interrupted time series design to estimate the effects of two consecutive events involved in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*. The first event was the leak of the draft opinion on May 2, 2022, and the second was the announcement of the final ruling on June 24, 2022.

The data consists of responses to three waves of similar surveys administered online by YouGov. Invitations to participate were sent to a sample of U.S. adult residents selected from YouGov's main online opt-in panel to be nationally representative of all U.S. residents. The sample was weighted according to gender, age, race, education, and geographic region based on the American Community Survey, as well as 2020 Presidential vote (or non-vote), and registration status. At waves 2 and 3, a portion of the sample was recontacts from the previous wave and made up our panel sample (the wave 2 recontact rate from wave 1 was 83% and the wave 3 recontact rate from wave 1 was 74%). Descriptive statistics of the three samples can be found in the SI Tables A.2 and A.3. All analyses apply post-stratification weights provided by YouGov. Applying these weights ensures that the survey sample matches the target sample given non-response.

2.2.1 Sample

To estimate the effects of the leak, we recontacted a sample of 2,133 respondents who participated in a YouGov survey fielded in April 2022 (one month prior to the leak) about their perceptions of the Supreme Court and of upcoming Court cases. We call the pre-leak survey wave 1. All respondents were American adults who provided consent at the start of each survey. On May 13, 2022 (after the leak but before the ruling), we invited this sample to complete a longer version of the survey with more items assessing personal opinions and norm perceptions about abortion. We simultaneously collected an additional nationally representative sample of 5,000 respondents at this time. The panel recontact and the fresh cross-section constitutes Wave 2. On June 27th, three days after the announcement of the *Dobbs* ruling, we recontacted panel participants who had responded to waves 1 and 2 and collected an additional nationally representative cross-section of 5,107 respondents (wave 3). At each recontact, panel participants were offered a large additional bonus of $4.00, which accounts for the relatively low attrition rate of 25.6% from panel wave 1 to wave 3. Sample demographics are presented in SI Table A.1.

2.2.2 Survey Items

From the three surveys, we estimate the impact of the leaked and official Court ruling on the following categories of items. Specific wording of each item is available in the Supplementary Information **Section A.3.**

1. *Norm perceptions on abortion.* In waves 2 and 3, we asked participants about the extent to which other people in America supported legal access to abortion, and were morally opposed to abortion.

2. *Perceptions of the Supreme Court.* Across three waves, we asked participants five ques-

tions about the Court's legitimacy, which were averaged into a single index of perceived Court legitimacy. We asked participants whether judges at odds with the people should be removed, if the Supreme Court was too independent, if the Supreme Court should be done away with if they make rulings that most people disagree with, if the Court can usually be trusted to make rulings that are right for the country, and whether the Court gets too mixed up in politics. Additionally, we asked participants whether the size of the Court should be increased and whether Supreme Court justices should have term limits.

3. *Personal attitudes toward abortion.* In waves 2 and 3, we asked participants about their personal attitudes toward abortion morality and legality. All respondents indicated whether they thought a woman should be able to legally choose to have an abortion, and the extent to which they are morally opposed to abortion.

4. *Views on the legality/constitutionality of abortion.* Across three waves, we asked participants about their views on the constitutionality of abortion. We distinguish between these kinds of ideas about legal issues from explicitly personal opinions about whether people should access abortion and whether it is moral. All respondents indicated whether they thought the Mississippi law banning abortion after 15 weeks violated the Constitution or not, and whether they thought the Supreme Court should overturn *Roe v. Wade*. In the last two waves, we asked participants to indicate the gestational age at which a fetus is considered a life. Because many people may not have a formed view about life and gestational age, we were interested to test whether the *Dobbs* case would anchor people on 15 weeks, given this was the case's threshold for fetal viability.

2.2.3 Analytic Strategy

We pre-registered our survey and analysis plan immediately after the leak and before the initial recontact of the panel and the new cross-sectional survey at wave 2. The complete pre-registration can be found online at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/DS6KB. For outcomes measured in all three waves, we estimate the effect of the leak and the additional effect of the ruling on outcomes. For variables measured only in waves 2 and 3, we can only estimate the effect of the ruling. In panel analyses, we stack individual responses and focus on within-subject variation by including individual fixed effects. All data analysis was conducted using R 4.1. In all analyses, we estimate robust standard errors. For robustness, we also estimate a model that includes a lagged outcome (three-wave variables in the panel sample only). Respondents with missing outcome data are dropped from analyses. We note three deviations from our pre-registered plan: 1. we pre-registered a third model that would control for the day-of-interview but decided not to estimate this model because of a lack of variation in time within wave; 2. we excluded non-abortion-related analyses from this paper for coherence; 3. we did not collect an additional 3 waves of data because of funding shortage.

All data and analysis scripts are available on Harvard Dataverse (doi.org/10.7910/DVN/C9SPVB).

Panel Analyses

We focus on within-subject variation in our panel. We include individual fixed effects and estimate robust standard errors.

We estimate fixed effect models of the form:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta_1 + \epsilon_{it}$$

For robustness we also estimate a model that includes a lagged outcome:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta_1 + \rho Y_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Where:

- Y_{it} is the dependent variable observed for individual i at wave t.
- X is a binary treatment indicator, where $X = 1$ refers to the waves after the treatment and $X = 0$ refers to the waves before the treatment.
- α_i are time-invariant individual effects.
- ϵ_{it} is the error term.

Cross-Sectional Analyses

To complement our panel analysis we also captured data in large cross-sectional interviews. Here our interest is in between-subject variation.

$$Y = \alpha + X\beta_1 + \epsilon$$

Where:

- Y_{it} is the dependent variable.
- X is a binary treatment indicator, where $X = 1$ refers to the waves after the treatment and $X = 0$ refers to the waves before the treatment.
- ϵ is the error term.

Recontacting Participants and Handling Of Missing Data:

All the respondents to wave 1 were invited back to participate in wave 2 of the panel. All respondents to wave 2 of the panel were invited to participate in wave 3. Those who only responded to wave 1 were dropped from all analyses. Any respondent with missingness on a dependent variable was dropped from relevant analyses. There was no imputation for missing data.

2.2.4 Author Contribution Statement

C.S.C. is the lead and corresponding author. C.S.C., E.L.P. and S.J.W. conceptualized the study and designed the wave 2 and 3 surveys. C.S.C., E.L.P., S.J.W., S.J., M.S. and N.M. refined the wave 2 and 3 surveys based on the US Supreme Court SCOTUSPoll wave 1 survey previously designed and published by N.M., S.J. and M.S. C.S.C., E.L.P., S.J.W., S.J., M.S. and N.M. contributed to the pre-analysis plan. C.S.C., E.L.P., S.J.W., S.J. and N.M. analyzed the data. C.S.C., E.L.P., S.J.W., S.J., M.S. and N.M. wrote the paper. C.S.C. and S.J.W. wrote the Supplementary Information.

2.3 Results

2.3.1 Summary of Findings

The majority of our evidence comports with a model of indirect influence whereby the Court rules in a salient case, the media and the public react, and the public updates its perceptions based on the observed reaction. We find that the Court's ruling influenced respondents' perceptions of social norms in a direction *contrary* to the ruling. Specifically, respondents were more likely to perceive that "people in America favor" legalized abortion access following the ruling. We explore one potential path of influence through social media, showing high engagement with the *Dobbs* ruling on Twitter, particularly with polls revealing that the

majority of Americans supported legalized abortion access.

We find the largest impact of the *Dobbs* ruling on perceptions of the Supreme Court itself. Following both the leak and the ruling, Republicans assessed the Court as significantly more legitimate, whereas Democrats assessed it as significantly less legitimate. This finding contradicts longstanding theories regarding the stability of Court legitimacy, even in the wake of unpopular opinions. Support for Court reforms such as expansion and term limits also increased among Democrats following the leak.

Our data show limited support for a theory of direct positive influence of the Supreme Court on the public. The leaked draft ruling is associated with a small increase in support of the more specific legal issue of overturning *Roe* and of the holding in *Dobbs*. These effects are driven by Republican respondents and are distinct from people's beliefs about public support for abortion. Additionally, the focus of *Dobbs* on the constitutionality of abortion at 15 gestational weeks seems to have anchored public perception: after the ruling, we observe a shift among all respondents in perceived age of fetal viability from above 15 weeks on average to below 15 weeks on average. Apart from matters of constitutionality, we find little evidence of change to personal attitudes regarding whether abortion should be legally accessible and if abortion is moral.

2.3.2 Norms: Perceptions of Americans' Abortion Opinions

We first examine perceptions of norms around abortion legality and morality. We find that norm perceptions regarding abortion legality moved in a direction contrary to the Court ruling, a direction predicted by models of indirect influence. Respondents were significantly more likely to report that "people in America believe" abortion should be legal for women who choose to have one (panel: 2.4 pp; $t(1576) = 2.70$, $p = 0.007$, 95% CI: [0.007; 0.041], and cross-sectional sample: 2.0 pp; $t(10045) = 2.94$, $p = 0.003$, 95% CI: [0.007; 0.033])) after the ruling compared to before (see Figure 2.1). There are no statistically significant changes in perceptions of Americans' moral opposition to abortion. We note that perceived norms of

abortion, personal opinions about abortion, and opinions about fetal viability were asked for the first time following the leak. (See all regression tables with results in the Supplementary Information **Section A.4.**.)

How large is the shift in norm perception following the *Dobbs* ruling? We can compare it to the rate and size of change in personal attitudes toward abortion over the decade prior to *Dobbs*. Since 2012, Americans' personal attitudes favoring legalized abortion shifted on average 1 percentage point every year, with total support increasing 6 percentage points over the last decade [Pew Research Center, 2022a]. The shift we observe in respondents' norm perceptions of other Americans' support for legalized abortion is equivalent to approximately one-third of the past decade's total change in personal attitudes.

2.3.3 Court Legitimacy and Court Reform

We next examine the effect of *Dobbs* on perceptions of the Court itself. Across both samples and in response to the leak and to the ruling, we observe large polarized shifts in participants' judgments of the legitimacy of the Court. The polarization is accounted for by participants' party identification (see Figure 2.2). For Republicans, Supreme Court legitimacy increased following the leak by 3.2 pp ($t(817) = 3.63$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.015; 0.049]) in the panel (cross-sectional sample: 3.3 pp, $t(2963) = 2.97$, $p = 0.003$, 95% CI: [0.011, 0.055]), and by an additional 4.6 pp ($t(817) = 4.43$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.026; 0.066]) following the ruling (cross-sectional sample: 3.8 pp, $t(2963) = 4.09$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.020; 0.056]). However, for Democrats, Court legitimacy decreased by 6.5 pp ($t(937) = -7.70$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [-0.081; -0.048]) in the panel (cross-sectional sample: 7.9 pp; $t(3933) = -8.31$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [-0.097; -0.060]) following the leak, and by an additional 4.8 pp ($t(937) = -5.37$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [-0.065; -0.030]) following the final ruling (cross-sectional sample: 3.5 pp, $t(3933) = -5.25$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [-0.048; -0.022]). From baseline to post-ruling, perceived legitimacy decreased substantially among Democrats (11.3 pp in the panel and 11.4 pp in the cross-sectional sample). We note that the single pre-leak survey serves as the initial




Figure 2.1: This figure shows changes in norm perceptions, regarding the extent to which a respondent believes that other Americans support legalized abortion. Weighted means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Note that the first panel wave is also used in analysis as the first cross-sectional wave. To increase visibility we shift the y-axis limits for each panel though the total y-axis range is consistent between panels. The orange dotted line indicates the same respondents across waves.

baseline wave for both the panel and the cross-sectional study.




Figure 2.2: This figure shows changes in perceived legitimacy of SCOTUS between waves. Weighted means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Note that the first panel wave is also used in analysis as the first cross-sectional wave. To increase visibility we shift the y-axis limits for each panel though the total y-axis range is consistent between panels. The orange dotted line indicates the same respondents across waves.

Democrats' perceptions of the Court depreciated substantially with the leak and the ruling. Meanwhile, their interest in Court reform increased. We find that Democratic respondents' support for increasing the size of the Court increased significantly after the leak compared to Republicans (tested with an interaction term in our model) in the panel sample (4.9 pp; $t(3338) = 2.66$, $p = 0.008$, 95% CI: [0.013, 0.086]) and in the cross-sectional

sample (7.6 pp; t(12159) = 3.18, $p = 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.029, 0.12]). There was an additional differential effect of the ruling in the panel sample (4.3 pp; t(3338) = 2.21, $p = 0.027$, 95% CI: [0.005, 0.082]) but not in the cross-sectional sample (-1.6 pp; t(12159) = -0.87, $p = 0.38$, 95% CI: [-0.02, 0.053]). Compared to Republicans, Democrats were also 7.8 pp (t(3297) = 4.24, $p < 0.001$, 95%, CI: [0.042, 0.11] in the panel sample and 9.9 pp; (t(12064) = 4.53, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.056, 0.14] in the cross-sectional sample) more supportive of establishing term limits after the leak. After the ruling, Democrats were an additional 7.9 pp (t(3297) = 4.26, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.043, 0.12]) in the panel sample, and 6.1 pp (t(12064) = 3.66, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.028, 0.094] in the cross-sectional sample) more supportive of the proposed policy. It is important to note that shifts in perceived Court legitimacy and support for reform could have been impacted by other 2022 rulings on politically polarizing cases. For example, the day before the official publication of the *Dobbs* opinion, the Court ruled 6-3 on cases concerning gun restrictions and separation of church and state. However, between April and the leak of the *Dobbs* opinion, when survey waves 1 and 2 were collected, there were no major Court decisions that received mass attention. Thus, we could assume that the shift in perceived legitimacy between these two times points is most reasonably associated with the *Dobbs* leak.

2.3.4 Personal Views on Abortion Constitutionality and Legality

We find little evidence for a theory of direct or indirect Court influence when examining participants' personal attitudes about abortion (see Figure 2.3). In the cross-section analysis only, we find a statistically significant 2.6 pp increase in personal support for maintaining legal abortion access (t(10056) = 3.08, $p = 0.002$, 95% CI: [0.009; 0.042]) associated with the ruling. This effect is not present among Republicans (see SI Table A.40), and there are no statistically significant changes in attitudes toward abortion legality in the panel (see SI Table A.6). We find no statistically significant changes in either dataset in terms of individuals' moral opposition to abortion (see SI Table A.7).




Figure 2.3: This figure shows changes in personal attitudes toward abortion between waves. Weighted means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Note that to increase visibility we shift the y-axis limits for each panel though the total y-axis range is consistent between panels. The orange dotted line indicates the same respondents across waves.

We next examine views about the legality (or constitutionality) of abortion—e.g., opinions about whether *Roe* should be overturned or whether the *Dobbs* 15-week gestation limit should remain (see Figure 2.4). Respondents read brief descriptions of each case and were asked how they thought the Court should rule. We find that, following the leak, responses of "*Roe v. Wade* should be overturned" increased by an average of 3.0 pp in the panel (t(3314) = 2.33, $p = 0.02$, 95% CI: [0.005; 0.055]) and 6.4 pp in the cross-sectional sample (t(12095) = 4.47, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.036; 0.091]). The effect is driven by Republicans, who increased their support for overturning *Roe* by 5.7 pp (t(820) = 2.51, $p = 0.012$, 95% CI: [0.012; 0.10]) in the panel and by 12.2 pp (t(2984) = 4.61, $p < .001$, 95% CI: [0.07; 0.17]) in the cross-sectional sample. Also following the leak, we find a 3.3 pp increase in support of upholding the constitutionality of the Mississippi abortion restriction at issue in *Dobbs* (t(12004) = 2.28, $p = 0.02$, 95% CI: [0.005; 0.062]), though the effect was statistically significant in the cross-sectional sample only.

One key question emerging from these results is why attitudes about the constitutionality of *Roe* changed about twice as much as views of *Dobbs* (6.4 pp compared to 3.3 pp in the cross-sectional sample; 3.0 pp compared to 1.6 pp (n.s.) in the panel). We turn to our media analysis for better understanding and find that television news coverage essentially ignored *Dobbs* and focused its discussion on *Roe* (see SI Figure A.1). Indeed, between April and August, television media mentioned *Roe* 36.5 times for each mention of *Dobbs*. This focus on *Roe* in the national media conversation is reflected in our data.

Since the law at issue in *Dobbs* sought to ban abortion after 15 gestational weeks, we asked participants at which week of pregnancy a fetus is considered "viable, that is, a human life." In both samples, we find perceptions of the average age of viability decreased significantly following the Court ruling, from just above 15 weeks to just below 15 weeks (panel: -1.04 weeks; t(980) = -3.02, $p = 0.003$, 95% CI: [-1.71; -0.36]); (cross-section: -0.66 weeks; t(7279) = -1.98, $p = 0.048$, 95% CI: [-1.32; -0.006]). There is a non-significant downward trend for Republicans and a statistically significant downward trend among Democrats in the cross-




Figure 2.4: This figure shows changes in views on constitutionality of abortion between waves. Weighted means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Note that to increase visibility we shift the y-axis limits for each panel. The orange dotted line indicates the same respondents across waves.

section and among Republicans in the panel. The interaction between Republicans and Democrats was not statistically significant for either the panel (-0.12 weeks; t(976) = -0.13, $p = 0.90$, 95% CI: [-1.92; 1.68]) or the cross-section (1.00 weeks; t(7275) = 1.30, $p = 0.19$, 95% CI: [-0.51; 2.52]).

2.4 Exploratory Analysis

2.4.1 Attention to Social Media Commentary on the Court

The shift in norm perceptions in a direction contrary to the Court ruling is consistent with a theory of indirect Court influence, in which people take cues from mass media and public discourse that is sparked by a Court ruling to understand social norms. Figures 2.5a and 2.5c show evidence of a social media environment that could have influenced people to perceive more rather than less supportive norms of abortion access (see Supplementary Information **Section A.8** for more details about this Twitter data). Figure 2.5a shows that people paid attention to the issue on Twitter following the leak, and Figure 2.5c shows that immediately following the ruling, 4 million tweets engaged with abortion polls showing the majority of Americans supported legalized abortion. For scale, a recent national event, the January 6th, 2021 attack on the US Capitol, generated approximately 10 million tweets [Westwood et al., 2022]. A close reading of a random sample of 1,000 tweets that reference this polling suggests that Twitter users were specifically fixated on the misalignment between the Court's final decision and public opinion. Figure 2.5b and Figure 2.5d show that the sentiment of the majority of tweets about abortion and about polling were negative, allowing any individuals observing these tweets to infer widespread displeasure with the Court for rolling back the constitutional protection of abortion access.

Complementing this analysis, we find in our survey data that learning about the leak from social media ($\sim$38% of our sample) was associated with people being less likely to feel *Roe* should have been overturned, and positive effects on perceived norms of support for

abortion and personal attitudes toward abortion. While these data are consistent with our aggregate results, the relationship is endogenous and we cannot identify the direction of the effect.

Those who learned about the leak from social media were distinct from those who did not (using wave 2 of our cross-section as two of our three outcome measures were introduced on this wave). Social media learners reported significantly lower levels of support for overturning *Roe* (β = -0.12; t(3536) = -5.99, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI [-0.15; -0.08]). Social media learners also reported significantly higher perceptions of public support for abortion among people in America (β = 0.03; t(3549) = 2.79, p = 0.005, 95% CI [0.01, 0.06]) and more positive personal attitudes (β = 0.11; t(3555) = 6.99, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI [0.08, 0.14]). The fact that the result for personal attitudes, which did not move in our analysis, was positively related to social media exposure (11 pp) suggests that social media was a source for those who supported abortion in the first place. However, when looking at our (more robust) panel and support for overturning *Roe*, we find a statistically insignificant interaction between the leak dummy variable and social media as the leak source (β = -0.00; t(4534) = -0.03, p = 0.97, 95% CI [-0.08; 0.07]); for full results see Supplementary Information **Section A.9**).

2.4.2 The Minimal Role of Traditional Media

Unlike cases from prior work where the media frame court decisions [Hitt and Searles, 2018] or alter public opinion by disproportionately focusing attention on majority opinions [Linos and Twist, 2016], abortion is such a divisive and salient issue that there was little room for the media to frame the substance of *Dobbs* or to alter the meaning of the case. Rather than fulfilling their traditional role of guiding the public on how to think about the Court's rulings, the media contrasted strong existing public views with a ruling. We identified 21 polls on American attitudes on abortion in the period around *Dobbs*, of which 20 find strong public support for abortion rights. Media coverage solely focused on these 20 polls, with the outlier poll only cited in a small network of right-wing non-news websites. Public opinion,




Figure 2.5: This figure shows how the public engaged with abortion on Twitter (a), the sentiment of abortion tweets (b), engagement with abortion polls showing majority support for legal abortion access (c), and the sentiment of tweets on polling (d). Note: Because of limits in the Twitter API we are only able to capture total tweets for a narrow window around the leak and ruling.

when covered, showed the misalignment between the Court and the public.

While those who learned from cable news reported significantly higher levels of support for overturning *Roe* ($\beta = 0.14$; t(3536) = 7.33, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.10; 0.18]) in wave 2 of the cross section, we find no statistically significant interactions between cable news consumption and Court events (the leak and the decision) for our three main outcome measures.

2.4.3 State-level Heterogeneity

Given the wide variety of state-level abortion laws, it is reasonable to think that a respondent's state of residence affect their views after *Dobbs*. This is not the case. There is no correlation between presidential swing state status: Republican (red), Democratic (blue), and Swing (purple). There is also no relationship between states that had trigger laws and those that did not. In both cases we find expected differences in baseline attitudes, but we find no interaction between having state groupings and the decision. Although our sample is large, we are underpowered for a full state-by-state analysis using statistical techniques such as MRP (multilevel regression and post-stratification); see Supplementary Information **Section A.9** for full results.

2.5 Discussion

This study offers the following lessons for the study of the Supreme Court and its influence on public attitudes, norms, and views of the Constitution. First, this research suggests that Court opinions can shift social norm perceptions, but it provides an important update to previous findings. In this case, when the *Dobbs* ruling curtailed rights and ran counter to majority public opinion, perceived social norms shifted *away* from the Court and in the direction of majority opinion (supporting legalized abortion). By contrast, previous work [Tankard and Paluck, 2017] showed that more-popular rulings, such as the ruling that legalized same-sex marriage, shifted perceived social norms supporting same-sex marriage in

the same direction as the Court ruling, leaving the direct and indirect pathways of influence indistinguishable.

Second, this research highlights the indirect influence of the Court, and specifically the role of media responses to a Court ruling in the formation of norm perceptions. Our television and social media analyses suggest that perceptions of social norms may have been more influenced by media coverage than by the Court itself. We evaluate this claim on Twitter, a platform that nearly 23% of Americans used in 2022 [Pew Research Center, 2022b]. While people still may be influenced by the Court for matters of understanding constitutionality and the specifics of the case on which the Court is deciding, they may be using social media to gauge where the public stands on an issue, particularly when social media provides abundant evidence that the Court's ruling runs counter to majority public opinion. In sum, our media analysis supplies unique evidence for previous hypotheses about the indirect influence of the Court, showing how Court rulings might stimulate people's attention to the content of media coverage, which influences perceptions of norms.

Third, this research shows that Court rulings can polarize the public in their views of the Court itself, despite a great deal of scholarship positing that the Court's public standing is robust to unpopular rulings (cf. Bartels and Johnston [2013], Johnston et al. [2014]). For Republicans, more of whom tended to *a priori* have an anti-*Roe* positioning, legitimacy trends slightly upward. But for Democrats, who *a priori* are much more likely to oppose the overturning of *Roe*, perceptions of Court legitimacy rapidly decline following the leak and the ruling. Interestingly, Democrats' perception of fetal age of viability decreases despite reporting lower levels of Court legitimacy. In contrast to positivity theory, or the claim that belief in the Court's legitimacy is largely resistant to adverse rulings [Gibson and Nelson, 2015], this study shows that the Court's legitimacy is not bulletproof, and that major decisions have the potential to reduce diffuse support for the Court.

Fourth, it suggests not just that there are limits to the Court's direct impact, but that people are able to conceptually distinguish ideas about statements about legality (and thus,

in this case, about the Constitution) from their personal attitudes. That is, there appears to be an important distinction between people's willingness to be persuaded by the Court on matters of primarily legal interpretation (i.e., should *Roe* be overturned) versus their beliefs about abortion itself. We find some evidence that the Court directly influenced ideas about the narrow topics of constitutional and legal issues, which befits the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitution. For example, it seems likely that the framing of *Dobbs* anchored the public on the 15-week gestational window as a critical time for ending pregnancies. However, we show the limits of the Court's legitimating capacity by observing no meaningful effects of the Court ruling over personal attitudes toward abortion.

While the fact that the *Dobbs* decision was surprisingly leaked offers advantages, it can also make interpreting the results challenging. Specifically, if the leak itself, rather than the content of the leaked draft opinion, made people distrust the operations of the Court, or made people view the opinion as "unofficial," then pre-post changes in norm perceptions and constitutional views could reflect both evaluations of the outcome as well as evaluations of the process. We believe that this concern is minimized by this time series measure of perceived Court legitimacy. If the act of the leak de-legitimized the Court and the unofficial ruling, then we would expect partisans to react to the leak in similar ways. That Democrats and Republicans were polarized following the leak with respect to Court legitimacy suggests that evaluations of the outcome on abortion rights overshadowed any procedural concerns. Moreover, our evidence suggests that the Court's leak did not de-legitimize it to the extent that it could not spark a change in people's perceptions of abortion in the United States.

Together, these findings contribute to our understanding of Supreme Court influence: that its direct effect is highly circumscribed, particularly in an era where the Court does not reflect average Americans' views [Jessee et al., 2022], and that its indirect effects are likely refracted through salient and strong reactions broadcast through media.

Chapter 3

The Effects of a US Supreme Court Ruling on Affirmative Action on the Attitudes and Norm Perceptions of the Public

This chapter is adapted from a manuscript in preparation co-authored by Clark, C. S. (lead investigator), Xu, J., & Paluck, E. L..

3.1 Introduction

In **Chapter 2**, I showed that the *Dobbs* ruling on abortion, which restricted rights, was associated with a shift in norm perceptions against the Court's opinion and in alignment with majority public opinion. These findings build on prior work by Tankard and Paluck (2017), which showed that the Court's 2015 legalization of same-sex marriage, an expansion of rights that aligned with majority public opinion, was associated with a shift in norm perceptions toward increased support for same-sex marriage [Tankard and Paluck, 2017]. In both cases, majority public opinion supported an expansion of rights and there was little evidence of change in personal attitudes associated with the Court rulings. The present work aims to expand our understanding of how Court rulings influence the attitudes and norm perceptions of the public by investigating a ruling that is aligned with majority public

opinion in favor of restricting rights.

In this study, we estimate the effects of the 2023 *Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College* and *Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina* rulings (henceforth *SFFA*) that effectively banned race-based affirmative action in college admissions. We use this ruling, which aligned with the majority opinion among white Americans in favor of restricting universities' ability to practice race-conscious admissions, to evaluate the Court's direct or indirect influence over white Republican and Democrat attitudes and norm perceptions. To further evaluate the model of influence, we measure subjective observations of subsequent media coverage and local discourse to estimate their impact on the ruling's effects. We also estimate the effect of the ruling on perceptions of the Court itself.

By studying the effects of the *SFFA* ruling, we extend the theorizing of Court signaling and influence into the domain of racial and ethnic inequality in America, a social problem central to American history and politics. As such, we estimate the effects of the ruling on attitudes and norm perceptions not only regarding affirmative action in college admissions, but also race, racism, and diversity more broadly. Specifically, we test the possibility that a Court ruling on affirmative action can affect people's racial prejudice, an established predictor of affirmative action support [Sidanius et al., 1996, Kinder and Sears, 1981, Feldman and Huddy, 2005], agreement with different rationales for diversity, and attitudes regarding organizational diversity. Additionally, we test whether the *SFFA* ruling changed peoples' understanding of how affirmative action policies function, specifically regarding the perceived relative advantage given to applicants from different racial or ethnic groups in the process. Finally, we estimate the effect of the ruling on simulated reactions to anti-affirmative action rhetoric online, a possible byproduct of shifting attitudes and norm perceptions.

3.2 Methods

Using an original panel dataset of online participants recruited through Prolific, we measured attitudes and norm perceptions across four waves of data collection between May and August of 2023. Participants provided informed consent to participate in the study and were compensated at a rate of roughly $14/hour for each wave as well as a $2 bonus for completing all four waves. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) at Princeton (IRB no. 11816) and Harvard (IRB23-0603) approved the research design.

We used an interrupted time series design to estimate the effects of the June 29, 2023 U.S. Supreme Court ruling on *Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College* and its companion case *Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina*. This quasi-experimental design hinges on the fact that the exact timing of Supreme Court rulings are unknown to the public. Therefore, the assignment variable that separates the treatment (post-ruling) and control (pre-ruling) groups cannot be manipulated by study participants.

3.2.1 Sample

Participants (45% men, 53% women; mean age = 41.8 years) were initially recruited online via Prolific between May 22, 2023 and June 5, 2023. Participant recruitment was restricted to those who identify as white and are located in the United States. We recruited Democrat and Republican respondents separately to ensure adequate representation of each subgroup. The initial sample consisted of 3,421 participants (2,001 Democrats; 1,330 Republicans; 90 Independents/Other).[1] During the first wave, participants were informed that they must complete all waves in the study in order to receive the $2 bonus at the end. Participation

[1] At the end of the first survey, we asked participants to indicate their political party identification on a 7-point scale ranging from "Strong Republican" to "Independent" to "Strong Democrat." We then grouped any strength of "Republican" as "Republican", any strength of "Democrat" as "Democrat", and "Independent" or "Other" as such. This pre-registered re-coded variable is used in all data analysis.

in each subsequent survey wave was limited to the participants in the previous wave. The final sample consisted of 2,694 participants (1,616 Democrats; 1,019 Republicans; 59 Independents/Other). All analyses are limited to the final sample of respondents for whom we collected data across all waves.

3.2.2 Survey Items

From the four surveys, we estimated the impact of the Court ruling on the following categories of items. Specific wording of each item is available in the Supplementary Information **Section B.3.**

1. *Perceptions of Norms.* We instructed participants to think about what people in the United States of America believe, then we asked about perceived American support for *affirmative action* (how much Americans think race and ethnicity should be considered when deciding which students to admit to U.S. colleges); *racial resentment* (to what extent people in America resent all of the special attention/favors that African Americans receive); and *racism importance* (to what extent people in America think racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an important problem today).

2. *Personal Attitudes.* We repeated the norms questions, but instructed participants to think about their own beliefs.

3. *Diversity Attitudes.* We asked participants two questions about support for organizational diversity: *diversity importance* (how important it is for organizations like universities and companies to be racially and ethnically diverse) and *support for a diversity-promoting policy* (how much companies and organizations should consider a candidate's race and ethnicity when it comes to decisions about hiring and promotions). We also asked participants about their agreement with two different rationales for diversity: that organizations should value

diversity for *moral* reasons (because it is the right or moral thing to do) or for *instrumental* reasons (because it helps them perform better).

4. *Social Media Pseudo-Behaviors.* Across three waves, we first asked participants to choose the social media platform they use the most and roughly indicate the number of followers they have on that platform. Then, we instructed them to imagine they were scrolling on that platform and saw the following post from someone they know: "Some people won't like to hear this, but affirmative action should be banned in college admissions. Special considerations for African Americans place other people at an unfair disadvantage when the truth is that slavery and racism are things of the past and the rest of us should not be punished when we've done nothing wrong." Finally, we asked them to indicate how likely they would be to "like", comment on, or repost the post, or unfollow or unfriend the person who posted it. If the participant said they were likely to comment, we asked what comment they would leave.

5. *Lay Beliefs about Affirmative Action.* We asked participants to imagine that two students applied to Harvard College last year with nearly identical applications. However, one applicant was Asian (or Black) and the other was White. Then, we asked what the chances were that the Asian (or Black) student was chosen instead of the White student on a scale of 0 (Asian/Black student was definitely not chosen) to 100 (Asian/Black student was definitely chosen).

6. *Feelings.* We asked participants to rate their own feelings and their perceptions of Americans' feelings toward three groups–Black people, Asian people, and white people–on a scale of 0 (very cold; really dislike this group) to 100 (very warm, really like this group).

7. *Perceptions of the Supreme Court.* We asked participants four questions related to perceived Court legitimacy: (1) whether judges at odds with the people should be removed, (2)

if the Supreme Court was too independent, (3) if the Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country, and (4) whether the Court tries to influence politics.

8. *Public Discourse.* We asked participants how much they heard about the Supreme Court decision on affirmative action in the media (like cable tv, newspaper, radio, social media, etc) and in conversations with people they know (in person, on the phone, over text messaging, etc.). For those who indicated they heard something, we asked about the tenor of each type of discourse (from very negative about the decision to very positive about the decision).

9. *Demographics.* We also asked participants about their age, gender, education, political party identification, political ideology, experience with the college admissions process, and whether or not they had children under 18 years old.

3.2.3 Analytical Strategy

We estimate the effects of the Court ruling using linear regression with individual fixed effects and robust standard errors. For robustness, we also estimate a model that includes a lagged dependent variable outcome (see SI **Section B.6**). All statistical analysis was conducted using R v.4.1. The research design and analysis plan were pre-registered online at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/VA5G3.

To assess the effect of the Court ruling on outcomes, we estimate fixed effect models of the form:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta_1 + \epsilon_{it}$$

Where:

- Y_{it} is the dependent variable observed for individual i at wave t.

- X is a binary treatment indicator, where $X = 1$ refers to the waves after the ruling and $X = 0$ refers to the waves before the ruling.
- α_i are time-invariant individual effects.
- ϵ_{it} is the error term.

Exclusion Criteria and Handling of Missing Data

We used mean imputation for missing demographic data. Respondents with missing data for dependent variables were excluded from relevant analyses.

We used linear regression to test for differential attrition across waves along each demographic variable. There was not significant differential attrition across waves along all but one variable: mean age of the final sample was approximately 1.3 years older than the mean age of the initial sample (see SI **Section B.1**).

We included an attention check within each survey. Participants who failed the attention check were redirected to the start of the survey and asked to complete it again while paying closer attention. For these participants, responses from the second attempt were used in analysis. Any participant who failed the attention check a second time within the same survey was removed from the panel and excluded from analysis. At each wave, over 98% of the sample passed the attention check the first time.

Built-In Experiment

A limitation of our quasi-experimental design is that we can only estimate the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of the ruling, or the effect of possible exposure to the Court's ruling on outcomes. To estimate the rate of exposure in our sample, we ask about respondents' awareness of the Court's ruling at the start of wave 3 (immediately post-ruling). Respondents who answered the awareness probe correctly (81.2% of the sample) proceeded to the main survey. Respondents who did not answer the question correctly (N = 526) were randomly assigned to either read a short vignette summarizing the Court's *SFFA* opinion before advancing to

the main survey (treatment) or to advance directly to the main survey (control). This design allows us to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of learning about the Court ruling on outcomes. The results of this experiment can be found in the Supplementary Information **Section B.7**.

3.3 Results

3.3.1 Summary of Findings

We find that the Supreme Court's *SFFA* ruling, which banned race-based affirmative action in college admissions, was associated with a shift in norm perceptions aligned with the opinion of the Court. Specifically, after the Court ruling compared to before, respondents perceived Americans as less supportive of affirmative action, more racially resentful, and less believing that racism is an important problem today. Subjective accounts of the public's reaction to the ruling moderated the effect of the ruling on norm perceptions, such that the more positive the media and close others appeared to be about the ruling, the greater the negative effect on perceptions of American support for affirmative action.

The Court ruling influenced personal attitudes toward affirmative action, race, racism, and diversity, as well as perceptions of the Court, but the direction of the effect differed by political party identification. Generally, white Republican respondents' attitudes after the ruling compared to before were less supportive of affirmative action and diversity more broadly, more racist, and more positive toward the Court. Meanwhile, white Democrat respondents' attitudes after the ruling were generally more supportive of affirmative action and diversity, less racist, and more negative toward the Court. However, the ruling had some similar effects on Republican and Democrat respondents' attitudes by decreasing their perception that Asian students are advantaged over white students in the college admissions process, as well as their reported likelihood of unfollowing someone who posts an anti-affirmative action message on social media.

3.3.2 Perceptions of Norms Regarding Affirmative Action, Race, and Racism

In the six weeks after the *SFFA* ruling compared to the five weeks before, respondents perceived Americans as less supportive of affirmative action, more racially resentful, and less concerned about racism. Across the sample, respondents perceived Americans' support for affirmative action to be 4.6 percentage points (pp) lower after the ruling compared to before ($\beta = -0.046$; $t_{8,669} = -12.6, p < 0.001, 95\%$ confidence interval (CI): $[-0.053, -0.039]$). For Republican respondents, perceived support decreased by -6.8 percentage points ($\beta = -0.068$; $t_{3,314} = -10.62, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.080, -0.055]$), and for Democrat respondents, perceived support decreased by -3.0 percentage points ($\beta = -0.030$; $t_{5,143} = -6.97, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.039, -0.022]$), effects that were significantly different according to an interaction between the ruling and political party identification ($\beta = -0.037$; $t_{8,457} = -4.84, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.053, -0.022]$). Before the ruling, Republican respondents perceived significantly more support for affirmative action than did Democrat respondents, but after the ruling, they perceived significantly less support compared to Democrat respondents (see SI Table B.9).

Perceptions of Americans' racial resentment and believed importance of racism (as measured by the adapted single item from the Colorblind Racism Scale) both shifted by a small but statistically significant degree following the ruling (perceived racial resentment increased by 0.7 pp; $\beta = 0.0074$; $t_{8,666} = 2.16, p = 0.031, 95\%$ CI: $[0.001, 0.014]$, and perceived importance of racism decreased by 0.7 pp; $\beta = -0.0074$; $t_{8,666} = -2.01, p = 0.045, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.015, -0.000]$). In both cases, the effects were driven by Republican respondents, whose perceived racial resentment increased by 1.8 pp ($\beta = 0.018$; $t_{3,312} = 3.23, p = 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.007, 0.029]$) and perceived importance of racism decreased by 2.1 pp ($\beta = -0.021$; $t_{3,312} = -3.37, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.032, -0.009]$.




Figure 3.1: The ruling shifted perceptions of norms regarding support for affirmative action. Average perceived support for affirmative action among Americans are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.3.3 Personal Attitudes Regarding Affirmative Action, Race, and Racism

At baseline, average support for affirmative action was negative–below the midpoint of the scale–for the entire sample (Republican respondent mean = 0.13, SD = 0.22; Democratic respondent mean = 0.42, SD = 0.28). Following the ruling, we observed significant shifts in expressions of personal support for affirmative action, but the effects moved in different directions for Republican and Democratic respondents. Specifically, support for affirmative action among Democrat respondents increased by 3.2 percentage points ($\beta = 0.032$; $t_{5,140} = 7.88, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.024, 0.040]$), while support among Republican respondents decreased by 3.0 percentage points ($\beta = -0.030$; $t_{3,314} = -7.61, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.037, -0.022]$). This interaction between the ruling and political party identification was significant (-6.1 pp; $t_{8,454} = -10.96, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.072; -0.050]$).




Figure 3.2: The ruling shifted perceptions of norms regarding the importance of racism today racial resentment. Average perceived racial resentment and importance of racism today among Americans are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Across the sample, racial resentment and importance of racism did not change significantly (racial resentment: $\beta = 0.000$; $t_{8,666} = 0.031, p = 0.98, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.004, 0.005]$; importance of racism: $\beta = 0.0012$; $t_{8,666} = 0.51, p = 0.61, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.003; 0.006]$). However, the overall null effect on importance of racism masks small but statistically significant changes in opposite directions from Democrat and Republican respondents. Republican respondents' attitudes increased by 1 percentage point ($\beta = 0.010$; $t_{3,314} = 2.17, p = 0.030, 95\%$ CI: $[0.001, 0.020]$) while Democrat respondents' attitudes decreased by 0.6 percentage points ($\beta = -0.006$; $t_{5,140} = -2.46, p = 0.014, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.010, -0.001]$). This interaction effect was statistically significant (1.6 pp; $t_{8,454} = 3.04, p = 0.002, 95\%$ CI: $[0.006, 0.027]$).




Figure 3.3: The ruling shifted Republican and Democrat respondents' attitudes toward affirmative action in opposing directions. Average amount that race or ethnicity should be considered in admissions are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.3.4 Simulated Behavioral Reactions to Anti-Affirmative Action Social Media Messaging

The Court ruling also decreased participants' reported reactivity to an anti-affirmative action post on social media. After the *SFFA* ruling, respondents' reported likelihood of commenting on the anti-affirmative post decreased by 1.3 percentage points (-1.27 pp; $t_{5,020} = -3.13, p = 0.002, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.021, -0.005]$) and their likelihood of unfollowing the poster decreased by 2.0 percentage points (-2.05 pp; $t_{5,020} = -4.66, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.029, -0.012]$). The commenting effect was driven by Democrat respondents (-1.5 pp; $t_{2,930} = -2.87, p = 0.004, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.025, -0.0046]$), but both Republican and Democrat respondents' likelihood of unfollowing the poster decreased significantly (Republican respondents' likelihood decreased by 2.4 pp; $t_{1,968} = -4.18, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.036, -0.013]$, and Democrat respondents' likelihood decreased by 1.8 pp; $t_{2,930} = -2.87, p = 0.004, 95\%$




Figure 3.4: The ruling shifted Republican and Democrat respondents' attitudes toward the importance of racism today in opposing directions, but not their racial resentment. Average racial resentment and importance of racism today are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

CI: $[-0.030, -0.0057]$).

3.3.5 Attitudes Regarding Diversity and Affirmative Action Broadly

Although the *SFFA* ruling focused narrowly on affirmative action in college admissions, we observed that attitudes toward diversity and DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) programming became more positive on average following the ruling. Specifically, the importance of organizational diversity to respondents did not change ($\beta = 0.002$; $t_{8,652} = 0.76, p = 0.45, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.003, 0.007]$), but respondents' belief that organizations should consider race or ethnicity when making hiring and promotion decisions increased by 1.1 percentage points ($\beta = 0.011$; $t_{8,652} = 3.57, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.005, 0.017]$).

Again, these general effects mask opposing partisan reactions in which Democrats and Republicans moved in opposite directions (the interaction characterizing the size of the difference in effects was significant; see SI Tables B.26 and B.27). After the ruling, the importance




Figure 3.5: The ruling shifted simulated reactions to anti-affirmative action messaging on social media. Average likelihood of different behaviors are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across three survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

of organizational diversity decreased by 1.8 percentage points among Republican respondents ($\beta = -0.018$; $t_{3,312} = -4.02, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.027, -0.009]$), but increased by 1.5 percentage points among Democrat respondents ($\beta = 0.015$; $t_{5,129} = 4.56, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.008, 0.021]$). Similarly, support for race-based affirmative action within organizations decreased among Republican respondents by 1.4 percentage points ($\beta = -0.014$; $t_{3,312} = -3.11, p = 0.002, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.022, -0.005]$), but increased among Democrat respondents by 2.7 percentage points ($\beta = 0.027$; $t_{5,129} = 6.49, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.019, 0.035]$).

The ruling also had a small positive effect on agreement with instrumental and moral diversity rationales. After the *SFFA* ruling, respondents' belief that organizations should value diversity because it helps them perform better (instrumental rationale) increased by




Figure 3.6: The ruling shifted Republican and Democrat respondents' attitudes toward diversity in organizations in opposing directions. Average attitudes toward organizational diversity and support for a policy to promote diversity are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

0.7 pp ($\beta = 0.007$; $t_{8,651} = 2.19, p = 0.28, 95\%$ CI: $[0.001, 0.012]$), but their belief that diversity should be valued because it is the right thing to do (moral rationale) did not change ($\beta = -0.000$; $t_{8,651} = -0.12, p = 0.90, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.006, 0.005]$). The interaction between the ruling and political party identification was significant for both items (see SI Tables B.28 and B.29). After the ruling, Republican respondents' instrumental reasoning did not change significantly ($\beta = -0.005$; $t_{3,311} = -1.00, p = 0.32, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.016, 0.005]$), but Democrat respondents' instrumental reasoning increased by 1.5 percentage points ($\beta = 0.015$; $t_{5,129} = 4.27, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.008, 0.022]$). Meanwhile, Republican respondents' moral reasoning decreased by 1.4 percentage points ($\beta = -0.014$; $t_{3,311} = -2.65, p = 0.008, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.025; -0.004]$), whereas Democrat respondent's moral reasoning increased by 0.9 percentage points ($\beta = 0.009$; $t_{5,129} = 2.82, p = 0.005, 95\%$ CI: $[0.0027, 0.015]$).




Figure 3.7: The ruling shifted Republican and Democrat respondents' attitudes toward diversity rationales in opposing directions. Average attitudes toward the moral and instrumental rationales for diversity are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.3.6 Impact of Rhetoric Surrounding the *SFFA* Case

The *SFFA* ruling decreased perceptions of Asian applicants' advantage in college admissions under affirmative action, but its effect on the perceived advantage given to Black applicants differed by partisanship. Across the sample, perceptions that the Asian applicant would have been admitted over the white applicant decreased by 1.8 percentage points with the ruling ($\beta = -1.77; t_{8,648} = -6.85, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-2.27, -1.26)$, but there was no effect on perceived relative advantage for the Black applicant ($\beta = 0.23; t_{8,648} = 0.83, p = 0.40, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.30, 0.75)$. Both Republican and Democrat respondents aligned in perceiving less of an advantage of being Asian after the ruling compared to before (Republicans: $\beta = -1.2; t_{3,310} = -2.65, p = 0.008, 95\%$ CI: $[-2.12; -0.32]$; Democrats: $\beta = -2.1; t_{5,128} = -6.8, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-2.73; -1.51]$). When asked about a Black applicant, Republican respondents perceived them to have a greater advantage over a white applicant under affir-

mative action after the ruling compared to before ($\beta = 1.7; t_{3,310} = 3.63, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $0.76, 2.55]$), but there was no significant change among Democrat respondents ($\beta = -0.64$; $t_{5,128} = -1.88, p = 0.061, 95\%$ CI: $[-1.30; 0.028]$).

As a result of these asymmetric effects, the perceived relative advantage of a Black applicant compared to an Asian applicant also increased as an effect of the ruling. In a non-preregistered exploratory analysis, we find no difference between the perceived advantage of the Black and Asian applicants over the white applicant prior to the ruling, but after the ruling, respondents perceived a significantly greater advantage of being Black compared to being Asian (see SI Table B.50).




Figure 3.8: The ruling shifted respondents' perceptions of the relative advantage given to Black and Asian applicants over white applicants in the college admissions process. Average perceived chances of an applicant of color being admitted over a white applicant are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Overall, the ruling had small negative effects on feelings toward white, Asian, and Black people. Across the sample, feelings toward Asian people decreased by 0.7 percentage points ($\beta = -0.74; t_{8,659} = -4.04, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-1.096, -0.38]$), feelings toward

Black people decreased by 0.7 percentage points ($\beta = -0.68; t_{8,659} = -3.74, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-1.03, -0.32]$), and feelings toward white people decreased by 1.4 percentage points ($\beta = -1.41; t_{8,659} = -7.56, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-1.78, -1.046]$). In all three cases, effects were present among both Democrat and Republican respondents, both immediately after the ruling and one month later (see SI Tables B.36:B.38). Perceptions of Americans' warmth toward Asian people increased by 0.44 percentage points after the ruling ($\beta = 0.44; t_{8,661} = 1.99, p = 0.046, 95\%$ CI: $[0.007, 0.88)$, but there were no effects of the ruling on perceived warmth toward the other groups (see SI Tables B.39 and B.41).

3.3.7 Opinions of the Court

The *SFFA* ruling also affected opinions on the Court itself, with Republican respondents viewing the Court more positively and Democrat respondents viewing the Court more negatively after the ruling compared to before. Averaging responses to the four Court opinion items into a single measure of perceived Court legitimacy, we find that the ruling was associated with a -0.7 percentage point decrease in legitimacy ($\beta = -0.007; t_{8,656} = -3.6, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.011, -0.003]$). The interaction between the ruling and political party identification was significant ($\beta = 0.079; t_{8,445} = 19.8, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.071, 0.087]$), meaning the effect of the ruling on perceived legitimacy among Republican respondents was significantly greater than among Democrat respondents. For Republican respondents, perceived Court legitimacy after the ruling was 4.1 percentage points greater than before the ruling ($\beta = 0.041; t_{3,312} = 12.7, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.035, 0.047]$), whereas for Democrat respondents, perceived legitimacy after the ruling was 3.8 percentage points lower compared to before the ruling ($\beta = -0.038; t_{5,133} = -16.2, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.042, -0.033]$). This pattern of results replicates with each individual Court opinion item (see SI Tables B.51:B.54).




Figure 3.9: The ruling shifted Republican and Democrat respondents' perceptions of the Court in opposing directions. Averages of the four attitudes: perceived trust in the Court (r), support for removing judges at odds with the people, belief that the Court is too independent, and belief that the Court tries to influence politics are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.3.8 Tenor of Public Discourse Moderates Effects of the Ruling on Norm Perceptions

Public discourse, whether defined as media coverage or the conversations people have with each other, can affect the relationship between the Court ruling and perceptions of norms. Looking at the full sample, exposure to media coverage does not appear to impact the Court's influence over perceptions of American support for affirmative action ($\beta = 0.004$; $t_{8,182} = 1.00, p = 0.32, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.004, 0.011]$). This is because for Republican respondents, the effect of the ruling on norm perceptions was strongest among those exposed to the most media coverage ($\beta = -0.014$; $t_{3,184} = -2.30, p = 0.022, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.026, -0.0021]$), whereas among Democrat respondents, the effect was strongest among those exposed to the least media coverage ($\beta = 0.012$; $t_{4,996} = 2.40, p = 0.016, 95\%$ CI: $[0.0021, 0.021]$). The moderating

role of public discourse is further demonstrated by the impact of observed reactions of close others to the ruling. Overall, the more respondents discussed the ruling with other people, the smaller its impact on norm perceptions ($\beta = 0.015$; $t_{8,179} = 3.81, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.007, 0.022]$). However, this relationship is only present among Democrats in the sample.

The direction of these media exposure effects suggests that respondents may be occupying polarized information environments that echo their partisan beliefs, a suspicion supported by the data showing that on average, Republican respondents reported seeing public discourse that was more positive than Democrat respondents' reports ($\beta = 0.80; t_{1,401} = 21.6, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[0.72, 0.87]$). The tenor of the observed discourse also impacted the Court's normative influence, such that the more positive the perceived tenor of media coverage ($\beta = -0.017$; $t_{7,145} = -3.10, p = 0.002, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.028, -0.0062]$) and conversations with others ($\beta = -0.032$; $t_{4,460} = -7.95, p < 0.001, 95\%$ CI: $[-0.039; -0.024]$), the greater the negative effect of the Court ruling on perceptions of public support for affirmative action.

3.3.9 Persistence of Effects

For many outcomes, the Court ruling had both an immediate effect (responses collected about one week post-ruling were significantly different from responses collected about one week pre-ruling) and a long-term effect (responses collected about five weeks post-ruling were significantly different from responses collected about one week pre-ruling). When both the immediate and long-term effects of the ruling were statistically significant and in the same direction, we characterize the effect as persisting five weeks later.

We find evidence of a persistent impact of the ruling on respondents' perceived norms and personal support regarding affirmative action, reported likelihood of unfollowing someone who posts an anti-affirmative action message online, support for diversity in the workplace both in principle and in terms of policy, feelings toward different racial groups, perceived Court legitimacy, and perceived relative advantage of being Asian in college admissions.




Figure 3.10: The perceived tenor of the media and conversations with other people moderated the effect of the ruling on perceived support among Americans for affirmative action. Averages of the four attitudes: perceived trust in the Court (r), support for removing judges at odds with the people, belief that the Court is too independent, and belief that the Court tries to influence politics are depicted for the full sample (black), Democrats only (blue), and Republicans only (red) across four survey waves. The dashed line represents the time of the *SFFA* ruling. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Additionally, we find persistence in Republican respondents' increased perception of racial resentment among Americans (see SI Section **B.4**).

3.4 Discussion

In June 2023, the US Supreme Court ruled that colleges and universities could no longer explicitly consider applicants' race or ethnicity during the admissions process, upending decades of legal precedent on affirmative action. We find that this historic ruling shifted white Republicans' and Democrats' norm perceptions and personal attitudes regarding affirmative action and race relations more broadly, as well as their perceptions of the Court itself. Specifically, we find that the ruling was associated with Republican and Democrat respondents aligning in perceiving Americans as less supportive of affirmative action, but

their personal attitudes regarding affirmative action and related topics and perceptions of the Court shifted in opposing directions.

The majority of the findings fit with the predictions of the model of indirect Court influence. We find that perceived positivity of the media and interpersonal discourse moderated the effect of the ruling on perceiving a norm of less support for affirmative action among Americans. This trend fits with the theory that the Court influences individuals' norm perceptions by triggering an observable reaction from the public to its ruling. In other words, the ruling's normative influence changed significantly depending on the strength and tenor of the public's reaction, which is a relationship we would not predict if the Court influenced the public directly.

Coupled with the shifting norm, we also find that white Republican and Democrat respondents were less likely to report they would "unfollow" someone who posted an anti-affirmative message on social media after the ruling compared to before, which could be indicative of increased tolerance for expressions of beliefs aligned with the shifting perception of the normative opinion. The decreased likelihood of commenting on the post by Democrats could further suggest that the expression of such attitudes may not only be more tolerated, but less publicly contested.

A main contribution of this study is the finding of an immediate and polarizing effect of a Court ruling on personal attitudes. White Republican and Democrat respondents' attitudes regarding affirmative action, racism as an important issue, diversity in the workplace, and justifications for diversity moved in opposing directions, or became more politically polarized, after the ruling compared to before. This pattern of results diverges from that described in **Chapter 2**, where we found little evidence of attitude change after the Court ruling on abortion. One possible explanation for these different findings could be the relative strength of attitudes related to the issue of affirmative action compared to the issue of abortion, which are characterized by high moral conviction and are among the most resistant to persuasive messaging [Bauman and Skitka, 2009, Krosnick and Petty, 2014]. Therefore, the lack of

attitude change after the abortion ruling could be more reflective of the strength of the attitude than the Court's influence.

Comparing respondents' perceived norms regarding affirmative action to personal attitudes leads to the following observation: on average, norm perceptions are more accurate before the Court ruling than after. More specifically, the observed shift in norm perceptions across the sample was in the direction of the true attitudes of Republican respondents and away from the true attitudes of Democrat respondents. This alignment of norm perceptions with the opinions of one political party and away from another could lead to politically asymmetric shifts in pluralistic ignorance, or perceptions of the distance between one's private opinions and the majority opinion [Prentice and Miller, 1993]. A consequence of such a shift could be Republicans feeling more empowered to express and act on their beliefs, and Democrats feeling less empowered.

Together, the findings of this study contribute to our understanding of the relationship between Supreme Court rulings and public opinion, and the critical role of public discourse. We show that a Court ruling has the power to align the public's perceptions of where society stands on an issue, and that its influence over norm perceptions is moderated by the perceived support for the Court's decision by the media and close others. Additionally, we show that a Court ruling can exacerbate existing political polarization in personal attitudes, both toward the specific issue being ruled on and toward related topics.

Chapter 4

The Behavioral Effects of Signaling Institutional Identity: A Field Experiment

This chapter is adapted from a manuscript in preparation co-authored by Clark, C. S. (lead investigator) & Paluck, E. L..

4.1 Introduction

In **Chapters 2 and 3**, I presented two studies testing the effects of US Supreme Court rulings on the public's attitudes and norm perceptions. In these chapters, I focused on a prominent and powerful public institution signaling information about its opinions on important and controversial issues. In the present chapter, I test the effects of institutional signaling in a new context: a private, local institution signaling information about its identity, with a focus on its effects on behavior. Specifically, I use a cluster-randomized control trial to test the causal effects of a locally-owned restaurant signaling its Black ownership identity on customer spending and other behaviors. Using cardholder names, I test for heterogeneous treatment effects based on the estimated race of the customer. By focusing on key behavioral outcomes like customer spending, this study evaluates the most important signaling effects for businesses: effects on the bottom line.

For businesses, fostering a sense of shared identity with a target consumer base can be an

effective marketing strategy. Drawing upon the principles of social identity theory [Tajfel, 1986], marketing researchers have shown that consumers who perceive shared identity and values with a company show greater company loyalty, support the company more socially and physically, and assess the company more positively Bhattacharya and Sen [2003]. Conversely, low consumer-company identification can lead to neutral outcomes and sometimes backlash [Scott and Lane, 2000]. Therefore, identity signaling by corporate institutions can lead to positive outcomes among some consumer groups and negative outcomes among others.

For minority-owned businesses, identity signaling could be an effective way of boosting positive outcomes among ingroup members as well as sympathetic outgroup members. A growing body of research explores the effects of businesses increasing the salience of their racial minority ownership. The majority of work suggests negative effects of signaling minority ownership, including in loan outcomes for small businesses [Blanchflower et al., 2003], online ratings of restaurants [Son et al., 2024], and purchase intentions of consumers, white conservative consumers in particular [Mookerjee et al., 2023]. However, following the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020, there was an influx of research on the effects of Black-ownership business labeling amid the heightened public awareness of racial inequality in America. The majority of this research shows the potential advantages of businesses advertising their minority-ownership. For example, restaurants labeled as "Black-owned" on online platforms saw increased online traffic, in-person visits, and online orders [Aneja et al., 2025, Agarwal et al., 2024] and restaurants whose Black ownership was mentioned more in online reviews saw increased foot traffic [Mitkina et al., 2022].

Most of the research showing positive behavioral effects of business minority-ownership labels estimates selection effects: customers looking for businesses to patronize. In the present study, we investigate the effects of this labeling *after* a customer has decided to patronize the business. Understanding the effects of signaling at each point in the process (before and after consumer selection) is critically important because positive effects at one stage may not translate to positive effects at another stage.

4.2 Methods

We conducted a field experiment with a cluster-randomized design at a Black-owned restaurant in Atlanta, GA to test the causal effects of presenting itself to customers as a Black-owned business on customer spending, tipping, time spent dining, and interest in following the business on social media and leaving a Google review. The study ran for a total of 147 days ($N_{treatment} = 71$ days; $N_{control} = 70$ days; $N_{excluded} = 6$ days).

At the start of each day, we used a random coin flip to determine the day's treatment condition (Black-Owned Business or Control). Once the condition was determined, the appropriate "table tents," or condition materials, were placed on each table by the restaurant manager on duty. The table tents in the control condition contained a message welcoming customers to the restaurant. The table tents in the treatment condition contained the same welcome message followed by "We are a Black-owned restaurant" along with a heart with the label "Black-owned" beneath it. At the bottom of all table tents in both conditions were two unique QR codes to "Leave us a Google Review" and "Follow us on Instagram." The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Princeton (IRB no. 16977) approved the research design. See SI Figure C.1 for images of the materials for each condition.

4.2.1 Hypotheses

We hypothesized that a restaurant self-presenting as a Black-owned business (treatment) would impact customer spending and other business-relevant behaviors. We did not hypothesize the direction of the effects given conflicting findings in the literature on the effects of businesses advertising their minority-ownership. Specifically, we hypothesized that the treatment would either increase or decrease total bill amount, tip amount, dining duration, odds of scanning a QR code to follow the business on Instagram, and odds of scanning a QR code to leave the business a review on Google, and combined odds of scanning either QR code.

Because we hypothesized that the effect of the treatment would feature underlying heterogeneity, we pre-registered an additional set of hypotheses specific to the subset of transactions for which we collected the name associated with the payer's credit card (roughly 40% of transactions). Among this subsample, we hypothesized that the treatment effect would interact with whether a customer was likely to be white (estimated from cardholder name). Specifically, we hypothesized that the treatment, relative to the control, would decrease total bill amount, tip amount, dining duration, and odds of scanning the QR codes to a greater extent among customers estimated to be white than among those estimated to be nonwhite. We also hypothesized significant subgroup effects in opposing directions, meaning we hypothesized that among customers estimated to be white, the treatment would decrease all outcomes, and among customers estimated to be non-white, the treatment would increase all outcomes.

4.2.2 Sample

Experimental condition was randomly assigned by day, with a final sample size of 141 days ($N_{treatment}$ = 71 days; $N_{control}$ = 70 days). This sample consists of a total of 2,746 tables (dining parties) and 3,609 individual transactions. Roughly 42% of all transactions were paid by debit or credit card with a valid payer name (N = 1,520 transactions).

Exclusion Criteria

The sample consists of all completed transactions by customers who dined at the restaurant during regular operational hours. Therefore, data from to-go orders, staff meals, orders placed at the bar or coffee counter, declined forms of payment, voided tickets, tickets discounted 100% (i.e. complimentary), or tickets used for internal testing or training, were excluded from the sample.

At the end of each shift, the restaurant manager sent the research team a report including any study-related issues during the shift. Some of these issues may have included the wrong

study materials being used, materials not going out at the start of the shift, materials not being placed on all tables, or any other logistical problems. As detailed in the pre-registration, the entire day's data was removed if any of these issues occurred. A total of six days were excluded from the sample due to one of these types of errors.

The sample used to estimate heterogeneous effects consisted of all transactions from the main sample for which a credit or debit card was the method of payment and the name associated with the card was a person's name. Therefore, data from cash transactions or card transactions without a valid name (i.e. the payer name contains VISA, Cardholder, LLC, etc.) were excluded from the subsample (see SI Table C.2).

4.2.3 Dependent Variables

The primary dependent variables are bill amount (subtotal + tax), tip (on top of auto-gratuity), and dining duration (minutes between the check opening and closing). This data was downloaded directly from the restaurant's POS (point-of-sale) system, both at the level of table (dining group or party) and the level of transaction. The secondary dependent variables are odds of scanning the QR code to follow the business on Instagram, odds of scanning the QR code to leave the business a Google review, and odds of scanning either QR code (Instagram + Google review). QR code scans were collected at the day-level (not the individual-level) by a QR code generator and stored separately.

4.2.4 Analytical Strategy

We estimated the effects of the treatment on primary dependent variables using OLS linear regression. We estimated the effects of the treatment on secondary dependent variables using a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) Model. All statistical analysis was conducted using R version 4.2.1. The pre-analysis plan is registered on OSF [Clark and Paluck, 2024] and the redacted data and code will be available online upon publication.

Primary Analyses

To estimate treatment effects on the primary dependent variables of bill amount, tip, and dining duration, we use an OLS linear regression model with robust standard errors. Because data was collected at the level of the table but randomization was at the level of the day, the primary analyses use the table-level data with the table as the unit of analysis while clustering standard errors by day of data collection. For precision, we estimated an additional model that controls for whether data was collected on a weekday (versus the weekend) and the total number of guests at the table.

Although randomization was at the level of the day, we also estimate treatment effects with an assumption of independence between tables. While diners shared the same servers and environment on a particular day, the same set of servers were present in both treatment and control days, and tables of diners rarely interact with one another. Assuming independence between tables, we also estimate treatment effects without clustering by day.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} + u_j$$

Where:

- Y_i is the dependent variable observed for unit i.
- i refers to the unit (table).
- j refers to the cluster (day).
- X is a binary treatment indicator, where $X = 1$ refers to the Black-owned business condition and $X = 0$ refers to the control condition.
- u_j is the error term for the cluster.
- ϵ_{ij} is the additional error within the cluster.

To estimate the effects of the treatment on the secondary dependent variables of odds of scanning one or both of the QR codes, we used a GEE Model with clustering at the level

of day. This model estimates the odds ratio of scanning the QR codes in the treatment condition compared to the control condition by comparing the proportion of scans to guests in each condition. [1]

We estimate a GEE model of the form:

$$Logit(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_j + \epsilon_{ij} + u_j$$

Where:

- $Logit(Y_i)$ is the log odds ratio of scanning for individual i.
- i refers to the individual (guest).
- j refers to the cluster (day).
- X is a binary treatment indicator, where $X = 1$ refers to the Black-owned business condition and $X = 0$ refers to the control condition.
- u_j is the error term for the cluster.
- ϵ_{ij} is the additional error within the cluster.

Secondary Analyses

In a secondary set of analyses, we test for treatment effect heterogeneity by estimated cardholder race or ethnicity. These analyses are limited to the transactions for which we collect valid cardholder names. Using the "predictrace" package in R [Kaplan, 2023], which uses name and race data from the US Census to calculate race/ethnicity probability scores for a given name, we estimate the most likely race or ethnicity for each first and last name in the sample. We then create a binary variable to indicate if each cardholder is likely white or not. Using OLS linear regression with robust standard errors and clustering at the level of

[1] In our pre-registration, we indicated that we would use a chi-squared goodness of fit test to estimate the effect of the treatment on proportion of QR code scans. However, the chi-squared method does not account for clustering and assumes independence between individual observations. To account for the clustering in our research design, we opted to use a GEE model instead. The results from both methods are included in SI Section **C.3.3**.

day, we separately estimate main effects of the treatment among cardholders that are likely white and cardholders that are likely non-white. We also estimate the moderating effect of being likely white on the treatment effect by interacting the binary white indicator with the binary treatment indicator.

We estimate an interaction model of the form:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{ij} + \beta_2 W_{ij} + \beta_3 X_{ij} W_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} + u_j$$

Where:

- Y_i is the dependent variable observed for unit i.
- i refers to the unit (transaction).
- j refers to the cluster (day).
- X is a binary treatment indicator, where $X = 1$ refers to the Black-owned business condition and $X = 0$ refers to the control condition.
- W is a binary race indicator, where $W = 1$ refers to likely white and $X = 0$ refers to likely non-white.
- u_j is the error term for the cluster.
- ϵ_{ij} is the additional error within the cluster.

4.3 Results

4.3.1 Summary of Findings

We find that the "Black-owned business" treatment did not significantly affect customer spending, tipping, or time spent dining, but it did significantly increase the odds of a customer scanning a QR code to follow the business on social media or leave a Google review. Using cardholder names to estimate customer race, we find a significant interaction between

the treatment and the customer being likely white, such that customers who are estimated to be white in the treatment condition spent $11.00 less on average than customers not estimated to be white in the control condition.

4.3.2 Customer Spending and Engagement with the Business

We first examine the effect of the treatment on customer spending, tipping, and dining duration. We find that presenting as a Black-owned business did not have a statistically significant effect on bill amount ($\beta = -0.95$ dollars; t(96.7) = -0.41, $p = 0.68$, 95% CI: [-5.56; 3.66]), tip amount ($\beta = 0.08$ dollars; t(96.7) = 0.25, $p = 0.80$, 95% CI: [-0.54; 0.70]), or dining duration ($\beta = 1.56$ minutes; t(96.7) = 0.74, $p = 0.46$, 95% CI: [-2.60; 5.72]).

Meanwhile, the treatment did significantly increase customer interest in following the business on social media or leaving an online review. Presenting as a Black-owned business significantly increased the odds ratio of a customer scanning either QR code by 1.36 ($\beta = 0.30$, $p = 0.045$), meaning the odds of a customer scanning either QR code in the treatment condition are 36% greater than in the control condition. Separately, the treatment increased the odds of scanning each type of QR code, but the effects did not reach statistical significance (follow on Instagram: $\beta = 0.26$, $p = 0.11$; leave a Google review: $\beta = 0.10$, $p = 0.54$) (see Figure 4.1).

Heterogeneous Effects of Cardholder Race

Among the subset of transactions with valid cardholder names, we find evidence of a significant negative interaction between treatment assignment and cardholder being likely white (estimated from cardholder name) on bill amount ($\beta = -11.0$ dollars; t(67.5) = -2.50, $p = 0.015$, 95% CI: [-19.84; -2.23]). This means that customers who are estimated to be white in the Black-owned business condition spend $11.00 less on average than customers not estimated to be white in the control condition (see Figure 4.2). This effect is driven by customers estimated to be white spending $5.34 less on average ($\beta = -5.34$ dollars; t(66.6) = -1.72,




Figure 4.1: The average proportion of QR code scans per customer per day in the treatment and control conditions. "Instagram" shows proportion of QR code scans to follow the business on Instagram, "Google Review" shows proportion of QR code scans to leave the business a review on Google, "Combined" shows proportion of all QR code scans. Means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted. * denotes $p < 0.05$.

$p = 0.09$, 95% CI: [-11.50; 0.86]) and customers not estimated to be white spending \$5.59 more on average ($\beta = 5.59$ dollars; t(63.2) = 1.49, $p = 0.14$, 95% CI: [-1.90; 13.1]) in the treatment condition compared to control condition. There were no significant effects on tip amount or dining duration (see SI Tables C.14 and C.15).




Figure 4.2: The average transaction amount for cardholders estimated to be white and cardholders not estimated to be white in treatment and control conditions. Means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted. * denotes $p < 0.05$.

Discussion

The present study investigates the effects of a small business presenting itself as Black-owned on business-critical outcomes like customer spending. We find that the treatment did not significantly affect customer spending, tipping, or time spent dining, but it did significantly increase the odds of a customer scanning a QR code to follow the business on social media or leave a Google review. Using cardholder names to estimate customer race, we find a significant interaction between the treatment and the customer being likely white suggesting that white customers' spending was negatively affected by the treatment whereas non-white customers' spending was positively affected by the treatment.

The null effects of the treatment on customer spending, tipping, and dining duration are inconsistent with recent research showing positive effects of Black-owned business labels [Aneja et al., 2025, Agarwal et al., 2024, Mitkina et al., 2022]. Common between these cited works is businesses signaling their ownership identity online, enabling customers who prefer to support minority-owned businesses to find them more easily. In the present study, customers are presented with the identity signal after being seated. Together, these findings suggest that Black-owned business labels can have positive effects when customers are selecting a business to patronize, but those effects should not be extrapolated to later stages.

For business owners interested in making their racial identity part of their brand, these null effects, or rather the absence of negative effects, are promising. Due to the pervasiveness of racial prejudice, Black business owners could opt to conceal their racial identity out of caution. Finding that the identity signal did not significantly reduce sales overall could empower businesses to make their racial identity part of their brand, which could lead to other valuable opportunities, such as media attention and other marketing opportunities. Furthermore, the finding that the treatment increased the odds of a customer scanning one of the QR codes speaks to the potential for positive effects of identity signaling without an accompanying financial cost. Finding evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity by estimated

cardholder race supports the theory that institutional identity impacts consumer behavior. Specifically, we find evidence of a substantively large (roughly $5.00 per transaction) negative effect of identity signaling on outgroup customer spending, but due to the reduced sample size after filtering for valid cardholder names, we were insufficiently powered for these subgroup analyses. Further investigation is needed to better estimate these heterogeneous effects of identity signaling.

A question for future research is whether Black-owned business labels tend to signal identity or values (i.e. Black pride), and how subjective interpretation of the signal moderates consumer behavior. Similarly, understanding customer perceptions of the business in the control condition could aid interpretation of these findings. The restaurant is located in Atlanta, GA, which has one of the largest percentages of Black-owned businesses in the country, and the restaurant staff is majority Black. As a result, customers in the control condition could assume that the business is Black-owned, making the treatment a manipulation of identity salience more so than identity itself.

Together, these findings contribute to our understanding of the impact of institutional identity signaling on individual behavior and the potential risks of signaling among outgroup identifiers.

Chapter 5

General Discussion

In this dissertation, I investigated how an institution can influence the attitudes, norm perceptions, and behaviors of the public regarding important social issues. Across three empirical investigations, I developed and tested a theoretical model of institutional influence whereby a prominent institution signals information to the public about its identity, values, or opinions, the public reacts to the signal, and individuals update their attitudes and norm perceptions based on observations of the public's reaction. Together, these dissertation studies offer many insights for the study of institutional influence, which I review below.

This research suggests that Supreme Court rulings can shift social norm perceptions, but it provides an important development to previous theorizing. When the Supreme Court opinion aligned with majority public opinion in support of banning affirmative action, perceived social norms shifted toward decreased support for affirmative action. By contrast, previous work showed that when the Court aligned with majority public opinion in support of legalizing same-sex marriage, perceived social norms shifted toward increased support for same-sex marriage [Tankard and Paluck, 2017]. Each of these studies advances our understanding of the Court's normative influence by demonstrating its effects on norm perceptions under the circumstances of restricting and expanding rights. However, both of these rulings were popular among Americans, leaving the direct and indirect pathways of influence indistinguishable.

The analysis of the Court's *Dobbs* ruling offers a critical contribution to the theory of institutional signaling by highlighting the Court's indirect influence over norm perceptions. When the *Dobbs* ruling curtailed abortion rights and ran counter to majority public opinion, perceived social norms shifted *away* from the Court and in the direction of majority opinion (supporting legalized abortion). The television and social media analyses suggest that perceptions of social norms may have been more influenced by media coverage than by the Court itself. Furthermore, I showed that the effect of the *SFFA* ruling on norm perceptions was in the same direction for white Republicans and Democrats and was moderated by perceptions of the public's support for the decision. Together, these objective and subjective measures of the public's reactions to Court rulings provide unique evidence for the indirect influence of the Court, showing how Court rulings might stimulate people's attention to public discourse, which influences perceptions of norms.

Consistent with the predictions of the indirect model of influence, I showed that when personal attitudes changed after a Court ruling, they mostly polarized. In most cases, this increased polarization after a ruling was driven by Republican and Democrat respondents each moving in opposing directions. Theorizing around Supreme Court rulings and opinion polarization tends to focus on the Court's direct influence over a particular demographic, like willing followers [Christenson and Glick, 2015], those without strong priors [Zaller, 1992, Christenson and Glick, 2015], or those with high reverence for the Court [Hoekstra, 1995, Clawson and Waltenburg, 2003, Clawson et al., 2001]. Each of these theories may predict increased distance between respondent subgroups after a Court ruling compared to before, driven by opinion change among one group and no change among the other. The findings presented here better support an indirect model of influence where individuals' attitudes are influenced by others' reactions to a Court ruling, but the reference groups differ for Democrats and Republicans.

While most of the findings support the indirect model of influence, I identify two distinct categories of attitude change that could result from direct Court influence. First, I showed

that when it comes to matters of constitutionality, on which the Supreme Court is expert, the Court can directly persuade the public of its stance. This is consistent with prior theorizing that the Court confers its legitimacy upon the position it favors when it rules [Marshall, 1987, Dahl, 1957]. Second, I presented evidence of the Court's direct influence over false beliefs related to the specific cases being ruled on and surrounding rhetoric. In the case of *Dobbs*, we found evidence of an anchoring effect on 15 weeks as the point of fetal viability, consistent with the 15-week Mississippi abortion ban at the center of the legal case. Similarly, the decrease in the perceived advantage given to Asian college applicants after the *SFFA* ruling could be attributed to the case's framing of Asian Americans as victims of discrimination under affirmative action. Finding that these attitudes shifted in the same direction for Democrats and Republicans, meanwhile their more personal attitudes were unchanged or polarized, suggests different underlying models of persuasion for these categories of beliefs.

In a different domain, I showed that institutional identity signals can impact individuals' behavior relative to the institution. When a restaurant presented itself as Black-owned, versus no identity signal, there was not an overall effect on customer spending, tipping, or dining duration, but there was a positive effect on interest in following the business on social media or leaving an online review. Further investigation revealed a significant interaction between customer estimated race and total spending, suggesting that the identity signal positively affected non-white customer behavior, but negatively affected white customer behavior. This study advances our understanding of the behavioral effects of institutional identity signaling with important implications for minority business owners.

These three dissertation studies offer important lessons on the risks of institutional signaling. First, I showed that Court rulings can polarize the public in their views of the Court itself, despite a great deal of scholarship positing that the Court's public standing is robust to unpopular rulings (cf. Bartels and Johnston [2013], Johnston et al. [2014]) and its legitimacy is largely resistant to adverse rulings [Gibson and Nelson, 2015]. After both *Dobbs* and *SFFA*, respondents' perceptions of the Court overall were more negative than

before, which suggests reputational costs of institutional signaling. In a different domain, I presented evidence of an economic cost of a small business signaling information about its identity, specifically among outgroup customers. These findings demonstrate that while institutional signaling can be an effective way of changing people's attitudes and perceptions, it can come at a cost to the institution.

Together, the work in this dissertation evidences the power of institutions to engineer social change by influencing the attitudes, social norm perceptions, and behavior of the public. The findings I presented suggest that US Supreme Court rulings can durably shift the attitudes and norm perceptions of the public on important policy issues like abortion and affirmative action, as well as toward related topics. Although the Court can directly influence the public in some cases, most of the evidence supports an indirect model of persuasion where a Court ruling triggers public discourse, and individuals update their attitudes and perceptions based on their observations of the public's reaction. Additionally, I provide evidence that signals specifically around an institution's identity can influence individuals' behavior. In some cases, institutional signaling leads to intergroup alignment, like in Republicans' and Democrats' social norm perceptions after a Court ruling, but in other cases, like white and non-white customers' spending at a Black-owned business, it leads to intergroup polarization. These findings offer important insights for institutional signaling more broadly, including its potential reputational and financial costs for the institution itself. Ultimately this dissertation shows how institutions can shape the way people think and behave relative to important social issues as well as their perceptions of where society stands on these topics.

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Chapter A

Supplementary Information for Study 1

A.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample

	Wave 1	**Wave 2**	**Wave 3**
Gender			
Male	48.0%	48.9%	49.2%
Female	52.0%	51.1%	50.8%
Political Party ID			
Democrat	31.2%	31.0%	29.2%
Republican	26.3%	26.5%	26.0%
Independent	31.3%	31.2%	32.3%
Other	3.3%	4.5%	5.2%
Not sure	7.9%	6.8%	7.3%
Age			
Under 30	19.8%	16.9%	15.8%
30-44	21.6%	20.0%	19.3%
45-64	35.6%	37.3%	37.6%
65+	23.0%	25.9%	27.3%
Race			
White	63.2%	62.7%	63.6%
Black	12.6%	13.2%	13.4%
Hispanic	15.4%	15.7%	13.7%
Other	8.7%	8.5%	9.3%
Education			
High school or less	30.9%	30.1%	29.7%
Some college	30.2%	31.9%	32.3%
College grad	25.2%	23.8%	23.6%
Postgrad	13.6%	14.2%	14.4%
Religion Importance			
Very important	36.9%	36.9%	37.1%
Somewhat important	24.0%	23.2%	23.3%
Not too important	15.4%	15.0%	14.7%
Not at all important	23.7%	24.9%	25.0%
Total	**2133**	**1769**	**1587**

A.2 Data Collection Schedule and Sample Sizes

Table A.2: Panel Sample Sizes

Wave	Start Date	End Date	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total N
1	3/30/22	4/6/22	665	906	562	2,133
2	5/13/22	5/23/22	549	752	468	1,769
3	6/27/22	7/7/22	463	711	413	1,587

Table A.3: Cross-Sectional Sample Sizes

Wave	Start Date	End Date	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total N
1	3/30/22	4/6/22	665	906	562	2,133
2	5/13/22	5/23/22	1702	2085	1213	5,000
3	6/27/22	7/7/22	1651	2216	1240	5,107

A.3 Variables

Perceptions of Norms

Abortion Access: Do you think **people in America** favor or oppose abortion being legal if the woman chooses to have one? *[Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither favor nor oppose; Somewhat favor; Strongly favor]*

Abortion Morality: To what extent do you think that **people in America** are morally opposed to abortion? *[Strongly morally oppose; Somewhat morally oppose; Neither favor nor oppose; Somewhat morally support; Strongly morally support]*

Attitudes

Abortion Access: Do you favor or oppose abortion being legal if the woman chooses to have one? *[Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither favor nor oppose; Somewhat favor; Strongly favor]*

Abortion Morality: Leaving aside whether or not you think abortion should be legal, to what extent are you morally opposed to abortion? *[Strongly morally oppose; Somewhat morally oppose; Neither favor nor oppose; Somewhat morally support; Strongly morally support]*

Dobbs Constitutionality: A new law in Mississippi bans nearly all abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy. Some people think that this law is constitutional. Other people think that this law is not constitutional. What do you think? *[Banning nearly all abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy is constitutional; Banning nearly all abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy is not constitutional]*

Roe Constitutionality: Should the Supreme Court overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision that established a constitutional right to abortion and prohibited states from banning abortion before the fetus can survive outside the womb, at around 23 weeks of pregnancy? *[Yes, Roe v. Wade should be overturned; No Roe v. Wade should NOT be overturned]*

Fetal Viability: In your opinion, at which week of pregnancy is a fetus considered viable, that is, a human life? *[0 weeks–41 weeks]*

Issue Importance: How important is the issue of abortion policy to you personally? *[Not at all important; Not too important; Somewhat important; Very important; Extremely important]*

Perceptions of the Court

Court Approval: How much do you approve of the performance of the Supreme Court? *[Strongly disapprove; Somewhat disapprove; Neither disapprove nor approve; Somewhat approve; Strongly approve]*

Court Legitimacy 1: Do you agree or disagree with the following: judges at odds with the people should be removed? *[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Court Legitimacy 2: Do you agree or disagree with the following: the U.S. Supreme Court is too independent? *[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Court Legitimacy 3: Do you agree or disagree with the following: if the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether? *[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Court Legitimacy 4: Do you agree or disagree with the following: The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics? *[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Court Legitimacy 5: Do you agree or disagree with the following: the U.S. Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole? *[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Court Ideology: Where would you place THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT on the

following scale?*[(0) Extremely Liberal – (100) Extremely Conservative]*

Court Size: The U.S. Supreme Court has nine members. Some people believe that Congress should expand the size of the Supreme Court, allowing the president to appoint one or more new Justices. Do you agree that the size of the Supreme Court should be increased?*[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Court Terms: U.S. Supreme Court Justices currently serve life terms. Some people think that, instead, Supreme Court Justices should be limited to 18-year terms. Do you agree or disagree that there should be such term limits for Supreme Court Justices? *[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Court Representativeness: Do you agree or disagree that decisions made by the U.S. Supreme Court represent public opinion in America? *[Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither disagree nor agree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree]*

Feelings

Feelings Toward Women: We'd like you to rate how you feel towards some groups on a scale of 0 to 100. Zero means very cold or unfavorable and 100 means very warm or favorable. Fifty means you do not feel cold or warm. How would you rate your feeling toward women seeking an abortion?*[(0) Cold – (50) Neither cold nor warm – (100) Warm]*

Feelings Toward Democrats: We'd like you to rate how you feel towards some groups on a scale of 0 to 100. Zero means very cold or unfavorable and 100 means very warm or favorable. Fifty means you do not feel cold or warm. How would you rate your feeling toward Democrats? *[(0) Cold – (50) Neither cold nor warm – (100) Warm]*

Feelings Toward Republicans: We'd like you to rate how you feel towards some groups on a scale of 0 to 100. Zero means very cold or unfavorable and 100 means very warm or favorable. Fifty means you do not feel cold or warm. How would you rate your feeling toward Republicans? *[(0) Cold – (50) Neither cold nor warm – (100) Warm]*

Moderators

Political Interest: Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs... *[Don't know; Hardly at all; Only now and then; Some of the time; Most of the time]*

Pride: How proud are you of being from The United States? *[I am not from the United States; Not proud at all; Not very proud; Neutral; Somewhat proud; Very proud]*

Personal Ideology: Where would you place YOURSELF on the following scale? *[(0) Extremely Liberal – (100) Extremely Conservative]*

Cable: Which of the following networks do you watch most often? *[I do not watch any cable news; Other cable news network; Fox News; MSNBC; CNN]*

A.4 Main Results: Regression Tables

Table A.4: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion (perceptions of the norm)

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	0.024	0.02
	[0.007, 0.041], p = 0.007	[0.007, 0.033], p = 0.003
Intercept		0.571
		[0.562, 0.581], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3345	10 047
R2	0.783	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.540	0.001

Table A.5: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' moral opposition to abortion (perceptions of the norm)

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	0	0.003
	[−0.018, 0.019], p = 0.978	[−0.009, 0.014], p = 0.674
Intercept		0.501
		[0.493, 0.509], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3337	10 029
R2	0.714	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.392	0.000

Table A.6: The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	0.006	0.026
	[−0.008, 0.02], p = 0.425	[0.009, 0.042], p = 0.002
Intercept		0.574
		[0.562, 0.586], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3345	10 058
R2	0.913	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.816	0.001

Table A.7: The effect of the ruling on moral opposition to abortion

	Panel	Cross
decision_cut	−0.006	0.002
	[−0.024, 0.012], p = 0.54	[−0.013, 0.017], p = 0.776
(Intercept)		0.495
		[0.484, 0.506], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3345	10 054
R2	0.836	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.653	0.000

Table A.8: The effect of the ruling on perceived age of fetal viability

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	−1.035	−0.663
	[−1.707, −0.363], p = 0.003	[−1.321, −0.006], p = 0.048
Intercept		15.575
		[15.083, 16.066], p = 0
Num.Obs.	2418	7281
R2	0.917	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.796	0.001

Table A.9: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe v. Wade*

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	0.03	0.064
	[0.005, 0.055], p = 0.02	[0.036, 0.091], p = 0
Ruling	0.019	−0.008
	[−0.006, 0.043], p = 0.143	[−0.03, 0.014], p = 0.472
Intercept		0.378
		[0.355, 0.4], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5449	12 098
R2	0.779	0.002
R2 Adj.	0.636	0.002

Table A.10: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs*

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	0.016	0.033
	[−0.012, 0.045], p = 0.262	[0.005, 0.062], p = 0.023
Ruling	0	−0.022
	[−0.03, 0.03], p = 0.995	[−0.044, 0], p = 0.053
Intercept		0.486
		[0.462, 0.509], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5429	12 007
R2	0.698	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.502	0.001

Table A.11: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index)

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	−0.007	−0.017
	[−0.016, 0.002], p = 0.12	[−0.028, −0.007], p = 0.002
Ruling	−0.011	−0.012
	[−0.02, −0.001], p = 0.031	[−0.021, −0.003], p = 0.007
Intercept		0.512
		[0.503, 0.52], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5412	11 951
R2	0.770	0.003
R2 Adj.	0.620	0.002

Table A.12: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	0.012	0.02
	[−0.002, 0.025], p = 0.097	[0.001, 0.039], p = 0.04
Ruling	0.025	0.009
	[0.01, 0.039], p = 0.001	[−0.007, 0.024], p = 0.271
Intercept		0.451
		[0.435, 0.467], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5479	12 168
R2	0.844	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.745	0.001

Table A.13: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	−0.008	−0.009
	[−0.022, 0.005], p = 0.225	[−0.025, 0.007], p = 0.256
Ruling	0.016	0.013
	[0.002, 0.03], p = 0.023	[0.001, 0.026], p = 0.041
Intercept		0.644
		[0.631, 0.658], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5437	12 073
R2	0.786	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.647	0.000

Table A.14: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	2.339	2.223
	[1.158, 3.519], p = 0	[0.998, 3.448], p = 0
Ruling	2.279	2.593
	[0.899, 3.66], p = 0.001	[1.509, 3.677], p = 0
Intercept		61.795
		[60.843, 62.748], p = 0
Num.Obs.	4955	10 366
R2	0.755	0.007
R2 Adj.	0.570	0.007

Table A.15: The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	−0.033	−0.026
	[−0.048, −0.019], p = 0	[−0.042, −0.01], p = 0.001
Ruling	−0.027	−0.033
	[−0.042, −0.011], p = 0.001	[−0.047, −0.02], p = 0
Intercept		0.512
		[0.499, 0.525], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5479	12 167
R2	0.737	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.570	0.005

Robustness: Lagged Model

Table A.16: The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe*

	Panel
Ruling	0.029
	[0.008, 0.051], p = 0.008
Lagged DV	−0.353
	[−0.426, −0.28], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3304
R2	0.884
R2 Adj.	0.753

Table A.17: The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs*

	Panel
Ruling	−0.013
	[−0.022, −0.003], p = 0.009
Lagged DV	−0.181
	[−0.245, −0.116], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3260
R2	0.876
R2 Adj.	0.734

Table A.18: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index)

	Panel
Ruling	−0.013
	[−0.022, −0.003], p = 0.009
Lagged DV	−0.181
	[−0.245, −0.116], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3260
R2	0.876
R2 Adj.	0.734

Table A.19: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court

	Panel
Ruling	0.028
	[0.015, 0.041], p = 0
Lagged DV	−0.385
	[−0.457, −0.312], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3340
R2	0.909
R2 Adj.	0.808

Table A.20: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits

	Panel
Ruling	0.011
	[−0.002, 0.023], p = 0.093
Lagged DV	−0.287
	[−0.349, −0.224], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3286
R2	0.890
R2 Adj.	0.766

Table A.21: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court

	Panel
Ruling	2.872
	[1.529, 4.215], p = 0
Lagged DV	−0.344
	[−0.444, −0.244], p = 0
Num.Obs.	2718
R2	0.854
R2 Adj.	0.683

Table A.22: The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance

	Panel
Ruling	−0.034
	[−0.049, −0.019], p = 0
Lagged DV	−0.188
	[−0.249, −0.126], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3338
R2	0.854
R2 Adj.	0.691

A.5 Heterogeneity by Partisanship

Table A.23: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion (perceptions of the norm), by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	0.029	0.023
	[−0.003, 0.061], p = 0.08	[0.001, 0.045], p = 0.036
Independent	−0.057	−0.138
	[−0.182, 0.067], p = 0.364	[−0.16, −0.117], p = 0
Republican	0	−0.213
	[−0.112, 0.113], p = 0.998	[−0.238, −0.188], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	0.004	0.002
	[−0.037, 0.044], p = 0.857	[−0.027, 0.031], p = 0.902
Ruling:Rep	−0.023	−0.019
	[−0.072, 0.027], p = 0.37	[−0.053, 0.016], p = 0.292
(Intercept)		0.683
		[0.667, 0.698], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3345	10 047
R2	0.784	0.082
R2 Adj.	0.540	0.081

Table A.24: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' moral opposition to abortion (perceptions of the norm), by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	0.011	−0.002
	[−0.025, 0.047], p = 0.546	[−0.022, 0.018], p = 0.863
Independent	−0.028	−0.106
	[−0.164, 0.108], p = 0.685	[−0.125, −0.087], p = 0
Republican	−0.024	−0.16
	[−0.165, 0.117], p = 0.741	[−0.182, −0.138], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	−0.015	0.011
	[−0.06, 0.03], p = 0.527	[−0.016, 0.038], p = 0.413
Ruling:Rep	−0.016	−0.002
	[−0.065, 0.033], p = 0.527	[−0.034, 0.029], p = 0.885
(Intercept)		0.585
		[0.571, 0.6], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3337	10 029
R2	0.714	0.053
R2 Adj.	0.391	0.053

Table A.25: The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	0.004	0.022
	[−0.019, 0.026], p = 0.758	[−0.002, 0.047], p = 0.078
Independent	0.018	−0.223
	[−0.107, 0.143], p = 0.777	[−0.249, −0.198], p = 0
Republican	0.043	−0.388
	[−0.081, 0.168], p = 0.494	[−0.416, −0.36], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	0.018	0.037
	[−0.014, 0.049], p = 0.27	[0.002, 0.071], p = 0.038
Ruling:Rep	−0.022	−0.05
	[−0.059, 0.014], p = 0.222	[−0.089, −0.011], p = 0.013
(Intercept)		0.764
		[0.746, 0.782], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3345	10 058
R2	0.914	0.175
R2 Adj.	0.817	0.175

Table A.26: The effect of the ruling on moral opposition to abortion, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	−0.01	0.001
	[−0.041, 0.021], p = 0.533	[−0.023, 0.025], p = 0.935
Independent	−0.051	−0.192
	[−0.172, 0.07], p = 0.413	[−0.216, −0.168], p = 0
Republican	−0.013	−0.321
	[−0.134, 0.108], p = 0.829	[−0.348, −0.294], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	0.015	0.015
	[−0.026, 0.056], p = 0.461	[−0.018, 0.048], p = 0.358
Ruling:Rep	−0.007	−0.023
	[−0.058, 0.044], p = 0.784	[−0.06, 0.015], p = 0.237
(Intercept)		0.655
		[0.638, 0.673], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3345	10 054
R2	0.837	0.133
R2 Adj.	0.653	0.133

Table A.27: The effect of the ruling on perceived age of fetal viability, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Ruling	−1.092	−1.875
	[−2.451, 0.266], p = 0.115	[−2.972, −0.778], p = 0.001
Independent	−1.035	−9.423
	[−5.592, 3.521], p = 0.656	[−10.518, −8.327], p = 0
Republican	1.107	−12.554
	[−3.178, 5.392], p = 0.612	[−13.676, −11.432], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	0.273	2.082
	[−1.459, 2.005], p = 0.757	[0.594, 3.57], p = 0.006
Ruling:Rep	−0.117	1.004
	[−1.915, 1.68], p = 0.898	[−0.51, 2.518], p = 0.194
(Intercept)		22.94
		[22.14, 23.74], p = 0
Num.Obs.	2418	7281
R2	0.917	0.150
R2 Adj.	0.795	0.149

Table A.28: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe*, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	−0.002	0.053
	[−0.048, 0.044], p = 0.931	[0.009, 0.097], p = 0.018
Independent	−0.014	0.163
	[−0.135, 0.108], p = 0.825	[0.112, 0.214], p = 0
Republican	−0.198	0.38
	[−0.345, −0.051], p = 0.008	[0.324, 0.436], p = 0
Ruling	0.004	−0.022
	[−0.041, 0.049], p = 0.853	[−0.056, 0.013], p = 0.217
Leak:Ind	0.027	−0.007
	[−0.034, 0.087], p = 0.386	[−0.069, 0.055], p = 0.816
Leak:Rep	0.072	0.069
	[0.008, 0.136], p = 0.027	[0.001, 0.137], p = 0.048
Ruling:Ind	0.006	0.007
	[−0.053, 0.065], p = 0.843	[−0.041, 0.055], p = 0.778
Ruling:Rep	0.047	0.043
	[−0.018, 0.112], p = 0.156	[−0.009, 0.096], p = 0.107
(Intercept)		0.212
		[0.175, 0.248], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5449	12 098
R2	0.781	0.124
R2 Adj.	0.640	0.123

Table A.29: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs*, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	0.03	0.096
	[−0.021, 0.082], p = 0.247	[0.05, 0.143], p = 0
Independent	0.037	0.248
	[−0.101, 0.175], p = 0.601	[0.195, 0.302], p = 0
Republican	−0.052	0.416
	[−0.215, 0.11], p = 0.529	[0.36, 0.471], p = 0
Ruling	0.032	−0.034
	[−0.024, 0.089], p = 0.265	[−0.072, 0.004], p = 0.076
Leak:Ind	−0.053	−0.108
	[−0.12, 0.015], p = 0.127	[−0.173, −0.043], p = 0.001
Leak:Rep	0.031	−0.057
	[−0.042, 0.105], p = 0.406	[−0.125, 0.012], p = 0.106
Ruling:Ind	−0.031	−0.005
	[−0.102, 0.041], p = 0.397	[−0.057, 0.046], p = 0.836
Ruling:Rep	−0.072	0.062
	[−0.153, 0.01], p = 0.084	[0.007, 0.117], p = 0.026
(Intercept)		0.274
		[0.236, 0.312], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5429	12 007
R2	0.699	0.091
R2 Adj.	0.504	0.091

Table A.30: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index), by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	−0.066	−0.079
	[−0.082, −0.05], p = 0	[−0.097, −0.06], p = 0
Independent	−0.045	0.024
	[−0.088, −0.003], p = 0.036	[0.004, 0.045], p = 0.019
Republican	−0.101	0.049
	[−0.149, −0.053], p = 0	[0.025, 0.073], p = 0
Ruling	−0.048	−0.035
	[−0.064, −0.031], p = 0	[−0.048, −0.022], p = 0
Leak:Ind	0.076	0.082
	[0.055, 0.097], p = 0	[0.058, 0.106], p = 0
Leak:Rep	0.099	0.112
	[0.075, 0.122], p = 0	[0.083, 0.14], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	0.03	0.01
	[0.008, 0.052], p = 0.008	[−0.009, 0.029], p = 0.297
Ruling:Rep	0.093	0.073
	[0.067, 0.119], p = 0	[0.05, 0.095], p = 0
(Intercept)		0.489
		[0.473, 0.505], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5412	11 951
R2	0.788	0.120
R2 Adj.	0.650	0.120

Table A.31: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	0.044	0.064
	[0.016, 0.072], p = 0.002	[0.035, 0.094], p = 0
Independent	0.033	−0.196
	[−0.036, 0.102], p = 0.346	[−0.231, −0.161], p = 0
Republican	0.086	−0.338
	[0.01, 0.163], p = 0.027	[−0.377, −0.299], p = 0
Ruling	0.048	−0.013
	[0.02, 0.076], p = 0.001	[−0.035, 0.008], p = 0.225
Leak:Ind	−0.045	−0.068
	[−0.079, −0.01], p = 0.012	[−0.109, −0.027], p = 0.001
Leak:Rep	−0.049	−0.076
	[−0.086, −0.013], p = 0.008	[−0.122, −0.029], p = 0.001
Ruling:Ind	−0.029	0.042
	[−0.063, 0.006], p = 0.103	[0.011, 0.073], p = 0.009
Ruling:Rep	−0.043	0.016
	[−0.082, −0.005], p = 0.027	[−0.02, 0.053], p = 0.382
(Intercept)		0.62
		[0.595, 0.646], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5479	12 168
R2	0.846	0.188
R2 Adj.	0.748	0.187

Table A.32: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	0.043	0.037
	[0.02, 0.066], p = 0	[0.01, 0.064], p = 0.006
Independent	0.06	−0.085
	[−0.01, 0.13], p = 0.092	[−0.116, −0.055], p = 0
Republican	0.053	−0.087
	[−0.023, 0.129], p = 0.171	[−0.123, −0.051], p = 0
Ruling	0.053	0.032
	[0.028, 0.077], p = 0	[0.014, 0.051], p = 0.001
Leak:Ind	−0.072	−0.054
	[−0.103, −0.041], p = 0	[−0.091, −0.018], p = 0.003
Leak:Rep	−0.078	−0.099
	[−0.114, −0.042], p = 0	[−0.142, −0.056], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	−0.037	−0.011
	[−0.069, −0.006], p = 0.021	[−0.038, 0.016], p = 0.424
Ruling:Rep	−0.079	−0.061
	[−0.116, −0.043], p = 0	[−0.094, −0.028], p = 0
(Intercept)		0.703
		[0.68, 0.726], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5437	12 073
R2	0.792	0.076
R2 Adj.	0.656	0.075

Table A.33: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	4.826	3.835
	[2.739, 6.914], p = 0	[1.675, 5.994], p = 0.001
Independent	1.109	−10.851
	[−4.618, 6.836], p = 0.704	[−13.121, −8.581], p = 0
Republican	−1.366	−13.084
	[−9.121, 6.389], p = 0.73	[−15.464, −10.703], p = 0
Ruling	0.604	1.511
	[−1.869, 3.076], p = 0.632	[−0.296, 3.318], p = 0.101
Leak:Ind	−2.246	−1.106
	[−5.141, 0.65], p = 0.128	[−3.964, 1.752], p = 0.448
Leak:Rep	−6.024	−5.504
	[−8.998, −3.05], p = 0	[−8.514, −2.494], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	1.696	0.547
	[−1.603, 4.995], p = 0.313	[−1.973, 3.066], p = 0.671
Ruling:Rep	3.839	3.147
	[0.309, 7.369], p = 0.033	[0.596, 5.699], p = 0.016
(Intercept)		69.748
		[67.988, 71.508], p = 0
Num.Obs.	4955	10 366
R2	0.757	0.099
R2 Adj.	0.573	0.098

Table A.34: The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance, by party identification

	Panel	Cross-Sectional
Leak	−0.123	−0.096
	[−0.147, −0.099], p = 0	[−0.128, −0.065], p = 0
Independent	−0.128	−0.034
	[−0.196, −0.061], p = 0	[−0.067, −0.002], p = 0.037
Republican	−0.137	0.097
	[−0.221, −0.053], p = 0.001	[0.062, 0.132], p = 0
Ruling	−0.099	−0.096
	[−0.124, −0.074], p = 0	[−0.121, −0.072], p = 0
Leak:Ind	0.119	0.106
	[0.086, 0.152], p = 0	[0.067, 0.144], p = 0
Leak:Rep	0.143	0.107
	[0.107, 0.179], p = 0	[0.066, 0.149], p = 0
Ruling:Ind	0.082	0.053
	[0.048, 0.116], p = 0	[0.021, 0.084], p = 0.001
Ruling:Rep	0.145	0.167
	[0.105, 0.184], p = 0	[0.133, 0.2], p = 0
(Intercept)		0.502
		[0.476, 0.528], p = 0
Num.Obs.	5479	12 167
R2	0.757	0.121
R2 Adj.	0.601	0.120

A.6 Within Group Analyses

Table A.35: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Ruling	0.002	0.028	0.029
	[−0.038, 0.042], p = 0.925	[−0.006, 0.062], p = 0.103	[0.003, 0.055], p = 0.027
Num.Obs.	880	1008	1457
R2	0.778	0.778	0.796
R2 Adj.	0.485	0.494	0.538

Table A.36: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.469	0.683	0.544
	[0.45, 0.489], p = 0	[0.667, 0.698], p = 0	[0.53, 0.558], p = 0
Ruling	0.005	0.023	0.025
	[−0.022, 0.032], p = 0.74	[0.001, 0.045], p = 0.036	[0.005, 0.045], p = 0.012
Num.Obs.	2444	3333	4270
R2	0.000	0.002	0.002
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.001	0.002

Table A.37: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' moral opposition to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Ruling	0.001	0.022	0.003
	[−0.033, 0.036], p = 0.938	[−0.015, 0.059], p = 0.236	[−0.025, 0.032], p = 0.813
Num.Obs.	879	1008	1450
R2	0.761	0.714	0.725
R2 Adj.	0.446	0.349	0.376

Table A.38: The effect of the ruling on perception of Americans' moral opposition to abortion (perceptions of the norm) in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.425	0.585	0.479
	[0.408, 0.442], p = 0	[0.571, 0.6], p = 0	[0.467, 0.492], p = 0
Ruling	−0.004	−0.002	0.009
	[−0.028, 0.02], p = 0.74	[−0.022, 0.018], p = 0.863	[−0.008, 0.027], p = 0.295
Num.Obs.	2438	3328	4263
R2	0.000	0.000	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.000	0.000

Table A.39: The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Ruling	−0.017	0.005	0.024
	[−0.047, 0.012], p = 0.253	[−0.018, 0.028], p = 0.66	[0.001, 0.047], p = 0.041
Num.Obs.	877	1010	1458
R2	0.915	0.914	0.914
R2 Adj.	0.804	0.804	0.805

Table A.40: The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding maintaining legal access to abortion in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.376	0.764	0.541
	[0.354, 0.398], p = 0	[0.746, 0.782], p = 0	[0.522, 0.559], p = 0
Ruling	−0.028	0.022	0.059
	[−0.058, 0.003], p = 0.076	[−0.002, 0.047], p = 0.078	[0.034, 0.083], p = 0
Num.Obs.	2443	3341	4274
R2	0.002	0.001	0.007
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.001	0.006

Table A.41: The effect of the ruling on moral opposition to abortion in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Ruling	−0.015	−0.013	0.003
	[−0.058, 0.027], p = 0.479	[−0.046, 0.02], p = 0.436	[−0.025, 0.031], p = 0.826
Num.Obs.	880	1010	1455
R2	0.804	0.831	0.854
R2 Adj.	0.544	0.614	0.670

Table A.42: The effect of the ruling on moral opposition to abortion in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.334	0.655	0.463
	[0.314, 0.355], p = 0	[0.638, 0.673], p = 0	[0.447, 0.48], p = 0
Ruling	−0.022	0.001	0.016
	[−0.05, 0.007], p = 0.138	[−0.023, 0.025], p = 0.935	[−0.006, 0.039], p = 0.144
Num.Obs.	2444	3344	4266
R2	0.001	0.000	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.000	0.000

Table A.43: The effect of the ruling on perceived age of fetal viability in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Ruling	−1.073	−0.863	−0.625
	[−2.255, 0.109], p = 0.075	[−2.319, 0.592], p = 0.244	[−1.749, 0.5], p = 0.275
Num.Obs.	730	690	998
R2	0.899	0.897	0.934
R2 Adj.	0.748	0.717	0.823

Table A.44: The effect of the ruling on perceived age of fetal viability in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	10.386	22.94	13.517
	[9.599, 11.173], p = 0	[22.139, 23.74], p = 0	[12.769, 14.265], p = 0
Ruling	−0.872	−1.875	0.207
	[−1.916, 0.173], p = 0.102	[−2.973, −0.778], p = 0.001	[−0.799, 1.212], p = 0.687
Num.Obs.	2066	2313	2902
R2	0.002	0.006	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.006	0.000

Table A.45: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe* in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Leak	0.057	0.008	0.026
	[0.012, 0.102], p = 0.012	[−0.039, 0.056], p = 0.734	[−0.014, 0.067], p = 0.204
Ruling	0.063	−0.006	0.015
	[0.016, 0.11], p = 0.009	[−0.052, 0.04], p = 0.807	[−0.025, 0.054], p = 0.464
Num.Obs.	1436	1666	2347
R2	0.803	0.760	0.787
R2 Adj.	0.655	0.575	0.629

Table A.46: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Roe* in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.592	0.212	0.374
	[0.549, 0.635], p = 0	[0.175, 0.248], p = 0	[0.339, 0.41], p = 0
Leak	0.122	0.053	0.046
	[0.07, 0.174], p = 0	[0.009, 0.097], p = 0.018	[0.002, 0.09], p = 0.039
Ruling	0.022	−0.022	−0.015
	[−0.018, 0.062], p = 0.288	[−0.056, 0.013], p = 0.217	[−0.049, 0.019], p = 0.399
Num.Obs.	2987	3987	5124
R2	0.013	0.002	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.012	0.001	0.001

Table A.47: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs* in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Leak	0.051	0.034	−0.022
	[−0.003, 0.105], p = 0.064	[−0.019, 0.087], p = 0.211	[−0.067, 0.023], p = 0.339
Ruling	−0.046	0.035	−0.005
	[−0.104, 0.011], p = 0.116	[−0.024, 0.093], p = 0.245	[−0.05, 0.039], p = 0.816
Num.Obs.	1436	1652	2341
R2	0.657	0.700	0.737
R2 Adj.	0.399	0.467	0.541

Table A.48: The effect of the leak and ruling on personal opinion regarding *Dobbs* in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.592	0.274	0.522
	[0.549, 0.635], p = 0	[0.236, 0.312], p = 0	[0.485, 0.559], p = 0
Leak	0.122	0.096	−0.011
	[0.07, 0.174], p = 0	[0.049, 0.143], p = 0	[−0.057, 0.034], p = 0.62
Ruling	0.022	−0.034	−0.04
	[−0.018, 0.062], p = 0.288	[−0.072, 0.004], p = 0.076	[−0.075, −0.005], p = 0.026
Num.Obs.	2987	3955	5068
R2	0.013	0.005	0.002
R2 Adj.	0.012	0.005	0.001

Table A.49: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index) in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Leak	0.032	−0.065	0.012
	[0.015, 0.049], p = 0	[−0.081, −0.048], p = 0	[−0.002, 0.025], p = 0.101
Ruling	0.046	−0.048	−0.017
	[0.026, 0.066], p = 0	[−0.065, −0.03], p = 0	[−0.031, −0.003], p = 0.017
Num.Obs.	1429	1655	2328
R2	0.818	0.766	0.799
R2 Adj.	0.681	0.586	0.648

Table A.50: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived court legitimacy (index) in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.538	0.489	0.513
	[0.52, 0.556], p = 0	[0.473, 0.505], p = 0	[0.501, 0.525], p = 0
Leak	0.033	−0.079	0.003
	[0.011, 0.055], p = 0.003	[−0.097, −0.06], p = 0	[−0.012, 0.018], p = 0.68
Ruling	0.038	−0.035	−0.025
	[0.02, 0.056], p = 0	[−0.048, −0.022], p = 0	[−0.038, −0.011], p = 0
Num.Obs.	2966	3936	5049
R2	0.015	0.051	0.004
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.051	0.003

Table A.51: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Leak	−0.002	0.05	0
	[−0.026, 0.022], p = 0.848	[0.021, 0.079], p = 0.001	[−0.021, 0.02], p = 0.975
Ruling	0.007	0.047	0.024
	[−0.02, 0.034], p = 0.604	[0.018, 0.076], p = 0.001	[0.003, 0.045], p = 0.026
Num.Obs.	1442	1675	2362
R2	0.861	0.784	0.850
R2 Adj.	0.758	0.620	0.739

Table A.52: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for increasing the size of the Court in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.282	0.62	0.424
	[0.253, 0.311], p = 0	[0.595, 0.646], p = 0	[0.4, 0.448], p = 0
Leak	−0.011	0.064	−0.004
	[−0.047, 0.025], p = 0.54	[0.035, 0.094], p = 0	[−0.032, 0.025], p = 0.797
Ruling	0.003	−0.013	0.028
	[−0.027, 0.033], p = 0.845	[−0.035, 0.008], p = 0.225	[0.006, 0.051], p = 0.013
Num.Obs.	3004	4001	5163
R2	0.000	0.006	0.002
R2 Adj.	−0.001	0.006	0.001

Table A.53: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Leak	−0.029	0.05	−0.026
	[−0.058, −0.001], p = 0.044	[0.026, 0.074], p = 0	[−0.047, −0.006], p = 0.013
Ruling	−0.024	0.047	0.015
	[−0.052, 0.003], p = 0.086	[0.022, 0.072], p = 0	[−0.006, 0.035], p = 0.155
Num.Obs.	1439	1662	2336
R2	0.821	0.774	0.812
R2 Adj.	0.689	0.602	0.670

Table A.54: The effect of the leak and ruling on support for establishing term limits in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.616	0.703	0.617
	[0.588, 0.643], p = 0	[0.68, 0.726], p = 0	[0.597, 0.638], p = 0
Leak	−0.062	0.037	−0.017
	[−0.095, −0.028], p = 0	[0.01, 0.064], p = 0.007	[−0.042, 0.007], p = 0.17
Ruling	−0.029	0.032	0.021
	[−0.056, −0.002], p = 0.035	[0.014, 0.051], p = 0.001	[0.002, 0.041], p = 0.028
Num.Obs.	2990	3976	5107
R2	0.010	0.010	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.010	0.009	0.001

Table A.55: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Leak	−1.466	4.573	2.578
	[−3.64, 0.708], p = 0.186	[2.46, 6.686], p = 0	[0.554, 4.603], p = 0.013
Ruling	5.16	1.197	2.934
	[2.877, 7.443], p = 0	[−1.355, 3.749], p = 0.357	[0.638, 5.23], p = 0.012
Num.Obs.	1336	1582	2037
R2	0.740	0.762	0.787
R2 Adj.	0.523	0.563	0.586

Table A.56: The effect of the leak and ruling on perceived conservatism/liberalism of the Court in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	56.664	69.748	58.897
	[55.06, 58.268], p = 0	[67.988, 71.508], p = 0	[57.462, 60.331], p = 0
Leak	−1.669	3.835	2.729
	[−3.767, 0.429], p = 0.119	[1.675, 5.995], p = 0.001	[0.857, 4.602], p = 0.004
Ruling	4.658	1.511	2.058
	[2.857, 6.46], p = 0	[−0.296, 3.319], p = 0.101	[0.302, 3.813], p = 0.022
Num.Obs.	2736	3581	4049
R2	0.012	0.008	0.007
R2 Adj.	0.011	0.008	0.007

Table A.57: The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance in the panel sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Leak	0.015	−0.121	−0.004
	[−0.012, 0.042], p = 0.284	[−0.146, −0.096], p = 0	[−0.027, 0.018], p = 0.715
Ruling	0.059	−0.098	−0.017
	[0.029, 0.088], p = 0	[−0.123, −0.072], p = 0	[−0.041, 0.006], p = 0.149
Num.Obs.	1441	1675	2363
R2	0.711	0.833	0.745
R2 Adj.	0.497	0.706	0.557

Table A.58: The effect of the leak and ruling on approval of the Court's performance in the cross-sectional sample

	Republican	Democrat	Independent/Other
Intercept	0.599	0.502	0.468
	[0.576, 0.622], p = 0	[0.476, 0.528], p = 0	[0.449, 0.486], p = 0
Leak	0.011	−0.096	0.009
	[−0.017, 0.038], p = 0.446	[−0.128, −0.065], p = 0	[−0.013, 0.032], p = 0.418
Ruling	0.071	−0.096	−0.044
	[0.048, 0.093], p = 0	[−0.121, −0.072], p = 0	[−0.063, −0.024], p = 0
Num.Obs.	3001	4001	5165
R2	0.019	0.047	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.018	0.046	0.005

A.7 Television Data

For these data we searched the Internet Archive for mentions of the two relevant abortion cases: "Roe" and "Dobbs." We then tabulated mentions of the terms during the period of investigation. We summed all results, and generated subset counts for left and right-leaning channels. Left-leaning channels were MSNBC and CNN, while right-leaning channels were Fox News and Fox Business.




Figure A.1: This figure shows differences in coverage of *Roe* and *Dobbs* between April and August 2022 on television news. FoxNews and Fox Business are grouped as right leaning-media and MSNBC and CNN Are grouped as left-leaning media. Data: Internet Archive

A.8 Twitter Analysis

We utilized the academic twitter API to collect data on engagement with abortion on the platform.

To identify abortion-related tweets we first searched for trending hashtags between April and August 2022 on abortion. We then requested all tweets using one of these hashtags or the word "abortion":

#AbortionRights

#AbortionIsHealthcare

#AbortionBan

#RoeVWade

#AbortionIsEssential

#MyBodyMyChoice

#ProLife

#ReproRights

#RepoductiveRights

#EndAbortion

#ProChoice

#SCOTUS

#Roe

#Abortion

#WomensRights

#AbortionisMurder

#PlannedParenthood

#NoAirTimeForAntis

#HumanRights

#GOP

#WeWontGoBack

#BansOffOurBodies

#VoteBlueToProtectWomen

#RoeRoeRoeYourVote

This generated a total number of tweets that exceeded the monthly academic allowance by an order of magnitude. As our interests were both in the overall number of engagements and the sentiment of the content (which requires actual tweet text) we revised our query to request tweets published approximately the day before and after the leak and the final ruling.

We then tabulated the total engagements with each tweet (the total number of likes, retweets and replies) and classified the sentiment of the tweet text. For parsimony we used the dictionary from Liu [2015]. Several of the standard terms from this dictionary show high positive sentiment, but have a distinct meaning in this domain. Specifically, "supreme" and "support" are highly positive words, but are used in this case to either merely reference the Court or in negation (e.g, "failed to support"). These terms were removed and mean sentiment was calculated.

Polling tweets

We also tracked the engagement with abortion polling data on twitter. For this we generated an exhaustive list of polls on American abortion attitudes. We identified 21 polls and then manually classified if the polls indicated popular support or opposition to abortion. All but one of the 21 polls indicated substantial public support for abortion. Our original intention was to separately track engagement for polls that indicated public support and polls that indicated public opposition to abortion. We abandoned this after finding that the single poll finding opposition to abortion was engaged with only 7 times on twitter. With this list we queried the twitter API for tweets linking to one of the polling urls between April and August 2022. This was a considerably smaller number of tweets and it was therefore possible

to capture the full set sent in this period.

https://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx

https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23167397/abortion-public-opinion-polls-americans

https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-july-2022/

https://www.npr.org/2022/06/27/1107733632/poll-majorities-oppose-supreme-courts-abortion-ruling-and-worry-about-other-righ

https://www.vox.com/a/abortion-decision-statistics-opinions/abortion-polling-mistakes

https://apnews.com/article/abortion-health-congress-government-and-politics-fc8c68d1c4dd29ef0a364050013b8cf4

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/29/abortion-roe-midterms-poll/

https://www.texastribune.org/2022/08/10/texas-politics-project-abortion-polling/

https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2022/07/20/mlspsc09-court-press-release/

https://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm

https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2022/06/24/american-opinion-supreme-court-abortion-roe-wade

https://www.npr.org/2019/06/07/730183531/poll-majority-want-to-keep-abortion-legal-but-they-also-want-restrictions

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2022-election/support-abortion-rights-hits-new-high-midterm-outlook-stays-mostly-unc-rcna28869

https://www.wsj.com/articles/upholding-roe-v-wade-is-supported-by-most-americans-wsj-poll-finds-11654162200?mod=hp_lead_pos10

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/06/13/about-six-in-ten-americans-say-abortion-should-be-legal-in-all-or-most-cases-2/

https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/21/politics/cnn-poll-abortion-roe-v-wade/index.html

https://www.npr.org/2022/06/03/1102872199/gallup-poll-pro-choice-roe-v-wade-supreme-court

https://news.gallup.com/poll/244709/pro-choice-pro-life-2018-demographic-tables.aspx

https://www.instituteforprolifeadvancement.org/new-poll-finds-that-millennials-gen-z-now-about-one-third-of-the-electorate-dont-hold-extremist-abortion-views-embrace-limits/

https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/where-americans-stand-on-abortion-in-5-charts/

A.9 Exploratory Source and Media Analysis

Cable news

Cable news consumption was only captured in the second wave, so for this analysis we focus on the panel where we have cable news consumption for all respondents. As cable news preference is a time invariant trait we remove respondent fixed effects from this model.

Table A.59: Cable News Consumption and our Main Outcomes (Panel)

	Roe Should be Overturned	Perceived American support for abortion	Personal support for abortion
Intercept	0.348	0.586	0.599
	[0.311, 0.384], p = 0	[0.561, 0.61], p = 0	[0.566, 0.633], p = 0
CNN	−0.068	0.103	0.156
	[−0.142, 0.005], p = 0.069	[0.048, 0.158], p = 0	[0.094, 0.219], p = 0
FoxNews	0.213	−0.08	−0.153
	[0.145, 0.282], p = 0	[−0.126, −0.033], p = 0.001	[−0.213, −0.094], p = 0
MSNBC	−0.153	0.198	0.188
	[−0.221, −0.085], p = 0	[0.141, 0.255], p = 0	[0.127, 0.25], p = 0
Other Cable	0.185	−0.015	−0.012
	[0.073, 0.297], p = 0.001	[−0.09, 0.06], p = 0.688	[−0.103, 0.079], p = 0.795
Leak	0.034		
	[−0.022, 0.089], p = 0.237		
Decision	0.01	0.027	0.011
	[−0.052, 0.071], p = 0.759	[−0.01, 0.063], p = 0.153	[−0.037, 0.059], p = 0.659
CNN X Leak	−0.063		
	[−0.181, 0.055], p = 0.293		
FoxNews X Leak	0.028		
	[−0.077, 0.133], p = 0.599		
MSNBC X Leak	−0.03		
	[−0.139, 0.078], p = 0.582		
Other Cable X Leak	−0.121		
	[−0.286, 0.045], p = 0.153		
CNN X Decision	0.02	−0.039	−0.023
	[−0.121, 0.161], p = 0.784	[−0.131, 0.053], p = 0.405	[−0.126, 0.08], p = 0.663
FoxNews X Decision	0.038	−0.023	−0.04
	[−0.076, 0.152], p = 0.511	[−0.092, 0.045], p = 0.503	[−0.127, 0.048], p = 0.373
MSNBC X Decision	−0.037	−0.013	0.03
	[−0.157, 0.082], p = 0.541	[−0.089, 0.062], p = 0.726	[−0.059, 0.119], p = 0.508
Other Cable X Decision	−0.029	−0.01	−0.01
	[−0.205, 0.147], p = 0.746	[−0.125, 0.105], p = 0.861	[−0.149, 0.13], p = 0.891
Num.Obs.	4219	2531	2532
R2	0.072	0.070	0.083
R2 Adj.	0.069	0.066	0.080
AIC	6110.5	1285.1	2508.6
BIC	6212.0	1349.3	2572.8
RMSE	0.47	0.29	0.37

Source of leak knowledge

For this analysis we subset to just the wave after the leak. We do this for clarity as only one of our three items (constitutionality) was on the pre-leak survey. All the results that follow are therefore the relationship between post-leak attitudes and how respondents learned of the leak.

Table A.60: Post-leak attitudes by source of leak

	Roe Should be Overturned	Percieved American support for abortion	Personal support for abortion
Intercept	0.35	0.59	0.6
	[0.31, 0.38], p = 0	[0.56, 0.61], p = 0	[0.57, 0.63], p = 0
CNN	−0.07	0.1	0.16
	[−0.14, 0.01], p = 0.07	[0.05, 0.16], p = 0	[0.09, 0.22], p = 0
FoxNews	0.21	−0.08	−0.15
	[0.14, 0.28], p = 0	[−0.13, −0.03], p = 0	[−0.21, −0.09], p = 0
MSNBC	−0.15	0.2	0.19
	[−0.22, −0.09], p = 0	[0.14, 0.25], p = 0	[0.13, 0.25], p = 0
Other Cable	0.19	−0.02	−0.01
	[0.07, 0.3], p = 0	[−0.09, 0.06], p = 0.69	[−0.1, 0.08], p = 0.8
Leak	0.03		
	[−0.02, 0.09], p = 0.24		
Decision	0.01	0.03	0.01
	[−0.05, 0.07], p = 0.76	[−0.01, 0.06], p = 0.15	[−0.04, 0.06], p = 0.66
CNN X Leak	−0.06		
	[−0.18, 0.05], p = 0.29		
FoxNews X Leak	0.03		
	[−0.08, 0.13], p = 0.6		
MSNBC X Leak	−0.03		
	[−0.14, 0.08], p = 0.58		
Other Cable X Leak	−0.12		
	[−0.29, 0.05], p = 0.15		
CNN X Decision	0.02	−0.04	−0.02
	[−0.12, 0.16], p = 0.78	[−0.13, 0.05], p = 0.4	[−0.13, 0.08], p = 0.66
FoxNews X Decision	0.04	−0.02	−0.04
	[−0.08, 0.15], p = 0.51	[−0.09, 0.05], p = 0.5	[−0.13, 0.05], p = 0.37
MSNBC X Decision	−0.04	−0.01	0.03
	[−0.16, 0.08], p = 0.54	[−0.09, 0.06], p = 0.73	[−0.06, 0.12], p = 0.51
Other Cable X Decision	−0.03	−0.01	−0.01
	[−0.2, 0.15], p = 0.75	[−0.13, 0.1], p = 0.86	[−0.15, 0.13], p = 0.89
Num.Obs.	4219	2531	2532
R2	0.072	0.070	0.083
R2 Adj.	0.069	0.066	0.080
AIC	6110.5	1285.1	2508.6
BIC	6212.0	1349.3	2572.8
RMSE	0.47	0.29	0.37

Table A.61: Support for overturning *Roe* (Wave 2 Cross-Sectional)

	Social Media	Cable News	Broadcast News	Online News
Intercept	0.455	0.354	0.46	0.411
	[0.431, 0.478], p = 0	[0.331, 0.378], p = 0	[0.436, 0.483], p = 0	[0.387, 0.435], p = 0
Source: Social Media	−0.116			
	[−0.154, −0.078], p = 0			
Source: Cable News		0.138		
		[0.101, 0.175], p = 0		
Source: Broadcast News			−0.144	
			[−0.182, −0.107], p = 0	
Source: Online News				−0.002
				[−0.04, 0.036], p = 0.924
Num.Obs.	3538	3538	3538	3538
R2	0.013	0.019	0.019	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.013	0.019	0.019	0.000
AIC	5390.4	5368.8	5367.7	5436.8
BIC	5408.9	5387.3	5386.2	5455.4
RMSE	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.49

Table A.62: Perceived support for abortion (Wave 2 Cross-Sectional)

	Social Media	Cable News	Broadcast News	Online News
Intercept	0.576	0.596	0.558	0.579
	[0.561, 0.59], p = 0	[0.581, 0.61], p = 0	[0.544, 0.572], p = 0	[0.564, 0.594], p = 0
Source: Social Media	0.034			
	[0.01, 0.058], p = 0.005			
Source: Cable News		−0.018		
		[−0.041, 0.006], p = 0.139		
Source: Broadcast News			0.088	
			[0.064, 0.113], p = 0	
Source: Online News				0.024
				[0.001, 0.048], p = 0.041
Num.Obs.	3551	3551	3551	3551
R2	0.003	0.001	0.018	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.003	0.000	0.018	0.001
AIC	2157.4	2164.7	2101.8	2162.2
BIC	2175.9	2183.3	2120.4	2180.8
RMSE	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31

Table A.63: Support for abortion (Wave 2 Cross-Sectional)

	Social Media	Cable News	Broadcast News	Online News
Intercept	0.558	0.633	0.565	0.589
	[0.539, 0.576], p = 0	[0.613, 0.653], p = 0	[0.546, 0.583], p = 0	[0.57, 0.607], p = 0
Source: Social Media	0.109			
	[0.078, 0.139], p = 0			
Source: Cable News		−0.084		
		[−0.113, −0.054], p = 0		
Source: Broadcast News			0.101	
			[0.07, 0.131], p = 0	
Source: Online News				0.027
				[−0.004, 0.057], p = 0.088
Num.Obs.	3557	3557	3557	3557
R2	0.018	0.011	0.015	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.018	0.011	0.014	0.001
AIC	3829.0	3854.0	3840.6	3889.1
BIC	3847.5	3872.5	3859.2	3907.7
RMSE	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39

Table A.64: Source Models: Panel

	Roe Should be Overturned	Court Legitimacy
Intercept	0.384	0.54
	[0.351, 0.418], p = 0	[0.526, 0.553], p = 0
Source: Social Media	−0.006	−0.04
	[−0.066, 0.054], p = 0.848	[−0.063, −0.017], p = 0.001
Leak	0.045	−0.01
	[0.003, 0.087], p = 0.035	[−0.028, 0.008], p = 0.271
Source: Social Media X Leak	−0.001	−0.002
	[−0.077, 0.074], p = 0.973	[−0.032, 0.029], p = 0.924
Num.Obs.	4528	4511
R2	0.002	0.007
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.007
AIC	6854.7	−591.9
BIC	6886.8	−559.8
RMSE	0.49	0.22

State-level analysis

Table A.65: Outcomes by swing state status

	Roe Should be Overturned	Percieved American support for abortion	Personal support for abortion
Intercept	0.389	0.603	0.623
	[0.368, 0.41], p = 0	[0.588, 0.618], p = 0	[0.605, 0.641], p = 0
Decision	0.012	0.028	0.033
	[−0.019, 0.044], p = 0.43	[0.008, 0.048], p = 0.007	[0.009, 0.057], p = 0.008
Purple State	0.045	−0.041	−0.069
	[0.016, 0.074], p = 0.002	[−0.062, −0.021], p = 0	[−0.095, −0.044], p = 0
Red State	0.074	−0.082	−0.116
	[0.037, 0.11], p = 0	[−0.109, −0.055], p = 0	[−0.15, −0.082], p = 0
Decision X Purple State	−0.012	−0.008	0
	[−0.057, 0.032], p = 0.588	[−0.037, 0.021], p = 0.574	[−0.035, 0.036], p = 0.99
Decision X Red State	0.024	−0.026	−0.042
	[−0.032, 0.079], p = 0.402	[−0.063, 0.012], p = 0.177	[−0.088, 0.004], p = 0.075
Num.Obs.	12 098	10 047	10 058
R2	0.004	0.015	0.020
R2 Adj.	0.004	0.014	0.020
AIC	18 567.8	5568.0	9762.4
BIC	18 619.6	5618.5	9812.9
RMSE	0.49	0.31	0.38

Table A.66: Outcomes by trigger law status

	Roe Should be Overturned	Percieved American support for abortion	Personal support for abortion
Intercept	0.399	0.594	0.611
	[0.381, 0.418], p = 0	[0.581, 0.607], p = 0	[0.594, 0.627], p = 0
Decision	0.011	0.03	0.038
	[−0.018, 0.039], p = 0.462	[0.012, 0.048], p = 0.001	[0.015, 0.061], p = 0.001
Trigger Ban	0.044	−0.045	−0.073
	[0.017, 0.07], p = 0.001	[−0.064, −0.026], p = 0	[−0.096, −0.049], p = 0
Decision x Trigger Ban	0.003	−0.022	−0.026
	[−0.037, 0.043], p = 0.89	[−0.048, 0.005], p = 0.106	[−0.059, 0.006], p = 0.111
Num.Obs.	12 098	10 047	10 058
R2	0.002	0.010	0.015
R2 Adj.	0.002	0.010	0.014
AIC	18 588.0	5612.1	9815.1
BIC	18 625.0	5648.2	9851.2
RMSE	0.49	0.31	0.38

Chapter B

Supplementary Information for Study 2

B.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics

Table B.1: Sample Descriptives and Test for Differential Attrition

	Wave 1	**Wave 4**	**T-test**
Gender			$p = 0.77$
Man	45.1%	45.1%	
Woman	53.5%	53.2%	
Nonbinary, Agender, Other	1.5%	1.3%	
Political Party ID			$p = 0.27$
Democrat	58.5%	60.0%	
Republican	38.9%	37.8%	
Independent/Other	2.6%	2.2%	
Age			$p < 0.001$
Mean	41.8	43.1	
SD	14.8	14.0	
Personal Ideology			$p = 0.17$
Liberal	58.2%	59.3%	
Neutral	3.0%	2.9%	
Conservative	38.8%	37.8%	
College Experience			$p = 0.71$
No	13.9%	14.0%	
Yes	81.6%	85.7%	
College Application Experience			$p = 0.78$
No	2.6%	2.8%	
Yes	97.4%	97.3%	
Total	**3,421**	**2,699**	

B.2 Data Collection Schedule

Table B.2: Sample Sizes

Wave	Start Date	End Date	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total N
1	5/22/23	6/5/23	2,001	90	1,330	3,421
2	6/5/23	6/21/23	1,835	77	1,212	3,140
3	7/3/23	7/14/23	1,699	68	1,088	2,860
4	7/25/23	8/6/23	1,616	59	1,019	2,699

B.3 Variables

Primary Outcome Variables

Perceptions of Norms

Affirmative Action: In your opinion, **people in America** believe that race and ethnicity should _____ when deciding which students to admit to U.S. colleges? *[Not be considered at all; Be considered a little; Be considered moderate amount; Be considered a lot; Be considered a great deal]*

Racial Resentment: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: To what extent do you agree that **people in America** resent all of the special attention/-favors that African Americans receive? *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Colorblind Racism: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: **People in America** think racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an important problem today. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Personal Attitudes

Affirmative Action: How much do you think U.S. colleges should consider race and ethnicity when deciding which students to admit? *[Not at all, A little, A moderate amount, A lot, A great deal]*

Racial Resentment: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: I resent all of the special attention/favors that African Americans receive. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Colorblind Racism: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: Racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an important problem today. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Feelings

Personal Feelings Toward Racial Groups: We'd like you to rate how you feel towards some groups on a scale of 0 to 100. Zero means very cold (I really dislike this group) and 100 means very warm (I really like this group). Fifty means you do not feel cold or warm. How would you rate your feeling toward *[Black, Asian, White]* people? *[0-100; (0) Cold/dislike, (50) Neither cold nor warm, (100) Warm/like]*

Perceptions of Americans' Feelings Toward Racial Groups: Now we want to ask you about **people in the United States of America**. We'd like you to rate how you think **people in America** feel towards some groups on a scale of 0 to 100. Zero means very cold (people in America really dislike this group) and 100 means very warm (people in

America really like this group). Fifty means people do not feel cold or warm. How would you rate **people in the America's** feelings toward *[Black, Asian, White]* people? [0-100; (0) Cold/dislike, (50) Neither cold nor warm, (100) Warm/like]

Opinions on the Court

Judge Removal: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: Judges at odds with the people should be removed. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Independence: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: The U.S. Supreme Court is too independent. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Trust: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: The U.S. Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Politicization: Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: The U.S. Supreme Court tries to influence politics. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Secondary Outcome Variables

Diversity Attitudes

Diversity as Principle: How important is it for organizations (like universities and companies) to be racially and ethnically diverse? *[Not at all important, slightly important, moderately important, very important, extremely important]*

Diversity as Policy: When it comes to decisions about hiring and promotions, how much should companies and organizations consider a candidate's race and ethnicity? *[Not at all, A little, A moderate amount, A lot, A great deal]*

Diversity Rationales

Moral Rationale: How much do you agree with the following statement: Organizations like universities and companies should value diversity because it's the right or moral thing to do. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Instrumental Rationale: How much do you agree with the following statement: Organizations like universities and companies should value diversity because it helps them perform better. *[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]*

Lay Beliefs about Affirmative Action

POC Advantage in Admissions: Imagine that two students applied to Harvard College last year with nearly identical applications. However, one applicant was *[Black, Asian]* and the other was White. What do you think were the chances that the *[Black, Asian]* student

was chosen instead of the White student? *[(0) The Black/Asian student was definitely not chosen – (100) The Black/Asian student was definitely chosen]*

Social Media Pseudo-Behavior

Reactions to Hypothetical Social Media Post: Imagine you were scrolling on *[most used social media platform]* and you saw the following post from someone you know:

Some people won't like to hear this, but affirmative action should be banned in college admissions. Special considerations for African Americans place other people at an unfair disadvantage when the truth is that slavery and racism are things of the past and the rest of us should not be punished when we've done nothing wrong.

How likely would you be to do the following after seeing this post?: *["Like" the post, Comment on the post, Repost the post, Unfriend or unfollow the person who posted it] [Definitely would not, Probably would not, Probably would, Definitely would]*

Placebo

Felon Rights: The Fair Housing Act (FHA) bans discrimination in housing based on race, color, nationality, religion, sex and gender, family status, and disability. Many local activist groups are pushing to make felon status an official protected category under the FHA, like race or gender. How supportive are you of outlawing discrimination based on felon status under the Fair Housing Act? *[Not at all supportive, A little supportive, Moderately supportive, Very supportive, Extremely supportive]*

Media Coverage Moderating Variables

Media Coverage: This week, how much coverage have you noticed of the Supreme Court [case/ruling] on affirmative action in the media (like cable tv, newspaper, radio, social media, etc)? *[None, I saw or heard one thing about this, I saw or heard a few things about this, I saw or heard a lot about this]*

Media Tenor: In your opinion, how has the media covered the Court ruling on affirmative action this week? The media coverage has been... *[Very positive about the ruling, Mostly positive, Both positive and negative, Mostly negative, Very negative about the ruling]*

Conversation Coverage: This week, how much have you heard about the Supreme Court [case/ruling] on affirmative action in your conversations with people you know (in person, on the phone, over text messaging, etc.)? *[It hasn't come up, It's come up once, It's come up a few times, It's come up many times]*

Conversation Tenor: Based on what you've heard, how are people taking the news about the Court ruling on affirmative action? People I've talked to are... *[Very positive about the ruling, Mostly positive, Both positive and negative, Mostly negative, Very negative about the ruling]*

Demographic Variables

Education: What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If you are currently enrolled, please select the highest degree received. *[No schooling completed, 8th grade, Some high school, no diploma, High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED), Some college credit, no degree, Trade/technical/vocational training, Asso-*

ciate degree, Bachelor's degree, Master's degree, Professional degree, Doctorate degree]

College Experience: Have you or anyone close to you ever applied to college? *[Yes, No]*

College Application Experience: In the future do you think you might apply to a college program (either for the first time or returning)? *[Yes, No]*

Children: Do you have children under the age of 18? *[Yes, No]*

Age: What is your age?

Gender: What is your gender? *[Man, Woman, Nonbinary or Agender, My gender is not represented here]*

Political Party Identification: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? *[Strong Republican, Not very strong Republican, Lean Republican, Independent, Lean Democrat, Not very strong Democrat, Strong Democrat, Not sure]*

Personal Ideology: Where would you place yourself on the following scale? *[(0) Extremely Liberal — (100) Extremely Conservative]*

Built-In Treatment

Last fall, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments on two cases involving the right to consider race in making decisions about college admissions, a practice commonly known as affirmative action. One case involved Harvard College, and the other case involved the University of North Carolina. The Court recently ruled on both cases, deciding that colleges and

universities [cannot/can in certain situations/can continue to] use race as a factor in admissions. This ruling is important as it [overturns/upholds] the Court precedent that colleges and universities can consider race, among other factors, in making admissions decisions.

Which of the following best describes the recent Supreme Court affirmative action decision? *[The Court will [restrict/ban] the right to consider race in college admissions; The Court will maintain the right to consider race in college admissions; I do not know]*

B.4 Main Results: Regression Tables

Perceptions of Norms Regarding Affirmative Action, Race, and Racism

Primary Analyses

Table B.3: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' opinions regarding affirmative action

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.046*	−0.068*	−0.030*	−0.030*
	[−0.053; −0.039]	[−0.080; −0.055]	[−0.039; −0.022]	[−0.039; −0.022]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.037*
				[−0.052; −0.022]
R^2	0.567	0.597	0.537	0.567
Adj. R^2	0.396	0.435	0.359	0.397
Num. obs.	12096	4645	7133	11778
RMSE	0.188	0.204	0.175	0.187

*$p < .05$.

Table B.4: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' racial resentment

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.007*	0.018*	0.000	0.000
	[0.001; 0.014]	[0.007; 0.029]	[−0.008; 0.009]	[−0.008; 0.009]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.018*
				[0.004; 0.032]
R^2	0.622	0.632	0.605	0.623
Adj. R^2	0.473	0.485	0.453	0.476
Num. obs.	12089	4643	7128	11771
RMSE	0.178	0.180	0.176	0.178

*$p < .05$.

Table B.5: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' colorblind racism

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.007*	0.021*	−0.002	−0.002
	[0.000; 0.015]	[0.009; 0.032]	[−0.011; 0.007]	[−0.011; 0.007]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.023*
				[0.008; 0.038]
R^2	0.625	0.623	0.620	0.626
Adj. R^2	0.476	0.471	0.473	0.479
Num. obs.	12089	4643	7128	11771
RMSE	0.192	0.197	0.188	0.192

*$p < .05$.

Secondary Analysis - Effects by Wave

Table B.6: Perceptions of Americans' opinions regarding affirmative action, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.004	−0.009	0.012*
	[−0.006; 0.014]	[−0.026; 0.008]	[0.000; 0.023]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.044*	−0.078*	−0.021*
	[−0.053; −0.034]	[−0.095; −0.061]	[−0.032; −0.009]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.044*	−0.066*	−0.029*
	[−0.054; −0.034]	[−0.084; −0.048]	[−0.040; −0.017]
R^2	0.567	0.597	0.538
Adj. R^2	0.396	0.435	0.359
Num. obs.	12096	4645	7133
RMSE	0.188	0.204	0.175

*$p < .05$.

Table B.7: Perceptions of Americans' racial resentment, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.007	−0.000	−0.011
	[−0.016; 0.002]	[−0.015; 0.015]	[−0.023; 0.000]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.008	0.020*	−0.001
	[−0.001; 0.018]	[0.005; 0.035]	[−0.013; 0.011]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.000	0.015*	−0.010
	[−0.010; 0.009]	[0.000; 0.031]	[−0.022; 0.002]
R^2	0.622	0.632	0.606
Adj. R^2	0.473	0.485	0.453
Num. obs.	12089	4643	7128
RMSE	0.178	0.180	0.176

*$p < .05$.

Table B.8: Perceptions of Americans' colorblind racism, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.003	0.004	0.001
	[−0.007; 0.013]	[−0.012; 0.021]	[−0.011; 0.014]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.014*	0.031*	0.003
	[0.005; 0.024]	[0.014; 0.047]	[−0.010; 0.015]
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.003	0.014	−0.006
	[−0.007; 0.013]	[−0.003; 0.031]	[−0.018; 0.007]
R^2	0.625	0.623	0.620
Adj. R^2	0.477	0.471	0.473
Num. obs.	12089	4643	7128
RMSE	0.192	0.197	0.188

*$p < .05$.

Table B.9: Republican vs. Democrat Perceived Support for Affirmative Action Before and After the Ruling

	Pre-Ruling	Post-Ruling
Intercept	0.325*	0.292*
	[0.318; 0.332]	[0.284; 0.299]
Republican	0.021*	−0.026*
	[0.008; 0.034]	[−0.039; −0.013]
R^2	0.002	0.003
Adj. R^2	0.002	0.003
Num. obs.	6362	5416
RMSE	0.246	0.232

*$p < .05$.

Personal Attitudes Regarding Affirmative Action, Race, and Racism

Primary Analyses

Table B.10: The effect of the ruling on personal opinion regarding affirmative action

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.008*	−0.030*	0.032*	0.032*
	[0.002; 0.013]	[−0.037; −0.022]	[0.024; 0.040]	[0.024; 0.040]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.061*
				[−0.072; −0.050]
R^2	0.824	0.737	0.771	0.827
Adj. R^2	0.754	0.632	0.683	0.759
Num. obs.	12092	4645	7130	11775
RMSE	0.149	0.126	0.161	0.148

*$p < .05$.

Table B.11: The effect of the ruling on personal racial resentment

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.000	0.004	−0.003	−0.003
	[−0.005; 0.005]	[−0.006; 0.014]	[−0.008; 0.003]	[−0.008; 0.003]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.006
				[−0.005; 0.017]
R^2	0.883	0.821	0.814	0.884
Adj. R^2	0.837	0.749	0.741	0.839
Num. obs.	12090	4645	7128	11773
RMSE	0.131	0.160	0.107	0.130

*$p < .05$.

Table B.12: The effect of the ruling on personal colorblind racism

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.001	0.010*	−0.006*	−0.006*
	[−0.003; 0.006]	[0.001; 0.020]	[−0.010; −0.001]	[−0.010; −0.001]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.016*
				[0.006; 0.027]
R^2	0.908	0.847	0.831	0.909
Adj. R^2	0.871	0.785	0.766	0.873
Num. obs.	12090	4645	7128	11773
RMSE	0.123	0.154	0.095	0.122

*$p < .05$.

Secondary Analysis - Effects by Wave

Table B.13: Personal opinion regarding affirmative action, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	-0.012^*	-0.004	-0.017^*
	$[-0.020; -0.004]$	$[-0.014; 0.007]$	$[-0.027; -0.006]$
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.001	-0.038^*	0.026^*
	$[-0.007; 0.008]$	$[-0.048; -0.027]$	$[0.015; 0.037]$
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.003	-0.025^*	0.021^*
	$[-0.005; 0.010]$	$[-0.036; -0.015]$	$[0.010; 0.031]$
R^2	0.824	0.738	0.772
Adj. R^2	0.755	0.632	0.683
Num. obs.	12092	4645	7130
RMSE	0.149	0.126	0.160

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.14: Personal racial resentment, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	-0.001	-0.001	0.001
	$[-0.007; 0.006]$	$[-0.014; 0.012]$	$[-0.007; 0.008]$
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.002	0.009	-0.003
	$[-0.005; 0.009]$	$[-0.004; 0.023]$	$[-0.010; 0.004]$
Long-term (w2:w4)	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002
	$[-0.009; 0.004]$	$[-0.017; 0.010]$	$[-0.009; 0.005]$
R^2	0.883	0.821	0.814
Adj. R^2	0.837	0.750	0.741
Num. obs.	12090	4645	7128
RMSE	0.131	0.160	0.107

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.15: Personal colorblind racism, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.004	−0.016*	0.004
	[−0.010; 0.003]	[−0.028; −0.003]	[−0.002; 0.011]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.002	0.009	−0.004
	[−0.004; 0.008]	[−0.004; 0.021]	[−0.010; 0.002]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003
	[−0.009; 0.003]	[−0.017; 0.009]	[−0.010; 0.003]
R^2	0.908	0.847	0.831
Adj. R^2	0.871	0.786	0.766
Num. obs.	12090	4645	7128
RMSE	0.123	0.154	0.095

*$p < .05$.

Simulated Behavioral Reactions to Anti-Affirmative Action Social Media Messaging

Primary Analyses

Table B.16: The effect of the ruling on likelihood of "liking" a racially resentful social media post

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.004	0.012	0.001	0.001
	[−0.005; 0.012]	[−0.005; 0.029]	[−0.007; 0.008]	[−0.007; 0.008]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.011
				[−0.007; 0.030]
R^2	0.849	0.804	0.761	0.849
Adj. R^2	0.751	0.676	0.609	0.751
Num. obs.	8264	3258	4789	8047
RMSE	0.160	0.211	0.114	0.160

*$p < .05$.

Table B.17: The effect of the ruling on likelihood of commenting on a racially resentful social media post

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.013*	−0.009	−0.015*	−0.015*
	[−0.021; −0.005]	[−0.022; 0.005]	[−0.025; −0.005]	[−0.025; −0.005]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.006
				[−0.011; 0.023]
R^2	0.772	0.766	0.773	0.771
Adj. R^2	0.624	0.612	0.630	0.624
Num. obs.	8262	3258	4787	8045
RMSE	0.157	0.168	0.150	0.158

*$p < .05$.

Table B.18: The effect of the ruling on likelihood of reposting a racially resentful social media post

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.001	0.002	−0.001	−0.001
	[−0.007; 0.006]	[−0.012; 0.016]	[−0.008; 0.005]	[−0.008; 0.005]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.003
				[−0.012; 0.018]
R^2	0.770	0.764	0.690	0.769
Adj. R^2	0.621	0.610	0.493	0.620
Num. obs.	8261	3258	4786	8044
RMSE	0.132	0.170	0.099	0.132

*$p < .05$.

Table B.19: The effect of the ruling on likelihood of unfollowing the account that posted a racially resentful social media post

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.020*	−0.024*	−0.018*	−0.018*
	[−0.029; −0.012]	[−0.036; −0.013]	[−0.030; −0.006]	[−0.030; −0.006]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.006
				[−0.023; 0.011]
R^2	0.850	0.727	0.800	0.850
Adj. R^2	0.753	0.547	0.674	0.754
Num. obs.	8261	3258	4786	8044
RMSE	0.167	0.139	0.183	0.167

*$p < .05$.

Table B.20: The effect of the ruling on likelihood of seeing a post like that on social media feed

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.039*	0.059*	0.029*	0.029*
	[0.029; 0.049]	[0.042; 0.076]	[0.017; 0.040]	[0.017; 0.040]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.030*
				[0.010; 0.051]
R^2	0.723	0.699	0.717	0.722
Adj. R^2	0.544	0.503	0.537	0.543
Num. obs.	8259	3258	4784	8042
RMSE	0.190	0.211	0.176	0.191

*$p < .05$.

Table B.21: The effect of the ruling on amount of Anti-AA posts like these observed on social media feeds

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.052*	0.050*	0.055*	0.055*
	[0.043; 0.061]	[0.035; 0.064]	[0.043; 0.067]	[0.043; 0.067]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.005
				[−0.024; 0.013]
R^2	0.664	0.688	0.643	0.663
Adj. R^2	0.447	0.484	0.417	0.447
Num. obs.	8259	3258	4784	8042
RMSE	0.180	0.178	0.180	0.179

*$p < .05$.

Secondary Analysis - Effects by Wave

Table B.22: Likelihood of "liking" a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.008	0.022*	0.001
	[−0.001; 0.017]	[0.002; 0.041]	[−0.007; 0.010]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.001	0.002	0.000
	[−0.011; 0.008]	[−0.018; 0.022]	[−0.008; 0.009]
R^2	0.849	0.805	0.761
Adj. R^2	0.751	0.677	0.609
Num. obs.	8264	3258	4789
RMSE	0.160	0.211	0.114

*$p < .05$.

Table B.23: Likelihood of commenting on a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.005	0.002	−0.009
	[−0.014; 0.004]	[−0.013; 0.018]	[−0.020; 0.003]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.021*	−0.021*	−0.021*
	[−0.031; −0.012]	[−0.036; −0.005]	[−0.033; −0.010]
R^2	0.772	0.767	0.774
Adj. R^2	0.625	0.614	0.630
Num. obs.	8262	3258	4787
RMSE	0.157	0.168	0.150

*$p < .05$.

Table B.24: Likelihood of reposting a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.006	0.014	−0.000
	[−0.002; 0.013]	[−0.001; 0.030]	[−0.008; 0.007]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.007	−0.012	−0.002
	[−0.015; 0.000]	[−0.028; 0.004]	[−0.010; 0.005]
R^2	0.770	0.766	0.690
Adj. R^2	0.622	0.612	0.493
Num. obs.	8261	3258	4786
RMSE	0.132	0.170	0.099

*$p < .05$.

Table B.25: Likelihood of unfollowing the account that posted a racially resentful social media post, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.021*	−0.027*	−0.018*
	[−0.031; −0.011]	[−0.040; −0.014]	[−0.032; −0.004]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.020*	−0.021*	−0.018*
	[−0.030; −0.010]	[−0.035; −0.008]	[−0.032; −0.004]
R^2	0.850	0.727	0.800
Adj. R^2	0.753	0.547	0.673
Num. obs.	8261	3258	4786
RMSE	0.167	0.139	0.183

*$p < .05$.

Attitudes Regarding Diversity and Affirmative Action Broadly

Primary Analyses

Table B.26: Diversity Principle-The effect of the ruling on belief it is important for organizations to be racially/ethnically diverse

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.002	−0.018*	0.015*	0.015*
	[−0.003; 0.007]	[−0.027; −0.009]	[0.008; 0.021]	[0.008; 0.021]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.033*
				[−0.044; −0.022]
R^2	0.875	0.832	0.796	0.876
Adj. R^2	0.826	0.764	0.718	0.828
Num. obs.	12060	4643	7102	11745
RMSE	0.136	0.146	0.129	0.136

*$p < .05$.

Table B.27: Diversity Policy- The effect of the ruling on belief that organizations should consider race/ethnicity in hiring and promotions

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.011*	−0.014*	0.027*	0.027*
	[0.005; 0.017]	[−0.022; −0.005]	[0.019; 0.035]	[0.019; 0.035]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.041*
				[−0.052; −0.029]
R^2	0.801	0.741	0.746	0.804
Adj. R^2	0.723	0.636	0.648	0.727
Num. obs.	12060	4643	7102	11745
RMSE	0.158	0.139	0.167	0.156

*$p < .05$.

Table B.28: Moral Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the moral reasoning for diversity

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.000	−0.014*	0.009*	0.009*
	[−0.006; 0.005]	[−0.025; −0.004]	[0.003; 0.015]	[0.003; 0.015]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.023*
				[−0.035; −0.011]
R^2	0.839	0.792	0.735	0.840
Adj. R^2	0.775	0.709	0.633	0.777
Num. obs.	12055	4642	7098	11740
RMSE	0.146	0.170	0.127	0.146

*$p < .05$.

Table B.29: Instrumental Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the instrumental reasoning for diversity

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.007*	−0.005	0.015*	0.015*
	[0.001; 0.012]	[−0.016; 0.005]	[0.008; 0.022]	[0.008; 0.022]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.021*
				[−0.033; −0.008]
R^2	0.824	0.786	0.731	0.824
Adj. R^2	0.755	0.699	0.628	0.756
Num. obs.	12055	4642	7098	11740
RMSE	0.154	0.170	0.143	0.154

*$p < .05$.

Secondary Analysis - Effects by Wave

Table B.30: Diversity Principle-The effect of the ruling on belief it is important for organizations to be racially/ethnically diverse, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.013*	0.022*	0.009*
	[0.006; 0.020]	[0.011; 0.034]	[0.000; 0.017]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.012*	−0.002	0.021*
	[0.005; 0.019]	[−0.014; 0.010]	[0.012; 0.030]
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.005	−0.013*	0.017*
	[−0.002; 0.013]	[−0.025; −0.000]	[0.008; 0.026]
R^2	0.876	0.832	0.797
Adj. R^2	0.827	0.765	0.718
Num. obs.	12060	4643	7102
RMSE	0.136	0.146	0.129

*$p < .05$.

Table B.31: Diversity Policy- The effect of the ruling on belief that organizations should consider race/ethnicity in hiring and promotions, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.010*	−0.003	−0.013*
	[−0.018; −0.002]	[−0.014; 0.008]	[−0.024; −0.002]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.002	−0.018*	0.016*
	[−0.006; 0.010]	[−0.030; −0.006]	[0.005; 0.027]
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.010*	−0.012*	0.026*
	[0.002; 0.019]	[−0.024; −0.000]	[0.014; 0.037]
R^2	0.801	0.741	0.746
Adj. R^2	0.723	0.636	0.649
Num. obs.	12060	4643	7102
RMSE	0.158	0.139	0.167

*$p < .05$.

Table B.32: Moral Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the moral reasoning for diversity, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.001	0.001	0.002
	[−0.006; 0.009]	[−0.013; 0.015]	[−0.006; 0.011]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.005	−0.023*	0.007
	[−0.012; 0.003]	[−0.037; −0.008]	[−0.001; 0.016]
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.006	−0.004	0.013*
	[−0.002; 0.014]	[−0.018; 0.010]	[0.004; 0.022]
R^2	0.839	0.793	0.735
Adj. R^2	0.775	0.709	0.633
Num. obs.	12055	4642	7098
RMSE	0.146	0.170	0.127

*$p < .05$.

Table B.33: Instrumental Reasoning- The effect of the ruling on agreement with the instrumental reasoning for diversity, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.006	−0.000	−0.008
	[−0.014; 0.002]	[−0.014; 0.014]	[−0.017; 0.002]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.003	−0.011	0.013*
	[−0.005; 0.011]	[−0.025; 0.003]	[0.004; 0.023]
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.005	0.000	0.009
	[−0.003; 0.013]	[−0.014; 0.015]	[−0.000; 0.019]
R^2	0.824	0.786	0.732
Adj. R^2	0.755	0.699	0.629
Num. obs.	12055	4642	7098
RMSE	0.154	0.170	0.143

*$p < .05$.

Impact of Rhetoric Surrounding the *SFFA* Case

Primary Analyses

Table B.34: The effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Black applicant being admitted over a white applicant

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.225	1.655*	−0.636	−0.636
	[−0.304; 0.754]	[0.761; 2.549]	[−1.300; 0.028]	[−1.301; 0.030]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				2.291*
				[1.179; 3.403]
R^2	0.769	0.736	0.739	0.771
Adj. R^2	0.678	0.630	0.639	0.681
Num. obs.	12052	4641	7097	11738
RMSE	14.021	14.544	13.634	13.998

*$p < .05$.

Table B.35: he effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Asian applicant being admitted over a white applicant

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−1.767*	−1.219*	−2.118*	−2.118*
	[−2.273; −1.262]	[−2.121; −0.317]	[−2.727; −1.508]	[−2.728; −1.507]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.899
				[−0.187; 1.985]
R^2	0.683	0.682	0.663	0.685
Adj. R^2	0.559	0.554	0.534	0.561
Num. obs.	12052	4641	7097	11738
RMSE	13.370	14.611	12.511	13.374

*$p < .05$.

Table B.36: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Black people

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.676*	−1.025*	−0.482*	−0.482*
	[−1.031; −0.322]	[−1.658; −0.392]	[−0.905; −0.060]	[−0.906; −0.059]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.543
				[−1.302; 0.217]
R^2	0.876	0.886	0.861	0.878
Adj. R^2	0.828	0.841	0.807	0.830
Num. obs.	12072	4643	7114	11757
RMSE	9.454	10.294	8.761	9.392

*$p < .05$.

Table B.37: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Asian people

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.738*	−0.710*	−0.772*	−0.772*
	[−1.096; −0.380]	[−1.339; −0.082]	[−1.204; −0.339]	[−1.205; −0.338]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.061
				[−0.701; 0.823]
R^2	0.839	0.835	0.843	0.840
Adj. R^2	0.775	0.768	0.783	0.778
Num. obs.	12072	4643	7114	11757
RMSE	9.521	10.198	8.952	9.460

*$p < .05$.

Table B.38: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward White people

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−1.413*	−1.116*	−1.633*	−1.633*
	[−1.779; −1.046]	[−1.686; −0.545]	[−2.111; −1.154]	[−2.112; −1.153]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.517
				[−0.227; 1.261]
R^2	0.844	0.815	0.850	0.847
Adj. R^2	0.783	0.741	0.792	0.786
Num. obs.	12072	4643	7114	11757
RMSE	9.777	9.379	9.878	9.686

*$p < .05$.

Table B.39: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Black people

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.104	0.029	0.204	0.204
	[−0.332; 0.541]	[−0.703; 0.761]	[−0.350; 0.757]	[−0.352; 0.759]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.174
				[−1.091; 0.742]
R^2	0.779	0.772	0.763	0.779
Adj. R^2	0.692	0.680	0.672	0.693
Num. obs.	12074	4643	7115	11758
RMSE	11.578	11.957	11.333	11.581

*$p < .05$.

Table B.40: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Asian people

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.442*	0.093	0.693*	0.693*
	[0.007; 0.877]	[−0.630; 0.816]	[0.139; 1.248]	[0.138; 1.249]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.601
				[−1.510; 0.309]
R^2	0.747	0.743	0.739	0.747
Adj. R^2	0.648	0.640	0.639	0.649
Num. obs.	12074	4643	7115	11758
RMSE	11.506	11.771	11.341	11.511

*$p < .05$.

Table B.41: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward White people

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.215	−0.193	−0.196	−0.196
	[−0.631; 0.201]	[−0.949; 0.564]	[−0.684; 0.292]	[−0.685; 0.293]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.003
				[−0.895; 0.902]
R^2	0.743	0.751	0.723	0.744
Adj. R^2	0.642	0.651	0.617	0.643
Num. obs.	12074	4643	7115	11758
RMSE	11.063	12.348	10.058	11.013

*$p < .05$.

Secondary Analysis - Effects by Wave

Table B.42: The effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Black applicant being admitted over a white applicant, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.662	−0.991	−0.401
	[−1.367; 0.044]	[−2.160; 0.177]	[−1.298; 0.496]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.276	1.561*	−0.406
	[−0.448; 1.000]	[0.320; 2.801]	[−1.302; 0.490]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.517	0.722	−1.295*
	[−1.242; 0.209]	[−0.495; 1.938]	[−2.209; −0.381]
R^2	0.769	0.737	0.739
Adj. R^2	0.678	0.631	0.639
Num. obs.	12052	4641	7097
RMSE	14.016	14.538	13.631

*$p < .05$.

Table B.43: he effect of the ruling on perceived chances of a Asian applicant being admitted over a white applicant, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.446	−1.130	−0.094
	[−1.111; 0.218]	[−2.287; 0.027]	[−0.910; 0.721]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−2.213*	−2.430*	−2.079*
	[−2.899; −1.527]	[−3.666; −1.194]	[−2.894; −1.264]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−1.751*	−1.081	−2.256*
	[−2.450; −1.052]	[−2.304; 0.142]	[−3.113; −1.399]
R^2	0.683	0.682	0.663
Adj. R^2	0.559	0.554	0.534
Num. obs.	12052	4641	7097
RMSE	13.369	14.598	12.513

*$p < .05$.

Table B.44: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Black people, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.092	−0.067	0.152
	[−0.410; 0.594]	[−0.934; 0.799]	[−0.462; 0.766]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.593*	−1.119*	−0.286
	[−1.070; −0.117]	[−1.970; −0.269]	[−0.851; 0.279]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.670*	−0.993*	−0.535
	[−1.135; −0.206]	[−1.795; −0.190]	[−1.100; 0.030]
R^2	0.876	0.886	0.861
Adj. R^2	0.828	0.841	0.807
Num. obs.	12072	4643	7114
RMSE	9.455	10.297	8.762

*$p < .05$.

Table B.45: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Asian people, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.209	0.264	0.162
	[−0.289; 0.708]	[−0.591; 1.120]	[−0.452; 0.776]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.575*	−0.436	−0.691*
	[−1.058; −0.092]	[−1.283; 0.410]	[−1.270; −0.111]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.696*	−0.733	−0.690*
	[−1.181; −0.211]	[−1.568; 0.101]	[−1.285; −0.094]
R^2	0.839	0.835	0.843
Adj. R^2	0.775	0.768	0.783
Num. obs.	12072	4643	7114
RMSE	9.521	10.200	8.953

*$p < .05$.

Table B.46: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward White people, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.272	0.313	0.154
	[−0.237; 0.781]	[−0.477; 1.103]	[−0.514; 0.822]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−1.466*	−1.014*	−1.804*
	[−1.959; −0.973]	[−1.779; −0.249]	[−2.449; −1.159]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−1.072*	−0.899*	−1.290*
	[−1.564; −0.580]	[−1.647; −0.151]	[−1.940; −0.641]
R^2	0.845	0.815	0.850
Adj. R^2	0.783	0.741	0.792
Num. obs.	12072	4643	7114
RMSE	9.777	9.381	9.878

*$p < .05$.

Table B.47: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Black people, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.850*	−1.221*	−0.640
	[−1.449; −0.251]	[−2.221; −0.221]	[−1.400; 0.121]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.598*	−1.197*	−0.155
	[−1.194; −0.003]	[−2.203; −0.191]	[−0.906; 0.597]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.021	0.088	−0.076
	[−0.616; 0.573]	[−0.915; 1.090]	[−0.825; 0.673]
R^2	0.779	0.773	0.763
Adj. R^2	0.692	0.681	0.672
Num. obs.	12074	4643	7115
RMSE	11.571	11.939	11.332

*$p < .05$.

Table B.48: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward Asian people, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	-0.792^*	-0.847	-0.804^*
	$[-1.380; -0.203]$	$[-1.809; 0.116]$	$[-1.563; -0.045]$
Immediate (w2:w3)	-0.235	-0.686	0.047
	$[-0.832; 0.361]$	$[-1.680; 0.308]$	$[-0.712; 0.806]$
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.349	0.056	0.552
	$[-0.244; 0.943]$	$[-0.915; 1.027]$	$[-0.212; 1.316]$
R^2	0.748	0.744	0.740
Adj. R^2	0.648	0.641	0.639
Num. obs.	12074	4643	7115
RMSE	11.500	11.765	11.336

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.49: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of Americans' feelings toward White people, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.000	-0.348	0.298
	$[-0.564; 0.565]$	$[-1.367; 0.672]$	$[-0.365; 0.960]$
Immediate (w2:w3)	-0.220	-0.517	0.070
	$[-0.790; 0.350]$	$[-1.556; 0.523]$	$[-0.594; 0.734]$
Long-term (w2:w4)	-0.210	-0.203	-0.172
	$[-0.777; 0.358]$	$[-1.218; 0.812]$	$[-0.850; 0.505]$
R^2	0.743	0.751	0.723
Adj. R^2	0.642	0.651	0.616
Num. obs.	12074	4643	7115
RMSE	11.064	12.350	10.059

$^*p < .05$.

Exploratory Analysis - Relative Advantage

Table B.50: Relative Advantage of Being Black vs. Asian Pre and Post Ruling

	Pre-Ruling	Post-Ruling	Interaction
Intercept	57.079*	54.987*	57.079*
	[56.604; 57.553]	[54.441; 55.533]	[56.604; 57.553]
Black Advantage	0.195	1.924*	0.195
	[−0.560; 0.951]	[1.062; 2.785]	[−0.560; 0.951]
Ruling			−2.091*
			[−2.815; −1.368]
Black Advantage*Ruling			1.728*
			[0.583; 2.874]
R^2	0.000	0.002	0.002
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.002	0.001
Num. obs.	13016	11088	24104
RMSE	21.977	23.145	22.522

*$p < .05$.

Opinions of the Court

Primary Analyses

Table B.51: The effect of the ruling on trust in the Court

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.007*	0.037*	−0.035*	−0.035*
	[−0.013; −0.001]	[0.028; 0.046]	[−0.042; −0.028]	[−0.042; −0.028]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.072*
				[0.060; 0.083]
R^2	0.830	0.768	0.766	0.834
Adj. R^2	0.763	0.675	0.676	0.769
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106	11749
RMSE	0.148	0.148	0.145	0.146

*$p < .05$.

Table B.52: The effect of the ruling on support for removing judges at odds with the people

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.018*	−0.061*	0.009*	0.009*
	[−0.025; −0.012]	[−0.072; −0.049]	[0.002; 0.017]	[0.002; 0.017]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.070*
				[−0.083; −0.056]
R^2	0.786	0.752	0.772	0.789
Adj. R^2	0.702	0.652	0.684	0.707
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106	11749
RMSE	0.169	0.185	0.157	0.168

*$p < .05$.

Table B.53: The effect of the ruling on belief the Court is too independent

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.037*	−0.019*	0.073*	0.073*
	[0.031; 0.044]	[−0.029; −0.009]	[0.064; 0.083]	[0.064; 0.083]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.092*
				[−0.106; −0.079]
R^2	0.761	0.766	0.708	0.766
Adj. R^2	0.667	0.671	0.596	0.674
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106	11749
RMSE	0.182	0.158	0.193	0.180

*$p < .05$.

Table B.54: The effect of the ruling on belief the Court tries to influence politics

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	0.002	−0.048*	0.034*	0.034*
	[−0.004; 0.007]	[−0.059; −0.038]	[0.028; 0.041]	[0.028; 0.041]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				−0.083*
				[−0.095; −0.070]
R^2	0.800	0.756	0.742	0.805
Adj. R^2	0.721	0.659	0.642	0.729
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106	11749
RMSE	0.154	0.176	0.135	0.152

*$p < .05$.

Table B.55: The effect of the ruling on perceptions of the Court (index)

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Interaction
Decision	−0.007*	0.041*	−0.038*	−0.038*
	[−0.011; −0.003]	[0.035; 0.047]	[−0.042; −0.033]	[−0.043; −0.033]
Republican				
Decision*Republican				0.079*
				[0.071; 0.087]
R^2	0.884	0.859	0.837	0.890
Adj. R^2	0.838	0.802	0.774	0.846
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106	11749
RMSE	0.100	0.102	0.094	0.097

*$p < .05$.

Secondary Analysis - Effects by Wave

Table B.56: The effect of the ruling on support for removing judges at odds with the people, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	0.008	0.011	0.006
	[−0.001; 0.017]	[−0.004; 0.026]	[−0.004; 0.017]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.010*	−0.054*	0.018*
	[−0.019; −0.002]	[−0.070; −0.039]	[0.008; 0.029]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.018*	−0.056*	0.006
	[−0.027; −0.010]	[−0.071; −0.040]	[−0.004; 0.017]
R^2	0.787	0.752	0.772
Adj. R^2	0.702	0.652	0.684
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106
RMSE	0.169	0.185	0.157

*$p < .05$.

Table B.57: The effect of the ruling on belief the Court is too independent, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.017*	−0.000	−0.028*
	[−0.026; −0.008]	[−0.013; 0.013]	[−0.041; −0.016]
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.030*	−0.024*	0.064*
	[0.021; 0.039]	[−0.037; −0.010]	[0.051; 0.076]
Long-term (w2:w4)	0.028*	−0.014*	0.054*
	[0.019; 0.038]	[−0.028; −0.001]	[0.041; 0.067]
R^2	0.762	0.766	0.709
Adj. R^2	0.668	0.671	0.597
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106
RMSE	0.182	0.158	0.193

*$p < .05$.

Table B.58: The effect of the ruling on trust in the Court, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	-0.014^*	-0.010	-0.015^*
	$[-0.021; -0.006]$	$[-0.022; 0.002]$	$[-0.024; -0.006]$
Immediate (w2:w3)	-0.023^*	0.034^*	-0.061^*
	$[-0.031; -0.016]$	$[0.021; 0.046]$	$[-0.071; -0.051]$
Long-term (w2:w4)	-0.003	0.029^*	-0.023^*
	$[-0.011; 0.004]$	$[0.016; 0.042]$	$[-0.033; -0.014]$
R^2	0.830	0.768	0.769
Adj. R^2	0.764	0.675	0.680
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106
RMSE	0.148	0.147	0.144

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.59: The effect of the ruling on belief the Court tries to influence politics, by survey wave

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	-0.003	0.007	-0.009
	$[-0.011; 0.005]$	$[-0.008; 0.021]$	$[-0.018; 0.000]$
Immediate (w2:w3)	0.004	-0.045^*	0.037^*
	$[-0.004; 0.012]$	$[-0.059; -0.030]$	$[0.028; 0.046]$
Long-term (w2:w4)	-0.004	-0.046^*	0.022^*
	$[-0.012; 0.004]$	$[-0.061; -0.031]$	$[0.013; 0.031]$
R^2	0.800	0.756	0.742
Adj. R^2	0.721	0.658	0.643
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106
RMSE	0.154	0.176	0.135

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.60: court_opinion_comp

	Full Sample	Republicans	Democrats
Pre-Ruling (w2:w1)	−0.000	−0.007	0.004
	[−0.005; 0.005]	[−0.015; 0.001]	[−0.002; 0.010]
Immediate (w2:w3)	−0.012*	0.039*	−0.045*
	[−0.017; −0.007]	[0.030; 0.048]	[−0.051; −0.039]
Long-term (w2:w4)	−0.002	0.036*	−0.026*
	[−0.007; 0.003]	[0.027; 0.045]	[−0.033; −0.020]
R^2	0.884	0.859	0.838
Adj. R^2	0.838	0.802	0.776
Num. obs.	12064	4643	7106
RMSE	0.099	0.102	0.093

*$p < .05$.

B.5 Heterogeneous Analyses: Regression Tables

Public Discourse Moderates Effects of the Ruling on Norm Perceptions

Amount of Public Discourse

Table B.61: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage

	Total	No Coverage	Some Coverage	Much Coverage	Interaction
Decision	−0.0456*	−0.0520*	−0.0464*	−0.0361*	−0.0566*
	[−0.0527; −0.0385]	[−0.0742; −0.0298]	[−0.0608; −0.0321]	[−0.0472; −0.0251]	[−0.0807; −0.0325]
Coverage					
Decision*Coverage					0.0038
					[−0.0037; 0.0113]
R^2	0.5668	0.5014	0.6712	0.5645	0.5396
Adj. R^2	0.3956	0.3307	0.3319	0.4170	0.3833
Num. obs.	12096	1456	2927	3926	10961
RMSE	0.1881	0.2147	0.1950	0.1759	0.1867

*$p < .05$.

Table B.62: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage, by PID

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-0.0566^{*}	-0.0290	-0.0672^{*}
	$[-0.0807; -0.0325]$	$[-0.0660; 0.0079]$	$[-0.0986; -0.0357]$
Coverage			
Decision*Coverage	0.0038	-0.0142^{*}	0.0116^{*}
	$[-0.0037; 0.0113]$	$[-0.0264; -0.0021]$	$[0.0021; 0.0212]$
R^2	0.5396	0.5683	0.5157
Adj. R^2	0.3833	0.4212	0.3515
Num. obs.	10961	4270	6691
RMSE	0.1867	0.2033	0.1746

$^{*}p < .05$.

Table B.63: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived coverage in conversations with others

	Total	No Coverage	Some Coverage	Much Coverage	Interaction
Decision	−0.0456*	−0.0610*	−0.0423*	−0.0345	−0.0733*
	[−0.0527; −0.0385]	[−0.0715; −0.0505]	[−0.0563; −0.0283]	[−0.0715; 0.0024]	[−0.0894; −0.0572]
Coverage					
Decision*Coverage					0.0145*
					[0.0071; 0.0220]
R^2	0.5668	0.5233	0.6950	0.5484	0.5404
Adj. R^2	0.3956	0.3617	0.3797	0.3948	0.3844
Num. obs.	12096	5125	2820	470	10957
RMSE	0.1881	0.1911	0.1860	0.2024	0.1865

*$p < .05$.

Table B.64: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived conversation coverage, by PID

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-0.0733^{*}	-0.0796^{*}	-0.0626^{*}
	$[-0.0894; -0.0572]$	$[-0.1066; -0.0526]$	$[-0.0824; -0.0427]$
Coverage			
Decision*Coverage	0.0145^{*}	0.0066	0.0157^{*}
	$[0.0071; 0.0220]$	$[-0.0069; 0.0201]$	$[0.0067; 0.0247]$
R^2	0.5404	0.5677	0.5164
Adj. R^2	0.3844	0.4204	0.3524
Num. obs.	10957	4270	6687
RMSE	0.1865	0.2034	0.1745

$^{*}p < .05$.

Table B.65: The effect of the ruling on attitudes regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage

	Total	No Coverage	Some Coverage	Much Coverage	Interaction
Decision	0.0078*	−0.0106	−0.0004	0.0323*	−0.0385*
	[0.0021; 0.0134]	[−0.0280; 0.0068]	[−0.0118; 0.0110]	[0.0231; 0.0415]	[−0.0576; −0.0195]
Coverage					
Decision*Coverage					0.0156*
					[0.0096; 0.0216]
R^2	0.8240	0.6878	0.8565	0.8459	0.8180
Adj. R^2	0.7544	0.5808	0.7083	0.7937	0.7562
Num. obs.	12092	1455	2927	3926	10958
RMSE	0.1493	0.1678	0.1547	0.1467	0.1488

*$p < .05$.

Table B.66: The effect of the ruling on attitude regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media coverage, by PID

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
(Intercept)	0.1546*	0.1735*	0.2453*
	[0.1323; 0.1770]	[0.1477; 0.1993]	[0.2131; 0.2774]
Decision	−0.0385*	−0.0371*	−0.0184
	[−0.0705; −0.0065]	[−0.0719; −0.0023]	[−0.0644; 0.0275]
Coverage	0.0526*	−0.0159*	0.0579*
	[0.0452; 0.0600]	[−0.0244; −0.0074]	[0.0480; 0.0679]
Decision*Coverage	0.0156*	0.0023	0.0160*
	[0.0048; 0.0263]	[−0.0093; 0.0139]	[0.0018; 0.0303]
R^2	0.0406	0.0114	0.0512
Adj. R^2	0.0403	0.0107	0.0508
Num. obs.	10958	4269	6689
RMSE	0.2952	0.2028	0.2769

*$p < .05$.

Table B.67: The effect of the ruling on attitudes regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived coverage in conversations with others

	Total	No Coverage	Some Coverage	Much Coverage	Interaction
Decision	0.0078*	−0.0060	0.0192*	0.0570*	−0.0198*
	[0.0021; 0.0134]	[−0.0142; 0.0022]	[0.0078; 0.0307]	[0.0277; 0.0862]	[−0.0325; −0.0071]
Coverage					
Decision*Coverage					0.0143*
					[0.0083; 0.0203]
R^2	0.8240	0.7829	0.8771	0.8455	0.8178
Adj. R^2	0.7544	0.7093	0.7499	0.7929	0.7560
Num. obs.	12092	5122	2820	470	10954
RMSE	0.1493	0.1495	0.1528	0.1610	0.1489

*$p < .05$.

Table B.68: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived conversation coverage, by PID

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
(Intercept)	0.6699*	0.3051*	0.6218*
	[0.6473; 0.6925]	[0.2528; 0.3574]	[0.5918; 0.6518]
Decision	0.1097*	0.0009	0.1193*
	[0.0779; 0.1416]	[−0.0728; 0.0745]	[0.0771; 0.1616]
Coverage	−0.1193*	−0.0471*	−0.0738*
	[−0.1266; −0.1120]	[−0.0598; −0.0343]	[−0.0870; −0.0606]
Decision*Coverage	−0.0339*	−0.0081	−0.0356*
	[−0.0441; −0.0237]	[−0.0259; 0.0097]	[−0.0543; −0.0170]
R^2	0.2823	0.0577	0.1077
Adj. R^2	0.2820	0.0563	0.1071
Num. obs.	5981	2025	3956
RMSE	0.2651	0.2095	0.2648

*$p < .05$.

Tenor of Public Discourse

Table B.69: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media tenor

	Total	Negative Tenor	Mixed Tenor	Positive Tenor	Interaction
Decision	-0.046^*	-0.031^*	-0.058^*	-0.071^*	-0.003
	$[-0.053; -0.039]$	$[-0.041; -0.021]$	$[-0.069; -0.047]$	$[-0.114; -0.029]$	$[-0.030; 0.024]$
Tenor					
Decision*Tenor					-0.017^*
					$[-0.028; -0.006]$
R^2	0.567	0.543	0.529	0.611	0.546
Adj. R^2	0.396	0.388	0.369	0.476	0.393
Num. obs.	12096	4966	4362	452	9570
RMSE	0.188	0.177	0.184	0.227	0.182

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.70: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived media tenor, by PID

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	−0.0034	−0.0559*	0.0290
	[−0.0303; 0.0235]	[−0.0972; −0.0147]	[−0.0064; 0.0644]
Tenor			
Decision*Tenor	−0.0170*	−0.0068	−0.0238*
	[−0.0277; −0.0062]	[−0.0228; 0.0093]	[−0.0381; −0.0095]
R^2	0.5465	0.5849	0.5159
Adj. R^2	0.3926	0.4437	0.3518
Num. obs.	9570	3507	6063
RMSE	0.1824	0.1979	0.1721

*$p < .05$.

Table B.71: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived convo tenor

	Total	Negative Tenor	Mixed Tenor	Positive Tenor	Interaction
Decision	-0.046^*	0.000	-0.032^*	-0.092^*	0.052^*
	$[-0.053; -0.039]$	$[-0.012; 0.012]$	$[-0.053; -0.012]$	$[-0.110; -0.074]$	$[0.030; 0.074]$
Tenor					
Decision*Tenor					-0.032^*
					$[-0.039; -0.024]$
R^2	0.567	0.528	0.504	0.618	0.558
Adj. R^2	0.396	0.366	0.335	0.488	0.408
Num. obs.	12096	2975	1427	1705	5981
RMSE	0.188	0.171	0.193	0.192	0.182

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.72: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, moderated by perceived conversation tenor, by PID

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.0521*	0.1294*	0.0388*
	[0.0300; 0.0742]	[0.0542; 0.2047]	[0.0111; 0.0664]
Tenor			
Decision*Tenor	−0.0315*	−0.0507*	−0.0267*
	[−0.0393; −0.0237]	[−0.0699; −0.0316]	[−0.0389; −0.0145]
R^2	0.5583	0.5978	0.5261
Adj. R^2	0.4078	0.4601	0.3646
Num. obs.	5981	2025	3956
RMSE	0.1822	0.1998	0.1723

*$p < .05$.

B.6 Robustness Analyses: Regression Tables

Robustness Models

For robustness we estimate a model that includes a lagged outcome:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta_1 + \rho Y_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{it}$$

For robustness we estimate a non-preregistered model that includes a wave indicator:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta_1 + D_{it}\beta_2 + \epsilon_{it}$$

Where:

- Y_{it} is the dependent variable observed for individual i at wave t.
- X is a binary treatment indicator, where $X = 1$ refers to the waves after the treatment and $X = 0$ refers to the waves before the treatment.
- D is the data collection wave.
- α_i are time-invariant individual effects.
- ϵ_{it} is the error term.

Lagged DV Analyses

Table B.73: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding affirmative action, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-0.049^*	-0.079^*	-0.029^*
	$[-0.058; -0.041]$	$[-0.094; -0.064]$	$[-0.039; -0.018]$
Lagged DV	-0.059^*	-0.066^*	-0.052^*
	$[-0.067; -0.051]$	$[-0.080; -0.053]$	$[-0.062; -0.042]$
R^2	0.653	0.677	0.638
Adj. R^2	0.458	0.491	0.437
Num. obs.	8669	3314	5144
RMSE	0.174	0.189	0.161

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.74: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding racial resentment, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.007	0.022^*	-0.003
	$[-0.001; 0.015]$	$[0.009; 0.035]$	$[-0.013; 0.008]$
Lagged DV	-0.069^*	-0.072^*	-0.066^*
	$[-0.077; -0.061]$	$[-0.084; -0.060]$	$[-0.077; -0.056]$
R^2	0.705	0.725	0.681
Adj. R^2	0.538	0.567	0.504
Num. obs.	8666	3312	5143
RMSE	0.167	0.165	0.168

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.75: The effect of the ruling on norm perceptions regarding colorblind racism, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.010*	0.027*	−0.002
	[0.001; 0.018]	[0.012; 0.041]	[−0.013; 0.009]
Lagged DV	−0.072*	−0.075*	−0.070*
	[−0.080; −0.065]	[−0.088; −0.063]	[−0.080; −0.061]
R^2	0.718	0.714	0.714
Adj. R^2	0.559	0.549	0.555
Num. obs.	8666	3312	5143
RMSE	0.176	0.181	0.172

*$p < .05$.

Table B.76: The effect of the ruling on support for affirmative action, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.004	−0.032*	0.027*
	[−0.003; 0.011]	[−0.041; −0.023]	[0.017; 0.037]
Lagged DV	−0.036*	−0.047*	−0.037*
	[−0.046; −0.026]	[−0.068; −0.027]	[−0.049; −0.025]
R^2	0.863	0.793	0.813
Adj. R^2	0.786	0.674	0.710
Num. obs.	8666	3314	5141
RMSE	0.140	0.115	0.153

*$p < .05$.

Table B.77: The effect of the ruling on racial resentment, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.000	0.005	−0.003
	[−0.006; 0.006]	[−0.007; 0.017]	[−0.009; 0.003]
Lagged DV	−0.067*	−0.066*	−0.066*
	[−0.077; −0.058]	[−0.080; −0.053]	[−0.081; −0.052]
R^2	0.911	0.862	0.859
Adj. R^2	0.861	0.782	0.781
Num. obs.	8666	3314	5141
RMSE	0.121	0.150	0.098

*$p < .05$.

Table B.78: The effect of the ruling on colorblind racism, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.001	0.008	−0.006*
	[−0.005; 0.006]	[−0.003; 0.019]	[−0.011; −0.000]
Lagged DV	−0.061*	−0.063*	−0.063*
	[−0.073; −0.050]	[−0.078; −0.047]	[−0.080; −0.045]
R^2	0.933	0.886	0.878
Adj. R^2	0.896	0.821	0.809
Num. obs.	8666	3314	5141
RMSE	0.111	0.142	0.085

*$p < .05$.

Table B.79: The effect of the ruling on support for diversity in principle, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.006*	−0.014*	0.019*
	[0.000; 0.013]	[−0.024; −0.003]	[0.011; 0.027]
Lagged DV	−0.065*	−0.065*	−0.065*
	[−0.074; −0.055]	[−0.079; −0.050]	[−0.078; −0.052]
R^2	0.901	0.865	0.833
Adj. R^2	0.844	0.788	0.740
Num. obs.	8651	3312	5129
RMSE	0.131	0.138	0.125

*$p < .05$.

Table B.80: The effect of the ruling on support for diversity policy, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.009*	−0.016*	0.025*
	[0.002; 0.016]	[−0.026; −0.006]	[0.015; 0.035]
Lagged DV	−0.058*	−0.069*	−0.056*
	[−0.068; −0.049]	[−0.088; −0.051]	[−0.067; −0.044]
R^2	0.846	0.784	0.804
Adj. R^2	0.759	0.660	0.696
Num. obs.	8651	3312	5129
RMSE	0.147	0.132	0.154

*$p < .05$.

Table B.81: The effect of the ruling on moral rationale for diversity, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.000	−0.016*	0.010*
	[−0.007; 0.007]	[−0.028; −0.003]	[0.003; 0.018]
Lagged DV	−0.064*	−0.064*	−0.064*
	[−0.074; −0.055]	[−0.077; −0.051]	[−0.077; −0.052]
R^2	0.874	0.834	0.794
Adj. R^2	0.804	0.739	0.679
Num. obs.	8650	3311	5129
RMSE	0.137	0.161	0.119

*$p < .05$.

Table B.82: The effect of the ruling on instrumental rationale for diversity, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.006	−0.006	0.016*
	[−0.001; 0.013]	[−0.018; 0.006]	[0.008; 0.024]
Lagged DV	−0.064*	−0.060*	−0.069*
	[−0.073; −0.056]	[−0.073; −0.047]	[−0.080; −0.058]
R^2	0.866	0.834	0.791
Adj. R^2	0.790	0.738	0.674
Num. obs.	8650	3311	5129
RMSE	0.143	0.159	0.132

*$p < .05$.

Table B.83: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Black people, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	−0.673*	−1.070*	−0.442
	[−1.079; −0.267]	[−1.806; −0.335]	[−0.918; 0.033]
Lagged DV	−0.204*	−0.163*	−0.235*
	[−0.246; −0.162]	[−0.228; −0.097]	[−0.289; −0.181]
R^2	0.914	0.920	0.906
Adj. R^2	0.866	0.873	0.854
Num. obs.	8659	3312	5137
RMSE	8.310	9.152	7.601

*$p < .05$.

Table B.84: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward Asian people, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-0.741^*	-0.620	-0.812^*
	$[-1.158; -0.323]$	$[-1.361; 0.121]$	$[-1.312; -0.312]$
Lagged DV	-0.244^*	-0.223^*	-0.252^*
	$[-0.286; -0.202]$	$[-0.290; -0.156]$	$[-0.306; -0.199]$
R^2	0.881	0.877	0.887
Adj. R^2	0.815	0.805	0.824
Num. obs.	8659	3312	5137
RMSE	8.559	9.243	7.999

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.85: The effect of the ruling on feelings toward White people, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-1.437^*	-1.018^*	-1.769^*
	$[-1.868; -1.007]$	$[-1.702; -0.334]$	$[-2.321; -1.218]$
Lagged DV	-0.204^*	-0.117^*	-0.255^*
	$[-0.248; -0.160]$	$[-0.193; -0.041]$	$[-0.310; -0.201]$
R^2	0.886	0.864	0.892
Adj. R^2	0.822	0.786	0.832
Num. obs.	8659	3312	5137
RMSE	8.844	8.443	8.896

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.86: The effect of the ruling on perceived American feelings toward Black people, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-0.143	-0.372	0.036
	$[-0.653; 0.367]$	$[-1.236; 0.493]$	$[-0.606; 0.677]$
Lagged DV	-0.277^*	-0.300^*	-0.261^*
	$[-0.312; -0.243]$	$[-0.358; -0.241]$	$[-0.304; -0.218]$
R^2	0.837	0.832	0.826
Adj. R^2	0.745	0.735	0.729
Num. obs.	8661	3312	5138
RMSE	10.528	10.865	10.323

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.87: The effect of the ruling on perceived American feelings toward Asian people, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.249	−0.190	0.532
	[−0.263; 0.761]	[−1.053; 0.673]	[−0.114; 1.179]
Lagged DV	−0.280*	−0.253*	−0.297*
	[−0.313; −0.248]	[−0.307; −0.199]	[−0.337; −0.256]
R^2	0.807	0.802	0.803
Adj. R^2	0.698	0.687	0.693
Num. obs.	8661	3312	5138
RMSE	10.609	10.915	10.421

*$p < .05$.

Table B.88: The effect of the ruling on perceived American feelings toward White people, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	−0.226	−0.319	−0.115
	[−0.714; 0.262]	[−1.214; 0.576]	[−0.684; 0.453]
Lagged DV	−0.277*	−0.254*	−0.294*
	[−0.316; −0.238]	[−0.314; −0.193]	[−0.344; −0.244]
R^2	0.801	0.806	0.789
Adj. R^2	0.689	0.694	0.672
Num. obs.	8661	3312	5138
RMSE	10.178	11.334	9.289

*$p < .05$.

Table B.89: The effect of the ruling on perceived Black advantage in admissions, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.047	1.567*	−0.824*
	[−0.588; 0.683]	[0.499; 2.635]	[−1.624; −0.025]
Lagged DV	−0.250*	−0.289*	−0.214*
	[−0.288; −0.211]	[−0.354; −0.224]	[−0.260; −0.168]
R^2	0.821	0.794	0.799
Adj. R^2	0.720	0.675	0.687
Num. obs.	8647	3310	5128
RMSE	13.190	13.640	12.808

*$p < .05$.

Table B.90: The effect of the ruling on perceived Asian advantage in admissions, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-2.171^*	-1.874^*	-2.354^*
	$[-2.784; -1.559]$	$[-2.964; -0.785]$	$[-3.096; -1.612]$
Lagged DV	-0.233^*	-0.268^*	-0.194^*
	$[-0.271; -0.196]$	$[-0.327; -0.209]$	$[-0.243; -0.144]$
R^2	0.749	0.748	0.733
Adj. R^2	0.608	0.603	0.585
Num. obs.	8647	3310	5128
RMSE	12.742	13.865	11.970

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.91: The effect of the ruling on trust in the Court, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-0.013^*	0.038^*	-0.047^*
	$[-0.020; -0.006]$	$[0.027; 0.049]$	$[-0.056; -0.038]$
Lagged DV	-0.061^*	-0.056^*	-0.068^*
	$[-0.070; -0.051]$	$[-0.072; -0.040]$	$[-0.080; -0.057]$
R^2	0.860	0.801	0.809
Adj. R^2	0.782	0.686	0.702
Num. obs.	8656	3312	5134
RMSE	0.143	0.143	0.139

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.92: The effect of the ruling on perception the Court is too independent, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.035^*	-0.022^*	0.072^*
	$[0.027; 0.044]$	$[-0.034; -0.010]$	$[0.060; 0.083]$
Lagged DV	-0.048^*	-0.061^*	-0.050^*
	$[-0.057; -0.039]$	$[-0.076; -0.045]$	$[-0.061; -0.038]$
R^2	0.818	0.812	0.775
Adj. R^2	0.715	0.703	0.649
Num. obs.	8656	3312	5134
RMSE	0.171	0.150	0.180

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.93: The effect of the ruling on perception the Court tries to influence politics, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	0.001	-0.050^*	0.036^*
	$[-0.006; 0.009]$	$[-0.064; -0.037]$	$[0.028; 0.044]$
Lagged DV	-0.051^*	-0.049^*	-0.061^*
	$[-0.060; -0.041]$	$[-0.064; -0.034]$	$[-0.072; -0.049]$
R^2	0.843	0.800	0.791
Adj. R^2	0.754	0.684	0.676
Num. obs.	8656	3312	5134
RMSE	0.146	0.169	0.126

$^*p < .05$.

Table B.94: The effect of the ruling on support for removing judges, lagged DV robustness analysis

	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Decision	-0.017^*	-0.063^*	0.013^*
	$[-0.025; -0.009]$	$[-0.077; -0.050]$	$[0.004; 0.022]$
Lagged DV	-0.051^*	-0.055^*	-0.051^*
	$[-0.059; -0.042]$	$[-0.068; -0.042]$	$[-0.062; -0.040]$
R^2	0.838	0.808	0.825
Adj. R^2	0.746	0.698	0.728
Num. obs.	8656	3312	5134
RMSE	0.158	0.171	0.147

$^*p < .05$.

B.7 Exploratory Analyses: Regression Tables

B.7.1 Built In Experiment

To assess the effect of the experimental treatment on outcomes among those unaware of the Court's ruling, we estimate regression models of the form:

$$Y = \alpha + X\beta_1 + \epsilon_{it}$$

$$Y = \alpha + X\beta_1 + pid\beta_2 + woman\beta_3 + age\beta_4 + \epsilon_{it}$$

Sample Descriptive Information

Table B.95: Wave 3 Demographics for Experimental Sample

Variable	NotNA	Mean
age	526	40.737
gender_cat	524	
... Man	209	39.9%
... Nonbinary, Agender, Other	4	0.8%
... Woman	311	59.4%
pid	526	
... Democrat	236	44.9%
... Independent	23	4.4%
... Republican	267	50.8%
college_app_exp	526	
... 0	30	5.7%
... 1	496	94.3%

Binary variables are coded such that 0 = no, 1 = yes

Treatment Effects Among Those Unaware of Ruling

Figure B.1: The effect of learning about the Court ruling on perceptions of norms regarding affirmative action




Table B.96: Effects of Built-In Treatment on Perceived Support for Affirmative Action

	Immediate	Immediate	Delayed	Delayed
(Intercept)	0.359*	0.108	0.334*	0.152
	[0.324; 0.393]	[−0.066; 0.282]	[0.298; 0.370]	[−0.004; 0.308]
exp_treated	−0.051*	−0.053*	−0.028	−0.035
	[−0.099; −0.002]	[−0.098; −0.008]	[−0.078; 0.022]	[−0.080; 0.010]
base_aa_norm		0.096*		0.089*
		[0.074; 0.119]		[0.065; 0.113]
pidIndependent		−0.032		−0.076
		[−0.153; 0.089]		[−0.186; 0.034]
pidRepublican		0.044		0.069
		[−0.029; 0.117]		[−0.017; 0.156]
college_app_exp1		0.099		0.121*
		[−0.016; 0.214]		[0.031; 0.210]
age		−0.001		−0.001
		[−0.003; 0.001]		[−0.002; 0.001]
gender_catNonbinary, Agender, Other		−0.041		−0.187*
		[−0.296; 0.214]		[−0.335; −0.039]
gender_catWoman		−0.016		−0.091*
		[−0.063; 0.030]		[−0.141; −0.042]
children		−0.014		−0.036
		[−0.060; 0.033]		[−0.084; 0.012]
personal_ideology_1		−0.001		−0.001
		[−0.002; 0.000]		[−0.002; 0.001]
R^2	0.008	0.179	0.003	0.213
Adj. R^2	0.006	0.163	0.000	0.196
Num. obs.	524	523	474	473
RMSE	0.284	0.261	0.277	0.248

*$p < .05$.

Chapter C

Supplementary Information for Study 3

C.1 Treatment Materials

Figure C.1: Treatment and Control Condition Materials



C.2 Sample Descriptive Information

Table C.1: Covariate Balance Across Conditions (Table-Level)

	N	Range	All Tables	Control	Treatment	Difference	P-value
Guests	2745	1-25	2.58	2.65	2.49	-0.16	0.14
Weekend	2746	0-1	0.39	0.42	0.36	-0.06	$< 0.05^*$

Table C.2: Estimated Cardholder Race Across Conditions (Transaction-Level)

	N	Range	All Tables	Control	Treatment	Difference	P-value
Card Payment	3609	0-1	0.90	0.91	0.90	0.00	0.66
Valid Name	3609	0-1	0.42	0.41	0.44	0.03	0.12
Likely White	1520	0-1	0.76	0.76	0.75	-0.01	0.56
Likely Black	1520	0-1	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.98
Likely Hispanic	1520	0-1	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.01	0.57

C.3 Main Results: Regression Tables

C.3.1 Table-Level Analyses

Table C.3: Treatment Effect on Total Bill Amount, Table-Level Data

	Day Cluster	Day Cluster	No Cluster	No Cluster
(Intercept)	78.651*	65.040*	78.651*	65.040*
	[75.318; 81.984]	[23.601; 106.479]	[75.888; 81.414]	[25.420; 104.660]
treatment	−0.949	−0.153	−0.949	−0.153
	[−5.563; 3.664]	[−4.461; 4.155]	[−4.819; 2.920]	[−3.722; 3.416]
weekend		−0.839		−0.839
		[−5.328; 3.650]		[−4.565; 2.887]
guests		5.262		5.262
		[−37.147; 47.671]		[−10.620; 21.145]
R^2	0.000	0.096	0.000	0.096
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.095	−0.000	0.095
Num. obs.	2746	2746	2746	2746
RMSE	52.101	49.557	52.101	49.557
N Clusters	141	141		

*$p < .05$.

Table C.4: Treatment Effect on Total Tip Amount, Table-Level Data

	Day Cluster	Day Cluster	No Cluster	No Cluster
(Intercept)	4.034*	3.225*	4.034*	3.225*
	[3.649; 4.418]	[1.809; 4.642]	[3.700; 4.367]	[1.935; 4.516]
treatment	0.079	0.152	0.079	0.152
	[−0.538; 0.695]	[−0.454; 0.757]	[−0.389; 0.547]	[−0.312; 0.616]
weekend		0.633*		0.633*
		[0.035; 1.232]		[0.157; 1.109]
guests		0.204		0.204
		[−1.096; 1.504]		[−0.293; 0.702]
R^2	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.011	−0.000	0.011
Num. obs.	2746	2746	2746	2746
RMSE	6.299	6.262	6.299	6.262
N Clusters	141	141		

*$p < .05$.

Table C.5: Treatment Effect on Total Dining Duration, Table-Level Data

	Day Cluster	Day Cluster	No Cluster	No Cluster
(Intercept)	53.270*	51.694*	53.270*	51.694*
	[50.670; 55.869]	[43.807; 59.580]	[51.391; 55.148]	[44.819; 58.568]
treatment	1.559	1.577	1.559	1.577
	[−2.598; 5.717]	[−2.553; 5.706]	[−1.347; 4.465]	[−1.286; 4.439]
weekend		−2.106		−2.106
		[−6.377; 2.165]		[−4.948; 0.736]
guests		0.928		0.928
		[−6.168; 8.024]		[−1.678; 3.534]
R^2	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.007
Adj. R^2	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.006
Num. obs.	2744	2744	2744	2744
RMSE	38.353	38.247	38.353	38.247
N Clusters	141	141		

*$p < .05$.

C.3.2 Transaction-Level Analyses

Table C.6: Treatment Effect on Total Bill Amount, Transaction-Level Data

	Day Cluster	Day Cluster	Table Cluster	Table Cluster
(Intercept)	59.248*	52.574*	59.248*	52.574*
	[57.266; 61.231]	[36.229; 68.920]	[57.127; 61.370]	[36.483; 68.665]
treatment	0.037	0.044	0.037	0.044
	[−3.236; 3.311]	[−3.273; 3.361]	[−2.970; 3.044]	[−3.066; 3.154]
weekend		1.637		1.637
		[−1.274; 4.547]		[−1.424; 4.697]
guest_count_r		2.392		2.392
		[−10.980; 15.765]		[−10.062; 14.847]
R^2	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.031
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.030	−0.000	0.030
Num. obs.	3609	3233	3609	3233
RMSE	40.407	39.448	40.407	39.448
N Clusters	141	141	2742	2516

*$p < .05$.

Table C.7: Treatment Effect on Total Tip Amount, Transaction-Level Data

	Day Cluster	Day Cluster	Table Cluster	Table Cluster
(Intercept)	3.054*	3.006*	3.054*	3.006*
	[2.735; 3.374]	[2.544; 3.469]	[2.795; 3.314]	[2.622; 3.391]
treatment	0.090	0.138	0.090	0.138
	[−0.368; 0.549]	[−0.354; 0.629]	[−0.276; 0.456]	[−0.260; 0.535]
weekend		0.455		0.455*
		[−0.040; 0.949]		[0.047; 0.862]
guest_count_r		0.068		0.068
		[−0.106; 0.242]		[−0.097; 0.233]
R^2	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.003
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.002	−0.000	0.002
Num. obs.	3609	3233	3609	3233
RMSE	5.313	5.469	5.313	5.469
N Clusters	141	141	2742	2516

*$p < .05$.

Table C.8: Treatment Effect on Dining Duration, Transaction-Level Data

	Day Cluster	Day Cluster	Table Cluster	Table Cluster
(Intercept)	57.619*	51.396*	57.619*	51.396*
	[54.261; 60.978]	[39.648; 63.143]	[55.173; 60.066]	[40.515; 62.277]
treatment	1.228	1.406	1.228	1.406
	[−4.246; 6.702]	[−3.499; 6.311]	[−2.613; 5.068]	[−2.078; 4.889]
weekend		−1.914		−1.914
		[−6.799; 2.971]		[−5.334; 1.507]
guest_count_r		1.493		1.493
		[−7.312; 10.297]		[−6.757; 9.742]
R^2	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.017
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.016	−0.000	0.016
Num. obs.	3606	3231	3606	3231
RMSE	39.434	34.175	39.434	34.175
N Clusters	141	141	2740	2514

*$p < .05$.

C.3.3 QR Code Scans

GEE Model

Table C.9: Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR Code (Combined)

	Estimate	Std.err	Wald	Pr(>|W|)
(Intercept)	-2.9448	0.1102	714.72	0.0000***
treatment	0.2957	0.1478	4.01	0.0453*

Table C.10: Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR code to leave Google Review

	Estimate	Std.err	Wald	Pr(>|W|)
(Intercept)	-3.2409	0.1109	853.93	0.0000***
treatment	0.1020	0.1664	0.38	0.5398

Table C.11: Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR code to follow the business on Instagram

	Estimate	Std.err	Wald	Pr(>|W|)
(Intercept)	-3.5549	0.1067	1109.12	0.0000***
treatment	0.2568	0.1618	2.52	0.1124

Chi-Squared Model

Table C.12: Treatment Effect on Odds of Scanning QR Codes - Chi-Squared

	X-squared	Pr(>|W|)
Combined	12.213	0.000***
Google	6.0695	0.01*
Instagram	5.4661	0.02*

C.4 Heterogeneous Analyses: Regression Tables

Table C.13: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Total Bill Amount, Clustered by Day

	Likely White	Likely Non-White	Interaction
(Intercept)	66.455*	60.715*	60.715*
	[62.689; 70.220]	[55.037; 66.393]	[55.037; 66.393]
treatment	−5.340	5.586	5.591
	[−11.535; 0.855]	[−1.899; 13.071]	[−1.937; 13.119]
likely_white			5.843
			[−1.159; 12.846]
treatment:likely_white			−11.034*
			[−19.840; −2.228]
R^2	0.003	0.005	0.004
Adj. R^2	0.002	0.002	0.002
Num. obs.	1086	348	1430
RMSE	46.390	39.011	44.764
N Clusters	129	105	133

*$p < .05$.

Table C.14: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Total Tip, Clustered by Day

	Likely White	Likely Non-White	Interaction
(Intercept)	3.852*	3.260*	3.260*
	[3.246; 4.459]	[2.456; 4.064]	[2.456; 4.064]
treatment	−0.189	0.054	0.057
	[−1.016; 0.637]	[−1.144; 1.252]	[−1.149; 1.262]
likely_white			0.599
			[−0.432; 1.629]
treatment:likely_white			−0.252
			[−1.650; 1.146]
R^2	0.000	0.000	0.002
Adj. R^2	−0.001	−0.003	−0.001
Num. obs.	1086	348	1430
RMSE	5.996	4.822	5.741
N Clusters	129	105	133

*$p < .05$.

Table C.15: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Dining Duration, Clustered by Day

	Likely White	Likely Non-White	Interaction
(Intercept)	56.832*	56.896*	56.896*
	[52.727; 60.936]	[51.627; 62.164]	[51.627; 62.164]
treatment	0.505	−0.274	−0.205
	[−6.207; 7.216]	[−7.116; 6.568]	[−7.084; 6.674]
likely_white			−0.019
			[−5.375; 5.336]
treatment:likely_white			0.665
			[−6.445; 7.776]
R^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adj. R^2	−0.001	−0.003	−0.002
Num. obs.	1086	347	1429
RMSE	36.619	32.815	35.783
N Clusters	129	105	133

*$p < .05$.