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Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa

Ledford, Andrew

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Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa

Andrew Kenneth Ledford

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Adviser: Professor Miguel Centeno

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Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa

ABSTRACT

A rebirth of religion is at the core of politics in the Middle East. Contrary to the secularization movement rampant in Europe, for the past 100 years in the Middle East, there has been a growing appetite to incorporate more religion in the state, fueling many activist and militant groups' desires for Islamic political reform. To understand these movements better, an analysis of Islamism was conducted in four parts: (1) a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of conditions present when Shari'a is incorporated into the Constitutions of the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, (2) a comparative historical analysis of two dipoles, Turkey and Iran, examining the historical context in each country with the findings of part 1, (3) a quantitative study of a specific strong Islamist state, namely Iran, to determine how much Islamism affects the functioning of the state's economy, and (4) a comparative historical analysis of Turkey's recent Islamist transformation based on the initial years of the Iranian Islamic Republic. The results of this study show a basic combination of conditions present alongside successful Islamist movements, namely authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, and poor macroeconomic conditions. This study also explores an Islamist movement occurring now in Turkey, one of the region's most secular states, and provides evidence that religion in MENA is not omnipotent, even in a theocracy such as Iran.

Contents

Abstract iii

List of Tables 4

List of Figures 5

Acknowledgements 6

Chapter 1 Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa

1.1 Introduction…… 7
1.2 The Importance of Terminology…….…… 9
1.3 The Early Days of Islam…….…….. 12
1.4 The Founders of Modern Islamism……... 13
1.5 The Seeds of Modernization in Europe……..…… 17
1.6 The Modernization Movement……..…… 19
1.7 The Examination of Islamism……..…… 22

Chapter 2 A FSQCA of Islamist Movements in the Middle East and North Africa

2.1 Introduction…….…… 24
2.1.1 Related Theoretical Work…...…… 27
2.1.2 Hypothesis……..…… 33
2.2 The Conditions Pertinent to Islamism…..…..…… 35
2.2.1 Shari'a Law in the Constitution…….…… 38
2.2.2 Authoritarian Regimes……...…… 42
2.2.3 The Rapid Injection of Modernity ……..……...……..…… 45
2.2.4 The Repression of Islamist Groups …….....…… 48
2.2.5 The Inequality Index …… 53
2.2.6 Unemployment of the Male Labor Force …….…… 56
2.2.7 Rentier State Status ……..……...……..…… 59
2.2.8 European Colonial Rule…… 61
2.2.9 Foreign Interference in Political Affairs……..…….. 62
2.2.10 The Modification of Conditions……..……. 65
2.3 The QCA Methodology…… 66
2.3.1 Calibration of Values…….……..…….…… 67
2.3.2 The Truth Table…… 70
2.3.3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of the Outcome……..… 71
2.3.4 Delineating the Trivial from Non-trivial……...….. 74
2.3.5 Standard Analysis to Determine Minimal Formula……. 75
2.4 Findings and Discussion…..…….…… 78
2.5 Conclusion…… 82

Chapter 3 The Cases of Turkey and Iran: A Historical Comparative Analysis of the conditions for Islamism.

3.1	Background..……	84
3.2	The Case of Turkey…..…….……	89
3.2.1	The Embers of the Ottoman Empire..……	90
3.2.2	The Bonds of Religious Education…….……	92
3.2.3	Social-Economic Impact of Turkish Islamism…..……..	95
3.3	The Iranian Example……..	101
3.3.1	The Iranian Rentier State ……..……	107
3.3.2	Social-Economic Impact on Iranian Islamism…….....	110
3.4	Analysis…….……..……...	114
3.5	Conclusion……	116

Chapter 4 Islamism in Iranian Provincial Resource Distribution.

4.1	Introduction……	122
4.2	Related Work……..……..	124
4.2.1	Contribution and Significance…..……..	128
4.2.2	Iran Budgeting Process……..	129
4.3	Analysis……..……	130
4.3.1	Research Design……..……...	132
4.3.2	Data……	133
4.3.3	Operationalization of Measures……	139
4.3.4	Modeling……	144
4.3.5	Results……..	147
4.4	Conclusion……	150

Chapter 5 Iran's Lesson for Turkey on Islamism

5.1	Introduction……...…..……	153
	5.1.1 Theories of Islamist Movements…….…..	156
	5.1.2 Research Data……	159
5.2	In the Wake of the Islamic Revolution…….……..	161
	5.2.1 The Transformation of Education in Iran……	162
	5.2.2 The Judicial System……...	164
	5.2.3 The Military in Iran and Creation of the IRGC……	166
5.3	Turkey's Slow Burn Transformation……..	169
	5.3.1 The AKP Investment in Education…..……	170
	5.3.2 Minarets are Bayonets……..……	176
	5.3.3 Vanguard of the Republic……	181
5.4	Analysis……..…….……	185
5.5	Conclusion……..…….	189

Appendices **192**

References **214**

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Independent and dependent variables for the QCA …… … 37

Table 2.2 Shari'a Law in the Constitution……..... 40

Table 2.3 Polity IV Data of Autocracy……... 43

Table 2.4 Rapidity of Injection of Modernity (Growth of GDP per capita)…….. 47

Table 2.5 State Repression from Political Terror Scale…… 51

Table 2.6 GINI Index for Countries in the Middle East and North Africa…… 55

Table 2.7 Standard Deviation of EHII Data……... 56

Table 2.8 Unemployment Percentage of Male Labor Force in MENA…… 57

Table 2.9 Percentage of Oil/Gas Export contribution to GDP……..... 60

Table 2.10 Foreign Intervention……..…….. 64

Table 2.11 Raw and Calibrated Values of Authoritarianism…… 69

Table 2.12 Calibration Criteria for Conditions……. 69

Table 2.13 QCA Truth Table of Calibrated Data…….…… 71

Table 2.14 Analysis of Necessary Conditions……..... 74

Table 2.15 Analysis of Necessary Conditions For NEGATED conditions…… 74

Table 2.16 Fuzzy Set Truth Table…… 75

Table 2.17 Standard Analysis with Intermediate Solution of Truth Table……... 76

Table 4.1 Measures Available…….. 133

Table 4.2 Long Format of Data…… 143

Table 4.3 Variation in methods used in the four models…… 147

Table 4.4 Coefficient Estimates of Per Capita Provincial Budgets, modeled with Random Effects……..….. 148

Table 4.5 Modeling Effects and P-values for Allegiance……. 149

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Polity IV Project Regime Values, 1946-2013..... 45

Figure 2.2 Graphical Representation of the GINI Index……..... 54

Figure 2.3 Regional Unemployment Rates for 2014 and 2015…… 58

Figure 2.4 Colonialism in MENA and Years of Independence……..... 61

Figure 2.5 Plot for the Authoritarian Condition…… 73

Figure 3.1 Graphical Representation of 2014 Crude Oil Production…… 97

Figure 3.2 Graphical Representation of 2014 Natural Gas Production…… 97

Figure 3.3 UTIP, Household Inequality Index in Turkey from 1963 – 2008…..……. 99

Figure 3.4 Unemployment Rate (% male) in Turkey from 1970-1982…… 100

Figure 3.5 Iran's Oil Production and Consumption from 1965-2008…….. 108

Figure 3.6 UTIP, Household Inequality Index in Iran from 1963-2005……... 111

Figure 3.7 Unemployment Rates (%) in Iran from 1956 – 2001……. 113

Figure 3.8 HQ of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, Riyadh, KSA….. 118

Figure 4.1 Per Capita Budgets by Distance from Tehran…… 127

Figure 4.2 Ethnic Concentrations in Iran……. 135

Figure 4.3 Religious Concentrations in Iran…… 135

Figure 4.4 Presidential Votes in Iran, 2005……. 136

Figure 4.5 Presidential Votes in Iran, 2009……. 136

Figure 4.6 Presidential Votes in Iran, 2013……. 137

Figure 4.7 Growth Plot of Allegiance and Budget…….. 150

Figure 5.1 Number of Imam-Hatip Students from 1924 – 2014……. 172

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Chapter 1

ISLAMISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The influence of Islam on politics is a topic that has moved beyond academia and into public parlance on almost a weekly, if not daily basis. It is no longer a topic solely of interest to secular and religious scholars, as more and more cities across the globe strive for greater inclusion of Islamic communities. The radical political events of early 2017 in Turkey, at the behest of the ruling Islamist party, demonstrate the far-reaching implications of this growing ideology. Given the increasing importance of the subject, a question that initiated much of this research was, how with such shared histories, processes of modernization, and intertwined cultures, political Islam unfolded so differently across the Middle East and North Africa?

To answer this question, this research study examined the regional, national, and in the case of Iran, provincial levels of political Islam, to better understand the phenomenon. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches to balance a methodical and replicable examination with an in-depth understanding of individual Islamist movements gathered over years of scholarship. The study begins with a very broad, regional qualitative comparative analysis of the conditions necessary for successful Islamist movements, then focuses on two specific countries—Turkey and Iran—for a historical comparative study of the aforementioned conditions, and then, carefully dissects the influence of Islamism in one country's economic budgetary process as a specific case study. Chapter 1 provides a discussion of some fundamental

concepts that are important to Islamism and will continue to be referenced in the subsequent chapters.

Islamism, interchangeably referred as political Islam, is utilized in other literature and this research as a political ideology based on the Qur'an, *hadith*, and selected *fiqh* to guide Islamist interpretation of laws, structure of the government, and conduct of society (Rashwan 2007). While there exist other definitions of Islamism, often incorrectly used in public forums, the provided definition adequately describes how Islamism was conceived in this study, further emphasizing the importance of defining other Islamic terminology up front, in the interest of clarity. Much of Islamism, as a political ideology, refers back to the early days of Islam under the first four caliphs following Muhammad. A brief introduction of this historical context, provided in this chapter, allows the reader a reference for modern versions of political Islam. In the same manner, the founders of this modern version of Islamism are briefly described to provide the aforementioned reference point.

Finally, much of the predominant theory explaining the growth of this political ideology refers to the modernization movement emanating from Europe following the industrial revolution. It is important to understand how this movement has affected the region. The brief introductions provided in this chapter provide the reader with an important base start point, whether exploring the topic for the first time or as a long-time scholar of the subject. Simple descriptions in this examination could be easily misconstrued without the aforementioned descriptions.

A considerable number of recent public and political rhetoric has used the terms "Islamic Extremism," "Radical Islam," and "Islamic Fundamentalism" albeit with little understanding of

their meanings. To exacerbate this problem of terminology, a recent survey by the Arab Barometer demonstrates that even within the Muslim community, there is little consensus on the amount of influence Islam should have on state functions (Jamal and Tessler 2008). Even within academia, these terms are often used with little distinction (Davis and Robinson 2004). Most Muslims have vastly different opinions on whether Islam should be political, whether religious authorities should influence government affairs, and how much Shari'a law should also be considered civil law (Arab Barometer III 2014). This struggle, primarily within the Muslim community, is the context for the next section on the terminology that is common to the literature on this subject.

1.2 The Importance of Terminology

The significance of terminology will be evident throughout this study, with Arabic terms representing common Islamic concepts that are essential for the understanding of the subject matter. For example, there are two concepts that are central to our understanding of Islam. The first, used in the development of Islamic law, is *ijma*, or agreement. It is only by the consensus of the Islamic scholarly community--the *ulema*--that Islamic law becomes obligatory (Goldziher 1981). The second fundamental concept is *tawhid* – communal spirit – which is evident in the weekly services with the faithful standing shoulder to shoulder in lines only allowing room for the *ruku* position, a deep bow, and *sajdah* position, fully bent over with forehead to the ground. *Tawhid* is also key to what makes *ijma* so important in Islamic law, an informal collective adherence to its edicts (Ayubi 1991). For Islamic law to be accepted, there must be communal obedience. For political Islam to be effective, there must be an agreement, *ijma*, across the faith, or at least the Islamic scholars. This caused a considerable rift for the Shi'a faith when the Ayatollah Khomeini instituted the concept of *velayat-e faqih*, which created the modern Iranian

theocracy. *Velayat-e faqih* is the Shi'a concept that allows for the senior religious leader to rule in matters of state. Many of the most respected Islamic scholars disagreed with the position and were jailed, exiled, or demoted by their opposition. There was little *ijma* for *velayat-e faqih* in Iran at the time of the Islamic Revolution.

Shari'a law is pivotal to any discussion on Islamism, as it is the basis of the political ideological movement. It is therefor, important to discuss it briefly. When referring to Shari'a or Islamic law, one must consider what is written in the Qur'an, which is viewed as the unadulterated word of God, the *hadiths*, which are the recorded lessons of the Prophet Mohammad, and *fiqh,* the interpreted precedents of earlier eras of faith. *Fiqh* could be best compared to case law in the legal profession. It is a series of judgments about various issues by well-respected members of the *ulema*. However, many Islamist groups tend to diverge from the collective Muslim body over which *fiqh* are selectively chosen to substantiate perspectives on political Islam (Ayubi 1991).

The term "puritanical" is often used in lieu of "fundamentalist" when referencing those seeking a more orthodox form of the faith. El Fadl (2005:18) makes a strong case against the use of fundamentalism as it more appropriately describes "one who relies on the fundamentals or basics" rather than the desired point of those who only believe in the adherence to specific *hadiths* and *fiqh* in Islam. Although the term "puritanical" has Christian origins and common usage, it most appropriately describes the rigidity to a strict moral code found in selective *hadiths* and *fiqh* that Islamists follow. Although some authors prefer the term radical Islamic in lieu of fundamentalist, most tend to shy away from using fundamentalism in this manner.

Modernization is another term that is important to discuss and is further explored in the last section of this chapter. Modernization often incorporates some level of secularization, which

many scholars believe was a key inspiration of political Islam. Lawrence notes that modernization involves three characteristics: "1) continuous change on the scale of various indices of social mobilization; 2) change in types of structural social organization (i.e., growing differentiation and specialization and universalistic and achievement criteria); and 3) the development of institutional frameworks capable of self-sustained growth" (1989:40). An important aspect of modernization is that it is not the same process in every country. Modernization has very different regional starting points, as evident in the distinction between Saudi Arabian and French cultures, that are critical to the way modernization occurs in each country (Sanjay 2012). The benefit of an empirical analysis isolated to case studies from a single region and religion as described in Chapters Two and Three is that the initial historical "start points" – where major societal changes begin due to modernizing reforms – are very close for variables of modernization, colonization, the introduction of Islam, and the influence of past Islamic empires. Including countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Southern Philippines, or those in lower Africa would incorporate much greater complexity with diverse cultures, languages, and dissimilar histories.

Future research should compare the findings of this study with those in other regions, for a cross-regional analysis. Establishing a benchmark of countries with similar histories and cultures however is an important first step in this puzzle. To progress towards the original question – how has Islamism unfolded so differently across countries with similar histories, processes of modernization, and shared cultures – it is helpful to start with the Middle East and North Africa region first, where knowledge of the early days of Islam is beneficial.

1.3 The Early Days of Islam.

It is common for most Islamist movements to reference the early days of Islam. The passing of the Prophet Mohammad left no clear successor despite the knowledge of the Prophet's deteriorating health in 632 CE (Ayubi 1991). With numerous disputes already taking hold, the Prophet Mohammad's trusted advisor, Abu Bakr ibn Qhuhfah was elected as the first leader, or caliph, of the group of followers and territory known as the caliphate, with critical support from Omar ibn al Khattab. Abu Bakr fended off opposition from Bedouin tribesman for two years before his death in 634 (El-Affendi 2008). Before he died, he nominated Omar to succeed him, ruling from 634 to 644 CE. Omar, seeing some of the turmoil that occurred with Abu Bakr's appointment, chose six candidates to assume his position, and requested that the next khalifa be appointed from one of them. Of these two, Ali ibn Abi Talib and Uthman ibn Affan drew the most support, with Uthman narrowly winning the election.

Uthman ruled from 644 to 656 CE when he was assassinated, which led to Ali taking the mantle of the Caliph until 661 CE in what some claim to be the only free election in the history of Islam (El-Affendi 2008). Ali's mother, Fatima, was the Prophet Mohammad's foster-mother, making Ali essentially the Prophet's brother. In 661 CE however, a group led by Muawiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty and governor of Syria at the time, contested Ali's role as khalifa. After a stalemate at the Battle of Siffin, Ali was eventually assassinated while praying at the Great Mosque of Kufa, and was quickly succeeded by his rival Muawiyah (Seestani 1997). Soon after, Muawiyah instituted a cottage industry of producing *hadiths* during his reign as Khalifa, many of which benefited his vision of the faith (Seestani 1997).

This period, which El Fadl refers to as the "Golden Age" of Islam (2005:163), was not a peaceful era for caliphs. The original Islamic theocracy was an uncertain time filled with

infighting and unrest. Understanding this historical context is important because many Islamic scholars suggest that the *hadiths* and *fiqh* originating during this period are often taken out of context by untrained believers, without the requisite years of education in the volumes of works necessary to fully interpret their meaning. There are many that suggest the Qur'an and Hadiths, two original sources of Islam, say little about any matters of the state (Ayubi 1991). Yet there continues to be a reference to this "golden age" for political purposes, which provide an association of Islam with politics. As our examination of the case studies continues, it will be prudent to look at the establishment of modern Islamist groups, their reference to their ideal state, and the scriptural basis to justify their actions.

1.4 The Founders of Modern Islamism.

There are several founders of Islamism that are so widely acclaimed within this movement that it is essential to touch briefly on their work prior to the analysis of the data in Chapter 2. Most lived through radical change during the final years of colonial rule in the region, which directly impacted their viewpoint and ideology as well as the subsequent turnover of power to a nationalistic leader.

Although not of the modern era, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) certainly provided the seeds and early roots for the movement and is often claimed as an inspiration for modern Islamism. As an Islamic preacher, his teachings did not invoke a specific political role for the faith; he did however beseech a much stricter obedience to the hadiths and the Qur'an (Euben and Zaman 2009). Whereas Islamist groups selectively utilize certain *fiqh* and *hadith* to their own ends, Wahhabis, based on the work of Abd al-Wahhab, view the Qur'an and *hadith* as the foundational texts underlying their stringent beliefs, aligning with the Hanbali School of

Islamic Jurisprudence for the most part. This strict interpretation of the faith is best understood as puritanical in nature and speaks to the stringency of their beliefs.

Al-Wahhab's "uncompromising insistence on the moral renewal of Islam" would influence Islamist scholars beyond the Saudi and regional borders, even centuries later (Euben and Zaman 2009:426). According to Wahhab, moderation of the faith was identical to having no faith at all. There was no middle ground (El Fadl 2005). Particularly strong Saudi tribes, known as the Ikhwan, were devout followers of Al-Wahhab's preaching and enforced this stringent interpretation throughout the Arabian Peninsula in a pact with the Saud Family. The Ikhwan, in Al-Wahhab's name, made a pact with King Abd-al-Aziz for rule over the Arabian Peninsula, and would later turn against him due to his own efforts of modernization and secularization. Wahhab's preaching is quoted frequently with modern Islamist groups as well as radical Islamic terrorist groups (El Fadl 2005).

The author most often mentioned by Islamist groups, however, is Sayyid Qutb. Initially an elementary school teacher, Qutb was often involved in philosophical discussions, which later evolved with his disappointment in Egypt's political entanglements with the British government (Strindberg and Warn 2011). Qutb's disenchantment with the West would grow with a two-year visit to the United States, which was a catalyst for him joining the Muslim Brotherhood shortly after his return to Egypt. Despite initially supporting the coup that brought Gamal al-Nasser to power in 1952, Qutb and members of the Muslim Brotherhood were later imprisoned for an assassination attempt on Nasser when the Egyptian leader did not accommodate Muslim Brotherhood interests (Euben and Zaman 2009). Qutb's time in prison, 15 years with hard labor

and torture, brought about his most prolific writings such as *Milestones* and *In the Shade of Islam*. In August of 1966, he was hanged for the assassination attempt against Nasser.

As Al-Wahhab preached a more stringent perspective of Islam, Qutb specified that all true-believers, regardless of disposition and capability, were required to engage in jihad against tyrannical rule, whether it be in the West or local governments that had wondered off the path of Islam (Strindberg and Warn 2011). Qutb argued that the socialist, Arab nationalist, Western democratic, and Muslim monarchs were all *jahili*, or morally bankrupt, in that they claimed human sovereignty that solely belonged to Allah (Euben and Zaman 2009). His writings introduced the political nature of Islam that crystalized modern Islamist thought. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 3, Ayatollah Khomeini, who translated two of Qutb's books into Persian, was influenced by his theories of political Islam, and further expanded on Qutb in the Shi'a faith with Khomeini's concept of rule by the guardian jurist in Iran, *velayat-e faqih*. Sayyid Qutb was one of the greatest influences of Islamist philosophy to date.

Hassan al-Banna was a contemporary of Qutb in Egypt who is also seen as the founder of modern Islamism. Al-Banna, also a schoolteacher, was more of an activist than Qutb. Al-Banna is credited with founding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, and codifying the organization's anti-colonial movement with propaganda, preparation of the population with "revolutionary consciousness," and finally an activist stage often involving armed conflict (Strindberg and Warn 2011:78). Al-Banna's activist organization originally started with a large contingent of social welfare programs for those overlooked by the Egyptian government. As secularism increased under British modernization reforms, al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood became increasingly disillusioned with not only colonial influence but also Egyptian politics that pushed the country away from Islamic ideals (Euben and Zaman 2009).

The influence of Sayyid Qutb's ideology, once he joined al-Banna, provided the perfect confluence of activity with philosophy to transform the Muslim Brotherhood into a powerful Islamist movement requiring Shari'a in all realms of life (Davis and Robinson 2006). It did not take long for this movement to gain the attention of the Egyptian security forces. In 1948, a member of the Brotherhood assassinated the Prime Minister of Egypt, resulting in the banishment of the organization. The next year, two men who many believed to be working at the behest of Egyptian King Farouk, shot al-Banna and his brother-in-law, elevating al-Banna's status as a martyr for Islamism (Euben and Zaman 2009). Al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood is now present in most countries of the Middle East and North Africa. For a period following the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, it also held a majority of seats in the parliament and claimed the presidency for its candidate, Mohammad Morsi, until he was deposed the following year (Trager 2011). It remains the world's largest Islamist movement encouraging Shari'a in all aspects of the government.

Abul al-Maududi is an Islamist philosopher who must also be mentioned in discussing the birth of modern Islamism: He was from southern India, and was one of the most prolific Islamist writers of the time, beginning his career as a journalist. Abul al-Maududi was a key advocate for partitioning the Indian subcontinent in the 1940s, to form Pakistan. Many of the Islamic provisions of Pakistan's constitution were influenced by al-Maududi (Euben and Zaman 2009). Al-Maududi wrote Islamist philosophy at a time when other similar treatises were being circulated from Egypt. His teaching required all, in a true Islamic state, to submit to shari'a law and affirmed the writings of Qutb. Al-Maududi provided a global dimension to Islamism rather than a regional one. The writings of al-Maududi and the success of establishing a state in the

name of Islam provided hope to many Islamists outside Pakistan's borders for the possibility of an Islamic caliphate that spanned beyond the region.

The four founders of modern Islamism as a political ideology were critical in shaping the expectations of some of the *ulema*. With the exception of al-Wahhab, all lived during a period of major transformations in the region. The aftermath of World War II and the reluctant withdrawal of colonialism in the region coincided with the major attempts to modernize both industry and society. This modernization movement, an import from the European colonial powers that had occupied much of the region, had powerful interactions with the founders of modern Islamism. Much of the conflict found between Islam and modernization stems from the celebration of individuality that inspired Western philosophy and liberalism. The next section describes the seeds of this modernization movement, which will help explain why many of the founders of the Islamist movement were conflicted with these reforms. Although somewhat abstract from the topic of Islamism, the philosophical underpinnings of modern reform provide some foundational knowledge for the subsequent chapters.

1.5 The Seeds of Modernization in Europe.

As with many sociological theories, the modernization movement begins with European philosophers of the 17th and 18th Centuries who began questioning divine intervention, and suggested that individuals are the best judges of their own will (El-Affendi 2008; Vahdat 2002). John Locke, the "father of liberalism," argued against state-sponsored oppression when discussing individual self-interest and freedom. That argument inspired others such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), during the age of

enlightenment, to develop two pillars of modernity that would influence the philosophy of politics for centuries to come: subjectivity and universality.

Subjectivity, according to Hegel, is defined as the free self, "self-willing, self-defining, and self-conscious individual agent" (Vahdat 2002:1). It is this free self in which Hegel defines our distinction from animals. The "thinking being…alone possesses freedom" (Hegel 1975:144). It would be impossible for every human to have unlimited free will however, as society would quickly erupt into chaos if everyone acted according to their own free will. For this reason, the other pillar of modernity was universality – something that can be applied to all humans, regardless of ethnicity, gender, or religion. Kant and Hegel balanced the concept of subjectivity with universality through various means. Hegel applied ethical laws to establish the correct balance between the two. Kant saw the need for a constitution to provide a contract for universality of free will. The political philosophy of subjectivity and universality created an initial break in the dominance of religion and began the ball of secularization rolling down through modernity. Kant goes on to reject morality not born of man's free will. In essence, he is rejecting religion's traditional role of providing morality to the state. Both advocated for a distinct separation between church and state (Vahdat 2002). Modernity was built upon the bedrock of subjectivity and universality, which promoted a level of secularization in areas such as morality, a long-term domain of religion.

It may seem off topic to delve into Hegel and Kant in this manner; however, modernization is a topic often cited in the historical analyses of the Middle East, and thus must be covered at some level to fully express the concerns of modern day Islamists. Social scientists highlight three revolutions, scientific, industrial, and democratic, as critical to the transformation originating in Northern Europe, spreading to the rest of the continent, and then the rest of the

world (Lawrence 1989). This transformation, which Lawrence labels as the Great Western Transmutation (GWT), invoked a secular nationalism, part and parcel of modernity.

Further discussed in case studies later in the chapter, periods in which secular nationalism advance often tend to be followed by a strong reaction of Islamism. Juergensmeyer (2008:34) notes a possible reason for the reaction; "the loss of faith in secular nationalism is part of a profound disappointment: the perception that secular institutions have failed to perform. In many parts of the world, the secular state has not lived up to its own promises of political freedom, economic prosperity, and social justice." He also notes that secular nationalism and religion can be "potential rivals" as they both can provide the moral glue that provides consistency to communities (2008:21). This supports the terminology of the previous section regarding Islamism as a political ideology.

The forces of modernization that encourage secular nationalism are often associated with the West. In the case studies that follow, we can expect to see instances of this secular nationalism appear, such as with the attempt at the nationalism of oil in Iran with Mossadeqh, or the nationalization of the Suez Canal in Egypt, and the promises associated with these instances to be followed shortly by Islamist events challenging the secular movement. Modern reforms are continuously implicated in the growth of Islamism in the region. The next section describes this movement and the interaction that provides so much conflict in greater detail.

1.6 The Modernization Movement

Although national modernization efforts are distinct as described earlier, there are some broad commonalities experienced by many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. El Fadl (2005:26) described the deterioration of religious authority as originating with colonialism

in the eighteenth century. Colonialism is "a direct outgrowth of the Great Western Transmutation" and a "vehicle for Western domination in Muslim lands" with consequences that are still ongoing (Lawrence1989:201). The Muslim world felt the destabilizing impact of modernization in a variety of forms and responded in a myriad of ways (El Fadl 2005). The industrial and post-industrial age of relativism, subjectivity, and scientific empiricism were periods that threatened Muslim traditionalists, especially in the days of al-Wahhabi, who believed that the corruption of the faith necessitated a more puritanical path be taken in the future. Wahhabism, as noted by El Fadl, "inoculated itself from the ages and threats of modernity by forcing religious texts to provide definitive and incontestable answers to practically all individual and social issues" (1989:46).

The emergence of Wahhabism was critical to traditional Islamic scholarship and is evident in the practice of jurisprudence. Pertinent to this study, al-Wahhab did not advocate for an Arab caliphate however. There was not much political theory or practice in his theology as it focused on a "true" interpretation of Islam that consisted of a stronger puritanical belief. Al-Wahhab's selection of certain *hadith* and *fiqh* to support his criticism of Islamic law and current culture drew disbelief however, even from his own family, who highlighted that al-Wahhab had not completed his basic Shari'a studies in school (El Fadl 2005). El Fadl notes that al-Wahhab's own brother wrote a full treatise on how faulty his brother's assertions on the faith were. This exposure quite likely would have kept the theology from taking hold had it not been for the Saudi Family's King 'Abd al-'Aziz's need for a strong fighting force to thwart local insurrections in Saudi Arabia. His pact with the Ikhwan, discussed earlier, allowed for the theology to prosper rapidly by melding Wahhabism with Arab nationalism (El Fadl 2005).

Control of both Mecca and Medina ensured that the theology permeated well beyond Saudi borders.

The introduction of the concept of political Islam begins a fracture in the Islamic community. Islamic philosophers such as Sayyid Qutb, Maulana Abu al-Alaa al-Maududi, and Hasan al-Banna begin to advocate for a higher level of puritanical Islamic belief that contradicts the secular nature of the state. As long as the movements were non-violent, the majority of Muslim states tolerated the political activists. In the 1970s, this support increased with many countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Sudan, so as to counter the threat of Marxism and leftist organizations (El Fadl 2005). This hedge against socialism is consistent with a belief that states tend to coopt newly mobilized groups to thwart revolutions (Huntington 1968). The withdrawal of major Western governance in the region post-World War II, especially by Britain and France, left many countries in the Middle East grappling to provide the same level of services as under their colonial masters. This, as El Fadl notes, floods the region with secular nationalistic ideologies that conflict with the political Islamic aspirations of the Islamists (2005:42).

The influence of European powers leading up to World War II, and then their withdrawal in the following two decades provided a critical opportunity for many competing political ideologies. Advocates for socialism under the communist banner, democracy aligned with the exiting Western powers, and authoritarianism were all vying for popular support. This was the historical context in which Islamists saw efforts of modern reform in the region, and the secularization often associated with it. Without question, it impacted the support many Islamists eventually garnered. However, was it the main factor in the growth of Islamism, or were other

far more significant factors involved? Chapter 2 will attempt to answer those questions using a quantitative method followed by a qualitative approach in Chapter 3.

1.7 The Examination of Islamism

This basic background on the origins of Islamism and the influence of modernism, secularism, and early Islamist philosophers will allow for a more succinct exploration of political Islam in the remaining chapters. This examination of Islamism will cover several levels of organization. It begins broadly across the region of the Middle East and North Africa in Chapter 2, followed by a national-level perspective involving two countries in Chapter 3, and then a very narrow viewpoint of Islamism and its influence at the provincial level of a single country in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will look at the national level with the historical context of two countries. This research study will also use a mixture of methods for a more robust pursuit of the topic. Chapter 2 will encompass a broad approach utilizing a qualitative comparative analysis of the conditions commonly present with the growth of Islamist movements such as poor socio-economic conditions and modernization. In Chapter 3, a comparative historical analysis will determine the validity of Chapter 2's findings with the cases of Turkey and Iran and their relevant historical context. Chapter 4 will examine Islamism in Iran's provincial budgeting process with a quantitative study of influence of budgets from religiosity, ethnicity, and allegiance to the regime, or spatial proximity to the capital. Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a qualitative historical comparative analysis of the societal transformation of Iran and Turkey as a result of Islamism.

By using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies as well as regional, then national, then provincial examinations, the diversity of Islamist influence was fully

explored. After reading the next four chapters, the reader should understand the elements of Islamism that influence countries in the Middle East and North Africa, recognize observable facets of Islamist movements occurring, and understand the extent to which Islam impacts Islamic States such as Iran.

Fortunately, this research coincided with an Islamist movement unfolding in Turkey over the past 15 years with significant societal changes occurring in the past 12 months. While Chapters 2, 3, and 4 describe factors that influence Islamist movements and their influence on the state, Chapter 5 examines the changes that occur in society once Islamism is the dominant political ideology. The control of Turkey by an Islamist party since 2002 has provided this unique opportunity, allowing for this research to interact with more current events. As history has shown however, even with this most recent example of the Turkish movement, Islamism as a political ideology will continue to transform, requiring additional research to fully comprehend its scope. This is only the beginning.

Chapter 2

A FSQCA OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

One of the greatest pitfalls of western study of Islamism since the days of T. E. Lawrence is the desire for an oversimplification of the "Arab mind" (Strindberg and Warn 2011). Countless authors have attempted, for decades, to generalize historical context with one of the most important social phenomena in the region, Islamism – or political Islam, describing what they believe it represents and what Islamists want. Combining elements of the second-largest religion in the world, with one-quarter of the world's population, into a singular concept or theory is fraught with academic peril (Strindberg and Warn 2011). The intention of this chapter is not to offer a "solution" towards the growth of Islamist movements; rather, this chapter parses the social phenomenon that is political Islam by identifying common attributes found in the 18 countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that share a formal subscription to Shari'a law. Most of the literature clearly argues against a singular transnational Islamist movement as local "exigencies and developments, not transcendent narratives of clashing civilizations" (Strindberg and Warn 2011:51). Counter to the claim of the importance of local exigencies and developments, I posit that certain conditions or configurations of conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the outcome of Islamism, operationalized in the outcome variable of this study as Shari'a law, specified in the constitution of countries within MENA. This

analysis seeks not a singular movement or causal phenomenon, rather a commonality among movements, an important distinction given their shared cultures and histories, which has been overlooked in the academic literature. Exploring the commonality of Islamist movements is critical to understanding why so many states in the region that share historical, cultural, and religious heritage, have such a diverse spectrum of Islamism.

A fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (FSQCA) methodology is utilized to examine configurations of five commonly cited conditions, namely authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, the rapid injection of modernity, and socio-economic conditions. Recognizing the complexity of this social movement in the region, the FSQCA methodology uses necessary and sufficient combinations to test the study's hypothesis, allowing for multiple causal pathways to the outcome. This research has two important contributions. First, it utilizes a methodology that leverages existing datasets for a unique approach to the subject in which variables are categorized by their degree of membership from 0 to 1, rather than simply present or not present, as would be in crisp set qualitative comparative analysis. Although the historical comparative approaches are common in the field, the FSQCA approach provides an alternative perspective with necessary and sufficient conditions that provide a more robust debate to the scholarship. Second and most importantly, it offers a structural argument in which a configuration of conditions provides a causal path to the phenomena of Islamism in the region. This counters the belief of some in the field that political Islam is a social movement that is particular to each country and their respective historical context.

As background, it is important to remember that contemporary Islamic movements began just under 100 years ago and have been expanding greatly across the globe ever since. A question often asked is, "Why has this movement gained so much momentum, especially over

the last several decades?" Externally-focused theories--those that see the majority of problems in the region as a result of external interlopers--cite the interference of colonial powers in the region, the redrawing of borders by European powers following World War I, or the conflict of the religion with modernization and secularization originating from Europe, as the origin of much of these movements (Abrahamian 1982; El Fadl 2005; Piazza 2006; El Affendi 2008; Euben and Zaman 2009; Delacoura 2015). Internally-focused explanations, most often offered by those outside of the region, cite the all-encompassing and political nature of Islam, the historically despotic and heavily repressive leadership of the region, the resource curse of oil, and the lack of general freedom of opposition groups (Ansari 1984; Davis 1984; Arjomand 1988; Ayubi 1991; Cassandra 1995; Dekmejian 1995; Faksh 1997; Hafez 2003). These internally focused explanations, common in political science literature, incorporate Ted Gurr's deprivation theory in which there is a delta between perceived expectations and reality, and Charles Tilly's political opportunity structures theory, in which social movements are predicated on evolving political opportunities; both are later discussed in Section 2.1.1 These theories are also central to terrorism studies that are often cited in public discourse (Piazza 2006). The "rooted-in-poverty" theory contends that poverty, inequality, poor economic growth, and continuous joblessness are main drivers of the support for Islamist groups who promise better opportunities. Despite conflicting studies supporting and refuting the theory, it still persists in political policy and general discourse. The position of the observer, inside or outside the region, often influences the theory purported for the growth of Islamism from external or internal sources, respectively.

The puzzle in explaining the growth of Islamist movements is that although many external and internal influences have been shared by most of the MENA countries during similar periods, there are clearly very different outcomes of Islamism within the region. Many MENA

countries experienced common influences such as colonial oversight, a secular nationalistic movement, and modernity, yet their respective political paths challenged Islamist movements in very different ways. This study seeks to test some of these internal and external theories and suggest evidence of a more generalized and nuanced movement. This chapter will first cover some basic background and related work, followed by a section on the hypothesis and the five conditions to be examined along with their data sources. Next, a section describing the FSQCA method is presented along with the study's findings. The final section will offer a discussion of what these findings imply in relation to the existing literature. Before delving into the particulars of the study however, it is prudent to examine some of the related work and how it frames this research.

2.1.1 Related Theoretical Work.

Theory provides a foundation for ideas that can be situated and tested with reality. This section provides the keystones of choices that affect the outcome of Islamism, and guides much of the subsequent sections. The internal or external condition debate within this research heavily leverages literature on social movements, as it deals with social-political change, modernization theory for the influence modernity has on society, and finally secularization theory for the societal transformation that occurs when religion loses its influence on society. This section does not cover all of the contributions of each theory but touch on a few major ones that are relevant to the topic of Islamism.

Political Islam, an ideology in many ways similar to other political ideologies, requires a collective acquiescence to flourish. Indeed, a religion whose overarching concept is submission, subscribes itself well to such a requirement. It is therefore useful to first look to social movement theory for how this acquiescence can be achieved. It is especially pertinent in light of the

colonial domination that occupied the region, which was closely followed by primarily authoritarian regimes.

One of the earlier theories of social movements focused on the crowd's collective behavior was by Gustav LeBon in 1895, which suggested crowds lose control of rational thought through a group transformation into a singular collective mind (McPhail 1991). Later LeBon's proposition would be seceded by Smelser's (1962) theory, among others, that the determinants of this collective mind were structural characteristics of the environment--economic or power-related for example, precipitating events, mobilization, and social control. The last determinant, social control, refers to the control of the collective by the dominant power such as the state, seeking to diffuse the movement. The implication of this theory is that the dominant entity invokes some level of control through the police or military to maintain power, which the collective must overcome. This theory, along with others in social movement studies, attempts to explain collective behavior conducted consciously or unconsciously, in order to impose a new ideology or partial ideology on the dominant entity, which resists the change through social control.

Another early social movement theory relevant to the topic of Islamism concentrates on the relative deprivation of the collective. Gurr (1970) saw the discrepancy of the collective's expectations and what their reality was capable of attaining as the impetus for collective action. Gurr's theory of relative deprivation attempts to define the collective's desire for political violence, which implies that social control is used by the state and must be overcome with violence. This theory was initially widely accepted and then precluded in later studies by McPhail (1971) and others for ensuing theories, but remains an important section of the shifting theory of social movements.

One other fragment of this shift pertinent to the Islamist literature is found with political process theory. This theory introduces political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive liberation as elements that shape social movements (McAdam 1999). Political opportunities are events that occur when changes to the power relationship between the state (typically) and collective are possible. This could be from industrial re-alignment, unemployment, or demographic shifts for example. McAdam (1999) notes that these political opportunities also require the opposition group to provide structure via their organizational strength, as well as the recognition of the opportunity by cognitive liberation of the collective's mindset. The period in which Islamism begins in the region over the last 100 years was peppered with many such political opportunities with the decline of colonialism, rise of nationalism, shift in demographic centers from rural to urban settings, and the influence of energy resources, to name a few. The dynamic between political opportunities and the cognitive liberation in which the collective must believe that change is possible was especially apparent with the 2011 Arab Spring in which country after country witnessed their neighboring state's activism, and changed their collective mindset of what was possible.

Social control and cognitive liberation are referenced in more recent social movement theories involving two common elements to many movements: repression and concessions. Repression theories occupy an entire sub-section of literature in social movements unto itself. Opp (1994) and Rasler (1996) look at repression in 1989 East Germany and 1978 Iran, to find that with social movements, repression can have both positive and negative effects on the dissenting group, depending on the public, moral, and social incentives. Rasler goes on to note that the inconsistency of concessions and repression by the Shah in Iran was significant to the success of the Islamist movement. Concessions are a part of social control theory that attempts to

diffuse the collective's ability for cognitive liberation. As we will see later in the chapter, the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan had a legal status since 1945 and was offered "roles in education and social affairs" in exchange for support against Arab nationalism and more radical Islamist groups (Dalacoura 2006:16).

In addition to various elements of social movement theory, modernization theory comes up often in the literature of Islamism as many scholars and the regional "collective mind" view the clash as not solely with Western Civilization but in reality, also with modernity. This is contrary to Huntington's notion that "modernization is distinct from Westernization" (2007). In *Defenders of God*, Lawrence (1989) makes the connection between modernity and what he terms as "fundamentalism" through a comparative approach that examines American Protestant fundamentalists as a result of the Great Western Transmutation (a collage of industrial, scientific, and democratic revolutions), orthodox Jewish fundamentalists, and very brief sections of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Egypt. Lawrence then arrives at a theoretical assertion that anti-modernism is the common strand that connects Christian, Jewish, and Islamic Fundamentalists, which he supports with the comparative analysis that occurs in the latter half of the book. His qualitative approach across religions provides a theoretical linkage between the growth of modernity and religious fundamentalism. The general consensus of the literature is that beginning with the Industrial Revolution in Europe and post-World War II for much of the rest of the world, modernization is a transformative process that creates tension between the traditional society and more advanced, modern future versions. The process infuses individualistic values and identities with scientific advances that create major shifts in society's structure.

This aspect of modernization theory was previously discussed in Chapter 1 in the section on subjectivity and universality by Hegel and Kant. The global transformative process that creates this tension has special ramifications for the Middle East and North African region when political Islam is incorporated. Rather than a special process involving Islam's clash with modernity that would be unique to this region, Lawrence's theory amongst others suggests that tension between traditional society and more modern, future versions is a normal phenomenon experienced elsewhere. This puts this theory at odds with others citing a Islam's incompatibility with modernity. This study will offer support Lawrence's global transformative process. The final theory discussed in this section, secularization theory, is somewhat of a spin-off of modernization theory as it includes the transformative nature of religion with this process.

Juergensmeyer (2008) explores secularization theory as a global religious rebellion that challenges the secular state. Based on his work, the global rebellion is a conflict between religious traditionalists and secular nationalism that began in America and Europe with the Middle East being the latest "front line." He suggests that both religious traditionalism and secular nationalism are ideologies at constant tension, dominating culture and influencing politics to suit their own respective needs. Juergensmeyer demonstrates this tension using case studies, first in the Middle East including Egypt, Iran, Israel, Iraq, and very brief coverage of movements in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan; he then looks to Central and Southeast Asia with brief descriptions of Islamist movements in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, and Bangladesh; followed by sections on Hindu Nationalism and Buddhist revolts, as well as democratic states such as Northern Ireland, Japan, and the United States.

While Lawrence focuses on modernity's challenge to religious puritanical movements, Juergensmeyer isolates secular nationalism, in particular as religion's chief rival, treating

religious movements as a threat rather than a symptom of a larger response to modernity. In doing so, Juergensmeyer writes primarily of the objections of religious movements to secular states but does not delve deeply into what those movements desire unto themselves. Juergensmeyer's broader approach to the concept of constant tension between religious traditionalism and secular nationalism provides a theoretical umbrella for this particular chapter with Islamists and nationalists wrestling for control of the state.

The final area of literature that was pertinent to this study was secularization theory from the sociology of religion as noted in Berger's (1967) *Sacred Canopy*. Berger cites modernity as an influence in curbing religion's primacy in society, politics, and culture, beginning at the age of Enlightenment, initiating a steady decline that has lasted to present day. He suggests in this and later works (1996) that the religious revival is a counter to secularization via modernity. Berger notes there was a slower experience of disconnecting from religion in the United States as compared to the rapid desecularization in Europe. Berger's secularization theory is important for this chapter as the foreign powers that have had the greatest influence on the Middle East were mostly Western European colonial powers that brought their own secularized forms of governing. According to his theory, indicators of modernization have resulted in a resurgence of religion in some areas.

The literature referenced above provides three key points to consider. (1) Social control can come in the form of repression and concessions, often with varying degrees of effectiveness. (2) Political opportunities are events in which dissenters seek cognitive liberation of the populace for successful movements to occur. Major social-political events such as large-scale protests, high unemployment, or inequality are such opportunities. (3) The region also experienced a transformative process, commonly referred to as modernization, that according to theory,

challenges traditional values and identities. This process can create powerful anti-secular forces as a backlash against the transformation. The literature on social movements, modernization theory, as well as secularization theory aptly provides a foundation for this work. It also frames the research question as a theoretical problem, in which evidence of a configuration of conditions that overlap consistently with Islamism support elements of social movement, modernization, and secularization theory. The following section builds on the theory provided in this section and explores the research study hypothesis, followed by a description of the five conditions, their relationship to the outcome and the data sources they were derived from.

2.1.2 Hypothesis.

In contrast to the perception by some in the field that each individual Islamist movement is a distinct, national event, I posit that there are generalizable aspects of the conditions leading to Islamism in countries of this region. In this chapter I hypothesize that certain combinations of conditions are necessary and sufficient for the outcome of Islamism within MENA. Support for this hypothesis is determined by significant results for the conditions, in which consistency scores from the FSQCA approach meet a minimum threshold. An important step in the FSQCA method requires a hypothesis of how each variable will individually influence the outcome. Implicit in my hypothesis for this method is that all of the cited causal conditions, when exceeding their theoretically derived thresholds, demonstrate positive support for the outcome, in this case Shari'a law in the constitution.

The first hypothesis, $H_{1,}$ based on case study analysis within the region, is that conditions such as repression, OR the rapid injection of modernity, OR rentier state status, OR any of the five conditions described in greater detail in the next section, with values over their thresholds,

will have a corresponding positive effect on Shari'a law in the constitution. This would support literature providing significant evidence of these conditions supporting Islamist efforts. Algebraically, H_1 can be represented as follows:

$$\mathbf{H_1} \quad \boldsymbol{REPPUR} \parallel \boldsymbol{MACROECON} \parallel \boldsymbol{AUTH} \parallel \boldsymbol{RAPMOD} \parallel \boldsymbol{RENT} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{SHARIA} \tag{2.1}$$

with "‖" indicating *logical or,* "*" indicating *logical and*, and "→" indicating necessary and sufficient. H_1 then allows us to make a more important hypothesis regarding the combination of conditions in $H_{1.1}$, which also yields a positive effect on the outcome.

$$H_{1.1} \quad \boldsymbol{REPPUR} * \boldsymbol{RAPMOD} \parallel \boldsymbol{RAPMOD} * \boldsymbol{RENT} \parallel \boldsymbol{MACROECON} * \boldsymbol{AUTH} \parallel \tag{2.2}$$

$$\boldsymbol{RAPMOD} * \boldsymbol{RENT} * \boldsymbol{MACROECON} * \boldsymbol{RAPMOD} \parallel$$

$$\boldsymbol{RENT} * \boldsymbol{AUTH} * \boldsymbol{MACROECON} \parallel\rightarrow \boldsymbol{SHARIA}$$

$H_{1.1,}$ as written in equation 2.2, states that any combination of the conditions will have a positive effect on the outcome. However, our interest is not in just any effect. The QCA methodology was used to determine a specific combination that has a significant effect with the outcome, meaning that when there is a particular combination of conditions that meets a theoretical threshold, there should be a positive occurrence of the outcome in a significant manner. For QCA, a significant level of consistency is considered to be at least .80. Consistency for this research is the proportion of the cases with the particular configuration and the outcome of Islamism – Shari'a in the constitution. The second hypothesis, H_2, describes the *logical and* combination of each of the five conditions in equation 2.3 resulting in the outcome to be tested:

$$H_2 \quad \boldsymbol{REPPUR} * \boldsymbol{RAPMOD} * \boldsymbol{RENT} * \boldsymbol{AUTH} * \boldsymbol{MACROECON} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{SHARIA}. \tag{2.3}$$

Findings that do not support these hypotheses will suggest that the Islamist movement is very much a unique, national occurrence, rather than a generalizable event.

Research on the conditions necessary for forms of political ideologies has been attempted for both democracy and communism. Indeed, Berg-Schlosser and De Meur note that in social science, the conditions for democratic systems are "one of the central concerns of political science" (1994:253). For democracy, socioeconomic requisites by some authors (Lipset and Cutright) as well as social factors (Almond and Verba) have been studied to substantiate a consistent relationship with democratic development (Neubauer 1967). Likewise, Karl Marx sought patterns in social and economic inequalities between the working class and bourgeoisie that are essential to the path he describes from capitalism to communism (Tucker 1978). Common conditions that yield political ideologies such as democracy and socialism have perplexed political scientists for decades. This inquiry into generalizable conditions of a political Islamic ideology is no different. The next section will describe the conditions, some of their historical contexts, and the data that represents them.

2.2 The Conditions Pertinent to Islamism

This research required the operationalization and evaluation of conditions that support Islamism based on theory and the literature discussed in Section 2.1.1. The outcome variable of interest, Islamism, is operationalized with the specification of Shari'a law into the national constitution. Based on the definition of Islamism provided in Chapter 1 as a political ideology, an essential ingredient of a political Islamic state is to govern based on the principles of Shari'a. This is the key differentiation from a state that is simply, loosely "Islamic." Without the specification of Shari'a by the state, the association of governance with Islamic principles would

be limited in the manner that U.S. governance associates with Judeo-Christian principles. Historically, the leverage of Islamic rhetoric and concepts, discussed in the next sections, has been used for a myriad of reasons during different periods in the region however, which had little to do with religion.

In conducting this research, it was first determined which conditions should be used as independent variables, and which should be used as dependent variables. In determining the conditions for the QCA, three sources were utilized: case studies of particularly Islamist or secular states, a portion of the social movement literature, and the often-cited conditions discussed in studies of Islamism. Case studies of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey in particular highlighted factors that were influential in altering the nations' path, either to or away from Islamism. These three cases were important because they represented the extreme positions of Islamism, and it is in the extremes that some of the conditions necessary for the development of a strong Islamic state were most apparent. Evidence of a condition in at least two of the case studies was enough to include it in the study; for example the 1930s rapid injection of modernity in both Turkey and Iran, in which a series of major reforms instituted over 5-10 years set events in motion that reverberated for decades later in both countries (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004).

Another source for conditions in this chapter was the literature on social movements. Hafez explains the predominant theory of why Muslims rebel, also the title of his book, as "underlying conditions of poverty, deprivation, and alienation that exist in the Muslim World" (2003:7). Relative deprivation theory from social movement studies occurs in Muslim populations when, familiar with their past history of regional domination, they become frustrated by their current low economic and international status. Several of the internal conditions used such as high unemployment, the inequality index, and rentier state status are derived from this

nexus of social movement literature with Islamism, and represents much of the internally-focused arguments explaining the growth of Islamist groups.

Finally, the literature on Islamism provided the remaining conditions used in this chapter. Almost all of this literature leveraged specific country case studies in a comparative analysis that yielded several conditions such as the repression of Islamist groups and strong authoritarian governments. These conditions were very apparent in a few case studies, for example the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, while non-existent in others. If the condition was very apparent in at least two countries, it was considered for inclusion in the study.

The conditions, or independent variables used for the QCA are listed below in Table 2.1, along with the dependent variable.

Table 2.1: Independent and dependent variables for the QCA .

Code	Condition Description
Dependent Variables:	
AUTH	Strong Authoritarian Government (Monarchy, Dictatorship)
RAPMOD	Rapid Injection of Modernity through reform within a 5-year period
REPPUR	Strong repression of Islamist groups (100's of Islamists arrested/killed)
UNEMPL	High unemployment rate of working-age males
GINI	High Inequality Index for all years prior to the constitution
RENT	Rentier State (Oil is the largest contributor to the GDP)
COLPOW	European Colonial Rule
FORINT	Foreign Interference
Outcome variable:	
SHARIA	Constitution states that Shari'a law will be the basis for legislation

All of the conditions were measured relative to the year in which the constitution was approved in a given state. For example, the rapid injection of modernity was examined for the five-year period prior to the respective country's constitution being approved. For Algeria, which was approved in 1989, this meant looking at the years 1983-1988 the variable. For three countries in particular: Jordan (1952), Kuwait (1962), and Lebanon (1926), obtaining data proved to be very challenging. The data for these countries were based on the earliest information available, as close as possible to their constitution date. All other countries had constitutions approved in the 1970's and later, which allowed for an accurate accounting of their conditions at the time of the formation of their constitution. For quantitative variables with a single value, such as the inequality index, the value for the year prior to the constitution was utilized. For Bahrain, the GINI was determined for 2001, the year prior to the 2002 approval of its constitution. The individual datasets used for each of the conditions can be found in Appendix V.

2.2.1 Shari'a Law in the Constitution.

The outcome variable, Islamism, is operationalized as the specification of Shari'a law in a state's constitution. This variable captures the institutionalization of Islamism in the governance of a country. In almost all of the countries, the state co-opted Islamist movements during periods of unrest to maintain its hold on power, reluctantly providing accommodations when needed (Hafez 2003; El Fadl 2005; Strindberg and Warn 2011). In the instance of the constitution, the inclusion of a specific statement of Shari'a law as the basis for all laws, as well as the number of references to Islam in the constitution suggests such an accommodation. This statement is particularly interesting as most of the governments in the region are authoritarian in nature, according to the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). Such inclusions

subjugate the leader to a divine authority that is beyond their control. These inclusions also introduce clerics as an element having some power over the interpretation of Shari'a, which has historically caused considerable tension with the regional regimes (White 2002; Hafez 2003; Kurzman 2004).

Historically, there has always been strong tension between the religious and civil authorities within the MENA region. Accommodations have been a means of diffusing objections and maintaining power. For example, Algeria's anxiety regarding the growth of Islamism and the swelling popularity of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut or FIS) in the early 1980s was the basis for passing the Family Code in 1984 as a FIS accommodation that curtailed women's rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance (Strindberg and Warn 2011). These accommodations allowed the states to temporarily fend off domestic threats to their sovereignty and are evidence of some of the successes of the domestic Islamist movement resulting in the outcome for this study. The inclusion of an article specifying Shari'a as the basis for all legislation in countries with authoritarian leadership is a vivid example of such an accommodation and represents some of the success of Islamism in that country.

The most recent constitutions of all of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa are located at The Constitute Project[1], which have been translated into English by native speakers for comparison. The respective governments recently modified many of these constitutions. The latest approved constitutions were used along with all the revisions. Algeria, for example, has a constitution from 1989 that was reinstated in 1996 and then revised in 2008. The constitution available with The Constitute Project was the original 1989 constitution along with all of the revisions.

[1] All copies of the constitutions can be found on the Constitute Project website at https://www.constituteproject.org/.

Analysis of the 18 constitutions revealed that 11 of the 18 included a statement affirming Shari'a Law as the basis for the civil law. Kuwait's 1962 Constitution, for example, states in Article 2, "The religion of the State is Islam and Islamic Law shall be the main source of legislation." Article 2 of Bahrain's 2002 Constitution reads, "The religion of the State is Islam. The Islamic Shari'a is a principle source for legislation. The official language is Arabic." Egypt's 2014 Constitution states, also in Article 2,

Table 2.2 Shari'a Law in the Constitution

COUNTRY	In Constitution	Islamist lines	Total Lines	%	SHARIA
Algeria	0	17	895	1.9%	1.9
Bahrain	1	5	965	0.5%	3.5*
Egypt	1	20	1683	1.2%	4.2
Iran	1	152	1336	11.4%	14.4
Iraq	0	6	1023	0.6%	0.6
Jordan	0	22	855	2.6%	2.6
Kuwait	1	5	692	0.7%	3.7
Lebanon	0	0	521	0.0%	0
Libya	1	5	243	2.1%	5.1
Morocco	0	18	1466	1.2%	1.2
Oman	1	7	658	1.1%	4.1
Qatar	1	8	633	1.3%	4.3
Saudi Arabia	1	58	573	10.1%	13.1
Syria	1	2	727	0.3%	3.3
Tunisia	0	10	1131	0.9%	0.9
Turkey	0	0	2769	0.0%	0
UAE	1	5	886	0.6%	3.6
Yemen	1	12	909	1.3%	4.3

***Shaded cells denote values over 3.0 and positive for SHARIA.**

"Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic Shari'a are the principle source of legislation." Table 2.2 provides the countries with this (or a similar) statement specified in their constitutions, denoted positive for this condition by a value of 1 in the column labeled "In Constitution."

Further analysis of the constitution was conducted to determine the number of lines of Islamic rhetoric as a percentage of the total lines in the constitution. Islamic rhetoric involved some reference to Islam, the Koran, or Shari'a however small. If there was one reference, however small, the line was counted as one. If the reference occurred over multiple lines, each line was counted. Every positive value for the second column of "In Constitution" was given a score of three and added to the percentage in column five to yield a combined SHARIA score shown in column six. The value 3 was used, as it was also the threshold for a country to be considered positive for Islamism, meaning that if a country had Shari'a as the basis of their constitution, they would meet the threshold. If the country also had at least 3% of the constitution with Islamist references, it would also meet the threshold. The 3% threshold was chosen based on the commonly perceived estimation of states such as Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria as the more secular states. Their values all were below the 3% value and created a natural delineation at this value between more secular and Islamist governments in the region based on the literature.

As seen in Figure 2.2.1, countries with Shari'a in the constitution also had relatively high percentages of Islamist lines. The combination of the value of Shari'a in the constitution, as well as the number of Islamist lines provided a continuous final score for the outcome variable, allowing a comparison against the continuous conditions described in the following sections. The following sections will discuss each condition in depth along with their respective thresholds and the reasons they were selected.

2.2.2 Authoritarian Regimes.

In the initial research for this project, an examination of three specific countries with strong authoritarian governments, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, effectively underscored some of the conditions for Islamism. Atabaki and Zurcher (2004) wrote that the intelligentsia, who were most often educated in Europe, saw the authoritarian structure as vehicles for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah, early authoritarian leaders of Turkey and Iran, respectively, to push through the modernizing reforms the intelligentsia so eagerly sought. In order to establish their monarchal power, the Saud Family coopted the religiously fanatical Ikhwan tribesman to quell insurrections, cementing the position of Wahhabism on the Saudi Peninsula (El Fadl 2005).

Strong authoritarianism in these three cases was certainly a factor in their progression with Islamism, although the path and timing varied greatly. Indeed, as shown in Table 2.3, data from the Polity IV Project[2] covering 215 years and

161 countries details the condition of high autocracy as dominant in the region. The Polity IV project was first established in the 1960's by Ted Gurr, who remains a consultant to the Monty Marshall of the Center for Systemic Peace that currently maintains the project. Four separate individuals coded each country by six main criteria with a high degree of convergence and consistency (Marshal, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016).

[2] The user's manual providing more detail on the Polity IV Project can be found at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf.

Table 2.3 Polity IV Data of Autocracy

(+10 Most Democratic to -10 Most Autocratic)

COUNTRY	Level of Autocracy
Algeria	-9
Bahrain	-9
Egypt	-4
Iran	-9
Iraq	-6
Jordan	-8
Kuwait	-8
Lebanon	2
Libya	-7
Morocco	-6
Oman	-7
Qatar	-10
Saudi Arabia	-10
Syria	-9
Tunisia	-7
Turkey	-6
UAE	-8
Yemen	-6

Source: World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators II, (ICPSR 5028)

The initial investigation of the three case studies provided two instances in which Shari'a law is present in the constitution (Saudi Arabia and Iran), and one case (Turkey) where it is not, despite all three showing high autocracy. This required a methodology that not only looked at individual variable relationships, but also configurational relationships with a small number of cases. A strong authoritarian government is NOT a necessary condition of this outcome on its own. The QCA methodology provides the ability to differentiate the necessity and sufficiency of combinations rather simply and in a more efficient manner than other traditional methodologies.

The polity score derived in the Polity IV Project reflects a combination of democracy and autocracy scores for each country over a number of years. Subtracting the autocratic score from

the democratic score in each country attains the polity value – a variable originally designed by Ted Gurr. Both are on an 11-point scale, -10 to 0, and 0 to +10 respectively. Democratic scores were coded based on their competitiveness of executive recruitment (elections are a method of executive recruitment), openness of executive recruitment, constraint on the chief executive, and the competitiveness of political participation. The Polity IV user manual describes an example of a mature democracy as one in which "(a) political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial" (Marshal, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016:15). The autocratic scoring incorporated all of the same criteria with an additional criterion of regulation of participation. Although the criteria were similar, categories under each criterion were completely different between the autocratic and democratic scales. There were no categories in common between the two. For example, the criterion of "competitiveness of participation" for the autocratic scale had categories of repressed or suppressed, while the democratic scale had categories of competitive, transitional, or factional. The manual notes that in mature form, "autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection with the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints" (Marshal, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016:15).

The polity value used in this research was an average score over all available years leading up to the approval year. The threshold for this condition, -6 and above, was taken from the Polity IV Project's annotation for full autocracies at those levels. Figure 2.1 shows this region, with many red countries in the full autocracy category, in contrast to other regions of the world democracies are denoted with blue.



Source: Polity IV Project, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Figure 2.1 Polity IV Project Regime Values, 1946-2013

Countries that are not autocratic, greater than -6, would receive a 0 value for this condition. Only Egypt (-4) and Lebanon (2) fell into this category for this research, once the average values up to the approval year of the constitution were obtained. All others fell into the autocratic category, defined by the Polity IV Project as those that "sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation, receiving a 1 value for this condition.

2.2.3 The Rapid Injection of Modernity.

The conflict between modernity and Islam is a common theme from the Islamist literature, although there is some debate as to what level of conflict actually exists. Under the

banner of Huntington's hypothesis of clashing civilizations, others such as Bernard Lewis (2004) and Paul Berman (2004) have suggested that modernity and secularism, as tenets of the West, impart an effect on Islam (not just Islamism) that is analogous to two similarly charged magnets forced together. The speed by which modernity was injected into Islamic societies, vividly seen in the Turkish and Iranian cases from the 1920s and 1930s, should be significant to the reception of the respective societies to such reforms. It is not hard to imagine the rapidity of such reforms along with the authoritarian nature of the state as a combination that had some impact on the budding Islamist organizations.

Modernization theory describes a transformational social change from "primitive, subsistence economies to technology-intensive, industrialized economies" as well as from "religious to secular ideologies" (Tipps 1973:204). It provides several key indicators for the levels of modernity. The employment of males in non-agricultural jobs, literacy percentage, the ratio of youth in school and higher education, and the gross national product per capita have all been used as indicators of modernization (Palmore and Manton 1974; He 2012).

For the purposes of this research, the goal is not to measure modernization in each country but rather the change in modernization over the years leading up to the approval of the constitutions. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is an indicator that is often used, has been historically available for each of the 18 countries, and is suitable to operationalize the concept of modernization (Acemoglu et al. 2009). The data are shown in entirety in Appendix B. The growth or contraction of GDP per capita over the five years prior to the approval of the constitution relative to all available values of the GDP per capita represents the rapidity of injection of modernity that occurred during this period. Growth over five years was used as the minimal amount of time for the impact of modernization to influence GDP per capita growth. It

is possible for this period to have been increased to 10 years however in the cases that exemplified this condition, Turkey and Iran in particular, this minimal amount was sufficient for the condition. The calculation for rapid injection of modernity was determined by establishing a ratio of the average GDP per capita growth covering the five years before the constitution over the overall average of GDP per capita in all years prior to the approval year. This ratio shows not only whether there was a positive growth but also by what percentage. For example, Bahrain had an average growth from 1981 onward of .24 annual percent GDP per capita. The five years prior to the constitution being approved in 2002, Bahrain had experienced an average of .30 annual percent GDP per capita.

Table 2.4 Rapidity of Injection of Modernity (Growth of GDP per capita)

RAPMOD = (Ave of 5 years prior to Approval Year) / (Average over all years)

COUNTRY	RAPMOD
Algeria	-0.91
Bahrain	1.22
Egypt	0.41
Iran	-0.72
Iraq	0.16
Jordan	.
Kuwait	.
Lebanon	.
Libya	1.43
Morocco	1.31
Oman	0.25
Qatar	1.38
Saudi Arabia	0.55
Syria	0.93
Tunisia	0.35
Turkey	-0.37
UAE	.
Yemen	4.74

Shaded values are those positive for the condition of RAPMOD.

The score of .30/.24, or 1.22, indicates that there increased growth of GDP per capita during this period that was 22% greater than normal. This 22% for Bahrain represents an increase of modernity in a short amount of time.

World Bank data of the World Development Indicators[3] provided the GDP per capita growth rates as annual percentages for each of the countries dating back to 1961. As mentioned earlier, the countries of Jordan (1952), Kuwait (1962), and Lebanon (1926) had constitutions approved prior to this dataset. Additionally, data for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was only available for 1976 and beyond, also prior to the approval of the constitution, which occurred in 1971. Table 2.4 indicates the five countries of Bahrain, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, and Yemen, in which there was an increase in modernity over a short period of five years prior to the constitution.

2.2.4 The Repression of Islamist Groups.

The repression of Islamist groups has varied over the years for many countries. As mentioned earlier, Islam was often co-opted by many states for the purposes of maintaining power. Much of this consisted of Islamic symbols and the use of Islamic rhetoric to rally the crowds and take wind from the sails of Islamists. For example, following the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, Saddam Hussein added the *takbir* (*Allāhu Akbar* - God is Great) to the Iraqi flag in between the three green stars representing the Baathist party's objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism. Pictures of him praying or kissing the Koran were disseminated in Iraq and the Western Coalition opposing his conquest of Kuwait was portrayed with heavy religious overtones as infidels desecrating the holy sites. It is widely held in Iraq that the script of the

[3] World Bank indicators for GDP per capita can be found at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators,

takbir on the Iraqi flag was in Saddam's personal handwriting as well (Sayyid 2014). Following his removal and death, the stars on the flag were removed and the script for the *takbir* was changed to a more traditional font.

When states weren't co-opting the religion, on many occasions they were repressing Islamist groups who argued for more Islam in the governing of the country. This repression occurred in several different forms; barring the organizations from meeting, prohibiting their inclusion in the political process, and most severely arresting, imprisoning, and executing Islamist leaders. For example, the two leading inspirations of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna were both killed at the behest of the government. Sayyid Qutb was executed along with six other members of the Muslim Brotherhood for plotting the assassination the Egyptian President in 1954. The years of torture and imprisonment prior to his hanging, led to most of the writings for which he is most famous (Hafez 2003). Hassan al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 by what most suspected to be government agents, after the Muslim Brotherhood was implicated in an assassination of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi the previous year (Bari 1995). Many Muslim Brotherhood members and leaders were arrested, tortured, and held for years in Egypt in response to their violent activities and political aspirations.

This sort of repression strengthened the resolve of some Islamist groups, such as the Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) in Algeria, which received seed money from al-Qa'ida to sustain itself (Strindberg and Warn 2011), while others wilted on the vine. This condition, which most would consider to be crucial in influencing the outcome, is also one of the most difficult to determine. There is no known data on the repression, specifically of Islamist groups over the past 40-50 years. As shown in Table 2.2.2, almost all of the countries are autocratic in nature and the sensitivity of the state's relationship with Islamist groups hindered collection in most countries.

Although there is considerable literature on the subject of state repression against Islamist groups, its effects on the opposition group is found to have mixed results. In countries that used heavy repression such as Tunisia since 1990, and Syria since 1982, almost all of the Islamist opposition was eliminated (Hafez 2003). In other countries however, such as Egypt since the 1970s and Algeria since 1992, heavy repression only exacerbated the state's problems with Islamism (Hafez 2003). Repression has been cited often in the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as well as the birth of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979.

Although there has been considerable qualitative analysis including repression as a source of Islamism solidarity, data for state repression against Islamist groups has, unsurprisingly, been slim. For this reason, state repression in general, was used for this study and is covered by two indicators, both of which were derived from the US State Department annual reports and Amnesty International's annual reports. The two indicators are the Political Terror Scale (PTS)[4] and the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI), and are led by scholars from Purdue University and SUNY Binghamton respectively, and use the same data to analyze the same types of state-sponsored violence. The PTS dataset was used for this study due to some of the inaccuracy in how the CIRI project desegregates data on state human rights abuses such as torture, extrajudicial killings, and imprisonment as well as its inability to account for the population size of the countries (Wood and Gibney 2010).

Within the PTS dataset, there are two values given for each country from 1976 onward, both on a scale of 1-5, with 1 representing countries under secular law and with rare instances of political imprisonment, torture or state-sponsored murders and 5 representing state terror expanding to the entire population with no limits to the scope, intensity and frequency of the

[4] Details on the Political Terror Scale can be found at http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. Information on the Richards Human Rights Data Project can be found at http://www.humanrightsdata.com/.

violence (Gibney, et al. 2015). The full descriptions of the levels of repression can be found in Appendix IV. One is based on the U.S. State Department's reports while the other is based on Amnesty International's (AI) reports. Values from only the State Department's data was used for this project as Amnesty International's data contained more than a few missing years. Additionally, some argue that AI, as do other non-governmental organizations, has an incentive of increased membership and greater donations to under-report an improvement of human rights records (Simmons 2009). In this case, the State Department data was selected for use, rather than an average of the two, for the 18 countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

Table 2.5 State Repression from Political Terror Scale

Value for the year prior to approval of the constitution

COUNTRY	Repression
Algeria	3
Bahrain	1
Egypt	4
Iran	4
Iraq	5
Jordan	2
Kuwait	1
Lebanon	2
Libya	3
Morocco	3
Oman	2
Qatar	1
Saudi Arabia	2
Syria	5
Tunisia	3
Turkey	3
UAE	1
Yemen	3

Source: Political Terror Scale dataset

Because the data began in 1976, countries that had constitutions approved prior to this such as Jordan (1952), Kuwait (1962), Lebanon (1926), and UAE (1971), received values from 1976. The PTS value for the year prior to the country's approval of the constitution was used as an indicator of the level of repression the state exerted at the time. Heavy repression, such as existed in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, just prior to their constitutional process could have involved an accommodation to the Islamist groups in the form of adding Shari'a law as the basis for all civil law. PTS values of either 4 or 5 demonstrate that state-sponsored "murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life." Even at level 3, there is "extensive political imprisonment. Execution orother political murders and brutality may be common" (Gibney et al. 2015). Although the Political Terror Scale provides overall repression data, it is assumed that the repression of Islamists corresponds with the general repression experienced across the country. Some of the countries in which one would expect heavier repression, such as Saudi Arabia, have surprisingly low scores. It is also important to note that there is some disparity between the State Department values and Amnesty International reports. The State Department data consistently yielded a value of 2 for almost all years in Saudi Arabia while Amnesty International reports produced 3's and 4's. Higher Amnesty International scores are not consistent however. In Iran, the State Department data provided levels of 5 across most years while Amnesty International reports surprisingly consisted of almost entirely 4's, which is surprising for a country that consistently and severely represses any political dissention.

2.2.5 The Inequality Index.

Another condition that is broadly claimed as influential in attracting mass support to Islamist causes is the uneven distribution of wealth in society. Economic inequality is measured using the GINI Index - one of the most common socioeconomic indicators cited in public and national policy discussions (Ansari 1984; Arjomand 1988; Ayubi 1991; Cassandra 1995). What is interesting about inequality is that there is an ongoing debate about the correlation between economic deprivation and Islamist movements, despite the popular acceptance of this notion in the West. Despite this, Hafez (2003) argues that there is no correlation between socioeconomic conditions and Islamist movements; however. In countries such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia in the 1980s and 1990s, Islamist rebellion did not occur similar to in Algeria and Egypt despite having similar socioeconomic conditions. Although Hafez's example only included five cases, it does suggest that there are serious questions about socioeconomic data being used as an indicator of Islamist growth. Including the condition of inequality in this study could reveal further insights regarding this popular notion.

The inequality measure, commonly referred to as the GINI Index after Corrado Gini (1884-1965), is a measure used often in social science to reflect disparity in the income distribution. The GINI Index, shown in Figure 2.2, is a comparison of area A, between the Lorenz Curve and the perfect line of equality against area B, under the Lorenz Curve (Roser 2016).



Source: Our World in Data Website: https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality/

Figure 2.2 Graphical Representation of the GINI Index

If all income were evenly distributed across the entire population, the GINI Index would be "0" and the Lorenz Curve would vanish. The Lorenz Curve represents how the income is actually distributed. The GINI Index is a useful indicator to demonstrate the level of inequality in a country, which often is one of the largest sources of resentment of the elites by the general population.

The GINI index for this study came from the University of Texas's Inequality Project[5]. The data for this variable was taken from the Estimated Household Income Inequality dataset (EHII), It encompasses 148 countries with 3,854 data points from 1963 to 2008.

[5] More details on the University of Texas Inequality Project can be found at http://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html.

Table 2.6 GINI Index for Countries in the Middle East and North Africa

COUNTRY	GINI
Algeria	39.16
Bahrain	36.00
Egypt	44.46
Iran	48.57
Iraq	43.38
Jordan	49.33
Kuwait	50.49
Lebanon	37.00
Libya	45.75
Morocco	49.66
Oman	51.42
Qatar	53.41
Saudi Arabia	45.90
Syria	47.72
Tunisia	48.30
Turkey	44.13
UAE	48.60
Yemen	48.79

Source: University of Texas's Inequality Project, EHII dataset

Table 2.5 shows the distribution of average GINI Indexes for the Middle East and North African countries from 1963 to 2008. The average of the GINI Indexes for all148 countries over 47 years was 41.75, with a standard deviation of 7.34. The complete data can be found in Appendix C. These data revealed the five countries of Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, and Qatar, outside of one standard deviation and in the highest 16% of the distribution.

Table 2.7 Standard Deviation of EHII Data

From the EHII data worksheet covering 148 countries from 1963 to 2008			
Average GINI =	41.7567137	1 Standard Deviation	2 Standard Deviations
standard deviation =	7.34071456	84.1% = 49.09742	95% = 56.43814282
Number of data points =	3854		

These countries had greater inequality than 84% of all 148 countries measured and were selected positive for this condition of the study based on EHII's use of standardized scores within the dataset. Based on the popular economic deprivation theories mentioned earlier, one would expect that these five countries in particular, demonstrating a socioeconomic lag behind their MENA counterparts, would have a greater propensity for Islamist movements if indeed the socioeconomic indicators had some correlation. Of those five countries however, two rather secular states do not have Shari'a Law in their constitution, Jordan and Morocco, while the three others, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, have Shari'a Law as the basis of their constitutions. Similar to the authoritarian variable, significant inequality represented in the GINI Index may not be a necessary condition for the outcome but it could be sufficient in combination with other conditions.

2.2.6 Unemployment of the Male Labor Force.

The unemployment data paints a similar picture as the GINI index. Unemployment data of the male labor force from the World Bank Development Indicators[6] and Trading Economics database were used for this condition. The unemployment rates for years as close as possible to

[6] Data for the World Bank Development indicators can be found at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS. Data for the Trading Economics database can be found at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/unemployment-rate.

the approval of the constitution were used. In some cases, data was available before and after the target years of the constitutional approval and an extrapolated value was calculated. For this data, values over 11%, which was a natural break point, were deemed positive for the condition of high unemployment. Figure 2.3 shows the International Labor Organization's unemployment data by region for 2014 and 2015. The Middle East and North Africa consistently scores higher than all other regions. As seen in Table 2.7, there were 7 of 18 countries in which unemployment was higher than the regional average. Of these seven countries with high unemployment, only Iran, Libya, and Yemen had the outcome variable of Shari'a Law in their constitution. The other four had relatively more secular constitutions.

Table 2.8 Unemployment Percentage of Male Labor Force in MENA

COUNTRY	UNEMPL (male labor force)
Algeria	17.2%
Bahrain	4.6%
Egypt	10.3%
Iran	14.0%
Iraq	19.2%
Jordan	14.3%
Kuwait	1.1%
Lebanon	8.4%
Libya	19.5%
Morocco	8.4%
Oman	6.6%
Qatar	1.5%
Saudi Arabia	7.4%
Syria	5.7%
Tunisia	13.8%
Turkey	10.5%
UAE	1.1%
Yemen	12.7%

Source: World Bank Development Indicators and Trading Economics dataset

As discussed earlier, socioeconomic theories claiming economic deprivation as a factor in the growth of Islamism would expect most of the countries with high employment to also demonstrate unrest and subsequently greater accommodations to the Islamists. As with the GINI index, the unemployment data does not have a direct relationship with the outcome of Shari'a law in the constitution. This supports Hafez's findings mentioned in which socioeconomic indicators do not correlate with higher support to Islamist movements.



Source: International Labor Organization data on Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/279790/unemployment-rate-in-seclected-world-regions/

Figure 2.3 Regional Unemployment Rates for 2014 and 2015

2.2.7 Rentier State Status.

The final economic factor considered for this study was the rentier state status of the country. A considerable body of economic research has been written about the resource curse since the 1950s. Explaining why countries with major resource exports tend to mismanage their economies has been an ongoing task of a legion of social scientists for decades (Ross 1999). Sachs and Warner (1997) looked at 97 countries over 19 years, and using regression analysis determined that high natural resource exports correlates to slow GDP growth rates. Scholarly research in the oil-rich region of the Middle East and North Africa has generally supported Sachs and Warner's findings. Rentier states, countries that "receive on a regular basis, substantial amounts of external rent" such as canal passage payments, mineral royalties, and oil/gas revenue (Mahdavy 2002:428), invoke resource curse theory, which suggests that MENA countries with high resource exports suffer from significant economic mismanagement and substantial corruption. In a similar manner to the unemployment and GINI index data, this economic mismanagement provides a basis for societal frustration and a greater proclivity to support Islamist groups who argue that the country has turned away from Islam. The rentier state status, if present consistently along with the outcome condition, would support the socioeconomic theory that worse economic conditions drive the population towards supporting Islamism.

The data for the rentier state status was attained from the CIA World Factbook[7], which provided the percentage of exports from petroleum products. Table 2.9 shows the GDP contribution percentage of exports attributed to oil and/or gas. In countries that were not producing significant amounts of oil exports, the CIA Factbook simply remarks that their resource exports were low without providing a percentage. For the purposes of this study, those

[7] More details on the data from the CIA World Factbook can be found at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html.

countries in which oil or gas export contributions were greater than 50%, were considered positive for this continuous condition. The value of 50% as a threshold is significant, as it would represent the most dominant contributor to the GDP. While previous conditions did not suggest a strong relationship between the condition and outcome, the rentier state status does. Eight out of the 10 countries with high percentages of oil and gas exports, Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, also incorporate Shari'a Law into their constitution. Only Algeria and Iraq did not. Of the eight countries that were not rentier states, four--Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey--also did not have Shari'a Law in their constitution. The analysis will determine if this evidence is significant enough to provide a minimal formula of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Table 2.9 Percentage of Oil/Gas Export contribution to GDP

COUNTRY	RENT
Algeria	0.95
Bahrain	0.86
Egypt	low
Iran	0.8
Iraq	0.84
Jordan	low
Kuwait	0.94
Lebanon	low
Libya	Very High
Morocco	low
Oman	0.84
Qatar	0.92
Saudi Arabia	0.9
Syria	low
Tunisia	low
Turkey	low
UAE	0.45
Yemen	0.65

Source: CIA World Factbook

2.2.8 European Colonial Rule.

Another condition that has a similar regional commonality is the influence of European Colonialism. Indeed, as Strindberg and Warn aptly warn, "Whether we like it or not, and regardless of whether specific courses of action make sense to us, Islamist struggles of both the third worldists and nativist kinds are at root anti-colonial liberation struggles" (2011:55). Frantz Fanon's (2005) epic work of civil rights and anti-colonialism in Algeria is often cited by Islamist literature, discussing the struggle many endured in the post-colonial era that neatly aligns with the growth of Islamism in the region. Figure 2.4 depicts colonial rule in all but three countries, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, in the last 50 years, which many cite as a precursor to Islamist movements. The experience of European colonial rule brought with it secularization, the separation of all



Image courtesy of David Poell
Map source: University of Notre Dame, Open Course Ware, Islamic Societies of MENA, Lecture 4

Figure 2.4 Colonialism in MENA and Years of Independence

religion from politics, in addition to what many perceived as an encouragement of materialistic values. Sayyid Qutb, whose writings crystalized early Islamist thinking and helped set the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on their path, saw British colonialism as "merely an aspect of a secularist, materialist, individualist and capitalist West" (Strindberg and Warn 2011:80). Colonialism created an association of modernity and secularization by way of Western influence so that anti-colonial efforts also incurred a rejection to some degree of modernity and secularization. Both modernity and secularization were thereby seen as threats to Islamist ideals. For this particular dichotomous condition, if a European power not simply influenced, but officially ruled over the country for a specific period of time, with a definitive independence date, it was assigned a positive value of 1.

2.2.9 Foreign Interference in Political Affairs.

Foreign interference in political affairs is often cited within the region as a condition for many of the problems in the Middle East (Wright 2016). It is easy to see why. The most infamous event is the "secret" Sykes-Picot Treaty that divided up the ruins of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. In Wright's *New Yorker* article, the governor of Iraq's Irbil Province is quoted as saying, "Hundreds of thousands have been killed because of Sykes-Picot and all the problems it created." The creation of this border that completely ignored all cultural and tribal identities for the simplicity of a straight line is often mentioned as a continuing source of conflict in the region. Another instance, although more anecdotal than truth, is known as Winston's Hiccup. This refers to the abrupt shift of Jordan's eastern border with Saudi Arabia that inexplicably moves in and out of Jordan leaving a sharp angle that remains to this day. It is

often claimed that Churchill's known fondness for libation in addition to his boastful claim to have created Jordan "with the stroke of a pen, one Sunday afternoon in Cairo" (Diener and Hagen 2010), resulted in a hiccup that created the zig-zag in Jordan's border with Saudi Arabia.

The condition has much more than anecdotal evidence to substantiate it however. The benefit of including this condition is that for countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, which did not have formal colonial rule, foreign interference was a significant factor in their political histories as well. In Iran for example, the infamous coup of 1953, largely orchestrated by the United States and the United Kingdom, solidified power for the Shah, who had fled to Baghdad. The removal of the Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq, a strong, secular voice in Iran, and subsequent routing of the Tudeh (communist) and Iran (nationalist) parties clearly had implications for the growth of Islamism in the form of the unsympathetic clerics in Iran thereafter (Abrahamiam 1982).

The foreign intervention is not solely from Western Powers for this condition. Indeed, foreign military involvement from within the region has significantly affected political affairs in many countries to include Iran (Iraq 1980), Kuwait (Iraq 1990), Iraq (US led coalition, 2003), Libya (Coalition, 2011), and Yemen (Saudi Arabia 2013). There are a great deal more interventions that occurred and are ongoing, which this variable captures through the International Military Intervention (IMI) Dataset ranging from 1946 to 2005. This dataset only records regular troops of one country conducting operations in another. It does not include paramilitaries or militias, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) working in Syria or Yemen. If the dataset provided an instance of intervention by another country at any time prior to the constitutional year, a value of one was given.

Table 2.10 Foreign Intervention

COUNTRY	FORINT
Algeria	1
Bahrain	0
Egypt	0
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Jordan	1
Kuwait	1
Lebanon	0
Libya	1
Morocco	1
Oman	0
Qatar	0
Saudi Arabia	1
Syria	1
Tunisia	0
Turkey	1
UAE	0
Yemen	0

Source: International Military Intervention Dataset, https://www.k-state.edu/polsci/intervention/.

Table 2.10 shows eight countries without interventions. The relevance in this variable is that the intervention by outside forces at times caused a nationalist reaction similar to what occurred following Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 (Kurzman 2004). Iraq's invasion provided a convenient distraction in Iran for the Islamist Regime from the purge of opposition that occurred following the 1979 Islamic Revolution (Axworthy 2013). Islamist groups have often leveraged nationalistic rhetoric and emotions in garnering support for their movement. The interventions provided in the IMI dataset offered opportunities that many Islamist groups took to further their cause.

The variables collected from the social movement literature and case studies of previous Middle Eastern Studies work have not previously been grouped in this manner, for this purpose. The benefit of both a qualitative and quantitative focus, which is an advantage of many works in the field of sociology in particular, makes the introduction of this group of variables unique in the research of Islamism. Based on historical context and theory, these variables should capture elements of the Islamist movement found in each of the 18 countries. In order to accomplish this methodology, some modification of the conditions was necessary as described in the next section.

2.2.10 The Modification of Conditions.

A common approach in QCA is to combine related conditions into a macro-condition to limit the number of logical combinations of conditions and account for complex variables, such as economic ones. In the QCA literature, a macro-condition is one in which this combination has occurred. Here, it was necessary to combine the inequality index and unemployment variable into one macro-economic condition that decreased the number of conditions used and combined the socio-economic factors into one. The macro condition was created in the FSQCA process once the calibrated values, described in the next sections, were attained. The values and process are detailed in Appendix J as well. The final group of conditions used in the QCA was authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, the rapid injection of modernity and the macro-economic condition. Both of the dichotomous variables, colonial power rule and foreign inference failed to demonstrate any type of individual relationship with the outcome and by their dichotomous nature, proved too difficult to include in fuzzy set methodology.

2.3 The QCA Methodology

As Ragin and Rihoux (2009) note in the beginning of *Configurational Comparative Methods*, comparison has been the hallmark of inquisitive scientific research both for hard science, as well as social science since the days of Aristotle. The dominance of correlational arguments in quantitative social science has neglected set-theoretic methodologies such as QCA, viewing them as rudimentary and antiquated (Ragin 2009). However, especially in small-N cases, there are a few other methods that can better bridge the benefits of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in the manner that QCA analysis does (Ragin 2009). Indeed it has been noted that QCA "preserves the complexity of the situations underlying the phenomena of interest while simplifying them as much as possible" (Becker 1998:186). This section contends that QCA is the best-suited method for this type of analysis. Recognizing that some may not be familiar with this methodology, this section is not intended to make one proficient in the technique. There are several readings that explain the methodology in greater detail if one plans to replicate this research (Ragin and Rihoux 2009; Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Fiss et al. 2013). A basic overview of the process utilized is covered however.

The heart of this method lies in understanding a specific pattern of a configuration of conditions, also labeled as sets, rather than segregating individual variables for a correlational analysis. This technique is optimal for complex cases because it doesn't target the relationship of a single variable with the outcome, rather a set of conditions working interdependently together. The QCA process then looks at the degree of membership in the set as a whole, for the comparative technique rather than individual variables. For complex systems, the interdependence of each element affects how the whole system behaves and limits traditional causal relationship methods in which "the more we observe variable X, the more we should

observe outcome Y" (Fiss, Cambre, and Marx 2013:6).

There are five major steps in FSQCA, covered in greater detail in the following sections: (1) calibration of data into "fuzzy set scores," (2) construction of the truth table, (3) determination of necessary and sufficient conditions of the outcome, (4) delineate trivial from non-trivial necessary and/or sufficient conditions, and (5) standard analysis to establish a minimal formula (Adhikari and Samford 2012). In discussing Islamist success in instituting Shari'a in the constitution, it should not be surprising that a combination of factors, rather than the influence of one or two specific variables, would be important. The QCA methodology can handle the interdependence of multiple variables often found in complex phenomena such as Islamist movements, while other methods have difficulty with just 2 or 3 (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). The QCA component most researchers associate with this method in examining this combination is the truth table. The truth table is a simple table of 0s and 1s representing the calibrated membership of a condition. In order to assess the truth table, the values must first be calibrated however.

2.3.1 Calibration of Condition Values.

In a manner similar to when a chemist, astronomer, or physicist would calibrate a tool prior to testing, the values of the conditions must be calibrated prior to using the QCA as a tool of exploration (Pawson 1989:135-37). In the QCA process, the calibration of values allows for diverse conditions to be configured appropriately. This step of the process, in effect, standardizes the values coded for each condition so that the degree of membership in each category can be combined as a set, rather than simply using their raw values. For example, the Authoritarian

values ranged from -10 to +2. In order to demonstrate the level of membership of this condition, three anchor points were required: the first was for full membership in which Authoritarianism was completely recognized by the data collectors; the second was the cross-over point from membership to non-membership; and the third was for full non-membership in which Democracy was present in lieu of Authoritarianism in this case. For the condition of Authoritarianism, full membership was at -9, the crossover point was set at -5, and full non-membership was at 0 as shown in Table 2.10. The QCA process establishes a scale from 0 (for full non-membership), a midpoint (the cross-over point from membership to non-membership), and 1 (for full membership). For Authoritarianism, the crossover point, full membership, and non-membership points was provided by the Polity IV study from which I obtained the data. I then registered the raw values along the new scale from non-membership to full membership. In the range of the Authoritarian condition observed in the region, raw values of -10 were considered full membership and received a .98, while countries with a +2, beyond the crossover point, were assigned a .01. This allows the researcher to transform the raw values into a qualitatively calibrated value of membership in the condition as shown in Table 2.11.

Based on careful study of the contextual information included with the respective datasets, calibration thresholds were input into the FS/QCA process as shown in Table 2.12 with the condition's respective full-membership, crossover, and full non-membership points. Once the calibration of the data was complete, the truth table could be constructed.

Table 2.11 Raw and Calibrated Values of Authoritarianism

COUNTRY	Raw AUTH values	Calibrated AUTH values
Algeria	-9	0.95
Bahrain	-9	0.95
Egypt	-4	0.35
Iran	-9	0.95
Iraq	-6	0.68
Jordan	-8	0.9
Kuwait	-8	0.9
Lebanon	2	0.01
Libya	-7	0.82
Morocco	-6	0.68
Oman	-7	0.82
Qatar	-10	0.98
Saudi Arabia	-10	0.98
Syria	-9	0.95
Tunisia	-7	0.82
Turkey	-6	0.68
UAE	-8	0.9
Yemen	-6	0.68

Table 2.12 Calibration Criteria for Conditions

Condition	Full-membership	Cross-over	Full non-membership
AUTH	-9	-5	0
RAPMOD	1.39	1	0
REPPUR	5	3	1
RENT	0.95	0.5	0.05
GINI	50	47	40
UNEMPL	17	10	2

2.3.2 The Truth Table.

The construction of the truth table allows the researcher to start understanding the space in which observed values and unobserved values of the conditions are configured. For example, there are 18 countries, or cases, in the MENA region for this research. Five conditions provide 32 possible configurations. Even if all 18 cases were non-duplicative from the others, there would be at least 14 unobserved possible configurations. That is why in the QCA process, the value of coverage – the degree of cases in the solution that explain the outcome, is so important (Kent 2008). It demonstrates how much vector space the configuration occupies. This will be discussed more in the analysis section but the truth table opens the discussion of how diversified the configurations are in the total vector space. Values of 1 and 0 are algorithmically assigned in the truth table to represent the different corners of the vector space, observed and unobserved, defined by the calibrated values. If the calibrated value was at or above the crossover point of .5, it received a 1 and 0 for below .5. Table 2.13 shows the truth table derived from the calibrated data for this project. The column labeled "Number" represents the number of occurrences of this combination in the observed data. Arranging the truth table in this manner allows one to note, for example, that in the cases in which the outcome was present, an authoritarian government was always present. Having an authoritarian government, however, did not always correspond with the outcome as shown in two cases in Table 2.13. With the truth table, it can be easily shown that authoritarian governments are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the outcome.

Table 2.13 QCA Truth Table of Calibrated Data

RAPMOD	REPPUR	AUTH	RENT	MACROECON	Number	SHARIA
0	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	1	1	0	3	1
1	0	1	1	0	2	1
0	1	1	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	1	1	0	1	0
0	0	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	0	1	0

States with Shari'a in their constitutions all have authoritarian regimes but having an authoritarian regime does not always mean that one will have Shari'a in the constitution. Further analysis will be covered in greater detail in the following section.

2.3.3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of the Outcome.

As mentioned above, the analyses of calibrated data begins with creating a truth table that allows for configurational thinking. Configurational thinking is comparing the degree of membership with each observed configuration as well as unobserved possible configurations with the degree of membership of the outcome (Ragin 2008). It is the determination of a sub-set from the set of observed occurrences and allows the QCA researcher to understand necessary and sufficient conditions of the outcome. The shift in mindset from variable-focused methods to a set-subset relationship method incorporates this necessity and sufficiency analysis as a fundamental indicator of a causal path (Fiss, Cambre, and Marx 2013). As an example of this shift, Skocpol's (1979) seminal work on revolutions did not result in a finding that applied to all successful revolutions. Her examination of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions

characterized only a sub-set of revolutions in which her structural argument regarding classes and states were applicable. While identifying the necessary and sufficient relationships with the outcome will not determine causation in the manner of traditional quantitative techniques, it does inform on how a complex, interdependent model for organizations, countries, and movements functions. Where a correlational analysis attempts to isolate the effects of independent variables to determine their individual effect on the dependent variable, the QCA approach, through configurational thinking, accepts the interdependency of the independent variables and examines the entire set.

With configurational thinking in mind, it is helpful to examine necessity and sufficiency in the conditions by plotting the calibrated outcome variable on the y-axis and one of the calibrated conditions on the x-axis. For example, when plotting the outcome onto authoritarianism, as indicated in Figure 2.4, the consistency for membership (visually depicted as being below the line) is .963 with a membership value of .562. If a predominance of points were below the diagonal, the condition would be considered to have set-relational necessity. If the points were plotted above the diagonal, the condition would have set-relational sufficiency (Thiem 2014). The consistency and membership values, both above the commonly used thresholds of .80 and .50 respectively, confirm what we saw in the truth table, that the authoritarian condition is a necessary condition of the outcome. It is the only condition that satisfies the criteria for necessity. None of the conditions satisfied the criteria for sufficiency. All of the XY plots for the five conditions for this chapter can be found in Appendix I for this chapter. The analysis of all of



Figure 2.5 Plot for the Authoritarian Condition

the conditions yielded the results indicated in Table 2.14. However, from our data, we know that there is one instance, Egypt, where the outcome is present but the calibrated authoritarian value is just under the threshold for membership. This means that authoritarianism cannot be a necessary condition on its own. A similar analysis of the negated values is tested to determine if the absence of the condition is a necessity as well. The results in Table 2.15 show the consistency and coverage values when the condition values are subtracted from 1. For example if the macro-condition membership score was .75, its negated score would be .25. For the negated conditions, only the negated macro-condition was found close to the threshold for consistency and above the threshold for membership. These results suggest that authoritarianism and the macro-economic condition could likely be prime implicants in the final solution.

Table 2.14 Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: **sharia**
Conditions tested:

	Consistency	Coverage	
rapmod	0.447	0.629	
reppur	0.532	0.583	
auth	0.963	0.562	⇐
rent	0.771	0.649	
macroecon	0.445	0.671	

A prime implicant is a base expression that cannot be logically minimized or excluded from the analysis any further. Prime implicants are the building blocks of the minimal formula we seek with this analysis.

Table 2.15 Analysis of Necessary Conditions For NEGATED conditions

Outcome variable: **sharia**
Conditions tested:

	Consistency	Coverage	
~rapmod	0.711	0.476	
~reppur	0.745	0.578	
~auth	0.274	0.560	
~rent	0.405	0.399	
~macroecon	0.797	0.517	⇐

2.3.4 Delineating the Trivial from Non-trivial.

Returning to the truth table once again allows the researcher to hone in on the minimal formula by using a cutoff for consistency to separate trivial necessary and sufficient conditions from the non-trivial. A common critique of the methodology is that trivial necessary conditions are included in the solutions speciously. Consistency, the degree of membership an observed condition overlaps with the postulated set, allows the researcher to set a threshold for trivial

configurations (Scheider and Wagemann 2012). Configurations with less than 75% consistency of the cases are cut from the table so that the focus of the analysis can be on substantial set-subset relationships rather than trivial ones. Based on those criteria, the truth table for these conditions is shown in Table 2.16 with the shaded configurations denoted as above the threshold.

Table 2.16 Fuzzy Set Truth Table

rapmod	reppur	auth	rent	Macro -econ	Frequenc y of cases	sharia	raw consistency
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.948
0	0	1	1	0	3	1	0.8
1	0	1	1	0	2	1	0.789
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.763
0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.748
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.739
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0.603
0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.582
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.507

Only the top four configurations were deemed non-trivial for the remaining standard analysis based on the consistency threshold. These four configurations that were tested in the final step of the FSQCA process using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm.

2.3.5 Standard Analysis to Determine Minimal Formula.

Once the Fuzzy Set Truth Table was completed, shown in Table 2.17, the Quine-McCluskey algorithm was applied to the table to accomplish two tasks through logical minimization: (1) find the prime implicants of the data, and (2) use the prime implicants to determine the minimal formula of causal solutions to the outcome (2008). The full solution of the standard analysis is shown in Table 2.15.

Table 2.17 Standard Analysis with Intermediate Solution of Truth Table

Model: sharia = f(rapmod, reppur, auth, rent, macroecon)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
frequency cutoff: 1.0
consistency cutoff: 0.763

Assumptions:

rent	(present)
auth	(present)
reppur	(present)
rapmod	(present)

Solution Terms

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~macroecon*rent*auth*~reppur	0.590	0.390	0.760
~macroecon*~rent*auth*reppur	0.270	0.138	0.642
macroecon*rent*auth*reppur	0.301	0.111	0.965

solution coverage: 0.843
solution consistency: 0.709

Most FSQCA studies use either a minimal consistency threshold of either .75 or .80 to determine valid configurations that are causal pathways to the outcome. This solution provides three solution configurations comprising of the macro-condition, rentier state status, authoritarian regime, and repression. The rapid injection of modernity fell out of all non-trivial terms in this analysis. The consistency for each configuration is the degree of membership of the configuration as a subset of the outcome. Using a value of .80 as a more stringent threshold, only the third solution term, with .965, met the criteria. The result was the minimal formula below in which "*" is the Boolean algrebraic term for the logical operator "and".

Minimal Formula: MACROECON*RENT*AUTH*REPPUR. (2.4)

If the lower acceptable threshold of .75 were used, the first configuration, with .760, would have narrowly met this criterion as well. This configuration is simply RENT*AUTH, a subset of the third configuration. The full solution substantiates a minimal formula with a coverage of .843, which means that 84% of the cases are in line with the set-theoretical relation established with this solution. The consistency and coverage shown in Table 2.3.5 are adequately within the QCA process to establish this set-theoretical relation between the minimal formula and the outcome.

One other aspect of the standard FSCQA analysis that must be discussed is the treatment of logical remainders. Logical remainders are configurations that were not observed in the data. There are three valid solution possibilities for logical remainders in FSQCA that differ by how they are simplified. The parsimonious solution option assumes all counterfactuals are true, in order to create the logically simplest solution regardless of plausibility. The parsimonious solution has been suggested by Ragin (2008) as being too parsimonious in many cases. The results of the parsimonious solution are shown in Appendix G.

The second solution option, the complex solution, does just the opposite in setting all logical remainders to false--not allowing any counterfactuals. Although this does simplify the solution, assuming that all of the observed cases are the only possible configurations to be used is too simplistic, despite the solution's name. Results of the complex solution are shown in Appendix F. The third solution option, which was selected for this study and advocated for the most by Ragin (2008), is the intermediate solution. The intermediate solution allows for logical remainders that are the most plausible. By selecting a hypothesized relationship between each condition and the outcome, i.e. present-present, absent-present, the researcher can activate logical remainders that are plausible in the solution. The coverage for each configuration provides the scope it is found in the other causal pathways to the outcome. By examining the

coverage, the researcher can determine how much the logical remainders influence the solution. The assumptions made for the logical remainders were that all of the conditions, with the exception of the macro-economic condition, when present would result in a positive instance of the outcome. For the macro-economic condition, the option of present or absent was selected to align with the mixed findings from the literature. For this research, the logical remainders, despite using the intermediate solution, were not a significant part of the overall result, which will be discussed further in the next section on the findings.

2.4 Findings and Discussion

The Intermediate solution showing the causal pathway of the macro-economic condition, positive rentier state status, an authoritarian regime, and repression as a causal pathway to Islamism has considerable support by the FSQCA process with 84% coverage. The consistency of this configuration, .965, is considered high for FSQCA consistency scores, easily surpassing the .80 threshold for significance. As a test of the robustness of our findings and the assumptions made with the logical remainders, when the complex solution was utilized and no assumptions regarding counterfactuals were made, the consistency of this same configuration was still .948, with no other configurations exceeding the .80 threshold. This demonstrates that the treatment of the logical remainders, a common source of critique of this methodology, had minimal influence on the findings.

The minimal formula also coincides with the earlier finding from Section 2.3.3, in which authoritarianism was a necessary condition of the outcome when combined with other conditions. Authoritarian regimes have been a consistent source of friction in the Middle East and North Africa, highlighted recently with the Arab Spring. Interestingly absent from the

findings is any element of rapid modernization's influence on the outcome of Islamism. This is counter to the second hypothesis, H_2, which projected it to be a part of the solution. Also, surprising from the solution is the inclusion of the macro-economic condition, which H_2 did not hypothesize to be important.

Overall, the findings that authoritarian regimes are a necessary condition of the outcome of Islamism when combined with rentier state status, repression, and significant socio-economic factors, may have been commonly assumed but never tested. This finding counters several items from the literature that are significant. First, it provides another data point in the debate over the relationship of socio-economic indicators with Islamism. As Hafez (2003) asserts, a common refrain in public and political discourse emphasizes a correlation between socio-economic indicators such as high inequality and high unemployment, and the region's acquiescence to an Islamist movement. The correlation is far from proven however, with very mixed results. The findings of this study support the notion that there is a positive influence of this condition on the outcome of Islamism when in combination with other factors. Indeed, even in the complex and parsimonious solutions, the macro-economic condition was a part of the only configuration to surpass the consistency threshold in each solution. This finding refutes Hafez and others' positions that socio-economic factors bear no influence on the outcome.

Inclusion of the macro-economic condition in the minimal formula does align with the literature on Islamism regarding accommodations as well. When the macro-economic condition, made up of high inequality and unemployment, in addition to a rentier state with an authoritative and repressive regime is present, the need for accommodations is substantial. Using Islamic rhetoric and incorporating Shari'a law in the constitution provides significant signaling to the masses that cooperation with the government is an Islamic duty, co-opting the religion, as many

governments in the region have a history of doing, and allowing the state to maintain power. When the socio-economic indicators are detrimental to the people, accommodations of Islamism are made to suppress frustration within the populace. Islamism can be a threat to the authoritarian regimes as it poses another political ideology that cannot be easily controlled by secular powers. The authoritarian states must walk a very fine line between Islamist accommodations to satiate the populace's frustration with their economic plight, and losing power altogether to religious authorities beyond their control.

Secondly, this finding advances that there is a common thread running through the 18 countries of the Middle East and North Africa, and their relationship with Islamism. Despite many scholars in the field of Near East Studies and social movements claiming that each instance of national movement towards Islamism is individual and historically contextual in nature, this finding establishes a configuration, which through the process of FSQCA, stands against such positions. These results provide further insight into the original research question in this study; how can so much shared history with Islam, culture, energy resources, and foreign influence result in such diverse relationships with Islamism? The answer of this configuration as one possible causal pathway to the outcome, not the only pathway, is reasonable when considering the conditions included. This finding posits that this configuration is indeed replicable across the region and is supported by 84% of the possible configurations, observed and unobserved.

Thirdly, as mentioned in earlier sections, the necessity of an authoritarian regime in combination with other conditions for the outcome is a novel claim in the Islamist field. The new approach to Islamism using the FSQCA is largely responsible for this finding. This also serves as an argument for more diverse studies in the field. The necessity of authoritarian regimes in the

outcome of Islamism makes an interesting comment on the phenomenon as a political ideology. As one may recall, the necessity aspect of this condition means that when Islamism is present, there is also an authoritarian regime present along with other conditions of the minimal formula. The link between authoritarian regimes and an outcome of Islamism might not be surprising to many scholars in the field but validating the relationship with empirical testing adds to the body of knowledge on the region.

The finding also supports Gurr's relative deprivation theory discussed in Section 2.1.1. The combination of an authoritarian government with repression and high inequality and unemployment certainly would create a disparity between expectations and reality that supports social movements such as Islamism. Although relative deprivation theory has been heavily criticized by many, this finding does make a similar argument.

The political opportunity theory from social movements also benefits from support of the results of this study. Both repression and the macro-economic conditions imply opportunities that could support an Islamist social movement. Accommodations of Islamism discussed in earlier sections would be triggered by such political opportunities. The inclusion of both conditions in a valid configuration suggests that political opportunities are important to this outcome as well.

Finally, this finding and specifically the lack of the rapid modernization condition in the solution counters modernization and Berger's secularization theories that suggest the growth of Islamism in the region is a reaction to the secularization associated with modernization. It also indirectly refutes the Huntingtonesque notion of a clash of modernized, western civilization with the Middle East, resulting in a greater subscription to Islamist movements. If this clash was valid and modernity's secularizing forces truly created a backlash of support for more Islamism, the

modernity condition should have been a part of the minimal formula. The lack of its presence in any of the configurations from the three possible solutions presents a consistent conclusion that it was not substantial to the outcome, at least with how the phenomena was operationalized in the growth rate of GDP per capita. As with all studies of macro-phenomena on complex systems such as countries, the operationalization choices were critical and remain an admitted limitation to the ardency of the claims of these findings.

2.5 Conclusion

There were five conditions of interest in their contribution to Islamism that were based on the literature of social movements, Islamism, and modernization theory. Of these conditions, the QCA methodology determined that only a configuration of an authoritarian state with a positive macro-economic condition, rentier state status, and repression had a consistent overlap with Islamism. These findings suggest that although there are individual paths to greater Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa, there are similar cultural, political, and religious dimensions that can make the growth of political Islam generalizable.

The qualitative comparative analysis methodology uses set-theoretics, group memberships, and relationships, to determine macro-concepts with a limited numbers of cases. FSQCA utilizes a qualitative understanding of cases along with quantitative methods where traditional methods of analysis in small and medium number of observed cases would fall short. This approach is ideal for testing multiple conditions that are most likely interdependent and form several causal paths to a singular outcome. The study of political ideologies such as Islamism, typically specify a country as the unit of analysis, which incurs significant complexity and usually minimal cases for comparison. Case studies requiring substantial historical knowledge have long been a favorite of this field. The FSQCA process leverages that historical

knowledge to inform operational choices and thresholds within the process, offering another perspective to the scholarship. It is the hope of this author that future research will test these findings using other methods that provide a more robust understanding of the conditions of political Islam. One can also hope that with more interest and study of this particular phenomenon, such knowledge gained will provide greater acceptance and compassion that can bridge the borders that so easily divide us.

Chapter 3

THE CASES OF TURKEY AND IRAN: A HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS FOR ISLAMISM.

Authoritarian, repressive governments with high-energy resources and equally high inequality and unemployment, are consistently fertile ground for successful Islamism. Islamism as a term has often been misappropriated, and is defined in other literature, and for the purposes of this research, as a political ideology that is based on the Qur'an, hadith, and selected fiqh to guide their interpretation of laws, structure of the government, and conduct of society (Rashwan 2007). The finding from Chapter Two is unique within the literature of the field, and posits that rather than a foreign or external conflict such as Huntington's (2007) clash of civilizations, an internally oriented configuration is present. Internally oriented conditions would be for example, socio-economic conditions, corruption, and repression. To test Chapter Two's findings, an alternative methodology, historical comparative analysis, will be used with a narrower focus on Islamism and the combination of authoritarianism, repression, rentierism, and high inequality and unemployment, with the two specific cases of modern Turkey and Iran. These cases, beginning with the major reform periods of Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah represent positive and negative examples of the outcome of Islamism. This specific, rather than regional perspective will compliment the previous chapter's qualitative comparative analysis, taking into account historical context and culture that contributes greatly to Islamist movement. Turkey and Iran, the negative and positive cases of Islamism studied in this chapter both experienced constitutional

reform in the wake of political upheaval from 1979-1982. Despite this, both feature vastly different political ideologies. This is particularly interesting in light of the parallel societal changes made during similar periods by their respective leaders Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah, in the 1920s and 1930s. The countries of Turkey, a Muslim-majority, democratic republic, and Iran, an Islamic theocracy, represent two poles of political Islam in the region with remarkably similar early modern histories that drifted to very different outcomes. Extreme cases have a propensity to highlight what can sometimes be missed in nuance. The comparable historical analysis of Turkey and Iran could underscore the claims made in the previous chapter, in which a causal pathway to Islamism includes authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, and high unemployment and inequality. Despite their many differences, Turkey and Iran share a considerable number of past commonalities, which through historical comparative analysis-the methodology for this chapter, can yield key arguments supporting the configuration described in Chapter Two. The comparison of Turkey with Iran dates back almost 100 years when their leaders, Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah, respectively, drove reformist and modernization efforts from the top down in both countries. The Iranian monarch, Reza Shah, was deeply impressed by the rapid modernization in a Muslim-majority country during his only visit to Turkey in June of 1934. During his visit, Reza Shah telegrammed back to Iran, ordering peasants to wear European-style hats with brims when working in the fields, embarrassed by the turbans Iranians had traditionally worn. When Atatürk accepted an invitation to a similar visit to Iran, plans were immediately drafted to rapidly modernize the country so that the Turkish leader would not compare Turkey's progress with Iran's "backwardness" (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). Both leaders saw their efforts as a collective, progressive movement, rather than strictly competition between rivals. Nevertheless, an account of both countries and their interaction with Islam and

traditionalists has been previously made, albeit individually, and seldom together.

The intent of this research is to understand Islamism in greater detail by testing the causal pathway found in Chapter Two with a qualitative methodology. This will first be accomplished by studying Turkey and Iran's historical context as it relates to Islamism, with an eye towards the importance of authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, and the macro-economic conditions in each country, 60 years prior to their most recent constitutions. This analysis will look at the Turkish case study first and how the remnants of the Ottoman Empire began shaping the country's propensity for secularism and reform. Turkey's Islamic past, discussed in Section 3.2, explores its bi-polar relationship with Islamist political parties struggling to gain a foothold within the parliament. All these contexts will be important to consider alongside Turkey's lack of energy resources, mild inequality, and rising unemployment data for the period, to determine the support of Chapter Two's findings. Section 3.3 considers a similar historical context of reform in Iran but includes Iran's massive energy resources as another element of difference between the two cases.

Finally Section 3.4 considers the interaction between the four conditions of authoritarianism, repression, rentierism, and high inequality and unemployment as a factor in the outcome of Islamism as posited in the findings of Chapter Two. The interplay between authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, and high inequality and/or unemployment in Turkey and Iran as two endpoints on the scale of Islamism in the region could contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, the final step of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis conducted in Chapter 2 is always a qualitative examination with specific cases. In Turkey, the negative case of Chapter 2's analysis, with an absence of the outcome of Islamism, based on these findings, the absence of the causal configuration of conditions should be expected. In Iran,

where the outcome of Islamism was present, the full causal configuration should be present. These are only two cases in particular and don't "prove" Chapter Two's findings. They do, however, provide weight to the argument from each endpoint of the Islamist spectrum in the region. The second contribution of this historical comparative analysis will be to unpack the historical contributions of both results, to better understand the interaction of the four conditions provided in Chapter Two, with specific examples of Turkey and Iran. The theoretical structural argument of the previous chapter's Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) can be more fully appreciated by examining this interaction of conditions. The methodology of QCA is especially useful for complex causal processes in which more than one configuration could lead to the outcome. Rather than attempt to isolate and mitigate interdependence between conditions, QCA works with it to provide multiple pathways to the outcome of Islamism. It is this interdependence that will be explored more fully in the subsequent case studies of Turkey and Iran. Before delving into this interdependence however, the following discussion will first frame the argument in the relevant literature.

The analysis of the results in Chapter Two finds that the conditions of authoritarianism, rentier state status, macro-economic conditions, and repression, are the most influential for the outcome of Islamism in the region. Not all of the conditions discussed were a part of the final configuration however. The rapid injection of modernity, for example, fell out of the QCA process in the previous chapter, limiting support for the modernization theory. According to this theory, following the industrial revolution, a societal transformation occurred that placed greater emphasis on the individual, thereby removing the importance of divinity in society's structure. The importance of this theory with Islamism is that based on works by Berger (1967; 1996) and Lawrence (1989), modernizing, social reforms such as what occurred under both Atatürk and

Reza Shah, acquired significant, secular tones. Individual agency attributed to modern reforms replaced the traditional predestination of Allah's will in modernization theory. Two pillars of the modernization movement, subjectivity – the "self-willing, self-defining, and self-conscious individual agent" (Hegel 1975:44) and universality – something applicable to all human beings regardless of religion, promoted the interests of the individual in modernization at the perceived detriment of the Divinity. Traditionalists in both countries rebuked the reforms central to this theory as un-Islamic, creating more support for the burgeoning Islamist movement. Although the QCA did not highlight conditions supporting this theory, it will be interesting to see if either case study of Turkey or Iran does. The sections with historical context of Turkey and Iran may demonstrate how much this backlash against secularizing reforms influenced either country, which could support the modernism theory.

The importance of the disconnect between Western and Middle Eastern societies, highlighted by the "clash of civilization" theories of Lewis (1990) and Huntington (2006; 2007), corresponds to the importance theorists place with internal (domestically attributed) or external (foreign attributed) causal paths to Islamism. External arguments, with key elements of colonial dominance and foreign interference, did play a role in the recent Turkish and Iranian modern history. The extent of that role however, and how influential it was on Islamism in either country will be the focus of the subsequent sections. From a macro-perspective, this analysis hypothesizes that internal conditions such as authoritarianism, repression, and rentierism, have greater influence on Islamism than an externally oriented "clash of civilizations" theory, Western modernity conflicting with regional and religious traditionalism. In examining the historical context of each country, we do indeed find the internal conditions central to the eventual outcome as a secular democracy in the negative case of Turkey and an Islamic theocracy in the

positive case of Iran.

An additional set of literature pertinent for subsequent discussions is derived from the theories of revolution. Although this chapter does not support a particular theory of revolution such as relative deprivation theory by Gurr (1970), which describes a disparity between the populous' perceived expectations and reality, it replicates a similar structural argument, that there is a combination of conditions that occurs concurrently with significant social-political change. The social-political change for this analysis is the incorporation of Islam into the state through Shari'a law. The comparative historical analysis of this chapter will confirm Chapter Two's configuration as a pattern applicable to cases in this region in a manner similar to Skocpol's previously mentioned theory of revolutions. Whether this combination is applicable beyond the region, however, will require additional work and analysis not covered in this chapter but highly suggested for future research.

3.2 The Case of Turkey

This section examines Turkey's relationship with Islamism over the past 80 years, paying particular attention to the four conditions cited in the previous chapter and relevant literature of the previous section. The exploration of the rich historical context for each condition is a critical facet of the historical comparative methodology. The intent is not a complete historical review of Turkey's past with Islamism but rather to discuss the critical aspects of its recent history that influenced the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the most secularly governed, Muslim-dominated country in the world. This analysis will pay particular attention to whether the four variables of our hypothesized configuration influenced this outcome in any significant manner. It

will also pursue significant influence of other conditions not originally considered in the previous qualitative comparative analysis of Chapter Two. At the end of this section, it should be apparent that the absence of these conditions did indeed affect Turkish political Islamic ideology by allowing just enough Islamist participation in political affairs to mitigate mass support. The section will also demonstrate that Turkey avoided common rentierism pitfalls of corruption and poor socio-economic conditions.

3.2.1 The Embers of the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman modernization movement, *Tanzimat*, lasting from 1839 to 1878, was birthed in the final gasps of the empire and sputtered on as more and more Turks returned from higher education in Europe. The *Tanzimat* did not have the long-lasting reforms most sought, leaving many of the reformists unsatisfied with the movement as the Ottoman Empire broke up following World War I. The disappointment of the Ottoman Empire's disintegration left a lasting impression on many young Turks, eager to seek a rebirth of Turkish dominance found in the promise of reform (Mardin 2006). The ideas emanating from Europe required significant cultural change to Turkey's traditional Islamic systems that were not realized during the *Tanzimat* period. The end of World War I was the death bell for the Ottoman Empire in Turkey. Many of the allies were increasingly worried by the nationalistic fervor growing in Turkey and supported restructuring the Ottoman government. Atatürk, with the support of the Allies, abolished the Sultanate officially in November of 1922 ending the long reign of political Islamic rule in Turkey (Yavuz 2009).

The failure of the *Tanzimat* to produce the democracy desired by so many of its

participants provided the foundation for Atatürk to accomplish much of the societal transformation sought in the Young Turk movement. A tension between Islam and modernity was defined during this period by militant secularists of the movement such as Abdullah Cevdet. Other intellectuals however did not see Islam as an obstacle to progress but a key component of the Turkish identity (Yavuz 2009). Members of the former were in greater numbers than the latter and enacted secular codes that subverted religious courts, reformed the education system with secular policies that provided for the greater inclusion of women, and passed the Family Law of 1917 that allowed women to initiate divorce proceedings (Mardin 2006).

The secularization of society was imposed by Atatürk with the support of the Young Turk movement in a series of subsequent laws on the wearing of the hat in lieu of the traditional Turkish fez (October, 1925), the abolition of Sufi Centers – fundamental Sunni sects (November, 1925), the adoption of the international calendar (December, 1925), Swiss Civil Code (February, 1926), European Numerals (May, 1928), and the Latin Alphabet (November, 1928). Additionally, Atatürk pulled from the constitution a clause stating that the state religion was Islam (April, 1928) and added the phrase "The Turkish state is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Laïc, and Reformist" (January, 1937) (Mardin 2006). These six adjectives, known as the Six Arrows of Kemalism, established a theoretical consistency to Atatürk's vision for the country (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). Ignoring the changes made to Islam's precedence in Turkish Society, the new laws influenced the daily dress, writing, counting, and civil proceedings for every citizen, regardless of religion. The change was massive. Couple this change with the dramatic swing from the Ottoman Empire to a laïc, or secular Turkish Republic, one can begin to appreciate how radical Turkey's transformation was in the late 1920s.

Two critical elements in Turkey that Atatürk did not change however were the political

institutions of the national assembly and the primary political party, the Republican People's Party. Allowing these institutions to develop their own identities comingled with the country's new status allowed Atatürk to institutionalize his changes in them so that the transformation would continue beyond his death (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). Atatürk certainly would qualify as an authoritarian ruler by today's standards, but the consistency of his rule with the Six Arrows of Kemalism encouraged much greater inclusion of other elites in Turkey than what would be seen in Iran with Reza Shah, described in the later sections. The Turkish Republic began with some level of authoritarianism, as these changes were driven onto society from the top down. The inclusion of several other institutions of national power did however help mitigate a considerable amount of opposition at the time. There were limits to this inclusiveness. In 1930, Atatürk allowed an opposition party, the Free Republican Party, to form in an attempt for greater inclusiveness. Once popular support began to rally with the opposition, it was quickly banned (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). It would be 20 more years before the Turkish State would once again allow a second political party.

3.2.2 The Bonds of Religious Education.

For decades under the Ottoman Empire, there was a popular association of education with Islam (Jenkins 2008). Madrasas were key facets of public education. When the state changed to the Latin alphabet and secularized the educational system, it severed one of the last linkages of influence by the clerics, minimizing the importance of religious classes in reading and writing (Jenkins 2008). Control of religion by the state with respect to lay education and clerical training was centralized in 1924 under the Directorate General of Religious Affairs, which operated at the

direction of the Prime Minister (Mardin 2006). Under this centralization, all of the madrassas were quickly closed that same year. In May of 1935, parliament significantly restricted the prominence of Islam within society once again by establishing Sunday as the weekly holiday, from what had traditionally been Friday, for the observance of the Islamic holy day.

Without control of religious lay education, the training of clerics, and the subversion of any influence Islam previously had on the state or populace, the prospects for political Islam in Turkey was seriously dimmed. It would not be until the 1950s, and the installment of a second political party, the Democrat Party, that things would begin to change. The Democrat Party began advocating for Islamic issues as a challenge to the ruling Republican People's Party, who had long safeguarded the secular cornerstones of the state. This advocacy encouraged greater inclusion and emphasized Islamic loyalties in exchange for popular support to the party (Yavuz 2009). By 1960, the Islamist advocacy triggered the Turkish government to ban the Democrat Party. A combination of Turkish nationalism began to fuse with Islamist activism as a hedge against communism from the Turkish left. Ironically, foreign Islamist writers like Qutb and Mawdudi, discussed at length in Chapter One, were also gaining notoriety in the region and were viewed as a separate strain of Islamism from Turkish Islamist-nationalism (Yavuz 2009). In the 1960s, the foundations of a growing Islamist movement in Turkey began with the Democrat Party. The Democrat Party eventually evolved into the Justice Party, and later in 1972 was rebranded as the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi).

The National Order Party, rather than a political party leveraging Islamism for popular support, was a true Islamist political party. In May of 1971, the Constitutional Court in Turkey banned the National Order Party, following a "soft" coup by the military to stop Islamist parties and activists, known as "Grey Wolves" from participating in heavy political violence against

secular, activist groups (Jenkins 2008). The National Order Party soon was reestablished as the National Salvation Party (MSP) the following year. Eventually, the MSP would be banned along with all other parties in 1981, following another military coup and reestablished as the Welfare Party in 1983. The formation of a new Islamist party would repeat again almost every ten years, as older ones were banned by the constitutional courts, eventually leading to the formation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a majority of the parliament in 2002.

As previously discussed, authoritarianism and the repression of Islamist activism, although evident in the early days of the Turkish Republic, were not at high levels relative to other countries of the region. Atatürk did enforce his secular vision on the society but did so with the support of many in the national assembly and political elite. Although there was a limitation of multiple parties in the 1930s and 1940s, eventually the Turkish State would allow opposition to participate in the political process, paving the way for Islamist political parties to exist. These parties, consistently banned by the Supreme Court for violating the secular codes of the constitution, were repeatedly allowed to reform under a new name and banner.

Rasler describes repression as the "frequency of actions taken to coercively demobilize the opposition" (1996:138). The level of Islamist repression in Turkish political parties was relatively lower than what was experienced elsewhere in the region, for example in Tunisia and Syria, where effective repression by the state all but eliminated the Islamist movements (Hafez 2003). In Egypt, the hard repression of Islamists led to thousands being jailed and dozens of executions (Delacoura 2006). Relative to the other countries in the region, the repression in Turkey on Islamist groups was light even in the years following the 1980 military coup. In fact, immediately after the coup, the military enacted a program of Islamization to heal many of the social rifts that had formed in the previous decade. During this effort, the military formally

subsidized the dramatic increase of mosques in all major cities, and the expansion of religious education (White 2002). This effort to mend the societal cleavages through Islam, known as the "Turk-Islam synthesis" could ironically be claimed to lay the foundation for the Islamist movement to take control of the government under the banner of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002.

With the exception of the early years of Atatürk's reforms, neither authoritarianism nor repression had a significant impact on Turkey's relationship with Islamism. There was some level of both present; however, not nearly enough to eliminate the movement or provide some degree of solidarity for the Islamists as seen in Iran in the 1970s. In considering the findings of Chapter Two, the combination of at least these two conditions did not result in the presence or absence of Islamism in Turkey, up to the 1982 constitution. In the next section we consider the other two conditions, rentier state status and the macro-condition of inequality and unemployment.

3.2.3 Social-Economic Impact on Turkish Islamism.

Given the brief historical context of Turkey's growing Islamist movement, this section will address the impact of social-economic indicators, specifically inequality and unemployment. In this section the abundant energy resources that have plagued Turkey in the same manner as much of the region will also be examined. As mentioned earlier, many have cited the lack of jobs and prosperity as creating a garden for both radical Islamic terrorism, as well as support for Islamist movements (Ansari 1984; Arjomand 1989; Ayubi 1991; Cassandra 1995). There is no consensus in the literature on whether socioeconomic factors play a role in successful Islamist

movements. Hafez (2003) noted that in the five countries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, economic indicators alone were not consistent with the growth of Islamist movements. My own findings from the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (FSQCA) include the macro-condition of both indicators in a configuration that aligns consistently with Islamism, thereby contradicting Hafez's claim. This section aims to examine the values of the social-economic indicators to determine whether, in the case of Turkey, there is some historical parallel of the Islamist movement with higher or lower levels of the conditions. Before the discussion the conditions, it is noteworthy that Turkey, unlike most of its neighbors in the region, has very limited gas and oil energy reserves. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, in 2015 Turkey imported 99% of its consumed natural gas and 89% of its required oil. This has not changed dramatically for decades. As depicted in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, Italy has a greater oil and gas production than Turkey. Despite modernization and industrialization efforts, Turkey simply does not have the strategic energy reserves of the surrounding area. While many countries in the Middle East and North Africa have had the blessing (or curse) of abundant energy resources, Turkey has not. The only benefit to the country from natural energy resources is being located at a crossroads for energy reserves with a proximity to over 75% of the world's proven oil and gas reserves and strategic location between the Mediterranean and Black Seas at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa (Cavusoglu 2016). Regardless, Turkey still remains reliant for most of its energy consumption.

As a corollary of resource curse theory, the lack of energy resources can be claimed to mitigate a common source of corruption and mismanagement in the region (Sachs and Warner 1997; Ross 1999; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006).



Source: International Energy Agency's Energy Atlas

Figure 3.1 Graphical Representation of 2014 Crude Oil Production



Source: International Energy Agency's Energy Atlas

Figure 3.2 Graphical Representation of 2014 Natural Gas Production

This presents one less political opportunity of skewed expectations from the populace with their governance, which has historically played into the hands of Islamist activists. Regarding the lack of rentier state status in Turkey, there is no historical evidence that there was any positive or negative influence on Islamism for the past 100 years. It simply was not a factor.

There is considerable debate about whether social economic indicators such as inequality and unemployment were factors however. In Turkey, a few studies have focused on inequality and its relationship to terrorism, specifically for the Kurdish separatist movement in Southeast Turkey. Much of this literature connects inequality with the Kurdish separatist movement and does not have significant claims on the Islamist movement (Araz-Takay et al. 2009). In the observed data of inequality from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), covering 227 countries from 1963 to 2008, Turkey was rated rather low for inequality in the years leading up to the 1970s and was in fact, declining for much of the decade with a peak during the 1979-1980 political crisis (Elveren and Galbraith 2009). The average of this index over the region from 1963 to 1983 was 46.6, which suggests that Turkey's inequality during the same period was relatively low, with only one year – 1979, exceeding the regional average. As shown in Figure 3.3, it was well after the crisis, the 1980 coup, and the military turnover of control in 1983 that inequality began to significantly rise. Prior to the1983 constitution, gross inequality was not a major concern in Turkey at the time. Derin-Güre, Pinar, and Elveren (2014) likewise determined that inequality was not a factor in separatist terrorism as well.



Data: http://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html

Figure 3.3 UTIP, Household Inequality Index in Turkey (1963 – 2008)

In comparison to the inequality index, Turkey did have greater adversity with the unemployment rate during this same period however. As shown in Figure 3.4, the unemployment rate rose from a moderate level of 5% in the early 1970s to 18% by the year the new constitution was approved. The combination of a foreign exchange crisis, a new embargo by the United States, and a political stalemate in the parliament during the mid 1970s were factors in this significant rise. This economic pinch affected a very broad spectrum of the population explaining why there might not be a commensurate growth in inequality as well during this period.



Data Source: Ceyhun 1988

Figure 3.4 Unemployment Rate (% male) in Turkey from 1970-1982

The combination of relatively low inequality and rising unemployment in Turkey hardly makes a strong case for major frustration by the Turkish population over socio-economic conditions. Indeed, the greatest period of disillusionment with the government, from 1925 to 1983, occurred with the crisis of 1979-1980, in which the government came to political gridlock in the parliament, resulting in lethal chaos in the streets, and eventually the military taking control in the coup of September 12th, 1980 (Birand 1987; White 2002). Prior to the crisis, Turkey did not experience much of the disparity and poverty seen in many of its neighbors, which was largely a result of the modernization and reforms imposed by Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s. It would be difficult to argue that a macro-condition of inequality and unemployment in Turkey had a serious impact on Islamism during the decades leading up to 1982. The turmoil that existed in the two or three years prior to 1982 could substantiate a possible argument that the harsh economic environment was influential, but as Birand (1987) points out, the National Salvation Party (NSP), a major Islamist party during that period actually lost influence in the

political gridlock of the parliament. There was no parallel rise of influence by the NSP during this period. Neither conditions exceeded moderate levels in the region and indeed, the historical literature failed to provide much of a link to the growth of Turkish Islamist movements.

The combination of some authoritarianism with little real repression of Islamists discussed in the previous section, and the moderate nature of the macro-economic condition described in this section supports the hypothesis of the previous chapter's findings with Turkey's case. The lack of significant levels of each of the four conditions aligns with the lack of significant Islamism in Turkey up to the 1982 constitution, a document that reinforced Turkey's secular status. If there had been high levels of one or several of these conditions along with Turkey's secular status, this hypothesis would not have been supported. In Turkey's case, the absence of the configuration of conditions coexists with the absence of Islamism for this period. In the next section on Iran, we will examine how Reza Shah started along the same modernization path as Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s, but eventually took the country down a different path with his and his son's implementation of the reforms.

3.3 The Iranian Example

A very interesting aspect of the two cases selected for this historical comparative analysis is the similar start of both countries, imparted by their leaders, Atatürk and Reza Shah. Both Turkey and Iran had a legacy of vast empires and greatness that was and still is a part of the psyche of its people. Both leaders saw reform and modernization in the 1920s as a way to parallel the progress they witnessed in Europe, as well as a method to keep the European colonial conquest at bay (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). This European model, as discussed in Section 3.1.3,

invoked an individualism that contradicted the core principle of submission to Allah in Islam. Both leaders had to contend with the great resistance to modernization and reform from the clerics and Muslim-majority population. In Turkey's case, on the heels of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk coordinated this massive change to secular, modernized state through the Young Turk movement, and incorporated the general assembly and intelligentsia into his movement.

Reza Shah in Iran desired to accomplish the same reforms but took a more authoritarian approach. In 1908 Iran, the Qajar Dynasty (1797-1925), under the rule of Mozaffar Shah, faced the wrath of Shia clergy fresh off their revolt against the use of tobacco in 1892, subsequently relenting with the Constitutional Revolution, which established laws to prohibit "un-Islamic" legislation being passed in the future (Juergensmeyer 2008). With the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the religious elite in Iran, the ulema, was still fractionalized. Reza Shah eventually deposed the Qajar Dynasty in 1925, but failed to grasp the lesson that the clerics in Iran still had immense power. It is possible to assume that failing to understand this, Reza Shah took a heavier-handed approach in Iran than his counterpart Atatürk to deal with the religious element rather than include them. According to Atabaki and Zurcher:

> "The model of authoritarian development strategy put into practice by Ataturk and Reza Shah has not, so far, been the object of a great deal of comparative analysis, and that is a pity. The regimes of these reforming generals can be seen as a unique mixture between the nineteenth-century tradition of the 'reforming pasha' (which started with Egypt's Mehmet Ali) on the one hand and the more modern European (particularly Mediterranean) dictatorships of the inter-war period on the other," (2004:12).

The latter authoritative practice appears to be Reza Shah's preferred method as he denied even his own supporters' ownership of his reforms and enacted dramatic institutional change specifically to undermine the authority of the clerics in a similar manner to Atatürk in Turkey (Tamadonfar 2001). Prior to Reza Shah's 1921 coup, Iran was in chaos under the last monarch of the Qajar Dynasty, Ahmad Shah. The welcome relief of peace immediately provided by Reza

Shah was used to gradually install sweeping institutional changes over his 20-year rule to the standing army, monetary system, and the secularization of the education and judicial systems. It is generally accepted that Atatürk incorporated segments of the intelligentsia and his support base in the Young Turks. Reza Shah on the other hand, progressively isolated himself from his supporters and the clerics, eventually transitioning from an autocracy in which the multiple levels of the government are directed by one figure, to a strictly arbitrary rule – devoid of any restrictions or discretion (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). Many of the reforms were similar; accepting European dress codes, banning of the veil for women, limiting the power of the religious elite, nationalizing the private religious endowments, and creating new central government taxes to pay for the modernization of transportation and business (Gheissari and Nasr 2006). Whereas Atatürk utilized his support base, the Young Turk movement, Reza Shah either jailed or executed his opposition in the early days and throughout his reign, with no equivalent movement of support. His popularity with the military establishment that facilitated his coup did not transfer efficiently to the larger populous. When the religious establishment began to revolt against his policies in the mid-1930s, he routed the upheaval putting hundreds in prison and the hospital over several clashes (Bakhash 1986).

The harsh authoritative nature of Reza Shah's rule, his subversion of the religious elite and his repressive nature to maintain power were initially not replicated by his son, Mohammad Shah Pahlavi, who began his reign in 1941 once the allies occupied Iran, and his father abdicated the throne (Gheissari and Nasr 2006). Whereas Reza Shah ruled arbitrarily through the military, the Pahlavi reign did not begin with such stability. Abrahamian (1982) describes this initial period from 1941-1946 as the "embattled monarchy." The young shah was seen as indecisive

and lacking the charisma and strength of his father (Moazami 2013). Quickly, with the help of career politicians and a cautious alliance with General Razmara – a senior and powerful leader of the military – Mohammad Shah Pahlavi quickly built a military apparatus with unquestioning loyalty to the shah.

The state during the early years of Mohammad Pahlavi's reign faced significant threats from the leftist Tudeh Party – Iran's Communist movement and the legislative body – the majles. The majles' champion of oil nationalization during this period was Mohammad Mosaddeq, who eventually took the office of Prime Minister in 1951. Mosaddeq's growing popularity within the majles and the country along with his threatening tone towards the monarch culminated in 1953 with a coup orchestrated by the CIA at behest of the United Kingdom. The Iranian military removed Mosaddeq as prime minister, placing him under house arrest, which allowed the Shah several critical political opportunities. Besides removing the nationalists from the forefront of politics, the coup allowed the Shah to go after the Tudeh Party, removing several of their key leaders and limiting their influence (Hunter 2014). It also solidified the shah's power as a monarch (Moazami 2013). Several years before the coup, the Shah had co-opted the national assembly to pass legislation that granted him authority to dissolve the majles and appoint half the members of the senate. Now with the 1953 coup, Mohammad Pahlavi had the authority and plausible cause to centralize his power. The embattled monarch, by the mid-1950s was a militarized, central state, completely under the control of the Shah (Moazami 2013).

Despite this seemingly strong position, the threat from socialists and the disenfranchised nationalists and intelligentsia still concerned the Shah and he began to appease the ulema and use Islam as "a buffer between his weak state and contending political and social forces" (Moazami 2013:107). The late 1950s and early 1960s was also a period in which an Iranian sociologist, Ali

Shariati, began introducing Islam as a political ideology within the country. Although Shariati disagreed with certain aspects of Marxism, his vision of an Islamic society shared several concepts regarding labor and capital as well as communitarian ownership (Hunter 2014). As the influence of the ulema began to grow, this period also saw some collusion with leftists. Their desired political ideologies were still dramatically different, but distaste for Western liberal democracy and its associated modernization influencing their society provided a shared enemy.

From 1961 to 1962, the International Monetary Fund directed fiscal austerity measures for Iran to combat a sluggish economy with minimal growth, which resulted in a severe recession, high unemployment, and an impending economic crisis. The Shah took the opportunity for a "White Revolution," supposedly bloodless, and named as a snub to leftists seeking a red revolution, in which major land reforms, entrepreneurship, voting rights for women, and greater labor rights for workers were a central part of reforming the social-political landscape (Gheissari and Nasr 2006). The White Revolution was the Shah's attempt at the modernization and reform imposed by Atatürk and Reza Shah earlier. He believed, as they did, that modernization and societal reform were catalysts to an industrialized and prosperous Iran. In making the drastic societal changes of the White Revolution, the Shah undermined large landowners, incensed the religious factions who protested in large numbers, and subverted the left's revolutionary rhetoric with the Shah's own "revolution" (Hunter 2014).

The White Revolution did not go as planned for the regime. Besides ostracizing both the religious and land-owning elites, a good portion of the illiterate peasant beneficiaries of the reforms did not comprehend the improvements that had been made (Hunter 2014). The explosion of oil prices in 1972 exacerbated the disconnect of the populous and the regime when the Shah poured the new oil money into major upgrades of the Iranian military, and doubled down on the

modernization efforts with large expenditures on the Iranian industrial complex. Universities and education were improved, leading to larger portions of the population receiving advanced degrees; however, the Shah's directed efforts, in large-scale industrial projects, overshadowed these improvements with popular perceptions of mismanagement and corruption (Gheissari and Nasr 2006). Much of this rapid industrialization caused serious demographic changes in Iran with large percentages of the illiterate, rural populations flooding the urban centers. Cities could not keep up with the influx of new residents requiring jobs, housing, education, and services. When oil revenue fell in 1977, an already dire socio-economic situation exploded with cutbacks by the government (Kurzman 2004). The religious hierarchy, long the outcast of the regime, now offered support through its exiled proponent of Islamism, Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran was a coordinated effort of the religious community that had long protested the secularized reforms of the previous decades, the leftist groups seeking a more socialist rather than Western capitalist direction for the country, the land-owning elites losing economic and political power, and the intelligentsia ignored by the arbitrary rule of an authoritarian monarch. With the promises of the White Revolution unrealized, the Shah had isolated his regime from all of the other power bases in the country, leaving a very tenuous grip on the country that was completely lost, to the surprise of the rest of the world. The Shah's attempts at severe repression through the Iranian secret police, the Savak, along with concessions to the protests such as allowing more open news media reporting, were lethal to the survivability of his reign (Kurzman 2004). The Shah was overthrown and replaced by Khomeini who established an authoritarian state of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In comparison to Turkey, as well as many of the other countries of the region, Iran – under Reza Shah and then Mohammad Shah Pahlavi – was without question highly authoritative

leadership. Both leaders used repression and arbitrary rule to enforce their vision of modernization and reform on the country, isolating all of their possible support in the process. The authoritarian milieu ended with an abdication for the former, and exile for the latter, which led to the only theocratic, Islamist state in the world. Iran's historical record with authoritarianism and repression over the decades, from 1920 to 1980, supports the findings of Chapter 2 at least partially. In the next section, we will examine the other two conditions of the causal configuration, rentier state status and the macro-economic conditions, for Iran to determine their level of support.

3.3.1 The Iranian Rentier State.

As demonstrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, Iran's energy story is quite different from Turkey's. Oil was discovered in Iran in 1908, just after the Constitutional Revolution by William D'Arcy. D'Arcy was a British speculator who secured a 60-year oil concession from the Shah in 1901 with only 16% net profits going to the Iranian government at the time. By 1914, the British Government had become the largest shareholder of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). In 1933, Reza Shah agreed to another 60-year concession for a £750,000 annual payment, a £1 million lump sum fee, and 20% of the profit share. The nationalization movement, led by the Iranian Majles and Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadegh, expelled the British AIOC staff from the country in 1951 and sought to nationalize Iranian oil in 1953 (Parra 2004). Six rounds of talks with no consensus on royalties between the Iranian nationalists and the British government eventually culminated in the U.S. sponsored coup, which overthrew Mossadegh and restored power to Mohammad Shah Pahlavi. The British diplomats convinced the Americans that given

the Shah's feeble grip on power at the time, if the nationalists took over the country, communism would ensue without American intervention.

Following the successful coup, the AIOC was forced to renegotiate the 1933 concession and redistribute AIOC's, renamed the British Petroleum Company, share of the oil profits to a consortium of Royal Dutch-Shell with 14%, Chevron, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, and Texaco (all U.S. companies) receiving 8% each, the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) with 6%, and British Petroleum taking the final 40% (Parra 2004).



Source: http://crudeoilpeak.info/iran-peak

Figure 3.5 Iran's Oil Production and Consumption from 1965-2008

Iran's share was increased to 50% for 25 years with the option of renewing the concession every five years beyond 1979. The consortium received the other 50% of profits and managed production in this manner for the next several decades. Iran's reliance on oil grew significantly in the 1960s to the late 1970s as depicted in Figure 3.5 of oil production and consumption. The oil consumption (purple) remained the same throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with a small dip from

1981 to 1984 during the brunt of the Iran-Iraq War. The oil production, in blue, increased significantly in the 1960s and early 1970s until it took a drastic decline following the revolution in 1979. Oil production in Iran still has not recovered fully to the peak levels of the 1970s. Once royalty terms had been renegotiated in the 1950s and the price of oil quadrupled internationally from 1973-1974, Iran grew increasingly dependent on the surge of available cash. Rather than invest the unexpected capital methodically to hedge against the volatility of the oil market however, the Shah spent practically all of this new revenue domestically modernizing the military and creating his vision of a national, industrial complex (Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013).

The corruption and waste of the abundant energy resource was a source of angst for the Islamist activists demonstrating in the streets prior to the Islamic Revolution. The vices of the monarch were intermixed with vices of large oil surplus production. The revolutionary clerical leadership was eager to thwart the associated corruption of oil money. For this reason in 1979, the provincial government of Iran purposefully reduced oil production by 30%, once in power (Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013). Iran's rentier state status in the decades leading up to the revolution was considered an evil brought on by the West, who for decades diverted the majority of oil revenue back to Europe and the United States. The existence of large oil reserves and the accompanying corruptive curse associated with it was easy fodder for Islamist calls for greater morality found in an Islamist state based on Shari'a law.

Iran's rentierism, as one of the four elements of the QCA configuration, supports the hypothesized, positive relationship with Islamist movements. A positive rentier state status exacerbates the combination of authoritarian regimes and repression by providing a disparity between expectations from abundant natural resources and the reality of mismanagement and corruption. The significant social frustration with the state, as described with Gurr's relative

deprivation theory discussed in Section 3.1, drives more of the population to seek political alternatives such as Islamism. The final criteria, the macroeconomic condition, and the interaction with the previous conditions are complex and dynamic, rather than dichotomous. It is often cited in social movement studies as a contributing factor to successful movements and will be explored in the next section.

3.3.2 Social-Economic Impact on Iranian Islamism.

Many have cited the lack of jobs and prosperity as a garden for radical Islamic terrorism as well as support for Islamist movements (Ansari 1984; Arjomand 1989; Ayubi 1991; Cassandra 1995). As stated earlier however, there is no consensus in the field on the evidence of social-economic factors playing a role in the growth of these movements. Hafez (2003) noted that in the five countries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, economic indicators alone were not consistent with the growth of Islamist movements. This section explores the role macro-economic conditions played in Iran prior to 1979.

Iran's inequality and unemployment in the years preceding the Islamic Revolution were only moderately influenced by the oil boom of the mid 1970s, which injected a great deal of capital into the country. Unfortunately for most Iranians at the time, the Shah directed most of those proceeds to long-term improvements of the military and the modernization of major industries, which would take 25-30 years for the benefits to trickle down to the population (Root 2008). Most of the country would not see much of the remunerations of the energy boom.

Iran's inequality in the decades preceding the 1979 constitution was high relative to other

countries in the region. Khomeini noted that "Iran's Islamic Revolution was not about the price of melons" (Wright 2010:95) but the inequality level certainly was not helpful to the Shah's grip on power.



Data: http://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html

Figure 3.6 UTIP, Household Inequality Index in Iran (1963-2005)

As depicted in Figure 3.6, the average household inequality data from Iran recorded by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), from 1963 to 1978, had a GINI coefficient of 48.56, well above the regional average during the same period of 46.62. In comparison, the average for all 227 countries during this period was 41.48. This data, not available prior to 1963 in Iran, does correspond with the historical literature describing huge demographic shifts of rural, illiterate peasants migrating to the large cities in search of jobs and opportunity in the 1950s and 1960s. Both Reza Shah and Mohammad Shah Pahlavis' concern with Iran's perceived "backwardness" was rooted in the large sections of Iran's agrarian-based economy from the

1920s to 1960s, which created great disparity between the elite bazaari and landowning classes, and the peasants. Shah Pahlavi's attempt with the White Revolution of 1963 was to rectify this inequality with sweeping land reforms that removed some of this disparity. His struggle to develop an industrial base for his country aimed to provide jobs, opportunity to improve social status, and mitigate the inequality present in Iran (Chehabi et al. 2013).

The Shah's efforts to change the economy of Iran from agrarian to industrial-based took decades however; time which did not enable the Shah to demonstrate the full benefits of his vision (Axworthy 2013). Inequality, although not vociferously cited by the Islamists in their push for greater support of the movement, was something that was indeed present in Iran in high levels prior to the Islamic Revolution. This condition backs the claims that contend that poor social-economic indicator levels correspond with greater support of Islamist and extremist views.

Iran's unemployment during this period was also significant. The Shah of Iran, heavily influenced by Western private industry and policymakers, invested in modernizing the economy (Root 2008). This 1960s and 1970s transformation from an agricultural economy towards urban services and industry created a large migration from the countryside to larger cities, with the hope of economic freedom (Axworthy 2013). Those living in large cities in Iran grew from 23% of the population in 1941 to almost 50% by the 1970s (Kurzman 2004). As the population shifted, the demand for jobs increased rapidly, leaving more and more out of work in the city centers. By the late 1970s, unemployment, at almost 10%, was certainly an issue that resounded with many Iranians. This played into the hands of the Islamists, eager to foment social frustration with the current regime. The growth of unemployment, caused by the rural-to-urban migration, continued long after the new Islamic Regime took over in 1979.



Data: Statistical Center for Iran, Census information for those seeking employment

Figure 3.7 Unemployment Rates (%) in Iran from 1956 – 2001

In Iran, a high level of inequality and moderate unemployment levels were a factor of the high level of the macroeconomic condition prior to the new constitution. This was very apparent in the rash of strikes that crippled the country in 1978 as the Islamic revolution was gathering steam. What started as 15 nation-wide strikes by various professions in September 1978 grew to 45 by October. The following month, at the behest of Ayatollah Khomeini, almost all the country was on strike and had ceased working (Kurzman 2004). Although Islamists in Iran often downplayed the economic conditions as a factor for their popular support, it rallied others such as the socialist left, to join the ranks of the revolutionaries, increasing the level of support for a new regime and constitution. The macroeconomic condition was to some degree, a factor in the successful Islamist movement in Iran, although it certainly was not the sole or primary reason (Kurzman 2004). However, it did contribute to the Islamist effort, in combination with other factors that led to the most heavily Shari'a-based constitution in the region. In Iran, a high level of this condition coincided with a very Islamist constitution. In the next section, the analysis

considers the combination of the four conditions, and how they could provide a catalyst for Islamist success.

3.4 Analysis

The historical context of both Turkey and Iran, when each condition is considered separately, supports the initial hypothesis that positive instances of authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, and macroeconomic conditions coincide with a successful Islamist effort establishing Shari'a in the constitution. There was not an instance, for example, in which strong authoritarianism was observed, and a corresponding outcome of Islamism was not also apparent. Individually, when each of the conditions was strongly positive, it also corresponded with the occurrence of Islamism, operationalized as Shari'a in the constitution. In the case of Turkey, inconclusive levels of authoritarianism and repression, although present to some degree, did not merit sufficient intensities to have a positive influence on the outcome condition. The same went for rentier state status, in which only Iran was clearly positive for the condition. The macroeconomic condition, however, was slightly more complex.

Turkey saw growing unemployment and a stable inequality value, which provided a moderate to low level of the condition, relative to the region. In comparison, Iran experienced a somewhat high inequality value with growing unemployment percentages. Together, they led to a much greater level of this condition in Iran, exceeding all but one other country in the region. The social-economic conditions, although not entirely healthy in Turkey, was not a factor in the new constitution or in the Islamist efforts just prior. In Iran, although the Islamic revolution was not "about the price of melons," it was indeed a factor in the collusion of others that supported the successful Islamist movement. The conjoined efforts of religious student activists, the

intelligentsia, and communists along with the proliferation of strikes throughout the country made the social-economic conditions in Iran an important aspect of the Islamic Revolution's success, despite the claims of the ruling clerics (Kurzman 2004).

The structural argument supported by these cases also sustains the internal claims in which conditions originating from within the countries, play a more significant role in the outcome of Islamism rather than the external claims of Lewis (1990) and Huntington (2006; 2007) discussed in Section 3.1. If the hypothesis was not supported, one might look towards more external factors such as the clash of modernity with traditionalism to illuminate the growth of Islamism in the region. The historical evidence of both countries did not support such a clash however. Although friction between traditionalists and reformists was certainly evident in Turkey and Iran, it was not a major factor in their outcomes with Islamism.

The relative deprivation and rentierism theory also finds some support with these results. The abundance of energy resources, when coupled with the other conditions, aggravates the social frustration with the populace, providing support to Islamists seeking an alternative political solution. The social-economic and rentier conditions provide the most support for these theories, however the interdependence with authoritarianism and repression cannot be overlooked. Autocracy, and harsh repressive policies magnify this frustration. It also counters Hafez's (2003) claims that social-economic conditions are red herrings for Islamism or Islamic terrorism. Hafez did not consider social-economic conditions influential based on his comparative analysis of five countries. Both the QCA of Chapter 2 and this historical comparative analysis do find some relationship between social-economic conditions and Islamism when in a configuration with other conditions however. In Iran, a certain aspect of the revolution was "about the price of melons."

Rentier state status or significant repression alone did not guarantee Islamism. The findings in this chapter require the combination of the four conditions, to be relevant to the tested hypothesis. In the positive case of Iran, the presence of a strong authoritarian regime with strong repression of Islamists and a national dependency on energy resources with flagging inequality and/or unemployment, aligned with positive instances of Islamism. When those conditions were not present in the negative case of Turkey, the outcome of Islamism was also not present.

The Middle East and North Africa, according to the Polity IV dataset described in Chapter 2, has more authoritarian regimes for longer periods in the post-modern era than any other region in the world. Many of these dictatorships, for example ex-President Hussein of Iraq, ex-President Ben Ali of Tunisia, ex-President Mubarak of Egypt, President Saleh of Yemen, and Col. Gaddafi of Libya were recently overthrown. Other authoritarian regimes, for example President al-Assad's of Syria, King Al Khalifa's of Bahrain, Emir Al-Sabah's of Kuwait, King Abdullah's and since 2015, King Abdulaziz al-Saud's of Saudi Arabia, to name just a few. The findings of this comparative analysis support Chapter 2's findings that the resource curse of oil in many countries, and incipient unemployment and inequality, coupled with repression in many cases has created a fertile garden for Islamists to rally support for their movements. These movements, with these conditions present, have been successful in implementing Islamic law in their countries' constitutions.

3.4 Conclusion

The historical comparative analysis of Turkey and Iran – the negative and positive cases of an authoritarian, rentier state, repressive in nature and with poor inequality and unemployment

– consistently coincides with the negative and positive instances of Islamism in the form of Shari'a based constitutions. This is not to say this combination is the only configuration in which this occurrence happens. As witnessed in Saudi Arabia, the second most Islamic-based constitution behind Iran, Islamism was not repressed but openly embraced, dating back to the religious zealots of Ikhwan in 1912 with King 'Abd al-'Aziz, to establish the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (El Fadl 2005). In Saudi Arabia, repression of Islamists was certainly not a factor in the Islamist movement. Ironically, it is the Islamists in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in the form of the Presidency of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, also known as the religious police, who conduct religious repression based on Islamic Shari'a. As with other social phenomena such as revolutions, in which multiple recipes coincide, often with successful occurrences, based on the findings of Chapter 2 and this chapter, the hypothesized configuration is one such recipe for Islamism.



Source: Author's photo of Riyadh Headquarters

Figure 3.8 HQ of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, Riyadh, KSA

This analysis accomplishes the two goals established in Section 3.1. It provides support for the findings in Chapter Two in that both case studies found the outcome present when the configuration of conditions were also present, and absent when one or more of the conditions in the configuration were absent. It also validated the interaction of the four conditions as a very important element of the outcome – the individual conditions alone were not enough on their own to provide this outcome. This is perhaps the more important contribution to the literature. It was not enough for either country to be authoritative and repressive. Positive instances of these conditions also required reinforcing conditions of weak socio-economic factors and the traditional corruption associated with rentier states to support the outcome. The negative case of Turkey suggested that with the absence of this causal configuration, sufficient frustration with the state was also not present, which resulted in Islamists failing to gather enough support for the

outcome. The qualitative comparative analysis of the Chapter 2 was specifically developed to allow for complex causal pathways that involved interdependent conditions.

As discussed in Iran, the Shah of Iran distanced himself from many of the power centers of Iran, ruling with a heavy hand through his secret police, the SAVAK. This coincided with large degrees of inequality that occurred from the Shah's modernization reforms, shifting much of the population from rural to urban centers. This shift influenced unemployment in the country heavily and was further exacerbated with the influx of oil money that went to the military and major industries, rather than social programs. Each of these issues reinforced the hardships felt by most Iranians, which provided a sympathetic ear to the Islamist cause. By the end of 1978, all of these factors had brought millions to the streets, which convinced the Shah's military to step aside and allow the Islamic Revolution to occur. Iran exemplifies this complex, reinforcing structural argument made in Chapter Two's findings.

This proposition, that these four conditions provide compounding support for the outcome, is supported in both cases. It also counters the modernization and secularization theories (Berger 1967;1996; Lawrence 1989), which suggest that the growth and success of the Islamist movements can be attributed to a reaction to secularism imported with modernist reforms. While there are traces of this sentiment in both countries, both the qualitative comparative analysis of Chapter Two and the historical comparative analysis of this chapter indicate that the most consistent causal pathway to the outcome does not involve this condition. This is rather surprising in that there is public perception, and a perception in the academic literature of a great conflict between traditional devout Muslims, and secular modernity (Smith 1977; Bennett 2005; Rajaee 2007; Martin and Barzegar 2010; Osman 2016). Much of the literature consists of descriptive explanations of the interactions between modernity and Islam,

modernity and Islamism as a political ideology, and modernity/democratic value and Islam. The findings in Chapter Two and Three do not suggest that these explanations are wrong; rather that there may be other more influential conditions besides the aforementioned. Based on this analysis, it appears that there is much more to the successful outcome of Islamism than simply the traditionalist clash with modernity.

The outcome of political Islam is something that continues to unfold each day in the Middle East and North Africa. Islamist groups seeking greater participation and power within the state have been vocal about the disparity between modern cultural values, lumped into a hegemonic order, and the purist-Islamic traditions. Prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, movie posters on billboards and magazine covers with scantily clad women were often cited as the corruption to the Iranian societal fabric. There is vulnerability in overemphasizing the importance of this clash, both for academics and Islamist groups. Most would concede that rejection of all modernity is not completely accepted, even among the most traditional and religious. This perspective in this chapter of a structural arrangement in lieu of the modernity theory provides another viewpoint of Islamism's evolving movement. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Five, Turkey's ongoing transformation from a secular democracy provides a current example of how the modernity theory falls short in providing a full explanation.

Despite the difficulty in social research in this region due to lack of available data beyond the past 25 years, more studies are needed on this topic. The use of multiple methodologies to examine Islamism and the conditions most often associated with it is something to be embraced in this field. As history has demonstrated for the past 100 years, Islamism as a political ideology continues to grow and is not a topic just for academics interested in the MENA region. Many cities with growing Muslim populations have heard calls for greater consideration of Islamic

customs and governance of their communities. The subject of Islamism is not one to go away soon; rather it will continue to grow in importance as it rapidly has over the past 25 years. Increasingly, the discussion of Islamism and the extent to which Islam is a part of governance is not simply for academics or those within the Ummah, but indeed much of the world, as many continue to seek ways to live in harmony, regardless of religion or beliefs.

Chapter 4

ISLAMISM IN IRANIAN PROVINCIAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION

The fourth chapter of this research examines Iran as a strong Islamic state, one in which there is a high level of Shari'a influence, but through the lens of resource distribution amongst Iranian provinces. The use of the provincial budgetary allotments by the state is the single instance in which Islamism can influence political or economic matters. In the first chapter, a very broad look at the conditions for Islamism across the region was covered. Chapter Two consisted of a narrower qualitative study of Islamist movements in Turkey and Iran, examining the conditions from Chapter One and how they specifically affected the divergent paths of these two countries. Chapter Four will narrow the focus even more on Islamism to one country, Iran, and one aspect of how it functions economically as the region's only theocracy. Isolating one state function, which is typically absent of religious influence in most countries, the distribution of economic resources to the provinces allows an opportunity to see at the granular level whether all or only some political decisions are executed based on political Islamic interests. This is not to say that all state functions in Iran have Islamist overtones. It only provides a specific case to determine how much religion matters.

Islam is a religion that infuses belief with all matters of human-to-human conduct, making it very difficult to separate "church" from state (Ayudi 1991). In this narrow study on Iran, budgets for the provinces provided by the Islamic Republic will be used along with survey

data from 2009 to 2013, in order to study the influence of religion, ethnicity, allegiance, and the proximity to the capital on a strong religious-political framework. Comparing the religiosity of individual provinces against their respective ethnic and loyalty traits can shed light on whether religion supersedes variables found dominant in other regions (Kimenyi 2006).

This section will analyze per capita budgets in each province along with coded values from the survey on religion and ethnicity, as well as the voting patterns in each province. The voting records by province will be categorized into reformist or conservative groupings to allow an index of allegiance to be utilized in the model. Finally, the spatial distance between Tehran and the provincial capitals will also be utilized in this section, as this variable is central to the most common theory of Iranian scholars who believe that the greatest influence in Iranian economic matters is proximity to Tehran (Hafiznia and Qalibaf 2001; Bakhtiari et al. 2006; Hosseini 2015). With the level of importance of Islam in all matters, a rational expectation in a strong Islamic theocracy such as Iran is that the variable of religiosity would have the greatest influence on some economic decisions. In this chapter whether the Iranian scholars' theory of proximity is accurate, whether Islam is as ubiquitous as one would expect, or whether there is some other factor at play that has been observed in other regions such as ethnicity or allegiance. A finding substantiating the Iranian scholar theory of geography mentioned above would demonstrate that there could be many levels to Islamism. It could possibly normalize the state process in Iran, ruled by the Supreme Leader of the religion with governing committees such as the Guardian Council and Expediency Council, dedicated to ensuring almost all state matters are in line with their Islamic interpretation. This normalization would suggest that although a theocracy, Iran functions in a secular manner similar to less religious states.

The lack of research on religious governments by social scientists (Waskey 2007) is

mirrored by a lack of study on state resource distribution particularly in the Middle East (Anselmi et al. 2015). Both gaps are puzzling in that poverty, lack of opportunity, and power vacuums in the post-modern age are often cited as causes of Islamic radicalization and turmoil in the Middle East (Wimmer 2013). Nonetheless, resource distribution is an important matter to consider when examining state processes, whether it is a theocracy or democracy, as it is the grease that allows the state machinery to function. Movements such as Islamism may affect this grease, causing the state machinery to falter or adapt to new efficiencies. Saudi Arabia, for example, has had to co-opt the Islamist movement over decades, to maintain its monarchical control of the state (Al-Atawneh 2009). In states where resource distribution is highly inefficient, whether from corruption, political clientelism, or ineptitude, have historically had more occasions for interruptions in the form of revolutions and unrest.

4.2 Related Work

Political patronage, also termed clientelism, is a focus of a significant portion of resource distribution literature as every country in the world has an unequal per capita resource distribution and political influence is the most common source of "adjustment." With this point in mind, it is helpful to examine theories on patronage and public goods distribution, to understand this study's contribution to the literature. Indeed, as noted by Heeger (1974), patrimonialism in new states often incurs spoils apportioned by the leadership to various factions to retain their support (Theobald 1982). This study uses the provincial budgets distributed by the state as a method to determine that support. Even in a theocracy, especially one with such recent memories of revolution, some continued support by the populace is necessary to maintain power.

Common perception is that more religious provinces such as Qom and Khurason Rezavi receive more support specifically because they are religious epicenters of Iran. This study seeks to determine whether Heeger and Theobald's theories of patrimonialism hold for religion in a theocratic state as well.

Another facet of political clientelism is the interest-group theory of governance, which suggests that the state, in its own self-interest, takes corrective action in the distribution of goods to support their own constituency groups and prevent market failure (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). A result of this corrective action exacerbates in-group and out-group dynamics. Kimenyi (2006) used this theory to demonstrate that in African States, the distribution of public goods follows ethnic fractionalization. Franck and Ranier (2012) also explored ethnic favoritism by the state in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their study found that it occurred less frequently in countries with a high majority of a single religion, as would be the case with Iran, which has 90-95% Shi'a. Pitting ethnicity against religion as the underlying basis for the unequal distribution of goods allows this study to not only determine if Kimenyi's conclusions in Africa are region-specific, but also confirm whether Franck and Ranier's findings are accurate in Iran.

The most dominant theory that exists amongst Iranian scholars working in Iran regarding resource distribution is that spatial proximity to the capital of Iran, Tehran, is the greatest influence on provincial revenue, education, and even life expectancy, exceeding any influence from religion, ethnicity, or regime loyalty (Bakhtiari et al. 2006). This theory aligns well with Centeno and Enriquez's (2010) examination of Tilly's work applied to national state development from an imperial metropole. Concentrating the bulk of power and economic resources close to the centrally located capital is a concept seen in many countries and empires throughout history. This study's use of distances of province capitals from Tehran as an

independent variable against provincial budgets, seeks to validate the Iranian spatial proximity theory positioning Tehran as a metropole amongst its client provinces.

The political patronage and interest-group theories suggest resource distribution is based on a proclivity to a certain group, whether it is religious, ethnic, or simply regime loyalty. The Iranian spatial proximity theory would expect influence based on geographic distance to the capital. Three possible findings for this study related to the previous relevant work include: 1) support for political patronage and interest-group theory, 2) support for the Iranian Spatial proximity theory, or 3) further studies are required.

This theory exists external to Iran in Centeno and Enriquez's (2010) examination of Charles Tilly's work, applied to national state development from an imperial metropole. Iran's history as one of the world's great ancient empires, harmoniously incorporating a diverse collection of cultures and societies could provide the long-term historical roots of this geographically-based centrality theory as well. An ideal state distribution would have an equitable per capita expenditure of state funds amongst the various provinces. This theory however, would suggest a greater inequality in the border provinces that typically have an ethnic composition distinct from the central provinces.

This theory is refuted based on the data available in this study. As depicted in Figure 4.1, by simply plotting the regression lines of per capita budgets in each province with their respective distances from Tehran, the trend is opposite to the theory, with greater per capita provincial budgets rising on the y-axis as the distance from Tehran on the x-axis increases. This evident in every year from 2005 to 2014, as shown in the individual graphs found in Appendix IV as well. If this centrality theory is not corroborated by the data, the question still remains, what other factors might influence the provincial budgets in Iran?



Figure 4.1 Per Capita Budgets by Distance from Tehran

As one might suspect, there is not a great deal of literature in the West on Iranian provincial politics and budgeting. Once the above question was considered, additional factors of ethnicity distribution and religious participation were introduced as they are both common to claims of inequality within Iran (Chehabi, 1997). Background on the initial allegiance question was derived mostly from political science literature on patrimonialism or political clientelism, which focuses on elections and how the incumbents in an authoritarian regime dole out state resources for political favorites (Blyades, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2006, 2008; Greene, 2007; Pepinsky, 2007; Masoud, 2008).

An Iranian paper by Professor Hosseini of the Economics Department at the University of Tehran provided a considerable degree of context from within Iran for this project. In his paper, a more updated, theoretically grounded copy of two chapters were provided by the author reflecting the properties of provincial budgets based on spatial distance from Tehran, along with

the normal considerations of oil, population density, provincial size, and other external factors. Hosseini examined these factors between 2000 and 2007 to determine if there was indeed a spatial effect on budgets, which he did find. What is not covered in his work is why this is the case. The examination of the independent variables of ethnicity, religiosity, and allegiance may provide alternative explanations for Professor Hosseini's spatial findings.

4.2.1 Contribution and Significance.

The three chapters described above will deepen the knowledge of the conditions for Islamism in the Middle East and Northern Africa region, a topic that is vastly understudied in the literature. With Chapter 2's minimal formula for Islamism, this generalization will not only contribute something new to the literature but also could potentially inform policy makers of the optimal conditions for more Islamist movement during transitional events in the Middle East and North Africa. Knowledge of these optimal conditions could aide in how much influence Western Powers apply to either support or hinder such Islamist movements through soft power.

Chapter Two deepens this knowledge even further through the historical context of two endpoint countries, Turkey and Iran. Examining in greater detail the conditions of Chapter One for these two cases offers a different methodological approach to the same topic, providing some robustness to the analysis. Finally, the level of importance of Islamism in a narrow instance of Iranian provincial budgets adds a quantitative approach that could normalize government functions in Iran. As one of the world's only existing theocracies, the dominance of religion in routine government processes is not well known. The difficulty in attaining data, as well as the opaqueness of the Iranian regime has long hindered such research. The findings of this research will begin to uncover some of the inner workings of the Iranian State and in the event the regime returns to the fold of the international community, will allow a better understanding for mutual

collaboration. Although these chapters will not provide causality of Islamism in the region, they should begin to frame the issue for further research on the subject. Greater understanding of political Islam is necessary not only in those interested in academia but also for the continued public and political dialogue that occurs daily.

4.2.2 Iranian Budgeting Process.

As noted in Professor Hosseini's paper, which certainly applies to this study as well, Iran's budgetary process is not a monolithic event but rather a marathon. It consists of a number of steps, passing through several entities before final approval in the Majlis. In a state-provided Budget Process Primer[8], the basic procedures for the creation of the budget are as follows: The President submits a budget to the Majlis by 6 December each year. The Majlis have 10 days to review the budget and then provide their recommendations to the Expert Committee, a special group within the Majlis that focuses on key areas of health, education, defense, and security. The Expert Committee then has 15 days to provide their report to the Compilation Committee. The Compilation Committee reviews the report and provides a final assessment back to the Majlis General Assembly where only recommendations from the Compilation Committee can be debated. There must be an agreement of two-thirds of the General Assembly to move the budget on to an allocation part of the process. The General Assembly will debate the allocation recommendations in the report, item by item with two-thirds approval necessary to proceed. The budget then proceeds to the Guardian Council for ratification, after assessing its compliance with Islamic Law and the Constitution. Any irreconcilable differences between the Guardian Council

[8] The full Budget Process Primer can be found at https://www.nabziran.com/sites/default/files/iran_budget_process_primer_en.pdf.

and Majlis are sent to the Expediency Council for final arbitration. The budget is then signed into law by the speaker of the Majlis and sent to the President for implementation.

A special "Did you know?" box within the Budget Process Primer notes, "The amount of funds that your province receives is influenced in part by bargaining among the Majlis representatives, as well as the nature of the relationship between Majlis members and your provincial officials." It is in these procedures, with the lobbying efforts mentioned above, that the influence of the independent variables of this study occurs. Any patronage found in the dependent variable, the province budget, is most likely due to several of these groups—the Majlis, the Expert Committee, the Compilation Committee, and the Guardian Council—acting in a biased manner. Bias within the process would be nothing new. An often-cited example in elections is how the regime mitigates opposition by tightly controlling the presidential and legislative candidates to be considered, ruling most of the registered candidates as "un-Islamic" and disqualified from the ballot. Indeed, the most surprising finding possible of this study would be if there was no influence on the budgets by any of these measures.

4.3 Analysis

The examination of resource distribution in Chapter Three leverages the budgetary data from all of Iran's 31 provinces, to determine how religiosity, ethnicity, allegiance, and geography influence a theocracy. The use of four waves of survey questions from 2009-2013 on how often religious services were attended, as well as ethnic identification, will provide the independent variables of religiosity and ethnicity. Voting patterns for reformist or conservative candidates in each province for elections from 1997-2013 were used for allegiance values. The geographic distance in kilometers from the province capital to Tehran was used for the geographic variable to determine if proximity to the capital bears influence on the process. A

multilevel model will be constructed using the independent variables listed above along with the dependent variable of per capita budget percentages to account for various sizes of the provinces.

The initial hypothesis for this study is that greater religious participation positively and significantly influences the per capita budget received by the province.

H_1 => Greater religious participation positively influences the per capita budget received by the province (4.1)

This supports the political clientelism and interest-group theories discussed earlier. Additionally the following hypotheses will also be tested, lending similar support:

H_2 => Higher ethnic heterogeneity positively influences provincial per capita budgets received by the provinces (4.2)

H_3 => Greater provincial votes for conservative candidates in previous elections positively influence per capita budgets received by the provinces. (4.3)

These hypotheses seek other influences to the provincial budgets but still substantiate the political clientelism and interest-group theories. The final hypothesis supports the Iranian spatial proximity theory mentioned earlier:

H_4 => Less distance in kilometers between the provincial capital and Tehran positively influences per capita budgets received (4.4)

The hypotheses mentioned above take into consideration whether state leaders and provincial populations are ethnically heterogeneous, the degree to which a provincial population attends religious services, as well as the aggregate provincial loyalty to the regime in previous elections. For this project, the dependent variable was the approved per capita budget of each province per year from 2005 to 2014. Therefore, the unit of analysis will be province per year. There are data points for 31 provinces over these nine years, which provide 279 possible points to consider for the study. A Multilevel analysis methodology should produce both fixed-effects

and random-effects models that account for variation *between* provinces as well as *within* provinces over time.

In this chapter, it is determined whether spatial centrality, the foremost theory in Iran, holds the greatest influence on state support, contradicting one of our hypotheses that religion matters the most. Provinces such as Qom, Esfahan, Alborz, and Mazandaran, all provinces encompassing Tehran, are believed to receive more resources from the state than others at the periphery such as Sistan and Baluchistan, Bushehr, Kurdistan, and Ardabil. Religious intensity, the variable believed to be the most influential in Iran, provides a specific example of the level that Islamism pervades the national economic structure. Iran, as the extreme side of the Islamism spectrum, helps establish some benchmarks for how allotropic political Islam can be.

4.3.1 Research Design.

The hypotheses mentioned above take into consideration whether state leaders and provincial populations are ethnically heterogeneous, the degree to which a provincial population attends religious services, as well as the aggregate provincial loyalty to the regime in previous elections. For this project, the dependent variable is the approved per capita budget of each province per year from 2005 to 2014. Therefore, the unit of analysis will be province per year. There are data points for 30 provinces over these nine years, which will provide 270 possible points to consider for the study. A measure of heterogeneity, religious participation per province, and percentage of voters for reformist candidates in the 2005, 2009, and 2013 presidential elections represent the previously mentioned independent variables. By using proportions of budgets instead of actual numbers, one can control for the price of oil and effects of sanctions, as

well as inflation, all of which are external influences, clouding the possible discovery of political clientelism.

4.3.2 Data.

The major challenge of any research regarding Iran is often simply finding data. The transition from a monarchy, which was moving towards modernization, to the Islamic Republic, which is notoriously opaque with its governmental processes, hinders a great deal of quantitative macro-analysis. To overcome this, Iranian Studies researchers must overturn many rocks in the hopes of uncovering nuggets of information that can be pieced together for their examination. This study was no exception. Not only did this paper require a good deal of rock-turning, several assumptions had to be made to account for items difficult to measure, such as allegiance. As indicated in Table 4.1, all dependent and independent measures were not available for all of the years of the study, requiring some of the following caveats.

Table 4.1 Measures Available

Measures	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Budgets	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ethnicity						☐	☐	☐	☐	
Religious Participation						☐	☐	☐	☐	
Allegiance (Election Results)	☐				☐				☐	
Population		☐							☐	

The major coup in rock-turning for data involved the discovery of a survey that included four years of ethnicity and religious participation data by province from 2010-2013; one of several copies made was found at the Parke Shahr Public Library in Tehran. The survey, entitled

The Measured Indicators of Public Culture, was utilized in facilitating this study. With the generous support of the faculty and graduate students of the University of Tehran, copies of the survey encompassing hundreds of documents and tables, were sent by mail to be reassembled and examined by Iranian research assistants at Princeton hired for the study. The measures of ethnic heterogeneity and religious participation were stable enough over the four years to allow a mean value to be used as a constant for each province for the period of this study, 2005-2014.

The difficulty in finding ethnicity data in Iran cannot be overstated. Iran is one of the few countries in the world that does not account for ethnic groups in their national, regional, or municipal censuses. The Islamic Republic views ethnic nepotism as a potential catalyst for dissent, and is disinterested in any public dissemination of their composition (Elling, 2013). In addition to the ethnicity sampling, also included in the study were questions on religious participation. As indicated in Appendix L, the sample sizes ranged from 500-650 in each province, yielding approximately 17,000 interviewed.

Visual representations of the ethnicity data, Figure 4.2, and religious participation, Figure 4.3, allow for a basic understanding of the centrality/periphery theory of inequality discussed earlier in the relevant literature section. As shown, central provinces retain an ethnic majority of Fars while the peripheral provinces consist of other groups. The basis of the centrality theory mentioned earlier, as well as the reason for the most common Iranian perception is most likely found in this ethnic distribution.





Figure 4.2 Ethnic Concentrations **Figure 4.3 Religious Concentrations**

Interestingly, the centrality theory is not supported by the religious participation data. As one can see from Figure 4.3, there is no majority of devout attendance aligned with the center. In fact, it is almost the opposite of what one might expect, with more religious participation in the periphery and lesser degrees at the center.

The most substantial initial assumption for the study was that voting for conservative candidates during presidential elections represents allegiance to the government. There are certainly different levels of dissatisfaction with the government. This assumption does not suggest that voting for a reformist candidate is the equivalent of seeking total regime change; however it does convey some level of dissatisfaction with the current state structure and underlines a level of desire for a different outcome. This assumption can work both ways when compared to provincial budgets. Allegiance, measured for this study in conservative votes, can be viewed in two ways: (1) citizens rewarding an incumbent's government spending with their votes (or punishing an incumbent for lack of government spending) when past spending is considered by the voters *prior* to the election, or (2) it can also be the cause of an increase or decrease in provincial spending by the state or incumbent *after* an election as a reward or punishment. The former is more useful in democratic systems as the reward/punishment effect of

voting for incumbents is the primary influential mechanism that maintains the political order. The latter is more pertinent for more authoritarian systems in which the state does not adjust by voting, but actually provides patronage post-election to its clientele (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). This study will utilize the latter description in order to be more consistent with the authoritarian political clientelism literature discussed in the earlier section.

The pattern of voting concentrations for the 2005, 2009, and 2013 elections further confounds an expectation from the centrality theory, which would suggest that peripheral states largely support reformists while the central provinces support the conservative, regime-backed candidates. The basic pattern of the majority of votes in each province as indicated in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 demonstrates there are no constants, or consistent loyalties, with green areas voting primarily for reformists (above 65%), orange voting for reformists (less than 35%), and yellow a mix of the two (between 35 – 65%) this suggests that over the course of three elections, provinces vacillated in their support, similar to American states changing between blue and red.



Figure 4.4 Presidential Votes, 2005



Figure 4.5 Presidential Votes, 2009



Figure 4.6 Presidential Votes, 2013

The voting patterns for both 2005 and 2009 were clearly for the conservative party, and were ultimately won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in both elections. In these elections, one can see a slight pattern of reformist leaning in the peripheral provinces. This is not as clear with the election of 2013 in which most of the provinces voted for a mix of reformist and conservative candidates. Another important point regarding the allegiance data is that the election data from 2009 was widely considered as compromised by the government to support Ahmadinejad's election as President. Two hours after the polls closed, the regime announced that the 38 million valid votes had been counted to elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with 62% (Mebane, 2010). Without the ability for independent accountability in the election numbers, the available data are the only option for this analysis unfortunately. This exemplifies why Iranian Studies continue to present many difficult research problems.

In addition to assumptions made about the independent variables, it was necessary to make some assumptions with the dependent variable (provincial budgets) as well. There are two budgets often listed for each province in Iran in government documents: a practical budget, representing what the provinces actually use (and need), and an approved budget from the Majlis, which was what they were allowed to spend. The practical budget not only included what

the province received from Tehran but also from other internal sources as well. For the purposes of this study, the approved budget was utilized, as it was the best reflection of the state's resource distribution to the provinces. The budget data gathered for this project also required turning over quite a few rocks, as there was no single repository for provincial budgets to be found for the entire length of the study. As indicated in Appendix M, the sources for provincial budget data included the website for the Iranian Majlis, microfiche from editions of the *Iranian Statistical Yearbook*, the Iranian Expediency Council's website, the Budget Planning Institute, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance publications, and the Agriculture-Jahad Ministry website. Each of these sources had partial data for the years considered but none had data for all years. These sources were also exclusively in Persian, requiring native expertise in distilling the data. The Iranian research assistants for this project spent approximately 200 hours collecting this information from the various sources, all of which is now posted on Princeton University's Iran Data portal[9] along with all of the other sets of data gathered for this paper.

The primary data indicating allegiance to the regime was based on a table of presidential election figures for the years considered. Unfortunately, election data prior to 2005 were not available. The data for population numbers were attained through the National Population and Housing Census, which is typically produced every 10 years (1976, 1986, 1996, and 2006) as well as the website for the Statistical Center of Iran, as noted in Table 4.1 earlier. Another necessary adjustment occurred with these population figures, which

were linearly interpolated between known values to provide reasonable annual population values used to provide the per capita budgets in each province.

[9] The budgetary data for the Provinces of Iran can be accessed on the Iran Data Portal at http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/.
The original data for all examined variables used in this project can be found at: https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B3oKGKwMb1uyR1FvUVBUcXpUM0U&authuser=0.

4.3.3 Operationalization of Measures.

This section explains in detail the manner in which the budget, survey, and election data were refined for analysis. Together with the original data provided above, these methods as explained should allow full replication of the findings. The values of ethnicity found in the survey mentioned above were combined to form the percentages of Fars and non-Fars for each particular province. Fars being the dominant ethnic group nationally with 51% (Hosseini, 2015) as well as forming the overwhelming majority in both Tehran and the parliament was utilized as the baseline ethic group. As an example, a province with 24% Kurds, 30% Turk, 35% Fars, 8% Arab, and 3% others was given a non-Fars percentage of 0.65. There was no level of distinction between the minority ethnic groups other than that they were in the minority and lumped together. As mentioned earlier, another more refined and commonly used approach to examine ethnicity in each province is to consider the ethnic heterogeneity as well. Provinces with high ethnic heterogeneity were less likely to be singled out for bias simply based on ethnicity. More ethnically homogeneous provinces incurred some greater level of bias that could reflect in their budget if ethnicity is an influential factor. As our comparison only considers two groups, Fars and non-Fars ethnic groups, ethnic heterogeneity within each province can be calculated as the following (essentially calculated the same way as the Herfindahl Index of heterogeneity but with only two groups):

ethnic heterogeneity = (ethnicity mean) x (1 – ethnicity mean) in each province. (4.4)

Values for religious participation were slightly more difficult to measure and quantify. There were two approaches commonly used to determine religiosity. The analysis was conducted using both methods to determine any disparity between the methods. The first method, utilized often in health studies, was to use a scale of 0-52 based on 52 weeks of religious attendance as a full measure of religious participation. The values used for religious participation corresponded directly with the categories used in the survey. Based on the survey response to "How often do you attend religious services?" available categories of responses were every week, 2-3 times per month, once per month, less than once per month, only on special days, never, and don't know/didn't answer. Those that attended religious services each week received a full 52 value. Those that attend two to three times a month received a value of 30 (between 24 and 36 times averaged to 30), once a month saw a value of 12, less than once a month were issued a value of 6 (between 12 and 0), and special occasions with 4 (as there are four special occasions per year). The "don't knows" and "didn't answers" received a mid value of 26 to account for those who just don't attend at all as well as those that attend so frequently they just couldn't keep track. This is not a perfect solution but with most of the "don't knows/didn't answers" being at or under 1%, the problem is minimal. The percentage of respondents for each survey response (every week, 2-3 times per month, once per month, etc.) was then used as a weight to multiply the category number (52, 30, 12, 6, 4, 26) to compute a weighted average. For example, if 23% surveyed in a particular province stated that they attended religious services every week, the weighted value would be .23 x 52 or 11.96. The weighted values for each level (52, 30, 12, 6, 4, 26) were then added together for a final total value of religious participation for that province during that particular year. A mean of the four years provided a religiosity value for that

province, as the four values were stable enough to allow for an accurate constant. This method provided a full measure of how much religious attendance occurred at all levels.

The alternative method for religious participation values was to assign category values of (6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 4) based on a scale of 0-6 instead of the 52-week method for a simple assignment of religiosity survey responses. In a similar manner as above, the product of the category value and percentage that category was included for all categories, to provide a single weighted-average value of religiosity per province per year. The mean of the four years was used for the religiosity value for that province. As mentioned with the previous method, values across the four years were stable enough to allow for an accurate constant value derived in the mean.

Political allegiance values were calculated with the number of voters for reformist candidates divided by the total number of valid voters per province. If there were multiple reformist candidates, their votes were added together. This provided a percentage value for each province per election year that represented the proportion of the population seeking a reform candidate. This presented the problem of what to do for the interceding years. As with the religious attendance values, there are two methods commonly used, both of which were followed for this study to examine any disparity between the two. The first method was a simple linear interpolation between the two known values for the interceding years. For example, in a particular province, if the 2005 election year allegiance value was 0.24, and the 2009 allegiance value was 0.48, then allegiance for that province during the interceding years of 2006, 2007, and 2008, would respectively be, 0.30, 0.36, and 0.42. The logic in interpolating the values between election years was that changes in opinions are typically measured on election days only, but could occur over the non-election years as well. This interpolation method also provides greater degrees of freedom for the analysis. The alternative method took the last election value and

carried it forward until the next election value. For example, if in the election of 2005, a province had a value of .48 (meaning 48% of the province voted for a reformist candidate), that value was carried forward in the next three non-election years as well, so that 2006, 2007, and 2008 would all receive a value of .48. The value would then change for the next election and carry forward again. This is called the last observation carried forward (LOCF) method. This method assumes that a change in opinion, or allegiance as it is termed in this study, only occurs on election days. Despite the weakness of this assumption and the LOCF method, it was also used in comparison to the interpolation method to determine the findings.

The approved total budgets in each province were first converted to a percentage of the sum of province budgets so that inflation, varying oil prices, and other external factors could be controlled for. This normalization measured provincial budgets not in units of currency, but as a relative percentage for each province that could be used for comparison purposes with the budgets of other provinces. These percentages were then divided by the respective province populations for that year, to produce values for per capita budgets.

The data were then arranged in a single datasheet with 30 rows of provinces and columns for budgets by year, means of ethnicity by year, religious participation percentages for each category response (every week, 2-3 times per month, once per month, etc.) by year, population values by year, and allegiance values (percentage of votes for reformist candidates in each province) by year. The datasheet was then imported into statistical software for data cleaning and analysis.[10]

[10] The full code for cleaning and analysis can be accessed at: https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B3oKGKwMb1uySVZEckZicGltdE0&authuser=0.

Once the data were cleaned and organized into a vector and matrix format, it was then converted from a wide format, with rows of provinces and columns of variables such as budgets, ethnicity, etc. to a long format, indicated in Table 4.2, which is truncated to three years for demonstration purposes. Converting from wide format to long format allows for the examination *within* the province over time, as well as *between* provinces by using STATA statistical software. This step is important as it represents two influences that are necessary to examine in the analysis: what happens between provinces and what happens within the province over time. Using STATA packages specifically designed for this analysis was simpler than attempting to do so in R statistical software.

Table 4.2 Long Format of Data

Province ID*(i)*	Time*(t)*	Allegiance	Ethnicity	Religiosity	per capita Bud
1	1	x_{11}	n_1	r_1	y_{11}
1	2	x_{12}	n_1	r_1	y_{12}
1	3	x_{13}	n_1	r_1	y_{13}
2	1	x_{21}	n_2	r_2	y_{21}
2	2	x_{22}	n_2	r_2	y_{22}
2	3	x_{23}	n_2	r_2	y_{23}
3	1	x_{31}	n_3	r_3	y_{31}
3	2	x_{32}	n_3	r_3	y_{32}
.	.	.	.	.	.

The long format used in STATA requires the first column, as the various provinces, repeated 10 times for the 10 years examined in the study (only three years - 1, 2, and 3, are shown for the example below), the second column numbering time (years) 1-10 and then repeated for each province, the third column as the time-varying allegiance value, the fourth column was time-invariant ethnicity constant for each province, the fifth column was the time-invariant religious

constant, and the final column was the outcome measure, per capita budget in each province. Once this information was listed in the appropriate format, the multilevel modeling and analysis with STATA could be properly performed. [11]

4.3.4 Modeling.

As in the two previous sections, a discussion on the modeling process provides full details of the path to the findings. Often, much of this step-by-step approach for multilevel modeling is left out of research reports. Although this approach was not simple, it is delineated to provide clarity on the method utilized for modeling, and remove any hint of smoke and mirrors in the analysis. Multilevel modeling was utilized for this study as it examined influences both *within* the province over time, as well as *between* the provinces. Additionally, there are time invariant variables such as ethnicity and religious participation, which remained constant for this period, as well as time-varying variables, which multilevel modeling was able to accommodate unlike other methods. This model included the provincial level (level 2), in which most of the values are entered, in addition to the time level within this model (level 1). If one were to use standard regression methods, the risk of underestimating the standard errors of regression coefficients, leading to possible Type 1 errors could occur (Luke, 2004).

Two of the three independent variables, ethnicity and religious participation, were treated as constant for these years as the standard deviation was consistently less than 5% across years 2009-2013, and were not available for all other years. Examination with a fixed effects model, in which unobserved variables were treated as fixed parameters, was not as valuable as utilizing

[11] The STATA code for this analysis can be found at: https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B3oKGKwMb1uyOW5HWWJJYTVNSzg&authuser=0.

random effects modeling in which the unobserved variables (treated as part of the error term) were assumed to be uncorrelated with the observed, independent variables (Allison 2009). Utilizing the random effects models also allowed for an examination of the difference *between* provinces as well as *within* provinces over time. Use of the fixed effects models would *only* show the differences within provinces, eliminating a good portion of information between provinces. The risk in including the between province variation, as mentioned earlier, was that if there are effects at work in the provinces that are not accounted for, they could have some relationship to our independent variables of ethnicity, religiosity, and allegiance, which could confound the model (Allison 2009). It is challenging enough to explain the known influences, let alone knowing how the unknown influences work; therefore, although random effects models are used primarily, as one can see in the robustness checks, utilizing fixed effects models provided similar results for comparison purposes.

For this data, a basic equation that accounts for all of the variables needed is:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{00} + \beta_1 x_{it} + \beta_2 n_i + \beta_3 r_i + \beta_4 t_{it} + e_{it}, \quad \text{where } e_{it} = u_i + w_{it}. \tag{4.5}$$

e_{it} is the error term that can be broken down into uncorrelated, unobserved error, w_{it}, as well as an element of unobserved error, u_i, that *does* correlate to our outcome variable. By breaking the error terms apart, it allowed the correlated error, u_i, to be combined with the intercept for each province, β_0, and time-invariant variables, *n* and *r,* to create a single constant, β_{00}. As mentioned earlier, using multi-level modeling allowed one to establish a second level equation indicated in Equation 4.7.

Level 1: $Y_{it} = b_{i0} + \beta_1 x_{it} + \beta_4 t_{it} + w_{it}$ (4.6)

Level 2: $b_{i0} = \beta_{00} + u_i + \beta_{01} n_i + \beta_{02} r_i$ (4.7)

In this equation, β_{00} is the grand mean in which the provincial random effects of the error term, u_i, were included. This allows time-varying variables, like allegiance along with its uncorrelated, and unobserved error, w_{it}, to remain separated from the time-invariant measures, like ethnicity and religiosity along with their unobserved error, u_i. This also demonstrates why this method is often called mixed effects. It includes *both* the random effects in level 2 and fixed effects in level 1.

To check the intuition, a Hausman Test was conducted to determine whether fixed effects or random effects modeling would best represent our data. For the Hausman test, there was an assumption that for random effects, Equation 4.8 was true.

Cov (r_{it} X_{it}) = O where r_{it} is the unknown effects and X_{it} is the independent variable (ethnicity, religiosity or allegiance) (4.8)

This was important because if Equation 4.8 was true, the calculation of the Hausman statistic, shown in Equation 4.9, where β_{FE} is the parameter from fixed effects, and β_{RE} from random effects, should yield a very small H.

$$H = \frac{(\beta_{FE} - \beta_{RE})^2}{Var(\beta_{FE}) - Var(\beta_{RE})}, \quad (4.9)$$

If the null hypothesis is not true, one would expect to see a large value of H, and significant chi squared value, demonstrating that fixed effects is the best estimation strategy to utilize. In testing, the chi squared value for this study was not significant at .64, suggesting that the H_o, Cov (r_{it} X_{it}) = O, is true and that a random effects model is the best estimator for the data.

The four models utilized for the analysis are described in Table 6.2 below. Model #1 used the religious participation values of (6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 4) as the weights with the survey percentages within the provinces. It also used the allegiance value from the last election carried forward (LOCF) through the non-election years.

Table 4.3 Variation in methods used in the four models

Models	Ethnic Heterogeneity	Religiosity	Allegiance
Model #1	$\bar{x}$ (1 - $\bar{x}$)	(6,5,4,3,2,4) values	LOCF method
Model #2	$\bar{x}$ (1 - $\bar{x}$)	(52,30,12,6,4,26) values	LOCF method
Model #3	$\bar{x}$ (1 - $\bar{x}$)	(52,30,12,6,4,26) values	Interpolated method
Model #4	$\bar{x}$ (1 - $\bar{x}$)	(6,5,4,3,2,4) values	Interpolated method

For Model #2, the religious participation values of (52, 30, 12, 6, 4, 26) were used instead, and the allegiance values utilized the LOCF method. For Model #3, the religious participation values of (52, 30, 12, 6, 4, 26) were used but allegiance values during the non-election years were interpolated linearly between the two election year numbers. Model #4 utilized the (6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 4) religious participation values as well as the interpolated method for allegiance. The use of the four variations allows for an examination of the basic model with a consideration for the various operationalization decisions made with certain variables.

4.3.5 Results.

The random effects analysis of all four models failed to have any significant values for both ethnicity and religious participation, as indicated in Table 7.1. Contrary to the previous theory on ethnic heterogeneity, neither variable showed significant correlation to the per capita budget in each province. This contrasts the findings of many African studies that find ethnic heterogeneity to be a significant influence on state distribution of goods and services. It demonstrates that patronage in Iran does ***not*** significantly occur along the lines of ethnicity or religious lines. The only significant results found were those for allegiance. For this period, only models #3 and #4 were statistically significant, where values of allegiance were interpolated between elections, rather than simply carried forward from the last election (LOCF). Allowing

greater degrees of freedom with models #3 and #4 could be a reason for the significant results. Models #3 and #4 show that with greater votes for reformist candidates in a presidential election, there *is* a negative effect on their respective provincial budget.

Models #3 and #4 show that with greater votes for reformist candidates in a presidential election, there *is* a negative effect on their respective provincial budget. If a majority of the province votes for the reformist candidate in an election, there is a correlated drop in their per capita budgets provided by the regime. To determine how robust these results were for allegiance, further analysis was done with both random and fixed effects as well as basic regression for comparison purposes.

Table 4.4 Coefficient Estimates of Per Capita Provincial Budgets, modeled with Random Effects.

	Model #1	*Model #2*	*Model #3*	*Model #4*
Year	-0.0000635	-0.0000634	-0.0000025	-0.00000212
	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.000058)	(0.0000586)
Ethnic heterogeneity	-0.0262	-0.0244	-0.0244	-0.0261
	(0.0153)	(0.0156)	(0.0155)	(0.015)
Religiosity	0.000406	0.00369	0.00406	0.000469
	(0.000483)	(0.0039)	(0.00387)	(0.000477)
Allegiance	0.000197	0.00021	**-0.00384***	**-0.00387***
	(0.00146)	(0.00146)	(0.00191)	(0.00191)
Constant	0.017**	0.0134	0.0138	0.0175
	(0.00633)	(0.00922)	(0.00913)	(0.00625)
n	271	271	271	271
σ_u	0.00704	0.00703	0.00695	0.00694
σ_e	0.00215	0.00215	0.00213	0.00213
ρ	0.914	0.914	0.913	0.913

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 4.5 shows solely the allegiance values of statistical testing in the four models with all of the control variables included for both random and fixed effects. The results shown in Table 4.4 also hold somewhat true with fixed effects, which obscures the *between* province variation in addition to basic regression analysis as well but still remains on the edge of significance. The aforementioned findings that allegiance is correlated to provincial budgets, do not necessarily translate to causation however. To provide a deeper understanding of the provincial drivers of these findings, a plot of the change in per capita budget and change in allegiance was made.

Table 4.5 Modeling Effects and P-values for Allegiance

Models and Variations	Coef.	p-value	r-squared
Random effects GLS, Model #1	.0001968	0.893	0.1058
Random effects GLS, Model #2	0.886	0.886	0.1095
Random effects GLS, Model #3	**-.0038428**	**0.044***	**0.1191**
Random effects GLS, Model #4	**-.0038718**	**0.043***	**0.1166**
Fixed effects GLS, Model #1	.0002593	0.860	0.0018
Fixed effects GLS, Model #2	.0002593	0.860	0.0018
Fixed effects GLS, Model #3	**-.0036968**	**0.056**	**0.0011**
Fixed effects GLS, Model #4	**-.0036968**	**0.056**	**0.0011**
Regression, Model #1	-.0011117	0.764	0.1066
Regression, Model #2	-.0005764	0.871	0.1100
Regression, Model #3	**-.0086188**	**0.037***	**0.1244**
Regression, Model #4	**-.010171**	**0.019***	**0.1246**

In Figure 4.7, the shaded quadrants show the provinces that support Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis suggests that when the allegiance variable increases (greater voting for reformist candidates), the per capita budget decreases, represented in the bottom right shaded quadrant, and as the allegiance variable decreases (greater voting for conservative candidates), the per capita budget increases seen in the top left shaded quadrant. The number supporting Hypothesis 3, 21 out of 31 provinces, is substantial, especially considering that there are an additional five provinces relatively close to the line. The dilemma with these findings is that there are a number

of possible unknown influences. The number of committees and interaction involved within the Majlis creating the budgets certainly brings in most of these possibilities, which could not be completely accounted for in this research. The strongest conclusion in this study can make is that there is a relationship between voting results for the conservative or reformist candidates and the budget the province receives between 2005 and 2013.



Figure 4.7 Growth Plot of Allegiance and Budget

There is no discernable pattern for the Fars versus non-Fars ethnic groups that supports this hypothesis or religious participation that supports this hypothesis as one would expect from the insignificant results mentioned earlier for ethnic heterogeneity or religious participation.

4.4 Conclusion

The findings from this examination of data from years 2005 to 2013 provide three significant theoretical contributions. The first, as discussed earlier in the report, is in conflict with the centrality theory, which suggests that a closer proximity to Tehran equates to more resources for the province. As demonstrated in Figure 4.1, the data does not support this and in fact, shows a slight increase of per capita budgets as province capitals increase in distance from

Tehran. This finding contradicts several economic studies in Iran, thus offering an alternative explanation of influence rather than solely a spatial factor. The second is that contrary to the African studies citied earlier on ethnic heterogeneity, the interest group theory of governance does not appear to apply in Iran during the analyzed years. The data demonstrates that ethnic heterogeneity plays a limited role in influencing Iranian provincial budgets. This point could be considered controversial in Iran, as most Iranians believe there is a large disparity between the services and budgets of peripheral provinces along the borders of Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, compared to the central provinces surrounding the capital. There are several reasons why these findings may differ from what is commonly perceived in Iran. The inequality between provinces may be a historical phenomenon that has been recently corrected, especially after the major provincial budget reform of 1999-2000, which centralized more spending rather than providing it to the provinces. It is possible that this budget reform corrected for past disparities in some meaningful way. Perceived disparities in infrastructure, life expectancy, and literacy for example, all require decades rather than a few years to change significantly. The budget may not *now* be influenced by the ethnic composition or religious attendance, but the effects of previous decades of bias could still remain. In examining the raw per capita budgets in each province during the analysis, values hovered primarily around 15,000 to 18,000 rials per person. There were a few provinces in which values of 25,000 and 30,000 rials per person were found, suggesting that there is indeed still some disparity in the budgets. Overall however, it does not happen in a consistent or significant manner in relation to ethnicity. Further examination of the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and provincial budgets in the years prior to 2005 may yield other findings.

The third contribution is with political science budget theory and political clientelism theory, which may also benefit from the findings of this study. The evidence of a relationship between voting patterns and provincial budgets suggests the possibility of a reward/punishment mechanism at work substantiating the patronage theory. As mentioned earlier however, causation cannot be subscribed to by this study without additional research that includes the ideological makeup of the Majlis during this period. Unfortunately, this information is not publicly available at this time. Once it is published, consideration of the Majlis majority can be taken into account for this analysis as well.

In addition to the theoretical contributions mentioned above, these findings also have policy implications for Iran. In consideration of the 48th Article of the Islamic Republic previously mentioned, the possibility of bias in the provincial budgets does little to support the regime's argument of fighting inequality, a chief tenet of the 1979 revolution (Kurzman 2005). Inequitable per capita distribution of state resources based on voting patterns could be viewed as the seeds of popular frustration. Contentious political theory suggests that greater frustration leads to anger, and anger provides a greater disposition to violence (Gurr, 2011). The Islamic Republic currently has enough to be concerned about with the Iranian youth's increasing desire for social reforms, international political pressure for nuclear appeasement, and an aging clerical leadership that represents the last active participants of the revolution. Growing resource deprivation, another key concept in contentious political theory, provides an additional item of concern in a society that is savvy of their recent revolutionary history.

Chapter 5

IRAN'S LESSON FOR TURKEY ON ISLAMISM

The previous chapters analyzed Islamism through a structural lens encompassing the region, a historical comparative approach between the dipoles, and finally a quantitative examination in a singular country. Up to this point, the focus has been on factors affecting Islamism in a particular country, such as the structural factors discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, and the pervasiveness of those factors, explored in Chapter 4. With this information in mind, this chapter takes advantage of timing to discuss a current transformation occurring in Turkey, alongside the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. It is helpful to study ways to recognize this Islamist movement altering society and the state as it occurs, rather than solely as a historical event. Some argue that since the 1980 military coup in Turkey, small changes have occurred both within society and the state that have forever altered the traditionally secular state. The case of Turkey demonstrates the gradual incorporation of Islamist sensitivities into the government (Yavuz and Esposito 2003; Mardin 2006). Since 2002, the Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP) has controlled the Turkish Government and progressively implemented changes that have weakened Ataturk's secular vision for the country.

This chapter will examine this slow but steady, Turkish progression towards Islamism in comparison to Iran's rapid transformation in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. By comparing these two cases, structural changes to society are most perceptible in three key areas in both cases: educational reforms to influence future stakeholders of the system, judicial reforms to influence

legal constraints, and the neutralization of the military to influence armed opposition. These areas reveal major societal changes that have occurred with Islamism, whether a slow, methodical Turkish movement, or a rapid Iranian Islamic revolution. Islamism is on the rise and nowhere is it more evident than in Turkey in the wake of the coup attempt of 2016. In line with the definition provided in Chapter 1, Islamism as a reform movement and political ideology seeks to reorder government in accordance with Shari'a law. The intent of this chapter is not to posit that all Islamist movements are the same, but that the existence of this movement can be seen in these three key structural areas.

Prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the term and concept of Islamism was scarcely known (Mozaffari 2007). While some religious scholars and activists had discussed the topic, it was not until Ayatollah Khomeini made it a reality that the ideology was universally introduced. Iran experienced a very rapid conversion from monarchy to theocracy that had major repercussions for every citizen. The backdrop of Iran's case allows one to study Turkey's progression in greater detail with this historical context in mind. Although the recent coup in Turkey on July 15th, 2016 did not alter the country in the same way as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it does demonstrate the parallels that exist in both countries, helpful for the discussion in this chapter.

In both cases, a large portion of the population in the capital cities took to the streets in demonstration, regardless of their views on Islamism. In Iran during the final months of 1978, secularists, communists, and liberal academics stood shoulder to shoulder with Qom religious students against the Shah and by their significant numbers convinced the military to declare its neutrality, allowing the revolution to occur. On the night of the most recent failed coup in Turkey, thousands from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) – the Islamist-leaning

conservative party, along with liberals, students, intelligentsia and elites, took to the streets of Istanbul to protest against the military actions, eventually convincing the military to abandon the coup leaders and end the coup.

In Turkey, suspicion for instigating the coup was cast on a cleric, Fethullah Gülen, self-exiled for 17 years. In Iran, another cleric-Ayatollah Khomenei, had been exiled for 15 years prior to orchestrating the revolution and eventually took control of the government as the Supreme Leader. Following the revolution in Iran, the United States refused to extradite the Shah to the revolutionaries, sparking significant outrage in Iran. In Turkey following the coup, the U.S. refused to extradite Fethullah Gülen, who Turkey claimed to be the head of a vast network of opposition to the Turkish government and sponsor of the coup, exacerbating relations between Washington and Istanbul. These parallels on the religious-political landscape, although somewhat superficial, are not isolated, as is demonstrated in this chapter.

This chapter will examine the historical context of the post-revolution actions of the revolutionary council in Iran for the first two years, which has been sufficiently catalogued in the literature. Turkey's current Islamist activities, beginning for the most part in 2002 with the AKP winning the majority of the government, are a slightly tougher topic to discern as the regime has closed down any opposition news outlets in the country after 2015 and curtailed much of the information about its activities, except for the state-run media. Interviews with senior military colleagues from the Turkish military residing in Europe provided critical information for understanding the drastic changes occurring within the military. A research assistant living in Istanbul provided translated documentation of policy changes within the Ministry of Education, as well as the judicial system. The research assistant, a teacher in both the public and private school systems in Turkey, was able to describe educational policy reforms determined by the

government as affecting curriculum, dress, and job opportunities since 2002. She was also able to translate key legislative changes affecting the judicial system, openly reported in Turkey over the past 15 years.

Turkey's failed military coup in 2016 is not a starting point for the Islamist movement in Turkey but rather an inflection point in which greater changes have occurred since the AKP's control of the state. The pre-coup years of AKP's dominance in Turkish politics is the focus, with the more recent post-coup activities supporting the argument. The intent of this analysis is to determine whether the Islamist movement afoot in Turkey under the leadership of President Erdoğan is reminiscent of actions by the clerical leadership following Iran's revolution. It does not suggest that Islamism in both countries is the same but that structural changes are required in society for the movement to continue unimpeded. It is unlikely that Turkey will become a theocracy in the way that Iran has, as the Sunni clerical leadership in Turkey do not have the hierarchy found with the Shi'a in Iran.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of several theories of Islamist movements to frame the research. It then covers Iran's transformation in education, the court system, and finally the military. Several sections follow this with what has occurred in Turkey in these same areas since 2002. The final section analyzes the similarities and differences between the two countries to determine how much of a parallel really exists between cases.

5.1.1 Theories of the Islamist movements.

The comparison between Iran and Turkey's Islamist transformation requires some discussion of similar or different theories at work. For example, Stark and Finke (2000) use

modern economic science to explain that when one religion is ubiquitous, meaning that almost all of the population adheres to one faith without competition from other faiths, there will be low religious commitment by its members. This theory also suggests that profuse religious organizations raise the level of religiosity of their respective members (Introvigne 2006). In countries like Turkey, with 99.8% Muslims (mostly Sunni), and Iran, with 99.4% Muslim (mostly Shi'a), the competition for faith in Stark and Finke's terms, would appear to be low suggesting that the religious populace will pay lower costs of involvement and dedication to the faith. However, within those Turkish Sunni and Iranian Shi'a populace, numerous sects and niches have developed based on their level of fundamentalism or liberalism within the religion.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979, and the current Turkish Islamist movement both required more commitment and costs as a result of the Islamist positions, supporting the theory of religious economy. As shown, the transformation of societies in both countries to align with Islamists values in education and the court system incurred a greater commitment to the faith. Islamist activism would result in more government involvement into religious affairs, creating more competition on the religious market, and subsequently greater support for extremist groups (Introvigne 2006).

Another theoretical claim used to define the Islamist process of change that has occurred in Iran and Turkey entails groups occupying the periphery of society and the center of political power (Mardin 1972). Groups at the periphery have little political power while those at the core have all of it. As discussed in Chapter Three, Iran experienced a massive demographic shift from the 1950s to 1970s, with large sections of the population moving from rural to urban city centers. The oversaturation of the urban sector created significant dissatisfaction with the state. The clerics and bazaari community leaders, long pushed to the periphery of political power by the

secularly-oriented monarch, Mohammad Shah Pahlavi, now regained some grass-roots support.

Likewise in Turkey, the AKP, in various forms over the previous decades (Virtue Party, Welfare Party, National Order Party, National Salvation Party, and Democrat Party), had long been a peripheral organization struggling to maintain some legitimacy in a centrist and secularly dominated government that formed the core of power (Akdogan 2006). The progressive reforms of the Republican People's Party, the secular and centrist power of the Young Turk's movement, derided the backwardness of the peasant class, seeking to elevate the Turkish position commensurate with European advance (Mardin 1972). In the 1950s and 1960s, the Democrat Party and then the Justice Party succeeded in leveraged Islamic sympathies of the periphery to garner more support and power. By the turn of the millennium, this core and periphery had begun to switch. The core-periphery theory in which power is often held in a concentrated core group over an often dispersed periphery, is not an Islamist theory but does lend itself to the discussion of both country's histories quite well (Borgatti and Everett 1999). In Iran, there was a large demographic shift that influenced this core-periphery power arrangement. Turkey did not have such a shift in demographics but still saw the power arrangement alter.

The final theory relevant for this argument has been discussed at length in Chapter Two and Three – the theory of modernization and the accompanying secularization imported from Europe. The release of the European colonial grip on the Middle East and North Africa in the decades after World War II was followed by a wave of nationalism and the rejection of Western influence. As Western colonial dominance waned, the remnants of Western ideals of relativism, subjectivity, and scientific empiricism remained, challenging the traditionalists and religious authorities across the region. Although Turkey and Iran escaped direct European colonial control, they were both heavily influenced by the Euro-centric liberal reforms imposed by

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Reza Shah, and Shah Pahlavi respectively.

As the societal reforms described in greater detail in Chapter 3 under Atatürk and Reza Shah secularized the universities and court systems, prohibited women from wearing the veil, or men wearing the Fez in Turkey, or non-religious men wearing the turban in Iran, Islamist groups garnered more support to reinforce the importance of Islam within the country (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). The backlash to these reforms drove more and more of the population to support parties like the Virtue and Welfare Parties in Turkey, and the clerical leadership in Iran, both claiming to bring Islamic social values to benefit the people. Western-centric modernization is theorized to align with a parallel religious response resisting such influence (Lawrence 1995; Berger 1999; 2011). Modernization theory along with the theories of core-periphery and religious economy provide possible theoretical phenomena at work. This paper seeks evidence in Turkey, similar to Iran's experience, to demonstrate if a reaction to modernization is indeed ensuing. The next section will cover some of the data obtained as evidence of the changes in Turkey.

5.1.2 Research Data.

The dilemma with research in many countries of the Middle East is that due to the weak institutions, authoritarian governments, government-run press, and the repressive nature of the governments, national data is difficult to come by. Although it is getting better, historical national data is still sporadic at best for most countries. Changes occurring after Iran's Islamic Revolution have fortunately been documented for the most part over the past several decades. There is information on what changes occurred in the secondary and undergraduate curriculum

in most schools, as well as modifications of the court system. The transformation of the Iranian military has also been documented, providing a decent benchmark for the most enduring case of successful Islamist control of the state. Turkey's information was slightly more difficult to obtain with the recent suppression of open media organizations by the state in 2016.

Through the use of a freelance recruiting website, Upwork.com, I hired a graduate student research assistant in Istanbul, Turkey, to assist with the collection and translation of materials needed for this research. My research assistant, currently back at school as a graduate student, happened to be a former elementary and middle school teacher with access to much of the past and present educational policies and curricula. Her experience provided detailed background on the national school policy documents affecting the primary, secondary, and vocational schools in Turkey, specifying when religious education was injected, and into what grades. She also helped provide additional information on the changes to the court systems as well, leading to a more complete picture with the limited literature available.

Data on one of the remaining subjects, the transformation of the military, was attained through a series of interviews with a dozen Turkish officers, stationed in Europe in various billets in the fall of 2016. Many of these officers, ranking from Lieutenants and Captains (somewhat junior) to Admirals and Generals (senior) were recalled back to Turkey following the coup of July 2016. Despite having nothing to do with the events occurring in Turkey from their posts in Europe during that period, almost all were told that their time in the Turkish military was over, and the few that did return were detained indefinitely. Most of the officers I interviewed remained in Europe, forever prohibited from returning to their homeland. These interviews provided detailed information of the massive changes occurring within the Turkish military that has yet to be exposed in the media or academic publications. All spoke openly about the events

in their country on the condition of anonymity. The gravity of these changes to the Turkish military, as it will be discussed in this chapter, is far-reaching and will change the social and political make-up of the country.

5.2 In the Wake of the Islamic Revolution

Iran's path to Islamism started well before the 1979 Revolution. As far back as the 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution in Iran, during which a council of justice (majles-e 'adalat) or parliament was formed to limit the monarch's power, clerical leadership argued against a parliamentary function of the government that would pose a threat to the centrality of Shari'a law in Iran (Ostovar 2016). In support of the theory of religious economy, as the monarch put pressure on the religious establishment, more pockets of faith emerged, increasing the commitment of the faithful. The ideas of early Islamism, penned by Sayyid Qutb and early pioneers of the Muslim Brotherhood, crossed sectarian boundaries into the Shi'a realm especially with Ayatollah Khomeini, who translated two of Qutb's works into Persian, and initially received lauds of support from the Muslim Brotherhood (Khalaji 2009).

As described in Chapter 1, Sayyid Qutb took elements of Wahhabism and added a political dimension to his account of the faith. Khomeini, in a similar manner for the Shi'a, introduced a novel concept in the form of *velayat-e faqih*, or rule of the Islamic jurist. What started as an idea in a series of lectures in 1970 would eventually come to fruition with the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and Khomeini taking the role of the Guardian Jurist for himself. The revolution in Iran has been labeled Islamic, but it consisted of intellectual secularists, communists, bazaar businessmen, all unified against the Shah but for a multitude of reasons

(Kurzman 2004). Once the clerics were in charge, a series of changes needed to occur rapidly to enshrine the principles of their version of an Islamist state to endure.

First, the clerics concluded that society needed to incorporate more Islam into daily activities. Their initial investment was in the educational system. Although not a process that could occur overnight, injecting religion into the school systems would eventually provide an Islamic society apt to accept a fully Islamic government. The court system was another major element that needed a radical transformation to reinforce the current and future Islamic edicts of the regime. The changes could be seen most visibly on the streets with how women dressed, and certain rights they would have (or lose). Finally, the military presented the greatest internal threat with armed power to resist and possibly overthrow the new Islamic Republic. As with almost all revolutions not instigated by the military, the armed services as the purveyor of armed power needed to either be dismantled entirely, or be neutralized by having a secondary armed force keep it in check. These three indicators of the Islamist transformation in society are discussed in the following known case of Iran, in which the transformation was completed, allowing the success of the Islamic Republic for the past 37 years.

5.2.1 The Transformation of Education in Iran.

One year after Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from his 15-year exile, he declared, "All of our backwardness has been due to the failure of most university-educated intellectuals to acquire correct knowledge of Iranian Islam society." He went on to note that all Iranian universities had to fundamentally change to correct this "backwardness" (Sakurai 2004:389). Khomeini, as one of the most senior clerics in the Shi'a faith, had long been a religious educator

with thousands of followers and passed out copied cassette tapes of his sermons, hand-to-hand for those that could not hear him in person. After 15 years of exile from Iran, being an educator himself, one of his first priorities was a radical transformation of the educational system across the country. Immediately, a Cultural Revolution committee was formed to Islamicize the national education ministry.

In the year following the revolution, all universities were closed for two years for "purification" (Sakurai 2004). Both students and professors labeled as "Westoxified" based on their lack of support for the Islamic Republic were expelled. Tens of millions of schoolbooks were recalled to eradicate pre-Islamic history and replace it with an emphasis on Islam (Wilber 1981). That first year, the former minister of education, Dr Farookhrou Parsa, who later served as the Minister of Women's Affairs up to the Islamic Revolution, was executed by the new regime for creating a dependency on "imperialist Western culture" in Iranian education (Wilber 1981:341). Thousands in the education field were expelled, imprisoned and in some cases executed for their secular positions on education and Western sympathies. The first two years of the Islamic Republic eliminated any dissention of the injection of Islam into education at all levels.

Besides the revision of all curriculums and elimination of secular-minded faculty from educational institutions, one of the most influential tools of the new regime to directly influence education and promote loyal supporters to the most powerful positions in society was the introduction of the Konkur test for admission to universities. The Konkur is a 4.5-hour, multiple-choice test that all students seeking post-secondary education must take. The test goes well beyond S.A.T.s in the United States as it measures which students are committed to the tenets of the Islamic Revolution. It also scores students based on their social and political backgrounds

(Sakurai 2004). The students scoring high on Konkur demonstrated by their knowledge, social standing, and loyalty to the regime, go to the best universities in Iran, leading to the best job opportunities upon graduation. In the early years, only around 10% of the applicants would be accepted for a spot at any university, making the test an early indicator of blue-collar or white-collar job potential. The regime effectively used the Konkur to ensure the "Islamization of the university" and tightly controlled powerful job opportunities for only the most loyal applicants (Sakurai 2004).

Within the first three years following the revolution, the education field transformed from secularized and Western-oriented to one methodically producing more committed followers of the Iranian Islamist state. A potential threat comprised of intelligentsia, scornful of the clerical takeover of the state, was converted to a powerful force that supported the regime. Ayatollah Khomeini, the newly appointed Supreme Leader of Iran, saw that the transformation of society started with the ministry of education. His complete control of the ministry was a clear indicator of the presence and success of the Islamist movement in Iran.

5.2.2 The Judicial System in Iran.

In a similar manner as education, the judicial system went through a radical transformation in Iran following the revolution that strengthened the Islamist ideals within the state. Early on in the Islamic Republic, the court system required immediate attention to deal with the "counterrevolutionary crimes" of thousands who supported the Shah. Revolutionary tribunals were set up immediately and tried thousands in "kangaroo courts" with subsequent executions of most of the accused (Wehrey et al. 2009:23). The courts were an immediate solution to eliminating the political opposition within months of Khomeini returning to Iran.

The head of the judiciary was in 1979 and remains to this day, appointed by the Supreme Leader, who uses it as "the enforcer of the ideological line" (Tamadonfar 2001:261). By 1981, special civil courts were created to seek guidance from the Supreme Leader to adjudicate cases in which guidance did not exist or was vague (Paidar 1995; Osanloo 2009). In Article 162 of the new constitution, only judges with a minimal level of religious clergy training, *mujtahid*, were permitted to serve on the supreme court or as prosecutor general. The qualification of judges and their worthiness to serve was determined, as stated in Article 163 of the constitution, by their adherence to Shari'a law.

In addition to replacing secular, Western-trained judges with clerics, the types of courts were altered as well. Islamic Revolutionary courts were created to administer justice for crimes against the internal and external security of the country (Tamadonfar 2001). These courts specialized in economic offenses, political affairs, and drug crimes. In order to eliminate opposition from within the clergy from those that were opposed to a "supreme" religious leader running the country, special clergy courts were created to discipline the religious ranks. Those that disagreed with this interpretation of the faith were censured, demoted, and imprisoned (Kurzman 2001). Within these new court systems, especially ones dealing with family law issues such as divorce, judges were permitted to determine cases by their own interpretations of Shari'a law and exclude secular lawyers from representing clients (Osanloo 2009:125). The court system in Iran changed dramatically following the Islamic Revolution in order to reinforce the Islamist perspective of the state's role with religion. This was necessary to impede the internal threats to the religious state from cleric and political opposition, early in its history. As the next section shows, the other major threat that required immediate attention regarded the standing military, who had sworn previous allegiance to the Shah, and only reluctantly stood neutral to allow the

revolution to occur. How could the military ever be fully trusted to not turn on the clerics in power?

5.2.3 The Military in Iran and Creation of the IRGC.

Control, or at least acquiescence, of the military is essential in any revolutionary change to society and state. Whether the control is by physical force in armed confrontation, or by the sheer multitude of peaceful protestors on the streets as was the case in Iran in 1978, the military must be convinced to stand aside. Once the Islamic Revolution occurred, the clerical leadership in Iran raised an immediate concern as to how much the military could be trusted. Abrahamian characterized Iran during the Shah's last decades prior to the revolution as a "military monarchy" (Abrahamian 1982), one built on the "dominance of the military and repressive rule" (Moazami 2013:47). The new regime required a purge of the most loyal members of the military to the Shah and the creation of another military power as a hedge against a military coup.

The transformation of military power in Iran occurred in three phases: (1) the purge, (2) Islamization of the force, and (3) create a new and more powerful military element – the Sepah, or Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Zabih 1998). The purge of the military began immediately with the removal of most of the senior staff. Within two weeks of Khomeini's return to Iran, four senior generals of the military were tortured and then marched to the top of the Refah School, soon to be Khomeini's initial headquarters, and executed by firing squad as "corrupters on Earth" (Kadivar 2001). Estimates were difficult because of the rapidly changing state and military structures, but it is commonly accepted that at least 400 senior military officers, SAVAK (secret state police), and other members of the old administration were promptly executed in the first few months. At least another 128 were immediately imprisoned or

exiled. Keep in mind that there was no military coup in Iran. The military allowed for the revolution to occur unimpeded once the presence of protestors on the streets had reached historic proportions by the end of 1978. The new Revolutionary Council in Iran quickly enacted a law to standardize the procedures for military personnel to be tried for anti-revolutionary activity. The purge of the Iranian military affected every unit and level of the military as a reminder of the new state power.

The second phase of the transformation included Islamicizing the force. This required specially qualified clerics to instruct all military officers in the "principles of belief," doctrine exhorting the ideals of the revolution and Islam (Zabih 1988, 137). A new organization, the Ideological-Political Directorate (IPD) of the Armed Forces was created in October of 1980 to analyze each branch of the military and oversee this Islamization. The military academies were prime starting points for the amalgamation of military doctrine and Islam to occur. Commanders of the academies were encouraged to recruit candidates with a demonstrated zeal for the revolution. A former director of the Ideological-Political Directorate, H. Rassaghi, stated that the academies represented the heart of the armed services and that the goal was to fully immerse the officers in Islamic tenets (Zabih 1988).

The command schools – service schools for officers with orders to lead units, and staff academies – service schools for senior enlisted leaders, were closed for three years to develop an ideological and political indoctrination segment of training for every student attending (Zabih 1988). The War Colleges, where master's degrees and advanced training were typically provided, following a four year hiatus also saw a major overhaul in its instruction to accommodate Islamic prioritization. The change in education at every point in a servicemen's

career was complete by 1984. At every point of instruction, Islamic perspectives were incorporated, regardless of rank or service.

The third approach in controlling the military was to create a separate armed force whose revolutionary loyalties were unquestioned. This force, the IRGC in Iran, has a parallel army, navy, air force, and special operations force, and is completely separate from the regular military. Immediately after the revolution, Khomeini created the IRGC on May 5, 1979 as a vanguard of the revolution's ideals and achievements (Buchta 2000). IRGC units were placed in all of the major cities to quell unrest and provide an armed reaction force that could serve the clerical leadership's needs quickly. The new regime grew the force rapidly from many of its most loyal supporters, squashing rebellions by the Kurds, Beluch, and Turkmen, and cementing their position as Khomeini's personal, elite unit. The IRGC developed its own procurement process outside of regular military channels that not only provided better weapon systems, but also greater budgets. Initially the IRGC commander, Mohsen Reza'I, appointed directly by Khomeini, reported directly to the Supreme Leader for all issues. This direct line allowed the IRGC to swell into the most powerful armed force in Iran.

Within the IRGC, a militia was formed after the first year of the revolution to maintain security in the initial absence of a loyal police force, purge anti-revolutionary elements from government and academic institutions, develop an information gathering network in all fields and businesses to identify opposition, and thwart any internal threats such as uprisings or coups (Wehrey et al. 2009). Khomeini called for this unit, the Basij, to be 20-million strong. While the IRGC was the more advanced, formally trained armed force, the Basij were the brute force that wielded scorched-earth tactics. Today the Basij have offices to monitor all local activities in every university, every major, and almost all small cities in Iran. Together, the IRGC and their

militia wing, the Basij, are the dominant armed force in Iran, surpassing the might of the regular military services.

From the beginning of the revolution, the uncertain loyalty of the regular military was a constant concern of the new Islamic Republic that required several steps to mitigate its threat. The purge of the senior leadership, the indoctrination of all military members in Islamic culture and doctrine, and the hedge provided by the IRGC and Basij kept the military in check, minimizing the potential for a military coup. The transformation of military power in Iran, along with transformations of the educational and judicial systems, not only solidified the accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution, but also empowered it to grow. This all coincided with Saddam Hussein's incursion into Iranian territory in September of 1980 to seize the oil-producing region of Khuzestan in the Southwest corner of Iran, igniting the bloody eight-year Iran-Iraq War. The nationalistic fervor in Iran caused by Iraq's invasion bolstered the massive transformations taking place. These three indicators of Iran's progress towards an Islamist state help demonstrate not the cause of Islamism, but rather the signposts of Islamism taking effect after its revolutionary turn. It is with this helpful illustration that we now consider Turkey's case, led by the AKP since 2002. Although there was not a quick revolution as was the case with Iran, it will be interesting to see whether the slow burn of Turkey's Islamist transformation replicated the Iranian example.

5.3 Turkey's Slow-Burn Transformation

There is little debate that since 2002, Turkey is in the process of a major political shift. The AKP since then has gradually loosened the secularists' hold on power. This is no small feat in Turkey. For decades, the secular state controlled the training of religious clergy through the

Directorate General of Religious Affairs and consistently banned new religious political parties once they reached a certain level of support. To overcome the decades of secular control of the government, and to take control by winning two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in November of 2002, the AKP harnessed the anger felt by the electorate with the austerity measures of the previous Democratic Left Party, who failed to meet the 10% threshold needed for a presence in parliament. With decades of repression behind them, the AKP worked to unshackle more opportunities for Islamist concepts to enter the state and society. This chapter uses the indicators of change in education, judicial, and military organizations to not only demonstrate the transformation that is occurring in Turkey, but to discuss the pace at which the transformation is happening. Using Iran's rapid revolution as a comparison, this section will document this Islamist movement's progress. Where Iran required hasty action to solidify their grip on power immediately after the revolution, the AKP in Turkey, as we shall see, has taken a more deliberate approach.

5.3.1 The AKP Investment in Education.

The alteration of the education system in Turkey actually started well before 2002 and at the behest of the neoliberal Motherland Party following the military coup of 1980. The Motherland Party (ANAP) sought to restrict the interference of government into society, and encouraged private investment. One of the major changes by the new government in 1983 was to re-centralize the education system, allowing for competition between private and public, state-funded schools. Turkey's educational system had been very centralized from the days of Atatürk who saw major disparities between madrassas, private, and public education. Over the decades however, it has grown in diversity and complexity. The ANAP centralized the system once again, but allowed private institutions to share the role of education as well. This opened the door

for a new religious movement, the Gülen movement that is still prevalent throughout Turkey today. Fethullah Gülen has impacted Turkish education since the mid 1980s more than any other in recent history.

Gülen advocates for incorporating Islam into society more fully with the exception of politics, which he suggests should be separate in a manner akin to Christianity, "So give back to Caesar what is Caesar's; and to God what is God's" (Matthew 22:21 New International Version). He uses the teachings of Said Nursi (1873-1960), the founder of a faith movement in Turkey that emphasized education-oriented communities called dershanes – reading circles, to inspire Islamic social work (Yavuz and Esposito 2003). Gülen created religious education and support groups called "lighthouses" to counter what he saw as a void of spiritualism in modern Turkey. Lighthouses provided a home where five or six same-sex, university students live together according to Islamic principles in solidarity against secular temptations such as drugs, alcohol, and premarital sex. A reform of public and private education was a large part of his strategy to alter Turkish society's path back towards Islam. By the late 1990s, there were around 150 private Gülen schools, 150 educational centers offering additional courses in Turkey, and over 250 Gülen-inspired schools around the world. A very interesting aspect about these schools is that they taught ethics rather than religion, unlike many of the more popular Imam-Hatip schools (Yavuz and Esposito 2003).

The Gülen movement's emphasis coincided with the growth of Imam-Hatip schools, vocational secondary schools that emphasize Islamic teaching. As depicted in Table 5.1, Imam-Hatip schools have been around since 1924, but their popularity has risen and fallen depending on Kemalist tolerance over the years, and their subsequent policies affecting the schools. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military subsidized the growth of more mosques and Imam-Hatip

schools, to heal the deep political cleavages that had necessitated the coup. This led to a large growth of the Imam-Hatip students from 1983 until a soft coup in 1997, when the military banned Imam-Hatip middle schools altogether, created penalties on university entrance exams for Imam-Hatip high school graduates, and banned headscarves for women in universities (Kaya 2014).



Source: Turkish Ministry of Education, Statistics Report of Imam Hatip Schools
Table of values in Appendix II.

Figure 5.1 Number of Imam-Hatip Students (1924 – 2014)

Unlike the Gülen schools, Imam-hatip schools did have lessons on Qur'an, the life of Mohammad, and Islamic principles, which Kemalists saw as a threat to the secularism of the state and society.

This was the context when the AKP took control of the government in 2002 with only two Islamic-focused campaign promises, both having to do with education. The first was to lift the ban on headscarves for women in universities. The second campaign promise was to eliminate the penalties for Imam-Hatip students on university entrance exams (Altinyelken et al. 2015).

Although the AKP desired to fulfill these promises quickly, the secular President Ahmet Sezer remained in power until 2007, blocking many of their reforms. The AKP was also not eager to upset the secular European Union (EU), who was considering assessing Turkey at the time, and put off any major Islamic reforms to the education system. The election of the new President in 2007, Abdullah Gül – co-founder of the AKP, however, allowed these changes to finally take place (Kaya 2014). In 2007, the AKP government was able to finally lift the ban on headscarves in the universities and in 2013 lifted the ban for civil service as well.

The national curriculum for public schools was also altered in 2007 and 2012 by providing optional Islamic courses such as The Life of the Prophet Muhammad, the Qur'an, and the Fundamentals of Religion in all middle and high schools, and a mandatory "Religious Culture and Morality" course taken by all high school students. A non-Sunni, Muslim family took the Turkish AKP government to court over this requirement but the course has continued to stand. The ministry of education commented that the course is to "put into practice the requirements of the belief (Islam) individually, without any need of guidance from other authorities" (Türkmen 2009). Other changes began to appear in schools such as prayer rooms in Kindergartens, changing the first letter of the alphabet learned in primary school from the traditional "A" to "E", which is the first letter in the Arabic alphabet, and raising the mandatory school attendance to 4 years of primary school, 4 years of middle school, and 4 years of high

school. This last change, argued by the government to better conform to EU and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) standards, was seen by many as an effort to provide greater flexibility to families considering Imam-Hatip schools. These efforts, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1, have resulted in an exponential growth of Imam-Hatip students, now available at the primary, middle, and high school levels.

The remaining discussion is derived from materials provided by my research assistant in Istanbul gathered as a former elementary and middle school teacher in Turkey. Like Iran and most countries, Turkey has an entrance exam for admission to university level education. It has typically consisted of only one entrance exam, but in the past 5 years, changes were made by the Council of Higher Education to create two exams: the Entrance to Higher Education Exam (YGS) – which all students take and is pass or fail, and the University Placement Exam (LYS) – which determines what university and department students will eventually attend. There have not been any major changes to these entrance exams in the past two decades. The way that they are structured however, already provides the state with wide latitude to influence which students attend the best universities. The LYS exam scores are provided to the Council of Higher Education, and students are subsequently dictated which university and department they will attend. There are no social or economic background questions similar to the Konkur in Iran. The Council of Higher Education's website states that applicants for graduate work are selected, if desired, by the higher education systems.

Most recently in 2016, the AKP government replaced all of the University Presidents, known as Rectors, in Turkey. Traditionally, academic institutions appointed their respective Rectors. This latest law, dated October 29th, 2016, found in Appendix P, transfers the power to appoint all Rectors to the President of Turkey. Additionally, many university professors,

following the July 2016 coup attempt, were questioned and subsequently fired. Reports indicate that in July 2016, over 15,000 members of the ministry of education were fired and 21,000 educators lost their professional licenses following the coup attempt (Bohannon 2016). Later on September 19th, 28,000 more teachers were fired for alleged links to terrorism. Many see these post-coup purges by the AKP government as an effort to eradicate secular opposition to their policies. The October 29th decree supports this argument as it now allows the new, government-appointed Rectors to replace the expelled faculty with more Islamic-friendly teachers.

Although the early years of the AKP's control of the government consisted of slow changes to the national education, since 2007, there has been a sense of urgency with transforming the school systems, which was kicked into high gear in the second half of 2016. There are significant parallels to changes seen in Iran's post-Islamic Revolution. Both saw changes to the curriculum, and an injection of Islamic teaching and principles at all levels of education. Both saw large shifts in faculty at the university level. In both countries, examinations for university entrance were altered by the government, which especially in Iran, oversaw the placement of students into top universities and eventually more powerful positions. In Turkey's case, with the recent September firing of 28,000 teachers and October 29th decree, it appears that the transformation of Turkey's higher education system is still in progress. It is quite clear that as Khomeini prioritized changes to national education, to eradicate "Westoxified" ideas, the current AKP government under President Erdoğan also seeks to transform Turkish education to secure an Islamic foothold in Turkish society. The point of this comparison is not to suggest that Turkey will be an Islamic State akin to Iran, as both have significant cultural, historical, and religious differences; rather it is to use the structural changes that occurred in Iran as a marker for the possibility of similar structural changes in Turkey. As demonstrated with the educational

changes, the heavy involvement of the AKP government in the school systems at all levels confirms that an effort is being made to alter the character of society in a manner reminiscent of Iran. In order to make such changes more permanent, the judicial system requires control by the state as well. The next section examines if a similar investment is underway with the court systems in Turkey.

5.3.2 Minarets are Bayonets.

"Minarets are bayonets, domes helmets; mosques are our barracks, and the believers are soldiers." These were the words of a famous Turkish poet Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) read by the current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then former Mayor of Istanbul, on December 6th, 1997, that led to his ten-month prison sentence for "inciting hatred based on religious differences" (Shambayati 2004:266). Although he only served four of the ten-month sentence, it is safe to conclude that the prison time burned very strong emotions into Erdoğan about the legislative process and Turkish court system. This searing experience together with the concept that change in a democratic society requires change in the education and court systems, are factors that many cite for the AKP's prioritized reform of the judiciary.

Like the education ministry, most of the more drastic and controversial changes occurred late in the AKP's control of the state, when in 2010, a constitutional amendment was approved in parliament with strong backing by the AKP. This amendment made the senior bodies of the judicial system, the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK) more representative in their structure through internal elections with less intrusion from the executive branch (Özbudun 2015). It greatly expanded the Constitutional Court from 12 to 17 seats, allowing the AKP to appoint five new judges to the bench (Muedini 2015). European

Institutions such as the EU, the Council of Europe, and Venice Commission, who sought mitigation measures for Turkey's human rights issues, lauded the amendment. It also created a little more distance between the Council of State and Ministry of Justice, which was something the AKP would later regret.

As mentioned earlier, the Gülen movement focused quite a bit of resources and effort on enhancing the education system in Turkey, infusing Islamic values with modern issues. This emphasis on quality education has paid off in many ways. There have been many graduates of the Gülen schools who have risen to the highest levels of the medical, business, and law fields (Muedini 2015). The influence of so many Gülen advocates increasingly worried not only the secular Kemalists who perceived any emphasis on Islam in public venues as a threat to Atatürk's vision, but also Erdoğan and the AKP as well. A rift between the AKP and the Gülen movement formed slowly in 2010 with the Israeli raid on the flotilla bypassing the Israeli blockade on Gaza. Gülen spoke critically of the flotilla, which put him at great odds with Erdoğan (Lauria 2010). This rift grew in 2013 with the Turkish government's crackdown on protesters in Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park over an urban development plan. The harsh treatment of protesters by government troops leaving 11 dead and 8,000 injured, resulted in condemnation by Gülen, further deepening the rift with Erdoğan and the AKP (Özel 2014).

This rift turned to a chasm when Erdoğan began shutting down Gülen schools in 2013 and eventually, on the heals of major corruption charges, demoted 100 pro-Gülen judges and public prosecutors to more minor positions (Özbudun 2015). The following year, the Turkish government reversed course from the 2010 amendment and adopted a law that radically restructured the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK), centralizing more power under the Minister of Justice (Özbudun 2014). This 2014 HSYK law was immediately

challenged and although some portions were found unconstitutional and annulled, enough of the law was left intact to alter the membership of the HSYK in the next election, leaving a very AKP-sympathetic body (Özbudun 2015).

Having sufficiently altered the HSYK, the only other major element of the judiciary that could hinder future AKP efforts was the Constitutional Court, which for decades had abolished previous Islamist parties such as the Virtue Party, the Welfare Party, and the National Order Party. In order to change the composition of the Constitutional Court, the AKP needed three-fifths of the parliament in the elections of 2015. Although the AKP won 317 of the 550 seats in the second snap election of 2015, it was short of the 330 seats needed for the dramatic constitutional change it sought. The election centered on restructuring the executive branch to a presidential system, providing what many feared to be more authoritarian powers to the President (Kemahlıoğlu 2015). The failure of the AKP to get the three-fifths it needed for a major overhaul of the Constitutional Court and executive branch meant that other methods were required.

In 2016, the failed military coup of July 15th provided another method. Upon landing in Istanbul following the coup attempt, in his first speech, Erdoğan stated "This uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army" (Champion 2016). Indeed, the cleansing did not stop with the military. The HSYK, now firmly under the direction of the AKP, fired and subsequently detained 2,745 judges from the judiciary (Zimmer 2016). Members of the Constitutional Court, the HSYK, and the Court of Cassation were accused of pro-Gülen activities and arrested with thousands others from sectors of the government. The Turkish Government cited the Gülen movement as the real orchestrators of the attempt and any connection was deemed as suspicious enough to warrant arrest following the coup. In my interviews with Turkish military officers, several commented that even having license plates that included the

letters FG, possibly in support of Fethullah Gülen, was enough to be included in the post-coup purge.

The three-month state of emergency that followed the coup attempt allowed completely unchecked, executive authority to "institute new laws not subject to judicial review" (Zimmer 2016:2). An August 2016 *New York Times* article entitled "The Scale of Turkey's Purge is Nearly Unprecedented," described in greater detail the scope of Turkey's most recent actions (Keller et al. 2016). During this period, the Turkish government under public claims of collaboration with terrorist groups, fired:

- 2,745 Judges and judicial staff (1,684 of those were arrested),
- 9,000 Police officers,
- 21,000 Gülen teachers (1,000 private schools were closed),
- 10,012 Military (5,000+ were arrested),
- 21,700 Ministry of Education,
- 1,500 Ministry of Finance,
- 1,500 University Deans (Rectors), and
- 28+ Journalists (over one hundred media organizations have been closed).

The significant amount of replacements in the judiciary rivals the extent seen in Iran after the Islamic Revolution. Turkey removed the U.S. equivalent of every state judge in California, Georgia, New York, and Texas, in the first week following the coup (Zimmer 2016).

The detention of most of the public officials described above as the military officers I interviewed, consisted initially of a 30-day confinement often with just bread and water for sustenance each day. Most heard that the confinement would be extended to 90 days. The prisons had become so overcrowded following the coup attempt that the officers relayed that soccer

stadiums were being used as detention centers. On July 31st of 2016, the Turkish Government also froze all of the assets for over 3,000 judges and prosecutors suspected of ties to the Gülen movement (Zimmer 2016). The *Turkish Gazette* published in August of 2016 that 38,000 non-violent prisoners would be released from prison to make room for the new detainees. All of the interviewed officers stated they knew of detainees who had been tortured, and in a few cases of female detainees, they were sexually assaulted. The treatment of military detainees can be assumed to be similar to the treatment of the 1,684 judicial detainees arrested in the days following the coup attempt. Details of the post-coup activities are covered in the next section regarding the transformation of the military.

The radical alteration of the judicial system beginning in 2010 with the changes to the HSYK, which is the governing body of Turkey's judges and public prosecutors, continued in 2013 and 2014 with amendments changing the makeup of the organization, and placing the body for the most part under the control of the AKP. The massive purge of judges, lawyers, and prosecutors in 2016 left the judicial ministry gutted of any Gülen advocates or secularists, removing a key obstacle to the regime's quest for greater authoritarian control.

The changes to the court system in Turkey were massive and reminiscent of the revolutionary changes made in Iran. Iran's court system changes injected Islamic courts and judges into the ministry while Turkey has not. Both countries, however, have curtailed any sense of independence of the court system from the executive branch, effectively leaving the Supreme Leader in Iran and the President of Turkey legally unchallenged. This may seem an unfair comparison of the two leaders who have very different authoritative powers and political structures, but in both cases, major political and societal change required the court systems to be neutralized and brought under control, evidenced by the years immediately after the 1979 Islamic

Revolution and the past 6 years in Turkey. Neither country has the legal means to challenge authoritative control of their current, respective governments. The next section discusses the final potential challenge to major change in Turkey, the military, which has long been the guardian of Atatürk's Republic over the decades.

5.3.3 Vanguard of the Republic.

As mentioned in the section on the military in Iran, a revolutionary change in a country requires the acquiescence of the military at some point. The acquiescence can be forced through significant popular demonstrations instilling fear in the military, it can be created with a separate armed force whose loyalty is to the revolutionaries, and it can also be the result of neutralizing key members of the military. In 2008, the Turkish military may have sensed such an effort underway and attempted its own neutralization of the AKP. It was already too late however.

As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, following the 1980 military coup, the military subsidized new mosques and Imam-Hatip schools to encourage healing of political cleavages in Turkish society through Islam. Almost all scholars believe that this created the surge in Islamism that would later result in the AKP taking control of the government in 2002 (Yavuz 2006). In 1997, the military waged a "soft" coup and dissolved the current government under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Welfare (or Refah) Party and installed a new, more secular government in its place (Aydinli 2009). The constitutional court at this time ruled that the Welfare Party was banned for violating the constitution. Additionally, the military-backed government created strict, anti-Islamic policies to maintain Turkey's secularism in the future. Ironically, this had the opposite effect. Yavuz (2006) writes that almost immediately, the military lost most of their "pious Anatolian Sunni-Turk" support base, creating sympathy for the Islamist

groups. This along with Erdoğan's charismatic appeal and a few other factors led to the AKP's successful 2002 elections, and an end to military dominance in Turkish politics.

By 2008, the military, through its remaining supporters in parliament and the constitutional court, attempted to get the AKP banned. The measure was narrowly defeated, dealing a major blow to the military's soft power (Muedini 2015). This was a turning point for the AKP to maintain political control from the military. In 2010, the AKP through constitutional amendments increased the Constitutional Court from 12 to 17 seats, allowing them to appoint five new, AKP-sympathetic judges (Muedini 2015). This negated any future attempts by military supporters on the bench similar to what occurred in 2008. It effectively ended the political power of the old bureaucracy, the Kemalist deep state (Polat 2016). In my interviews with the Turkish officers working in Europe, the next blow came in 2012 and 2013 with a wave of resignations, and the arrest of over 250 senior military officers for suspected crimes against the state. The military chief of defense was arrested for conspiracy and jailed along with about 10% of the Turkish general officers (Finkel 2012).

This was the context for the attempted military coup of 2016. Following the coup, the officers I interviewed stated that the Turkish government exercised any possible excuse for detainment of military members, in order to "neuter" the military once and for all. The information provided in the interviews provided an insider's viewpoint to the actions of the government specifically targeting Turkish military personnel. A senior Turkish officer explained:

> The whole process of saving our democracy against a so-called "coup" has turned out to be an irrational, constitutionally illegal, and well intentional purge of government officials who are known to hold firm stances on democracy, human rights, and rule of law. The massive ongoing purge and imprisonment in Turkey have catastrophically affected thousands of military personnel in Turkey. Hundreds of Turkish personnel who worked at different NATO Headquarters at the time of the event could not evade the disaster (Turkish military officer, personal communications, January 2017).

All of the interviewed officers discussed the smartphone messaging app "ByLock," which operates in a similar manner to other messaging apps but with one fatal flaw. The app retained individual identities that could be accessed by Turkish government hackers. The popular app was apparently found on a few of the orchestrators of the coup attempt, which led the Turkish government to round up tens of thousands of users in the military, simply due to the presence of the app on their smartphones. The military members I interviewed stated that "use of the ByLock [app] means you are a member of the coup" (Turkish military officer, personal communications, October 2016). According to the app website, there were around 1 million users at the time of the coup in various countries around the world. By cracking security software, Turkish officials stated that they were able to uncover 40,000 Gülenist "operatives" (Murdock 2016).

The officers I spoke to also described the closing of all Turkish military academies, War Colleges (graduate-level schools), and the dismissal of all of the cadets and military members at those institutions. Many Turkish officers attend Western military academies and war colleges as well, which traditionally has enhanced their military status for future promotions. Officers who had attended Western military schools were also fired for having "Western values" that did not correspond with the direction of the Turkish Government. The new military general responsible for restructuring all of the military schools in Turkey was appointed directly by President Erdoğan. In the Turkish Navy, every commanding officer and executive officer (2nd in command) was replaced in the months following the coup attempt. Additionally, the Turkish President appointed the former Turkish Naval Attaché to Moscow as the head of Naval Personnel, responsible for the execution of the Turkish military purge. To have such an

appointment directed personally by the President was described by the interviewees as unprecedented.

Most of the officers stationed in Europe and the United States on behalf of the Turkish government had their passports canceled on claims that they were stolen. All were given letters that allowed travel only to Istanbul in lieu of a valid passport. Those officers that did return to Turkey were immediately arrested and detained, initially for 30 days, without any judicial processing. A few that did not return had police raid their extended families' homes back in Turkey repeatedly, which most felt was retribution for not returning. For those detained, there was no appeal process for their detention. As the country was in a declared state of emergency, there was also no assistance by the Supreme Court for these matters. All judicial procedures were suspended.

A very senior member of the Turkish military described to me the actions taken against Turkish military personnel, recalled while working abroad as follows:

> None of the ejected personnel were officially properly informed why they had been accused. All were denied their fundamental legal rights to defend their innocence, in any oral or written form. All are accused of being members of a deliberately ill-defined terrorist organization, which supposedly plotted the coup. The criminal investigations are devastatingly diluted with false evidence and forged witness statements, collected from intimidated/tortured individuals. Biased prosecutors, government-affiliated media and some government/military officials who collaborate with the others are striving very hard to cleanse democratic, secular, and candid people from official services. It's not surprising to see that the huge vacuum of cleansed personnel is filled with some officers with extreme negative feelings against NATO, NATO countries, the European Union, and the United States. Government-affiliated media immensely utilizes lies, slanders, exaggerations, and counterfeit allegations to mobilize and convince Turkish people against the purged or imprisoned government officials. This behavior sometimes reaches a level, which could be a grave concern for the safety of Turkish officers and their families in Turkey and abroad. Unfortunately, NATO countries including Germany and the United States are also deliberately accused by the same media for planning, conducting, and supporting the coup attempt in Turkey. Many newspapers and TV stations in Turkey concert an immense strategic communication against Western people and Western values (Turkish military officer, personal communications, March 2017).

The "gift from God to cleanse our army," as the President claimed immediately after the coup, affected every unit and every service in the Turkish military. The devastation to the Turkish military has largely gone underreported by both the media, now firmly controlled by the Turkish government, and in academia. The transformation of the military in Turkey was very different method to that of Iran's military following the Islamic Revolution, but with the same result – the mitigation of military power. Any hope that the Turkish military has entertained from 2008 in banning the AKP and pulling the country back toward a secularist government was eliminated in the months following the coup attempt of 2016. Now with the control of the Constitutional Court, the HSYK, and the neutralization of the military, the AKP has mitigated any obstacles to strengthening their Islamist positions. On April 16, 2017, Turkey voted in a referendum for a new constitution that would eliminate the role of the Prime Minister, converting the country to a presidential republic under Erdoğan. It would also allow the president to appoint his own ministers, provide a national budget, dismiss parliament if he deemed necessary, and move Turkey towards a more authoritarian political structure. This referendum, the first electoral event since the coup-attempt, has dictated Turkey's long-term direction. The vote for the referendum, granting Erdoğan the authoritative control his party seeks, will further mitigate the military's traditional role as vanguards of the secular republic.

5.4 Analysis

The transformation in Turkey from the AKP's victory in 2002 to the post-coup attempt activity of 2016 has been remarkable. The Turkish military's anti-Islamic policies of 1997, turning the sympathy of much of the population away from the Kemalists, and the futile military efforts of 2008 and 2016 emboldened the Islamist proclivities of the AKP under President Erdoğan. Although the Turkish version of an Islamist government is vastly different from that of

Iran's theocracy, some of the same structural transformations have occurred in both countries. There are similarities, as well as some important differences that signal a disparity in the movements, discussed in this section.

Regarding the similarities, the education and judicial systems were both dramatically overhauled in Iran and Turkey. In both countries, thousands of teachers and judges were fired and replaced with more government-friendly workers. Schools were closed in both countries for a period of time to allow this restructuring to occur. Members of the opposition to these changes were arrested and detained for long periods without sufficient judicial recourse. Their respective leaders distrusted the militaries of both countries, and efforts were made to mitigate their potential threat. Leaders of both the Iranian and Turkish Armed Forces were arrested and executed for crimes against the state. This could be viewed as plausible in Turkey following the military coup attempt of 2016; however in Iran, the military actually allowed the Islamic Revolution to occur. Removing the leadership of both militaries was necessary for both countries to proceed with the substantial changes to societal and government structures.

The disparity between the Iranian and Turkish transformations was telling as well. The differences in the pace of change, as well as the substance of changes in both countries do not just detail the difference in the intent of the Islamist movements in both countries, but also the method utilized in achieving that intent. In Iran, the intent of the efforts after the Islamic Revolution was to establish a true Islamic state under a senior religious figure that ruled the state and religion through the concept of *velayat-e faqih,* guardianship of the jurist (Abrahamian 2008). In Turkey, the AKP under President Erdoğan intended not to create a theocracy but a government that was highly cognizant of Islamic principles. The educational system in Turkey has not seen a massive restructuring of its curriculum as was experienced in Iran, a very

important difference. Additionally, religious courts have not been established in Turkey thus far, maintaining some level of secularism to the Turkish interpretation of civil law. This is also a very important difference as it inhibits the amount of religion that infuses Turkish society. If the court systems are still based on secular law, than the role religion plays remains somewhat limited. There are still many changes occurring in Turkey with this ongoing movement however.

Major adjustments to the curriculum in schools and the introduction of religious courts in Turkey would take the country one more step towards an Islamic state, ruled almost entirely by Shari'a law determined from the Qur'an, hadith, and fiqh. The control of the HSYK and Constitutional courts by the AKP, as well as the neutralization of the military, removes impediments to that end. Centralizing power in the office of the President, as the April referendum proposes, could accelerate the country more towards this direction as well. The focus of the past five chapters has been on Islamism, political Islam, which is the governing of a society according to mostly Islamic law and principles. Turkey, in comparison to Iran, is certainly not at the point of an Islamic state. Yet the speed at which changes are taking place, especially in the wake of the July 2016 coup attempt, is increasing. The slow simmer of the AKP's alterations of the educational, judicial, and military systems has significantly increased. It is hard to imagine Turkey as an Islamic theocracy, but if the changes witnessed over the past 14 years continue at the current pace, there is no doubt that Turkey's secular days are numbered.

The interaction of these changes with theory is also interesting. Stark and Finke's theory of the economic market of religion in which the ubiquity of a particular religion decreases the level of religiosity of its members, provides a noteworthy point with this change in Turkey. If the country moves towards the direction of a strictly Sunni Islamic society with less apathy for other religions, the willingness of Turks to incur greater costs for their religion should decrease. This

would translate to less support for the AKP's efforts, if it impacts Turkish freedoms in any way. As this movement continues to progress in Turkey, it will be interesting to see the fluctuation of support for the AKP in elections. The Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey reported that the AKP won 34% of the vote in parliamentary elections in 2002, then 46% in 2007, 49% in 2011, 40.8% in the first election of 2015, and 49% in the second 2015 election, to create a new government. The 2016 April referendum was also the first electoral signal of AKP support following the coup-attempt. Continued support of the AKP at these levels would undercut Stark and Finke's economic market theory of religion, and certainly solidify Turkey's path towards a more Islamic government.

A successful vote for the referendum will also substantiate the complete switch of core and periphery groups that has occurred in Turkey since 1997. Islamist groups have for decades been the periphery group, often disbanded by the Constitutional Courts only to be re-established under a new name. This has dramatically changed with the AKP's control of parliament and the presidency. The Kemalists and secularists have largely found themselves, especially in the latter half of 2016, pushed to the periphery of power in Turkey. This shift from periphery to the core power also occurred in Iran when the secular Monarchy at the core of Iranian power suddenly switched to the clerics, long on the periphery in Iran. The speed of the core-periphery switch in Iran was substantially faster, however both countries have experienced this shift in power.

Finally, the modernization theory discussed at length in Chapter Three was also supported in part by both countries. The theory suggests that as the country modernized its national infrastructure, an accompanying secularism that was derived from mostly European influence in the region, invoked a strong religious backlash that supported Islamist movements. The support to this theory in both countries however comes from the association of secularism

and Western influence. In Iran to this day, the term "Westoxification" is mentioned in political speeches on a weekly if not daily basis. The term implies that Western influence and values detract from Islamic ones. Likewise in Turkey, the Turkish officers I interviewed all spoke of how Turkey was pulling away from its Western alliances such as NATO and inclusion in the EU, and moving towards a closer relationship with Russia. The firing of all Turkish officers with Western military education is a clear sign of Turkey's own version of Westoxification. Much of President Erdoğan's recent rhetoric suggests of an incompatibility of Turkish progress and Western influence. Both countries support modernization theory's perceived connection of secularism with Western support. As Turkey moves farther along in an Islamist direction, it is quite likely to merge greater Islamic proclivity with anti-Western tendencies, eventually removing itself from NATO and aligning with Russia as an anti-Western bloc.

5.5 Conclusion

When first considering the topic of Islamism in the Middle East in mid 2015, my intent was to focus on the Islamic Revolution in Iran, as it had been the focus of my previous research. As the dissertation developed and the events in Turkey unfolded, being a scholar of Islamist movements, it was an exciting time to witness a very visible Islamist movement progressing in real-time. During my interviews in Europe in late 2016 with Turkish military officers however, the costs of the movement were driven home quite vividly. Most of the officers had only recently been informed of their recall to Turkey, and their termination from the military after 15-20 years of loyal service. While we talked in their homes or in nearby restaurants, they all spoke about the families still in Turkey that faced harassment from the Turkish government and the fact that they would not be able to return to their country for as long as the AKP was in power. The emotions

they expressed were sadness, hurt, and a feeling of betrayal by their government rather than anger. Many were still in shock and I was asked by several, how they would be able to tell their children, who were often in the next room, about what was happening.

Even this however, paled to the atrocities the officers shared of their friends that had been detained back in Turkey. The conditions these political prisoners are experiencing without judicial process is very alarming. Exacerbating the tragedy is that most of the tens of thousand of detainees were not political activists but rather teachers, lawyers, and loyal military servicemen serving their communities and country. The purpose of this paper has been to document the progress of the Islamist movement in Turkey, in comparison to the structural changes made in Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Transforming Iran from a secular monarchy with a somewhat liberal society to what currently exists required a transformation of the education and judicial systems and the neutralization of the military. In Turkey, the transformation started slowly, both in the education and judicial systems, but has recently gathered steam. The past year in Turkey has seen most of the secular and liberal teachers and judges removed from their posts, paving the way for more substantial changes to come if so desired by the AKP. The structure in both sectors has been changed since 2002 to allow much more significant alterations. The modification of curriculums in schools or the establishment of a religious court system, are examples of the next steps for Turkey with the support of the AKP in the April 2017 referendum. The support of this referendum will likely see more stories similar to what I witnessed, and move beyond a point of no return from Atatürk's vision of a Turkish Republic.

Appendices

Appendix A

Data collected for Chapter Two

Year	COUNTRY	Islamist lines	Total Lines	%	SHARICON	SHARIA	COLPOW	RAP MOD	INCLUS	REP PUR	AUTH	GINI	UNEMPL	RENT	FORINT
1989	Algeria	17	895	1.9%	0	1.9	France (1962)	-0.91	1	3	-9	39.1609	17.20%	0.95	1
2002	Bahrain	5	965	0.5%	1	3.5	UK (1971)	1.22	0	1	-9	.36(2011)	4.60%	0.86	0
2014	Egypt	20	1683	1.2%	1	4.2	UK (1922)	0.41	0	4	-4	44.46325436	10.30%	low	0
1979	Iran	152	1336	11.4 %	1	14.4	No	-0.72	0	4	-9	48.566438	14% (2001)	0.8	1
2005	Iraq	6	1023	0.6%	0	0.6	UK (1930)	0.16	0	5	-6	43.38137333	19.20%	0.84	1
1952	Jordan	22	855	2.6%	0	2.6	UK (1946)	.	0	2	-8	49.32685	14.3% (2005)	low	1
1962	Kuwait	5	692	0.7%	1	0.7	UK (1961)	.	0	1	-8	50.48918	1.1% (1984)	0.94	1
1926	Lebanon	0	521	0.0%	0	0	France (1946)	.	0	2	2	.37(2008)	8.4% (1990)	low	0
2011	Libya	5	243	2.1%	1	5.1	Italy (1951)	1.43	0	3	-7	45.75252647	19.50%	Very High	1
2011	Morocco	18	1466	1.2%	0	1.2	France (1956)	1.31	0	3	-6	49.66385387	8.40%	low	1
1996	Oman	7	658	1.1%	1	4.1	UK (1970)	0.25	0	2	-7	51.42180333	6.60%	0.84	0
2003	Qatar	8	633	1.3%	1	4.3	UK (1971)	1.38	0	1	-10	53.41092818	1.50%	0.92	0
1992	Saudi Arabia	58	573	10.1 %	1	13.1	No	0.55	1	2	-10	45.9 (2013)	7.40%	0.9	1
2012	Syria	2	727	0.3%	1	3.3	France (1946)	0.93	1	5	-9	47.71640593	5.70%	low	1
2014	Tunisia	10	1131	0.9%	0	0.9	France (1956)	0.35	0	3	-7	48.30219241	13.80%	low	0
1982	Turkey	0	2769	0.0%	0	0	No	-0.37	1	3	-6	44.13420053	10.5% (2005)	low	1
1971	UAE	5	886	0.6%	1	3.6	UK (1971)	.	1	1	-8	48.59588	1.1% (1985)	0.45	0
2001	Yemen	12	909	1.3%	1	4.3	UK (1967)	4.74	0	3	-6	48.78859	12.70%	0.65	0
							Ruled by Colonial Power	1 is RAP MOD	1 is No Inclusion	3,4,5 is repression	(-5 or lower)	(49 or greater)	(11% or greater)	(.5 or greater)	1 is Foreign Int

Appendix B

Data for Rapid Injection of Modernity for Chapter Two

Source: World Bank Development Indicators (1961-2015), GDP per capita growth (annual %)

Fuzzy Score = (5 year average) – (full historical average from 1961 to constitution year)

				Data Source	World Development Indicators	
				Last Updated Date		8/10/16
Country Name	YEAR	Country Code	Dichotomized score	Fuzzy Score	AVERAGE	Ave of 5 years prior
European Union		EUU				
Middle East & North Africa (excluding high income		MNA				
Algeria	1989	DZA	0	-2.82	1.47	-1.35
Bahrain	2002	BHR	0	0.05	0.24	0.30
Egypt, Arab Rep.	2014	EGY	0	-1.53	2.60	1.07
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1979	IRN	0	-3.37	1.96	-1.41
Iraq	2005	IRQ	1	-3.82	4.55	0.73
Jordan	1952	JOR	.		2.29	.
Kuwait	1962	KWT	.		-2.62	.
Lebanon	1926	LBN	.		1.59	.
Libya	2011	LBY	1	0.71	1.65	2.36
Morocco	2011	MAR	0	0.91	2.92	3.83
Oman	1996	OMN	0	-5.92	7.84	1.92
Qatar	2003	QAT	1	0.57	1.50	2.08
Saudi Arabia	1992	SAU	1	-0.49	1.07	0.59
Syrian Arab Republic	2012	SYR	0	-0.18	2.61	2.43
Tunisia	2014	TUN	0	-1.83	2.80	0.97
Turkey	1982	TUR	1	-3.47	2.53	-0.94
United Arab Emirates	1971	ARE	.		-2.17	.
Yemen, Rep.	2001	YEM	1	1.57	0.42	1.99

Appendix C

Data for Inequality Index (GINI) for Chapter Two

Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (1963 – 2008) covering 148 countries

University of Texas Inequality Project

Code #	Country	Country	Average GINI
12	Algeria	Algeria	39.161
818	Egypt	Egypt	44.463
364	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Iran	48.566
368	Iraq	Iraq	43.381
400	Jordan	Jordan	49.327
414	Kuwait	Kuwait	50.489
434	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Libya	45.753
504	Morocco	Morocco	49.664
512	Oman	Oman	51.422
634	Qatar	Qatar	53.411
760	Syrian Arab Republic	Syria	47.716
788	Tunisia	Tunisia	48.302
792	Turkey	Turkey	44.134
784	United Arab Emirates	UAE	48.596
887	Yemen	Yemen	48.789

From the entire EHII data worksheet Covering 148 countries from 1963 to 2008

Estimated Household Income Inequality

Average GINI =	41.7567137	1 Std Dev	2 Std Dev
standard deviation =	7.34071456	84.1% = 49.09742	95% = 56.43814282
Number of data points =	3854		

Appendix D

Political Terror Scale Levels for Repression Data for Chapter Two

Source: Political Terror Scale Data (1976 – 2014)

Political Terror Scale Levels	http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html
Level	**Interpretation**
1	Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
2	There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3	There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
4	Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
5	Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Appendix E

Sources for Data for Chapter Two

Shari'a law in the constitution (SHARIA) – The Constitute Project
https://www.constituteproject.org/

Colonial Power Rule – (COLPOW) – University of Notre Dame, OpenCourseWare, Islamic Societies of Mena, Lecture 4
http://xxpt.ynjgy.com/resource/data/20091107/U/NotreDame20090001/arabic-and-middle-east-studies/islamic-societies-of-the-middle-east-and-north/lectures/lecture-4.htm

Rapid Injection of Modernity (RAPMOD) – World Bank Development Indicators (1960 - 2015), GDP per capita growth
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators

Unemployment Rate (UNEMPL) – World Bank Development Indicators (1960 – 2015), Unemployment (males)
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators
also Trading Economics (1984-2005) for Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Turkey, and UAE
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/unemployed-persons

Rentier State Status (RENT) – CIA World Factbook, based on percentage of revenue reported from oil/gas
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html

Inequality Index (GINI) - U of Texas Inequality Project, Estimated Household Income Inequality (1963 – 2008)
http://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html
Lebanon GINI – International Poverty Center http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy13.pdf
Bahrain GINI – Bahrain Center for Human Rights http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/4130
Saudi Arabia GINI – CIA World Factbook
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html

Authoritarian State (AUTH) - Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions (1800-2015), Polity score http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

Repression of Islamists (REPPUR) – Political Terror Scale (1976 – 2014), only the State score was used
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/

Inclusion of Islamists (INCLUS) – National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (1945 – 2012), Variables Nelda 3, Nelda 5, Nelda 11, Nelda 13, Nelda 15 and their respective notes were used. http://www.nelda.co/

Foreign Interference (FORINT) - International Military Intervention Dataset (1946 – 2005)
https://www.k-state.edu/polsci/intervention/

Appendix F

Complex Solution of Truth Table for Chapter Two

The truth table analysis with a complex solution provided the results below in Table 2.3.5. Based on the consistency cutoff in the Table of .763, there are two configurations with this complex solution that surpass the threshold:

~RAPMOD*REPPUR*AUTH*~RENT*~MACROECON and

~RAPMOD*REPPUR*AUTH*RENT*MACROECON.

Table 2.3.5 – Complex Solution of Truth Table

Model: shariafz = f(rapmodfz, reppurfz, authfz, rentfz, macroeconfz)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.763052

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~reppurfz*authfz*rentfz*~macroeconfz	0.589963	0.460220	0.760252
~rapmodfz*reppurfz*authfz*~rentfz*~macroeconfz	0.232558	0.130967	0.763052
~rapmodfz*reppurfz*authfz*rentfz*macroeconfz	0.199510	0.079559	0.947674

solution coverage: 0.804162
solution consistency: 0.750000

Based on the results of the complex solution, when there is no rapid injection of modernity but repression and an authoritarian regime are present, shari'a law is present in the constitution when the rentier status and macro-econ conditions are oppositely denoted. If both rentier status and macro-econ conditions are the same, i.e. both present or both absent, then this configuration does not provide for shari'a law.

Appendix G

Parsimonious Solution to Truth Table for Chapter Two

The parsimonious solution to the truth table, in which any remainder is used if it generates a simpler solution, has a slightly different result. In this solution, the three configurations that met the consistency cutoff threshold of .763 were:

~REPPUR*RENT

REPPUR*MACROECON and

RENT*MACROECON as shown in Table 2.3.6 below.

Table 2.3.6 – Parsimonious Solution of Truth Table

Model: shariafz = f(rapmodfz, reppurfz, authfz, rentfz, macroeconfz)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.763052

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~reppurfz*rentfz	0.636475	0.388005	0.763583
reppurfz*authfz*~rentfz	0.279070	0.055080	0.581633
reppurfz*macroeconfz	0.389229	0.000000	0.785185
rentfz*macroeconfz	0.330477	0.013464	0.924658

solution coverage: 0.804162
solution consistency: 0.750000

The parsimonious solution to the truth table proposes that when repression is not present but there is rentier state status, or if repression is present along with macro-econ conditions, or when both rentier state status and macro-econ conditions are present, Shari'a law will also be present.

Appendix H

Macroeconomic Data from combined GINI index and Inequality values for Chapter Two

	ginifz	unemplfz	macroeconfz
Algeria	0.03	0.96	0.03
Bahrain	0.01	0.12	0.01
Egypt	0.25	0.53	0.25
Iran	0.83	0.85	0.83
Iraq	0.17	0.98	0.17
Jordan	0.91	0.86	0.86
Kuwait	0.97	0.03	0.03
Lebanon	0.01	0.35	0.01
Libya	0.37	0.98	0.37
Morocco	0.93	0.35	0.35
Oman	0.99	0.22	0.22
Qatar	1	0.04	0.04
Saudi Arabia	0.38	0.27	0.27
Syria	0.67	0.17	0.17
Tunisia	0.79	0.84	0.79
Turkey	0.23	0.55	0.23
UAE	0.83	0.03	0.03
Yemen	0.86	0.76	0.76

The values for the macroecon condition were derived by using Boolean “logical and” operators with the calibrated GINI index and unemployment value. With this operator, a macro condition is created by taking the lessor of the two values, known as the “weakest link” approach, for the new macroecon value. This approach is used most often in seeking whether a case conforms to an ideal type. It is the most conservative approach in determining degrees of membership. Another approach not used would choose the greater of the two values (known as substitutable conditions or “logical or”.) The final other approach possible is the compensatory approach in which the average of the two scores is taken, which typically produces many mid-range scores centered on the cross-over value (Ragin, correspondence with author, 2016).

Appendix I

XY Plots of Conditions for Necessity and Sufficiency for Chapter Two

XY Plot of RAPMOD and SHARIA



XY Plot of RAPMOD and SHARIA



XY Plot of AUTH and SHARIA



XY Plot of RENT and SHARIA



XY Plot of MACROECON and SHARIA



Appendix J

Research Methodology for Chapter Three

This chapter will conduct a historical comparative analysis of the past century prior to the 1979 Iranian constitution and 1982 Turkish constitution, which were endpoints used in the analysis from the previous chapter. In both countries, the 1920's began a period of dramatic reform that had a consistent ripple effect to this day. Both Atatürk and Reza Shah sought to secularize their countries as much as possible in a quest for modernization and reform of their respective societies. This process did start, to some degree, before both leaders came to power. For Turkey, the demise of the Ottoman Empire and in Iran the 1906 Constitutional Revolution certainly had early elements of this movement, but the "big bang" leading to their respective modern outcomes began for the most part in the 1920's.

The historical comparative approach offers three methodological benefits. First, as a strictly qualitative technique, comparative historical analysis is a completely different genre of methodology than QCA, the quantitative method used to produce the findings tested in this chapter. The use of diverse genres of methodologies to examine the same conditions and outcome provides some level of robustness to this research in the pursuit of conditions for Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa. Second, for very small-N research, there are only a handful of methodologies that are generally accepted. Comparative historical analysis, though there are naysayers criticizing the arguments of such methods, is an established process with decades of significant work by well-known scholars. Finally, as the subject of this study is on political Islam, a religious-political movement that seeks an Islamic revolution across the region, comparative historical analysis is *the* technique that is utilized most often on the subject of revolutions, with many works having claimed substantial influence on the field (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). As Goldstone (2003) notes, it is not simply because of a limited number of revolutions or data on revolutions, but studies with large-N statistical methodologies simply are cited far less than the contextually rich, qualitative studies on revolutions. The historical setting of the 1980 military coup in Turkey and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, both drastic upheavals in their respective political structures that led to new constitutions, require a deep understanding of context for this purpose.

The intent of this appendix is not to argue the merits of comparative historical analysis over more traditional statistical methods. There are countless articles focused exclusively on that goal (Marini and Singer 1988; McMichael 1990; Lieberson 1991; Goldstone 2003; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). Rather, it presents how the comparative historical analysis methodology can be utilized to test the claims of Chapter Two. An example of how comparative historical analysis can provide this analysis is demonstrated in Skocpol's (1979) work on revolutions, which ironically, happened to be published exactly when these two cases were occurring. Skocpol's intent was not to determine generalizations for all revolutions using only three examples of France, Russia, and China. She instead sought to establish a structural argument regarding the relationships between classes and states in successful social movements. Comparative historical analysis can be very useful in providing validity to whether cases converge or diverge with theoretical causal patterns (Goldstone 2003). It is exactly in this manner that comparative historical analysis is leveraged for this chapter.

In my discussion with some scholars in the field, an argument was made that successful Islamist movements, denoted by instances of Shari'a law in constitutions in Chapter Two, are a result of an individual, national sequence of events with little commonality. There is a good amount of literature from modernization theory however, that cites the process of modernization in the 1950's through 1980's as responsible for a substantial amount of universal social change (Parsons 1966; Almond 1973; Goldstone 2003). It is not hard to imagine that this process, along with a blossoming Islamist movement emanating from Egypt across the region, could together yield a repetitive pattern. Establishing what the proposed pattern is, which was a finding from Chapter Two, and then

examining the fitness of cases of Turkey and Iran within this pattern in the decades prior to their constitutions' approval is the comparative historical analysis process used in this chapter. The divergence of either case from the posited configuration of conditions supporting Islamism will cast suspicion on the validity of the previous chapter. Convergence of both cases on the configuration will not "prove" the findings but certainly support the argument through a separate methodology and two polar opposite examples. The hypothesis of this chapter is that the conditions of authoritarianism, repression, rentier state status, and macroeconomic conditions in Turkey and Iran align with an outcome of Islamism. Specifically, positive instances of these conditions in combination should correspond with a positive instance of Islamism in the constitution.

Appendix K

Survey Methodology for Chapter Four

Ethnicity and Religious Participation Survey Methodology
Based on documents received from these volumes of the survey, the following were the procedures used by the survey teams in Iran for the survey data of ethnicity and religious participation. The following passages were translated directly from the survey literature.

Methodology for picking areas to sample:
The addresses in each city were randomly selected and provided to the interviewers who conducted a maximum of five interviews at any given location.

House-selection method for conducting interviews:
The interviewers were instructed to pick the first house in the street/road whose number ended with a 0 (or if there was not such house to pick, one whose number ended with a 5). With this house to their right, interviewers began the interview with the first house to their left. If a house was less than two floors in height, interviewers picked the house to the left on the first floor. If the building was three or more floors tall, they picked the mid, lower floor and the house that was to the left of the elevator/staircase. If it was not possible to enter the building, they had to ring the bell that was in the middle lower row on the left side. After picking the house, whether they managed to have a successful interview with the people in the house or not, they were instructed to exit the building, and take the next building after skipping two buildings. They followed the same procedure again in selecting a house in each subsequent building.

House-selection method for conducting interviews in villages:
Interviewers were instructed to stand in front of a public location such as a mosque, school or market and choose the house to their left. They then followed the same procedures as with the cities in picking houses for the interview.

Selecting a person from the house:
In order to make a random selection, interviewers requested to meet the person in the house who was of Iranian nationality, 16 years of age or older and who was the last person whose birth date had passed. Interviewers had strict instructions to only speak with such a person. If for any reason they were not able to find such a person in the house, they would not interview anyone else. If the person was not available at the time, they made an appointment to meet him/her at a later date.

Appendix L

Sample sizes for Ethnicity/Religiosity Survey, 2010-2013 for Chapter Four

طرح بررسی و سنجش شاخص های فرهنگ عمومی کشور

	Ethnicity/Religiosity Survey Sample Size			
Province	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Tehran	659	659	659	660
Khorasan R	541	541	541	541
Isfahan	617	617	641	641
Fars	506	506	564	564
Khuzestan	No Data	536	621	621
E. Azerbaijan	533	533	539	540
W. Azerbaijan	500	500	500	200
Mazandaran	500	500	500	499
Kerman	500	500	500	500
Alborz	644	644	644	644
Gilan	500	500	500	500
Sistan and Baluchestan	500	500	933	933
Kermanshah	534	534	534	534
Hamadan	500	500	500	501
Lorestan	500	500	500	501
Golestan	500	500	500	500
Kurdistan	500	500	500	500
Hormozgan	500	500	500	522
Markazi	545	545	545	545
Ardabil	500	500	500	501
Qazvin	540	540	540	540
Qom	500	500	500	500
Bushehr	526	526	526	536
Yazd	599	599	599	630
Zanjan	500	500	500	500
Chahar Mahaal/bakhtiari	500	500	500	242
N. Khorasan	500	500	500	501
Kohgiluyeh	500	500	500	499
S. Khorasan	500	500	500	501
Semnan	574	200	574	573
Ilam	503	No Data	503	504

Appendix M

Sources for Provincial Budget Data for Chapter Four

Persian Cal. Year	Common Era Cal. Year	Reference	Website Link
1376	1997	Islamic parliament research center	http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/report/show/733818
1377	1998	microfilms (Princeton Library)	
1378	1999	Islamic parliament research center	http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/report/show/733818
1379	2000	Islamic parliament research center	http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/report/show/733818
1380	2001	Islamic parliament research center	http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/report/show/733818
1381	2002	microfilms (Princeton Library)	
1382	2003	NA	
1383	2004	NA	
1384	2005	microfilms (Princeton Library)	
1385	2006	Expediency Discernment Council	http://old.maslahat.ir/Contents.aspx?p=f542dd90-2f4d-4c24-8a83-d462acd834c8
1386	2007	Expediency Discernment Council	http://old.maslahat.ir/Contents.aspx?p=a3763d1d-b329-42fb-b88d-b8eaa7122ed0
1387	2008	Expediency Discernment Council	http://old.maslahat.ir/Contents.aspx?p=bfe8a80c-6c99-462a-8141-9194c673892c
1388	2009	microfilms (Princeton Library)	
1389	2010	budget planning institute	http://www.barnameh-bodjeh.com/File/Rules/Ghanoon%201389-%20Madevahede.pdf
1390	2011	budget planning institute	http://www.barnameh-bodjeh.com/File/Rules/madevahede-90.pdf
1391	2012	ministry of economic affairs and finance	http://www.mefa.ir/portal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=9097199d-5638-42b4-89d4-6f8f43d5158a
1392	2013	Agriculture-Jahad Ministry	http://dpe.agri-jahad.ir/portal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=c6cacb1d-9d02-4234-a219-7dd949198f05
1393	2014	budget planning institute	http://www.barnameh-bodjeh.com/fa/RulesView.html?ItemID=191&SearchText

Appendix N

Graphs of Per Capita Budgets by Distance from Tehran for Chapter Four














Per Capita Budgets by Distance (2011)
Per Capita Budget
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0
500
1000
1500
Distance in Km from Tehran


Per Capita Budgets by Distance (2012)
Per Capita Budget
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0
500
1000
1500
Distance in Km from Tehran


Per Capita Budgets by Distance (2013)
Per Capita Budget
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0
500
1000
1500
Distance in Km from Tehran


Per Capita Budgets by Distance (2014)
Per Capita Budget
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0
500
1000
1500
Distance in Km from Tehran

Appendix O

Province distances from Tehran for Chapter Four

Province	Distance (km)
Tehran	0
Khorason Rezavi	894
Isfahan	439
Fars	924
Khuzestan	874
East Azerbaijan	599
West Azerbaijan	907
Mazandaran	267
Kerman	1038
Alborz	57
Gilan	325
Sistan and Baluchestan	1567
Kermanshah	526
Hamadan	337
Lorestan	499
Golestan	397
Kurdistan	501
Hormozgan	1334
Markazi	293
Ardabil	591
Qazvin	150
Qom	132
Bushehr	1228
Yazd	677
Zanjan	319
Chahar Mahaal and Bakhtiari	543
Khorason, North	713
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad	738
Khorason, South	1313
Semnan	236
Ilam	710

Appendix P

Decree Appointing Rectors for Chapter Five

Appointing Rectors to Universities in Turkey:

The President is given power to directly appoint rectors to universities in Turkey.
Here is the decree in the power of law (Turkish: Kanun Hükmünde Kararname)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be able to appoint rectors to universities directly without having to consider the preferences of academics following the imposition of the latest state of emergency decree on Oct. 29.

The regulation brings an end to the practice introduced in 1992, which states that rector candidates are elected by the academics at the universities in question before being presented to the president, who can either accept the recommendation or choose another scholar as rector.

The Official Gazette about it
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161029.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161029.htm

29 Ekim 2016 CUMARTESİ **Resmî Gazete** Sayı : 29872

KANUN HÜKMÜNDE KARARNAME

OLAĞANÜSTÜ HAL KAPSAMINDA BAZI DÜZENLEMELER YAPILMASI HAKKINDA KANUN HÜKMÜNDE KARARNAME

MADDE 85- 2547 sayılı Kanunun 13 üncü maddesinin (a) fıkrasının birinci paragrafı aşağıdaki şekilde değiştirilmiştir.

"Devlet üniversitelerinde rektör Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından önerilecek, profesör olarak en az üç yıl görev yapmış üç aday arasından Cumhurbaşkanınca atanır. Bir aylık sürede önerilenlerden birisinin atanmaması ve Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından, iki hafta içinde yeni adaylar gösterilmemesi halinde Cumhurbaşkanınca doğrudan atama yapılır. Rektörün görev süresi 4 yıldır. Süresi sona erenler aynı yöntemle yeniden atanabilirler. Ancak aynı Devlet üniversitesinde iki dönemden fazla rektörlük yapılamaz. Rektör, üniversite veya yüksek teknoloji enstitüsü tüzel kişiliğini temsil eder. Vakıflarca kurulan üniversitelerde rektör, mütevelli heyetinin Yükseköğretim Kuruluna teklifi ve Yükseköğretim Kurulunun olumlu görüşü üzerine Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından atanır."

Translation of the related part.

THE DECREE IN THE POWER OF LAW

THE DECREE IN THE POWER OF LAW
ABOUT MAKING SOME REGULATIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF STATE OF EMERGENCY DECREE

ITEM 85- NO.2547 LAW, item 13, clause 13 has been changes as the following: "In state universities rector, who has to have worked as a Professor at least 3 years will be advised by the Higher Education Committee, and will be appointed by the President. There must be 3 rectors and the President will choose among them. If the advised ones will not be appointed within one month and new candidates will not be suggested by the Higher Education Committee, the appoinment will be made directly by the President. …

Link about the case: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-given-power-to-directly-appoint-rectors-to-universities-in-turkey-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=105519

Appendix Q

Figures for Imam Hatip Schools for Chapter Five

Source: Ministry of Education, Statistics for Imam-Hatip Schools 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1997, 2008

Year	Number of Imam-Hatip Middle Schools Students	Number of Imam-Hatip High Schools Students
1923	1822	0
1925	1009	0
1929	0	0
1931-50	0	0
1951	876	0
1955	2181	254
1960	3374	1171
1961	4305	5507
1962	5936	7109
1963	8606	9873
1964	9719	11005
1965	12156	13813
1966	17905	20233
1967	25588	28992
1968	33400	37963
1969	38544	43851
1970	42360	49146
1971	37388	9012
1972	17462	20723
1973	10785	23795
1974	24091	24804
1975	51724	25770
1976	84784	25800
1977	108345	26169
1978	114263	34417
1979	130094	47941
1980	138814	62186
1981	147071	69792
1982	145653	70250
1983	144798	76193
1984	145816	83157
1985	150364	87560
1986	160197	89666
1987	170066	81972
1988	180389	87079
1989	190176	92385

1990	209915	100300
1991	229570	117706
1992	258405	137490
1993	283601	162828
1994	303179	172996
1995	407699	185110
1996	418775	192727
1997	213417	178046
1998	0	192786
1999	0	134224
2000	0	91620
2001	0	71742
2002	0	64534
2003	0	84898
2004	0	73563
2005	0	108064
2006	0	120668
2007	0	129274
2008	0	143637
2009	0	198581
2010	0	235639
2011	0	268245
2012	0	380771
2013	0	474096
2014	385830	546443

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