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The International Security Cooperation Market

Henke, Marina Elisabeth

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THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION MARKET

COALITION BUILDING IN PURSUIT OF PEACE

Marina E. Henke

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Abstract

This dissertation develops the concept of an *International Security Cooperation Market*. The currency of this market is the side-deal. These deals, also known as issue-linkages or side-payments, are systematically negotiated between *Lead Nations* - nations for which the execution of a particular security cooperation effort is a top foreign policy priority - and *Laggards*, which do not assign a similar level of importance to the same endeavor. I argue that *institutional connectedness* between leaders and laggards affects the likelihood of a laggard being successfully recruited by the leader. I demonstrate that institutional connectedness allows leaders to minimize information asymmetries and to maximize payment flexibility thus increasing the likelihood of concluding a successful bargain. I propose that this market mechanism exists parallel to traditional collective action efforts: if too few "like-minded" security cooperation partners are available, the market can fill the void.

I test this argument in two ways. First, I undertake a quantitative analysis of all security operations (i.e., multilateral military deployments) conducted since the end of the Cold War. I present an original dataset to investigate whether there exists a statistical association between institutional connectedness and troop deployments. In addition, I examine six specific instances of force generation negotiations to understand the precise causal processes at work. These case studies draw on extensive field research over two years in Nigeria, France, Ireland, Austria, Australia, Washington D.C., New York and Brussels. They rely on over 100 interviews with high-ranking government officials, including former prime ministers, foreign ministers, Joint Chiefs of Staff and UN ambassadors.

I find that there is a strong statistical relationship between institutional connectedness and security operation participation, which holds across twelve different statistical models. In addition, the case studies illustrate that the hypothesized causal mechanisms of the market model function as expected, although some are more common than others. These findings have implications for both academic theory and political practice in the fields of international cooperation, international institutions and bargaining.

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List of Abbreviations

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
AMIS	African Union Mission in Darfur
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Economic Community of Central African States
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COW	Correlates of War
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DOD	Department of Defense
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DV	Dependent Variable
EC	European Communities
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUFOR Chad-CAR	European Union Force in Chad and the CAR
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
HQ	Headquarters
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IV	Independent Variable
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LN	Lead Nation
MAP	Membership Action Plan

MID	Militarized Interstate Dispute
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONUSCO	United Nations Organizations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OSCE/CSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PN	Potential Participant
POL-MIL	Political-Military
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
Std. Devs.	Standard Deviations
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TNI	Indonesian Armed Forces
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Operation in Sierra Leone
UNDPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Department
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMIL	United Nations Operation in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	World War Two

Dedicated to my parents, Lucie and Hartmut Henke, and my godfather Rudi Templer, who taught me to love, respect and be curious about this world in all its diversity.

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"Choose your dissertation committee wisely. They might well become some of the most important people in your life as a graduate student and beyond" – this was one of the recommendations that Princeton University gave to its incoming graduate student class in the fall of 2007. Little did I know then how true that statement would become. This dissertation and my overall experience at Princeton would not have been the same without the outstanding academic guidance by Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Tom Christensen and Christina Davis. Their academic brilliance provided me with intellectual roots. Their belief in me and my project gave me wings. Time and again they inspired me to think harder, dig deeper and push further. I couldn't feel more grateful.

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I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Lucie and Hartmut Henke, and my godfather, Rudolf Templer. Their stories about their work and life in far-away places, their respect and love for this world and its peoples in all their diversity instilled in me a curiosity to discover and understand myself – a desire that lies at the very heart of this work.

Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.

Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 23

INTRODUCTION

On January 30, 2008, Brigadier Alois Prähäuser left his hometown of Mautern in the pristine Austrian province of Steiermark to deploy to Chad - a country in the heart of Africa. Alois was a member of the Austrian Special Forces, the so-called *Jagdkommando,* which was sent to Chad to participate in the European Union operation to Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad-CAR).[1] Alois knew it would be hot and dangerous down there, but did he know why he was being deployed? No, not exactly. Had Alois consulted the scholarly literature on international security cooperation, he would have found the following answer: countries deploy troops to conflicts which arouse for normative, geopolitical and other reasons the special attention of the government in power.[2] In other words, Austria may have participated in EUFOR Chad-CAR because of strong pressure from domestic humanitarian constituencies to relieve the plight of the Chadian civilian population. Alternatively, Austria might have wanted to protect important investments in Chad or feared security spillovers from the Chadian conflict. Further research into those potential motives would have left Alois wondering even more. Austria had literally no relationship with Chad or its surrounding neighborhood: there was no Austrian embassy in the Chadian capital of N'Djamena, no Austrian company investing in Chad, next to no

[1] Parts of this dissertation have been presented at the ISA Annual Conference, March 2011, Montreal; the APSA Annual Conference, September 2011, Seattle; the ISSS-ISSAC Annual Conference, October 2011, Providence (RI); the ISA-CISS Annual Conference, July 2010, Venice (Italy); and the ISA Annual Conference, February 2010, New Orleans.

[2] Bove and Elia 2011; Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Bellamy and Williams 2005; Byman and Waxman 2002; Neack 1995; To be precise, the bulk of the existing literature explaining participation in peace operation ignores the specific geographical patterns of force deployments. It focuses instead on a country's overall motivations to deploy forces abroad. Commonly listed motivations are to spread peace, democracy and the rule of law; garner prestige or benefit from UN peacekeeping training, equipment and financial reimbursements; safeguard UN Security Council seats; or keep the armed forces entangled in foreign operations rather than having them interfere in domestic politics; see e.g. Sorensen and Wood 2004; Findlay 1996; Stähle 2008; Suzuki 2008; Velazquez 2010; Lebovic 2010; Lebovic 2004; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Mullenbach 2005; Andersson 2002; Donald et al. 2008.

trade with Chad and no Chadian diaspora in Austria. Most importantly, however, the Austrian public voiced staunch opposition to the deployment: an opinion poll conducted in January 2008 showed that 73 percent opposed sending soldiers to Chad![3]

So why then *did* Austria deploy to Chad? Similarly, why did Switzerland participate in the UN operation in Burundi (ONUB), Thailand in the UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID), Norway in the NATO operation in Libya, and Chile in the NATO operation in Kosovo (KFOR)? How were forty-two nations recruited to serve in NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and how were fifty-six nations convinced to help patrol the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as part of the UN mission MONUSCO? Is there a systematic pattern that explains a country's deployment choices? These empirical questions lie at the heart of this dissertation.

SCOPE OF RESEARCH

Cooperation problems have long been at the center of International Relations (IR) research. At their core resides a distinctly political process: somehow disconnected actions need to be brought to conformity; policies must be adjusted and patterns of behavior changed. This dissertation studies international cooperation in the security sphere—traditionally perceived as the most difficult area for international cooperation efforts to succeed.[4] More precisely, it looks at cooperation in *Security Operations*—multilateral deployments of military and/or police forces across recognized state boundaries for objectives other than territorial conquest.[5] These operations include humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping

[3] OE24, "73 Prozent gegen den Tschad Einsatz," Available from <http://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/73-Prozent-gegen-den-Tschad-Einsatz/227424.> Accessed 16 July 2012.

[4] E.g., Jervis 1982, 1999; Lipson 1984; Lipson in Baldwin 1993; Betts 1997; Stein 1990; Snidel 1991a, 1991b.

[5] This dissertation uses security operation and security coalition interchangeably.

and peace enforcement operations, as well as operations aimed at changing the political authority structure in the target state.[6]

Once a rather rare event limited to a small circle of international actors, security operations today have become exceedingly frequent international phenomena involving an extraordinarily large number of countries around the world. To be precise, between 1990 and 2010, 133 security operations have been deployed involving 174 countries. At the time of this writing, more than 300.000 military and police personnel are deployed in 53 multilateral security operations.[7]

Security operations are without a doubt the most forceful and most costly conflict prevention and resolution tools extant. Some of them create peace; others protract conflict. Some spread democracy; others prolong dictatorships. So far, the existing research on security operations has focused on exactly that: their effects on the conditions on the ground.[8] Yet much less is known on how exactly security operations are formed.[9] This dissertation attempts to fill such a void.

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[6] The choice of combining various types of operations under the banner of *Security Operations* rests on the assumption that the distinction between "high-intensity" and "low-intensity" operations has become increasingly blurred. In fact, the "holy trinity"—the UN principals of target state consent, impartiality, and limited use of force, which once distinguished regular military operations from peacekeeping, do not hold up any longer. Peace operations have been deployed in circumstances in which target state consent was wholly absent (e.g., Kosovo, where the sovereign former Yugoslavia was the target of NATO military action) as well as in failed states (e.g., Somalia) in which consent was impossible. Peace operations have supported government forces over rebel groups (e.g., ISAF in Afghanistan) or democratic forces against the de facto government (e.g., Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti), clearly abandoning the principal of impartiality. While traditional peacekeeping permitted military actions only in self-defense, today's "peace operations" include heavy weaponry, offensive tactics, and considerable firepower, including air strikes in some cases.

[7] Réseau Francophone de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix, "Ongoing Operations." Available from <http://www.operationspaix.net/operations-en-cours.html.> Accessed 18 July 2012.

[8] Most importantly, Fortna 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Bratt 1996; Greig and Diehl 2005.

[9] Notable exceptions are Bennett et al. 1994, 1997; Baltrusaitis 2009; Mullenbach 2005; Jakobsen 1996; Vucetic 2011; Neack 1995; Lebovic 2004; Perkins and Neumayer 2008. Sorensen and Wood (2004) provide the most thorough case study analysis on peacekeeping motivations.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Security operations are actions of choice, and those choices are revealing. Domestically, no foreign policy issue is more controversial than the use of military force; involving the immediate risk of life, no other issue raises the questions of what a state's interests are in the world and what it is prepared to do to further them more directly and more forcefully.[10] Overall, how force is used, by whom and for what purpose reveals the character of world society and hints at the underlying mechanisms that structure world politics.[11] The specific research question this dissertation tackles is thus: what are the motivating factors behind individual countries' multilateral troop deployments? How does cooperation in multilateral security operations occur?

THE ARGUMENT

This dissertation develops and tests a causal pathway explaining security coalition formation. The argument consists of four components.

First, participants in security operations vary with regard to the preference intensity they assign to the security problem at hand. Based on this variation, I suggest that security coalition members need to be divided into *Leaders* and *Laggards*. For leaders, the execution of a specific operation is a top policy priority, while laggards do not assign a similar level of importance to the same cooperation endeavor. My contention, however, is that the preference intensity variance between leaders and laggards is not dichotomous. Instead, a continuum of preference intensities exists, ranging from top priority to medium priority to indifference and opposition.

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[10] Haass 1999, 1.

[11] Finnemore 2003, 1.

Second, the nature of preferences and preference intensities of individual governments depends on domestic societal mobilization with regard to the security cooperation objective at hand. Governments facing unified and strong domestic societal pressure turn into leaders on a particular security question. Governments facing ambiguous, divided, negative, or no societal pressure constitute the population of laggards.

Third, leaders recruit laggards to minimize domestic opposition to the operation. Such opposition can result from branches of the government, lobby groups, and/or public opinion. The multilateralization of the operation allows "outsourcing" of certain political and military responsibilities, thereby diminishing the strength of the real or anticipated domestic antagonism.

Fourth, the recruitment of laggards is most often accomplished via side-deal bargains (i.e., side-payments or issue-linkages).[12] In other words, leaders provide "selective incentives" to less-interested laggards so that they will join the operation.[13] The principal theoretical inquiry of this dissertation is thus: who receives the selective incentives, and how is their value determined? This dissertation proposes the following answer: Given the population of available cooperation candidates, the likelihood of receiving a selective incentive increases with the degree of institutional connectedness between leaders and laggards. In other words, the more bilateral and multilateral institutional ties a leader-laggard dyad shares, the more likely the latter is to join the security operation of the former's choice. Moreover,

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[12] I define issue-linkage as the tying of two issues for negotiation purposes. Those issues are not substantively or inherently connected (see e.g., Haas 1980, Sebenius 1983, Aggarwal 1998).

[13] The term 'selective incentive' has been coined by Olson (1965). It describes a method to overcome problems of collective action. Olson (1965, 51, emphasis in original) writes: "Only a *separate and selective* incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way . . . The incentive must be 'selective' so that those who do not join the organization working for the group's interest, or in other ways contribute to the attainment of the group's interest, can be treated differently from those who do."

the value of the selected incentive is a function of the laggard's preference structure. Why is this so?

THE COSTS OF SIDE-DEAL BARGAINS

My contention is that institutional connectedness minimizes the costs of side-deal bargains. There are, in particular, three costs that can occur in the side-deal bargaining process: search costs, domestic adjustment costs and enforcement costs. Search costs arise in the process of searching for suitable cooperation partners in an environment of heterogeneous preferences intensities. Domestic adjustment costs, in turn, occur from funding side-deals, a process which almost certainly provokes some kind of domestic opposition as money or other resources need to be shifted from one area of preoccupation to another.[14] Finally, enforcement costs result from making sure that individual side-deal commitments will be honored.[15] I argue that these three costs can be minimized by exploiting the effects of institutional connectedness. First, institutional ties determine the breadth and depth of information available to both states and thus minimize search costs. Second, institutional ties create "goodwill accounts" and maximize the range of issue-linkage opportunities thus minimizing domestic adjustment costs. Third, institutional ties provide opportunities for retaliatory linkages, which increases the costs of reneging on a cooperation agreement thus minimizing enforcement costs.[16]

THE MARKET ANALOGY

At its core, this dissertation aspires to offer an original way of thinking about international cooperation efforts. It proposes the existence of an *International Security Cooperation*

[14] Davis 2004; 2008/9, 151-2.

[15] Martin 1992; 1994, 485; Keohane 1984, 91; Weingast and Marshall 1988, 142.

[16] Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984.

Market, in which security cooperation seekers first search for and then bargain with potential security cooperation providers. Cooperation, then, is the result of a market transaction and not of a common need for collective action. My contention is that this "market mechanism" exists parallel to collective action efforts; if no "like-minded" cooperation partners are available, the market can fill the void. Domestic societal pressure in lead states creates a market demand for security cooperation. The uneven distribution of preferences and power creates security cooperation supply. Many nations have resources — whether financial, physical, material or normative—concentrated in one issue-area while their preferences spread across many issue-areas.[17] This constellation provides a strong impetus for side-deal bargains—*the currency of the international security cooperation market.* Side-deal bargains allow transmitting resources from one area of strength to secure objectives in an area of weakness, all depending on the individual preference structures of the market actors. Efficiency in this market is gained via institutional connectedness. It allows market actors to minimize information asymmetries and to maximize "payment flexibility" thus increasing the likelihood of concluding a successful bargain.

A PRAGMATIC WORLD ORDER

Security cooperation sourced by the international security cooperation market is the result of the prevailing international security environment. During most of the twentieth century, ideology was the central organizing principal of international security relations. Two superpowers focused on building and defending their alliance systems. This struggle was so overwhelming that it automatically performed the most essential function of strategic

[17] Oye 1979, 13-16

thinking, setting priorities.[18] After the fall of the Iron Curtain, pragmatism replaced ideology. In a pragmatic world, each state sets its own priorities depending on the domestic societal pressures it faces. Accordingly, security operations have become discretionary operations; that is, operations of choice by states attempting to maximize their individualized sets of normative, political or economic preferences. Alliance partners do not coalesce automatically to fight a common threat. Instead, they require additional incentives exogenous to the cooperation objective, which conversely depend on their own individualized sets of preferences.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Three alternative causal pathways have been advanced to explain cooperation in multilateral security operations. Each one is described in the following.

Preference Convergence Model

A large array of literature suggests that states join security operations to add others' power capabilities to their own. Cooperating partners are assumed to be "like-minded"; that is, to have convergent security preferences and similar preference intensities, which are advanced by forming a security coalition.[19] Such homogenous security preferences can be of varied origins. Realist theory, for instance, would propose that security cooperation is a function of security-seeking. In particular, states aggregate capabilities to balance the most imminent threat.[20] Threats closer to home are thereby considered particularly pervasive; a conflict in the immediate vicinity is likely to generate negative externalities such as refugee

[18] Cf. Deibel 2007, 1.

[19] This is the implicit are explicit assumption of most of the existing literature to date that deals with the question of troop contributions e.g. Vucetic 2010; Mullenbach 2005; Jakobson 1996; Findlay 1996; Neack 1995; Lebovic 2004; Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Andersson 2000.

[20] Walt 1987.

flows, disruption of trade relations, and political instability, fostering crime or even conflict contagion.[21] In addition, realists would suggest that, in particular, small states join security operations to jump on the bandwagon with a dominant state so as to benefit from the gains of cooperation.[22] Liberal theory would advance that a state's specific social, political, and institutional makeup determines its likelihood to join a security operation. Being permanently "subject to capture and recapture" by different domestic societal coalitions, a government can favor interventions for humanitarian, security, economic or other reasons.[23] A government captured by economic interests, for instance, is more likely to join a coalition targeting a natural resource-rich state.[24] A government captured by normatively driven societal groups might instead deploy troops to stop large-scale human suffering or spread normative ideals such as democracy and the rule of law.[25] So far, most liberal studies have attributed security coalition formation to shared regime type; democracies tend to fight alongside and for each other.[26] This seems to be the case because democracies draw legitimacy, in large part, from liberal principals and perceive it to be in their self-interest to export liberal practices and pursue humanitarian objectives.[27] Finally, constructivists would emphasize the importance of international norms and values, which are said to tell states not only what they should do but also what they believe they should be.[28] States thus join security coalitions due to normative motivations or to enhance their

[21] Perkins and Neumayer 2008, 900; Regan 2002, 49.

[22] Schweller 1994, 1998.

[23] Moravcsik 1997.

[24] Klare 2005; Pilger 1998; Gibbs 1991.

[25] Dodds 2005; Jakobsen 2002; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 198.

[26] e.g. Lebovic 2004; Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Leeds et al. 2002; Andersson 2000; Risse-Kappen 1995.

[27] Doyle in Brown et al. 1996, 4-5; Owen in Brown et al. 1996, 118.

[28] Müller in Carlsnaes et al. 2002, 381; Finnemore 2003; Wheeler 2000.

international reputation as responsible stakeholders.[29] Similarly, security coalition formation is theorized as the result of a shared identity—of a feeling of belonging together and thus helping each other out in times of necessity. According to Vucetic, from this perspective, "NATO or the Anglosphere is not simply an alliance or a zone of peace but a security community or a "'family of nations.'"[30]

The literature on capability aggregation acknowledges the fact that, despite apparent preference convergence, cooperating partners might encounter collective action problems when joining forces.[31] Domestic institutional variables are also advanced to explain apparent "free-riding." It is argued, for instance, that institutionally weak executives are most likely to provide minimal support for interventions, as they are too preoccupied with retaining office.[32] The timing of elections also appears to matter. Various scholars find that states are particularly reluctant to share defense-burdens if their leaders face immediate elections.[33]

Threat Model

The second alternative causal mechanism questions the assumption that all cooperating partners share homogeneous preferences for collective action on a specific security question. Instead, it proposes that lead nations use direct or indirect threats to coerce other countries to cooperate. The coercive abilities of the lead nations thereby depend on their superior availability of financial and/or military resources; the more asymmetrically dependent a

[29] Stähle 2008; Suzuki 2008.

[30] Vucetic 2010, 4 (quotation marks in original).

[31] On NATO burden sharing see e.g., Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; on UN burden-sharing see Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu 1998; and Shimizu and Sandler 2002.

[32] Auerswald 2004.

[33] Baltrusaitis 2009, 215; Tago 2007; Gaubatz 1995.

party is on those resources, the more likely a coercer will find adequate instruments to make this party join the operation. Asymmetrical dependence on factors such as foreign aid, trade or military alliances can lead to coercive security cooperation.[34]

Especially in the run-up to the Iraq invasion of 2003, many analysts argued that the United States was coercing other countries into cooperation. The Washington-based Institute for Public Policy, for instance, ran a piece entitled "Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced."[35] Similarly, Newnham finds that the U.S. "found it especially easy to influence countries [to contribute troops to the 2003 U.S.-led Iraq invasion] that were already dependent on U.S. aid."[36] Also with regard to the formation of the Gulf War Coalition, Bennett et al. find that economic and/or alliance dependence accounts for a significant number of troop contributions.[37] Tago examines more generally whether U.S. aid allocations influences troop contributions and finds that states are often (although not always) rewarded with foreign aid if they join U.S.-led security coalitions and are punished if they do not.[38] In the same vein, Lake suggests that hierarchy influences a state's decisions to contribute troops to a U.S.-led operation. To be precise, Lake argues that states which are "subordinate" to the U.S., provide troops as acts of symbolic obeisance, which he defines as "collective displays of submission that acknowledge and affirm the authority of the ruler."[39]

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[34] Hirschman 1945; Keohane and Nye 1977; Baldwin 1980; Caporaso 1978.

[35] Institute for Policy Studies, "Coalition-of-the-Willing or Coalition-of-the-Coerced," February 2003. Available from <www.ips-dc.org/files/1767/COERCED.pdf .> Accessed 10 Oct 2011.

[36] Newnham 2008, 86.

[37] Bennett et al. 1997, 12-13 and 38.

[38] Tago 2008; Sarantakes 1999.

[39] Lake 2009, 165-167.

Auction Model

The third alternative causal pathway proposes that lead nations—either ad hoc or through an international organization—run a "peacekeeping auction;" they publicly announce a fixed reward for the contribution of a specific set of military personnel and/or equipment. Countries willing to participate can then bid on such an offer, and the highest bidder is awarded "the job."[40] For example, the UN reimburses each country with roughly US $1,000 per troop/month deployed to the conflict theater. In addition, the United Nations Peacekeeping Department (UNDPKO) manages a reimbursement catalogue for all equipment used in the field by the national contingents.[41] The usage of each tank, jeep, helicopter or other equipment is reimbursed according to UN criteria. States which are interested in the "peacekeeping job" under the terms proposed by the UN, can declare their interest to UNDPKO, thus "submitting their bid to the UN auction."[42]

THE METHOD

This dissertation employs a mixed methods approach. The explanatory power of the four causal pathways introduced above will be tested using large-*N* regression analysis as well as qualitative research methods. The quantitative analysis investigates whether there is a general statistical association between institutional connectedness between leaders and laggards and the latter's probability to deploy troop to an operation of the former's choice. It therefore provides important insights on the macro-factors that determine a country's decision to participate in a security operation. The analysis examines the entire population

[40] Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Julien, Kennes and King 2000. In the field of economics. such an auction model has been found as the most efficient way to achieving resource allocation in economic environments with trading frictions, i.e., in environments in which private information/search costs inhibit the matching of demand and supply. So far this theory has not been applied to problems of international cooperation.

[41] United States Peacekeeping Department, Booklet, Available from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/coe/referencedocuments/Booklet%20Handout%20Intro%20to%20COE.pdf.> Accessed 10 Oct 2011.

[42] For a similar account on NATO, see Toczek 2006.

of security operations conducted since the end of the Cold War.[43] I collected an original dataset and coded various new variables to perform this statistical analysis. The qualitative analysis, in turn, tests the specific steps of the causal mechanisms described above and sheds light on the micro-factors explaining security cooperation. The qualitative approach comprises a cross-case comparison of three security operations as well as a causal-process analysis of six bilateral force generation negotiations: three successful negotiations and three failed negotiations per operation. The security operations picked for the cross-case comparison are the United Nations-African Union Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the *ad hoc* operation in East Timor (INTERFET) and the European Union Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad-CAR). The causal process analysis focuses on the bilateral force generation negotiations between the United States and Nigeria; United States and Ukraine; Australia and Thailand; Australia and Malaysia; France and Ireland; and France and Romania. The case studies draw on extensive field research conducted over two years in Nigeria, France, Ireland, Australia, Austria, Washington, D.C., the UN headquarters in New York City, and the EU headquarters in Brussels. I conducted over 100 interviews with high-ranking government officials, including former prime ministers, foreign ministers, Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN ambassadors, and other diplomats and military officers. I complemented the interview evidence with archival research in the *National Security Archive* in Washington D.C., as well as by consulting other primary and secondary sources.

BROADER IMPACT

This dissertation attempts to break new ground theoretically and empirically.

[43] To be precise, I look at all ground operations which have been initiated after January 1990 and no later than December 2005.

Empirically, it sheds new light on how international security cooperation occurs. Since the inception of IR research, alliance theory has been the dominant paradigm through which international security cooperation is perceived, analyzed and understood. In particular, throughout the Cold War, alliances were needed to deter the enemy through credible common positions demonstrating unquestionable resolve.[44] Such credible commitments required the establishment of centralized decision-making institutions, which allowed production of tight systems of coordinated planning, tripwire defense mechanisms, and coherent public rhetoric.[45] This dissertation project suggests, however, that alliance structures are ceding their predominance in enabling international cooperation in the use of force.[46] While alliance theory is one of the most developed branches of IR research, the specific formation of coalitions-of-the-willing has thus far gained much less theoretical traction.[47] This dissertation attempts to fill this gap by offering a causal pathway as to how security coalitions are built. It also makes publicly available an original security operation dataset representing a unique collection of security operation characteristics.

Theoretically, this dissertation project adds to the IR literature on side-deal bargaining. The existing literature so far has failed to grasp the underlying logic of side-deal negotiations, or, as Oye noted, "aside from observing what linkages have been constructed in the past, no clear criteria have emerged for predicting [any] patterns."[48] This dissertation tries to remedy this shortcoming by showing that issue-linkages are negotiated and

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[44] Schelling 1966,

[45] cf. Maynes in Prins 2002; Moravcsik 2009.

[46] For a similar analysis see e.g. Pierre 2002; Baltrusaitis 2009; Norris 2003; Tertrais 2004; Menon 2003; Dibb 2002.

[47] Noteworthy exceptions are Bennett et al. 1994, 1997, with regards to the multinational coalition formed in the Gulf War; Baltrusaitis 2009, with regards to the multinational coalition formed during the Iraq War; Tago 2007, 2008; Lake 2009 and Vucetic 2010 on US-led operations overall.

[48] Oye 1979, 18; see also Tollison and Willet 1979.

distributed *systematically*. By proposing this logic, I highlight the difficulties of finding suitable bargaining partners in an environment of heterogeneous preference intensities and the domestic hurdles to side-deal cooperation. I propose that institutional ties can reduce both impediments; institutional connectedness provides the information necessary to reduce information asymmetries between potential cooperation partners and enlarges the possible range of issue-linkage opportunities. As a result, institutional ties multiply international cooperation efforts not necessarily *because* of preference convergence – as often suggested by the literature – but *despite* persistent preference divergences among cooperating partners.

Overall, this dissertation proposes the idea of an international security cooperation market in which "cooperation services" can be exchanged, all depending on the preference intensities of the individual market actors. I argue that this market exists parallel to traditional collective action efforts; if no "like-minded" cooperation partners can be found, the market is used to fill the gaps. In this market, power assets, whether in the economic, institutional or security spheres, become not only fungible but tradable. Efficiency in this market is gained via institutional connectedness; the more connected an actor, the more information and flexibility it has available, and the cheaper its cooperation bargains can be. As a result of this market, institutional interdependence takes on another meaning, not one of a constraining condition—of impinging on a state's sovereignty and making it sensitive to other countries' policies—but one of reducing the costs of side-deal bargains, thus enabling cooperative outcomes which would otherwise either be very costly or impossible to achieve. While tested here in the security sphere, similar situations of heterogeneous cooperation preferences are easily imaginable in other issue areas such as environmental cooperation,

cooperation in questions of human rights, or other regulatory issues such as tax evasion or money laundering.

Finally, this dissertation further bridges the divide between International Political Economy (IPE) and security studies approaches to international relations research. In fact, implicitly or explicitly, the existing IR literature still holds on to a division between "high politics" and "low politics," i.e., depicting security concerns as concerns to state survival and therefore superior to economic matters. The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that, in our current age, this distinction is less pertinent than hitherto assumed.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

To answer the research question described above, this dissertation engages in rigorous triangulation of qualitative case-study research and large-*N* regression analysis. Chapter One describes in detail the four causal pathways presented above. Chapter Two introduces the research design and data employed. It provides a description of the coding procedures used to build the dataset for the large-*N* regression analysis. It also discusses the case selection criteria as well as the interview strategy and questions. Chapter Three conducts a quantitative test of the casual pathways presented earlier. The chapter contains a statistical analysis of the impact of institutional ties on the probability of force deployments. Chapters Four, Five and Six present qualitative examples of how the causal mechanism linking institutional ties and troop deployments works. Chapter Four focuses on the UN-AU operation in Darfur (UNAMID), illustrating how the United States took the lead in setting up UNAMID and how it incentivized Nigeria to provide the largest number of troops to UNAMID. It also discusses why Ukraine failed to participate in UNAMID

despite intensive U.S. lobbying efforts. Chapter Five, in turn, examines the *ad hoc* intervention in East Timor (INTERFET). It explains how Australia turned into the leader of INTERFET and how Thailand decided to send the second largest contingent to East Timor. It also explores Malaysia's refusal to participate in INTERFET. Finally, Chapter Six examines EUFOR Chad-CAR, providing details on France's motivation to launch an EU operation in Chad and how it motivated Ireland to join the endeavor. It also looks at why Romania refused to participate in EUFOR Chad-CAR. I conclude this dissertation by assessing the assembled empirical evidence. I also consider the broader implications of this work as well as depict future directions of research.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORIZING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

This chapter presents a causal pathway of how cooperation in multilateral security operations comes about. I introduce the theory in six steps.

First, I explain how security coalition partners often vary with regard to the preference intensity they assign to resolving the security problem at hand. As a result of this variation, participants in security operations need to be divided into *Leaders* and *Laggards*. For leaders, the execution of a specific operation is a top policy priority, while laggards do not assign an identical level of importance to the same cooperation endeavor. Second, I explain the preference formation process in both lead and laggard states. I distinguish between unidimensional and multidimensional preferences and elaborate in detail how variation in preference intensities determines bargaining power. Third, I describe why leaders want laggards to join a security operation despite their lesser interest in resolving the security issue at hand. I argue that five rationales drive the force generation process: legitimacy concerns, partisan concerns, costs concerns, operational capacity concerns, and deterrence concerns. Fourth, I explain how leaders go about recruiting laggards. I argue that the force generation process unfolds in two steps: in the search process, leaders identify potential bargain candidates; in the subsequent bargaining process, leaders and laggards bargain over inducements or "selective incentives" that the leaders will offer to the laggard so that it joins the operation. My contention is that institutional ties between leaders and laggards determine the likelihood of the latter to be successfully recruited by the leader.

Fifth, I introduce the concept of an *International Security Cooperation Market*. I argue that this market works parallel to traditional collective action efforts. Finally, I distinguish my theory from alternative perspectives on international security cooperation. In particular, I consider three alternative causal pathways that can also explain security coalition formation. The first alternative causal mechanism, which I call the *Preference Convergence Model,* argues that security cooperation partners do share common or convergent preferences and homogeneous preference intensities. As a result, coalition members do not require exogenous incentives to join a security operation. The second causal mechanism, the *Threat Model*, proposes that laggards are coerced into cooperation. And, finally, the third causal mechanism, the *Auction Model*, suggests that laggards join security coalitions via "peacekeeping auctions." The argument that I want to convey is that all four causal pathways can be observed empirically when examining how security cooperation occurs. Nevertheless, the *Market Model*—the causal mechanism that I introduce in this dissertation and which suggests that cooperation results from transactions in the international security cooperation market, is the most prevalent.

1.1. PREFERENCE STRUCTURES OF SECURITY COALITION MEMBERS

This dissertation adheres to the view that political actors try to maximize non-hierarchical, fluid and heterogeneous preferences.[49] Such preferences include national security, wealth, and power alongside a myriad of other concerns.[50] The exact interpretation and combination of the pursued preferences vary across time and place but remain stable during a particular negotiation context.

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49 Moravcsik 1997; Milner 1997, 11; Ruggie 1983, 265.

50 This approach contrasts with other scholarly accounts (e.g., Morgenthau 1973, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001), which propose that states pursue fixed and homogeneous objectives, chief among them national security, wealth and power.

1.1.1. What is a Preference Structure?

A preference structure summarizes an actor's particular preference constellation at a specific point in time. It provides two types of complementary information: what does a particular actor want (i.e., what are its preferences?), and how much does the actor want it compared to all other things on its wish list (i.e., what preference intensity does it assign to a particular policy objective given resource constraints?). Preference structures thus represent rank-orderings of political priorities across or within issue-areas, determining, for instance, that in a particular negotiation context economic development trumps national security concerns, trumps environmental protection concerns, trumps human rights concerns, and so on.

Figure 1.1 below depicts such a hypothetical multidimensional preference hierarchization. The left hand side of the graph shows those issues (1 and 2) which are of highest importance to a specific political actor, followed by a range of issues of medium to low importance (3-8), followed by issues the actor is indifferent about (9-15).

Figure 1.1: Hypothetical Distribution of Multidimensional Preference Intensities





Figure 1.1 above compares the levels of importance one specific actor assigns to the objectives comprising its set of fundamental interests. It thus holds the actor constant while presenting variation in preference intensities. In a multi-actor environment, however, preference intensities do not vary only by issue-area but also by actor. Figure 1.2 below thus switches the assumptions of Figure 1.1. It holds the issue-area constant while presenting a stylized range of actors (A to Z). It thus allows comparing unidimensional preference intensities—preference intensities with regard to one particular outcome of interaction.[51] The left hand side of the graph shows those actors (A, B, C) mustering the strongest preference intensity in favor of such an outcome, followed by a substantial number of countries (D-V) with medium to low preference intensities, and, finally, a small number of countries (W-Z) which expect to be negatively affected by the same outcome.

Figure 1.2: Hypothetical Distribution of Unidimensional Preference Intensities



The effects of such divergent preference structures have so far attracted rather little scholarly attention.[52] Many international relations (IR) studies assume for simplicity that preferences are dichotomous phenomena: either one favors a certain outcome or one does not.[53] Such a concept overlooks, however, the fact that preference structures are crucial to understanding how political actors respond if the maximization of their stated preferences

[51] For a similar way of graphing preferences, see, e.g., Milner 1997; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Laver and Hunt 1992.

[52] Notable exceptions are Martin (1994; 1992) and Moravcsik (1998).

[53] Cf. game-theoretical approaches.

is threatened. In short, preference structures determine bargaining power. The more intensely an actor favors an agreement (i.e., the greater its preference intensity), the greater its incentive to offer concessions and compromise in a bargaining context.[54] For instance, if actors bargain over the provision of a public good, an actor holding a medium preference intensity requires a smaller "selective incentive" to join the cooperation effort than an actor holding a low or negative preference intensity. Conversely, an actor being offered help with achieving its most cherished policy goal (issue 1 in Figure 1.1) is more likely to join the same collective action effort than if it is offered something else.[55] The problem with preference structures, of course, is their secrecy. Because they determine bargaining power, governments are very careful about revealing what their exact preference priorities are.

1.1.2. Preference Formation Process

This dissertation assumes that preference structures are the result of domestic deliberations. It considers private individuals and voluntary associations with primarily autonomous interests, interacting in civil and transnational societies, as the most fundamental actors in politics.[56] These distinct individuals and societal groups influence politicians, which themselves require the support of a coalition of domestic voters, political parties, interest groups, bureaucracies, opinion-makers, and financial sponsors to secure

[54] Moravcsik 1998, 62-63.

[55] Binmore and Dasgupta 1987, 1-10; This analysis relies on the Nash bargaining model, which predicts that those actors that most intensely favor a given agreement will make disproportionate concessions on the margin in order to achieve it.

[56] Moravcsik 1993, 481.

their reelection.[57] Although nascent in the domestic area, preference structures are not, however, oblivious of international constraints. Societal actors vying for influence are aware of their own government's power capabilities and economic resources as well as of the constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.[58] The identity, interests, and relative influence of individual societal actors vary across time, place, and especially issue-area according to the net expected costs and benefits of potential political decisions.[59] At times, domestic societal mobilization is unified and strong, resulting in sharply defined preferences and strong preference intensities (e.g., issues 1 and 2 in Figure 1.1 above). At other times, societal pressure is ambiguous or divided, resulting in less sharply defined preferences and weaker preference intensities (e.g., issues 3-15 in Figure 1.1 above).[60]

As Chapters Four, Five, and Six of this dissertation will show, societal mobilization in favor of intervention can occur inside and outside governmental structures. U.S. preferences regarding the UN operation in Darfur, for instance, were largely the result of intense lobbying efforts by a domestic coalition of evangelical Christian, Jewish, and African-American societal groups. French preferences to intervene in Chad stemmed predominantly from mobilization inside the French bureaucracy, namely the French military. Australian preferences to launch an operation in East Timor, in turn, originated in a curious coalition of left- and right-wing elements of Australian society, including labor unions, human rights organizations, the Catholic Church and Australian World War II veterans.

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[57] Practically, this means that the policy preferences of executives need not follow their party platforms nor their campaign promises. Instead, executives can pick and choose among policies to best serve their immediate electoral interests; see, e.g., Downs 1957; Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1995; Moravcsik 1997; Milner 1997, 34.

[58] Moravcsik 1997, 523.


[59] Moravcsik 1997.

[60] Moravcsik 1993, 484; Milner 1997, 12.

1.1.3. Leaders vs. Laggards

States joining security operations do not necessarily share convergent preferences and homogeneous preference intensities. In particular, one needs to distinguish between *Leaders* and *Laggards:* For leaders, the execution of a specific security operation is a top foreign policy priority. Laggards, instead, do not assign an identical level of importance to the launch of the same operation. Nevertheless, the preference intensity variance between leaders and laggards is not dichotomous; it is not true that individual governments are either fully committed to an operation or not at all. Instead, laggards assign varying levels of importance to the intervention depending on the strength and unity of domestic pressure. Figure 1.3 below depicts such a hypothetical distribution of varying preference intensities among a stylized set of nations (A to Z). The left hand side of the graph shows the lead nations (A, B, C) mustering the strongest preference intensity in favor of a particular security operation, followed by a substantial number of countries (D-V) with medium to low preference intensities, and, finally, a small number of countries (W-Z), which are outright opposed to such an operation.

Figure 1. 3: Stylized Distribution of Preference Intensities for one specific Security Operation



1.1.4. Why such Variance in Preference Intensities?

Security operations are not about participants' national survival or the survival of our democratic system of governance. No large-scale armies are mobilized; no economies are turned to war production.[61] Instead, security operations are discretionary interventions or interventions of choice. Modest forces are deployed against a smaller enemy in pursuit of a secondary security concern. Fighting is limited and carefully constrained in geography, time, scope and weaponry.[62] Based on geographical location, socio-demographic composition, history, political power, or simply different national election procedures and timing, states pursue different security interests and thus make different political choices. As a result, their preferences with regard to the execution of a particular security operation vary.

1.2. COOPERATION IMPETUS

One logical question follows from the preceding discussion about preference intensity variance between leaders and laggards. Participating in security operations is costly; why then do laggards join an intervention although such an operation does not constitute one of their foreign policy priorities? The short answer to this question is that laggards are incentivized to do so by the leaders of the operation.

1.2.1. Leadership in Security Operations

Security Operations are often depicted as having been launched by international organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the

[61] Cf. Clark 2001, XXXVIII.

[62] Ibid.

European Union (EU). No IO can, however, mount a security operation on its own.[63] Instead, *Lead Nations* do the bulk of the "political work" necessary to launch a security operation.[64] Such political work may include, among other things, negotiation of peace or cease-fire agreements between the warring parties preceding the intervention; negotiation with the target nation of the operation to seek permission to deploy forces; negotiation of UN Security Council resolutions; operational planning of the deployment (including planning of an exit strategy and provision of military intelligence); financing of the deployment; and, most importantly, the provision of military troops.[65] In fact, no IO has standing forces at its disposal. Instead, states retain an untainted monopoly on the means of warfare. They are the only actors capable of launching and executing military operations.[66]

Sometimes the lead nations alone provide all troops necessary for the intervention. Most frequently, however, lead nations prefer to recruit other countries—laggards—to join the operation. This happens despite the fact that leaders are fully aware that laggards assign a much lower level of importance to the launch of the same operation as they do. So why is there still the need for cooperation?

1.2.2. Rationales for Recruiting Laggards

Security operations are most often dramatic, controversial, and expensive. Troops must be deployed, supported and equipped; military hardware is used and often expended. As a result, domestic pressure in favor of intervention is frequently compounded by domestic

[63] See also Coleman 2007, 3.

[64] Several scholars and practitioners have noted the importance of lead nations (e.g., Whitefield in Chesterman 2007, 92-101; Teixeira 2003). Most importantly, Teixeira (2003), a seasoned UN diplomat, has put together a list of lead nations of the most important UN operations since the end of the Cold War.

[65] This includes pronunciation of ultimatums, which in essence are last-ditch peace attempts.

[66] Coleman 2007, 3.

mobilization against intervention. Again, such domestic opposition can come from groups inside or outside government institutions. Generic points of criticism are: (1) the operation is the wrong thing to do, politically or morally; (2) the operation is too risky; (3) the operation is too costly; (4) the government lacks the military capacity to successfully conduct the operation. Recruiting laggards can affect the strength of each of those arguments. The list of recruitment rationales presented below is predominantly based on research by Kreps (2011), Coleman (2007), Schultz (2003), Finnemore (2003), and Regan (2002).[67]

Recruiting Laggards to overcome Legitimacy Concerns

The conventional wisdom holds that the number of countries deploying to a conflict theater affects the legitimacy of the operation. At the end of World War II, a norm emerged against interstate aggression.[68] Over time, however, military interventions for humanitarian purposes became increasingly considered acceptable, even laudable.[69] Yet, in practice, it is quite difficult to distinguish between the two. Both types of intervention involve combat-ready troops. Moreover, regardless of their actual objectives, all intervening states have a strong incentive to portray their activities as benign peace enforcement.[70] How can an informed citizen cope with the danger of confusing aggression with benign humanitarian intervention? Scholars have suggested that the multilateralization of an operation serves as a hint: The more states involved in an intervention, the more credible the claim to speak in

[67] The list provided here is not meant to be exhaustive. The five rationales are analytically distinct although in reality they often overlap.

[68] Cf. Coleman 2007, 2.

[69] Finnemore 2003.

[70] Cf. Coleman 2007, 2; Finnemore 2003, 176.

the name of peace for the international community.[71] As a result, lead nations have an incentive to recruit as many laggards as possible to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the operation.[72] IOs can further boost legitimacy perceptions because as Colman writes: "[international] organizations act as gate-keepers to legitimacy in the contemporary international system."[73] Chapter Six of this dissertation proves Colman's point: France sought cooperation partners and, particularly European partners, because it feared that a unilateral intervention in Chad would cause a public outcry accusing the French government of post-colonialism. The premise was that the "Europeanization" of the intervention would give the mission an elevated level of authority and legitimacy.[74]

Recruiting Laggards to overcome Political/Partisan Concerns

"I wanted to be able to ask doubting members of Congress how they could deny their President support that countries like Ethiopia and Malaysia and Zaire had given him in the Security Council," former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker writes in his memoirs about his coalition-building efforts prior to the Gulf War. "For better and worse, there [is] a synergistic relationship between the international coalition and domestic support. The stronger the coalition, the easier it was to generate consensus at home."[75]

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[71] E.g., Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Feaver and Gelpi 2004.

[72] Finnemore (2003, 181-182) writes: "19th century multilateralism was strategic. States intervened together to keep an eye on each other and discourage adventurism or exploitation of the situation for no humanitarian gains. Multilateralism was driven by shared fears and perceived threat, not by shared norms and principals. Contemporary multilateralism is political and normative, not strategic. It is shaped by shared notions about when the use of force is legitimate and appropriate."

[73] Coleman 2007, 41. Coleman argues states thereby care about the legitimacy of the operation because it affects their "standing in the international society." My contention is that lead nations care more about the instrumental benefits of multilateral legitimacy e.g., public opinion approval; on IO legitimacy see also , e.g., Abbott and Snidal 1998, 18; Finnemore 2003, 81-82; Hurd 2008; Talentino 2005, 38; Barnett and Finnemore 1994, 5; Grieco and Gelpi, et al. 2011.

[74] Charbonneau in Black and Williams 2010, 216.

[75] Baker 1995, 332.

Baker's empirical observation was adopted and formalized by Schultz.[76] Working through international organizations, Schultz suggests, can help the president overcome, or render irrelevant, congressional resistance to an intervention. In addition, it allows the president to tie his own hands, thus signaling that he will go forward with an operation regardless of congressional opposition. The president hence induces legislators to shy away from efforts to deauthorize, defund, or otherwise limit the mission.[77]

Recruiting Laggards to Minimize Operational Risk

Despite their limits in scope, security operations still bear operational risks, which intervening states are eager to minimize through the recruitment of laggards. At the most basic level, any casualty borne by a laggard is one less for the lead nation. Moreover, the multilateralization of an operation can increase the deterrent effect of the intervening force—if the operation is launched without the consent of the target nation and if the key actors are states, not non-state actors.[78] For instance, a target nation might be less willing to declare war on a coalition composed of forty states than a coalition which is composed of three. Also, the recruitment of major military powers such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, or Russia increases the intimidating effect of an intervening force.

As Chapter Five will show, deterrence was arguably the key reason why Australia recruited laggards to join its intervention force in East Timor. Former Australian Prime Minister John Howard recalls: "I wanted America involved. It was an instinctive reaction. U.S. involvement would send an implicit but clear deterrent signal to anyone in Jakarta who

[76] Schultz in Drezner (eds.) 2003.

[77] Schultz in Drezner (eds.) 2003, 108-109.

[78] On the difficulty of deterring non-state actors, see Smith 2006.

might have considered resisting the intervention force."[79] Similarly, Mike Keating, the head of military planning of Australia's East Timor intervention, remembers, "if Australia would have gone in by herself, the Indonesians might have reacted differently but with 20 odd countries and a UN resolution, it would have been really difficult for [Indonesia] to oppose the intervention."[80]

Recruiting Laggards to Minimize Operational Costs

Security operations are costly. The multilateralization of the operation offers some ways to split these costs.[81] The UN, for instance, maintains a peacekeeping budget that totaled US$ 7.84 billion in 2011-2012.[82] All UN member states must contribute to this budget based on a predetermined scale of assessments. The EU provides a cost-sharing mechanism called the Athena mechanism. While most of the costs must be absorbed by the coalition members ("costs lie where they fall"), certain common costs are split among all members of the EU, e.g., the establishment of headquarters, salaries of locally hired peoples, strategic airlift, select enablers (mainly rotary-wing assets) and information acquisition.[83] NATO follows a similar logic; certain common costs are shared among all NATO member states, such as the use of NATO's command structure, air defenses, command and control systems, and communications systems.[84]

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[79] Howard 2010, 346.

[80] Author's interview with Mike Keating, Brisbane, 9 December 2011.

[81] Cf. Regan 2002.

[82] United Nations Peacekeeping, "Financing Peacekeeping." Available from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml.> Accessed 11 July 2012.

[83] Seibert 2010, 48.

[84] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Paying for NATO." Available from <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67655.htm.> Accessed 11 July 2012.

As Chapter Six will demonstrate, while certainly haunted by legitimacy concerns, France also opted to conduct its operation in Chad under an EU umbrella because it did not want to shoulder the financial burden of such an operation alone.[85] By making the operation an EU endeavor, other EU members had to contribute to the common costs of the operation via the Athena mechanism. Countries contributing troops would also defray their own deployment expenses.

Recruiting Laggards to Maximize Operational Capacity

Finally, recruiting laggards enables leaders to partially or completely "outsource" military interventions in case their own military is either overstretched or unwilling to go. Chapter Four of this dissertation illustrates this scenario. In fact, when the *Save Darfur Coalition* was swelling to unprecedented proportions, the White House was looking at the possibility of a unilateral U.S. intervention in Darfur. The Pentagon was, however, utterly unenthusiastic about this idea. Its key preoccupations during 2004-2007 were Iraq and Afghanistan. Darfur was considered a conflict in which U.S. national interests were remote, to say the least.[86] The U.S. Assistant-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, recalls: "[Officials at the Department of] Defense would come up with these ridiculous estimates like 'you need 120,000 troops to succeed.' Then of course they would say, 'well, we don't have that because of Iraq.'"[87] The Bush White House was not willing to pick a fight with the Pentagon over Darfur and thus looked first to the AU, then to NATO, and finally to the UN to outsource the operation.

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[85] Novosseloff and Gowan 2012, 40 (fn 40); Seibert 2010, 48-49.

[86] Bolton 2007, 351.

[87] Hamilton 2011,75.

1.3. RECRUITMENT PROCESS

The section above provides details about why lead nations recruit laggards to join a security operation. This section now elaborates on how leaders go about doing so. The recruitment process can be analytically divided into a search process and a bargaining process. During the search process, potential bargaining partners are identified. It would be too time-consuming to enter into negotiations with all available security cooperation candidates. During the subsequent bargaining process, leaders and laggards negotiate over the terms under which the laggard will join the operation. My contention is that institutional ties play a crucial role in both processes. Overall, the number of institutional ties between leaders and laggards determines the likelihood of the latter being successfully recruited.

1.3.1. Institutional Ties and the Search Process for Cooperation Candidates

So far, the existing IR literature has largely ignored the issue of identifying potential cooperating partners. The bulk of the existing literature on international cooperation seems to implicitly suggest that cooperating partners coalesce automatically. As a result, no specific search process for cooperating partners occurs. It is, however, uncertain whether in an environment of heterogeneous preference intensities (see above) such assumed automaticity indeed exists.

My contention is that leaders need to engage in a search process which resembles the search process of a firm to find the best employee or of a consumer to find the best product given his or her budget constraints. I argue that leaders prefer states that can provide better quality troops to be deployed to the conflict theater. At the same time, however, when it comes to rewarding laggards for their cooperation services, leaders are unable to spend infinite resources on incentivizing the best available cooperation candidate. The ideal

cooperation partner thus strikes an even balance between the leaders' quality and price constraints. The price of the laggard is thereby a function of its bargaining power, which in turn is determined by its preference structure (see above).

In the field of microeconomics, the particularities of job and/or product searches have led to the development of *Search Theory*.[88] At the heart of Search Theory are information asymmetries. In fact, search theory emerged as a response to the perceived weaknesses of "General Equilibrium Theory," which assumes that market agents are perfectly informed about the price and quality levels in an economy, and consequently information on trading opportunities is omnipresent and available at little to no cost to any interested market agent.[89] In reality, however, infrequent traders are often ill-informed about the distribution of price and quality levels in the market. They thus risk being exploited in the sense of paying a higher price than they would if they had access to more and better information.[90] Minimizing the risk of being exploited involves *search costs*—costs that occur in the process of obtaining better information on price and product availability.[91]

Transposing search theory to the recruitment process of coalition partners, I argue that leaders face a risk of being exploited when recruiting cooperation partners. Since recruitment processes are rare phenomena, leaders are not perfectly informed about the distribution of "quality and price levels" among potential coalition partners. As a result, any laggard can exploit the existing information asymmetries and misrepresent its "bottom line." Any leader interested in minimizing the risk of being exploited thus faces search costs

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[88] E.g., Diamond 1984; 1987; Rothschild 1974; Salop 1977.

[89] Walras 1984; Diamond 1984; 1987.

[90] Nicolson and Snyder 2007, 426.

[91] Diamond (2008) writes: "In Search Theory, there is a cost to finding any trading partners and possibly a large cost to finding one willing to trade at some particular price."

to approximate the "real" reservation level of a potential cooperation partner, which depends on the partner's preference structure.

This dissertation proposes that leaders make use of bilateral and multilateral institutional ties to reduce search costs. Consequently, among a set of potential cooperation candidates, leaders approach those states first to which they are most institutionally connected. It is important to note that leaders do not think that those institutionally connected laggards share the same preferences and preference intensities regarding the operation as they do.[92] Instead, leaders approach these cooperation candidates because they have the most information available about those countries and thus can minimize the risk of being exploited. The two sections that follow will explain this proposition in detail.

Institutional Connectedness helps approximate a state's preference structure

It has been widely discussed in the IR literature that institutions upgrade the general level of information available to states.[93] My contention is that the overall number of shared institutional ties between a country dyad determines the breadth and depth of information available to both states and thus allows approximating a state's preference structure.

Multilateral ties (i.e., shared membership in multilateral institutions) allow observing the behavior of a fellow state in multilateral fora: on what topics does the state speak up? When does it stand on the sidelines? How does it interact with other members? Bilateral ties, in turn, open information channels between a country dyad; during treaty negotiations, countries record preferences in the issue area the treaty addresses. Once the treaty comes into force, countries monitor how preferences evolve.

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[92] For scholarly accounts which would make this argument, see, e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Ingram, Robinson and Busch 2005.

[93] Keohane 1984.

For example, if a trade agreement is negotiated, a country pair first realizes the trade priorities of its counterparts: which areas are sensitive because of intense domestic interests? Which areas are more flexible because of less organized domestic preference groups? Once the agreement is in force, diplomats at the countries' embassies and/or the country desks in the respective foreign offices monitor the implementation of the agreement. This often creates "standard operating procedures." Desk/portfolio officers stay in touch with their foreign colleagues to exchange treaty-related information. Enduring social contacts and networks are developed, which again improve the flow of information.

Overall, bilateral and multilateral ties allow countries to keep track of preference stability and/or change in their partner countries almost without any costs. If no ties exist, no such automatic information exchange would occur. In the case of a coalition building effort, leaders can access such information gathered via institutional connectedness to gauge (1) the cooperation capacities a potential cooperation partner could bring to the table; (2) its unidimensional preference intensity in the operation at hand; and (3) its multidimensional preference intensities (i.e., the range of top policy priorities pursued by a given country).

Former U.S. Secretary of State Baker's account of how he incentivized Turkey to join the Gulf War Coalition nicely illustrates how institutional ties provide information which is then used to construct linkage bargains. "I also knew," Baker recalls, "that Turkey's psychological needs were in many ways more important than its economic requirements. For years, Turkey had chafed at what it considered a lack of respect from some of its colleagues in NATO. It was anxious to be treated more as a full NATO partner and it wanted badly to join the EC. . . I [thus] told Ozal [the Turkish Prime Minister] that I had already consulted with key NATO allies and was authorized to reaffirm the alliance's treaty obligations to Turkey's defense. . . I also told him that, while it was a decision for the EC

members, the U.S. had formally endorsed, and would be strongly supportive of, Turkey's application to join the EC. . . Anticipating his [the Turkish Prime Minister's] request [regarding a World Bank loan] I had [also] talked the week before to. . . the President of the World Bank. I was happy to inform Ozal that the World Bank was prepared to extend Turkey between $1 billion and $1.5 billion in loans for each of the next two years."[94]

Institutional Connectedness creates "Goodwill Accounts"

Institutional ties do not only provide information about preference structures but also about past favors, e.g., political or financial support granted to a partner country. Overall, all of these good deeds by one country to another are registered as a positive balance on a state's "goodwill account." Other expressions used to describe the same phenomenon are: "political capital," "political debt," or even "chip accounts."[95] Tony Blair, for instance, recalls in his memoirs how he convinced President Clinton to get involved in Kosovo: "After two weeks [of air campaign], I thought enough was enough . . . We were going to grip it and I would use all my chips with President Clinton to get a commitment to ground troops on the agenda."[96]

While being purely subjective without any "right of retrieval," political goodwill can make a big difference in the underlying tone of a bilateral relationship. In bilateral meetings of presidents, ministers, ambassadors, or other diplomatic staff, countries often initiate discussions by highlighting the "current balance of the goodwill account." For example, conversations are often initiated by saying, "We perceive that our current state of bilateral affairs is excellent. Our two countries cooperate on nuclear proliferation; the war against terrorism; in the WTO Doha Round; and we have recently concluded a bilateral trade

[94] Baker 1995, 284.

[95] See also Keohane 1986

[96] Blair 2011, 237.

agreement." The savvy diplomat then knows exactly that his or her country either incurred or expended "political debt" in those issue areas in the other country. Overall, the more institutionally connected a country pair, the more opportunities there are to add funds to the account but also to make use of accumulated goodwill in partner countries.

For example, when trying to get Germany to pick up parts of the Gulf War bill, U.S. Secretary of State Baker made blatant use of the U.S. goodwill account with Germany. "We worked very closely in the last year to meet your needs," Baker recalls having told the German Chancellor Kohl, "I think we've done a good job, and it wasn't always easy . . . It's a wonderful achievement for all of us, but we have some needs now."[97] Similarly, Chapter Five of this dissertation illustrates how Australia made use of its "goodwill account" with Thailand when looking for potential recruits for the East Timor intervention. During the Asian financial crisis, Australia had been one of the most generous states, providing loans to Thailand via the IMF trust fund. Also, in 1999, Australia staunchly supported the Thai candidate for the WTO director generalship over his competitor from New Zealand. When Australia needed to put together a military coalition in fall 1999, Australia reminded Thailand of those deeds, and Thailand agreed to reciprocate—a move which was considered extremely surprising given Thailand's difficult economic situation at the time and its strong political ties with Indonesia.

1.3.2. Institutional Ties and the Bargaining Process

The second step in the recruitment process involves bargaining over the terms under which the laggard will join the operation. There is ample empirical evidence that certain force generation negotiations succeed while others fail. Why is this the case? What determines

[97] Baker 1995, 299.

bargaining success? In general terms, negotiations succeed if the win-sets[98] of bargaining agents overlap in at least one policy space.[99] It logically follows that the larger the win-set of each agent the greater the likelihood of win-set overlap.[100] I define win-set here as the range of outcomes each party prefers to the status quo and thus is willing to accept as bargaining result.[101] The size of the win-set is assumed to depend on the perceived costs to decision-makers of "no agreement": the lower such perceived costs of not reaching an agreement, the smaller the win-set.[102]

Institutional Connectedness allows for 'Payment Flexibility'

My contention is that the degree of institutional connectedness between leaders and laggards determines bargaining success: the more bilateral and multilateral institutional ties a dyad shares, the less likely the negotiations are to fail. I argue that chief executives (i.e. ministers or heads of state) are not constrained to one single issue-area (e.g., security cooperation) but have a multi-issue environment in mind when thinking about possible troop contributions to security operations. Security cooperation can thus be reciprocated by cooperation in the financial, economic, political, military, or other realms.

The existing IR literature has noted that side-deals potentially bear considerable domestic costs.[103] Side-payments (e.g., increases in development and/or military aid) may arouse

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[98] Shepsle and Weingast (1987, 90) first introduced the term win-set. Any bargaining agent *i* is assumed to have an ideal point x_i, and his or her preferences are representable by strictly convex indifference contour (i.e. concentric circles) around the ideal point x_i, thus forming agent *i's win*-set (i.e. all bargaining outcomes that agent *i* prefers to the status quo).

[99] See, e.g., Putnam 1988, 438.

[100] Sebenius 1983; Tollison and Willett 1979.

[101] Shepsle and Weingast 1987, 9; Odell 2000; Putnam 1988.

[102] Putnam 1988.

[103] Davis 2004; 2008/9, 151-2; Moravcsik 1998; Morgan 1990, 320; see also Milner (1997, 9) on international negotiations more generally.

domestic opposition as money needs to be shifted from one area of preoccupation to another. The same holds true for issue-linkages. Any issue-linkage is likely to bring about increased benefits for some domestic interest groups but losses for others, and the losers are likely to be more vocal about their losses than the gainers are about their gains.[104] As a result, this dissertation depicts the side-deal negotiation process as a two-level game: any international agreement needs to be "pre-approved" by the domestic level.[105] To guarantee domestic level approval, executives need to minimize domestic adjustment costs, i.e., domestic costs that potentially occur due to side-deal bargains. I argue that such a minimization process is facilitated by the degree of institutional connectedness. In fact, institutional interdependence increases the range of possible issue-linkage opportunities. The possibility of finding an issue-linkage that avoids hurting influential domestic interests can thus be maximized. Overall, the domestic level win-set is enlarged.

For instance, if two countries only share one institutional relationship, e.g., a trade agreement, country A can ask country B to lower import duties on automobiles as a reward for its troop contribution. Facing considerable domestic opposition from its automobile industry, however, country B cannot accept such an issue-linkage, as the value of country A's contribution to the security operation will not offset the potential domestic adjustment costs of lowering automobile import duties. If, however, two states share several institutional relationships, such as, for instance, a trade agreement, a bilateral investment treaty, or several joint IO memberships, country A can ask country B to either lower import duties on automobiles, offer mining rights to country A's mining companies, or support country A's candidate for the next Director General of the World Trade Organization.

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[104] e.g. Hoekman 1989, 697; Keohane and Nye 1977, 30; Moravcsik 1998, 65.

[105] Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993.

Country B can thus choose between three issue-linkages and pick the one that minimizes its own domestic adjustment costs, i.e., select the one issue-area in which it expects the lowest opposition by its own domestic societal groups.

Institutional Connectedness reduces Risks of Incomplete Contracting

Bargaining over an agreement is often only a first step. States need to look down the road at the monitoring and enforcement of any agreement reached.[106] The frequent non-simultaneity of side-deals can cause incomplete contracting e.g., the early withdrawal of forces from the operation.[107] Some states may not want to keep a commitment because defection might appear beneficial. Others may not be able to carry out a commitment that has been made. Governments may enter into agreements that they intend to keep, assuming that the environment will continue to be benign; if adversity sets in, they may be unable to do so. This dissertation suggests that the institutional infrastructure shared between leaders and laggards minimizes the credible commitment problem; institutions permit credible commitments by reducing uncertainty.[108] In addition, institutional connectedness also facilitates the usage of a tit-for-tat strategy. In fact, institutional connectedness increases the range of possible "retaliatory linkage" opportunities and thus maximizes the costs of reneging on an agreement by transforming single shot games into iterated games with long time horizons.[109]

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[106] Oye 1986; Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984.

[107] Lohman 1997; Martin 1992; 1994, 485; Keohane 1984, 91; Weingast and Marshall 1988, 142; Eichengreen and Frieden 1993.

[108] Keohane 1984, Martin 1992.

[109] Axelrod 1984.

1.4. THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION MARKET

Overall, this theory chapter aspires to offer an original way of thinking about international cooperation efforts. It proposes the existence of an international security cooperation market, in which security cooperation seekers first search for and then bargain with potential security cooperation providers. I argue that this 'cooperation market mechanism' works parallel to traditional collective action efforts: if no 'like-minded' security cooperation partners are available, the security cooperation market can fill the gaps. The sections that follow provide details of the market analogy.

1.4.1. The Market Analogy

Markets form if a demand for a specific good or service is met by the appropriate supply of such good or service. States highly interested in cooperation in a specific issue area (e.g., cooperation in a security operation) represent the demand side of the cooperation equation. Less interested states—laggards—represent the supply side.

How are Demand and Supply created?

Domestic societal pressure in lead states creates demand for security cooperation. The uneven diffusion of preferences and power creates security cooperation supply. Many nations have power—whether financial, physical, material or normative—concentrated in one issue-area, while their preferences spread across many issue-areas.[110] This constellation provides a strong impetus for side-deal bargains — the currency of the international security cooperation market. Side-deal bargains allow transmitting power

[110] Oye et al. 1979, 13-16.

resources from one area of strength to secure objectives in an area of weakness.[111] Interestingly, there is no hierarchy between issue-areas, no distinction between low and high politics.[112] Issues are traded depending on the preference structures of individual states.

How are Trading Opportunities discovered?

Efficiency in the international security cooperation market is gained via institutional connectedness. It allows market actors to minimize information asymmetries, which are the key impediments to finding trading opportunities in an environment in which market agents are not perfectly informed about the price and quality levels present in the market setting and thus risk being exploited.

Cooperation Brokers

The key actors in the international security cooperation market are states. However, officials working for international institutions such as the UN, NATO, or the EU also act as market brokers. They help match security cooperation demands with cooperation offers. IOs are particularly adept in doing so because of their constant exposure to specialized information from member states. A security cooperation seeker can thus complement its own information on specific trading opportunities with the information acquired by IO officials. Importantly, IO officials have an interest in sharing this information, as such an information exchange increases the institution's power and relevance.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Cf. Hoffman 1966.

How to conclude a Successful Trade?

Institutional connectedness also plays an important role in increasing the likelihood of concluding a successful bargain by enlarging the range of possible issue-linkage opportunities (e.g., maximizing payment flexibility). At the same time, institutional connectedness also reduces attempts of incomplete contracting by prolonging the time horizon of the trade.

1.5. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

I contrast my approach to security cooperation with three alternative causal pathways. The first, the *Preference-Convergence Model*, suggests that states join security coalitions to enhance their own problem-solving capacities. Cooperating partners are thus assumed to be "like-minded," that is, to have convergent security preferences and common preference intensities. The second, the *Threat Model*, suggests that highly-interested *Leaders* use coercive threats such as the withdrawal of development aid or military assistance to bring additional coalition members on board. Finally, the *Auction Model* depicts the coalition formation process as a public auction: individual states or international institutions such as the UN or NATO announce a fixed monetary award for the contribution of a specific set of military personnel and equipment. Any state interested in the offer can then submit its bid to the organization.

Each of these models is not simply an empirical judgment about a specific case of security cooperation. Instead, it builds on established international cooperation and bargaining theories. Each model thus makes different assumptions about why and how states cooperate. These assumptions vary, in particular, with regard to five dimensions: (1) the preference structures underpinning individual states' decisions to cooperate; (2) their


impetus for cooperation; (3) the identification and recruitment process of cooperation partners; (4) the determinants of bargaining success; and (5) the mechanisms to minimize incomplete contracting. This variation of predictions will serve in the empirical chapters that follow as standards by which to weigh confirming and disconfirming evidence regarding the various pathways of how international security cooperation comes about.

1.5.1. Preference Convergence Model

The *Preference Convergence Model* assumes that security cooperation partners are "like-minded"; they have convergent security preferences and similar preference intensities.[113] In other words, one coalition partner can pursue geostrategic, the other humanitarian objectives. Nevertheless, all assign about the same level of importance to the cooperative outcome; for all participants the operation is a top foreign policy priority.

Figure 1.4 below depicts the preference intensities of coalition participants as proposed by the *Preference Convergence Model*. Similar to Figure 1.2 above, it shows a hypothetical range of cooperation partners (A-Z). In contrast to Figure 1.2, however, there is no preference intensity variation among cooperating partners. Instead, all cooperating partners assign a value of 10 (the max. value) to the cooperative outcome.

Figure 1.4: Preference Structure of Preference Convergence Model



[113] Cf. Morrow 1992, 906.

The *Preference Convergence Model* suggests that cooperation is predominantly motivated by a desire to aggregate and coordinate individual capabilities to increase the coalition's overall strength and thus probability of operational success. The dominant view in alliance theory, for instance, suggests that alliances allow pooling resources.[114] Allies thus value each other for the military assistance they can provide to one another.[115] Military resources previously deployed against the ally can now be redirected against enemies.[116] Similarly, Kreps argues that, in a non-alliance environment, multilateralism promises payoffs in the long term, since the costs of intervention—troops, finances, and opportunity costs can be shared.[117] Given a homogeneous need for collective action, the *Preference Convergence Model* suggests that cooperation partners coalesce automatically.[118] Leaders thus do not explicitly need to search for potential cooperating partners. Moreover, force generation negotiations are determined by distributional consequences.[119] Cooperating partners are

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[114] Morrow (1991, 904) for instance writes: "The dominant view sees alliances as tools for aggregating capabilities against a threat; nations form alliances to increase their security by massing their capabilities against a common enemy."

[115] There is a debate in the field of security studies whether security coalitions are 'alliances.' Scholars, who emphasize the formal commitments and identified targets of alliance structures (e.g. Beres 1972, 702; Snyder 1997, 4; Morrow 1991; Miller and Toritsyn 2005; Gibler and Sarkees 2004) argue that a security coalition is not an alliance. Walt (1987, 12), however, who defines an alliance as "formal or informal arrangements for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states", would suggest that security coalitions are alliances. The most dominant view is arguable that coalitions differ from alliances because of their limited duration (e.g., Pierre 2002; Dibb 2002, 132; Snyder 1997, 12; Morrow 1986; Weitsman 2003, 20; Norris 2003, 359-360; Tertrais 2004, 136) and the specific purpose they set out to do (Snyder 1997, 12; Morrow 1986, 1136; Dibb 2002, 132).

[116] E.g., Snyder 1997, 53; Morrow 1991, 904-906; Kaplan 1957; Morgenthau 1973; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979.

[117] Kreps 2011,7.

[118] Following *Collective Action Theory*, the *Preference Convergence Model* acknowledges that, despite convergent preferences and homogeneous preference intensities, cooperating partners might encounter collective action problems when joining forces; see e.g., Goldstein 1995, 42; Bennett et al. 1997; on NATO burden sharing see also, e.g., Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; on UN burden-sharing see Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu 1998; and Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Martin (1992, 779) calls this a "Suasion Game." She writes: "Suasion problems have equilibrium outcomes that leave once actor dissatisfied. The hegemon has a dominant strategy to cooperate. Knowing this, player B can achieve its most favored outcome by defecting. Faced with this situation, the hegemon has, in the abstract, two ways to convince the other to cooperate. First, it could threaten to act irrationally in the short term, defecting if player B does. This would lead to player's B least favored outcome, and, if credible, convince home to cooperate. The problem with such a strategy, of course, is establishing credibility . . . More frequently, the aggrieved actor will choose the second path—tactical issue-linkage."

[119] Martin 1992.

averse to an absence of policy coordination.[120] Nevertheless, they may have trouble determining where "to settle on the Pareto-frontier."[121] In other words, potential cooperating partners have difficulties determining, for example, what type of military strategy to pursue or what type of forces to employ. Negotiations succeed if cooperating partners manage to agree on an equilibrium point at which to settle (e.g., whether to use air or ground forces). Negotiations fail if the potential distributional consequences for an individual bargaining partner are too high to settle on a compromise. Once a cooperative equilibrium is found, cooperation partners have no incentive to defect from it.[122] As a result, the risk of incomplete contracting is quite small.

1.5.2. Threat Model

Unlike the *Preference Convergence Model*, the *Threat Model* does not assume that all cooperating partners share homogeneous preference intensities. As a result, cooperating partners do not coalesce automatically, and leaders need to search for recruits. The *Threat Model* acknowledges that, due to the opaqueness of the "security cooperation market," leaders lack information on cooperation capacities and preference intensities of potential cooperation partners. Nevertheless, leaders do have access to a particular range of information, notably with regard to the degree of asymmetrical dependence between them and certain potential partners. Such dependence is most easily measured in terms of costly bilateral transaction flows, such as foreign aid, military assistance, preferential trade and so on.[123] If manipulated, such asymmetrical flows can lower the "bottom line" of potential

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[120] Ibid.

[121] Krasner 1991, 339-340.

[122] Martin 1992, 775.

[123] Keohane and Nye 1977.

cooperating partners.[124] The *Threat Model* thus proposes that leaders use asymmetrical flows to determine which countries to approach first for troop contributions. The *Threat Model* also suggests that the degree of asymmetry between leaders and potential cooperation partners determines bargaining success; the more vulnerable the cooperation candidate, the more likely it is to join the security operation.[125] Negotiation failure, instead, occurs if a laggard does not take the coercive threat seriously; if it thinks that the threat is not credible, e.g., because domestic interests in the lead nation will not allow a certain policy change to occur. Finally, the *Threat Model* assumes that, given the asymmetrical dependence between leaders and laggards, leaders should threaten to make use of a tit-for-tat strategy (i.e., punishing defecting cooperating partners via aid cuts) to reduce the risk of incomplete contracting.

1.5.3. Auction Model

Similar to the *Threat Model*, the *Auction Model* does not assume that all cooperating partners share homogeneous preference intensities. Leaders thus need to search for additional recruits. To avoid search costs altogether, the *Auction Model* proposes that leaders open a call for tender specifying a fixed monetary award for the contribution of a specific set of military personnel and equipment. For instance, the leader can independently (or via an international organization such as the United Nations) determine that each soldier deployed will receive a specific amount of money per month. In addition, all equipment used in the field is to be reimbursed according to a predetermined

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[124] Cf. Gilpin 1981, Grieco 1988; (Neo-) realism posits that state behavior that appears cooperative is, in fact, the result of hegemonic guarantees or coercion by a major power. For example, hegemons often run "security rackets," linking protection to economic issues (Gilpin 1981, 9-10). Analyzing the effects of asymmetric power relations has been the most successful application of realist theory to the current modes of security cooperation. Baltrusaitis (2009), for instance, finds ample evidence that the United States made use of coercive threats in its endeavor to assemble a coalition of the willing for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

[125] Cf. Hirschman 1945; Keohane and Nye 1977; Baldwin 1980; Caporaso 1978.

reimbursement catalogue. Any state interested in the offer can subsequently submit its bid to the leader or the organization. Potential participants themselves thus need to take the initiative and approach the leader; the leader does not need to search the market. Two types of countries are thereby most likely to step forward: (1) countries holding a medium preference intensity with regard to the operation, which calculate that the "auction award" provides enough of an additional incentive to motivate their force deployment; and (2) countries for which the "auction award" constitutes a considerable amount of money and/or resources and which are thus willing to deploy troops despite their disinterest in the actual operation. These are, accordingly, relatively poor countries. The *Auction Model* thus predicts that no negotiations occur. Instead, the bidder who offers the most valuable contribution is awarded "the job." In addition, given that incomplete contracting is a real threat, leaders are likely to establish specific reward and punishment structures. For instance, laggards should be paid in several installments, depending on their performance in the field.

1.6. CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to establish the theoretical framework for investigating the central thesis of this dissertation, namely that security cooperation is most often the result of a transaction in the international security cooperation market. The chapter began by elaborating how security coalition partners often vary with regard to the preference intensity they assign to the launch of a specific operation. Given this variance in preference intensities, I noted that security cooperation partners need to be divided into *Leaders* and *Laggards*. The challenge then was to conceptualize why laggards join a specific security coalition, although such operation does not constitute one of their foreign policy priorities. I argued that leaders incentivize laggards to join a security operation because of legitimacy,

financial/operational capacity, and/or risk concerns. The third section of this chapter then described in detail the recruitment process of laggards. I highlighted the importance of institutional connectedness in both the search process of potential cooperating candidates as well as the bargaining process. The fourth section introduced the notion of an international security cooperation market. I argued that such a market exists in parallel to traditional collective action effort: if no "like-minded" cooperation partners can be found, the market can fill the void. Finally, in the fifth section I presented three alternative causal pathways to explain security coalition formation: the *Preference Convergence Model* argued that security coalition members are like-minded; the *Threat Model* proposed that laggards are coerced into cooperation; and the *Auction Model* suggested that laggards join security operations through auctions.

At its core, this chapter outlined an original way of thinking about international security cooperation efforts—cooperation efforts in a world, in which preferences and preference intensities among alliance partners not necessarily always align. My contention is that in such a world, cooperative equilibria quite often result from transactions in the international security cooperation market. My contribution includes theorizing how security cooperation demand and supply are created, how trading opportunities are discovered, and which factors allow for a successful conclusion of a trade.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

Before moving to a test of the arguments presented in the previous chapter, I will review the research methodologies used in this dissertation. First, I will discuss the mixed methods research design. Second, I will provide a description of the coding procedures used to build the dataset for the large-*N* regression analysis and present some descriptive statistics of the *dependent variable*—participation in security operations, and the principal *independent variable*—institutional connectedness. Third, I will explain the case selection criteria and develop testable qualitative hypotheses based on the causal pathways presented earlier. These hypotheses will serve as orienting standards in the three case study chapters that follow. Finally, I will discuss the various data sources used for the case study narratives.

2.1. OVERALL RESEARCH DESIGN

This dissertation employs a mixed methods research design. It triangulates different research methods such as large-*N* regression analysis, in-depth interviews, and archival research trained on the same problem. As a result, I am able to collect data from different places, perspectives, and levels of analysis to gain the most complete picture of the phenomenon under investigation. The quantitative regression analysis looks at the entire population of security operations conducted since the end of the Cold War.[126] Recall that I define "Security Operation" as a multilateral deployment of military and/or police forces across recognized state boundaries for objectives other than territorial conquest. These

[126] To be precise, the dataset covers all operations which have been initiated after January 1990 and no later than December 2005.

operations include humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations as well as operations aimed at changing the political authority structure in the target state. My dataset is composed of seventy-seven operations conducted *ad hoc* or under various institutional umbrellas such as the UN, EU, NATO, the African Union (AU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[127] I coded new variables, such as the exact number of troops deployed per country/operation as well as the overall number of institutional ties (bilateral as well as multilateral) between a country dyad. In addition, I developed a coding technique to discern the *Lead Nations* of each security operation in the dataset. I use the quantitative analysis to test whether there is a statistical correlation between institutional connectedness between leaders and laggards and the laggard's probability to contribute troops to an operation of the leader's choice.

While the large-*N* regression analysis provides important insights on the *macro-factors* that determine a country's decision to participate in a security operation, it does not permit me to test the specific steps of the casual pathways described in Chapter One. I thus revert to qualitative causal-process tracing to fill this void. My qualitative analysis comprises a cross-case comparison of three security operations as well as a causal-process analysis of six bilateral force generation negotiations. The cross-case comparison aims to examine the

[127] Please note that the dataset focuses solely on ground operations. Naval and air operations have been excluded due to the difficulty of discerning individual countries' contributions. Also operations involving fewer than 100 military and/or police forces have been left out to avoid operations with a merely "political" objective (i.e. to show flag). Please refer to the *Security Operation Codebook* available at www.princeton.edu/~mhenke for details.

general pattern of force generation negotiations in the setting of one specific operation. It takes the perspective of the lead nation and examines (1) the factors pushing the lead nation to launch an intervention; (2) its motivation to multilateralize the intervention; and (3) how it goes about finding suitable cooperation partners. The causal process analysis, in turn, zooms in on six specific bilateral negotiation instances: one successful negotiation and one failed negotiation per operation. In each instance I examine why a particular country was chosen by the leader to initiate force generation negotiations and why that country agreed or failed to deploy troops.

My qualitative work is based on extensive field research over two years in Nigeria, France, Ireland, Australia, Austria, Washington, D.C., at the UN headquarters in New York, and at the EU headquarters in Brussels. I conducted in-depth interviews with more than 100 decision-makers, including former prime ministers, foreign ministers, Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN ambassadors, and other high-ranking diplomats and military officers. I complemented the interview evidence with archival research at the *National Security Archive* in Washington, D.C., as well as by consulting other primary and secondary sources. As a result, all three case study chapters present very detailed "causal process tracing."[128] Each one establishes the physical, political, and social pathways through which purported causes indeed affected outcomes. I was able to connect the different phases of the policy process and identify the reasons for the emergence of a particular deployment decision.

[128] George 1979, 113-14; George and McKeown 1985, 34-41; Bennett and George 2005.

2.2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

This section will review the data used in this dissertation. It will clarify coding techniques and present some descriptive statistics to give the reader a feel for the general trends in the data.[129]

2.2.1. The Dependent Variable: Participation in Security Operations

The regression analysis uses three dependent variables: (1) a binary dependent variable set to one if a country participated in a specific security operation; (2) a binary dependent variable set to one if a country deployed at least a company-sized contingent (minimum 100 troops) to a specific security operation; and (3) a continuous dependent variable accounting for the exact number of troops deployed by a given country to a specific operation. While the first dependent variable examines overall participation, the second dependent variable focuses on substantive contributions, thus excluding symbolic or token contributions. The third dependent variable captures the exact level of troop commitment. Each country that has participated at least once in a security operation during the period 1990-2005 is considered a potential force contributor for each intervention, as it has shown that it is in practice both capable and willing to commit troops to multilateral security cooperation efforts. For a given operation, lead states and target states are excluded from the list of potential coalition partners. Data for operation participation/troop contributions were retrieved from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) *Military Balance* (years 1990-2006), the United Nations Peacekeeping Department (UNDPKO), the Réseau Francophone de Recherche sur les Operations de Paix (ROP), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as well as other secondary sources.

[129] Please refer to *Appendix II* for the summary statistics of the dataset.

Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variable

Participation in security operations is a rare phenomenon. As Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 below show, there was a 14 percent chance that a potential participant actually participated in an operation during 1990-2005. This percentage drops to 5 percent if only deployments of 100 or more troops are considered.

Table 2.1 : Probability of Joining an Operation


Participation	Frequency	Percent
0	12,174	86 %
1	1,927	14 %

Table 2.2 : Probability of Joining an Operation with min.100 troops

More than 100 troops	Frequency	Percent
0	13,351	95 %
1	750	5%

Figure 2.1 below shows a list of countries (excluding lead nations), which participated the most frequently in security operations.[130] Canada ranks first with forty-six deployments, followed by Sweden (forty-four deployments) and Norway (thirty-nine deployments).

Figure 2.1: Number of Deployments per Country



The rank order changes if only troop contributions greater than 100 troops are taken into consideration, as Figure 2.2 below illustrates. Now Bangladesh takes the lead with twenty-

[130] The graph is truncated for space limitations; any country having participated less than twenty times during 1990-2005 is not shown on this graph.

two deployments, followed by Canada (twenty-one deployments), Pakistan (twenty-one deployments), and the Netherlands (nineteen deployments). Overall, however, developed countries remain as engaged as developing countries.[131]

Figure 2.2: Number of Deployments min 100 Troops per Country




Table 2.3 below describes the distribution of the number of troops deployed. The mean number of troops deployed is 56.62, with a standard deviation of 1119.67.

Table 2.3 : Summary Statistics of *Number of Troops Deployed*

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of troops deployed	13941	56.62	1119.67	0	100000

A Quick Word on Force Structures

One dominating feature of the force structures of security operation is their skewness. Most operations are composed of one to four states, which provide the bulk of troops. I call these countries "backbone nations," because they constitute the backbone of the operation. All

[131] The graph is truncated for space limitations; any country having participated less than ten times during 1990-2005 is not shown on this graph.

other troop contributors provide a far smaller number of troops. Many troop contributions are, in fact, so-called "token contributions" of one or two soldiers. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the phenomenon of backbone nations. In the UN operation to Southern Sudan (UNMIS), India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh served as backbone nations accounting together for roughly two-thirds of the 8,800-strong UN force. Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Egypt served as backbone nations in the UN operation to Darfur (UNAMID), accounting for roughly half of the approximately 20,000-strong UN force.

Figure 2.3: Force Structure of UN Operation to Southern Sudan (UNMIS)





Figure 2.4: Force Structure of UN Operation to Darfur (UNAMID)



2.2.2. The Independent Variable: Institutional Connectedness

The key explanatory variable of my quantitative analysis is dyadic institutional connectedness. It is used to test my core hypothesis, which proposes that the higher the degree of institutional connectedness between a potential contributing country and the

leaders of a particular security operation, the more likely that country is to participate in/send a larger number of troops to such an operation. Institutional connectedness is operationalized by counting all bilateral and multilateral institutional ties a country pair has established. Data on cumulative joint international organization membership comes from the International Governmental Organization (IGO) Dataset.[132] I coded the data on cumulative bilateral institutional ties myself. I retrieved most of the information on bilateral treaties from the World Treaty Index.[133] I counted all bilateral treaties concluded since 1945 toward the overall number of bilateral institutional ties between a country dyad.134 If a specific state did not exist in 1945, bilateral treaties are counted from the date of its creation.[135]

Descriptive Statistics: Principal Independent Variable

The table below describes the distribution of the newly coded variable "bilateral institutional ties." The mean number of bilateral institutional ties between a country-dyad is 16, with a standard deviation of 28.

Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of *Institutional Connectedness*

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Bilateral Ties	31514	16	28	0	313

[132] Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2004.

[133] *World Treaty Index.* Available from <http://worldtreatyindex.com.> Accessed 23 July 2012.

[134] This includes all types of bilateral agreements, e.g., security, socio-economic and other.

[135] Please note that for now only the bilateral ties of all Lead Nations have been coded.

2.3. Coding Lead Nations

One of the principal concepts developed in this dissertation is the concept of *Lead Nation*. I argue that lead nations are the drivers behind the launch of security operations; without lead nations security operations could not materialize. I define lead nations as those countries which display the greatest preference intensity for the execution of a specific operation. To discern preference intensity I developed two different coding criteria.

Coding Criterion n°1: How vocal is a state in international fora pushing for an operation?

Most security operations—whether a UN operation or other—are preceded by discussions in the UN Security Council. Any UN member state, whether permanent, non-permanent or a non-member of the UN Security Council at the time of deliberation can request to address the Security Council during its public sessions on a particular security topic. I assume that states having sharply defined and intense preferences with regard to a specific security operation are particularly likely to request permission to address the UN Security Council on that subject matter. As a result, to discern preference intensities with regard to specific security operations, I count the times a country speaks up in the UN Security Council on the security topic the operation addresses. I use the *UN Index to Speeches* (years 1988-2010)[136] as a source for UN Security Council statements.[137] I code a country a "Lead Nation" if it is ranked three standard deviations (std. dev.) above the mean of all state interventions

[136] I look at the period 1988-2010 to maximize the available observations per country/conflict and thus get the best approximation of preference intensities per UN member.

[137] *United Nations Bibliographic Information System*. Available from <http://unbisnet.un.org.> Accessed 23 July 2012. Please note that I exclude from the speech count any statements made by the target state of the intervention and by states speaking on behalf of regional or other organizations. In addition, statements made by the country presiding at the UN Security Council sessions are also excluded, as such statements are often required administratively and thus are not the result of state-specific preference intensities.

in the UN Security Council on a specific security topic.[138] For example, Figure 2.5 and 2.6 below show the variation of countries' interests in the security situations in Burundi and Sierra Leone respectively. In the case of Burundi, France and the United Kingdom rank three std. devs. above the mean while in the case of Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom and the United States rank three std. devs. above the mean of all other remaining UN Security Council speakers.

Figure 2.5 : UNSC Statements by Country on the Security Situation in Burundi





Figure 2.6: UNSC Statements by Country on the Security Situation in Sierra Leone



[138] If no country's speech record is three standard deviations above the mean, I revert to two standard deviations above the mean. Please refer to the *Security Operations Codebook* available from www.princeton.edu/~mhene for details.

Coding Criterion n°2: How involved is a state in conflict resolution efforts prior to the launch of the operation?

The UN Speech Record serves as a first cut at determining states' preference intensities. I am aware that talk may be cheap and thus not necessarily truthful in revealing preference intensities.[139] As a result, in addition to looking at UN Security Council statements, I examine the willingness of the key UN Security Council speakers to engage in more costly actions regarding the conflict situation in question. In fact, the deployment of most security operations is preceded by (successful or failed) negotiations of peace/cease-fire agreements. Using the available secondary literature on the negotiations in question, I code whether a state served as initiator, mediator, observer, or principal financial sponsor of such negotiations. I thus assume that states having particularly strong preferences with regard to a specific security operation are more likely to be involved in such negotiations than any other state. Only states fulfilling both criteria, (1) being ranked among the top speakers at the UN, and (2) being diplomatically involved in peace negotiations, are coded *Lead Nations* of a specific operation. In case of a major discrepancy between the speech record analysis and the negotiation analysis I put more weight on the empirical negotiation analysis. For details on the individual operations please refer to the *Security Operations Codebook* available from www.princeton.edu/~mhenke. Overall, a state can serve as sole lead nation in an operation or in a *Lead Coalition*—a group of countries that all show an equally strong preference intensity for the launch of a specific intervention. The largest lead coalition I encountered during my empirical analysis had six members: United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy, to end the war in the Balkans in 1995.

[139] Schelling 1980, 117.

Descriptive Statistics: Lead Nations

The descriptive statistics that follow are meant to give the reader a feel for the data on lead nations. Figure 2.7 describes the times a state served as lead nation of a security operation during 1990-2005. Please note that this figure does not distinguish whether a country served as the sole lead nation of an operation or as a member of a lead coalition.

Figure 2.7: Leadership Breakdown by Country




Figure 2.8 : Breakdown by Number of Lead Nations




Table 2.5: Coalition Preference by Country

Lead Nation	Total Number of Leadership	Acting as sole Lead Nation	Acting in a Coalition of 2	Acting in a Coalition of 3	Acting in a Coalition of 4	Acting in a Coalition of 5	Acting in a Coalition of 6
USA	40	17	6	4	2	5	6
France	31	9	5	2	4	5	6
UK	16	2	1		4	3	6
Italy	15	2			4	3	6
Russia /USSR	15	6		3			6
Germany	13				4	3	6
Australia	8	3	3			2	
Portugal	4		1	3			
South Africa	4	2	1	1			
Nigeria	3	1	2				
New Zealand	3		3				
Japan	2					2	
Indonesia	2					2	
Spain	1				1		
Mexico	1				1		
Norway	1				1		
Venezuela	1		1				
Libya	1		1				
Chad	1		1				
Zimbabwe	1	1					
Brazil	1				1		
Argentina	1				1		
Chile	1				1		

Figure 2.9: Breakdown by Umbrella Organization




Table 2.6: Institutional Umbrella Preference by Country

Lead Nation	Total Number of Leadership	Acting through UN	Acting through AU/OAU	Acting though NATO	Acting through EU	Acting though ECOWAS	Acting ad hoc	Acting through other IO
USA	40	27	1	6		2	3	1
France	31	15		5	5	2	3	1
UK	16	7		5			4	
Italy	15	5		5	4		1	
Russia /USSR	15	9		2				4
Germany	13	4		5	4			
Australia	8	4					4	
Portugal	4	3				1		
South Africa	4	2	1					1
Nigeria	3	1				2		
New Zealand	3						3	
Japan	2	2						
Indonesia	2	2						
Spain	1	1						
Mexico	1	1						
Norway	1	1						
Venezuela	1	1						
Libya	1							1
Chad	1							1
Zimbabwe	1							1
Brazil	1							1
Argentina	1							1
Chile	1							1

Figure 2.8 and Table 2.5 show that overall more than half of all security operations (54 percent) are initiated by one sole lead nation. South Africa serves the most frequently as sole lead nation (50 percent of all instances), followed by the United States (42.5 percent), Russia (40 percent), and France (29 percent). Figure 2.9 and Table 2.6 illustrate that the most frequent international institution through which a security operation is launched is the UN; during 1990-2005, 53 percent of all security operations were UN operations. The United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France all use the United Nations as their preferred vehicle for security operation initiatives. The United States initiated 68 percent of its security operations through the UN, France 48 percent of its operations, Russia 60 percent, and the UK 44 percent. Ad hoc operations are particularly popular with Australia and New Zealand.

2.4. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation uses qualitative case studies to trace the causal pathways proposed in Chapter One. This section describes the case selection criteria and presents testable hypotheses to guide the reader when weighing the evidence in favor of each causal process. I also discuss the qualitative data sources I used for the case narratives.

2.4.1. Qualitative Case Selection

My qualitative analysis comprises a cross-case comparison of three security operations and a causal-process analysis of six bilateral force generation negotiations. The case selection criteria for each are described below.

Cross-Case Comparison

For the cross-case comparison I picked the following three security operations: (1) the AU-UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID); (2) the *ad hoc* multilateral operation in East Timor (INTERFET); and (3) the EU operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad-CAR).

I have attempted to select cases to maximize variation on several factors in order to enhance the ability to draw inferences from these cases to the population at large. With three cases, there are limits to the amount of variation one can build into such an enterprise. Nonetheless, as Table 2.7 below shows, the cases chosen introduce variation on the following factors: the lead nation of the operation, the target nation of the intervention, the institutional umbrella under which the operation was conducted, the intervention objective, and the operation's intensity.[140] Overall, the security operations have also been chosen for their ordinariness. None of them was particularly controversial and/or tried to resolve a particularly unique security problem. Instead, the three chosen operations represent typical security interventions

Table 2.7: Case Variation

Operation	Target Nation	Institutional Umbrella	Intervention Objective	Intensity	Lead Nation
EUFOR Chad/CAR	Chad/CAR	EU	Refugee crisis	medium	France
INTERFET	East Timor	ad hoc	Turmoil after secession	high	Australia
UNAMID	Sudan	UN	Ethnic conflict	low-medium	USA

[140] These are all factors that might influence a laggard's decision to participate in a specific security operation. Introducing variation on these factors allows controlling for this possibility.

Causal Process Analysis: Successful and Unsuccessful Cases

For the causal process analysis I picked three successful and three failed negotiations. For the successful cases, I picked the country which deployed the largest number of troops to one of the operations described above but was not coded a member of the lead coalition of such an operation. This constitutes thus a hard test case, as it examines the reasons behind the "most costly deployment" of any non-lead coalition member. For the three operations under examination these countries are the following:

Table 2.8: Causal Process Analysis - Joiners

Operation	**Lead Nation**	**Greatest Troop contributor (outside of Lead Coalition)**
EUFOR Chad-CAR	France	Ireland
INTERFET	Australia	Thailand
UNAMID	USA	Nigeria

For the failed negotiations, the selection of the cases was admittedly more difficult. Failed negotiations constitute a "non-event." As a result, it is almost impossible to determine the sample size of the population. I had to rely on interview information to gauge how many negotiations in a setting of one security operation had failed. I then tried to pick the one negotiation that, according my interview partners, was the most advanced but then still fell through. The individual cases are as follows:

Table 2.9: Causal Process Analysis – Non-Joiners

Operation	**Lead Nations**	**Non-Joiners**
EUFOR Chad-CAR	France	Romania
INTERFET	Australia	Malaysia
UNAMID	USA	Ukraine

2.4.2. Qualitative Hypotheses and Observable Implications

In this section I develop theoretical hypotheses and observable implications for each of the four models presented in Chapter One: the *Preference Convergence Model*, the *Threat Model*, the *Auction Model* and the *Market Model*. As mentioned earlier, each of these four causal pathways builds on established international cooperation and bargaining theories. Each model thus makes different assumptions about why and how states cooperate. These assumptions vary, in particular, with regard to five dimensions: (1) the preference structures underpinning individual states' decision to cooperate; (2) their impetus for cooperation; (3) the identification and recruitment of cooperation partners; (4) the determinants of bargaining success; and (5) the mechanisms to minimize incomplete contracting. All empirical case studies presented in Chapter Four, Five and Six are structured around those five dimensions to help the reader weigh the evidence in favor of each casual pathway. In the following I will go through each of these five dimensions in more detail.

Dimension 1: Preference Structure

Empirically, the *Preference Convergence Model* is distinguishable from the other three models by the displayed sharpness of state preferences and the underlying degree of domestic mobilization. As mentioned earlier, this project suggests that preference structures emerge from domestic deliberations. Depending on the strength and unity of societal mobilization, a state either adopts a sharply defined and intense preference in favor of intervention or a more ambiguous, even reluctant stance on the same topic. The *Preference Convergence Model* predicts that all coalition participants' unidimensional preferences are sharply defined. The security cooperation project is a foreign policy priority

for all coalition members. When interviewed, decision-makers should thus be able to describe the preference structure underlying their country's troop deployment. They should emphasize its political priority compared to other preferences in their set of foreign policy objectives. For instance, decision-makers should be able to explain which branches of the government favor participation and for what reasons as well as which societal groups mobilized in favor of collective action. They should also be able to explain why this particular conflict gained the attention of the government as opposed to any others. This entails that generalized participation reasons such as "we wanted to contribute to peace and prosperity in the world" are not sufficient. Instead, decision-makers should be able to explain why peace and prosperity ought to be brought to this specific conflict theater and not to others.

All other models predict that only lead nations have sharply defined and intense preferences with regard to the security cooperative objective at hand. Only in these countries is the security operation a top foreign policy priority. Only there, decision-makers are able to describe the exact preference structure underpinning their troop deployment. In all other countries, preferences endogenous to the security operation (i.e., preferences concerning the operation and no third factors) should be less sharply defined. The security operation should not be a top political priority compared to all other foreign policy objectives. When interviewed, decision-makers in those laggard countries should acknowledge that domestic mobilization by interest groups in favor of intervention is weak or even non-existent.

Dimension 2: Cooperation Impetus

The *Threat, Auction* and *Market Models* predict that leaders initiate security cooperation to minimize domestic opposition. When interviewed, decision-makers should thus point to domestic concerns when explaining why less-motivated countries were lured into the coalition. Reasons such as public opinion concerns or anticipated opposition in the legislative body or other governmental bodies should be advanced to explain why a country did not "go it alone," or did not go at all and instead "outsourced" the whole operation. The *Preference Convergence Model*, instead, predicts that security cooperation serves to pool resources with an aim to enhancing the coalition's overall problem-solving capacities. Cooperating states can still feel the need to seek IO authorization (i.e., a UN mandate). However, no additional troops should be recruited due to domestic concerns.

Dimension 3: Search Process

The Preference Convergence Model predicts that cooperation partners coalesce automatically. As a result, when asked, decision-makers should not indicate that a specific strategy was pursued to recruit cooperation partners. The Auction Model, instead, predicts that leaders open a call for tender to recruit additional cooperation partners. Here, decision-makers should mention that a fixed reward was determined either by the leaders themselves or by the organization conducting the operation. All states were subsequently informed of the pending offer. Interested states then indicated their interest in the operation. If the Threat Model is correct, decision-makers should mention the importance of asymmetrical dependence (e.g., foreign or military aid flows) to recruit cooperation partners. When interviewed, they should indicate that those countries they knew were the most dependent in aid and/or trade terms were approached first in the force generation

process. Finally, the Market Model underlines the importance of preference intensities. Here decision-makers should draw up a list of those countries which they think are the most interested in the operation. Leaders are also expected to think of potential side-deals that might induce cooperation by the countries put on the list. Such side-deals should be based on the subjective multidimensional preference intensities of potential cooperation partners. Information on such preferences should be retrieved through existing bilateral and multilateral institutional ties.

Dimension 4: Determinants of Bargaining Success

If the Auction Model is correct, no explicit force generation negotiations take place. Instead, leaders pick the best offers following their call for tender. If the Preference Convergence Model is correct, we should see force generation negotiations. Such negotiations are expected to succeed or fail based on disagreements on "technical issues"; e.g., military strategy, operational planning, and so on. States which ultimately join the coalition should have a similar opinion on "where to settle on the Pareto-Frontier." If asked, decision-makers should thus mention that either a similar or dissimilar perspective on operational issues facilitated or inhibited the negotiation process. The Threat Model predicts that the degree of asymmetrical dependence determines bargaining success. We expect that the leader adopts a form of a take-it-or-leave-it strategy toward the laggard.[141] The laggard, in turn, feels obliged to take it because to leave it would be very costly. Overall, the laggard should be aware of its precarious situation. When interviewed, laggard country decision-makers should express the stress, fear, anxiety, and resistance that they experienced

[141] Zartman and Rubin 2000, 276.

during the negotiations.[142] In the instance of failed force generation negotiations, laggards should indicate that they did not believe the threat was credible, e.g., that they thought that domestic interests in the lead state would prevent the policy toward the laggard being successful. Finally, the Market Model emphasizes the importance of "domestic level" influence. Side-deals to recruit cooperation partners can only succeed if domestic costs can be minimized. The lead state thus appreciates "payment flexibility"—in fact, the greater the payment flexibility, the greater the probability of successful negotiations. As a result, when interviewed, lead state decision-makers should mention that several other side-deal bargains were available for conclusion, but that they had to be dropped due to domestic level concerns. Only those side-deals which allowed minimizing domestic adjustment costs were concluded.

Overall, the Market Model and the Threat Model should be empirically distinguishable by the way the laggard feels getting out of the negotiations. The Market Model suggests that a cooperative outcome is the result of an exchange or a transaction in which both actors intend to maximize their individual returns. Both actors thus should leave the negotiations feeling that their situation has improved. The Threat Model, instead, should make the laggard feel worse—even if it accedes to the coercion out of a sense of self-interest.[143]

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[142] Baldwin (1971, 31) argues that an agent's immediate reaction to sticks usually differs from his immediate reaction to carrots. Whereas fear, anxiety, and resistance are typical responses to threats, the typical responses to promises are hope, reassurance, and attraction.

[143] Ellis 1971, 693.

Dimension 5: Incomplete Contracting

The *Preference Convergence Model* suggests that incomplete contracting is unlikely to occur; once settled on a point on the Pareto-Frontier, no participant has an interest in defecting. As a result, when interviewed, decision-makers should not express in principle any concern about coalition participants trying to defect from the cooperation equilibrium. The *Threat Model* predicts that incomplete contracting is a real danger. Nevertheless, the usage of a *quid pro quo* strategy, i.e., the threat of immediate punishment in case of defection, should be relatively easy to implement due to the asymmetrical power distribution between leaders and laggards. As a result, when interviewed, decision-makers should be aware of the risk of defection and propose and/or give examples of how the manipulation of asymmetrical flows is likely to prevent defection. If the *Auction Model* is correct, incomplete contracting is also a real threat. However, in this case, a *quid pro quo* strategy is unlikely to be implemented. Instead, the lead state should revert to establishing complex engagement treaties, including specific reporting requirements, gradual reward installment plans, and such, to minimize the risk of incomplete contracting. Thus, when interviewed, lead state decision-makers should be able to elaborate on the specific "commitment" provisions included in the engagement treaty. Finally, if the *Market Model* is correct, leaders should rely on their institutional ties to prevent incomplete contracting. When interviewed, leaders should mention that "retaliatory linkages" are easily put in place due to the large range of institutional ties shared between leaders and laggards.

The two tables that follow summarize once more the theoretical logic behind each model described in Chapter One, as well as the observable implications that follow from each theory.

Table 2.10: Summary of Hypotheses:
What's the theoretical logic behind each model?

Dimensions	Preference Convergence Model	Auction Model	Market Model	Threat Model
Preference Structure	Convergent preferences and common preference intensities.	Dissimilar preference intensities.	Dissimilar preference intensities.	Dissimilar preference intensities.
Cooperation Impetus	Increase problem-solving capacities.	Reduce domestic opposition.	Reduce domestic opposition.	Reduce domestic opposition.
Search Process	Cooperation partners coalesce automatically.	Leaders avoid *Search Costs* by calling for an auction.	Institutional interdependence allows minimizing *Search Costs.*	Asymmetrical dependence allows minimizing *Search Costs.*
Determinants of Bargaining Success	The lesser the distributional consequences, the greater the likelihood of bargaining success.	No bargaining.	Institutional interdependence enlarges the win-set and creates "payment flexibility."	Degree of asymmetrical dependence lowers reservation levels.
Incomplete Contracting	Overall small risk of defection. In case of free-riding, hegemon steps in to provide selective incentives.	Defection is a real threat.	Institutional interdependence allows for reduction of uncertainty.	Asymmetrical dependence allows for quid pro quo strategy.

Table 2.11: Summary of Observable Implications:
What should we be able to observe?

Dimensions	Preference Convergence Model	Auction Model	Market Model	Threat Model
Preference Structure	No distinction between leaders and laggards; all have sharply defined preferences.	Distinction between leaders and laggards; laggards have ambiguous preferences and no domestic mobilization.	Distinction between leaders and laggards; laggards have ambiguous preferences and no domestic mobilization.	Distinction between leaders and laggards; laggards have ambiguous preferences and no domestic mobilization.
Cooperation Impetus	No domestic level motivations for cooperation.	Domestic level concerns motivate cooperation.	Domestic level concerns motivate cooperation.	Domestic level concerns motivate cooperation.
Search Process	No search process.	Leaders (or IO) announce fixed reward. Interested States approach leaders (IO) with cooperation offer.	Only a limited number of countries are approached, which fulfill quality and price criteria. Information on quality and price levels has been collected via shared institutional ties prior to interactions. States on which no information is available are not or last to be approached.	Leaders first approach those countries which they think are the most vulnerable to pressure. Development and/or military aid flows are used as metrics to identify vulnerability. Non-vulnerable countries are not or last to be approached.
Determinants of Bargaining Success	Dissimilar views on "technical" issues inhibit bargaining success.	No negotiations.	Side-deals enable cooperative outcome or domestic level disapproval of side-deals causes bargaining failure.	Laggards' fear of punishment determines success or coercive threats which are not credible causes of bargaining failure
Incomplete Contracting	No apparent risk of defection. Hegemon persuades free riders.	Extensive engagement treaties, including reporting requirements, gradual award installments, etc.	Retaliatory linkages are expected via institutional ties.	Threat of immediate withdrawal of aid inhibits defection.

2.4.3. Interview Strategy

I gathered the bulk of my empirical evidence through semi-structured interviews with key decision-makers in the lead and laggard countries. Interview partners provided oral consent to be interviewed. Due to the delicate information exchanged, most of my interviews were conducted confidentially. To identify potential interview partners, I used the so-called "snowball" or chain-referral technique: I selected an initial set of relevant respondents, mostly through newspaper or other secondary sources, and then requested that they suggest other potential subjects who they thought would have information relevant to my research.[144] I continued this process until I felt my sample was large enough. *Appendix I* provides a list of all my interview partners along with sample interview questions.

Overall, my elite interviews allowed me to shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from only observing a political outcome or analyzing primary sources. I was able to probe my subjects, thus moving beyond the "official version of events." Too often the general public is unable to distinguish between official justifications and actual motivations, particularly because official statements and documents most often conceal the real considerations that precede decision-making, or, as Finnemore writes, "humanitarian justifications have been used to disguise baser motives in more than one intervention. More frequently, motives for intervention are mixed; humanitarian motives may be genuine but may be only one part of a larger constellation of motivations driving state action."[145]

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[144] Tansey 2007, 770

[145] Finnemore in Katzenstein (eds.) 1996, 158.

2.4.4. Other Sources Used

I tried to corroborate all the important information given to me by my interview partners with official documents and/or secondary sources, thus increasing the solidity of the findings.[146] For the UNAMID case-study, in which the United States served as lead nation, I was able to find newly released primary documents in the *Darfur Collection* of the *National Security Archive*. For the case studies on INTERFET and EUFOR Chad-CAR, I relied on a myriad of other primary and secondary sources, including reports from the French Senate, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Australian Department of Defense.

2.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed the research design as well as the data used in this dissertation. Among others, I provided descriptions of the coding procedures used to build the *Security Operations Dataset* and presented some descriptive statistics of the principal variables. I explained the case selection criteria and presented testable qualitative hypotheses and observable implications for the case study chapters.

Now that we have discussed the key methodological aspects of this dissertation, we move to the first empirical chapter, which tests more fully the causal mechanism linking institutional connectedness and troop deployments.

[146] Tansey 2007, 766.

CHAPTER THREE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Why do states join multilateral security coalitions? This chapter tries to shed some light on this question by means of a large-*N* regression analysis. First, I will briefly review the four casual mechanisms explaining cooperation in security operations. These mechanisms include (1) the *Preference Convergence Model*; (2) the *Threat Model*; (3) the *Auction Model*; and (4) the *Market Model*. Second, I will run various statistical tests to assess the explanatory power of each of the models introduced above.

3.1. REVIEWING THE ARGUMENT

The principal argument of the dissertation is that institutional connectedness reduces the costs of side-deal bargains, thus increasing the likelihood of international security cooperation despite heterogeneous preference intensities among cooperating partners. I call this explanation the *Market Model*. The large-*N* regression analysis allows testing for whether a statistical correlation exists between institutional connectedness and the probability of the laggard deploying troops to an operation of the leader's choice. The quantitative analysis thus sheds some light on the macro-factors determining force contributions.

Three alternative explanations have been advanced to explain participation in security operations. The first explanation, the *Preference Convergence Model*, suggests that security coalition partners have convergent preferences and similar preference intensities when joining forces. Such common preferences can originate in similar threat assessments, normative values, or other political interests related to the conflict theater. The second

explanation, the Threat Model, suggests that lead nations use direct or indirect threats to coerce countries to cooperate. The coercive abilities of the lead nation thereby depend on its superior financial and/or military resources; the more asymmetrically dependent a party is on those resources, the more likely a coercer will find adequate instruments to make this party join the operation. Finally, the third explanation, the Auction Model, proposes that laggards join security operations through auctions. Their participation in the auction is determined by their technical skills, troop and/or equipment availability.

3.2. TESTING THE ARGUMENT

To test the explanatory power of the four models described above, I use the data described in Chapter Two. Recall that "Security Operation" is defined as a multilateral deployment of military and/or police forces across recognized state boundaries for objectives other than territorial conquest.[147] My dataset includes 77 operations conducted *ad hoc* and under various institutional umbrellas such as the UN, EU, NATO, AU, CIS, ECOWAS, SADC, CEMAC, CEN-SAD and OSCE/CSCE. Please refer to *Annex II* for the summary statistics of the dataset.

3.2.1. Baseline Model

To begin, I will estimate three baseline models for comparability of my research approach with previous scholarly studies. Note that these models will not include the principal independent variable of this study, namely, institutional connectedness between leaders and laggards. The baseline models include the following variables:

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[147] Recall that the dataset focuses solely on ground operations. Naval and air operations have been excluded due to the difficulty of discerning individual countries' contributions. Also operations involving fewer than 100 military and/or police forces have been left out to avoid operations with a merely "political" objective (i.e. to show flag). Please refer to the *Security Operation Codebook* available from www.princeton.edu/~mhenke for details.

(3.1) $PN_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_3 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_4 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_5 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_6 log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_7 log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_8 pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_9 log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{12} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{13} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{14} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{16} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

(3.2) $PNC_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_3 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_4 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_5 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_6 log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_7 log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_8 pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_9 log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{12} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{13} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{14} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{16} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

(3.3.) $log(total)_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_3 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_4 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_5 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_6 log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_7 log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_8 pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_9 log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{12} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{13} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{14} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{16} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

Dependent Variables

As mentioned in Chapter Two, I operationalize the dependent variable, participation in security operations, in three different ways. The dependent variable in Model 3.1., PN_{iot}, is a binary variable. It measures the probability that state *i* participates in an operation *o* in year *t*. The dependent variable in Model 3.2., PNC_{iot}, is also a binary variable. It measures the probability that state *i* participates in an operation *o* in year *t* with at least a company-sized contingent (minimum 100 troops). It thus intends to focus on substantive contributions, excluding symbolic or token contributions. The dependent variable in Model 3.3., $total_{iot}$, is a continuous variable. It accounts for the exact number of troops deployed by state *i* to an operation *o* in year *t*.[148] It intends to measure the precise level of a state's operational commitment. Each country which has participated at least once in a security

[148] For five security operations (Operation Allied Harbor, EUPM, NMOG II, Operation Uphold Democracy and OSCE Georgia) I was unable to identify the exact number of troops deployed. Please refer to the *Security Operations Codebook* for details.

operation during the period 1990-2005[149] is considered a potential force contributor for each intervention, as it has shown that it is in practice both capable and willing to commit troops to multilateral security cooperation efforts. For a given operation, lead states and target states are excluded from the list of potential coalition partners. The unit of analysis of the study is potential participant/operation/year.

Independent Variables

The first independent variable, $lnpn_alliance_{iot-1}$, captures formal alliance memberships between lead nations and potential participants.[150] This variable serves as the principal proxy to test the explanatory power of the *Preference Convergence Model.* The literature on alliances suggests that alliance partners share common security concerns.[151] As a result, if the *Preference Convergence Model* is correct, we expect the coefficient estimate for this variable to be positive and statistically significant; a greater number of common alliance ties between leaders and laggards should increase a laggard's probability to deploy troops to a specific operation. The second independent variable, $lnpn_s3un_{iot-1}$, is computed to isolate the effects of interest affinity between leaders and laggards. The variable, which is based on Gartzke's *Affinity of Nation Index*[152]*,* reflects the overall similarity of a dyad's revealed preferences based on its common voting positions in the United Nations General

[149] This is the start and end year of this dataset. My analysis focuses on security cooperation after the end of the Cold War, which explains the start date 1990. Most data used in the dataset is only available until 2005, which explains the end date 2005.

[150] More precisely, the variable captures the cumulative number of separate alliances in a particular year in which both states are members (overlapping for at least one day). Data on common alliance memberships has been retrieved from the Correlates of War *Formal Alliance Dataset* (Version 3.03) by Gibler and Sarkees 2004

[151] e.g., Walt 1987, 43-33.

[152] Affinity of Nations Index (Version 4.0) by Gartzke 2006.

Assembly.[153] This variable also serves as a proxy to test the *Preference Convergence Model*. The expectation is $lnpn_s3un_{iot-1}$, to be positively associated with troop deployments.

To further control for preference convergence among coalition partners, I include independent variables $pntn_contiguity_{io}$ and $pntn_sameregion_{io}$. The former captures the impact of potential participant-target state contiguity, while the latter controls for whether the potential participant and the target state reside in the same region. The literature on conflict management suggests that countries are more likely to intervene in a conflict closer to home.[154] Conflicts in the close vicinity can generate negative spillovers.[155] Moreover, ethnic affinities in cross-border or regional communities are generally higher, generating domestic constituencies in favor of intervention.[156] An intervention in the neighborhood might also be easier to conduct, as the logistical efforts are smaller, thus further increasing the probability of success.[157] The expectation is that both contiguity and regional membership are positively correlated with troop deployments. The next three variables, $pn_repintn_{iot-1}$, $pntn_(trade/gdppn)_{iot-1}$, and $pntn_(aid/gdppn)_{iot-1}$, control for whether the laggard and the target state have strong diplomatic[158], trade and aid ties.[159] The literature contends that states are more likely to intervene in countries which are of economic or

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[153] cf. Signorino and Ritter, 1999; Sweeney and Keshk, 2005; Voeten, 2004, 735–737.

[154] Perkins and Neumayer 2008, 900-

[155] Findley 1996; Perkins and Neumayer 2008, 900; Siverson and Starr 1991.

[156] Regan 2000, 49.

[157] Data on contiguity comes from the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Dataset (Version 3.1) by Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman 2002. Data on geographical regions has been obtained from the World Bank.

[158] Embassies or consulates are usually only opened in places in which a country has something at stake. This is especially the case for developing countries for which the maintenance of an embassy/consulate constitutes a substantive financial burden. Diplomatic representation data has been retrieved from the Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange Dataset (Version 2006.1) by Bayer 2006.

[159] Aid data comes from the OECD DAC database and trade data from the Correlates of War Trade Dataset (Version 2.01). The aid and trade flows are divided by the potential participant's GDP to control for the importance of such flows to the participant. GDP data comes from the World Bank.

strategic interest to them[160]—an interest which can be measured by looking at the strength of a dyad's diplomatic, aid and trade relationship. To measure the relative importance of a particular tie to the participant, I divide the overall bilateral aid and trade flows by the GDP of the participant. The *Preference Convergence Model* would suggest that all three independent variables are positively associated with troop deployments: the more strategically important a country, the more likely a state is to intervene. Next I include variable $pn_polity2i_{iot-1}$ to control for normative or other "ideational" motivations. Various scholars have suggested that countries participate in security operations to spread normative ideals, such as democracy and the rule of law. Countries might also want to demonstrate "good international citizenship" or garner international legitimacy.[161] A state which is domestically more attached to liberal norms might also be more likely to uphold these norms abroad.[162] As a result, I attempt to capture normative motivations by controlling for regime type using the POLITY-2 score from the POLITY IV project.[163] The expectation is $pn_polity2i_{iot-1}$ to have a positive impact on troop deployments.

The next two independent variables, $lnpn_(aid/gdppn)_{iot-1}$ and $lnpn_(trade/gdppn)_{iot-1}$, serve as principal proxies to test the *Threat Model*. Variable $lnpn_(aid/gdppn)_{iot-1}$ controls for the aid flows, while variable $lnpn_(trade/gdppn)_{iot-1}$ for regular trade flows between leaders and laggards. The aid and trade flows are divided by the laggard's GDP to control for the relative importance of such flows to the laggard. The *Threat Model* would suggest that both variables are positively correlated with troop deployments; a country is more likely to join a security operation initiated by a state on which it is asymmetrically

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[160] Klare 2005; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008; Pilger 1999; Gibbs 1997; Russett and Nincic 1976.

[161] Dodds 2005; Jakobsen 2002; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 198.

[162] e.g. Doyle 1996, 4-5; Lebovic 2004.

[163] Marshall, Jaggers et al. 2010. Available from < http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm > Accessed 14 August 2012.

dependent in aid or trade terms.[164] Finally, the *Auction Model* suggests that troop deployments depend on troop and equipment availability and/or other technical skills. To control for these factors I add the independent variables pn_simd_{iot}, $pnconflict_{iot}$, $pnconflict_{iot-1}$, $pntn_comlang_{iot-1}$, pn_cinc_{iot-1}, and pn_gdppc_{iot-1} to the model. The variable pn_simd_{iot} is a continuous variable accounting for the number of a laggard's simultaneous military deployments (greater than 100 troops) in a given year. The *Auction Model* would suggest that the variable is negatively correlated with troop contributions; the more troops a country has already deployed, the less likely it is to contribute to a new operation. The variables $pnconflict_{iot}$ and $pnconflict_{iot-1}$ are both dichotomous variables set to one if the potential contributor is or was embroiled in a *Militarized Interstate Dispute* (MID) the year of or the year prior to the security operation.[165] The *Auction Model's* expectation is that both variables also have a negative impact on troop deployments. Finally, $pntn_comlang_{iot-1}$ is a binary dummy variable to control for whether the potential contributor and the target state speak the same language. The variable pn_cinc_{iot-1} controls for the potential participant's overall military strength and the variable pn_gdppc_{iot-} for its economic power.[166] The *Auction Model* assumes that these last three independent variables are positively correlated with troop contributions: the greater a country's military and economic power and/or other specific technical skills (e.g. language skills), the greater its probability to participate in a peacekeeping auction.

The last independent variable of the equation is μ_{io}, a stochastic error term.

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[164] The aid data has been retrieved from the OECD DAC database. Trade data comes from the Correlates of War Trade Dataset (Version 2.01).

[165] The *Militarized Interstate Dispute* (MID) data (Version 3.1) has been used to code for such scenario. If the participant is involved in a MID simultaneously ($pnconflict_{iot}$) or the year prior to the start of an operation ($pnconflict_{iot-1}$) the dummy variable is set to one.

[166] The proxy variables used are the COW CINC score as well as GDP per capita.

❖ *Model Specifications: Baseline Model*

Given that the observed values of the dependent variables in Model 3.1 and 3.2 are dichotomous, I utilize a probit regression model. The dependent variable in Model 3.3 is continuous. I thus estimate Model 3.3 by using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. To address problems specific to cross-sectional analysis (e.g., contemporaneous correlation among cross sections), I estimate robust standard errors clustered by target state with the assumption that observations are not independent within one specific conflict theater.[167] Several target states receive multiple operations (e.g., former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia). I thus assume that a country which participates in the first operation in a specific target state might be more likely to stay on and also participate in all subsequent operations. I added year, lead nation and umbrella organization fixed effects to each model. This amounts to creating binary dummy variables for all years, the key lead states and umbrella organizations. By including these dummy variables, I attempt to control for the independent effects of (1) the year of operation, (2) the institutional umbrella organization, and (3) the lead nations of an operation.[168] I do not employ dyad fixed effects (target-state participant or lead nation-participant) in any model, given that time stable or quasi-stable variables, such as dyadic alliance ties, common regional membership, common language skills, would drop out. These variables are, however, key independent variables used in this work.[169]

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[167] I also ran robustness checks with standard errors clustered by potential participant. The results do not alter the findings described below.

[168] All these variables might have independent effects on a laggard's decision to contribute troops, which the model does not account for. For instance, a laggard might experience an economic recession in a particular year (year fixed effects), been elected to serve as chairman of a particular IO (organization fixed effects) or pass through a tense period with a lead nation (lead nation fixed effects).

[169] I have also run robustness checks using operation and target state fixed-effects. The results do not affect the principal findings described below.

Considerable effort went into addressing missing data in the overall dataset. For the dependent variables I used a very broad range of data sources to ensure the completeness of the observations. Missing data on aid and trade was coded zero under the assumption that levels between states with missing data were negligible.[170]

All IVs except variables pn_simd_{iot} and $pn_conflict_{iot}$ are lagged one year to avoid simultaneity problems. Outlier problems are addressed by expressing the exact number of troop contributions, aid and trade flows in log form. In case of multiple lead nations, the analysis uses the aggregate aid and trade flows between all lead nations and the potential participants as well as the aggregate number of all institutional ties shared between all lead nations and the potential participants.[171]

❖ *Statistical Results: Baseline Model*

The estimates of the three baseline models are presented in Table 3.1. The results give strong support to the *Preference Convergence Model*: in all three models, dyadic alliance membership is positively correlated to the likelihood of participating in a security operation. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In addition, countries are more likely to join a security operation if such an operation is staged in their own region ($pntn_sameregion_{iot}$), if they have a diplomatic representation in the target state ($pn_repintn_{iot-1}$), and if they are "more democratic" ($pn_polity2_{iot-1}$). The coefficients of these variables are all positively associated with troop contributions and are almost always highly statistically significant (at the 0.01 level). Surprisingly, strong aid and trade ties

[170] All models were run with a dummy variable controlling for missing data coded zero. The coefficient estimates of the dummy did not achieve statistical significance in any of the models.

[171] Also note that the panel data this analysis uses is incomplete, which means that there is an uneven number of observations (potential participants) over cross-sectional units (security operations). Analysis using two random samples of a subset of data with an even number of observations across cross-sectional units did not change, however, the substantive results suggesting no statistical bias in estimation.

between potential participants and target states are negatively correlated with troop deployments, suggesting that laggards are reluctant to intervene in target states of relative economic importance—a plausible finding, given that an intervention might interrupt trade relations and weaken the government in power.

The *Threat Model* receives little support from the coefficient estimates of the baseline models. Asymmetrical aid and trade relations between leaders and laggards do not seem to influence troop contributions. Rather, the converse is the case; the more asymmetrically dependent a laggard is on trade with the leader, the less likely it is to participate in an operation. Similarly, the *Auction Model* falls short in its explanatory strength. Contrary to the expectations of the model, the number of simultaneous troop deployments is positively correlated with new troop commitments, suggesting that military overextension is not often invoked as reason to forego a force deployment. Nevertheless, a country's overall military strength is positively associated with troop contributions, suggesting that technical skills do increase the likelihood of troop deployments. Most other variables are of the expected sign, but the estimates do not achieve statistical significance. The results of the three models are remarkably similar, further strengthening the robustness of the individual coefficient estimates.

3.2.2. Market Model

I will now estimate three models which include the principal independent variable of this study: institutional connectedness between leaders and laggards. The other variables are exactly the same as in the baseline models described above:

(3.4) $PN_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_InstCon_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_3 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_4 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_6 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_7 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_8 log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_9 log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} +$

β_{12}log(lnpntrade/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + β_{13}pn_simd$_{iot}$ + β_{14}pnconflict$_{iot}$ + β_{15}pnconflict$_{iot-1}$ + β_{16}pntn_comlang$_{iot-1}$ + β_{17}pn_cinc$_{iot-1}$ + β_{18}pn_gdppc$_{iot-1}$ + μ_{iot}

(3.5) PNC$_{iot}$ = α_0 + $\beta_1$lnpn_InstCon$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_2$lnpn_alliance$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_3$lnpn_s3un$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_4$pntn_contiguity$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_6$pntn_sameregion$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_7$pn_repintn$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_8$log(pntn_trade/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_9$log(pntnaid/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + β_{10}pn_polity2$_{iot-1}$ + β_{11}log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + β_{12}log(lnpntrade/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + β_{13}pn_simd$_{iot}$ + β_{14}pnconflict$_{iot}$ + β_{15}pnconflict$_{iot-1}$ + β_{16}pntn_comlang$_{iot-1}$ + β_{17}pn_cinc$_{iot-1}$ + β_{18}pn_gdppc$_{iot-1}$ + μ_{iot}

(3.6) log(total)$_{iot}$ = α_0 + $\beta_1$lnpn_InstCon$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_2$lnpn_alliance$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_3$lnpn_s3un$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_4$pntn_contiguity$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_6$pntn_sameregion$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_7$pn_repintn$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_8$log(pntn_trade/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + $\beta_9$log(pntnaid/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + β_{10}pn_polity2$_{iot-1}$ + β_{11}log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + β_{12}log(lnpntrade/gdppn)$_{iot-1}$ + β_{13}pn_simd$_{iot}$ + β_{14}pnconflict$_{iot}$ + β_{15}pnconflict$_{iot-1}$ + β_{16}pntn_comlang$_{iot-1}$ + β_{17}pn_cinc$_{iot-1}$ + β_{18}pn_gdppc$_{iot-1}$ + μ_{iot}

The variable *lnpn_InstCon*$_{iot-1}$ captures all institutional ties of a leader-laggard dyad. I described the coding of the variable *lnpn_InstCon*$_{iot-1}$, in Chapter Two.[172] As mentioned earlier, I use institutional connectedness as a proxy variable to test the explanatory power of the *Market Model*. I expect the coefficient estimate for institutional connectedness to be positive and highly statistically significant.

- *Model Specifications: Market Model*

I employed exactly the same model specifications in Models 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 as I did in the all three baseline models above.

- *Statistical Results: Market Model*

The estimates of Models 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 are shown in Table 3.2. The results give strong support to the *Market Model*. In all three models, the institutional connectedness coefficient estimate is positively correlated and strongly significant at the 0.01 level. In addition, dyadic alliance membership—the key proxy variable to test the explanatory power of the

[172] The variables *lnpn_alliance*$_{iot-1}$ and *lnpn_InstCon*$_{iot-1}$, are 0.51 correlated. Thus, there should not be an issue of multicolinearity.

Preference Convergence Model—is no longer statistically significant in any of the three models. Nevertheless, other proxy variables of the *Preference Convergence Model* (i.e., common regional membership, diplomatic representation in the target state, and level of democracy) maintain their statistical significance. Similar to the previous baseline model results, simultaneous deployments ($simd_{iot}$) remain positively associated with troop deployments, while strong asymmetrical trade ties between leader and laggard ($lnpn_(trade/gdppn)_{iot-1}$) maintains a negative correlation with operation participation. The statistical significance of military strength (pn_cinc_{iot-1}) disappears, however, in the new model. Overall, the estimates are remarkably similar throughout all three models, highlighting once more the robustness of the results. To gain some understanding of the impact of institutional connectedness on the prospect of deploying troops, Figure 3.1 and 3.2 present the predicted probabilities of a deployment based on columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2. Figure 3.1 shows the effects of institutional connectedness between leaders and laggards (in percentiles) on the probability of participating in an operation while holding all other variables at their means. Figure 3.2 shows the impact of institutional connectedness on the probability of sending at least a company-sized contingent (minimum 100 troops). I perform both calculations using the STATA12 margins command.

Figure 3.1: Predicted Probabilities (overall participation)[173]




Figure 3.2: Predicted Probabilities (minimum 100 troops)[174]




Figure 3.1 shows a mean probability of participating in a security operation of roughly 11 percent. This percentage increases by 4 points when we look at the 75th percentile, by 14 points at the 90th percentile, and even by 50 points at the 99th percentile. Figure 3.2 illustrates a similar impact of institutional connectedness on troop deployments of at least

[173] The figure shows a 95% confidence interval.

[174] Ibid.

company-size. The mean probability of deploying at least a company is roughly 5 percent. It increases to 6 percent at the 75th percentile, to roughly 10 percent at the 90th percentile**,** and to 25 percent at the 99th percentile.

We can conclude from both figures that institutional connectedness has an exponential impact on force contributions. There is little difference in impact between a small and an average number of dyadic institutional ties. The effects of institutional ties are only felt in the upper percentiles. In other words, having little or average information/linkage flexibility does not increase the likelihood of side-deal bargains. Instead, it is necessary to have substantially *more* information/linkage flexibility than the average actor to overcome traditional bargaining difficulties.

3.2.3. Disaggregated Market Model

I will now estimate three models which disaggregate the principal independent variable into its component parts: multilateral institutional ties and bilateral treaties. I run these models to test which one of the institutional ties does the heavy lifting inside the model; is it about common international organization membership or bilateral treaties?

These models are as follows:

(3.7) $PN_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_IOMS_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1} + \beta_1 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_3 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_4 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_5 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_7 log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_8 log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_9 pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{12} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{13} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{14} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{16} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{17} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

(3.8.) $PNC_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_IOMS_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1} + \beta_1 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_3 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_4 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_5 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_7 log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_8 log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_9 pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{12} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{13} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{14} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{16} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{17} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

(3.9.) $\log(\text{total})_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{lnpn_IOMS}_{iot-1} + \beta_2 \text{lnpn_Bilat}_{iot-1} + \beta_1 \text{lnpn_alliance}_{iot-1} + \beta_2 \text{lnpn_s3un}_{iot-1} + \beta_3 \text{pntn_contiguity}_{iot-1} + \beta_4 \text{pntn_sameregion}_{iot-1} + \beta_5 \text{pn_repintn}_{iot-1} + \beta_7 \log(\text{pntn_trade/gdppn})_{iot-1} + \beta_8 \log(\text{pntnaid/gdppn})_{iot-1} + \beta_9 \text{pn_polity2}_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} \log(\text{lnpn_aid/gdppn})_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} \log(\text{lnpntrade/gdppn})_{iot-1} + \beta_{12} \text{pn_simd}_{iot} + \beta_{13} \text{pnconflict}_{iot} + \beta_{14} \text{pnconflict}_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} \text{pntn_comlang}_{iot-1} + \beta_{16} \text{pn_cinc}_{iot-1} + \beta_{17} \text{pn_gdppc}_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

Models 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 include the same dependent and independent variables as the six models described above. The only difference is the inclusion of $lnpn_IOMS_{iot-1}$ *and* $lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1}$. The variable $lnpn_IOMS_{iot-1}$ captures all multilateral institutional ties of a leader-laggard dyad, while the variable $lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1}$ controls for all bilateral treaties a country dyad has negotiated.[175] I describe the coding of variable $lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1}$ in Chapter Two. My expectation is that both coefficient estimates are positively associated with troop deployments and thus highly statistically significant.

- *Model Specifications: Disaggregated Market Model*

I employed exactly the same model specifications in Models 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 as I did in the six statistical models described above.

- *Statistical Results: Disaggregated Market Model*

The estimates of Models 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 are shown in Table 3.3. As expected, all three models show the *simultaneous* statistical significance (at the 0.01 level) of both institutional ties: international organization memberships and bilateral treaties have a similar positive and statistically significant effect on force contributions. All other coefficient estimates remain almost identical to those of the other models described above.

[175] The variables lnpn_IOMS_{iot-1} and $\text{lnpn_Bilat}_{iot-1}$ are 0.54 correlated. Thus, there should not be an issue of multicolinearity.

Overall, these nine models provide firm evidence that institutional connectedness can encourage troop deployments. In all six models, institutional connectedness (or its component parts) is positively correlated with troop deployments and is highly statistically significant (at the 0.01 level). This is a strong initial support for the *Market Model*, especially since other factors which could be associated with troop deployments (especially alliances and interest affinity between leaders and laggards) are controlled for in this analysis. Nevertheless, other variables associated with the *Preference Convergence Model* also appear to be important predictors of troop deployments. Most importantly, countries with no connection to the target state (i.e., being situated outside the region of operation and/or having no diplomatic representation in the target state) are highly unlikely to join a specific operation. In addition, the democracy score of a country seems to positively influence a country's decision to participle in security operations as well as its military strength, although to a lesser degree. Most surprisingly, however, the number of simultaneous deployments does not reduce a country's likelihood to deploy forces. On the contrary; it greatly increases the probability of participation. This suggests that most troop contributing countries are "regulars" which participate frequently and in more than one operation at the same time.

3.3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

To further assess the robustness of the results presented above, I ran a battery of robustness checks the most important of which I will present below.

3.3.1. Confronting Institutional Endogeneity

A weakness of my principal independent variable, *institutional connectedness,* is its imprecision with regard to the exact role institutions play in the force generation process.

One possibility is that institutions lower the price of side-deal bargains. Another possibility is that institutions have "socialization effects," which lead to the gradual convergence of member state preferences and preference intensities.[176] I will examine the exact effects of institutional ties in great detail in the case study chapters that follow. Nevertheless, several quantitative tests can also be run to investigate whether side-deal bargaining or institutional socialization has a greater impact on force deployments. One test in this regard, which has already been included in the previous models, is controlling for Gartzke's *Affinity of Nations Index*, a metric which has been used to examine whether common international organization memberships indeed lead to interest assimilation.[177] Given that the coefficient estimate of the variable $lnpn_s3un_{iot-1}$ is not statistically significant in any of the nine models above, interest similarity between leaders and laggards does not appear to be associated with troop deployments. To further ensure the robustness of the finding, I substituted Gartzke's *Affinity of Nation Index* with two similar metrics: the S-Score and the Tau-B Score.[178] The results of the analysis show that neither variable is statistically significant. Moreover, their addition to the models above does not alter the statistical significance of institutional connectedness or any other variables in the models.[179] To further corroborate that institutional connectedness does not pick up the socialization effects of international institutions, I estimate three additional models. Several scholars have argued that the degree of institutionalization of an international organization affects the "socialization" effects it has on its members; the more institutionalized the organization

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[176] e.g., Johnston 2001; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Russett and Oneal 2001.

[177] See e.g., Bearce and Bondanella 2007, which find that countries sharing more institutional ties indeed have more similar UN voting patterns.

[178] The Tau-B score is a rank order correlation of two states' alliance portfolios, The S-Score is a rank order correlation of two states' alliance portfolios, which takes into account the presence *and* absence of an alliance in the correlation calculation; see Signorino and Ritter 1999.

[179] For space limitation, I do not show the specific regression results here. Regression results are, however, available upon request.

(e.g., the larger the bureaucracy, the more frequent the meetings), the more intense the interest assimilation of member states.[180] The models I estimate are the following:

(3.10) $PN_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_igominst_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_igomedst_{iot-1} + \beta_3 lnpn_igomaxst_{iot-1} + \beta_4 lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1} + \beta_5 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_6 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_7 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_8 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_9 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{12} pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_{13} log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{14} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{16} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{17} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{18} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{19} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{20} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

(3.11) $PNC_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_igominst_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_igomedst_{iot-1} + \beta_3 lnpn_igomaxst_{iot-1} + \beta_4 lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1} + \beta_5 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_6 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_7 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_8 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_9 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{12} pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_{13} log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{14} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{16} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{17} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{18} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{19} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{20} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

(3.12) $log(total)_{iot} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 lnpn_igominst_{iot-1} + \beta_2 lnpn_igomedst_{iot-1} + \beta_3 lnpn_igomaxst_{iot-1} + \beta_4 lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1} + \beta_5 lnpn_alliance_{iot-1} + \beta_6 lnpn_s3un_{iot-1} + \beta_7 pntn_contiguity_{iot-1} + \beta_8 pntn_sameregion_{iot-1} + \beta_9 pn_repintn_{iot-1} + \beta_{10} log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{11} log(pntnaid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{12} pn_polity2_{iot-1} + \beta_{13} log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{14} log(lnpntrade/gdppn)_{iot-1} + \beta_{15} pn_simd_{iot} + \beta_{16} pnconflict_{iot} + \beta_{17} pnconflict_{iot-1} + \beta_{18} pntn_comlang_{iot-1} + \beta_{19} pn_cinc_{iot-1} + \beta_{20} pn_gdppc_{iot-1} + \mu_{iot}$

Models 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 include the same dependent and independent variables as the nine models described above. The only difference is the inclusion of the independent variables $lnpn_igominst_{iot-1}$, $lnpn_igomedst_{iot-1}$, and $lnpn_igomaxst_{iot-}$. All three variables come from the Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom[181] dataset that categorizes IOs according to their degree of institutionalization. The variable $lnpn_igominst_{iot-1}$ captures minimally institutionalized institutions, and the variable $lnpn_igomedst_{iot-1}$ accounts for average institutionalized IOs, while $lnpn_igomaxst_{iot}$ controls for strongly institutionalized international organization. If institutional socialization effects are driving the force generation process, we would expect that, the more institutionalized an IO, the greater its

[180] Bearce and Bondanella 2007.

[181] Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 2004. The dataset only goes until 1992. 1992 data was thus used to fill in for missing values. As a robustness check, the Honaker and King (2001, 2007) multiple imputation method for cross-section data and Amelia software was used to impute missing data in this dataset. The results did not change any of the findings described below.

effect on troop contributions. As a result, in particular $lnpn_igomaxst_{iot}$ should be positively correlated with troop deployments and highly statistically significant.

- *Model Specifications: Market Model with IO Institutionalization*

I employed exactly the same model specifications in Models 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 as I did in the nine models above.

- *Statistical Results: Market Model with IO Institutionalization*

The estimates of Models 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 are shown in Table 3.4. The results indicate that the degree of IO institutionalization does not matter. In fact, none of the three variables capturing "institutionalization" ($lnpn_igominst_{iot-1}$, $lnpn_igomedst_{iot-1}$, and $lnpn_igomaxst_{iot}$) achieves statistical significance, while the variable accounting for bilateral ties ($lnpn_Bilat_{iot-1}$) remains statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This finding further corroborates the hypothesis that IOs *do not* influence troop contributions because of their socialization effects on member states.

3.3.2. Controlling for UN and NON-UN Operations

The next robustness check addresses the differences among different types of security operations. It sounds quite plausible that UN operations differ from other security operations. Apart from the apparent superior legitimacy of UN operations, the funding of UN peacekeeping also differs from other operations. In fact, the UN disposes of a "standing" peacekeeping budget, to which every UN member state is legally obligated to contribute. In contrast, non-UN operations have to be funded *ad hoc*. To control for this potential variance, I split my dataset into UN and non-UN operations and ran six additional

robustness checks.[182] All variables and model specifications remain as in the models described above.

- *Statistical Results: Only UN Operations*

The estimates of the "Only-UN Operations" Models are shown in Table 3.5. As in the previous models, institutional connectedness is positively associated with troop contributions and highly statistically significant (at the 0.01 level). Other statistically significant predictors of UN operation participation are common regional membership with the target state, simultaneous deployments, and a potential participant's democracy score. Interestingly, in Model 3.13, the coefficient for common alliance membership between leaders and laggards ($lnpn_alliance_{iot-1}$) is negatively correlated with troop contributions to UN operation and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Overall, the results do not, however, question the key findings from above.

- *Statistical Results: Only NON-UN Operations*

The estimates of the "Only Non-UN Operations" Models are shown in Table 3.6. Again, institutional connectedness is positively associated with troop contributions and highly statistically significant (at the 0.01 level). Most other coefficients remain unaltered except the coefficient for common alliance membership ($lnpn_alliance_{iot-1}$) in Model 3.18. In contrast to Model 3.13 above, the coefficient estimate is now positively correlated with troop deployments and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. As a result, we can conclude that alliance ties appear to have a slight positive impact on participation in non-UN interventions. Yet, they appear to have a negative impact on participation in UN operation.

[182] As described in Chapter 2, UN operations constitute over half of the operation conducted during 1990-2005.

3.3.3. Additional Robustness Checks

The statistical research design presented above assumes that security operations are random events (i.e., lead nations select intervention targets randomly). Such an assumption does not necessarily coincide with reality. Nevertheless, I cannot think of a satisfactory selection function which would incorporate the plethora of domestic and international factors influencing a state's decision to take the lead in a specific security operation. However, based on the assumption that no *single* factor exists influencing the decision-making process to lead a security operations, I ran robustness checks with a multitude of randomly sampled subsets of the data. The results using those randomly sample subsets do not alter the key findings described above.

Finally, I ran the key models described above with a reduced number of potential participants. Instead of including all countries that participated at least once in one operation between 1990 and 2005, potential participants were required to meet a specific CINC score threshold (one standard deviation above the mean) to qualify for participation. Again, the results do not affect the principal findings shown above.

3.4. CONCLUSION

The statistical results presented in this chapter provide substantial support for most of the aspects of the *Market Model*. Institutional connectedness with the lead nation of a specific security operation appears to have a positive and statistically significant impact on a country's decision to contribute troops to that same operation. In particular, the impact of institutional connectedness appears to outweigh the effects of joint alliance memberships and interest affinity with the lead nation—the principal proxy variables to test the explanatory power of the *Preference Convergence Model*.

Institutional connectedness is, however, not the only factor influencing troop deployments. Other factors (e.g., having diplomatic ties with the target state and being located inside the region of operation) also strongly affect the likelihood of a laggard to join a specific operation. These findings might mirror the importance of preference intensities. The most likely participants are those which do have some basic interest in the conduct of a specific security operation but still require additional exogenous incentives to motivate their force deployment.

The key challenge now is to open further the black box of institutional connectedness. I am aware that the metric could serve as a proxy for institutional socialization, for voice opportunities or for side-deal bargains as suggested by the *Market Model*. The large-*N* regression analysis only allows for a superficial examination of this puzzle. To remedy this shortcoming, in the next three chapters I present case-studies illustrating the force generation processes of three security operation. Each case study presents in great detail the causal processes linking institutional ties and troop contributions.

As mentioned earlier, each case narrative is structured around the five dimensions introduced in Chapter Two: (1) the preference structures underpinning individual states' decision to cooperate; (2) their impetus for cooperation; (3) the search strategy pursued by lead nations; (4) the determinants of bargaining success; and (5) the mechanisms to minimize incomplete contracting. This will help the reader to weigh the empirical evidence in favor of each one of the four causal pathways described in Chapter Two.

Table 3.1: Regression Results - Baseline Model

Models	**3.1**	**3.2**	**3.3**
IV's/DV's	PN	PNC	log_total
Preference Convergence Model:			
Lead Nation-Participant alliances $_{t-1}$	**0.120****	**0.132****	**0.236****
	[0.034]	[0.027]	[0.016]
Lead Nation-Participant affinity score $_{t-1}$	0.144	-0.147	0.009
	[0.459]	[0.445]	[0.953]
Participant-Target Nation contiguity	0.118	**0.338*****	0.220
	[0.369]	[0.010]	[0.187]
Participant – Target Nation same region	**0.626*****	**0.690*****	**0.426*****
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Participant has diplo. rep. in Target Nation $_{t-1}$	**0.543*****	**0.400*****	**0.509*****
	[0.000]	[0.007]	[0.004]
Participant-Target Nation trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.002	0.000
	[0.716]	[0.665]	[0.977]
Participant-Target Nation aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.025*****	**-0.023****	-0.017
	[0.002]	[0.014]	[0.111]
Participant Polity2 score $_{t-1}$	**0.026*****	**0.018*****	0.005*
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.079]
Threat Model:			
Lead Nation – Participant aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.006*	**-0.007****	-0.003
	[0.067]	[0.049]	[0.321]
Lead Nation – Participant trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.014*****	**-0.017*****	-0.002
	[0.003]	[0.009]	[0.474]
Auction Model:			
Participant simultaneous deployments	**0.337*****	**0.379*****	**0.400*****
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Participant involved in MID	-0.106	0.033	-0.026
	[0.185]	[0.826]	[0.595]
Participant involved in MID $_{t-1}$	-0.070	-0.187	-0.011
	[0.447]	[0.219]	[0.846]
Participant –Target Nation share common lang.	0.188	**0.284****	**0.301****
	[0.184]	[0.023]	[0.049]
Participant CINC score $_{t-1}$	**4.084*****	**4.208*****	**2.122****
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.040]
Participant GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.143]	[0.139]	[0.616]
Constant	**-2.638*****	**-2.740*****	-0.504
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.327]
Observations	11,521	11,521	11,384
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.253	0.2831	0.201
Note: Robust p-values are in parentheses clustered by target state. Estimation includes year, operation type and lead nation fixed effects. Estimation performed using Stata 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***			

Table 3.2: Regression Results - Market Model

Models	**3.4**	**3.5**	**3.6**
IV's/DV's	PN	PNC	log_total
Market Model:			
Lead Nation –Participant institutional connectedness $_{t-1}$	**0.003*** **	**0.002*** **	**0.003*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Preference Convergence Model:			
Lead Nation-Participant alliances $_{t-1}$	-0.074	-0.005	0.034
	[0.287]	[0.933]	[0.718]
Lead Nation-Participant affinity score $_{t-1}$	0.018	-0.215	-0.126
	[0.927]	[0.273]	[0.406]
Participant-Target Nation contiguity	0.094	**0.323** **	0.199
	[0.490]	[0.015]	[0.242]
Participant – Target Nation same region	**0.650*** **	**0.713*** **	**0.436*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Participant has diplo. rep. in Target Nation $_{t-1}$	**0.498*** **	**0.337*** **	**0.453*** **
	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Participant-Target Nation trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000
	[0.684]	[0.773]	[0.998]
Participant-Target Nation aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.019** **	**-0.019** **	-0.010
	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.314]
Participant Polity2 score $_{t-1}$	**0.025*** **	**0.018*** **	0.003
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.254]
Threat Model:			
Lead Nation – Participant aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.003	-0.005	0.000
	[0.436]	[0.129]	[0.909]
Lead Nation – Participant trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.014*** **	**-0.017*** **	-0.002
	[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.468]
Auction Model:			
Participant simultaneous deployments	**0.310*** **	**0.360*** **	**0.368*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Participant involved in MID	-0.143*	0.014	-0.053
	[0.075]	[0.925]	[0.293]
Participant involved in MID $_{t-1}$	-0.124	-0.242	-0.044
	[0.174]	[0.117]	[0.438]
Participant –Target Nation share common language	0.127	0.232*	0.247
	[0.366]	[0.070]	[0.100]
Participant CINC score $_{t-1}$	0.332	1.842	-1.118
	[0.805]	[0.210]	[0.215]
Participant GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	[0.698]	[0.810]	[0.404]
Constant	**-2.514*** **	**-2.510 *** **	-0.419

	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.403]
Observations	11,521	11,521	11,384
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.209	0.271	0.216
Note: Robust p-values are in parentheses clustered by target state. Estimation includes year, operation type and lead nation fixed effects. Estimation performed using Stata 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***			

Table 3.3: Regression Results - Disaggregated Market Model

Models	**3.7**	**3.8**	**3.9**
IV's/DV's	PN	PNC	log_total
Disaggregated Market Model :			
Lead Nation-Participant common IGO membership $_{t-1}$	**0.005*** **	**0.003*** **	**0.003** **
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.021]
Lead Nation-Participant bilateral treaties $_{t-1}$	**0.003*** **	**0.002*** **	**0.004*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Preference Convergence Model:			
Lead Nation-Participant alliances $_{t-1}$	-0.033	0.011	0.064
	[0.645]	[0.872]	[0.559]
Lead Nation-Participant affinity score $_{t-1}$	0.010	-0.208	-0.089
	[0.958]	[0.279]	[0.543]
Participant-Target Nation contiguity	0.094	0.319**	0.202
	[0.488]	[0.017]	[0.233]
Participant – Target Nation same region	**0.633*** **	**0.705*** **	**0.432*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Participant has diplo. rep. in Target Nation $_{t-1}$	**0.496*** **	**0.336*** **	**0.450*** **
	[0.000]	[0.005]	[0.004]
Participant-Target Nation trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.002	0.000
	[0.589]	[0.730]	[0.991]
Participant-Target Nation aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.023*** **	**-0.021** **	-0.013
	[0.005]	[0.016]	[0.189]
Participant Polity2 score $_{t-1}$	**0.028*** **	**0.019*** **	0.005*
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.073]
Threat Model:			
Lead Nation – Participant aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.004	-0.005	-0.001
	[0.293]	[0.124]	[0.791]
Lead Nation – Participant trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.004	-0.011	0.003
	[0.371]	[0.103]	[0.324]
Auction Model:			
Participant simultaneous deployments	**0.309*** **	**0.359*** **	**0.367*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Participant involved in MID	-0.133*	0.014	-0.050
	[0.092]	[0.924]	[0.305]

Participant involved in MID $_{t-1}$	-0.128	-0.252	-0.055
	[0.162]	[0.112]	[0.348]
Participant –Target Nation share common language	0.166	0.247*	0.267*
	[0.234]	[0.050]	[0.070]
Participant CINC score $_{t-1}$	0.704	1.691	-1.229
	[0.607]	[0.237]	[0.172]
Participant GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	[0.765]	[0.822]	[0.457]
Constant	**-2.345*** **	**-2.498*** **	-0.315
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.528]
Observations	11,521	11,521	11,384
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.270	0.292	0.215
Note: Robust p-values are in parentheses clustered by target state. Estimation includes year, operation type and lead nation fixed effects. Estimation performed using Stata 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***			

Table 3.4: Regression Results – Degree of Institutionalization

Model	**3.10**	**3.11**	**3.12**
IV's/DV's	PN	PNC	log_total
Lead Nation-Participant min. institutionalized ties $_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.002	0.007
	[0.658]	[0.761]	[0.279]
Lead Nation-Participant med. institutionalized ties $_{t-1}$	0.011	0.006	0.007
	[0.566]	[0.773]	[0.746]
Lead Nation-Participant max. institutionalized ties $_{t-1}$	0.001	-0.002	0.001
	[0.831]	[0.803]	[0.895]
Lead Nation-Participant bilateral treaties $_{t-1}$	**0.003*** **	**0.002*** **	**0.004*** **
	[0.000]	**[0.000]**	**[0.000]**
Preference Convergence Model:			
Lead Nation-Participant alliances $_{t-1}$	0.001	0.035	0.057
	[0.993]	[0.624]	[0.595]
Lead Nation-Participant affinity score $_{t-1}$	0.145	-0.147	0.002
	[0.446]	[0.440]	[0.989]
Participant-Target Nation contiguity	0.099	0.331**	0.202
	[0.463]	[0.013]	[0.240]
Participant – Target Nation same region	**0.647*** **	**0.714*** **	**0.447*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Participant has diplo. rep. in Target Nation $_{t-1}$	**0.515*** **	**0.359*** **	**0.460*** **
	[0.000]	[0.010]	[0.005]
Participant-Target Nation trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	[0.772]	[0.785]	[0.970]
Participant-Target Nation aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.023*** **	-0.021**	-0.012
	[0.007]	[0.024]	[0.201]
Participant Polity2 score $_{t-1}$	**0.025*** **	**0.018*** **	0.003

	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.304]
Threat Model:			
Lead Nation – Participant aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.004	-0.006*	-0.001
	[0.212]	[0.092]	[0.704]
Lead Nation – Participant trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.015*** **	**-0.018*** **	-0.002
	[0.001]	[0.005]	[0.338]
Auction Model:			
Participant simultaneous deployments	**0.319*** **	**0.366*** **	**0.379*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Participant involved in MID	-0.137*	0.014	-0.051
	[0.090]	[0.927]	[0.287]
Participant involved in MID $_{t-1}$	-0.114	-0.236	-0.045
	[0.204]	[0.131]	[0.436]
Participant –Target Nation share common language	0.146	0.235*	0.257*
	[0.311]	[0.067]	[0.090]
Participant CINC score $_{t-1}$	1.042	2.055	-1.050
	[0.444]	[0.161]	[0.269]
Participant GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	[0.784]	[0.553]	[0.595]
Constant	**-2.539*** **	**-2.609*** **	-0.497
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.371]
Observations	11,522	11,522	11,385
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.262	0.289	0.213
Note: Robust p-values are in parentheses clustered by target state. Estimation includes year, operation type and lead nation fixed effects. Estimation performed using Stata 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***			

Table 3.5: Regression Results - Only UN Operations

Models	**3.13**	**3.14**	**3.15**
IV's/DV's	PN	PNC	log_total
Market Model:			
Lead Nation –Participant institutional connectedness $_{t-1}$	0.004***	0.002***	0.003***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Preference Convergence Model:			
Lead Nation-Participant alliances $_{t-1}$	-0.206***	-0.109*	-0.120*
	[0.000]	[0.085]	[0.095]
Lead Nation-Participant affinity score $_{t-1}$	-0.233	-0.422	-0.330
	[0.315]	[0.135]	[0.112]
Participant-Target Nation contiguity	-0.125	0.263	0.042
	[0.520]	[0.199]	[0.851]
Participant – Target Nation same region	0.327***	0.364***	0.280**
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.017]
Participant has diplo. rep. in Target Nation $_{t-1}$	0.611***	0.167	0.317**
	[0.000]	[0.673]	[0.020]

Participant-Target Nation trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.006	-0.002	0.002
	[0.180]	[0.585]	[0.788]
Participant-Target Nation aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.016**	-0.004	-0.019*
	[0.016]	[0.619]	[0.053]
Participant Polity2 score $_{t-1}$	0.029***	0.020***	0.011***
	[0.000]	[0.005]	[0.006]
Threat Model:			
Lead Nation – Participant aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.005	-0.002
	[0.689]	[0.298]	[0.545]
Lead Nation – Participant trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.012****	**-0.019****	-0.004
	[0.011]	[0.023]	[0.117]
Auction Model:			
Participant simultaneous deployments	**0.330*****	**0.392*****	**0.489*****
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Participant involved in MID	**-0.253****	-0.131	**-0.154****
	[0.013]	[0.532]	[0.013]
Participant involved in MID $_{t-1}$	-0.011	-0.097	0.028
	[0.929]	[0.667]	[0.734]
Participant –Target Nation share common language	0.260	**0.373****	**0.418****
	[0.102]	[0.015]	[0.037]
Participant CINC score $_{t-1}$	2.855*	**4.228****	2.407
	[0.051]	[0.021]	[0.116]
Participant GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*
	[0.115]	[0.421]	[0.058]
Constant	**-1.595*****	**-3.229*****	0.165
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.530]
Observations	5,831	5,547	5,757
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.221	0.25	0.236
Note: Robust p-values are in parentheses clustered by target state. Estimation includes year, operation type and lead nation fixed effects. Estimation performed using Stata 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***			

Table 3.6: Regression Results - Only Non-UN Operations

Models	**3.16**	**3.17**	**3.18**
IV's/DV's	PN	PNC	log_total
Market Model:			
Lead Nation –Participant institutional connectedness $_{t-1}$	**0.003*****	**0.003*****	**0.003*****
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Preference Convergence Model:			
Lead Nation-Participant alliances $_{t-1}$	0.087	0.083	**0.277*****
	[0.331]	[0.102]	[0.010]
Lead Nation-Participant affinity score $_{t-1}$	0.580	0.230	0.064
	[0.108]	[0.621]	[0.786]
Participant-Target Nation contiguity	0.287*	0.375*	0.347*
	[0.094]	[0.054]	[0.067]
Participant – Target Nation same region	**1.457*****	**1.356*****	**0.643*****
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]

Participant has diplo. rep. in Target Nation $_{t-1}$	**0.351*** **	**0.359*** **	**0.630*** **
	[0.000]	[0.006]	[0.001]
Participant-Target Nation trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	0.009	0.011	0.003
	[0.406]	[0.425]	[0.739]
Participant-Target Nation aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	**-0.027** **	**-0.031*** **	0.001
	[0.035]	[0.006]	[0.920]
Participant Polity2 score $_{t-1}$	**0.018** **	0.016	-0.002
	[0.026]	[0.142]	[0.497]
Threat Model:			
Lead Nation – Participant aid flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.002	-0.004	0.004
	[0.769]	[0.496]	[0.225]
Lead Nation – Participant trade flows (over GDP PN) $_{t-1}$	-0.007	-0.008	0.003
	[0.388]	[0.294]	[0.267]
Auction Model:			
Participant simultaneous deployments	**0.291*** **	**0.329*** **	**0.237*** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.003]
Participant involved in MID	0.081	0.240	0.028
	[0.566]	[0.126]	[0.693]
Participant involved in MID $_{t-1}$	-0.361*	**-0.532*** **	-0.094
	[0.059]	[0.004]	[0.211]
Participant –Target Nation share common language	-0.245*	-0.063	-0.021
	[0.079]	[0.637]	[0.886]
Participant CINC score $_{t-1}$	**-7.945** **	-2.192	**-3.530*** **
	[0.035]	[0.475]	[0.001]
Participant GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	0.000***	0.000	0.000
	[0.009]	[0.106]	[0.300]
Constant	**-3.981*** **	**-3.993*** **	**-0.804** **
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.031]
Observations	5,690	5,690	5,627
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.441	0.442	0.261
Note: Robust p-values are in parentheses clustered by target state. Estimation includes year, operation type and lead nation fixed effects. Estimation performed using Stata 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***			

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN UNAMID

The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations in world history. As of April 30, 2012, UNAMID's strength stood at 17,764 troops, 5,318 police, 313 military observers and 1,097 international civilian personnel.[183] UNAMID's budget amounts to US$1.7 billion for the fiscal year 2011-2012. Established on July 31, 2007, by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, UNAMID's core mandate is the protection of civilians in Darfur. In addition, it is tasked with monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, as well as assisting with the promotion of human rights and the rule of law in the greater Darfur region.[184]

The following countries have participated so far in UNAMID: Nigeria (3,700 military and police forces), Rwanda (3,430 forces), Egypt (2,650 forces), Ethiopia (2,400 forces), Senegal (1,330 forces), Bangladesh (1,080 forces), Tanzania (1,030 forces), Burkina Faso (970 forces), South Africa (850 forces), Thailand (832 forces), Pakistan (796 forces), Jordan (700 forces), Nepal (640 forces), Sierra Leone (400 forces), Gambia (343 forces), China (323 troops), Ghana (310 forces), Zambia (200 forces), Yemen (190 forces), Togo (150 forces), Indonesia (150 forces), Kenya (90 forces), Mongolia (70 forces), the Philippines (70 forces), Namibia (40 forces), Cameroon (35 forces), Malaysia (35 forces), Burundi (25 forces), Niger

[183] United Nations Peacekeeping Department, "UNAMID Fact Sheet." Available from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml.> Accessed 7 June 2012.

[184] UNAMID, "Background." Available from < http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10998&language=en-US.> Accessed 7 June 2012.

(20 forces), Jamaica (15 forces), Fiji (12 forces), and token forces from the United States, Tajikistan, Mali, Germany, Malawi, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Kirgizstan, Guatemala, Iran, South Korea, Ecuador, Italy, Uganda, Palau, the Netherlands, and Canada.[185]

4.1. CAUSAL PROCESS ANALYSIS: U.S. Waging Intervention in Sudan

This section takes the perspective of the lead nation of UNAMID, the United States. It analyzes (1) U.S. motivations to take the lead in resolving the Darfur crisis; (2) U.S. rationales to "outsource" the operation to the United Nations; and (3) U.S. strategies to recruit countries to participate in UNAMID.

4.1.1. OVERALL PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

The United States showed without a doubt the strongest preference intensity for launching UNAMID and thus stands out as UNAMID's *Lead Nation*. The United States was the key financial sponsor and broker of the successive Darfur peace agreements. As we will see in more detail later, the United States was at the heart of shifting the Darfur peace process first initiated by the Chadian President Déby to the African Union (AU). Once this change had been established, the United States defrayed most of the expenses related to the peace talks. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, personally participated in the final round of the negotiations concluding in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. At the United Nations, the United States led all diplomatic processes regarding Darfur. It was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of all UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue

[185] Réseau Francophone de Recherche sur les Opération de Paix, "MINUAD," Available from <http://www.operationspaix.net/78-operation-minuad.html.> Accessed 2 August 2012.

and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions.[186] When Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir first rejected the transition of the AU peacekeeping force in Darfur to the UN, the United States worked tirelessly to change Al-Bashir's mind. Once the transition was confirmed, the United States led the force generation process. U.S. government officials would bilaterally approach potential troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and plead for force contributions. Once troop pledges were made, the United States would follow-up by sending U.S. ambassadors to assess the readiness of the TCCs. When UNAMID fell short of specific strategic assets (e.g., helicopters and other transport equipment), the United States would again appeal to foreign governments to make the required contributions. The United States also dispatched U.S. military officers to help UNDPKO with operational planning.[187] Overall, the deployment of UNAMID was an extremely high United States Government foreign policy priority all through 2005-2008.[188]

Figure 4.1 below shows the variation in countries' revealed interests through UN statements on Darfur. After the United States, the United Kingdom (UK) came next in its interest in resolving the Darfur crisis. The UK government was partly invested in Darfur because of its former colonial relationship with Sudan.[189] It was also influenced by powerful NGOs, notably Oxfam and Christian Aid, as well as large sections of the British media,

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[186] E.g., Embassy Manila to Secretary of State, "The Philippines to support UNSCR Resolution on Darfur," cable 003613, 27 July 2004, Darfur Collection, box 2, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.


[187] U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton to UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 8 February 2006, Darfur Collection, box 2, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.

[188] See, for instance, U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton to UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, letter, 8 February 2006, Darfur Collection, box 2, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.

[189] Williams in Black and Williams 2010, 197.

which suggested that saving Africa would be a vote-winner with the British public.[190] China also showed a particular strong interest in the Darfur crisis. Chinese corporations are the leading developers of oil reserves in Sudan, and China currently imports 60 percent of Sudan's oil output.[191] All through 2004-2006, China served on the UN Security Council as a key ally of the Khartoum regime, working against a UN deployment to Darfur.[192] Unwilling to let the 2008 Beijing Olympics be overshadowed by Chinese-Sudanese relations, China changed course in mid-2007 and publicly advised Sudan to accept a UN peacekeeping force.[193] Other countries, in particular other major powers such as France, Germany and Japan, showed little interest in the Darfur crisis.[194]

Figure 4.1: UN Speech Record Evaluation Darfur



Lead Nation Preference Formation Process

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, had been afflicted by civil war almost incessantly since its independence from the British Empire in 1956. In simplistic terms, it was a conflict pitting the Arab Muslim north against the black African, and predominantly Christian or

[190] Williams in Black and Williams 2010, 201.

[191] Taylor in Black and Williams 2010, 176.

[192] Author's interview with John Bolton, Washington, D.C., February 2012.

[193] Taylor in Black and Williams 2010, 83.

[194] This compelled Kristof from the *New York Times* to write on September 11, 2007: "France and Germany, I sympathized with your opposition to the war in Iraq. But are you really now so petty and anti-Bush that you refuse to stand with the US against the slaughter in Darfur, or even to contribute significant sums to ease the suffering? Does the Chirac government really want to show the moral blindness to Sudan's genocide that the Vichy regime did to Hitler's?"

animist, south. Since 1989, Sudan has been ruled by the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist regime under General Omar Al-Bashir, which had its power base in the north. The south, in contrast, was led in its armed struggle to gain autonomy or independence from the north by John Garang, the undisputed leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

That the Sudan conflict would become one of the Bush Administration's top foreign policy priorities came as a surprise to many. Africa "does not fit into the national strategic interests" of the United States, candidate Bush was quoted as saying on the campaign trail.[195] As a result, the Africa dossier was quickly handed over to the business wing of the Bush team. Walter Kansteiner III, a canny businessman, who had made a fortune advising African governments on privatizations, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.[196] It set the tone for the Bush administration's priorities for Africa: business opportunities and oil—the latter really being "the only American interest in Africa," as Kansteiner confided to *The Economist* in October 2002.[197] "What is going to stand between me and my strategy for Africa?" Kansteiner is said to have asked at one of the very first staff meetings of the U.S. State Department's Africa Bureau. The answers given were "Sudan" and "Zimbabwe." "Any legislation concerning Africa that had to pass through Congress will be an uphill battle if Sudan is not resolved," a high-ranking official in the State Department recalls having responded to Kansteiner, "it might cost you a considerable amount of political capital."[198] Snyder was referring to a group of congressmen, chief among them Representatives Frank Wolf, Donald Payne, and Tom Tancredo, and

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[195] Huliaras, 2006, 711.

[196] Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 1 April 2001.

[197] Black gold, America is increasingly interested in Africa's oil reserves, *The Economist*, 24 Oct 2002.

[198] Author's interview with high-ranking U.S. diplomat, Washington, D.C., March 2012.

Senators Bill Frist and Sam Brownback, which was determined to do something about Sudan. Wolf, Tancredo, Frist, and Brownback represented conservative Christian evangelical constituencies, who had long been deeply troubled by the apparent persecution and enslavement of Southern Sudanese Christians by Northern Sudanese Muslims.

Evangelical Christians: the core political force behind U.S. policy toward Sudan

About a quarter of U.S. citizens claim to be evangelicals or "born-again" Christians. Although overall the American evangelical community is not homogeneous, in Washington D.C., the community is represented by one single organization: the National Association of Evangelicals.[199] Robert Putnam argues: "American evangelicals have built the largest, best-organized grassroots social network of the last quarter century."[200] In the early 2000s, hundreds of U.S. evangelical organizations were operating in Sudan. They were providing humanitarian assistance, but often they were also involved in an anti-slavery movement that had emerged in the early 1990s in response to the recurring abduction of Christian southern Sudanese to serve as slaves in the Arab Muslim north. Steady campaigning on the issue at the Christian grassroots level and fundraising through appeals to "buy back" slaves helped to upgrade U.S. domestic interest in Sudan's civil war.[201]

In addition to Congress, the evangelical Christian community also had strong benefactors in the Bush White House. Evangelical Christians accounted for approximately 40 percent of the Republican presidential vote in 2000.[202] Evangelical voters had played a significant role in the contested 2000 presidential election, especially in the states President Bush won in

[199] Huliaras 2006, 711.

[200] Putnam 2000, 162.

[201] Huliaras 2006, 712-713.

[202] Woodward 2006, 115.

the Electoral College. In those states 78 percent of evangelicals voted Republican.[203] Moreover, Franklin Graham, one of America's most famous evangelicals and a friend of George W. Bush, is said to have personally urged the President to turn his sights on Sudan.[204]

Other lobbying efforts

Evangelicals were able to multiply political leverage by collaborating with non-evangelical groups, particularly Jewish organizations.[205] Jews and evangelical Christians bonded over the idea of religious prosecution by Muslim regimes. Growing U.S. evangelical interest in Sudan also coincided with the increasing anger of humanitarian and development NGOs at the continued interference of the Sudanese government in the workings of *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, a consortium of NGOs and government agencies providing humanitarian assistance to Southern Sudan. American anti-slavery groups and other African American organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) also joined the fray.[206] For the Congressional Black Caucus, the condemnation of slavery in Sudan was arguably the only one issue on which it could easily agree.[207] In addition, the U.S. oil lobby had a stake in the process. Although Chevron had discovered oil in Sudan in the 1970s, Sudan's oil reserves, which yielded over two billion dollars per year, were off limits to U.S. companies because of stringent U.S. sanction policies in place since

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[203] Huliaras 2006, 712.

[204] Power 2004; Huliaras 2008, 170.

[205] Huliaras 2008, 168; Michael Horowitz, a former Reagan administration official and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, was a significant figure in bringing about this alliance. "Christians are the Jews of the 21st century," he claimed prominently in the *Wall Street Journal* on July 5, 1995, referring to the persecution of Christians in Sudan.

[206] Huliaras 2008, 170.

[207] High-ranking U.S. diplomat, interview with author.

the 1990s.[208] Congressional approval to remove those sanctions would require an end to the Sudanese civil war.[209]

9/11

Although the Bush administration's interest in Sudan predated 9/11, the 9/11 attacks changed the dynamics and level of immediacy of the issue. Khartoum had notoriously housed and supported Islamist terrorist networks, including Osama Bin Laden until his expulsion from Sudan in May 1996. In the wake of the Afghanistan intervention, the U.S. government, and especially its security community, was anxious to prevent Sudan from again becoming a terrorist refuge.[210]

Toward the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The U.S. Government's first policy initiative on Sudan was to revive the stalled peace talks between the North and the South. As the framework for the peace negotiations, the United States opted for a troika approach, bringing in Great Britain and Norway as junior partners. To the surprise of many, the negotiations soon made impressive progress. Khartoum appeared willing to compromise. It was suffering under U.S. sanction policy, and in the wake of the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan it wished to avoid being added to the Bush Administration's target list.[211] One Northern Sudanese politician put it as follows: "The United States looked like a wounded lion. It was very difficult for us to predict what kind of

[208] Woodward 2006, 113.

[209] Power 2004; Barltrop 2011, 118.

[210] Barltrop 2011, 125.

[211] Power 2004.

action they would take tomorrow. We had to wait and see, and watch what we said and what we did—and engage."[212]

Darfur catches fire

While the North-South peace negotiations progressed, the inhabitants of Darfur, the Western region of Sudan, felt that their region was being ignored.[213] If the South was getting political attention, so should Darfur. Over the years, Darfur had suffered appalling neglect. The government in Khartoum had rarely paid for roads, schools, hospitals, civil servants, or communications facilities.[214] Most government posts had been awarded to local "Arabs," although they constituted the ethnic minority in Darfur. Disgruntled Darfurians had appealed to include their concerns on the agenda of the North-South peace process, but to no avail. Many concluded that, if they ever wanted to see their needs met, they would have to do what John Garang had done in the South: take up arms against the Khartoum regime and try to get the world's attention.[215]

The first attack against Sudanese government forces was staged by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in the town of Golo on February 26, 2003. Shortly after the SLA's attack, another rebel group announced its formation: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). On the morning of April 25, 2003, the SLA and JEM mounted a joint attack on the government airbase in El Fasher, destroying seven planes and killing more than seventy government soldiers.[216] The El Fasher incident shocked the Khartoum regime. For Al-Bashir and his clique, Darfur represented a much greater threat than the South. Al-

[212] As quoted in Johnson 2011, 19.

[213] Williams 2006, 174; Prunier 2007, 79; Hamilton 2011, 22.

[214] Power 2004.

[215] Ibid.

[216] Hamilton 2011, 22.

Bashir's archrival, Hassan Al-Turabi, was allegedly involved with the JEM movement. In 1989, Al-Turabi had plotted together with Al-Bashir the overthrow of the Sadiq Al-Mahdi government.[217] In 1999, however, Al-Bashir began to doubt Al-Turabi's loyalty. Al-Bashir consequently removed Al-Turabi from all political functions. Al-Turabi had always had a base of supporters in Darfur, which led Al-Bashir to worry that Darfur would become his opponent's launch pad for a coup to take over his government.[218]

Accordingly, Al-Bashir decided that the Darfuri insurgency had to be defeated in its infancy.[219] The trouble was that many of the foot soldiers in the Sudanese army had been drawn from Darfur. Could they be relied upon to crush their own people? Khartoum would better recruit militias—the Janjaweed—to do the job.[220]

Ignoring Darfur

Despite information about the growing violence, the global community paid little attention to Darfur during 2003 and early 2004. Khartoum was set to deliver a historic peace agreement, a once-in-a-generation diplomatic breakthrough. Impending success in the North-South peace negotiation had, in fact, catapulted the "Sudan File" to the highest echelons of the U.S. State Department. Charles Snyder, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, recalls Colin Powell pressing him every morning at the 8:30 a.m. meeting about the Sudanese peace process.[221] For Colin Powell, Sudan had the potential to

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[217] Baltrop 2011, 206; Sadq al-Mahadi had been democratically elected and served as President of Sudan from 1986 to 1989.

[218] Hamilton 2011, 17; Tar 2006, 417.

[219] Stedjan and Thomas-Jensen in Black and Williams (2010, 166) write that the regime in Khartoum also feared that showing weakness in Darfur would reduce its bargaining power in the North-South negotiations.

[220] Hamilton 2011, 22; Williams 2006, 175.

[221] Author's interview with Charles Snyder, Washington D.C., February 2012.

become *his* legacy, and he was determined not to let Darfur get in the way.[222] As a result, the U.S. embassy in Khartoum was instructed to focus solely on concluding the negotiations and building up counterterrorism cooperation.[223] With a similar intention, the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, John Danforth, told the UN head of humanitarian operations, Jan Egeland, "Don't rock the boat; we're trying to finish this [the North-South peace agreement]."[224] It was not until spring 2004 that this attitude started to change. A significant increase in violence, compounded with the ten year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, arguably triggered the reversal. Within a single week in late March/early April 2004, six articles comparing Darfur to Rwanda appeared on the editorial pages of major U.S. newspapers. As a result of the media frenzy, President Bush issued his first public statement condemning the atrocities in Darfur.[225]

The N'Djamena Peace Initiative and the deployment of AMIS

The initial attempt of restoring peace in Darfur came from Idriss Déby, the president of Chad. Chad itself was highly implicated in the Darfur crisis. Déby suspected that Sudanese-backed rebels were using Darfur as a staging ground for a coup over his own government in N'Djamena. By chairing peace talks, Déby hoped that he would be able to strengthen his own grip on power. Soon after the first round of talks, the Chadian government approached the United States to ask for financial assistance to host the talks.[226] The U.S. government was, however, reluctant to help. Chad was too implicated in

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[222] Ibid.

[223] Hamilton 2011, 20.

[224] As quoted in Hamilton 2011, 24.

[225] Hamilton 2001, 32.

[226] American Embassy N'Djamena to Secretary of State, "Joint Commission meeting set for June 30 in N'Djamena," cable 000973, 28 June 2004, Darfur Collection, box 1, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington D.C.

the whole affair to serve credibly as an unbiased peace broker. U.S. diplomats thus suggested that the mediation efforts be shifted to the African Union; only then could the United States sponsor the talks. U.S. diplomats directly proposed this change of negotiation venue to Mozambique's President Chissano, then serving as AU chairman.[227] Chissano agreed. As a result, the AU was put in charge of implementing the N'Djamena cease-fire agreement of April 8, 2004. At the AU Peace and Security Council meeting on May 25, 2004, the agreement was made to deploy a small "observer mission" to Darfur, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).[228] By October 2004, AMIS comprised 465 personnel from ten African countries. The tale of U.S. involvement in the Darfur crisis could have stopped right here. Yet it did not. The key reason for this unexpected development was the creation of a U.S. advocacy movement of impressive proportions.

The Save Darfur Coalition

While the plight of South Sudan had been advertised at the U.S. grassroots level for years, Darfur was completely unknown to most Americans before it began to receive media coverage in the spring of 2004.[229] The initial Darfur campaign was led by the Sudan Coalition and Christian Solidarity International (CSI). Together with members of the Black Caucus, they held daily protests in front of the Sudanese embassy in Washington, D.C. The NGO Africa Action also appeared early on the scene and focused on pressuring Colin Powell to declare the conflict as "genocide."[230] As mentioned earlier, while touched by the Darfur crisis, Powell did not want to lose momentum regarding the North-South peace

[227] Secretary of State to American Embassy Maputo, "Sudan: Chissano willing to consider AU or UN request to send Mozambican troops to Darfur," cable 209233, 28 September 2004, Darfur Collection, box 1, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington D.C.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Murphy 2007, 317; according to Murphy (2007, 317) from 1994 to 2003 the word "Darfur" had appeared in the *Washington Post* four times and twice in the *New York Times*.

[230] Hamilton and Hazlett in de Waal 2007, 341-342.

negotiations. He was thus eager to shift the burden of intervention to somebody else. Would using the term "genocide" help in this regard? The State Department chief legal advisor, William Taft IV, said it would. Taft's understanding was that, "if the United States determined genocide was underway, its only obligation under the Genocide Convention would be to present their findings to the United Nations."[231] The United Nations then had to decide what to do about it. As a result of this legal opinion, on September 9, 2004, Powell declared before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

> The evidence leads . . . the United States to the conclusion that genocide had occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur . . . no new action is dictated by this determination. We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese government to act responsibly. So let us not be too preoccupied with this designation.[232]

Powell's testimony marked the first time that any government in world history had declared that genocide was occurring while the violence was still ongoing.[233] The use of the "G-word" elevated Darfur above other crises. It had an enormous effect, especially on the Jewish community.[234] More importantly, however, the notion that Powell would, on the one hand, acknowledge that genocide was taking place and, on the other hand, reject any responsibility for doing something about it, ignited moral outrage, or, as Hamilton put it: "Powell had wanted to shock the governments of the world into action; what happened instead . . . was that ordinary Americans started to mobilize."[235]

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[231] Hamilton 2011, 36.

[232] Hamilton 2011, 10.

[233] Hamilton 2011, 39; Straus 2005, 84.

[234] Hamilton and Hazlett in de Waal 2007, 361; Hamilton 2011, 109.

[235] Hamilton 2011, 44; Thomas-Jensen and Spiegel 2008, 205.

The meeting that laid the foundation for the Save Darfur Coalition took place on July 14, 2004, at the City University of New York.[236] By 2007, the coalition had grown into an alliance of more than 180 faith-based, advocacy and humanitarian organizations and disposed of an annual budget of approximately US$ 14 million.[237] People wore Save Darfur bracelets, played Save Darfur video games, and wore Save Darfur T-shirts.[238] One of the most surprising features of the Save Darfur Coalition was that much of its numerical strength, resilience, and even policy successes came from students.[239] Overall, its enormous success is still difficult to understand. "At Africa Action we ran many campaigns alerting people about conflicts in Africa. Darfur was different. The response was overwhelming," Ann-Louise Colgan, then the assistant director for policy analysis and communications at *Africa Action,* recalls.[240] "There was good strategy, good advocacy and good grassroots mobilization." Mamdani, in contrast, argues that the success of the Safe Darfur Coalition can only be understood when put next to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. He writes:

> Unlike Iraq, Darfur [was] a place for which Americans [did] not need to feel responsible but [chose] to take responsibility . . . In Darfur, Americans [could] feel themselves to be what they know they are not in Iraq: powerful saviors.[241]

In addition, as Lanz argues, "the Save Darfur movement was magnified by technology"—it was one of the very first mass movements that made use of the big social media inventions

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[236] Mamdani 2009, 22.

[237] Mamdani 2009, 23.

[238] Author's interview with Ann-Louise Colgan, Washington, D.C., March 2012.

[239] Hamilton and Hazlett in de Waal 2007, 345; Haeri 2008, 36. The NGO Students Take Action Now: Darfur (STAND) served as one of the largest and loudest of the grassroots voices regarding Darfur, boasting 600 student chapters nationwide. Other student initiatives included the Genocide Intervention Fund, which was formed with the idea of convincing private citizens to donate to AMIS as a means of shaming the US government into raising its own contributions.

[240] Colgan, interview with author.

[241] Mamdani 2009, 61; Lanz 2009, 670.

of the early 2000s—e.g., blogs, Facebook, YouTube—were used center stage as mobilizing devices. Other advocacy techniques were letter-writing and calling members of Congress, the White House, and the State Department. GI-net, another key advocacy organization, established a special toll-free number, 1-800-GENOCIDE. It would provide talking points about key legislation pending in Congress on Darfur. Any caller would be put through to his or her representative's office to deliver the message.[242]

By mid-2005, the key objective of the Save Darfur Coalition had become the replacement of the African Union mission in Darfur (AMIS), with a fully-fletched United Nations peacekeeping force.[243] In early 2006 the Save Darfur Coalition launched the "A Million Voices Campaign," a postcard campaign urging President Bush to support "a stronger multinational force to protect the civilians in Darfur."[244] Integral to the campaign were nationwide rallies planned for April 30, 2006, with the biggest planned for Washington D.C.—an event that would attract over 35.000 participants.[245]

The contested deployment of UNAMID

The Sudanese Government in Khartoum was adamantly opposed to a UN takeover of AMIS. For reasons explained earlier, Khartoum was exceptionally sensitive about the insurgency in Darfur. It did not want other countries or international organizations interfering in this issue. It could tolerate African Union peacekeepers because it knew they

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[242] Hamilton 2011, 100; GI-net also graded every member of Congress from A+ to F on how they had responded to Darfur. Once this information was published, citizens represented by low-scoring politicians began using the scorecards in face-to-face meetings with representatives, while others published articles in their local papers to publicly shame low-scoring representatives from those areas. The success of this strategy was quite overwhelming; out of the 167 representatives who scored an F in August 2006, 166 took action to improve their scores in the following eighteen months."

[243] Lanz 2009, 673; Mamdani 2009, 41.

[244] Hamilton 2011, 80-81.

[245] Darfur by the Numbers, Save Darfur Coalition, <http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/darfur_by_the_numbers//print/.> Accessed 14 June 2012.

were militarily weak and also because it maintained a certain degree of political leverage on many African Union governments deploying troops.[246] The Sudanese government found an unexpected ally in the UNDPKO chief, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who also opposed a UN deployment to Darfur, albeit for an entirely different set of reasons; chief among them was the absence of a peace agreement between the different rebel forces. If there was no peace to keep, why send a peacekeeping force?[247] As a result, the day after the mass rallies across the United States, Deputy-Secretary of State Bob Zoellick was dispatched to Abuja to help the AU negotiate a peace agreement for Darfur.[248] For the last three years, Sudanese officials had been meeting with Darfuri rebel leaders in the Nigerian capital of Abuja.[249] Zoellick did not disappoint; a peace deal was rammed through by May 9, 2006. To further overcome Sudanese opposition to a UN operation, a compromise was found in the form of a hybrid UN-AU force: UNAMID.[250]

4.1.2. COOPERATION IMPETUS

When it came to Darfur, the U.S government was internally divided between those government branches that were exposed to direct public pressure, such as Congress, the White House, the Department of State, and others which were more insulated, chief among them the Department of Defense (DOD). The latter was greatly worried that U.S. forces would get drawn into Darfur. During 2004-2007, the key preoccupations of the DOD were Iraq and Afghanistan. Darfur was considered none of the U.S.'s business—a conflict in

[246] Author's interview with Andrew Natsios, Washington, D.C., March 2012.

[247] Hamilton 2011, 111.

[248] Hamilton 2011, 85.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Hamilton 2011, 127.

which U.S. national interests were remote, to say the least.[251] In fact, as the Save Darfur Coalition swelled to unprecedented proportions, the White House was considering the possibility of a unilateral U.S. intervention in Darfur. Bush's National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, however, recalls how unenthusiastic the Pentagon was about this idea.[252] The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, tells a similar story:

Officials at [the Department of] Defense weren't keen, so they would come up with these ridiculous estimates like 'you need 120,000 troops to succeed.' Then of course they would say, 'well, we don't have that because of Iraq.[253]

Given the incapacity of the African Union and the overwhelming unwillingness of the U.S. military to do something about Darfur, troops had to be found elsewhere. The U.S. government briefly thought of NATO, but other heads of NATO members had no interest in expanding NATO's involvement to Sudan.[254] "Only when it became clear that NATO was not a live option did we realize we were left with the UN," recalls President Bush's senior policy adviser, Michael Gerson.[255]

The U.S. cooperation impetus was thus of a functional nature. The U.S. government was not particularly concerned about legitimacy reasons. The advocacy movement in the United States most likely would not have opposed a unilateral U.S. intervention in Darfur. Nevertheless, the DOD refused to seriously engage with the Darfur issue. It appears that the White House could not or did not want to travel on a collision course with top U.S.

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[251] Bolton 2007, 351.

[252] Hamilton 2011, 75.

[253] Ibid.

[254] Secretary of State to EU Member States Collective, "Approaching the EU in Advance of April 25 Foreign Ministers Meeting (GAERC), cable 072185, 19 April 2005, Darfur Collection, box 2, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.

[255] As quoted in Hamilton 2011, 79.

military officials. As a result, it reverted to "outsourcing" the operation to the United Nations.

4.1.3. SEARCH PROCESS

As mentioned earlier, the regime in Khartoum was vehemently opposed to a UN operation in Darfur. To make its position crystal clear, the Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN sent a letter to potential TCCs dated October 3, 2006, saying: "In the absence of Sudan's consent to the deployment of UN troops, any volunteering to provide peacekeeping troops to Darfur will be considered as a hostile act, a prelude to an invasion of a member country of the UN."[256] Nevertheless, in November 2006, at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, the compromise of an AU-UN hybrid operation was forced upon Sudan.[257] One of the conditions inserted into the compromise by Sudan was that UNAMID would have a predominant African character: To the greatest extent possible, first priority in the UNAMID force generation process would go to suitable pledges from African countries. Only if the Africans were unable to meet force requirements would pledges from other troop contributors be considered.[258]

U.S. reaches out to African allies via the ACOTA and GPOI programs

The UNAMID search process was orchestrated by the U.S. State Department with help from UNDPKO. The U.S. started feeling out potential TCCs for UNAMID in February 2006, when U.S. Ambassador Bolton publicly invited possible mission contributors to

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[256] U.S. says Sudan is Intimidating Troop-Contributing Countries, *Africa News*, 5 October 2006.

[257] Representatives from more than 30 countries as well as the AU, the Arab League, and the UN were present in Addis. The U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Natsios, recalls that the Kofi Annan rammed the UNAMID compromise through. "In a way it was almost comical. [Sudanese officials] would raise objections and Kofi would say 'thank you for approving.'" (as quoted in Hamilton 2011, 127).

[258] UNAMID Deployment on the Brink, December 2007, Joint NGO report. Available from <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/unamid1207web.pdf.> Accessed 11 April 2012.

indicate their interest to the UN Secretariat.[259] By the end of 2007, when UNAMID finally managed to deploy, the highest echelons of the U.S. government were involved in the UNAMID force generation process: President Bush, his National Security Adviser Steven Hadley, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Deputy-Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and others. The institutions most involved in the process were (1) the State Department's Political–Military (POLMIL) Bureau; (2) the State Department's Africa Bureau; and (3) the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

The standard operating procedure of the UNAMID force generation process worked the following way: The POL-MIL and Africa Bureaus drafted together a list of countries to be approached for force contributions.[260] To create the list, the POL-MIL bureau obtained most of its data from channels the State Department had established through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) and its successor program the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).[261] ACOTA and GPOI were set up to provide training to African and other military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations.[262] Through the ACOTA and GPOI cooperation efforts, the POL-MIL bureau had acquired an extensive knowledge of the military capabilities of participating African states. The Africa Bureau, in turn, added "political" information,

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[259] Sudan; Security Council explores transition from African Union to UN, *Africa News*, 3 February 2006.

[260] Input was also solicited from other bureaus. The list was one of the topics of discussion of several high-level meetings inside the State Department.

[261] ACOTA originated as an Africa Bureau program in 1997 under the name of Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). President Bill Clinton established ACRI as the first of a whole array of new military programs aimed at expanding U.S. military activities on the African continent. In 2004, ACRI was expanded and renamed ACOTA. Today the Africa Bureau maintains the policy lead and regional political expertise for ACOTA input, while the POL-MIL bureau oversees the budget process and contractors implementing ACOTA training. GPOI extended the ACOTA programs to countries outside of Africa. GPOI is funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, which is managed by the POL-MIL Bureau. It had a budget of $660 million (FY2005-FY2008) to fund potential TCCs training and deployment needs. Countries which were beneficiaries of ACOTA or GPOI are not legally required to deploy to peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, it "is a process the US encourages."

[262] Volman 2007.

which it had gathered mainly through the U.S. embassy network in Africa. The breadth of information available per country would vary with the depth of the bilateral relationship with the United States; the deeper the relationship in terms of reciprocal commitments, the greater the number of local contact persons. This greater number of local access points, in turn, increased the range of issue areas in which information could be collected. Charles Snyder recalls that, based on its knowledge, the Africa Bureau would often look at the draft list produced by POL-MIL and say, "No way, those countries will never sign up." Still, the POL-MIL Bureau's input was appreciated. Charles Synder argues that in the end "military capabilities did matter quite a bit."[263]

Once a list of countries was established, the State Department sent out cables to the U.S. embassies in the identified countries, requesting the local ambassadors to undertake so-called *démarche*—visits to the local authorities to ask whether the government would be willing to contribute troops. The ambassadors then reported back to the State Department what the exact conditions were for a deployment. The conditions ranged from very basic requests (e.g., airlift to the conflict theater) to various equipment needs to complex political bargains. Often high-ranking officials in the State Department and the White House (including the Secretary of State and the President) would handle the follow-up on an individual request, either by bringing it up at a bilateral or multilateral meeting (i.e., "corridor discussion") or by making a phone call to the leadership of the country in question.

Role of UNDPKO

UNDPKO's Force Generation Service is generally perceived to be in charge of UN force generation. In the case of UNAMID, UNDPKO did manage the technical parts of the force

[263] Snyder, interview with author.

generation process. It negotiated with the TCCs as to in which area of the conflict theater they would operate, what type of equipment they would provide, and what the exact reimbursement rates were for the equipment. UNDPKO also inspected the TCC's equipment prior to their deployment. Nevertheless, the political agreement to commit troops to UNAMID was in large part secured by the United States. Only once a bilateral political accord had been concluded would the TCCs report to UNDPKO for further and more technical negotiations.[264] On several other occasions, the United Nations also asked the United States for technical and financial help. For example, in November 2006, the United Nations asked the United States to provide all the engineering and camp support for UN personnel working in Darfur.[265]

4.2. BARGAINING ANALYSIS 1: Force Generation Negotiations USA-Nigeria

Nigeria is the largest troop contributor to UNAMID. There are currently over 3,700 Nigerian personnel serving in the UNAMID force (including four military battalions, one military hospital, military observers, and staff officers). Prior to UNAMID, Nigeria had gradually contributed approximately 2,000 troops to AMIS, the African Union force in Darfur. This section traces in detail the Nigerian decision-making process regarding UNAMID. It examines why Nigeria was chosen to participate in UNAMID and how the bargaining process between the United States and Nigeria unfolded.

4.2.1. NIGERIA'S PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

As mentioned earlier, Chad's President Idriss Déby initiated the first round of inter-Sudanese peace talks on Darfur in March 2004. Chad itself, however, was highly implicated

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[264] Author's interview with Abi Williams, Washington, D.C., March 2012.

[265] Secretariat of the United Nations to Permanent Mission of the United States to the UN, fax, 6 November 2006, Darfur Collection, box 2, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington , D.C.

in the Darfur crisis. As a result, the United States refused to defray any costs Chad was incurring by hosting the peace process. Instead, U.S. diplomats suggested that the mediation efforts should be shifted to the African Union. On July 6, 2004, Olusegun Obasanjo, the President of Nigeria, was elected chairman of the African Union. Thus began Nigeria's involvement in the Darfur crisis.

Nigeria's unidimensional preferences regarding Darfur

Without a doubt, Nigeria's President Obasanjo was a particular kind of political leader. From the very beginning of his tenure as the first civilian President of Nigeria after decades of military rule, Obasanjo thought large for Nigeria and for himself. Nigeria had to be rescued from its economic decay, ethnic political distrust, and international opprobrium. It had to be led back to the glorious days when it was seen as an African giant, wealthy, influential, confident, and riding high—its brother's keeper and a force for good in Africa and the world. Obasanjo blissfully embraced his chairmanship of the African Union—and the African Union embraced him in return. Contrary to many other African leaders, Obasanjo was held in high esteem by both "African" and "Arab" members of the African Union, one of the latter being Omar Al-Bashir, the President of Sudan. In his eyes, Nigeria was a credible interlocutor on the Darfur issue, particularly because of Nigeria's own Muslim population, which was mainly composed of the Hausa and Fulani ethnic tribes. These tribes maintained strong ties with Sudan. Over the centuries, Hausa and Fulani had left the northern regions of Nigeria to engage in the Hajj—the holy Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia—a journey which led them through Sudan. Several became stranded on their way to or from Mecca in areas of today's Sudan. These people now

constituted an important Nigerian diaspora in Sudan estimated to number between six and seven million.[266]

Obasanjo's first steps as AU peace broker for Darfur reflected a pro-Sudanese rather than pro-Darfuri attitude. In August 2004, while on a visit to Khartoum, Obasanjo publicly played down any possible military intervention in Darfur.[267] Also, on October 17, 2004, Obasanjo attended a meeting between leaders of Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria, which concluded that no foreign intervention should occur in Darfur.[268] This anti-intervention attitude resounded well with the Nigerian public. Although largely sharing Obasanjo's views on Nigerian exceptionalism in Africa, by the early 2000s the Nigerian population had developed a strong anti-peacekeeping attitude. This view was largely the result of Nigeria's dire military experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which had cost the Nigerian government over US$ 8 billion and thousands of Nigerian lives.[269] A 2000 survey conducted by a researcher from Ibadan University found that 84 percent of the survey participants considered Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone and Liberia not worth the money spent and believed that the government should focus instead on the socio-economic problems at home.[270] Picking up on this mood, Obasanjo refused to participate in an ECOWAS intervention in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and a UN intervention in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002.[271]

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[266] We are building a Nigerian Community in Sudan—Ambassador Dahiru, *Africa News*, 1 August 2006.

[267] Iliffe 2011, 283.

[268] African leaders reject foreign intervention in Darfur, *Taipei Times*, 19 October 2004.

[269] Iliffe 2011, 218.

[270] Ajayi 2000, 399.

[271] Ibid.


U.S. diplomacy in pursuit of Darfur

U.S. diplomats first approached the Nigerian government in pursuit of Darfur in mid-April 2004—very shortly after the conclusion of the first round of the N'Djamena peace talks. On July 12, the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Robert Campbell, officially met with President Obasanjo to request Nigerian military support for AMIS.

Lifting U.S. sanctions on Nigeria

On paper, Nigeria was the logical cooperation partner for the United States. Nigeria did not only possess one of Africa's best trained and equipped military forces, it also was one of the countries on the continent with which the United States maintained the most institutional ties. As Figure 4.2 below illustrates, in terms of institutional connectedness Nigeria ranked third of all countries in Africa after Ethiopia and Liberia. The United States thus possessed many institutional access points in the country along with wide-ranging information of what was going on in Nigeria.

Figure 4.2: U.S. Institutional Ties with African Countries



Nevertheless, in 2004 U.S.-Nigerian military cooperation was at a low point. In fact, in October 2001, Congress had imposed sanctions on U.S. military cooperation programs with

Nigeria after the so-called Benue Massacre.[272] For U.S.-Nigerian Cooperation on Darfur to intensify, these sanctions had to be lifted. U.S. diplomats urged President Obasanjo to deliver a military accountability speech so that the U.S. Congress would see that the situation had changed; Even so, it took Congress a year to lift all sanctions.[273] In the meantime, funding was provided by sources other than those controlled by Congress.

From Peace Talks to Boots on the Ground

The situation in Darfur grew increasingly violent over the summer of 2004. The small AU observer force, which had began deploying in August 2004 and to which Nigeria had contributed a company-size unit, proved to be utterly inefficient. At the same time, the Darfur groundswell in the United States was about to take shape. On July 22, the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives passed a joint resolution officially labeling the armed conflict in Darfur as genocide. On September 19, Colin Powell followed suit.[274] As mentioned earlier, Powell had hoped that his statement would shift the burden of intervention from the United States to the international community.[275] In particular, the United States looked at the African Union—and Nigeria—to carry the major burden of the

[272] Prior to the Benue Massacre, U.S.-Nigerian military relations had been on a precipitous rise. President Obasanjo was anxious to train and professionalize the Nigerian army. For this he enlisted the U.S. military, which eagerly agreed to help out thinking it could strengthen military ties with an important military ally in Africa. The U.S. military thus ran *Operation Focus Relief*—a military training program worth US $66 million. Such an intense cooperation with the U.S. armed forced draw the ire, however, from influential sections of the Nigerian service personnel, including the Chief of Army Staff, General Victor Malu. Malu openly opposed Obasanjo's pro-U.S. policy, criticized the U.S. training methods and accused the U.S. of pursuing selfish motives in Nigeria. Obasanjo, nonetheless, stuck to the U.S. training program and dismissed General Malu in April 2001. Responding to rumors that Malu was planning to overthrow the Obasanjo government after his dismissal, Obasanjo supposedly ordered a military "clean-up" of Malu's home region, the Benue State, resulting in the death of over 200 people. Following the massacre, the U.S. Congress sanctioned military cooperation with Nigeria.

[273] CRS Report for Congress, "Nigeria in Political Transition," 3 June 2005, 10.

[274] U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, *The Washington Post*, 10 September 2004.

[275] Hamilton 2011, 36.

intervention.[276] U.S. diplomats approached the Nigerian government once more, this time requesting them to step up their military engagement in Darfur.[277]

Nigeria's multidimensional preferences regarding Darfur

While willing to host peace talks and provide a small observer contingent to Darfur, Obasanjo was not in a mood for another major Nigerian peacekeeping involvement abroad. More importantly, the Nigerian army was entirely opposed to such an undertaking. While the Nigerian military generally liked peacekeeping operations, due to the financial incentives involved, in fall 2004 it felt intolerably overstretched. Overall, the Nigerian military numbered 80.000 troops. In October 2004, 4,000 of those troops were deployed to the UN operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Liberia (UNMIL); another 4,000 were training to replace the battalions in UNAMSIL and UNMIL; two units were designated to the ECOWAS Standby Brigade; a company of military police to Burundi; a company of mechanized infantry and a company of engineers to Benin; and another company to Monrovia. In addition, Nigeria had military observers stationed in Southwest Sahara, Cote d'Ivoire, and the DRC. At the same time, 12 battalions (approximately 25,000 troops) were committed internally, including on the Bakassi Peninsula, the Plateau State, and the Niger Delta. All three areas were major domestic hot spots with a serious potential to flare up at any moment.[278] Lt General Martin Luther Agwai, then serving as Nigerian Chief of Army

[276] Secretary of State to all African diplomatic posts, "All African embassies démarche on Sudan," cable 208362, 27 September 2004, Darfur Collection, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.

[277] Secretary of State to all African diplomatic posts, "African press guidance December 3, 2004," cable 258164, 3 December 2004, Darfur Collection, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.

[278] Because of its ethnic composition, Nigeria is an extremely volatile state almost permanently "dancing on the brink" of civil war (cf. Campbell 2011).

Staff, suggested in our interview that another Nigerian deployment was simply impossible—"there were no troops, there was no equipment."[279]

The Obasanjo government's top foreign policy priority in fall 2004 dealt, in fact, with an entirely different issue area: debt relief. Obasanjo had declared the latter the key foreign policy goal of his presidency. Most of Nigeria's US$ 33 billion debt was held by the Paris Club. It had been accumulated by military governments preceding Obasanjo's presidency. This debt, Obasanjo had concluded, was a major cause of Nigeria's failure to develop. Getting rid of it would represent a fresh start, a second chance for a new Nigeria.[280]

4.2.2. DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING SUCESS

By September 2004, Obasanjo was growing concerned that his plan of debt reduction would not work out. Previous successful examples of dept reductions (e.g., Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, and Cameroon) had shown that debt reduction was not granted because of economic but political factors. In all three cases, France had been instrumental in pushing the deals to fruition.[281] As a result, Nigeria needed a champion for its cause. Nigerian diplomats had been working for some time to get the United Kingdom and the United States on board. Now Obasanjo felt the need to intensify the pressure, in particular on the United States. In a speech on September 16, 2004, given at a Nigeria-U.S. investment conference—and thus targeting a U.S. audience—Obasanjo made his point crystal clear; it was pay-back time. The United States wanted Nigeria to be its deputy policeman in Africa? Well, Nigeria in turn wanted the United States to use all of its weight to ensure this debt deal passed. On December 2, 2004, during a meeting with President Bush at the White House, Obasanjo

[279] Author's interview with Martin Luther Agwai, Abuja, May 2012.

[280] Campbell 2011, 17-18.

[281] Moss, Standley and Birdsdall 2004, 22.

again pleaded for U.S. assistance with debt relief. Congruent with directly engaging President Bush, Obasanjo also sent his staff to convince individual members of Congress. Obasanjo wanted the debt deal resolved during the G-8 summit to be held from July 6-8, 2005, in Gleneagles, Scotland.[282] In April 2004, a Nigerian delegation met with U.S. Rep. John Boozman (R-AZ), Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL), Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA), Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN), Rep. Diane Watson (D-CA), Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-CA), Sen. Christopher Smith (R-NJ), Rep. Gregory Weeks (D-NY), Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA), Rep. Thomas Tancredo (R-CO), Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ), and Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA).[283] During his meeting with the Nigerian delegation, Rep. Tancredo emphasized what had been Obasanjo's strategy so far: He promised to make a strong case for the United States to cancel Nigeria's debt if Nigeria took the lead on the Darfur crisis.[284] Rep. McCollum and Rep. Royce, instead, brought up a different issue: Charles Taylor—the former Liberian president, who lived in exile in Nigeria and who had been indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on seventeen counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. [285]

Charles Taylor

The Charles Taylor issue was a delicate one for Obasanjo. Obasanjo had personally guaranteed Taylor safety from arrest and international prosecution when he still was the *de facto* president of Liberia. In return, Taylor had agreed to give up the Liberian

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[282] Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, "Report on Campaign for Debt Relief", 2005. Available from <http://www.dmo.gov.ng/oci/senreprt/docs/Senate%20Report%20of%20the%20Campaign%20for%20Debt%20Relief.pdf.> Accessed 24 May 2012.

[283] Ibid.

[284] Ibid.

[285] The same week that the delegation was visiting Washington, D.C., Congress had passed a resolution calling on Nigeria to turn Charles Taylor over to the International War Crimes Tribunal. The United States was also offering a US $2 million reward for Taylor's capture.

presidency, leave Liberia for Nigeria, and formally allow the Liberian war to come to an end.[286] Obasanjo did not want to backtrack on his promise to Taylor. "Nothing should be done to erode the credibility of Nigeria," Obasanjo staunchly declared during his May 5, 2005, visit to the White House, "if I renege on the asylum agreement 'nobody will respect us.'"[287]

Because Obasanjo did not want to move on the Charles Taylor issue, he had to put all his eggs in one basket: Darfur. On May 5, 2005, Obasanjo again met with President Bush, only weeks before the G-8 summit. The meeting focused on debt relief and Darfur. McClellan, the White House spokesman, summarized the conversation as follows: "The President thanked [Obasanjo] for his strong leadership in Darfur and talked about the importance of resolving the situation in Sudan." In addition, Obasanjo raised the question of debt relief for Nigeria, asking Bush to "use his good offices" to press the issue with his European counterparts.[288]

On June 30, 2005, Obasanjo carried the day. The Paris Club agreed to a 60 percent reduction of Nigeria's debt. The official agreement was signed in Paris on October 26, 2005. A bilateral U.S.-Nigerian agreement followed on December 17, 2005. The United States government and the White House in particular played crucial roles in the final negotiations. U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Robert Campbell writes: "Despite rancorous disagreements among the involved agencies, the White House imposed an interagency policy in support of debt relief for Nigeria."[289]

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[286] Hayner 2007.

[287] Nigerian leader says he won't turn Taylor over for trial, *The Washington Post*, May 6, 2005.

[288] Ibid.

[289] Campbell 2011, 19.

In response to the debt relief agreement, Nigeria changed its military rotation policy to cope with the new demands of a Nigerian deployment to Darfur. As mentioned earlier, Nigeria's military was heavily overstretched. Nigerian troops would normally rotate every six months, with six months in the field, six months to rest and train. The new rotation policy entailed that troops stationed in Liberia and Sierra Leone would stay for one-year instead. This change freed a substantive number of troops for deployment to Darfur.[290] Nevertheless, Martin Luther Agwai recalls that the demands on Nigeria troops were still immense: "Some soldiers came back from Sierra Leone or Liberia and were sent straight to the Plateau State or the Niger Delta with no rest in between."[291]

4.2.3. INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING

As mentioned earlier, in August 2004 Nigeria had agreed to send 150 troops with the nascent African Union force to Darfur (AMIS). The AMIS force soon proved to be inefficient and, in October 2004 Nigeria was asked to send an additional 680 troops.[292] Nigerian General Festus Okonkwo was also appointed to head the AMIS operation. Another major increase in the number of Nigerian troops followed in July 2005, when Nigeria agreed to send an additional battalion to Sudan.[293] All together, by the time the debt deal was about to be finalized, Nigeria had deployed three infantry battalions to AMIS, or roughly 2,040

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[290] Author's interview with General Pennap, Abuja, May 2012; There are also rumors that Obasanjo resolved the controversial dispute with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in an attempt to get troops out of Bakassi and into Darfur.

[291] Agwai, interview with author.

[292] The October 2004 deployment proved to be highly problematic. As mentioned earlier, the Nigeria military was skeptical of the Darfur deployment. Nevertheless, Obasanjo ordered the deployment without even consulting the Chief of Defense Staff, General Ogomudia. This resulted in a stand-off between the government and the military. The United States had offered to provide airlift for the Nigerian troops. When the U.S. air force team asked to survey Nigerian airports from which to carry the Nigerian troops, Nigerian military authorities refused any communication and would not give diplomatic clearance to U.S. planes to land and pick up the troops. The Nigerian air force made it clear that it wanted to airlift its troops itself and, rather than the U.S. providing airlift, it should help Nigeria whip Nigerian C-130s transport aircraft back into shape. U.S. planes were allowed to pick up the Nigerian soldiers only after tense last-minute negotiations.

[293] O'Neill and Cassis 2005, 63.

troops.[294] All these troops were re-hatted when AMIS converted into UNAMID over the course of 2007. With the debt deal concluded, why did Nigeria stick to and even further increase its military commitment to Darfur?

Third Term

Once the debt deal was concluded, another topic took center stage on Obasanjo's agenda; he wanted to continue his tenure as Nigeria's President beyond 2007. This required a revision of the Nigerian constitution, which allowed only for two electoral terms, not three. By winter 2005, discussions around a "Third Term" were dominating talks in Abuja. Any constitutional revision had to pass both houses of the Nigerian parliament, and lawmakers were put under pressure from the presidency to endorse a constitutional amendment.[295] Obasanjo knew that U.S. and other Western acquiescence would very much increase the viability of his plan.

For the United States, "Third Term" posed a significant dilemma. Close collaboration with Nigeria on Darfur was an essential U.S. national interest.[296] As a result, Obasanjo was again invited to the White House on March 29, 2006, despite the rumors circulating in Abuja.[297] In late April 2006, the U.S. embassy in Abuja nevertheless took a stand against

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[294] Eric Wong (AF/SPG) to Brian Schmitt (AF/SPG) and Kendra Gaither (AF/S), "Follow up HIRC briefing materials [AMIS TCC info for A/S Frazer testimony]," email, 18 May 2006, Darfur Collection, box 1, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington D.C.

[295] Campbell 2011, 88-89.

[296] Campbell 2011, 93.

[297] Campbell (2011, 130-131) reports that Obasanjo's visit to Washington in May 2006 also solved the Charles Taylor issue. The weekend before Obasanjo's visit, Nigerians had removed Taylor's guards from his compound in Calabar. Two days later, the night of Obasanjo's departure, Taylor fled. The Bush administration and members of Congress were furious, and upon his arrival in Washington Obasanjo learned that a scheduled meeting between the two presidents was in jeopardy. A few hours later, Taylor was apprehended in Northern Nigeria and was later turned over by the Nigerians to the Special Court. The meeting of the two presidents went forward. However, Obasanjo remained deeply angry at the American officials in Washington who had pressured him to recapture Taylor, seemingly as a condition for a presidential meeting.

"Third Term," issuing a statement affirming that "executive term limits should be respected."[298]

A few weeks later, on May 17, the Nigerian Parliament officially rejected the constitutional change.[299] For a while Obasanjo thought he could salvage his authority by implementing Plan B, namely, being elected chairman of the governing party's Board of Trustees for life and thereby retaining much of the substance of presidential power.[300] In December 2006 Obasanjo imposed his choice for presidential candidate, Umaru Yar'Adua, an obscure Northern governor in ill health, on the ruling party PDP.[301] On Election Day, April 14, 2007, it was announced that Yar'Adua had won the elections with 24 million votes—a ridiculously high number of votes in an election in which international and domestic observers all estimated total turnout of no more than 14 million.[302] Given the undeniable election fraud, Washington refused to receive the newly elected Yar'Adua, and only low-level representatives were sent to his inauguration.[303] Nigeria's response to this snub was immediate. In June 2007, Nigeria rejected another U.S. request to send troops, this time not to Darfur, but to the African Union mission in Somalia. In October 2007, the Nigerian government also initiated an official review of its peacekeeping efforts in Darfur—a decision which was meant to serve as a signal to the United States that Nigeria was considering withdrawing from Darfur.[304]

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[298] Nigeria; US warns against 3rd term, *Africa News*, 1 May 2006.

[299] The Right Thing in Nigeria, *The International Herald Tribune*, 19 May 2006.

[300] Campbell 2011, 95.

[301] Campbell 2011, 98.

[302] Campbell 2011, 105.

[303] Campbell 2011, 110.

[304] Nigeria reportedly reviews Darfur peacekeeping role over troop safety concerns, *BBC Monitoring Africa*, October 30, 2007.

U.S.-Nigerian Reconciliation

The "pause," as U.S. State Department official called the Nigerian–U.S. stand-off after the April 2007 elections, did not last very long. Already in June 2007, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, emphasized Nigeria's continuing importance to the United States in her testimony to Congress:

> The stakes are too great to walk away from Nigeria . . . Nigeria remains vitally important to U.S. security, democracy, trade, and energy policy needs and objectives. Its government remains one of our most dependable allies on the continent on a wide array of diplomatic initiatives such as Darfur, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, and HIV/AIDS.[305]

On December 12, 2007, Yar'Adua was invited to the White House. To no surprise, the lingering Darfur Crisis again dominated the bilateral talks. In the end, Nigeria agreed to deploy a fourth battalion to Darfur.[306]

4.3. BARGAINING ANALYSIS 2: Failed Force Generation Negotiations USA-Ukraine

By mid-2007, the key UNAMID force structure was in place. Nevertheless, UNAMID was lacking strategic assets, such as helicopters and other transport vehicles, which limited UNAMID's force projection. Sudan had rejected potential TCCs which could have provided such assets.[307] The U.S. State Department recommended Ukraine to fill the gaps. This section traces the reasons for the failure of force generation negotiations between the United States and Ukraine.

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[305] State Department Archive Press Release. Available from <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/86195.htm> Accessed 2 August 2012.

[306] All four battalions were funded by the United States.

[307] UNAMID Deployment on the Brink.

4.3.1. UKRAINE'S PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

When the urgency of aviation assets for UNAMID became apparent, various State Department officials immediately thought of Ukraine to fill the void. The key rationale behind this thinking was that Ukraine was one of the very few countries in the world that possessed a significant number of transport helicopters. More importantly, the United States maintained a very close relationship with the Ukrainian President, Yushchenko. In 2004 the United States had supported Yushchenko during the "Orange Revolution" against his opponent Viktor Yanukovych.[308] In simplistic terms, Yanukovych represented the "old Ukrainian guard." He was a pro-Russian western-skeptic who relied on the support of Ukraine's oligarchic clans. Conversely, Yushchenko was a pro-reform, pro-western figure. After the "Orange Revolution," the United States poured money into Ukraine to help reform government institutions as well as Ukraine's economic system. The United States was instrumental in Ukraine's joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in May 2008, and had also lobbied hard to get Ukraine into NATO.[309]

Nevertheless, in early 2008, when Ukraine was approached by the United States to support UNAMID, the Ukrainian government was a broken institution. On March 26, 2006, Ukraine had held parliamentary elections, which were won by Yanukovych's party, the "Party of the Regions," and Yushchenko was forced to appoint Yanukovych as Ukraine's Prime Minister. Yanukovych openly defied Yushchenko, refusing to implement Yushchenko's presidential decrees. On April 2, 2007, Yushchenko dissolved the Ukrainian parliament and announced new elections. The results, however, did not depart significantly from the March 2006 elections. Still, Yushchenko was able to appoint Yuliya Tymoshenko,

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[308] CRS Report for Congress, "Ukraine: Current issues and U.S. Policy," 10 September 2008, 12.

[309] Ibid.

a less conservative Ukrainian politician, as the new Prime Minister, although her government clearly depended on a razor-thin majority.

Ukraine's unidimensional preferences regarding Darfur

The strongest preferences in favor of a Ukrainian participation in UNAMID emanated from the Ukrainian presidency. As mentioned earlier, President Yushchenko had put integration into the global economic and Euro-Atlantic institutions at the center of Ukraine's foreign policy.[310] He wanted Ukraine to join the European Union and NATO. As a result, he perceived Darfur as a good opportunity to show his attachment to human rights and humanitarian values. Other forces outside the presidency saw, however, little value in a Darfur deployment. Ukrainian NGOs paid little to no attention to the Darfur conflict, while the Ukrainian military was indifferent with regard to Darfur. It certainly had the necessary troops and equipment available, but it did not view Darfur as an especially interesting military deployment opportunity. Nor was it particularly enticed by the financial incentives the UN provided.

Ukraine's multidimensional preferences regarding Darfur

Ukraine's key preoccupation in 2008 was the overheating of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine suffered from excessive inflation amounting to over 30 percent, high short-term external debt relative to reserves and high exposure of banks to foreign funding.[311] It was feared that soon the Ukrainian banking system would collapse. As a result, Ukraine appealed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an emergency loan. To the dismay of the Ukrainian government, the IMF insisted on attaching stringent conditions to the

[310] Author's interview with Bill Taylor, Washington, D.C., July 2012.

[311] IMF Approves US $16.4 billion stand-by Arrangement for Ukraine, *IMF Press Release No. 08/271*, 5 November 2008.

loan, such as further reform of the Ukrainian economy, in particular, the liberalization of gas prices, which so far had been kept artificially low. On several occasions, Ukrainian government officials appealed to the United States to put a word in for Ukraine to abate IMF conditionality.[312]

4.3.2. DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING FAILURE

President Bush visited Kiev on April 1, 2008. He raised the Darfur issue with President Yushchenko himself. Yushchenko's hands were, however, tied. Any Ukrainian foreign military deployment required approval by the Ukrainian parliament, which in all likelihood would oppose a deployment to Darfur. Indeed, the "Party of the Regions" and the communists had just ended a blockage of the Ukrainian parliament in response of a letter that Prime Minister Tymoshenko, President Yushchenko, and Parliament Speaker Arsenyi Yatsenyuk had sent to NATO requesting a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine.[313] Both parties were strongly opposed to a MAP. Yanukovych himself had threatened to hold public demonstrations against the government's request for a MAP.[314] As expected, the Parliament voted against a Ukrainian deployment to Darfur, and thus U.S.-Ukraine negotiations on Darfur ended.

4.4. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

The narrative above provides detailed observations on the dynamics of the UNAMID force generation process. The most striking features of the UNAMID case study are the following:

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[312] Taylor, interview with author.

[313] CRS Report for Congress, "Ukraine: Current issues and U.S. Policy", 10 September 2008, 7.

[314] The parliament had only resumed operations after it passed a resolution stating that the parliament would consider legislation to join NATO only after a public referendum approved NATO membership.

1) **Heterogeneous preference intensities:** The Save Darfur Coalition was at the origin of U.S. policy on Darfur. No other country in the world experienced a similar amount of societal pressure. As a result, preference intensities among coalition members were heterogeneous.

2) **Domestic institutional opposition as cooperation impetus:** Simultaneous deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan made the U.S. military reluctant to intervene in Darfur. As a result, the U.S. government "outsourced" the operation to the United Nations.

3) **Institutional ties minimize search costs:** The United States systematically approached potential troop contributors based on previously acquired information. The POL-MIL Bureau relied on information acquired through the ACOTA and GPOI programs while the Africa Bureau made use of its diplomatic access points in African countries. This allowed the United States to minimize search costs.

4) **Institutional ties minimize domestic adjustment costs:** Nigeria's participation in UNAMID is most likely the result of U.S. support for Nigeria's debt relief. It is unlikely that Nigeria would have participated in UNAMID otherwise, given its military overstretch. The preexisting institutional ties allowed the United States to minimize domestic adjustment costs. It would have been politically much harder to create a new budget line to fund an equivalent amount of aid for Nigeria. In addition, President Obasanjo most likely could have sealed the debt deal by transferring Charles Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, he considered such a move too costly domestically, preferring to step up Nigeria's commitment to Darfur. Obasanjo was thus also able to minimize his domestic adjustment costs.

5) **Political stalemate in Ukraine prevents linkage-bargain:** Ukraine's government was deeply divided between a pro-western Presidency and an anti-western Parliament. Given that the parliament had to approve any Ukrainian foreign deployments, it had the power to prevent the conclusion of any side-deal bargain.

6) **Incomplete contracting is limited by breadth of institutional network:** Nigeria had an interest in reneging on its troop commitment once the debt deal had passed. Nevertheless, Obasanjo's need to gain U.S. acquiescence for his "Third Term" most likely prevented Nigeria's defection from the deployment agreement.

The specific empirical observations per dimensions are as follows:

4.4.1. PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

The United States faced two different sources of domestic societal pressure on Darfur. President Bush's initial interest in Sudan originated from pressure by the American evangelical community, African-American associations, humanitarian NGOs, and business lobbies. Colin Powell's statement that the events in Darfur constituted "genocide" then triggered the creation of a mass movement, the Save Darfur Coalition.

No other country experienced the same domestic pressures regarding Darfur as the United States. Although European countries did fund a significant share of the peace initiatives, their contributions were often the result of U.S. prodding.[315] The exceptions were arguably Norway and the UK. Nevertheless, the degree of societal mobilization in the latter two countries was in no way comparable to that of the United States.

4.4.2. COOPERATION IMPETUS

While the Save Darfur Coalition was swelling to unprecedented proportions, the White House looked at the possibility of a unilateral U.S. intervention in Darfur. In contrast to Iraq, there were no domestic legitimacy concerns. Nevertheless, the Pentagon was very unenthusiastic about the idea. Its key preoccupations during 2004-2007 were Iraq and Afghanistan. Darfur was considered a conflict in which U.S. national interests were not involved. The Bush White House was not willing to pick a fight with the Pentagon over

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[315] Secretary of State to Embassy Berlin, Brussels, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Stockholm, "Démarche request: Need for increased donor response to Darfur crisis," cable 886891, 28 September 2004, Darfur Collection, box 1, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.

Embassy Lisbon to Secretary of State, "Portugal: support for draft resolution on crisis in Darfur," cable 001097, 9 July 2004, Darfur Collection, box 1, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.; William Brenick to the Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs, "Your meeting with EU Special Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto," memorandum, 6 April 2006, Darfur Collection, box 1, The National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, D.C.

Darfur, so it looked first to the AU, then to NATO, and finally to the UN to outsource the operation.

4.4.3. SEARCH PROCESS

The United States government made systematic use of its institutional connections to search for UNAMID participants. The United States was constrained in its search to African countries or countries "vetted" by Al-Bashir. The U.S. search process was run by the Department of State's POL-MIL and Africa Bureaus. The POL-MIL Bureau was in charge of gathering information on military capabilities. It used its ACOTA and GPOI connections to collect appropriate information on potential TCCs. The Africa Bureau, instead, looked at political variables and used its embassy network to collect data. The United States also asked UNDPKO for help with identifying potential TCCs. UNDPKO thus acted as a "cooperation broker." On the whole, by using institutional ties and the UNDPKO, the U.S. government was able to minimize search costs.

It appears that most participants were approached by the United States first, not vice-versa—rejecting the idea of a "peacekeeping auction." In addition, there is no evidence that the United States solely relied on "vulnerability" considerations when selecting bargaining candidates. Nevertheless, development and military aid metrics were certainly included in the information gathered by the State Department on potential participants. These metrics thus formed part of the data that the State Department used to approximate potential TCCs' preference structures although they were not decisive.

4.4.4. BARGAINING WITH NIGERIA

Without a doubt Nigeria had national interests involved in Darfur. Obasanjo wanted to prove Nigeria's status as regional hegemon by resolving a major African conflict. In

addition, the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups maintained important ties with the "African" Darfurians, who were partly the victims of Al-Bashir's ethnic cleansing campaign. Nevertheless, during 2004-2007, the Nigerian military was heavily overextended. In addition, the Nigerian public was very critical of Nigerian foreign military deployments in light of the extremely costly interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia during the 1990s. Given its domestic preferences regarding Darfur, it is likely that Nigeria would have sent a small military continent to Darfur without any external incentivizing. However, the deployment of over 3,000 troops and the related necessary changes in Nigerian military rotation policy can only be understood in the light of the parallel debt negotiations. Obasanjo's "pay-back time speech" on September 16, 2004, and his letter to President Bush dated December 9, 2004, provide considerable evidence for this argument. The debt deal helped the U.S. government minimize domestic adjustment costs. Creating a budget line of the equivalent amount of money (US$ 600 million) or shifting pre-assigned budget lines to fund a Nigerian deployment would have caused more domestic opposition either in Congress, USAID, the State Department, or the Department of Defense.

During the debt negotiations, members of Congress asked Obasanjo to extradite Charles Taylor. Obasanjo, however, vehemently objected to such a "side-deal." He feared for his credibility domestically and in Africa as a whole. Instead, he decided to step up his engagement in Darfur. This "payment flexibility" increased the likelihood of a successful side-deal bargain between the United States and Nigeria. As a result, institutional connectedness allowed not only the United States but also Obasanjo to minimize domestic adjustment costs.

During my extensive empirical research, I found no evidence that Nigeria was at any point coerced into cooperation, or that it "volunteered" to deploy 3,000 troops to Darfur.

4.4.5. BARGAINING WITH UKRAINE

When the United States approached Ukraine to provide aviation assets for UNAMID, Ukraine's government was deeply divided between a pro-western Presidency and an anti-western Parliament. Given that the parliament had to approve any Ukrainian foreign military deployments, it had the power to prevent the conclusion of a potential side-deal bargain regarding an IMF emergency loan. I argue that the Parliament thwarted the side-deal because it would have indirectly strengthened the President's power over the Parliament – a move major factions in the parliament, in particular, the Party of Regions considered domestically too costly. This is the most plausible explanation for the failure of force generation negotiations between the United States and Ukraine.

There is no empirical evidence that negotiations failed because of "technical issues" (e.g., differences over intervention strategies) or because Ukraine did not have the necessary troops and equipment available. Moreover, there is no evidence that Ukraine refused to participate because it doubted U.S. coercive capacities.

4.4.6. INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING

Given the increasingly volatile domestic security situation in Nigeria, the Nigerian government had an interest in defecting from its troop commitment to Darfur once the debt deal was concluded. Interestingly, no defection occurred. On the contrary, Nigeria further increased its troop commitment. The most plausible explanation for this development is Obasanjo's need for U.S. acquiescence to his "Third Term" plan. In fact, once the U.S. had openly criticized Obasanjo for manipulating the Nigerian democratic system, Obasanjo threatened to withdraw from Darfur. His threats were taken very seriously by the U.S. government, which quickly made an effort to bury the hatchet.

Again, there is no evidence that the United States used coercive threats to force Nigeria to stay in Darfur. The United States arguably needed Nigeria very much, and it was clearly too risky to anger the Nigerian government any further.

4.5. CONCLUSION

The UNAMID case study provides critical evidence for the *Market Model* described in Chapter One. The empirical observations of the case study coincide best with the expectation of the *Market Model* in at least three of the five dimensions described in Chapter Two: (1) the preference structure underpinning the UNAMID security coalition; (2) the cooperation impetus of the *Lead Nation;* and (3) the search strategy of the *Lead Nation.* My findings regarding dimensions four (bargaining determinants) and five (incomplete contracting) are limited to only two instances of force generation negotiations: United States-Nigeria and United State – Ukraine. I am aware that by studying only two instances of negotiations, I cannot generalize to all other instances of UNAMID force generation negotiations. As a result, I consider both Nigeria and Ukraine as illustrative cases.

UNAMID was a UN peace operation mounted by the United States. There are many factors that make the United States a particular lead nation and the UN a particular umbrella organization. As a result, to maximize case variation and further increase the breath of empirical observations, the next chapter will look at INTERFET—an *ad hoc* security operation led by Australia.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN INTERFET

The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was an *ad hoc* security operation involving approximately 11,000 troops. Its core mandate was to restore peace and security in East Timor following the break-out of violence after a UN-held referendum on East Timorese independence from Indonesia. The UN Security Council authorized the operation by UN Resolution 1264 on September 15, 1999. Operations were launched on September 20, 1999, and lasted until February 28, 2000, when a UN follow-on force (UNTAET) took over from INTERFET. The following countries participated in the operation: Australia (5,500 troops), Thailand (1,580 personnel), the Philippines (600 troops), Jordan (700 troops), Italy (600 military personnel), Canada (600 troops), France (500 troops), New Zealand (500 troops), South Korea (400 troops), United Kingdom (270 troops), Singapore (medical detachment of 254 personnel), United States (200 troops and logistics support), Fiji (191 troops), Germany (medical unit of 100 personnel), Kenya (100 troops), Argentina (50 troops), Brazil (50 military personnel), and token contributions from Denmark, Norway, Egypt, Malaysia, Mozambique, Singapore, and Sweden.[316]

5.1. CAUSAL PROCESS ANALYSIS: Australia waging intervention in East Timor

This section takes the perspective of the lead nation of INTERFET: Australia. It examines (1) the factors driving Australia to launch an intervention in East Timor; (2) Australia's motivations to multilateralize the intervention; and (3) the strategy Australia pursued to bring additional countries on board with INTERFET.

[316] Dupont 2000, 167.

5.1.1. OVERALL PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

Australia showed without a doubt the strongest preference intensity for launching INTERFET and thus stands out at INTERFET's *Lead Nation*. As we will see in more detail later on, Australia was a key player in the run-up to the UN-held referendum on East Timorese independence from Indonesia. Once the prospect of potential military intervention in East Timor became apparent, Australia took the lead in rallying support for an intervention at the United Nations in New York. In March 1999, six months before the referendum, Australia dispatched a military officer to New York to make sure that the United Peacekeeping Department (UNDPKO) had its eyes set on East Timor.[317] Once the decision to intervene was taken, Australia led the force generation process. Prime Minister Howard himself contacted potential troop contributing countries (TCCs) to request troop contingents. At the United Nations, Australia asked the United Kingdom and the United States—both permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to help draft UN resolutions pertaining to East Timor.[318] Australia contributed over two-thirds of INTERFET troops and spent between US$ 420-481 million on the INTERFET intervention.[319]

Figure 5.1 below shows the variation in countries' revealed interests through UN statements on East Timor. Apart from the U.K. and the U.S., which served as Australia's spokespersons at the United Nations, Portugal also manifested intense interest in the East Timor crisis.[320] Nevertheless, due to its patent anti-Indonesia bias, it was largely sidelined

[317] Author's interview with high ranking Australian military official, Canberra, November 2011.


[318] Coleman 2007, 267.

[319] Coleman 2007, 255.

[320] Ibid.

in the set-up of INTERFET.[321] China took a skeptical stance on the East Timor intervention at the UN criticizing Australia for interfering in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Finally, France showed interest in the East Timor because it wanted to prove its status as *Pacific Power*.[322]

Figure 5.1: UN Speech Record Evaluation East Timor



Lead Nation Preference Formation Process

East Timor forms part of the Indonesian archipelago northwest of Australia. It was colonized by Portugal in the sixteenth century. Following Portugal's Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974, the Portuguese abandoned the island, and civil war broke out between the communist *Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor* (Fretilin) and the right-wing *Timorese Democratic Union* (UDT). Fearful of the rise of a potentially communist

[321] Author's interview with high-ranking Australian military official, Goulburn, December 2011.

[322] Author's interview with high-ranking French military official, Paris, February 2011.

neighboring state, Indonesia's Suharto regime decided to intervene in the East Timorese civil war, invading the island in December 1975.[323] On July 17, 1976, it officially declared East Timor Indonesia's twenty-seventh province.[324] Most countries in the world refused to recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.[325] Australia was one of the exceptions. Its support for Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was arguably the most steadfast of all the nations in the world.[326] Given its geographic proximity, its wealth of resources and sheer demographic size, Indonesia occupied a special place in Australian politics.[327] In January of 1979, Canberra went as far as to extend *de jure* recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Indonesia had requested this step as a necessary prelude to Australian-Indonesian negotiations over the rights to exploit the oil and natural gas deposits in the *Timor Gap*—the seabed between northern Australia and the south coast of East Timor.

As the Cold War continued and Suharto's power grip strengthened in Indonesia and internationally, no country dared to challenge Indonesia's rule over East Timor. It was not until February 1997 that renewed criticism emerged. At this time, Kofi Annan, the newly elected UN Secretary General, appointed Ambassador Ramsheed Marker as his personal representative for East Timor.[328] Marker was mandated to revive the negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia over East Timorese independence which had been ongoing since the very beginning of Indonesian occupation of East Timor. The real turning point, however,

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[323] Durch 2006, 393.

[324] Ibid.

[325] The UN Security Council publicly opposed the invasion, and the territory's nominal status in the UN remained "non-self-governing territory under Portuguese administration."

[326] Nevins 2005, 62, Wheeler and Dunne 2001, 809.

[327] Chalk 2001, 1.

[328] Durch 2006, 394.

came with the Asian financial crisis of 1997. It had a disastrous effect on the Indonesian economy and acted as a catalyst for the fall of the Suharto regime. Suharto was replaced by his vice-president, B.J. Habibie. Soon after his appointment, B.J. Habibie indicated that Indonesia would be open to reconsider the status of East Timor. He envisaged a "special status" for the territory, which would entail autonomy in all areas of government except defense, foreign affairs and monetary policy.[329]

Core domestic forces behind Australia's policy toward East Timor

Habibie's announcement was received with particular interest by Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer. Downer's desire to get involved in the East Timor question was partly motivated by a personal yearning "to make Australia count in the world."[330] More importantly, however, Australian domestic politics over East Timor were increasingly beginning to unravel. In late 1997, Laurie Brereton, then the Australian Labor Party's spokesperson on foreign relations, had fractured the long-standing bipartisan consensus on East Timor, calling for the first time in Australia's history for a Timorese right of self-determination.[331] By 1998, Downer felt that, if he let the issue go, he and his party would lose the political upper hand on a potentially important domestic topic.[332]

The East Timorese question kept indeed engaged a curious coalition of left- and right-wing elements of Australian society. On the left side of the political spectrum, one would find labor organizations, human-rights NGOs, and other humanitarian societal groups. Given its brutal suppression of left-wing dissidents, labor organizations had long held intense

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[329] Durch 2006, 394; White 2008, 71.

[330] Author's interview with Hugh White, Canberra, November 2011; Downer had grown up in a diplomat family and had served his country as a diplomat before entering politics.

[331] Fernandes 2008, 84.

[332] Ibid.

suspicions of the Suharto Government. Humanitarian NGOs were shocked into action by the continuing political repression in East Timor, best exemplified by the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991.[333] On the right side of the spectrum was the Australian Catholic Church, which was chiefly motivated by concerns for its coreligionists in East Timor. Catholicism had been on a constant rise in East Timor—a fact on which the Australian Catholic Church prided itself. There were also Australian World War II veterans, who held a deep affection for the East Timorese people because of their generosity toward Australian soldiers fighting the Japanese in East Timor during World War II.[334] In addition, Australian business lobbies were getting worried: East Timor was becoming an economic problem for Indonesia internationally. Concerns about Indonesian human right violations in East Timor limited Indonesia's ability to get the international financial support it needed for its economic recovery after the Asian financial crisis, which had a direct impact on Australia's trade interests in Indonesia.[335] All those individual groups were helped in their endeavor to raise awareness by a small but very lively community of East Timorese refugees in Australia, headed by their charismatic leader José Ramos Horta.[336]

The Howard Letter

The prevailing domestic atmosphere led the Australian National Security Committee (NSC)—an inter-agency institution composed of key cabinet ministers—to discuss the East Timor question on December 1, 1998. Foreign Minister Downer took the lead in presenting the policy options available on East Timor. Under Downer's guidance, Australia's

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[333] Connery 2010, 50

[334] Howard 2010, 337

[335] White 2008, 70

[336] Kelly 2009, 488; Howard (2010, 337) writes that fears of public demonstrations in Australia had caused that no Indonesians president had visited Australia since 1975 while there had been 12 official visits by Australian prime ministers to Indonesia

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) had run a survey in East Timor proper and among the East Timorese expatriate community on how Habibie's idea of a "special status" was perceived. The results of the survey suggested that self-determination was still the preferred form of government for most of the survey participants. As a result, Howard and Downer decided to send a letter to Habibie urging him to include in his proposal "a future act of self-determination."[337] To be clear, Canberra remained entirely convinced that East Timor should remain part of Indonesia.[338] The promise of holding a referendum on self-determination some years down the line was merely viewed as a calming device—East Timorese hopes would not be completely shattered, and autonomy within Indonesia would not be perceived as totally definitive. And, "who knows," Canberra thought, "with enough time to do the necessary prep work, say over five to ten years, the East Timorese might quite well reject self-determination at the ballot-box."[339]

Habibie's reaction to the letter was distinctly negative. In an interview recorded years later, Habibie remembers his initial thoughts:

> Howard suggested that I have to solve East Timor as other friends have solved their *colonies* [said with emphasis], prepare them for 10 years or whatever and then after that give them their independence. So as I read that I was upset. It is *John Howard* [said with emphasis], who makes me make a quick decision![340]

In his indignation, Habibie decided to make a surprise announcement to hold an UN-monitored referendum in six months' time offering the Timorese the choice between

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[337] Howard 2010, 341.

[338] White 2008, 73.

[339] Author's interview with high-ranking Australian military official, Canberra, November 2011.

[340] The Howard Years, TV Documentary (6:30 minutes), available from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Yb8ioAGUgg.> Accessed 18 June 2012.

autonomy within Indonesia or independence.[341] If somebody wanted to order him around, well, this is what he got.

Habibie's proposal represented a genuine Indonesian foreign policy revolution. To Foreign Minister Downer and Prime Minister Howard, Habibie's announcement was completely unexpected. Its implications appeared daunting. A referendum in six months' time? What would happen if East Timor indeed voted in favor of independence? Certainly, Australia would end up with another impoverished and conflict-ridden country right at its doorstep. The most likely scenario was indeed a protracted violent struggle between pro- and anti-independence elements in East Timor itself.[342] The will for conflict on both sides was blatantly evident. On the one hand, Falantil, the guerilla arm of the Fretilin party, had been fighting a pro-independence insurgency campaign against Indonesia since 1975. On the other hand, the Indonesian Army (TNI) had sponsored the growth of a number of armed anti-independence militia groups. General Wiranto, then chief of the TNI, hinted that in the case of East Timorese independence the Indonesia military would not lay low: "We lost 8,000 of our men in East Timor," he told Chris Barrie, Australia's Joint Chief of Staff, at a meeting in Jakarta, "We cannot just pack up and leave now. This is an important issue."[343] Making things worse, Canberra feared it would bear the brunt of the blame if the situation indeed escalated. After all, it had been "the Howard Letter" that instigated B.J. Habibie to announce the referendum. As a result, Australian officials from the highest levels

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[341] Durch 2006, 395; White (2008, 73) reports that to this date it remains unclear to what extent Habibie's decision to hold a referendum was caused by Howard's letter. Habibie may well have been already contemplating fairly radical steps before he received it. He could presumably have reached that decision without Howard's intervention, but, according to White, some anecdotal evidence suggests that a re-reading of Howard's letter in late January provided the final spur.

[342] White, 2008, 75.

[343] Author's interview with Chris Barrie, Canberra, November 2011.

downwards felt an immense urge to contain any potential damage.[344] All over sudden, East Timor became *the* top foreign policy priority of the entire Australian government—it absolutely required a good ending so that Australia would not look bad.[345]

Contingency Planning

As a first move, the Howard government thought of getting a UN intervention force ready to intervene in case things fell apart in East Timor. To watch UN planning up close and ensure that UNDPKO would not get distracted by other conflicts, in March 1999 the Australian Government dispatched Brigadier Mike Smith to New York. "We thought the UN could need some Australian help," Chris Barrie told me, "and also somebody needed to watch Australian interests in the whole affair."[346] The Australian Government also envisaged that Mike Smith would serve as commander of the UN force; therefore, he needed to become acquainted with the UN machinery.[347] He was also told to make sure that other Australians would occupy key positions inside UNDPKO, in particular, with regards to the logistics and finances of a potential operation.[348]

In the meantime, the security situation on the ground in East Timor was growing increasingly violent. On April 6, 1999, anti-independence militias attacked a church compound in Liquica, killing at least thirty of the estimated 2,000 local people. In response, Prime Minister Howard arranged a meeting with Habibie to recommend deploying an international peacekeeping force to East Timor prior to the ballot. Habibie, however,

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[344] White, interview with author.

[345] Ibid.

[346] Barrie, interview with author.

[347] High-ranking Australian military official, interview with author.

[348] Ibid.

forcefully rejected Howard's suggestion.[349] "No, no, no," he told Howard, his position would become domestically "untenable" if he accepted such a force.[350] It would humiliate Indonesia and particularly the Indonesian military. Indonesia was well capable of taking care of the situation. Australia's contingency plans thus went again underground. In clandestine cooperation with the United Nations, Australia planned *Operation Spitfire*—an evacuation operation of all Australian, UN and other international personnel from East Timor if security collapsed during or after the ballot.[351]

The UN ballot and its aftermath

UNAMET, the UN mission to administer the East Timor ballot, deployed on June 11, 1999. It was a purely civilian mission in accordance with Habibie's wishes. The bulk of its personnel consisted of UN staff accompanied by a small police force of approximately 270 police officers. The East Timor ballot was held on August 30, 1999. It was a remarkable event. At 5:30 a.m., an hour before the polls were schedule to open, would-be voters, dressed in their best attire, were already waiting in long lines at the polling stations. By 2:30 p.m., most of the polling stations were empty; most people already had cast their votes. Those Timorese who had fled their villages and towns bravely returned to the places where they were registered to exercise their right to vote, then quickly returned to their places of refuge. Overall, an astonishing 98.6 percent of the East Timorese population participated in the ballot.[352] Five days later, on September 4, 1999, the results were announced; 78.5 percent voted for self-determination. Almost immediately after the announcement, the anti-independence militias unleashed a systematic campaign of terror. Extreme violence

[349] Durch 2006, 399.

[350] Kelly 2009, 498.

[351] White 2008, 80.

[352] Nevins 2005, 97.

erupted, with gunfire, houses set alight, and thousands of East Timorese fleeing into the hills. After only few days, most of the buildings, utilities, and agricultural infrastructure throughout the territory were destroyed; almost the entire population was displaced, with over 250,000 transported by the TNI or anti-independence militias to West Timor—the part of Timor that was still under Indonesian control.[353]

The unfolding events in East Timor attracted intense media attention in Australia. "It united the whole country," Chris Barrie remembers, "all calling upon the government to do something."[354] Australia's initial response was to mount *Operation Spitfire* and evacuate Australians, UNAMET staff, media and as well as almost 1,900 East Timorese.[355] It soon became apparent, however, that this was not enough. The real objective had changed to ending the brutal violence and stabilizing the security situation. Despite Australia's foresight and insistence, the UN was not yet ready to deploy a full-scale UN peacekeeping force. Instead, some form of interim force was needed to intervene in East Timor.[356] Internationally, Australia was perceived as the logical candidate to lead an *ad hoc* peace enforcement operation. The Howard government, however, shivered at the mere thought of such a scenario. Canberra was afraid, both militarily and politically.[357] Intervening in East Timor would mean going to war with Indonesia, without a doubt the most powerful player in South-East Asia; a country of over 200 million people, with an army of over 200,000 men, 25,000 of whom were stationed in East Timor.[358] Australia's Defense Force felt utterly ill-prepared for such an undertaking. The Australian Army could surely serve in a UN force,

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[353] Durch 2006, 407.

[354] Barrie, interview with author.

[355] Durch 2006, 407.

[356] White 2008, 82.

[357] Coleman 2007, 244-245.

[358] Barrie, interview with author.

but to lead a military operation itself under the security circumstances then reigning in East Timor?[359] Canberra thus turned toward the United States. In June 1999, the U.S. Military's Pacific Command (PACOM) had approached Australia regarding the possibility of a U.S. peace enforcement operation if things went wrong in East Timor.[360] As a result, Canberra assumed that the United States would be willing to take the lead on East Timor, with Australia serving as junior partner.

Getting the United States on Board

The initial U.S. reaction to the Australian proposal on East Timor turned out to be quite different than Australia had anticipated. "It's your baby," Bill Cohen, the U.S. Secretary of Defense allegedly told Howard following his initial request.[361] Cohen represented the dominant view in Washington, D.C., which portrayed Indonesia as of great strategic importance to the United States, while East Timor was of none at all: Indonesia was thought of as "a potential counterbalance to Chinese power in South-East Asia."[362] Moreover, the U.S. had important business interests in Indonesia and a strong desire to see Indonesia's democratic experiment succeed. If East Timor destabilized Indonesian democracy—or worse, precipitated the break-up of that ethnically, religiously and geographically diverse nation—the costs could be astronomical.[363]

Upon his second attempt, Howard was rebuffed by U.S. President Clinton himself. "We're very stretched," Clinton said, "there's a lot of resistance to us committing ourselves any

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[359] White 2008, 82.

[360] Fernandes 2008, 90.

[361] Connery 2010, 92; Kelly 2009, 508.

[362] Greenlees and Garran 2002, 240.

[363] Ibid.

further. We've got many thousands in Kosovo."[364] Clinton's decision to send U.S. troops to Kosovo had indeed cost him significant political capital on the Hill.[365] He was not willing to pick another fight with the U.S. Congress, where political opposition to an East Timor deployment ran deep. "We are carrying such a burden in the Balkans," Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson was quoted as saying, "now to talk about marching off to another area of the world where there is no clear threat to U.S. security interests is wrong."[366] Nevertheless, information on the violence reigning in East Timor soon widely spread among the general public, U.S. religious organizations and humanitarian NGOs.[367] In a flurry of days, U.S. agencies received tens of thousands of e-mail messages.[368] As a result, several Senators and members of Congress began to look at the issue. On September 8, 1999, U.S. Senators Leahy and Feingold introduced a bill obligating Washington to cut off all military assistance and block international loans to Jakarta.[369] Behind the scenes, Richard Holbrooke, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, also lobbied President Clinton to get involved. More importantly, however, President Clinton felt the heat of the international community. Australia was seriously taken aback by U.S. inaction regarding East Timor. "Whenever the Americans had been involved in a major operation, they had always turned to Australia seeking a contribution. We had been willing to make it," Prime Minister Howard argued.[370] "This was a violation of the ANZUS alliance.

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[364] Kelly 2009, 508.

[365] Blair 2011, 240. The eruption of East Timor crisis came the same day the White House was about to send legislation authorizing US$3.4 billion to cover the costs of the Kosovo deployment to a Republican-dominated Congress.

[366] Greenlees and Garran 2002, 240.

[367] Author's interview with Francesc Vendrell, Princeton, November 2011.

[368] Greenlees and Garran 2002, 245.

[369] Fernandes 2008, 94; Nevins 2005, 124.

[370] Howard 2010, 346.

Australia was being dumped."[371] Foreign Minister Downer made this message public, appearing on CNN on September 7, 1999, to criticize the Clinton administration.[372] The same day, Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres also made a bold move, forcing U.S. attention to turn to East Timor. He telephoned Clinton and threatened to pull Portuguese troops out of Kosovo if no peacekeeping forces were deployed. To make his point crystal clear, Guterres prevented sixteen U.S. military flights from departing the Portuguese airbase in the Azores islands.[373] Finally, the Clinton administration came around. A senior U.S. official described the U.S. U-turn on East Timor the following way: "We don't have a dog running in the East Timor race, but we have a very big dog running down there called Australia and we have to support it."[374]

As a first step, Clinton rang Howard to say the U.S. would make a "tangible contribution."[375] The U.S. would provide strategic airlift, intelligence support and logistics, and, most importantly, it would throw all its diplomatic clout behind Australia to make INTERFET happen, or what Prime Minister Howard called "an all-out diplomatic effort in support of what Australia wanted."[376] At the time, Australia's greatest but seemingly most unattainable desire was obtaining Indonesia's acquiescence to the deployment of a multinational force to East Timor.[377] On several occasions, Indonesia had made it clear—even after the post-ballot violence—that any international military operation would be considered an invasion. "If the Security Council deployed troops against Indonesia's

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[371] Kelly 2009, 508.

[372] Kelly 2009, 508; Howard 2010, 346.

[373] Nevins 2005, 125; Greenlees and Garran 2002, 246; Fernandes 2008, 94.

[374] Fernandes 2008, 94.

[375] Kelly 2009, 509.

[376] Howard 2010, 347.

[377] Howard, 2010, 347; White 2008, 82.

wishes," the Indonesian government announced, "they would be going as peace enforcers and would be met by the Indonesian armed forces."[378]

U.S. diplomatic leadership now changed all this. The United States pulled all diplomatic levers at its disposition to persuade Indonesia to acquiesce to INTERFET. The World Bank was instructed to freeze US$ 300 million that had been scheduled for disbursement to Indonesia the following week. The IMF was told to postpone a mission to Indonesia for discussions on its economic recovery program. That meant in essence that the IMF would not disburse some US$ 6 million as planned in mid-Sept 1999.[379] On the military level, the U.S. government dispatched Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen to Jakarta. He warned the Indonesians against allowing conflict to break out between the TNI and any UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force. He spoke of "serious economic consequences" in case of Indonesia's continued resistance to the intervention, also hinting that American forces were available to provide backup if necessary.[380] The latter move added an additional dimension of U.S. leadership support: strategic deterrence.[381] The U.S. made it clear to Indonesia that any attempt to oppose INTERFET would meet an overwhelming response.[382] The U.S. would be on Australia's side or, as Ashton Calvert, DFAT's political director, put it: "if you touch the Australians, the U.S. will come after you."[383] Admiral Dennis Blair, commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces in the Pacific, and General Hugh Shelton, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both informed the chief of the TNI, General Wiranto that all U.S.-

[378] DFAT 2001, 84; Australia also feared that without Indonesia's consent no UN Chapter VII mandate would pass the UN Security Council. For long, Indonesia had been a highly respected member of the non-aligned movement. A foreign intervention gave off the impression of being a "failed state"—a humiliating image that Indonesia refused to accept. Many of Indonesia's UN friends felt the same way.

[379] Robinson 2010, 196.

[380] Howard 2010, 346; Fernandes 2008, 94.

[381] Howard 2010, 346.

[382] White 2008, 83.

[383] Kelly 2009, 511.

Indonesian military ties were being suspended. At the same time, President Clinton publicly warned Indonesia that, "if [it] does not end the violence, it must invite—*it must invite*—the international community to assist in restoring security . . . it would be a pity if the Indonesian recovery were crashed by this."[384] Finally, in an emergency debate in the UN Security Council on September 12, 1999, U.S. ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke warned Indonesia that it faced "the point of no return in international relations" if it did not accept an international peacekeeping force.[385]

The immense pressure on Indonesia eventually produced results. On September 13, 1999, Habibie informed Annan that he would invite a peacekeeping force of "friendly nations" to East Timor.[386]

5.1.2. COOPERATION IMPETUS

The key Australian motivation to bring additional countries on board with INTERFET was to deter Indonesia from opposing the force—militarily and politically. As mentioned earlier, the Indonesian government had publicly threatened that any international military operation in East Timor would be considered an invasion, while the TNI had warned the Australian military leadership that it was not willing to leave East Timor voluntarily.[387] Many Indonesians also believed that Australia was seeking to humiliate Indonesia, demonstrate its own military prowess, and extend its dominion into the southern Indonesian archipelago.[388] Australia was thus understandably reluctant to intervene unilaterally, particularly given that there was a real risk that other Asian countries and,

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[384] Fernandes 2008, 94.

[385] Humiliation for Jakarta, *Australian Financial Review*, 13 September 1999.

[386] Edwards and Goldsworthy 2001, 249.

[387] DFAT 2001, 84.

[388] Coleman 2007, 258.

more specifically, other Asian Muslim countries, would side with Indonesia against an Australia-led intervention. In this regard, Australia indeed felt especially vulnerable, as it had been struggling for decades with a feeling of "cultural isolationism" as the region's sole western, white, and Christian country.[389] Australia therefore pursued a two-tracked deterrence strategy. First, Australia insisted on the United States joining the coalition to increase the military deterrent power of the force; second, Australia worked tirelessly to bring as many other Asian countries on board with the coalition to sooth claims that this was a "white neocolonial intervening force" or, even worse, a Christian crusade against Muslim Indonesia.[390]

On the former point, John Howard recalls the following:

> I wanted America involved. It was an instinctive reaction. U.S. involvement would send an implicit but clear deterrent signal to anyone in Jakarta who might have considered resisting the intervention force.[391]

On the latter point, Mike Keating, the head of military planning of Australia's East Timor intervention, remembers:

> If Australia would have gone in by herself, the Indonesians might have reacted differently but with twenty odd countries and a UN resolution, it would have been really difficult for them [Indonesia] to oppose the intervention.[392]

Interestingly, in contrast to many other security operations, the Australian government had no need to be concerned about legitimacy perceptions among its own domestic

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[389] Chalk 2001, 1.

[390] Ryan 2000, 54; Dupont 2000, 166; Greenlees and Garran 2002, 266.

[391] Howard 2010, 346.

[392] Keating, interview with author.

audience. The Australian domestic public favored intervention even more adamantly than its government.[393] Howard remembers,

> I was basically being attacked by everybody for not invading the place. I said you can't do that, you've got to get a United Nations mandate. It was elementary. It seems bizarre in the light of all the later comments that have been made about me and the United Nations.[394]

5.1.3. SEARCH PROCESS

In a telephone call on September 6, 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan formally asked Howard if Australia would be willing to lead an intervention in East Timor. Informal discussions on this topic had already been ongoing since the initial preparation of the UN ballot. Following Annan's call, Australia's search process for INTERFET participants took full speed. Howard himself took the lead in this process.[395] He recalls the period between September 6 and the start of the operation as one of practically living on the phone "in pursuit of both diplomatic and potential military assistance."[396] For reasons mentioned above, Canberra preferred recruiting Asian countries and, in particular, ASEAN member states as well as countries which had Muslim populations. In addition, countries with previous peacekeeping experiences and adequately trained militaries were preferred over countries lacking the latter. DFAT was requested to come up with a list of potential troop contributing countries (TCCs) that matched these criteria. DFAT officials were requested to inquire through the Australian embassy network which countries would be willing to

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[393] Coleman 2007, 257.

[394] Kelly 2009, 507; Howard refers to his commitment to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was not authorized by a UNSC resolution.

[395] Kelly 2009, 505-506.

[396] Howard 2000, 345.

participate and under what conditions.[397] Resident foreign embassies in Canberra were also approached with informal inquires about potential INTERFET participation. At the same time, the Australian military started to feel out its counterparts in Asia and around the world. It thereby tapped into the alumni networks of Australia's military academies, which had a long tradition of training foreign military elites.[398]

The initial reactions to Australian démarches were alarmingly negative. Most countries in the region feared that the separation of East Timor from Indonesia would worsen domestic political instability in Indonesia and might even lead to a complete disintegration of the archipelagic state, which could spill over into the entire region, thus jeopardizing political stability and economic growth for decades to come.[399] East Timor was also seen as setting a potential precedent for Western interference, using the norm of humanitarian intervention as justification, in the internal affairs of other Asian states.[400]

The APEC Summit in Auckland and the UN General Assembly in NYC

Roughly one week after Annan's official request to Australia to lead a multilateral force, heads of states of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) were scheduled to meet in Auckland for their yearly summit. An economic institution, APEC had never served as a forum to discuss political or security issues. Nevertheless, it became the decisive venue for Australia's coalition-building efforts. Australia's Foreign Minister Downer recalls: "I don't know what would have happened without this APEC meeting."[401] In fact, Prime Minister Howard was able to schedule bilateral meetings with APEC heads of states at the margins

[397] Connery 2010, 37.

[398] Connery 2010, 38.

[399] Dupont 2000, 164.

[400] Ibid.

[401] Kelly 2009, 509.

of the summit to make direct personal approaches regarding troop contributions. The whole process of scheduling meetings unfolded in a surprisingly *ad hoc* manner. Howard's assistants, who were with him in Auckland, contacted officers working at DFAT and the DOD in Canberra via facsimile to request with which countries Howard should confer. These officers suggested countries based on the information they had gathered through their diplomatic and military networks over the preceding weeks.[402] Howard gained numerous "in principle" promises of support in Auckland. Overall, Howard recalls the APEC meeting as "another example of how the occasion of international meetings provides the opportunity for leaders to resolve issues in separate 'corridor' discussions, often quite unrelated to the formal agenda of the meeting."[403]

On September 14, just one day after the APEC summit had ended in Auckland, the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) opened in New York. Prime Minister Howard was personally unable to go to New York. Foreign Minister Downer thus stepped in, and took full advantage of the opportunities this international gathering offered to lobby foreign governments for INTERFET support.[404] In New York, U.S. support also proved to be critical in bringing TCCs on board or, as one senior Australian official put it, "the fact that the Americans were committed to it meant that a whole lot of people put in forces which might not otherwise. Whenever the coalition started to look a bit shaky, somehow somebody talked to them and . . . people stopped wavering."[405]

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[402] Author's interview with high-ranking Australian military official, Melbourne, December 2011.

[403] Howard 2010, 347.

[404] Ryan 2000, 40.

[405] Coleman 2007, 253.

Recruitment trip through South-East Asia and parallel developments in Canberra

Immediately after the conclusion of the UNGA, the Vice-Chief of the Australian Defense Forces, Air Marchal Doug Riding, was tasked to go on a rapid tour of Southeast Asia and follow-up on the "in-principle agreements" reached by Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer in Auckland and New York. Riding and a team of three staff officers were mandated to conduct detailed discussions in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei. The visit started poorly when the Malaysian Government changed its mind about contributing to INTERFET, and Singapore offered a much smaller group than anticipated. However, Thailand and the Philippines stuck to their promises (for negotiation details see below).[406] Back in Canberra, two newly created institutions were put in charge to continue the negotiations initiated by Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer. Those institutions were the East Timor Policy Unit and the INTERFET Branch, both located in the Australian Department of Defense. Their mandate was, among other things, to negotiate the specific role, size, and deployment timing of foreign INTERFET contributions—in other words, the technical details of the deployments. Most officers working in both units had no previous experience with the technicalities of force generation negotiations and thus were surprised by the range of demands the countries were making. Most of the technical negotiations were conducted by military officials (note that the preceding "political" negotiations had been mostly between diplomats and/or ministers and heads of state). Military representatives of many of the developing countries arrived with laundry lists of equipment and other services they required from the Australians before any deployment would be conceivable. The requests included, among other things, military kits (weapons, ammunition, vehicles, clothing, sunglasses, etc.), other

[406] Connery 2010, 38.

random equipment such as refrigerators, strategic air and sea lifts, health services (e.g., health check-ups as well as health and disability insurance coverage).[407] In fact, despite requiring the contingents to be capable of being self-sufficient for a minimum of forty-two days, a large number of troops, bordering on the majority, arrived in Australia with "pretty much nothing."[408]

Financial Issues

To satisfy the latter requests, Australia sought to establish a UN trust fund. To emphasize the special role of the ASEAN contributors, Australia proposed that ASEAN countries would have first access to this fund. The Japanese soon indicated that they would be willing to contribute US$ 100 million to the fund.[409] Nevertheless, the money first had to be approved by the Diet. Australia stepped in and agreed to meet the initial deployment cost of the various detachments.[410] It also agreed to finance the entire Fiji and Philippines deployments.[411] Overall, Australia donated AU$ 3.5 million in equipment to developing country INTERFET members.[412]

5.2. BARGAINING ANALYSIS 1: Force Generation Negotiations Australia-Thailand

Thailand was the largest troop contributor to INTERFET after the *Lead Nation*, Australia, sending 1,580 service personnel to serve in INTERFET. This section traces in detail the Thai decision-making process regarding its INTERFET deployment. It examines why

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[407] Keating, interview with author.

[408] Ryan 2000, 107.

[409] Edwards and Goldsworthy 2001, 252.

[410] Ryan 2000, 43.

[411] Coleman 2007, 274.

[412] Coleman 2007, 275.

Thailand was chosen to participate in INTERFET, and how the bargaining process between Australia and Thailand unfolded.

5.2.1. THAILAND'S PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

Thailand's deployment of over 1,500 troops to East Timor constituted a domestic foreign policy revolution. Prior to East Timor, Thailand had never served in any international peacekeeping operation. The domestic preference structure with regards to the East Timor operation is quite complex.

Thailand's unidimensional preferences regarding East Timor

The most fervent domestic proponent of INTERFET participation was the Thai military, which saw in the East Timor intervention an opportunity to broaden its range of activities, strengthen its domestic legitimacy, and gain international exposure and financial resources. During the Thai democratization period, cumulating in 1997 with the promulgation of a new democratic constitution, the Thai military was forced to disengage from domestic political affairs. In November 1997, the newly democratically elected Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai even took the dramatic step of appointing himself as Defense Minister.[413] The imposed political disengagement was accompanied by severe defense budget cuts.[414] After decades of military rule, these were bitter pills to swallow. Many military officials felt unappreciated by society and that they had been relegated to "minor tasks."[415] Senior officers thus seized on East Timor as an opportunity to demonstrate that they were still capable of making meaningful contributions to a civilian-run government.

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[413] Ibid. This was only the second time in Thailand's history that a civilian had ever occupied this position.

[414] Phongpaichit 2002, 418.

[415] Phongpaichit 2002, 417.

The Thai civilian government under Prime Minister Chaun Leekpai was, however, much less enthusiastic about East Timor than the military. In fact, it was utterly divided over the question of a Thai deployment to East Timor. While Thailand's Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan quickly embraced the idea of Thailand's participation in INTERFET, other members of the Chuan administration feared that East Timor would cause the disintegration or "Balkanisation" of Indonesia.[416] This could have grave repercussions for Thailand, which was struggling with a potent Muslim separatist movement in its southern provinces.[417] In addition, many Thai officials were tied to ASEAN's doctrine of non-interference—in particular, the non-interference of Western powers in the region.[418] Moreover, they feared for Thailand's relationship with Indonesia. Thailand had important economic ties with Indonesia, the Southeast Asian economic behemoth. Bangkok was also aware that elements in Indonesian society, in particular the TNI, would perceive a Thai deployment as a mayor betrayal, with potentially fatal consequences for ASEAN. The Thai Deputy Foreign Minister, M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, summarized it the following way: "We have always said that we don't want other countries, especially the superpowers, to interfere in the region . . . The time has come to show that we can solve the region's problems ourselves."[419] Finally, and most importantly, Thailand was still in the midst of recovering from the Asian financial crisis, which had shattered its whole economic system.

Thailand's multidimensional preferences regarding East Timor

When the East Timor crisis escalated, Thailand's Prime Minister Chuan had only been in office for roughly one and a half years. His premiership had been entirely dominated by

[416] DFAT 2001, 141.

[417] Dupont 2000, 164.

[418] Edwards and Goldsworthy 2001, 251.

[419] Ryan 2000, 50-51.

efforts to contain the aftershocks of the Asian financial crisis, which had commenced on July 2, 1997, when the Bank of Thailand decided to float the Thai currency, the baht. In a matter of months the baht dramatically lost value, falling from 24.3 to the US dollar in June 1997 to 52.5 US dollars in January 1998. By the end of 1997, fifty-six Thai financial institutions had shut down. By the end of 1998, two million people had lost their jobs, and Thailand faced the worst recession in its history, with growth rates of -1.8 percent in 1997 and -10.2 percent in 1998.[420] During 1998, private consumption went down by -15 percent, public consumption by -4.9 percent, private investment by -45.8 percent, and public investment by -19.6 percent. Export growth was reduced by -6.4 percent and imports by -35.5 percent.[421]

Watching the Thai economy's brutal disintegration, the Thai business elites and the urban middle class soon demanded the removal of Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh.[422] In November 1997, Chavalit resigned, and a reshuffle of minor parties enabled Chuan Leekpai to come to power. Unsurprisingly, Chuan's key promise to his supporters was to better manage the unfolding crisis and restore the health of the Thai economy. He was assisted in this endeavor by some of Thailand's most famous economists, such as Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda and Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi.[423] During 1998 and 1999, Chaun spent his full attention and political capital on restoring Thailand's external balance, plugging capital outflows and reviving confidence in the baht.

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[420] Mishra 2010, 146.

[421] Chadchaidee 2002, 197.

[422] Phongpaichit 2002, 425.

[423] Chadchaidee 2002, 187.

5.2.2. DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING SUCCESS

In terms of military readiness, Thailand was Australia's third preferred choice. Australia had good military-to-military relations with Thailand. Many high-ranking Thai military officers had received military training in Australia (e.g., Thailand's Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, who was a graduate of the Australian Royal Military College, Duntroon, in Canberra).[424] Shortly before the escalation of the East Timor crisis, Australia had also conducted a military exercise with the Thai armed forces—the so-called Australian–Thai combined exercise "Chapel Gold".[425] Australia thus knew that Thailand would be able to do the job, although not as effectively as Singapore or Malaysia.

From a diplomatic viewpoint, however, Australia was aware that Thailand was in Australia's debt. Approximately a year prior to INTERFET, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Australia had provided a one billion dollar loan to Thailand.[426] This bilateral loan was disbursed alongside the IMF stand-by credit.[427] What is more, Australia was the sole Western nation lending to Thailand; the United States and Europe had proven to be very stingy in this regard.[428] In addition, just months prior to INTERFET, Australia had maintained staunch support for Thailand's candidate, Supachai Panitchpakdi, as the new head of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Supachai had been up against the New Zealander, Mike Moore. Australia had gone to great lengths to broker a deal under which Supachai and Moore would divide the WTO directorship, consequently angering not only its

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[424] Author's interview with Australian diplomat, Melbourne, December 2011.

[425] Ryan 2000, 50-51.

[426] Edwards and Goldsworthy 2003, 251.

[427] IMF approves stand-by credit for Thailand, Press Release, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm> Accessed 7 July 2012.

[428] Other pledges received were from Japan (US$4 billion), Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore (US$1 billion each), and Indonesia and Korea (US$0.5 billion each). Subsequently, China pledged US$1 billion, and the World Bank and Asian Development Bank announced contributions of US$1.5 billion and US$1.2 billion respectively.

closest neighbor, New Zealand, but also the United States, which much preferred Moore over Supachai.[429] The Howard government was aware that both diplomatic actions, the bilateral loan and support for Supachai, had generated considerable goodwill toward Australia in Thailand.[430] In addition, Thailand was looking toward Australia for further help with its economic recovery.[431]

Tying the Knots

The Thai official political decision to make a substantial troop commitment to INTERFET took place at the APEC summit in Auckland.[432] Both the Thai Prime Minister Chuan and his Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan attended the summit. Prime Minister Howard and also U.S. President Clinton, at Howard's request, met Prime Minister Chuan at the margins of the summit. The conversation between Prime Minister Howard and Prime Minister Chuan was dominated by financial issues. Chuan said that Thailand was willing to deploy to East Timor, but only if Thailand's deployment expenses would be defrayed.[433] Chuan made it clear that, given the dire economic situation in Thailand, Thailand was incapable of shouldering a military deployment to East Timor on its own. Prime Minister Howard assured him that there would be resources available—either directly from Australia or from the United Nations Trust Fund.[434] At Downer's request, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also arranged a bilateral meeting with the Thai Foreign Minister

[429] Author's interview with U.S. diplomat, Washington, D.C., March 2012.

[430] Dee 2001, 10.

[431] Australian diplomat, interview with author.

[432] Ryan 2000, 50.

[433] Cotton 2004, 126.

[434] Greenlees and Garran 2002, 268.

Surin Pitsuwan during the UN General Assembly in New York. Albright further assured Pitsuwan that Thailand's INTERFET deployment expenses would be defrayed.[435]

Following-up on the Thai promise

The Howard government sent Doug Riding, the Vice-Chief of the Australian Armed Forces, to Thailand to follow up on its troop promises. He arrived in Bangkok on September 16, 1999, and was cordially welcomed by about forty military and civilian officials in a banquet hall in Bangkok. At the meeting, Prime Minister Chuan solemnly declared that "Thailand has the honor to contribute 1,500 troops to INTERFET." The high number of troops came as a great surprise to Riding and his delegation. It appeared that the Thai military was influential in determining the precise size of Thailand's contribution. Because of its enthusiasm it had lobbied Chuan for a larger force than anyone had expected.[436] The second surprise was that the Thais declared that they would be ready to deploy the next day. Doug Riding then offered Thailand the Deputy Force Commander position of the INTERFET operation.[437] In the meantime, in Canberra, the INTERFET branch negotiated the technical details of the Thai deployment. The Thai ambassador to Australia insisted, in particular, on Australia covering, in addition to all other deployment expenses, the medical and disability insurances of the Thai troops.[438]

Goodwill generates Goodwill: Overhauling Thai-Australian Relations

In November 1999, Foreign Minister Downer traveled to Bangkok to come up with an agenda that would help Thailand get back on its feet. On Downer's agenda were treaties to

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[435] Thai premier defends decision to send troops to ET, *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 30 September 1999.

[436] Ryan 2000, 50; Edwards and Goldsworthy 2003, 251.

[437] Author's interview with Australian military official, Sydney, December 2011.

[438] High-ranking Australian military official, interview with author.

expand the Australian-Thai trade and investment relationship.[439] What followed was, in Downer's words, a complete overhaul of the Thai-Australian relations: "When I first visited Bangkok in 1996, the relationship bordered indifference. Now it was almost love." Australia and Thailand soon started negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA)—a development, which, according to Downer, followed from Thailand's engagement in East Timor.[440] It was Australia's third FTA ever negotiated. Overall, Thailand's engagement in East Timor triggered a radical change of Australia's perception of Thailand to the significant benefit of Thailand and, in particular, Thailand's economy.

5.3. BARGAINING ANALYSIS 2: Failed Force Generation Negotiations Australia-Malaysia

Malaysia was Australia's top choice to act as key troop contributor to INTERFET. Nevertheless, the negotiations failed, and Malaysia ended up sending only a few interpreters to the INTERFET staff headquarters. This section traces the reasons for the failure of the force generation negotiations between Australia and Malaysia.

5.3.1. MALAYSIA'S PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

When officials at the Australian Department of Defense first realized the importance of a substantive force contribution from regional partners, they immediately thought of Malaysia. As Figure 5.2 below illustrates, Australia had intensive institutional relations with Malaysia, including a military alliance—the Five Power Defense Arrangement.[441] In

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
[439] Author's interview with Alexander Downer, Adelaide, December 2011; FED—Downer to visit regional Interfet partners, *Australian Associated Press*, 12 November 1999.

[440] Downer, interview with author.

[441] This was a series of bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, signed in 1971. The agreements were negotiated when Great Britain terminated its defense guarantees to Malaysia and Singapore in the wake of the Suez withdrawal of 1967.

addition, Malaysia qualified best in military and other technical terms: Malaysia had a well trained and well equipped military force, it was a largely Muslim country, it understood Indonesia's native language, Bahassa, and it had a good United Nations peacekeeping record.[442] Similar to Thailand, however, the Malay government was split in its support for a deployment to East Timor.

Figure 5.2: Australia's Institutional Ties with ASEAN/ SE Asian Countries



Malaysia's unidimensional preferences regarding East Timor

The Malay military was highly in favor of deploying troops to East Timor.[443] Malaysia maintained extensive military-to-military relations with Australia. As mentioned above, both Australia and Malaysia were members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement, which foresaw Australia's operation of an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) based at the Malay airbase Butterworth. Outside military circles the mood was, however, very different. In 1999, Malaysia was governed by Dr. Mahatir—often considered "the father of modern Malaysia."[444] During his tenure, which lasted for twenty-two years, he relentlessly pushed for Malaysia's modernization and economic development, but also for discriminatory policies favoring ethnic Malay over all other Malaysians when it came to access to higher

[442] Barrie, interview with author; Author's interview with Bob Cotton, Canberra, December 2011.

[443] Cotton, interview with author.

[444] Malaysia fetes Father Mahathir, *The Telegraph*, 17 July 2001.

education, government jobs and other privileges. In foreign policy terms, Dr. Mahatir was a staunch advocate of the third world, anti-colonial and, arguably, anti-western. He was a strong supporter of ASEAN as an institution that united South-East Asian countries and protected them from foreign interference by the West. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Dr. Mahatir claimed that the western countries were rejoicing in and abusing Asian weakness.

Malaysia's multidimensional preferences regarding East Timor

In 1999, the Australian-Malay relationship was at an extreme low point. In December 1998, Prime Minister Howard had cancelled his visit to Kuala Lumpur at the last minute because, the day before he was due to arrive, Dr. Mahathir had severely criticized the U.S.-led air campaign against Iraqi targets (Operation Desert Fox), in which Australia was participating. Dr. Mahathir hated the idea that "white people were bombing Muslims."[445] The Australian Prime Minister's office let the Malay Government know that "operations in Iraq were overshadowing the visit and thus Howard would prefer to come at a later date."[446] More importantly, however, Australian-Malay relations were tainted by the so-called "Anwar Affair." Anwar Ibrahim had been Dr. Mahathir's closest political ally.[447] Toward the end of the 1990s, however, Anwar's relationship with Dr. Mahathir deteriorated.[448] In 1999, he was arrested for corruption and sodomy—most likely following Dr. Mahathir's orders. Australia was the first country to publicize and condemn the

[445] Cotton, interview with author.

[446] Ibid.

[447] Hwang 2003.

[448] Hwang (2003, 277-282) explains this development by pointing out that Dr. Mahathir feared Anwar as a political competitor. Anwar had also taken a different view on governance and had attacked Mahathir regarding the widespread culture of nepotism and cronyism within his administration and the ruling party.

arrest.[449] Dr Mahathir was furious about Australia's interference in his handling of the affair.

5.3.2. DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING FAILURE

The Anwar Affair was not yet over when the Howard government informally approached Malaysia regarding troop contributions. While the military leadership had sent positive signals to Australia early on and was ready to deploy, Dr. Mahathir rejected the request almost immediately. In his opinion, INTERFET would help Australia gain further influence in the region—a result he was loath to support. His anger against Australia was indeed so deep-seated that he even started to publicly lash out against Australia and the West more generally. He blamed them for the crisis in East Timor, alleging that President B.J. Habibie had been pressured to allow an act of self-determination, even though many East Timorese had reconciled themselves to integration with Indonesia. Dr. Mahathir also argued that it had been the worst time for Indonesia to make a decision concerning East Timor, because it was struggling to cope with the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and a switch to liberal democracy, a messy and difficult business even under optimum conditions. He also accused the West of hypocrisy for opposing Indonesia's occupation of East Timor while turning a blind eye to similar transgressions by other countries.[450]

Dr. Mahathir's decision to refuse to deploy troops to East Timor had a racial and vindictive element to it. It was largely a product of Australia's criticism of Dr. Mahathir's handling of his political opponent, Anwar Ibrahim. It had nothing to do with lacking military equipment and/or pressure from Indonesia or the United Nations—arguments which have

[449] Cotton, interview with author.

[450] Dupont 2000, 165; according to Edwards and Goldsworthy (2003, 251) the tensions rose so high that, Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan was sent to talk to Dr. Mahatir. The upshot was that Malaysia decided to contribute some thirty personnel, mainly interpreters, to the INTERFET advance force.

been advanced to explain Malaysia's refusal to participate in INTERFET.[451] The Australian ambassador to Malaysia at the time, Ambassador Bob Cotton, also recalls that Australia refrained from using direct or indirect political or economic threats on Malaysia to deploy troops, out of fear that Malaysia would leak the incidents to the press. "Political relations were at such a low point," Bob Cotton remembers, "that literally no political trust existed."[452]

5.4. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Drawing upon the narrative above, I suggest that the INTERFET case study provides further critical evidence to validate several assumptions of the *Market Model*.

1) **Heterogeneous preference intensities:** Preference intensities among INTERFET coalition members were heterogeneous. While Australia witnessed immense domestic mobilization which resulted in sharply defined preferences regarding the East Timor question, other coalition members, such as the United States and Thailand, were domestically split in their support for INTERFET.

2) **Deterrence concerns as cooperation impetus:** Australia's cooperation impetus was largely determined by deterrence concerns. While Australia was willing to shoulder the financial costs and did not need to be concerned about legitimacy perceptions of its own domestic audience, Australia shivered at the thought of unilaterally "invading" Indonesia.

3) **Institutional ties minimize search costs:** Australia systematically approached potential troop contributors based on previously acquired information. This allowed Australia to minimize search costs. All countries in the region with which Australia was the most institutionally connected ended up contributing troops to INTERFET.

4) **Goodwill account minimizes domestic adjustment costs:** Thailand's participation in INTERFET was most likely the result of Australia's support for Thailand during the Asian financial crisis and Thailand's WTO candidate,

[451] Cotton, interview with author.

[452] Ibid.

Supachai Panitchpakdi. It is unlikely that, given its grueling economic situation, Thailand would have participated in INTERFET otherwise. Because of its accumulated goodwill in Thailand, Australia did not have to incur any domestic adjustment costs to incentivize Thailand to join INTERFET.

5) **Bilateral "Badwill" determines negotiation failure:** Malaysia's president Dr. Mahathir was angry with Australia because of its behavior in the "Anwar Affair." Dr. Mahathir perceived the domestic political costs of a Malay participation in INTERFET too high because it might have given credit to Australia and thus indirectly strengthened Australia's stance on Anwar.

The specific empirical observations per dimension are as follows:

5.4.1. PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

Australia experienced different forms and sources of domestic societal pressure at the various stages of the East Timor crisis. During 1998, the East Timor issue was supported by a coalition of societal groups including the socialist left, the Catholic Church, humanitarian NGOs, WWII veterans, and Australian business groups. The serendipity of such domestic coalition formation brought about the Howard government's policy shift on East Timor. Once the *Howard Letter* had been received in Jakarta, forces inside the Australian government took over the lead in pushing the East Timor issue in an attempt to achieve "damage containment." Finally, once violence broke out on the island, domestic mass mobilization in Australia forced the Howard government to react.

Few other INTERFET coalition members appear to have felt an equally strong preference intensity regarding the East Timor crisis. The exception is certainly Portugal, which experienced unprecedented mass mobilization when the violence in East Timor erupted. France also appears to have participated in INTERFET because of domestic societal pressures. The French Catholic Church lobbied the French government to involve itself in

East Timor. In addition, the French military is said to have pushed for a French participation in INTERFET because it desired to demonstrate the utility of French military installations in the Pacific.[453] France thus dispatched from its navy base in New Caledonia a 500-troop-strong INTERFET force contribution. All other INTERFET participants, including the United States and Thailand, appear to have been less self-motivated by the East Timor crisis.

5.4.2. COOPERATION IMPETUS

Australia felt too politically insecure to undertake a unilateral intervention in East Timor. It was afraid that Indonesia would be able to criticize and even antagonize a coalition containing only "white" Australian forces. As a result, Australia went to great length to bring the United States, as well as other "non-western" countries on board with INTERFET. Mike Keating, the head of military planning for INTERFET, suggested in our interview that Australia's cooperation impetus was largely psychological: "Our boys could have done the job and in the end they largely did it by themselves."[454] However, Australia wanted political back-up. Interestingly, domestic legitimacy perceptions were of no concern to the Howard government, as the Australian public favored intervention more adamantly than its government.

5.4.3. SEARCH PROCESS

Australian made systematic use of its institutional connections to search for INTERFET participants. Australia had "quality constraints," insofar as it preferred to recruit Asian and, if possible, Muslim countries. In addition, Australia cared about the military

[453] High-ranking French military official, interview with author.

[454] Keating, interview with author.

capabilities of potential TCCs. The Howard government obtained information on potential TCCs' preferences structures through its embassy network and alumni ties of foreign Australian military academy graduates. DFAT then produced a list of countries whose heads of state Howard and Downer would approach during the APEC summit in Auckland and the UNGA in New York. Overall, this approach allowed the Howard government to minimize search costs. Howard's recruitment strategy proved quite successful. As Figure 5.2 above illustrated, those Southeast Asian states which were the most institutionally connected with Australia (New Zealand, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) all ended up contributing troops to INTERFET. The only exception is Japan, which, however, largely bankrolled the intervention.

There is no evidence that Australia employed an "auction mechanism" to recruit INTERFET participants. Most participants were approached by Australia and not vice-versa. In addition, there is no evidence that Australia relied solely on "vulnerability" considerations when selecting bargaining candidates. In fact, countries which were highly dependent on Australian development aid (e.g., Papua New Guinea, and other Pacific Islands) were not approached for force contributions. Nevertheless, development and military aid metrics were included in the information that DFAT and the DOD received from its embassy network. These metrics thus formed part of the data that DFAT and the DOD used to approximate potential TCCs' preference structures but were not decisive.

5.4.4. BARGAINING WITH THAILAND

Bargaining success in the case of Thailand appears to have been largely the result of pre-existing institutional ties between Australia and Thailand. These relations had engendered goodwill on the Thai side; Thailand was grateful for Australian financial help during the

recent Asian financial crisis and Australia's support for Supachai. The use of the "Goodwill Account" thus enabled Australia to minimize domestic adjustment costs. In the process of force generation negotiations, Australia did not have to face any extra domestic political costs.

Bargaining with Thailand also highlights the different bargaining stages of a force generation process. The first stage is political: heads of state make "in-principal commitments" to deploy forces. In the case of Thailand, this commitment was made by Chuan to Howard at the APEC summit in Auckland. The "Goodwill Account" arguably played a major role in achieving this bilateral bargaining outcome. Once a political agreement is reached, negotiations transfer to a lower, more technical level. Now bargaining revolves around deployment details, such as the type of troops and equipment to be deployed and the range of operational duties. In the case of Thailand, these negotiations were conducted by the East Timor Policy Unit and various Thai military officers. Other incentives were required to finalize the technical details of the Thai deployment, such as providing military equipment and healthcare check-ups.

The case study provides no evidence that Thailand would have participated in INTERFET without Australian influence. In 1999, Thailand was still struggling with immense economic problems which limited its interest in foreign security affairs. In addition, there is no evidence that Thailand was coerced into cooperation at any point.

5.4.5. BARGAINING WITH MALAYSIA

Negotiations with Malaysia failed because of a lack of political trust between Australia and Malaysia. Dr. Mahathir was furious that Australia had publicized the "Anwar Affair." He felt politically insecure, and believed joining INTERFET would give credit to Australia,

thus indirectly strengthening Australia's criticism of how he had handled the demolition of his political opponent, Anwar Ibrahim. As a result, Dr. Mahathir perceived the domestic political costs of Malay participation in INTERFET as too high—a fact which limited the possibility of side-deal bargains. The case study provides no evidence that Malaysia refused to participate in INTERFET because of "technical issues" (e.g., military overstretch). In fact, the Malay military leadership was willing and ready to deploy to East Timor. Moreover, there is no evidence that Malaysia refused to participate because it doubted Australian coercive capacities or that negotiations failed because of "technical" differences (e.g., differences over intervention strategies).

5.5. CONCLUSION

The empirical observations of the INTERFET case study also coincide with the expectations of the *Market Model* in at least three of the five dimensions described in Chapter Two. The theoretical predictions of the *Market Model* fit best with the empirical evidence when it comes to (1) the preference structure underpinning the INTERFET security coalition; (2) the cooperation impetus of the *Lead Nation*, and (3) the search strategy of the *Lead Nation*. With regard to dimension four I am again limited to two instances of bilateral negotiations (Australia-Thailand and Australia and Malaysia). Generalizing my findings to all instances of force generation negotiations is therefore counterproductive. During my field research, unfortunately I could not find any empirical evidence for the fifth dimension (i.e., incomplete contracting).

The next chapter will look at the EU operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) to further maximize case variation and increase the breadth of empirical observations.

CHAPTER SIX

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUFOR CHAD-CAR

The European Union Force in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad-CAR) has been the EU's largest security operation conducted to date. It involved approximately 3700 troops. Its mandate was "to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation to protect civilians, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the safety of UN personnel" in the conflict zones of Eastern Chad and the North-Eastern Central African Republic (CAR).[455] The EU Council approved joint action on October 15, 2007. EU operations were launched in early February 2008 and lasted until March 2009, when the UN follow-up force MINURCAT deployed. The operation was authorized by UN Resolution 1778, which was passed on September 25, 2007.

The following countries participated in the operation: France (2000 troops), Ireland (450 troops), Poland (400 troops), Sweden (280 troops), Austria (170 troops), Russia (100 troops), Italy (90 troops), Netherlands (90 troops), Spain (80 troops), Belgium (70 troops), Finland (60 troops), Albania (60 troops), Croatia (15 troops), and Slovenia (15 troops).

6.1. CAUSAL PROCESS ANALYSIS: France Waging Intervention in Chad-CAR

This section takes the perspective of the lead nation of EUFOR Chad-CAR: France. It examines (1) French motivations to launch EUFOR Chad-CAR; (2) French rationales to use the European Union as an umbrella organization for EUFOR Chad-CAR; and (3) French strategies to recruit EUFOR Chad-CAR participants.

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
[455] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1778. Available from <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1778%282007%29/page_2.> Accessed 10 February 2010.

6.1.1. OVERALL PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

France showed without a doubt the strongest preference intensity for launching EUFOR Chad-CAR. As we will examine in more detail later, France put the Chad issue on the UN Security Council agenda in 2006. France single-handedly drafted all UN resolutions pertaining to Chad and the CAR and prodded numerous Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. When it appeared that the UN was unwilling to send a UN peacekeeping force to Chad and the CAR, France took the initiative to the European Union. To overcome Chadian President Idriss Déby's resistance to an EU force, France tirelessly worked out a compromise. France also took the lead in the EUFOR Chad-CAR force generation process and fiercely lobbied potential troop contributors. France itself deployed over 2000 troops to Chad—the largest EUFOR contingent. During 2006-2008, Chad constituted one of France's top foreign policy priorities.

Figure 6.1 below shows the variation in the countries' revealed interest through UN statements on Chad and the CAR. No other countries showed an even remotely similar preference intensity in the Chadian conflict to France. The United States supported the French initiative but was not involved at any point in policy-making on Chad and the CAR.[456]

Figure 6.1: UN Speech Record Evaluation Chad



[456] Novosseloff and Gowan 2010, 11.

Lead Nation Preference Formation Process

The key to understanding the conflict in Chad and the CAR lies in the outbreak of the Darfur crisis. Darfur borders Chad and the CAR in the west. At the beginning of the Darfur conflict, key members of the Darfur rebel factions were of Chadian origin. They were using the Chadian and Central African sides of the border region as support bases for their fight against Khartoum.[457] Over the years, Omar Al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, had established good relations with Chadian President Idriss Déby.[458] Thus, when the Darfur crisis erupted, Al-Bashir asked Déby for help putting down the rebellion on his side of the border. Déby agreed in exchange for money and military equipment from Sudan. Déby's overt support of Khartoum, however, soon began to erode his own domestic ethnic support base.[459] The Chadian population, like many other African societies, is still deeply fractured along ethnic lines. Déby had consolidated his power in Chad by blatantly privileging his ethnic tribe, the Zaghawas; however, the Zaghawas represent only two percent of Chadian society. The majority of Zaghawas live in Western Sudan, which includes Darfur. Many rebels involved in the Darfur uprising were, in fact of Zaghawa origin. By May 2005 many of Déby's closest collaborators—all themselves Zaghawas— were insisting that Déby changed course and started to support the Darfur rebellion against Khartoum.[460] Khartoum soon discovered the double-game and decided that Déby had to be weakened, if not removed.[461] Al-Bashir thus began supporting disgruntled Chadians—mostly non-Zaghawa and unhappy with Déby's discriminatory authoritarianism. He helped them get organized

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[457] Harvey 2010, 47.

[458] Déby had even used Darfur as his launch pad to overthrow his predecessor, Hissen Habré.

[459] Charbonneau in Black and Williams 2010, 222.

[460] Harvey 2010, 47.

[461] N'Djamena was also accused of rapprochement with Libya, a key supplier of weapons and ammunitions to the Darfuri insurgent movements.

in camps on the Sudanese side of the border and also supplied them with all necessary equipment to overthrow Déby. It was these Sudanese-financed Chadian rebels who staged a surprise offensive on N'Djamena in March 2006—a coup attempt which only failed because of French military intervention. By mid-2005, over 250,000 refugees were trapped in the middle of this proxy war between Chad and Sudan. These refugees had fled the brutal violence in Darfur and were now living in crowded refugee camps on the Chadian and Central African sides of the border.

Getting France involved

Chad and the CAR had been French colonies until 1960. Upon achieving independence, both Chad and the CAR signed a Franco-African military assistance agreement. The agreement provided France with the use of a major military base outside N'Djamena as well as automatic transit and flyover rights.[462] The N'Djamena base continues to serve as one of France's key military installations in Africa located almost perfectly in the middle of the African continent, half way between the French West African base in Gabon and its East African base in Djibouti.[463] Such a location made it ideal for deploying French troops and aircraft rapidly all over Africa. Moreover, the backwardness of Chad allowed doing so in quiet—out of sight of the French and the international public.[464] It required, however,

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[462] In return, France was not only to provide defense against external threats but also to assist in maintaining internal security. In other words, Chad and the CAR could automatically request direct French intervention to ensure the security of their government in the face of insurgency or coup attempts. The French government, however, had the right to honor or refuse requests as it saw fit.

[463] Since 1986 France stationed ca. 1,200 soldiers permanently in N'Djamena under the *Epervier Operation*—an operation which was initially conceived to discourage Libyan transgression of the 16th parallel, also known as the Aouzou strip.

[464] Etienne 2009, 10. In addition to these strategic advantages, Chad also holds an almost mythical place in French collective memory. It was in Chad—then still a French colony—where the famed French General Philippe Leclerc, a military officer loyal to "La France Libre" under Charles de Gaulle and in opposition to Pétain's "Régime de Vichy," began assembling an African force mostly composed of Chadians to liberate France from German occupation. This force then successfully fought Fascist Italy in Libya and famously swore in Kufra

that the Chadian government remained Francophile.[465] France thus traditionally picked and chose all Chadian heads of states including Idriss Déby, who was installed in a coup d'état in 1990.[466] By 2006, it had certainly become clear to the French government that Déby was not an "ideal president." Nevertheless, there was no one else as Francophile around.[467] France then developed a plan: To keep Déby in power, the border between Chad and Sudan had to be protected—or "frozen" as a French diplomat put it—so that Sudanese-sponsored rebel groups would not be able to overrun N'Djamena again.[468] Such a policy would also prevent larger regional destabilization (i.e., regional chaos expanding to Niger or even the Greater Lakes region) or, as another French diplomat argued, "what we want in Chad is stability. The rebels aren't any better than Déby, we simply wish to avoid a situation of continuous warfare affecting the broader region."[469]

Initial failure at the UN-Level

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France managed to introduce the Chadian conflict to the UN in the spring of 2006, suggesting that a UN peacekeeping force should be deployed to stabilize the situation. Until that date, the UN had only been dealing

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on March 2, 1941, that their fight would not stop "until the French flag flies again over the cathedral of Strasbourg, "an oath which was ultimately fulfilled largely by the same regiment on November 23, 1944.

[465] Charbonneau (in Black and Williams 2010, 217) asserts that with Djibouti, Chad is the country where the French military has been most involved in the post-colonial period. For example, to maintain control of Chad in the 1980s, the French army battled, directly and indirectly, the armies of Qaddafi and inflicted a bitter defeat upon them in 1987.

[466] Charbonneau (in Black and Williams 2010, 220); Déby's military campaign was planned by the French secret services and their man Paul Fontbonne, who stayed with Déby all the way to N'Djamena as a close personal advisor.

[467] Marchal (2009) writes that French government officials apparently came to that conclusion after the African Union Summit in Maputo in July 2003, when Déby collapsed and fell into a coma. Only a very fast reaction by French diplomats saved him. When convalescent in Paris, he is said to have offered various rewards and commitments to France that very much convinced Paris that he was the only statesman in Chad.

[468] Etienne 2009, 9-10.

[469] As quoted in Mattelear 2008, 15. The French also wanted to reaffirm their military supremacy in the region and thus deter other rebels from following the Chadian examples. Marchal (2009), for example, writes, "the March offensive took the French army by surprise. It showed that despite French support for Déby, foreign rebels could reach the capital city in very few days."

with the massive refugee inflows into Chad from Darfur through its humanitarian affairs office (OCHA) and its refugee agency (UNHCR). Following the French peacekeeping request, the UN peacekeeping department (UNDPKO) sent a fact finding mission to Chad in February 2007.[470] From very early on, UNDPKO was not enthusiastic about a potential UN operation in Chad.[471] It had too many other operations to handle, and the Chadian operation had a taste of France using the UN to advance its own political agenda.[472] UNDPKO thus designed an operational plan which heavily emphasized "political developments" as being key to the conflict resolution efforts (i.e., democratic elections and inclusive dialogue with the armed opposition).[473] For Déby such a "political mandate" was utterly unacceptable. Yes, he feared to be overthrown by rebel forces. Nevertheless, such a military defeat was still more acceptable than losing elections to "Sudanese-backed thugs." But even if no elections were held, Déby opposed a strong UN presence in Chad, fearing that it could legitimize Chad's rebels by making them *de facto* players. He also believed that a UN operation could jeopardize his military power advantage by emboldening the rebels to take action against the government and then withdraw into UN-controlled zones, thus avoiding government reprisal.[474]

All these discussions took place at the United Nations over the last months of the Chirac government. Chirac, a lame-duck president, lacked the political strength and motivation to push ahead.

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[470] The mission was initially scheduled for November or December 2007, but had to be aborted due to renewed threats of rebel attacks.

[471] Seibert 2010, 10.

[472] Novosseloff and Gowan 2012, 11.

[473] Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 6.

[474] Author's interview with high-ranking UN official, Brussels, February 2011.

Second Attempt under the Sarkozy-Government

Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President of France in May 2007. To soothe his reputation as a fierce right-wing conservative, Sarkozy announced to put together a "gouvernement d'ouverture"—a government including ministers from the French socialist and center parties. Sarkozy thus wanted to prove that all French citizens whatever their political orientation could identify with his new administration.[475] Most prominently, he invited Bernard Kouchner—the famous and highly popular French doctor, founder of "Doctors without Borders," a member of the French Socialist Party and former health minister in the socialist government of François Mitterrand—to become foreign minister. Kouchner accepted the invitation, a step which was viewed by many of his socialist party colleagues as unforgivable political treason. Kouchner himself, however, thought that with good deeds he would be able to redeem himself; if he only helped the young, the poor, the sick, and the weak, he would be able to win back his former electorate, people who cared about humanitarian interventions and social justice.

The hot humanitarian topic in spring 2007 was Darfur.[476] Western media spoke of genocide. Mass demonstrations were staged, and governments were pressured to ostracize Sudan. Kouchner thus seized on Darfur as the perfect case combining media attention, intense human suffering, and the possibility to apply his favorite foreign policy doctrine: *le droit d'ingérence* ("the responsibility to protect"). Indeed, his very first meeting as French foreign minister was a brainstorming session on what France could do about the Darfur conflict.[477] Soon the idea of "humanitarian corridors"— a concept that had been used during the

[475] Marchal 2009.

[476] See Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

[477] A Statesman without Borders, *New York Times*, 3 February 2008.

Balkan Wars to provide food and assistance to UN safe heavens in Bosnia—was raised.[478] The concept had, however, utterly failed then and so the idea quickly lost momentum. The notion of a possible military operation in Chad and the North-Eastern CAR resurged to replace this vacuum. Diplomats in the French Foreign Ministry realized that such an operation could kill two birds with one stone; something humanitarian could be done about Darfur—or at least for the Darfur refugees gathering in camps on the Chadian and Central African sides of the Darfur border—while at the same time a "cordon sanitaire" could be established to deter rebels from crossing the border into Chad and overthrowing Idriss Déby. The time for the latter project was indeed very pressing. Déby anticipated new rebel attacks with the arrival of the dry season starting in late October-early November 2007. Thus, a UN operation was not the ideal way to proceed because the force generation process would take too long. What could be done was an EU-UN bridging operation. The EU was much quicker to deploy and could stay in the field for about a year, and then the UN would take over—an excellent plan, which would also move European defense integration forward and set a precedent for exemplary cross-institutional cooperation.[479]

Nicolas Sarkozy quickly agreed to the plan. On the one hand, Sarkozy needed Kouchner. Without him his "gouvernement d'ouverture" would fall apart.[480] On the other hand, Sarkozy saw the plan fitting into his long term Africa policy. In contrast to his predecessors, Sarkozy did not relish the Franco-Chadian relationship, nor did he share their conception of la *France-Afrique*, i.e., that France and Africa had a special and

[478] Novosseloff and Gowan 2012, 40 (fn 40).

[479] Seibert 2010, 10.

[480] Author's interview with Bernard Kouchner, Paris, February 2011.

mutually indispensable relationship.[481] In essence, Sarkozy considered the numerous French military bases and operations in Africa a waste of money. As soon as he acceded to power, he asked his advisors to cut costs and repatriate as many French military assets from Africa as possible.[482] One of the most costly assets was the French military base in Chad.[483] His plan was that all French troops stationed in Chad would first become an integral part of the EU-UN mission and then be withdrawn along with the EU-UN forces.[484]

Finally, *Urgence Darfour*—a French offspring of the *Save Darfur Coalition*—had made Sarkozy and his socialist competitor Segolène Royal commit to imposing sanctions on Sudan during the French electoral campaign.[485] Now elected, Sarkozy liked the idea of showing at least some fidelity to his campaign commitment, thus appealing to a relatively influential French humanitarian constituency.[486]

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[481] Author's interview with high-ranking French military official, Brussels, February 2011; Harvey 2010, 50; see. See also Sarkozy's speeches in Cotonou (Benin) and South Africa. Available from <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-speech-to-the.html>,<http://infostrat.numeriblog.fr/mon_weblog/2006/05/discours_de_nic.html.> Accessed 10 February 2010.

[482] During his electoral campaign Sarkozy declared: "A mon sens, cette présence (française militaire en Afrique) devra être limitée au strict minimum lorsque l'Union africaine se sera dotée d'une capacité stratégique et militaire de rétablir elle-même la légalité internationale sur le continent." (Mes objectifs en matière de politique international, Paris, 28 February 2007). Sarkozy thus initiated the renegotiation of all Franco-African military agreements. Two years into his presidency, however, he radically changed course and intensified Franco-African relations wherever possible.

[483] Author's interview with high-ranking French official working for the French Senate, Paris, February 2011. The French military never considered Chad as a military base but, rather, an "operation." Thus French troops earned an "operation salary" when in Chad and only stayed for a maximum of four months, which involved considerable transport costs. When serving on an actual French "base," soldiers' received much lower salaries and moved with their families to stay for minimum two years.

[484] Novosseloff and Gowan 2012, 40 (fn 40); 'Paris fatigue!' *La Lettre du Continent*, 16 October 2008. The French government had designed the same plan for the French deployment in Côte d'Ivoire (based in Port-Bouet), which has already become an integral part of the current UN operation in Côte d'Ivoire and will be closed down with UN withdrawal.

[485] 'Darfour Agir!' *Libération*, 20 March 2007.

[486] Marchal 2009.

French pre-deployment leadership

The first obstacle in the way to deploying an EU operation to Chad was getting Idriss Déby's approval. In our interview, Bernard Kouchner told me that "the most difficult part of launching the EU operation was convincing Déby."[487] As stated earlier, Déby did not like the idea of having a peacekeeping operation on his soil, as he feared that this could legitimize and embolden the rebel factions. Kouchner had to go to N'Djamena three times. Finally, a deal was struck. Kouchner told Déby that, while protecting the refugees, the EU force would effectively seal the border and inhibit Sudanese support for rebel groups in both Chad and the CAR. Kouchner also guaranteed Déby that the EU operation would not ask for any political changes to the Chadian regime beyond the August 17, 2007 agreement, a political arrangement that France had brokered between the Chadian government and the opposition factions providing for a power-sharing mechanism but no foreign monitored elections.[488] Kouchner also pledged that France would provide the majority of EU troops and the field commander for the operation. In addition, all equipment and infrastructure set up by EUFOR would become Chadian property once the operation was concluded.[489] Finally, at Déby's insistence, Kouchner agreed that the EU operation would also repatriate internally displaced people (IDPs). In fact, at the time two types of "refugees" were populating the camps along the Sudanese-Chadian border: (1) Darfuri refugees and (2) Chadians, who had been displaced because of domestic conflict, droughts, or simply because of traditional migration patterns. Déby wanted to have them repatriated because

[487] Kouchner, interview with author.

[488] High-ranking UN official, interview with author; French diplomats largely brokered this agreement to appease the international community and show that Chad was on a good way domestically.

[489] High-ranking French military official, interview with author.

he feared that they might fuel rebellion in the camps.[490] Once Déby had agreed to the EU force, France went back to the United Nations, succeeding in acquiring a UN mandate for the EUFOR operation on September 25, 2007.

6.1.2. COOPERATION IMPETUS

France sought cooperation partners, particularly European cooperation partners, because it feared that a unilateral intervention in Chad would cause a public outcry accusing the French government of post-colonialism.[491] It was thought that the 'Europeanization' of the intervention would give the intervention an elevated level of authority and legitimacy.[492] The French Senate stated the case for European legitimacy very succinctly: "The EU brings a double 'added value': it can create a consensus and legitimacy; and it can act by using numerous and very diverse instruments of interventions."[493] In addition, France didn't want to shoulder the financial burden of such an operation alone.[494] By making the operation an EU endeavor, France knew that other EU member states would have to contribute to the common costs of the operation via the Athena mechanism.[495] Troop contributing countries would also pay for their own deployment costs.

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[490] Author's interview with French military official, Paris, February 2011.

[491] Author's interview with high-ranking French military official, Paris, February 2011.

[492] Charbonneau in Black and Williams 2010, 217; France and the UK are both eager to make use of the "EU legitimacy benefit." Both countries share similar interests in Africa but are encumbered by their colonial past (Mérand 2008, 125-126; Charbonneau 2009, 552). For both the legitimacy dimension gained new momentum after their controversial interventions in Sierra Leone (2000) and Côte D'Ivoire (2001), respectively. Olsen claims that from a moral justification point of view operations under a French flag in Congo in 2003 and 2006 would have been impossible, given the French engagement in the region in the early 1990s and not least because of the role of France during the genocide in Rwanda (Olsen 2009, 254; Gégout 2009, 239).

[493] As quoted in Charbonneau in Black and Williams 2010, 217.

[494] Novoseloff and Gowan 2012, 40 (fn 40); Seibert 2010, 48-49.

[495] In 2004, the EU set up a permanent mechanism to administer the financing of common costs of military operations. The bulk of the operational common costs (such as the establishment of headquarters, transport costs, salaries of locally hired personnel, barracks and lodging/infrastructure, etc.) are thus shared among all EU MS (not only those which participate in the operation). The breakdown of each EU MS contribution is

6.1.3. SEARCH PROCESS

The Europeans were informed about the French plans as early as May 21, 2007, when all foreign offices of EU member states received word from Paris about a proposal "to do something in Eastern Chad."[496] France had a clear preference to recruit European troops and suffered under the illusion that its EU partners would jump on the EUFOR bandwagon without hesitation.[497] In addition, France had a preference for bringing "neutral" countries on board to further enhance the legitimacy of the operation.

EUFOR Operation Commander

The first position the French wanted to fill was the position of *EUFOR Operation Commander*, the highest-ranking position in the EU force. In contrast to the *Force Commander*, the Operation Commander would be based in the EUFOR operational Headquarters in Mont-Valérian, not in the field. Given that it was already decided per Déby's request that the EUFOR force commander would be French, France was eager to fill the Operation Commander position with a non-French citizen to keep up the image of a "European force."

France first approached Sweden. Sweden's Foreign Minister Carl Bildt very much liked the idea of an EU operation in Africa, no matter the country or conflict. Bildt was a staunch defender of European defense integration.[498] In addition, Bildt believed that Europe and the Nordic states, in particular, should get more interested in Africa, because it was there

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determined in accordance with the gross national product scale, as specified in Article 28 of the EU Treaty. All other "non-common" costs must be borne by the participating EU MS.

[496] Mattelaer 2008.

[497] High-ranking French military official, interview with author.

[498] Finnish Government considering sending troops to Chad instead of Darfur, *BBC Monitoring Europe*, 15 August 2007.

where future conflicts were looming. Bildt thus seriously considered deploying the Nordic Battlegroup to Chad.[499] Nevertheless, Bildt's enthusiasm for EUFOR vanished during a fact-finding mission to Chad in August 2007. During that trip, he saw the extreme lack of infrastructure in Chad and apprehended the immense logistical costs Sweden would have to shoulder if it participated in the operation.[500] Realizing that Sweden would not come on board, France next approached Ireland, which ultimately did agree to provide the Operation Commander (see bargaining analysis below).

EU force generation

In fall 2007, after a UN mandate had been successfully secured for the operation, the official EU force generation process began in Brussels. All EU and NATO members were automatically invited to participate in "EUFOR Force Generation Conferences" which were to be held in Brussels in October 2007.[501] In addition to EU and NATO members, some "third countries" (i.e., non-EU and non-NATO member states) were also invited to attend the conferences. The invitations were sent out by the EU Council Secretariat at the suggestions of the EU Committee of Permanent Representatives and, in particular, the French Permanent Representative.[502] He, in turn, had received a note from a committee of officials from the French Foreign Ministry (the "Quai d'Orsay"), the Defense Ministry and the President's Office (the "Elysée"). The key selection criteria were (1) to dispose of the necessary military equipment, and (2) to play ball with French objectives. Selected

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[499] Finnish Government considering sending troops to Chad instead of Darfur, *BBC Monitoring Europe*, 15 August 2007. The Nordic Battlegroup had been a big project for Sweden, changing the character of the Swedish armed forces and forces structure. Bildt had been particularly supportive of such military reform and he was now eager to show the results to the Swedish and European public; For details on the EU Battlegroup concept please refer to http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf, accessed October 19, 2011.

[500] Author's interview with Finnish Diplomat, Brussels, December 2009

[501] This policy followed from the *Berlin plus Agreement* on EU-NATO cooperation.

[502] French military official, interview with author.

countries were, among others, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey.[503] In preparation for the official EUFOR force generation conference, EU member states met for some dry runs. The first "informal meeting" was held in Brussels on September 24, 2007. It was chaired by the EUFOR Operation Commander, General Pat Nash from Ireland. General Nash had a list with specific items he considered necessary to launch the operation (e.g., helicopters, jeeps, field hospital, transport equipment and so on). He then asked all the attendees, item by item, what they wanted to contribute. General Nash recalls this process as "incredibly painful."[504] For most of the items not a single hand would go up.[505] "The process resembled a game of poker," Nash told me, "everybody knew how important this operation was to the French. They thus knew that holding out could only be to their advantage. Eventually, the French would chip in."[506]

French diplomacy helps EUFOR to take shape

General Nash soon realized that the formal EU force generation process would not deliver the desired results. He thus reverted almost completely to a different technique to fill the remaining gaps of the EU force; he told the French government directly what forces he wanted and French diplomats would then do the political work to find them. In particular, Eric Chévalier, Bernard Kouchner's Special Representative for EUFOR Chad-CAR, traveled from European capital to European capital to negotiate contributions.[507] French embassies in Europe did most of the preparatory work. They approached their host governments to ask for contributions. The information was then transferred back to Paris,

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[503] Ibid.

[504] Author's interview with Pat Nash, Cork, June 2011.

[505] Mattelaer 2008.

[506] Nash, interview with author.

[507] High-ranking French military official, interview with author.

where senior officials in the Quai d'Orsay under Chevalier's guidance organized the follow-up work. For example, with regards to Albania's contribution to EUFOR, a high-ranking EUFOR official recalls the following process:

> The French military attaché in Tirana first hinted that Albania was willing to contribute; he then forwarded the information to Paris. From there on negotiations were conducted between the Elysée, the Quai d'Orsay and the Albanian Embassy in Paris.[508]

At the height of the force generation process, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin, and even French President Sarkozy were involved in begging EU, NATO and other countries for EUFOR contributions. They used every bilateral or multilateral meeting to approach potential force contributors. Many conversations were conducted informally: "By the way, have you decided upon your contribution to EUFOR?"[509] Prominent EU officials, most importantly EU High Representative Javier Solana and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Henri Bentégeat, were also involved in the French endeavor, repeating the message and explaining the operation to potential troop contributing nations.[510]

6.2. BARGAINING ANALYSIS 1: Force Generation Negotiations France-Ireland

Ireland was the largest troop contributor to EUFOR Chad/CAR after the *Lead Nation* France. This section traces in detail the Irish decision-making process regarding EUFOR.

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[508] Author's interview with high-ranking EUFOR official.

[509] High-ranking French military official, interview with author.

[510] Nash, interview with author.

6.2.1. IRELAND'S PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

Ireland's deployment of over 400 troops to EUFOR Chad-CAR was a domestically contested endeavor, pitting the Irish Foreign Office against the Office of the Taoiseach and the Department of Defense.

Ireland's unidimensional preferences regarding Chad

Ireland did not entertain any significant political or economic relationships with Chad or the CAR prior to the EUFOR operation, e.g., it did not even have an embassy or consulate in either N'Djamena or Bangui. The Irish population was, however, aware of the ongoing atrocities in Darfur. Irish human rights NGOs and the Irish Catholic Church were active in mobilizing domestic constituencies. Over the period 2006-2007, Ireland provided €27 million in aid to Sudan and €5 million to fund the African Union mission to Darfur (AMIS). Ireland also sent three members of the Irish Defense Forces to serve in AMIS. [511]

The strongest constituency interested in Irish participation in EUFOR was the Irish military. Since its first peacekeeping deployment to Congo in the 1960s, Ireland has prided itself on being one of the most engaged Western peacekeeping nations in the world. In September 2007, when the EUFOR force generation process began, Irish troops were available for a new deployment, largely because recent UN operations in Liberia and Lebanon were drawing down, relieving pressure on numbers.[512] The Irish Department of Defense had been actively looking for a new deployment because "you can't let the boys hang out in the barracks for too long."[513] From an Irish military perspective, EUFOR Chad-CAR appeared to be an interesting operation. It promised to be more demanding than

[511] Ahern to seek troop safety pledge, *Irish Times*, 1 October 2007.

[512] Army in Africa, *Irish Times*, 1 October 2007.

[513] Author's interview with high-ranking Irish diplomat, Dublin, May 2011.

anything the Irish military had ever done before—an appealing factor given the Irish military's desire to step up its peacekeeping experiences and reputation in Europe and globally.[514]

From a political point of view, however, an Irish participation in an EU military operation was an immensely risky undertaking.[515] In mid-2007, Ireland had still not voted on the EU constitutional treaty (i.e., the Lisbon Treaty). A referendum on Irish accession to the Lisbon Treaty was planned for early 2008 once the treaty was ratified by EU head of states. Irish opponents to the treaty were particularly critical of European defense policy, worrying that "neutral" Ireland was going to be dragged into continental European military adventures. An op-ed in the widely-read *Irish Times* neatly summarized this viewpoint:

> The Chad operation highlights the fears that many Irish people have about the direction of Irish and EU military developments, even before the Lisbon Treaty takes us further down the same road. Might Ireland's honourable record of impartial participation in UN peacekeeping be compromised by participation in EU operations that could serve as fig-leaves for the promotion of the interests of the French state, or of other EU states? It is precisely because of such concerns that opponents of the Lisbon Treaty are alarmed at the proposals to extend the types of tasks EU forces may engage in.[516]

As a result of this widely held public opinion, the Irish Foreign Office strongly opposed Irish EUFOR participation. It feared that any trouble in Chad could be exploited by the Irish anti-EU camp, thus jeopardizing the yes-vote in the scheduled referendum.[517] A rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by Irish voters was a nightmare scenario. In 2001, the Irish had rejected the Nice Treaty, an EU treaty preceding the Lisbon Treaty. This action had had very

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[514] Harvey 2010, 58.

[515] Officials play down embarrassing email, *BBC News*, 28 April 2008.

[516] Letters to the Editor – Debate on the Lisbon Treaty, *Irish Times*, 1 February 2008.

[517] Bertie's high-risk foreign adventure, *The Phoenix*, 8 February 2008.

negative repercussions for Irish diplomacy and Ireland's reputation in the European Union. Irish diplomats felt ostracized by other EU member states until 2004, when the Irish EU Presidency managed to turn things around.[518]

Ireland's multidimensional preferences regarding Chad

When asked why Ireland participated in EUFOR Chad-CAR, most of my Irish interview partners either opined that the operation was "a good opportunity for the Irish defense forces" or that "something had to be done about Darfur." When pushed a bit on the point that the operation was domestically extremely risky because of the pending EU referendum, and that taking such a risk would probably not have offset the benefits for either the defense forces or "Irish reputation in the world," most officials responded: "Well, the operation was a priority for our Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern." Bertie Ahern was in the lead.[519] When asked whether European defense, peacekeeping or other humanitarian issues were generally a top priority for Ahern, all my interview partners replied in the negative.[520] Bertie was a "local guy."[521] He had risen through the ranks of the *Fianna Fail* party because of his economic credentials. Bertie Ahern's decision to send Irish troops to Chad thus must have been motivated by something else, most likely his desire to win French support for his candidacy as EU President.[522]

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[518] Ahern 2009.

[519] Author's interview with high-ranking Irish diplomat, Dublin, May 2011; author's interview with high-ranking Irish official working for the Irish Defense Ministry, Newbridge, June 2011.

[520] Author's interview with Dan Harvey, Dublin, May 2011.

[521] Ahern 2009, 1.

[522] Bertie's high-risk foreign adventure, *The Phoenix*, 8 February 2008.

Ahern's European ambitions

Bertie Ahern had first made his interest in the EU President position known in August 2007.[523] Interestingly, it had been Ahern himself who had "created" the provision for a permanent EU President in 2004, when Ireland had held the rotating EU presidency under which he had served as lead negotiator of the EU Constitutional Treaty. He often joked about this detail when quizzed by the press about his ambitions beyond his tenure as Irish Taoiseach.[524] In mid-2007, Ahern's chances to land the job looked rather good. At that time Ahern was one of the longest serving and most popular European heads of state. His masterful management of the Irish EU presidency had made him the chief contender for the Presidency of the EU Commission.[525] Twenty-one EU leaders had indeed preferred Ahern over Joao Barroso for President of the EU Commission in 2004. At that point, however, Ahern declined, preferring to continue his mandate as Irish Taoiseach. Regarding this episode, Ahern writes in his memoirs:

> There is no doubt I gave it serious thought [to become President of the EU Commission]. I was confident I had the numbers. I didn't seem to have many enemies and had shown that I was capable of doing the job. The big three powers, Britain, Germany, and France, all wanted me to run . . . In the end, I decided no.[526]

Ahern then admits:

> Partly it was because I thought there was still a job to be done at home. There was the question of living in Brussels, which didn't appeal much. And then there was the thought that while president of the commission was a good job, it was also a thankless one. Perhaps if the constitution came into

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[523] Bertie's language barrier to top EU job, *Evening Herald*, 28 August 2007.

[524] Ahern 2009.

[525] Ireland, with plain-spoken 'Bertie' in charge, shines during EU presidency, *AP Newswire*, 30 June 2004; Ahern had backing of 21 EU leaders for top job, *The Irish Examiner*, 5 July 2004.

[526] Ahern 2009, 275.

> effect in 2006 and they were looking for a permanent EU president of the council, maybe then I might let my name go forward. But that question hadn't come up yet.[527]

In mid-2007, Bertie Ahern's key contenders for the EU Presidency were former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker. Ahern knew that Blair had the support of French President Sarkozy.[528] Nevertheless, he was also aware that Blair was a difficult candidate for France to back. Most importantly, Blair had little support in most other EU member states, chiefly because of his steadfast support for the U.S. invasion in Iraq. If he indeed wanted to grab the EU presidency, Bertie Ahern had to win over France, which was a crucial player in the nomination process. Ahern was conscious that France was keen on pushing forward a "political Europe"—a Europe going beyond economic integration. It was in this area where he still had to prove his credentials to the French.

6.2.2. DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING SUCCESS

After Sweden had refused to provide the EUFOR Operation Commander, France quickly thought of Ireland. Ireland had an excellent reputation in the peacekeeping business. Notably, its official policy of "alliance neutrality" had bestowed it with the status of being an honest broker. In addition, French President Sarkozy was fully aware that Bertie Ahern was interested in a "European career" and greatly conscious of France's *de facto* veto power over who was to become EU President. It was in this context that Sarkozy invited Bertie Ahern to attend a rugby match between Ireland and France in Paris on September 21, 2007. Ahern's invitation to Paris constituted the very first Franco-Irish bilateral meeting since Sarkozy's election in May 2007. Preceding the rugby match, both heads of state had a

[527] Ibid.

[528] Blair 2011, 653.

working lunch. Several of my interview partners, as well as newspaper sources, confirm that Irish participation in EUFOR was decided at that particular lunch.[529] A high-ranking official in the Irish Department of Defense recalls the following regarding the Paris lunch:

> I was in charge of telling the [Irish] treasury department how much the Chad operation would cost. We had made our calculations. Since this was probably the most challenging operation Ireland had ever participated in, we didn't want to send our boys out with bad equipment. So we came up with an estimate of €50 million—which is a lot of money. I knew that the Treasury wouldn't be happy about it. So when I went to meet the Secretary General of the Treasury. I was kind of worried. However, when I walked into the room, the Secretary General said, "Well, this has better been an f***ing nice lunch, because it will cost me €50 million dollars." In this moment I knew that Bertie Ahern had already done the whole work and the operation would go forward.[530]

On September 26, only five days after the Franco-Irish meeting in Paris, the Irish cabinet approved the deployment of 350 Irish soldiers to Chad and the CAR.[531] A week later, on October 2, 2007, the Irish government announced that General Pat Nash had been appointed Operation Commander of EUFOR Chad-CAR.[532] In early November, the Irish Foreign Minister, Dermot Ahern, traveled to Chad to further discuss the mission with government officials in Chad and Sudan.[533] In the meantime it had been decided to augment Irish participation from 350 to 400 troops. Irish diplomats in the Irish Foreign Office were also working hard to forestall any potentially catastrophic repercussions of the Irish deployment to Chad on the scheduled Irish EU referendum. Most importantly, the

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[529] Harvey, interview with author; see also Bertie's high-risk foreign adventure, *The Phoenix*, 8 February 2008; A safe pair of hands take charge of EU force in Chad, *The Irish Times*, 29 January 2008.

[530] Author's interview with high-ranking Irish official working in the Department of Defense, Newbridge, June 2011.

[531] Army's African Mission marks watershed for EU, *The Irish Times*, 28 September 28 2007.

[532] Irish General to command 3500 troop mission in Chad, *The Irish Times*, October, 3 2007; Paris financera l'essentiel de l'operation Tchad-CAR, *Le Monde*, 5 October 2007.

[533] Government set to decide on Chad deployment, *The Irish Times*, 19 November 2007.

Irish government insisted on special assurances from France to evacuate the operation in case of an emergency.[534] Ireland also pushed for the inclusion of a "neutrality clause" in the EUFOR operational plan to appease its domestic constituency, who had begun questioning the real motivations behind the Irish Chad deployment.[535] Ireland finally deployed to Chad in February 2008.

6.3. BARGAINING ANALYSIS 2*:* Failed Force Generation Negotiations France-Romania

France first approached Romania to support the EUFOR Chad-CAR during late summer/early fall 2007. By February 2008, Romania had rejected the deployment despite intense French-Romanian negotiations. This section traces the reasons for this bargaining failure.

6.3.1. ROMANIA'S PREFERENCE STRUCTURE


When Eric Chevalier and his collaborators in the Quai d'Orsay were looking for EUFOR contributions, Romania appeared to be an ideal cooperation candidate. Romania had a 90,000-strong military force with extensive peacekeeping experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, and even in Africa. Moreover, Romania had just joined the European Union in January 2007. France had been one of the most steadfast supporters of Romania's EU accession all through the accession negotiations. In addition to its European Union ties, France also maintained a relatively important bilateral institutional network with Romania, as Figure 6.1 below illustrates.

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[534] French military officer, interview with author.

[535] Author's interview with EU official, Brussels, February 2011.

Figure 6.2: France's Institutional Ties with EU countries



Nevertheless, when France approached Romania for EUFOR force contributions, the Romanian government was incapacitated by internecine infighting between the Romanian Prime Minister, Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, and the Romanian President, Traian Basescu. The leader of the Democratic Party (PD) until his election as President of Romanian in 2004, Basescu was a staunch transatlanticist. He had permitted the United States to establish military bases in Romania and use these bases for the CIA's secret program to interrogate terror suspects. He had also authorized the deployment of almost 2000 troops to Iraq and Afghanistan.[536] Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu, on the other hand, was the leader of the Liberal Party (PNL). He was decidedly less transatlanticist and favored a reorientation of Romanian foreign policy toward the European Union. Romania's political infighting escalated in April 2007, when Tariceanu introduced an impeachment vote in the Romanian parliament against Basescu. The vote passed; as a result, Basescu was suspended from his function as president until a national referendum to confirm his dismissal was held on May 19, 2007. This time, the vote did not pass: 74.48 percent of Romanians indeed wanted to keep Basescu in office. Once Basescu's presidential powers had been restored, he retaliated and asked for a no-confidence vote to dismiss Prime Minister Tariceanu. Tariceanu, however, survived the no-confidence vote on October 3, 2007.

[536] CRS, Romania: Background and Current Issues, 23 January 2007, 5-6.

Romania's unidimensional preferences regarding Chad

The Romanian population paid little attention to the Chadian or Sudanese conflicts. Romania also did not maintain any significant political or economic relationships with Chad or the CAR. Nevertheless, the EUFOR Chad-CAR deployment had a fervent supporter in Prime Minister Tariceanu. As mentioned earlier, Tariceanu aspired to reorient Romania's foreign policy toward the European Union. Tariceanu thus saw a good opportunity in the EUFOR deployment to show his attachment to European values and, in particular, to EU defense integration. Tariceanu perceived that in the EU defense sphere Romania could be a real player, given its strong and experienced military.[537] Nevertheless, Tariceanu faced strong opposition in his support for a Romanian deployment to Chad from Basescu.

Romania's multidimensional preferences regarding Chad

To a large part, Basecu's opposition to a Romanian deployment to Chad was vindictive and related to an earlier instance, when Tariceanu and Basescu had crossed swords over Romania's deployment to Iraq. In fact, on June, 29 2006, Prime Minister Tariceanu had announced that his party requested the withdrawal of Romanian troops "from international battle zones where they are deployed without a mandate from the United Nations, NATO, or the European Union."[538] This mainly concerned the Romanian troops in Iraq. At the time, observers speculated that Tariceanu's plan for withdrawal had been purposely put

[537] Author's interview with Romanian diplomat, Brussels, December 2009.

[538] Romania: Iraq debacle Highlights Governments Failings, *Oxford Analytica*, 19 July 2006.

forward shortly before Basescu's July 2006 trip to Washington, D.C. It was suspected that Tariceanu had intended to embarrass Basescu during his visit.[539]

6.3.2. DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING FAILURE

Prime Minister Tariceanu had signaled to France that Romania was willing to contribute troops to EUFOR in return for a specific financial reward. The sum of money the Romanians requested initially appeared exorbitantly high to the French, but both parties reached an agreement after further negotiations.[540] Nevertheless, when President Basescu found out about the deal he ordered the National Defense Council, an interagency committee which he presided and which had to approve any Romanian foreign military deployment, to veto Romania's participation in EUFOR Chad-CAR. On February 12, Basescu officially stated on Romanian TV that "Bucharest could not send troops to Chad without the consent of the Supreme Council of National Defense . . . [the Romanian deployment to Chad] had been announced by Prime Minister Tariceanu without waiting for this decision."[541] Milica Neacsu, a Romanian diplomat working at the Permanent Representation of Romania to the EU, told me that the veto caused much consternation in France. French officials in Brussels punished Romania with a temporary neglect of issues of Romanian interests at the EU level.[542]

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[539] Ibid.; Tariceanu's request was rejected the day after his proposal by the Romanian National Defense Council, an interagency committee presided by the President, which had to approve any Romanian foreign military deployments.

[540] French military official, interview with author.

[541] EUFOR Chad: Romania hesitant, *Europolitics*, 14 February 2008.

[542] Romanian diplomat, interview with author.

6.4. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Drawing upon the narrative above, I suggest that the EUFOR Chad-CAR case-study illustrates the following interesting force generation particularities:

1) **Heterogeneous preference intensities:** France stood out as the undisputable *Lead Nation* of EUFOR Chad-CAR. The difference in preference intensities among EUFOR coalition members was the largest of all operations examined in this dissertation.

2) **Legitimacy and cost concerns as cooperation impetus:** France sought the cooperation of the European Union to benefit from European legitimacy and cost-sharing mechanisms.

3) **Institutional ties minimize search costs:** France made great use of its "EU connections" to approach potential TCCs. It also solicited help from EU officials, such as the EU High Representative and the Chairman of the EU military staff. France could thus lower its search costs.

4) **Institutional ties minimize domestic adjustment costs:** Ireland most likely participated in EUFOR Chad-CAR because of Bertie Ahern's personal ambition to become EU President. It is unlikely that Ireland would have participated otherwise, given the risk the deployment posed for the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Common EU membership thus allowed France to minimize domestic adjustment costs.

5) **Political infighting in Romania prevents linkage-bargain:** During the better part of 2007, the Romanian government was paralyzed by political infighting. Ill will between Romania's Prime Minister Tariceanu and President Basescu prevented the conclusion of a side-deal bargain with France.

6) **Institutional ties allow France to punish Romania:** The French government was disappointed by Romania's abandonment of the EUFOR deal and punished Romania by temporarily ignoring issues of Romania's interest at the EU level.

The specific empirical observations per dimension are as follows:

6.4.1. PREFERENCE STRUCTURE

France stood out as the undisputable lead nation of the operation. The French pursued sharply defined preferences based on geostrategic, humanitarian and electoral interests.

Geostrategic interests were mainly pushed by the French Department of Defense, while the Quai d'Orsay and, in particular, Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner had humanitarian and electoral objectives in mind. Nicolas Sarkozy, instead, saw in the operation an opportunity to implement his new "cost-saving" approach to Africa. Conversely, to UNAMID and INTERFET, EUFOR Chad-CAR was a security operation largely driven by interest groups *inside* the French government structures.

Few other EUFOR coalition members appeared to have had an equally strong preference intensity regarding the Chadian security crisis. Ireland certainly experienced some domestic societal pressure in favor of EUFOR Chad-CAR. The Irish military was interested in deploying to Chad because it represented an operational challenge. Various Irish NGOs also advocated coming to the rescue of Darfuri refugees in Chad and the CAR. Nevertheless, Ireland was internally divided, and this division diminished Ireland's overall preference intensity for EUFOR Chad-CAR. Sweden, particularly Foreign Minister Bildt, also appeared to be moderately interested in Chad. Overall, however, no EUFOR member was as eager to see the operation materialize as France.

6.4.2. COOPERATION IMPETUS

EUFOR Chad-CAR provides ample evidence that France initiated multilateral cooperation to maximize the political legitimacy of the operation. Given the controversial style of government of Chadian president Idriss Déby, France feared a domestic backlash if it intervened unilaterally in its former colony. To a lesser degree, France also sought to reduce the costs of the intervention by making use of the EU Athena mechanism.

6.4.3. SEARCH PROCESS

For a short time period, the French government succumbed to the illusion that EU member states would join the Chadian intervention without major hesitation since it was a joint "EU security operation." Thus, France's initial search strategy consisted of enlisting the services of the EU machinery in Brussels and organizing "official" EU force generation conferences (i.e., "auctions"). Soon, however, France realized that this plan was doomed to fail. Without diplomatic background work, no country would lift a finger. France thus started approaching all EU member states on a bilateral level. In addition, it contacted a relatively small number of non-EU and non-NATO states which qualified in terms of their military capacities as well as political relationships with France.

Overall, EUFOR Chad-CAR provides interesting empirical evidence that "peacekeeping auctions" do not work in a political "search environment." States know that holding out can increase the selective incentive they will receive for cooperating. As a result, their incentive to volunteer forces in an auction is minimal. The EUFOR Chad-CAR case also further confirms that explicit vulnerability considerations do not solely guide the search process. For instance, France did not approach third parties, which were particularly dependent on French development or military aid flows (e.g. African countries).

6.4.4. BARGAINING WITH IRELAND

Ireland was split in its support for Chad between the Irish Department of Defense, which favored the deployment, and the Irish Foreign Office, which very much opposed it. It seems very likely that Bertie Ahern sided with the DOD and against the concerns of the Irish Foreign Office in order to win French support for his candidacy as EU President. There is no evidence that France used coercive threats to influence Bertie Ahern (i.e., Sarkozy did

not openly threaten to veto Ahern's candidacy if he refused to send troops to Chad). The whole process appears to have unfolded cordially, although Ahern was certainly aware that France *did* hold a veto power over his candidacy. There is also no evidence that Ireland volunteered to send troops to Chad. Interestingly, Ahern's strategy to become EU President did not work out. Because of delays in the ratification process, the Lisbon Treaty only came into effect in December 2009. By then, Bertie Ahern had lost his job in Dublin due to his involvement in a financial scandal. In addition, his international reputation took a hit as the Irish economy crumbled in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008.

6.4.5. BARGAINING WITH ROMANIA

At the time France approached Romania to contribute troops to EUFOR Chad-CAR, Romania's Prime Minister and Romania's President were involved in political infighting. The French government had negotiated a side-deal with the Romanian Prime Minister. When the President found out about the deal, he vetoed the Romanian deployment by refusing to have it approved by the Romanian National Defense Council. The case-study provides no evidence that negotiations between France and Romania failed because of "technical" differences (e.g., differences over intervention strategies) or because the Romanian military was overstretched. Moreover, there is no evidence that Romania refused to participate because it doubted France's coercive capacities. It is interesting to note that France punished Romania once it withdrew from the deal by temporarily ignoring Romanian interests at the EU level.

6.5. CONCLUSION

EUFOR Chad-CAR further validates the prevalence of the *Market Model*. The theoretical predictions of the *Market Model* fit best with the empirical evidence of EUFOR Chad-CAR

when it comes to (1) the preference structure underpinning the EUFOR security coalition; (2) the cooperation impetus of the *Lead Nation;* and (3) the search strategy of the *Lead Nation.* My findings regarding dimensions four and five are again limited to only two instances of bilateral negotiations (France-Ireland and France-Romania) and therefore cannot be generalized to all other instances of EUFOR force generation negotiations. Still, the Ireland and Romania cases fit the *Market Model* well and thus serve as another set of illustrative cases.

CONCLUSION

Few foreign events capture public attention more than military interventions. Whether in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan or Sudan, arguments fly high about the risks and benefits of foreign deployments. Scholars have made important inroads to understanding the effects of these deployments on the political developments in the conflict theatre. Yet, much less is known about why countries sign up to serve in such security cooperation efforts. The purpose of this work was to fill this gap and show that security coalition formation processes are not random events but instead follow a systematic pattern.

THE ARGUMENT

In Chapter One I presented a causal pathway of how cooperation in security operation occurs. I called this pathway the *Market Model*. The model proposed that participants in security operations need to be divided into *Leaders* and *Laggards*. Leaders recruit laggards to minimize domestic opposition to the operation. The recruitment process proceeds via the International Security Cooperation Market. In this market, lead nations first search for and then bargain with potential troop-contributing countries. Successful recruitment is a function of the number of institutional ties that connect leaders and laggards; the more interconnected a leader-laggard pair, the greater the likelihood that the laggard will join the operation of the leader's choice. I argued that institutional connectedness minimizes the costs of side-deal bargains, in particular search costs, domestic adjustment costs, and enforcement costs. I juxtaposed the *Market Model* and three alternative pathways: the *Preference Convergence Model*, the *Auction Model* and the *Threat Model*. I contended that all four models can be observed empirically. Nevertheless, the *Market Model* is the most prevalent.

THE FINDINGS

I employed a mixed-methods research design to demonstrate the prevalence of the *Market Model*. In Chapter Two I developed detailed theoretical hypotheses for each one of the four casual pathways. These hypotheses varied by five dimensions: (1) the preference structures underpinning individual states' decision to cooperate; (2) their impetus for cooperation; (3) the search strategy pursued by lead nations; (4) the determinants of bargaining success; and (5) the mechanisms to minimize incomplete contracting. All case narratives were structured around these five dimensions to help the reader weigh the evidence in favor of each model. The findings per dimensions are sketched below. Overall, the three case studies strongly and consistently supported the theoretical expectations of the *Market Model*.

- *Preference structure*

In Chapter Two I suggested that the bulk of the existing literature proposes that security coalition members are "like-minded," i.e., that they share common preferences and preference intensities. Yet each of the three cases showed that preference intensities between coalition members varied.

In the case of UNAMID, the United States stood out as lead nation. The U.S. government's preferences on Darfur were shaped by a domestic mass movement, the Save Darfur Coalition. Several other countries also showed an interest in resolving the Darfur crisis. The United Kingdom and Norway faced pressure from humanitarian constituencies; Nigeria and South Africa wanted to prove their status as regional hegemons; and Egypt and Ethiopia, both bordering Sudan, feared conflict spillovers. Still, no country was as eager to see UNAMID materialize as the United States. Without U.S. leadership, UNAMID would not have seen the light.

A similar story can be told about INTERFET. Here, Australia served as lead nation. Its preference intensity also resulted from domestic mobilization in favor of intervention. Apart from Australia, Portugal was also intensely interested in resolving the East Timor crisis. Had it not espoused a blatantly anti-Indonesian bias, it would have served as lead nation of INTERFET alongside Australia. Nevertheless, Australian officials refused to cooperate with Portugal to preserve a neutral reputation of the force. In addition, France perceived the East Timor crisis as a good opportunity to prove its status as a "Pacific Power." Yet, its preference intensity was decidedly less strong than Australia's and Portugal's.

Finally, in EUFOR Chad-CAR, France served as undisputable lead nation. French preferences originated in geostrategic, humanitarian, and electoral concerns, which were being influenced by forces inside the French government. In addition to France, Ireland and Sweden both espoused a moderate interest in the EUFOR operation. Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt saw in EUFOR a good opportunity to push EU defense integration forward, while the Irish Department of Defense was on the lookout for a new peacekeeping deployment. Nonetheless, both countries would not have initiated EUFOR Chad-CAR.

The UNAMID case best illustrates how leadership in security operations is not always "voluntary." On the contrary, lead nations sometimes would prefer not to take the lead but cannot do so because the domestic costs of inaction are considered too high. Overall, the three cases depict the immense amount of political and diplomatic work the launch of a security operation requires from the lead nation. It sheds light on what "political will"—a buzz word when it comes to foreign interventions—actually entails. At the height of the establishment of UNAMID, the highest echelons of the U.S. government were involved in prodding countries to support the UNAMID endeavor—financially, politically or militarily.

❖ *Cooperation Impetus*

In Chapter Two, I mentioned that the existing literature is divided regarding the question of why cooperation in security operations occurs. One strand suggests that states join forces to enhance their overall problem-solving capacities. Another strand advances that domestic concerns motivate multilateral cooperation efforts: States seek legitimacy, want to cut costs, or want to overcome other domestic opposition. The three cases confirmed the latter proposition. In UNAMID, the U.S. military opposed a U.S. deployment to Darfur. The U.S. thus "outsourced" the operation to the United Nations. In INTERFET, the Australian government was politically afraid to "invade" Indonesia, a mayor military power, by itself. In EUFOR Chad-CAR, France sought political legitimacy but also wanted to cut costs by using the European Union as the umbrella organization.

❖ *Search Process*

The bulk of the existing literature has not engaged with the process of "searching for cooperation partners." It implicitly assumes that cooperation partners coalesce automatically out of a homogeneous need for collective action. Yet each of the three cases disconfirmed this assumption. In each case, the lead nation of the operation engaged in a search process to identify suitable cooperation partners. The challenge was to examine whether states systematically search for cooperation partners and, if so, what kind of system they employ. In Chapter Two, I proposed three possible search strategies. The *Auction Model* suggested that lead nations open a call for tender. The *Threat Model* advanced that lead nations first approach those states which are the most asymmetrically dependent (e.g., in terms of development aid and military assistance). Finally, the *Market Model* contended that lead nations use their institutional ties to find cooperation partners.

The empirical evidence provides greatest support for the theoretical hypothesis of the *Market Model*.

In UNAMID, the United States asked the United Nations to organize the force generation process. This step could indicate that an "auction mechanism" was at work. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not volunteer forces. Only when the United States appealed to governments individually did they indicate their willingness to contribute to UNAMID. It was more difficult to tease out how, exactly, U.S. diplomats determined which countries to approach. My field research revealed that the UNAMID search process was headed by the State Department's POL-MIL and Africa Bureaus. Both bureaus used a range of military and political data that they had collected through U.S. institutional networks to determine which countries would be most likely to sign up for UNAMID. It appears that asymmetrical dependence metrics were among the considered factors, but they did not determine the selection process.

A similar search pattern could be observed in INTERFET. Australia publicly declared to seek cooperation partners for INTERFET. Yet most countries did not approach Australia to volunteer forces. Instead, Australia approached them. Conversely to UNAMID, the INTERFET search process was operated by Australia's Department of Defense. Australia's search strategy also relied on data provided by Australia's embassies. Defense Department officials, however, also tapped into the alumni networks of Australia's military academies. Similar to UNAMID, Australia did not rely on asymmetrical dependence metrics alone to search for cooperation partners.

Finally, for EUFOR Chad-CAR, France initially wanted to "run an auction" through the European Union. Yet, it quickly realized that this method would not yield the desired

results and completely reverted to bilaterally approaching potential troop contributors. France thereby predominantly relied on its EU ties and other diplomatic contacts—not on asymmetrical dependence considerations.

Overall, the three cases provide interesting empirical evidence on how, in a "political" search environment, auction mechanisms do not work. States know that holding out can increase the selective incentive they expect to receive for cooperating. As a result, their incentive to volunteer forces in an auction is minimal. In addition, the UNAMID and EUFOR cases highlight the role international organization officials play in the search process. Both UNDPKO chief Jean-Marie Guéhenno and EU High Representative Javier Solana acted as "cooperation brokers," helping the United States and France respectively by suggesting potential cooperation partners and encouraging these countries to participate.

- *Determinants of Bargaining Success*

In Chapter Two I presented three alternative explanations of how bargaining success occurs. The *Preference Convergence Model* suggested that negotiations succeed if potential disagreements on "technical issues" (e.g., military strategy, operation planning and so on) can be overcome. The *Threat Model* proposed that negotiations are determined by the degree of asymmetrical dependence between leaders and laggards; the more dependent the laggard, the more likely it will be to join the operation. Finally, the *Market Model* argued that negotiation success is determined by concluding side-deals, which are largely a function of "domestic level" considerations. To empirically distinguish the *Threat Model* and the *Market Model*, I followed the following strategy. If an actor left the negotiations feeling its situation had improved, I considered it a "side-deal." On the other hand, if the actor felt

worse off than before the negotiations I considered it "coercion"—even if the actor acceded to the threat out of a sense of self-interest.

The UNAMID case study looked at two bargaining instances: U.S.-Nigeria and U.S.-Ukraine. I argue that the successful conclusion of the U S.-Nigeria negotiations can only be understood in the light of the parallel debt negotiations between Nigeria and the Paris Club. Nigeria was willing to serve as a U.S. deputy policeman in Darfur, but only if the United States would champion Nigerian debt relief. Nigeria was aware that the delivery of Charles Taylor to the Special Court of Sierra Leone would have had a similar effect on the United States. Nevertheless, for Nigeria such an exchange was domestically too costly. The side-deal on debt relief and Darfur thus allowed both countries to minimize domestic adjustment costs. For the United States, it would have been domestically more difficult to fund an equivalent amount of money (i.e., US$ 600 million) by shifting or creating new budget lines. I also contend that U.S.-Ukraine negotiations failed because of "domestic concerns." When the U.S. government approached Ukraine for UNAMID contributions, the Ukrainian government was deeply divided internally between the presidency and the parliament. The parliament stalled the conclusion of a side-deal between the United States and Ukraine because it would have strengthened the President's power over the parliament.

The INTERFET case study looked at force generation negotiations between Australia and Thailand and Australia and Malaysia. I argue that Thailand joined INTERFET because Australia's financial aid to Thailand during the Asian financial crisis and Australia's support for the Thai WTO candidate had engendered goodwill among leading officials in the Thai government. The use of this "Goodwill Account" enabled Australia to minimize domestic adjustment costs. Negotiations between Australia and Malaysia, on the other

hand, failed because of Australia's criticism of Dr. Mahathir's handling of the demolition of his political opponent, Anwar Ibrahim. Dr. Mahathir thought that participating in INTERFET would give credit to Australia and thus indirectly reinforce Australia's position in the Anwar Affair—a move which Mahathir perceived to be too costly domestically.

The EUFOR Chad-CAR case study examined force generation negotiations between France and Ireland and France and Romania. I contend that Ireland's participation in EUFOR Chad-CAR needs to be put next to Bertie Ahern's ambition to win French support for his candidacy as EU President. Bertie Ahern thus swung the balance of competing Irish domestic forces in favor of EUFOR participation—a move which also minimized French domestic adjustment costs. Regarding the failed force generation negotiations between France and Romania, I suggest that, similar to the Ukraine-U.S. case, domestic infighting caused the breakdown of the bargain. Romania's President was unwilling to accept a deal that had been negotiated by his archrival, the Romanian Prime Minister.

Overall, one of the surprising factors of my analysis of the six bargain instances is the lack of use of coercive threats. I only came across one instance in which overt threats were used, the negotiations between Australia and New Zealand regarding New Zealand's participation in INTERFET. I was told that New Zealand was initially reluctant to make a significant contribution to INTERFET. Australian government officials then threatened to revisit Australia's alliance commitment with New Zealand—the only alliance of which New Zealand was still a member. New Zealand then made the unprecedented decision to deploy almost half its military force to East Timor.[543] I asked many of my interview partners why they had been reluctant to use overt coercion in force generation negotiations. Many replied

[543] Author's Interview with high-ranking Australian official working for the Australian Defense Ministry, Canberra, December 2011.

that coercive threats had the potential to severely damage a bilateral relationship. Diplomats and government officials are proud people. Coercion can often have counterproductive effects and reinforce the less powerful country's will to "stand up to the bully." Coerced countries would try to retaliate in one form or another and potentially damage the lead nation. Often they would leak the threat attempt, a move which would have a negative effect on the public image of the coercing country. Overall, I received the impression that the political costs of using threats were not offset by any possible benefits.

- *Incomplete Contracting*

In Chapter Two, I suggested that incomplete contracting (e.g., the early withdrawal of forces) was a real threat in force generation negotiations. I proposed that lead nations will revert to various techniques to limit this risk. The *Auction Model* suggested that lead nations establish complex engagement treaties, including specific reporting requirements and gradual reward installments. The *Threat Model* advanced that lead nations use their asymmetrical power advantage in case a laggard defects from the agreement. The *Market Model* suggested that lead nations will make use of their institutional ties to prevent incomplete contracting.

Overall, my research produced only a small number of empirical observations regarding incomplete contracting. In the UNAMID case, Nigeria threatened to reconsider its Darfur deployment when the United States criticized the 2007 election fraud in Nigeria. When Nigeria made its intentions known, the U.S. government quickly sought reconciliation. In all other cases, the force contributing countries stayed in the field until the draw-down of the operation and my interview partners could not identify possible strategies they had pursued to prevent defection. The risk of incomplete contracting thus does not appear to be of major concern in force generation negotiations or at least in the cases I examined.

A major challenge of this research project was to generalize the findings of the in-depth case studies to the entire population of security operations conducted since the end of the Cold War. To do so, I designed a large-*N* regression analysis. My objective was to test whether there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between institutional connectedness and the likelihood of troop deployments. I compiled an original dataset of seventy-seven security operations and ran fifteen different statistical models. The results of the analysis presented in Chapter Three confirmed that institutional connectedness with the lead nation of a specific security operation has a positive and statistically significant impact on a country's decision to contribute troops to that same operation. For instance, the mean probability to participate in a security operation is roughly 11 percent. It increases by four points when we look at the 75th percentile of institutional ties between leaders and laggards and by fourteen points at the 90th percentile..

THE IMPLICATIONS

This work has important implications for both academic theory and political practice. It addresses, in particular, the three research areas below.

International Security Cooperation

Since the inception of IR research, alliance theory has been the dominant theoretical paradigm to analyze international security cooperation efforts. The results of this dissertation, however, suggest that alliances only play a secondary role in enabling international cooperation in the use of force.[544] In all three case studies, U.S., French, or Australian alliance partners did not bear the brunt of the cooperation effort. Similarly, the alliance coefficient in the quantitative analysis did not show any statistical significance.

[544] For a similar analysis, see e.g., Pierre 2002; Baltrusaitis 2009; Norris 2003; Tertrais 2004; Menon 2003; Dibb 2002.

This finding highlights the characteristics of the post-Cold War security environment, which has turned the functions of many military alliances upside down. While during the Cold War (and arguably before) alliances served as deterrence devices, today many alliances (e.g., NATO, ANZUS) have turned into institutions that help their members conduct individualized security operations.

Data on Security Operations

I produced an original dataset for this dissertation: the *Security Operation Dataset.* It represents a unique collection of security operation characteristics. In particular, I developed a coding technique to identify the lead nations of individual security operations based on UN Security Council statements and involvement in peace negotiations preceding the security operation. This dataset is publicly available on my website. Hopefully it will be put to good use to further advance our understanding of security operations.

Selective Incentives

In "The Logic of Collective Action," Olson famously developed the concept of "selective incentives." Olson's work, however, left a yawning theoretical gap by not addressing the question: who in a group of potential cooperation partners gets the selective incentives, and how is their value determined? This dissertation has attempted to remedy this shortcoming. It shows that selective incentives are systematically negotiated and distributed. More precisely, this dissertation proposes that, given a population of available cooperation candidates, the likelihood of receiving a selective incentive increases with the degree of institutional connectedness between the leader of the cooperation project and potential cooperating partners. In addition, the value of the selected incentive is a function of the potential cooperation partner's domestic preference structure.

By proposing this logic of selective incentives, I took into account the so-far largely overlooked difficulties of finding suitable cooperation partners in an environment of heterogeneous preference intensities and of overcoming domestic hurdles to selective incentive negotiations. I proposed that institutional ties can reduce both impediments; institutional connectedness provides the information necessary to reduce information asymmetries between potential cooperation partners and enlarges the possible range of issue-linkage opportunities. My emphasis on the importance of institutional ties builds on institutionalist theory, which for long has analyzed the effects of institutions on international politics. Arguments about institutions providing information, facilitating issue-linkages, and enabling credible commitments are thus not new.[545] What is new is the application of institutional theory to our understanding of how selective incentives are negotiated.

International Cooperation writ-large

Overall, this dissertation puts forward a new way of thinking with regard to how international security cooperation efforts develop. It proposes the idea of an international security cooperation market, in which "cooperation services" can be exchanged, all depending on the preference intensities of the individual market actors. I argue that this market exists parallel to traditional collective action efforts; if no 'like-minded' cooperation partners can be found, the market is used to fill the gaps. In this market, power assets, whether in the economic, institutional, or security sphere, become not only fungible but tradable. Efficiency in this market is gained via institutional connectedness; the more connected an actor, the more information and flexibility it has available, and the cheaper its cooperation bargains.

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[545] E.g., Keohane 1984; Martin 1992, 1994; Davis 2004; Lohmann 1997; Frieden 1994; Weber and Wiesmeth 1991; Eichengreen and Frieden 1993; Moravcsik 1998.

FUTURE RESEARCH AVENUES

Many additional theoretical and empirical puzzles have arisen while I was working on this dissertation. In this section I detail those directions of future research that appear the most interesting.

Expanding the Scope of the "International Security Cooperation Market"

This dissertation proposes the existence of an international security cooperation market. Nevertheless, I think it is highly likely that a similar "cooperation market" also exists in other issue areas. The assumption that international cooperation partners coalesce automatically is most likely inaccurate, not only with regards to security cooperation, but also cooperation in human rights, the environment, or other issue areas. In each of these areas, preference intensities vary among cooperation partners. As a result, states which are highly interested in a specific cooperation objective require searching for additional cooperating partners. Furthermore, such cooperation candidates need to be induced to cooperate via incentives exogenous to the cooperation objective. Reasons to seek less-interested cooperation partners in issue areas outside of the security sphere might be of a technical nature. For instance, it makes little sense to implement an air pollution agreement in one country, if firms can easily relocate or if air pollution crosses the border from the implementing country to the next. To investigate the existence of these markets appears, to me, an interesting future research endeavor.

The Goodwill Account

The "Goodwill Account," which was instrumental in getting Thailand to join INTERFET, raises a set of theoretical and empirical questions. Despite the fact that no country has a guaranteed "right of retrieval," goodwill appears to play a major role in international

diplomacy. On what causal mechanism, then, is the goodwill account built? Rationality? Socialization? Affinity? Is the accumulated "goodwill balance" lost if governments change? Are authoritarian regimes more likely to keep track of goodwill because they stay longer in power? Do only head of states keep goodwill accounts, or do also lower-ranking government officials? All these are interesting questions for future research.

Why do Lead Nations lead?

This dissertation has generated new data on leadership in security operations. This data could be used to improve our understanding of the underlying motivational structures driving states to take military action in specific conflict theaters. In this dissertation, I limited myself to describing the preference formation process in lead nations without establishing a systematic pattern explaining leadership in security operations. It might be interesting to research whether such a systematic pattern indeed exists. In addition, future research might also look at whether the type of leader or the structure of the coalition influence the intervention outcome? So far no theoretical studies exist which answer these questions. Many scholarly studies have examined whether "peacekeeping works."[546] Nevertheless no study has analyzed whether some leaders and/or coalitions are more successful than others.

Where does institutional connectedness come from?

This dissertation is agnostic with regard to the origins of bilateral institutional connectedness. One possibility is bilateral interest affinity. Another possibility is cultural affinity or rational necessity (e.g., neighboring countries might have more issues in common

[546] E.g., Fortna 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Walter 2002.

that require an institutional resolution than other country dyads). Resolving this question would be another important research endeavor.

CONCLUSION

At its core, this dissertation is about advancing our knowledge of how international security cooperation occurs. Each security operation provides an intriguing example of how sovereign states manage to collaborate; how coalitions are formed; and how collective action is achieved. Nevertheless, the empirical observations generated by this work also recount tales of power and the limitations of power, of decision-making and bargaining. Each case study addresses the complexity of international diplomacy. It illustrates human perplexity in face of crises but also fierce determination to overcome difficulties and deadlock. Each case combines idealism with power politics, showing the strongest actors as weak and the weakest actors as strong.

Overall, this work arrestingly demonstrates the existence of a world order in which each state in the global system sets its own priorities depending on the domestic societal pressures it faces. This results in an unequal diffusion of preferences and power—a constellation, which provides the impetus for side-deals, the fundamental dynamic of the *International Security Cooperation Market*.

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Appendix I

Interview Partner

Princeton November 2009

1. Carlos Pinzon, former Deputy-Defense Minister of Colombia

Brussels December 2009

2. Artur Stam, Defense Attaché, Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU
3. Bert Versmessen, Diplomat, Belgian Permanent Representation to the EU
4. Joanna Janiszewska, Head of CSDP Unit, Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the EU
5. Pete Piirainen, Diplomat, Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU
6. Milica Neacsu, Diplomat, Romanian Permanent Representation to the EU
7. Keith McBean, Ambassador, Permanent Representation to the EU

Vienna July 2010

8. Peter Pilz, Member of the Austrian Parliament for the Green Party, Spokesperson for Security and Defense Policy
9. Stefan Prähauser, Member of Austrian Parliament for the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) (phone interview)
10. Stefan Hirsch, Spokesperson for Austrian Defense Minister Norbert Darabos
11. Arnold Kammel, Secretary-General, Austria Institute for European and Defense Studies
12. Peter Steyer, Austrian Green Party, European Policy Unit
13. Ursula Plassnik, former Austrian Foreign Minister
14. Peter Huber, Head of International Organization Bureau, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
15. Klaus Roch, First Lieutenant, commanding officer in EUFOR Chad-CAR (per email)
16. Rainer Trischak, Brigadier, Defense Policy Division, Austrian Ministry of Defense
17. George Lennkh, Head of Africa Bureau, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
18. Dr. Gerhard Jandl, Head of Defense Policy Bureau, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New York September – December 2010

19. Noufou Beremwoudougou, Military Attaché, Burkina Faso Mission to the UN
20. Paul Badji, Ambassador, Senegal Mission to the UN
21. Abdoulaye Badiane, Military Attaché, Senegal Mission to the UN
22. Kokou Nayo M'Beou, Secretary, Togo Mission to the UN
23. Gustavo Formento, Military Attaché, Uruguay Mission to the UN
24. Martin Vidal, Military Attaché, Uruguay Mission to the UN
25. Federico Perazza, Military Attaché, Uruguay Mission to the UN

Paris January-February 2011

26. Patrick Hebrard, Former Member of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff
27. Stephane Gruenberg, Head of Central Africa Unit, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
28. Jean-Philippe Ganascia, EUFOR Chad-CAR Force Commander
29. Damien Helly, Researcher, EUISS
30. Zaki Laidi, Professor, Sciences Po Paris

31. Pierre Sabatié-Garat, former Admiral in French Navy, former Director of Strategic Planning at EADS
32. Pierre Buhler, Director for International Cooperation, former diplomatic advisor of French Defense Minister Alain Richard, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
33. Edgar Buckley, Marking Director Europe, Thales
34. Antoine Devaux, former Director of Operations at the EU Military Staff in Brussels
35. Alexis Lamek, Deputy-Director for Political Affairs, International Organization Bureau, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
36. Bernard Thorette, former Chief of the French Army, former Chief of Staff of the office of the French Defense Minister Alain Richard
37. Pascal Asseur, Secretary, International Organization Bureau, French Defense Ministry
38. Michel Miraillet, Chief of Strategic Planning, French Defense Ministry
39. Bernard Kouchner, former French Foreign Minister
40. Roland Marchal, Researcher CRNS
41. Patrice van Ackeren, Chief of Staff of the office of the President of the Defense Committee in the French National Assembly
42. Raphael Pouyé, former political advisor to EUFOR Force Commander Jean-Philippe Ganascia

Brussels February 2011

43. Xavier Paitard, French Ambassador to NATO, former Chief of Staff of the office of French Defense Minister Hervé Morin
44. Victor Angelo, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to the UN mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT)
45. Pierre Seailles, Liaison Officer Commission-Council during EUFOR Chad-RCA, European External Action Service

Dublin May 2011

46. Dan Harvey, former Spokesperson for EUFOR Operation Commander General Pat Nash
47. Busso von Alvensleben, German Ambassador to Ireland, former Director of Global Affairs, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs
48. John Biggar, Director for Security Policy, Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
49. Colm O'Floinn, former Director for Security Policy (2005-2008), Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
50. Gerry Fitzgerald, former Deputy Force Commander in the UN operation MINURCAT
51. Gerald Aherne, former Deputy Force Commander in the UN operation MINURCAT
52. Brian Reade, former Chief of Operations in the UN operation MINURCAT
53. General Pat Nash, former Operation Commander of EUFOR Chad-CAR
54. Seamus O'Giollain, former member of EUFOR Chad-CAR HQ staff, Irish Defense Ministry
55. Michael Howard, Secretary General, Irish Defense Ministry
56. Adrien McDaid, Foreign Affairs Attaché, Irish Embassy Washington D.C. (phone interview)

Princeton October – November 2011

57. Francesc Vendrell, former UN Special Envoy to East Timor
58. Asle Toje, Researcher at Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway

Australia November – December 2011

59. Chris Barrie, former Chief the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Australian Defense Ministry
60. Gary Bornholt, former Military Attaché, Australian Mission to the UN (1996-2000) and Australian Embassy in Washington DC (2002-2006)
61. Alan Ryan, Director of Research, Australian Defense College
62. David Connery, Professor, Australian National University
63. Mike Scrafton, former Director of East Timor Policy Unit, Australian Defense Ministry
64. Peter Jennings, former Deputy-Director of East Timor Policy Unit, Australian Defense Ministry
65. John Howard, former Australian Prime Minister (specifically asked for confidentiality)
66. Alexander Downer, former Australian Foreign Minister
67. Mike Smith, former Deputy-Commander of the UN mission to East Timor UNTAET
68. David Horner, Professor, Australian National University
69. Bill Fischer, Former Australian Ambassador to Thailand (specifically asked for confidentiality)
70. Bob Cotton, Former Australian High Commissioner to Malaysia
71. Hugh White, former Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence, Australian Ministry of Defense
72. Matthew Skoien, former INTERFET Policy Officer, Australian Defense Ministry
73. Michael Keating, former Director INTERFET Strategic Branch, Australian Defense Ministry
74. Steve Ayling, former Director of INTERFET Strategic Planning, Australian Defense Ministry
75. John Blaxland, former Australian Military Attaché to Thailand
76. David Coghlan, former INTERFET planning staff, Australian Ministry of Defense

Washington D.C. February-March 2012

77. Kim Holmes, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (2001-2004), U.S. Department of State
78. Williams Martin, Deputy Director Peace Operations, International Organization Bureau, U.S. Department of State
79. Charles Snyder, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 2003-2004, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs (2000-2003), U.S. Department of State
80. Alan Goulty, former Sudan Envoy, UK Foreign Office
81. Jacki Wilson, former Military Attaché, U.S. Embassy Nairobi
82. John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the United Nations
83. Steve Cohen, Researcher, Brookings Institutions
84. Brig. Abdullah Dogar, Military Attaché, Pakistan Embassy Washington D.C.
85. Mike Smith, Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI) Program Manager, U.S. Department of State
86. Richard Hecklinger, former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (phone interview)
87. Ann-Louise Colgan, former Director of Research, Africa Action
88. Abi Williams, former Adviser to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan

89. Lincoln Bloomfield, former Assistant Secretary of State for POLMIL Affairs (2001-2003) (phone interview)
90. Andrew Natsios, former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
91. Jonathan Morgenstein, ACOTA Trainer Rwanda (phone interview)

Nigeria May 2012

92. Martin Luther Agwai, former Chief of Army Staff, former Chief of Defense Staff, former Force Commander of the AU operation to Darfur (AMIS) and the UN operation to Darfur (UNAMID)
93. Obobolaji Olarinmoye, Researcher, Princeton-Oxford Program on Global Governance
94. Prof. Remi Ogun, Professor of Economics, University of Ibadan
95. Prof. Issac Albert, Head of Institute for African Studies, University of Ibadan
96. Prof. OBC Nwolise, Professor of Political Science, Head of Political Sciences Department, University of Ibadan
97. Prof. Ifeanyi Onyeonoru, Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Ibadan
98. Dr Tajudeen Akanji, Professor of Conflict Resolution, University of Ibadan
99. Prof. Olutayo Adesina, Professor of History, University of Ibadan
100. Dr Emmanuel Remi Aiyede, Professor of Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria
101. Col Ryan McMullen, Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Abuja
102. Charles Neary, Political Counselor, U.S. embassy in Abuja (specifically asked for confidentiality)
103. Matthias Veltin, Deputy Ambassador, German Embassy Abuja
104. General Adulrahman Danbazau, former Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army
105. Col. ATB Ahmed, Colonel, Nigerian Army
106. General Ishaku Danladi Pennap, Head of Peace Operation Planning, Nigerian Army

Washington July 2012

107. Bill Taylor, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine

Princeton July 2012

108. Ambassador Jim Gadsden, U.S. Department of State (retired)

Sample Interview Questions

For Lead Nations:

1) Preference Structure

When did you first contemplate launching operation X?

What were the factors in favor and against intervention? What position did you defend? Was this opinion shared by your colleagues? If not, why not?

What about other countries? Did they share your country's intervention concerns?

2) Cooperation Impetus

Why didn't you intervene unilaterally?

Why did you pick X institution as an umbrella organization?

3) Search Process

Which countries were considered potential participants? All? Only a subset? If the latter, how was such a subset selected?

Did those countries approach your country or did you approach them?

Did you country collaborate with these countries prior to the operation? If so in which areas? What kind of information did your country have about these potential participants prior to the negotiations?

Did military capabilities of the laggards matter? Other technical skills?

What was the role of institution X in the force generation process?

4) Determinants of Bargaining Success

How were laggards compensated? Did your country announce a specific reward for potential participants? Did the laggards themselves propose the reward? How was the amount of the reward determined?

Were several possible reward under consideration? If so how was the winning deal picked?

Were domestic costs of importance during the negotiation process? Did you consider public opinion concerns?

5) Incomplete Contracting

Were you confident that these countries would do a good job in the theater? Were there any worries that the laggards would defect? How was the risk of defection minimized?

Did you sign a bilateral cooperation agreement? What is the value of such agreement?

For Laggards:

1) Preference Structure

How was your relationship with the target country prior to the intervention? Have you been involved in the conflict beforehand?

When did you first hear about a possible military intervention in country X?

How did you react to such possible intervention? How did people around you react?

What arguments came up in internal discussions regarding a potential troop contribution by your country? What was your personal opinion? Did your colleagues/subordinates defend different opinions?

Was there a debate about how many troops you would contribute? What were the key factors resolving this debate?

2) Search Process

Did you interact with other countries during the decision-making process? Which countries were these? Have you had prior interactions with these countries? If so why and in which policy area?

How and where did these interactions take place? How did you prepare for such interactions? What did you talk about in these meetings?

3) Determinants of Bargaining Success

Did your negotiation partner offer special incentives to motivate your contribution? Did you ask for such incentives? If so, what type of incentive? Was there a range of possible incentives? How did you pick the one you got?

Did you feel strong in the negotiations? Did you get the impression that your negotiation partner valued your contribution? What did your negotiation partner value the most about you? Military capabilities? Your good international reputation? The ease he could negotiate with you?

4) Incomplete Contracting

Did your country ever think about defecting from the deployment agreement e.g., withdrawing your troops early?

Appendix II

Summary Statistics: Security Operations Dataset

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
year	14104	1997.22	4.389879	1990	2005
pn_{iot}	14104	0.1367697	0.3436163	0	1
pnc_{iot}	14104	0.0532473	0.2245342	0	1
$log(total)_{iot}$	13944	0.436051	1.41655	0	11.51293
ccode3 [COW code for target state]	14104	469.1614	210.6045	41	940
adhoc	14104	0.1471923	0.3543101	0	1
au	14104	0.0366563	0.1879231	0	1
cis	14104	0.0367981	0.1882724	0	1
ecowas	14104	0.0612592	0.2398137	0	1
eu	14104	0.0605502	0.2385119	0	1
nato	14104	0.0841605	0.2776382	0	1
sadc	14104	0.024532	0.1546995	0	1
un	14104	0.5121242	0.4998707	0	1
australia	14104	0.0974901	0.2966345	0	1
france	14104	0.3877623	0.4872572	0	1
germany	14104	0.1678247	0.3737238	0	1
italy	14104	0.1923568	0.3941658	0	1
nigeria	14104	0.0366563	0.1879231	0	1
russia	14104	0.1815797	0.3855114	0	1
southafrica	14104	0.0489223	0.2157132	0	1
uk	14104	0.2166052	0.4119459	0	1
usa	14104	0.5471497	0.4977896	0	1
$lnpn_s3un_{iot-1}$	14104	0.2533507	0.3851871	-1	1.048342
$lnpn_sunglob_{iot-1}$	14104	0.4298355	0.3406345	0	1
$lnpn_swtglob_{iot-1}$	14104	0.2682224	0.2985655	-0.378109	1
$lnpn_tauglob_{iot-1}$	14104	0.0303577	0.2083404	-0.366825	1
$log(pntn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1}$	14095	-0.3968149	3.184862	-31.6707	0
$log(pntn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1}$	14095	-1.782658	6.188814	-31.88122	0
$log(lnpn_trade/gdppn)_{iot-1}$	14104	-12.33243	7.77931	-31.37563	0
$log(lnpn_aid/gdppn)_{iot-1}$	14104	-4.508052	8.669951	-31.5066	0
pn_cinc_{iot-1}	14104	0.0051112	0.014969	8.04E-07	0.1565447
$pn_polity2_{iot-1}$	12079	2.179319	6.884275	-10	10
pn_gdppc_{iot-1}	14104	5835.264	10200.57	84.28445	100502.6
$pnconflict_{iot}$	14104	0.2506381	0.4333959	0	1

$pnconflict_{iot-1}$	13466	0.2193673	0.4138333	0	1
$pn_repintn_{iot-1}$	14104	0.8925128	0.3097427	0	1
$pntncomlang_{iot}$	14104	0.0424702	0.2016665	0	1
$Pntn_contiguity_{iot}$	14098	0.0341183	0.1815395	0	1
$pntn_sameregion_{iot}$	14098	0.1948503	0.3960995	0	1
pn_simd_{iot}	14104	0.6464124	1.155058	0	7
$lnpn_InstCon_{iot-1}$	14104	109.8923	119.4987	0	1018
$lnpn_alliance_{iot-1}$	14104	0.2208593	0.6072795	0	8
$lnpn_Bilatnm_{iot-1}$	14104	34.55162	59.19435	0	615
$lnpn_igomaxst_{iot-1}$	14104	10.8711	11.14279	0	89
$lnpn_igomedst_{iot-1}$	14104	2.664209	3.56412	0	38
$lnpn_igominst_{iot-1}$	14104	5.04949	7.395635	0	73