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The Social Consequences of Subnational Restrictionist Immigration Policies in the U.S.

Flores, Rene Daniel

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THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SUBNATIONAL RESTRICTIONIST IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE U.S.

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A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
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Advisor: Edward Telles

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Abstract

As immigrants have moved beyond traditional immigrant gateways in recent years, local and state restrictive immigrant ordinances have proliferated. Although scholars have studied the determinants of these policies, we still know little about their social consequences.

In Chapter 2, I draw on ethnographic and interview data collected between 2007 and 2011 in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, which passed an anti-immigrant ordinance in 2006. I find that the law affected both immigrants and natives alike. It motivated anti-immigrant activism, hardened native views of Hispanics (regardless of documentation status), and increased native whites' fears of lawlessness and crime.

Chapter 3 examines whether similar restrictionist immigration policies also increased local concern about crime and disorder beyond Hazleton. I find that the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances was associated with a 6 percent increase in handgun sales in the Pennsylvania counties in which these policies were formally considered. I find that local newspapers increasingly published stories linking immigrants with crime following the proposal of these policies. I argue that these menacing portrayals of immigrants had the unintended effect of increasing social anxiety, which increased gun purchases. These results are replicated using concealed gun permits data from South Carolina.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine the impact of Arizona's SB 1070, a controversial law that required local authorities to verify the documentation of individuals suspected of being undocumented, on public sentiment towards immigrants. Using sentiment analysis and a difference-in-difference estimation technique to analyze more than 300,000 tweets published in Nevada and Arizona in 2010, I find that the implementation of SB 1070 had a significant negative impact on the sentiment of messages regarding immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics posted by Twitter users in Arizona. In contrast, the bill did not affect public discourse on Asians or African-Americans.

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Table of Contents

Abstract……III

Acknowledgments……IV

1. **Introduction**……7

2. **Living in the Eye of the Storm: How did Hazleton's Restrictive Immigration Ordinance Affect Local Interethnic Relations?**…….. ..9

Chapter Two tables and figures……. 30

3. **Taking the Law into Their Own Hands: Do Local Anti-immigrant Ordinances Increase Gun Sales?** ……. 32

Chapter Three tables and figures…… 56

4. **Do Anti-immigrant Laws Shape Public Opinion?: A Study of Arizona's SB 1070 using Twitter data** ……. 71

Chapter Four tables and figures…… 101

Conclusions…… 118

References…… 123

1. Introduction

In the last few years, Hispanic immigrants, led by Mexicans, have moved beyond traditional immigrant gateways like New York and California to settle in small, rural communities in the East Coast, Southeast, and Midwest that have little or no experience with migration (Marrow, 2011; Massey, 2008; Zúñiga & Hernández-León, 2005).

This rapid geographic dispersion has often resulted in political opposition, and by 2009, more than 200 U.S. communities had considered anti-immigrant ordinances (O'Neil 2011). These laws include fines for employers and landlords of undocumented immigrants, bans on foreign flags, English-only declarations, and 287(g) provisions, which is a federal program that allows local police officers to enforce federal immigration laws. Along with municipalities, states have also challenged federal preeminence over immigration legislation. In 2005, there were 300 immigration-related bills proposed by state legislatures. By 2007, the number of introduced immigration bills had grown by more than 500% (Hegen 2008).

Research has already shown that immigration policies enacted by the federal government can shape immigrants' outcomes (Donato and Armenta 2011; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Portes and Zhou 1993). Nevertheless, considering the increasing trend of states and municipalities legislating on immigration, scholars have called for research that examines the potential impact of these subnational policies on immigrants' experiences (Donato and Armenta 2011; Jones-Correa and Fennelly 2009; Tienda and Fuentes 2014; Varsanyi et al. 2010).

In this dissertation, I conduct one of the first systematic analyses of the social consequences of these subnational restrictionist policies. I rely on ethnographic, administrative, and social media data collected in Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Arizona, and Nevada. In Chapter 2, I draw on ethnographic and interview data collected between 2007 and 2011 in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, which passed an anti-immigrant ordinance in 2006. I find that the law affected both immigrants and natives alike. It motivated anti-immigrant activism, hardened native views of Hispanics (regardless of documentation status), and increased native whites' fears of lawlessness and crime.

Chapter 3 examines whether similar restrictionist immigration policies also increased local concern about crime and disorder beyond Hazleton. I find that the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances was associated with a 6 percent increase in handgun sales in the Pennsylvania counties in which these policies were formally considered. I find that local newspapers increasingly published stories linking immigrants with crime following the proposal of these policies. I argue that these menacing portrayals of immigrants had the unintended effect of increasing social anxiety, which increased gun purchases. These results are replicated using concealed gun permits data from South Carolina.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine the impact of Arizona's SB 1070, a controversial law that required local authorities to verify the documentation of individuals suspected of being undocumented, on public sentiment towards immigrants. Using sentiment analysis and a difference-in-difference estimation technique to analyze more than 300,000 tweets published in Nevada and Arizona in 2010, I find that the implementation of SB 1070 had a significant negative impact on the sentiment of messages regarding immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics posted by Twitter users in Arizona. In contrast, the bill did not affect public discourse on Asians or African-Americans.

My research contributes to two debates within the sociology of immigration. First, in contrast to other scholars optimistic about Hispanic immigrant incorporation in new destinations, I demonstrate that the recent spread of local and state restrictionist policies often cast a shadow on Hispanics' ability to successfully incorporate into these communities. Second, my research highlights the importance of examining micro-political contexts of reception, such as municipalities and counties, to understand immigrant outcomes. In addition, it contributes to the policy feedback effects literature by providing evidence of the extra-legal implications of punitive laws. More specifically, my research shows that even policies that do not provide direct benefits to any group, like punitive immigration policies, can still stimulate natives' political mobilization.

Chapter 2: Living in the Eye of the Storm: How did Hazleton's Restrictive Immigration Ordinance Affect Local Interethnic Relations?·

Within the past few years, Hispanic immigrants, led by Mexicans, have increasingly moved beyond "traditional" immigrant gateways and have settled in smaller, often rural communities in the East Coast, Southeast, and Midwest that have little or no experience with migration (Marrow, 2011; Massey, 2008; Zúñiga & Hernández-León, 2005).

This rapid geographic dispersal raises critical questions of whether immigrants will be able to incorporate in these new destinations. Waters and Jiménez (2005) argued that racial and ethnic hierarchies are less crystallized in these new areas and that immigrants may have "more freedom to define their position" (p. 117). Although some scholars argue that Hispanic newcomers are having relatively positive experiences in these communities (Marrow, 2009), many of these immigrants are increasingly encountering organized political opposition (O'Neil, 2011; Parrado, 2012; Varsanyi, 2010). By 2009, more than 200 U.S. towns and counties had considered anti-immigrant ordinances (Donato & Rodríguez, 2014). In addition, several states, including Arizona, Mississippi, and Alabama, have enacted strict restrictionist immigration laws (Flores 2014a).

These recent developments reveal two significant gaps in the academic literature. First, although migration scholars have long argued that the national context of reception, largely structured by federal government policies, is a crucial factor that shapes the life outcomes of immigrants (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996), the increased willingness of towns and municipalities to legislate on immigration matters highlights the potential importance of micro-contexts of reception for the process of immigrant incorporation (Donato & Armenta, 2011; Jones-Correa & Fennelly, 2009).

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Second, although some researchers have studied local anti-immigrant policies, they have mostly attempted to understand their causes rather than their consequences (Hopkins, 2010; O'Neil, 2011; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010). Yet, there is growing evidence that these ordinances shaped the communities in which they were proposed (Ebert & Ovink, in press; Szkupinski Quiroga, Medina, & Glick, 2014).

I contribute to this nascent literature by assessing how the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance in 2006 shaped the social climate of Hazleton, a working-class Pennsylvania town whose actions inspired similar legislation across the country (Longazel, 2013). More specific, I examine (1) how the ordinance influenced native whites' perceptions of Latino immigrants, (2) how it affected immigrants' social interactions with native whites, and (3) how non-Hispanic whites responded in both the short and medium terms to the social changes set in motion by the ordinance. I rely on semi-structured interviews and ethnographic data, which I collected in 2007 and 2011.

Legal Context of Reception

A robust literature in migration studies shows that the national context of reception, largely structured by government policies, powerfully shapes the life outcomes of immigrants (Donato & Armenta, 2011; Menjívar & Abrego, 2012; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Punitive national immigration policies can negatively affect immigrant outcomes (Massey & Gelatt, 2010; Phillips & Massey, 1999). However, given the increasing willingness of states and municipalities to legislate on immigration matters, it is critical for social scientists to study how the resulting subnational policies are shaping the experiences of immigrants (Donato & Armenta, 2011; Jones-Correa & Fennelly, 2009; Varsanyi, 2010).

Some scholars have been relatively optimistic about Hispanics' prospects for successful incorporation in the United States (Alba & Nee, 2003; Kasinitz et al., 2009; Marrow, 2009; Waters & Jiménez, 2005). Some of them believe that Hispanics are socially closer to whites than are blacks. As evidence, they cite Hispanics' lower levels of residential segregation (Wilkes & Iceland, 2004), higher rates of intermarriage (Qian & Lichter, 2007), and more fluid racial identities (Lee & Bean, 2007). Some even argue that Hispanics may follow in the footsteps of European immigrants and become "white" (Warren & Twine, 1997). In contrast,

African Americans' highly racialized experiences make them an exceptional case (Gans, 1999; Kasinitz et al., 2009). Such optimism has also extended to research on Hispanics' experiences in new immigrant destinations. Marrow (2009) used ethnographic data from rural North Carolina, a new destination in the South, and found that Hispanics, even those who are "dark-skinned, poor, and undocumented" (p. 2), are having relatively positive experiences with native whites. She then argued that Hispanics are becoming incorporated in the rural Southern racial structure in the advantaged side of the "black/non-black" color line (Marrow, 2009).

The recent proliferation of local and state anti-immigrant laws, however, could potentially derail immigrants' prospects for successful incorporation. In 2006, the city council of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, made international headlines by passing the Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA), a strict immigration ordinance that fined employers and landlords of undocumented immigrants and established English as the official language of the local government (Longazel, 2013). A wave of local anti-immigrant laws soon spread throughout Pennsylvania and beyond. By 2009, 215 towns and counties in the United States had considered anti-immigrant ordinances and 156 (72.6%) had passed them (O'Neil, 2011). These ordinances include fines for employers and landlords of undocumented immigrants, day-laborer bans, English-as-official-language declarations, restrictions on flying foreign flags, and 287(g) provisions, which is a federal program that allows local police officers to enforce some federal immigration laws.

Nevertheless, we still have little systematic evidence of how local anti-immigrant ordinances shape the social reality of the communities in which they are proposed. Until now, researchers have mostly attempted to understand the causes rather than the consequences of such policies (Hopkins, 2010; O'Neil, 2011; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010).

However, a growing body of research shows that punitive ordinances could have tangible social consequences for immigrants (Esbenshade, Wright, Cortopassi, Reed, & Flores, 2010; Furuseth & Smith, 2010; Longazel, 2013; Wilson, Singer, & DeRenzis, 2010). Furuseth and Smith (2010) argued that the proposal of several restrictive immigration measures in Meckenburg County, North Carolina, led Latino immigrants to change their lifestyles by "going underground" to be less visible. Similarly, Menjívar and Abrego (2012) argued that

Central American immigrants living in Maricopa County, which signed a 287(g) agreement in 2007, live in a constant state of fear and anxiety. For these immigrants, "deportability is palpable in daily life, as even commuting between home and work or shopping for groceries involves 'anguish' and careful deliberation to avoid the possibility of being separated from loved ones" (p. 1401).

Punitive subnational immigration laws have also been associated with increased reports of discrimination among Hispanics (Ebert & Ovink, in press). In addition, recent evidence suggests that their effects may extend beyond the undocumented population. Szkupinski Quiroga and her collaborators (2014) found that after the passage of Arizona's SB 1070, even U.S.-born Latinos reported negative experiences with authorities and employers, although these policies' effects were especially severe among unauthorized immigrants.

Although insightful, previous studies have often relied primarily on immigrant accounts or media sources (for an exception, see Donato & Rodríguez, 2014). Also, some of them focus on these communities at the peak of ethnic animosities when ordinances have just been proposed, which could magnify the perceived effects of these laws. To address these shortcomings, in this chapter, I rely on interview and ethnographic data that I collected in the summers of 2007 and 2011 in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, to understand the short- and medium-term social ramifications of these laws for both immigrants and natives.

The Expressive Effects of Laws

Part of the complexity in assessing the consequences of local anti-immigrant ordinances is that the majority of them were not actually implemented (O'Neil, 2011). This is so because some of them were blocked in court by lawsuits brought by the ACLU and other civil rights groups. In addition, other ordinances merely reassert the inability of undocumented immigrants to access social services, which highlights their symbolic status "since they seek to bar undocumented immigrants from accessing services that were already unavailable to them" (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012, p. 1395).

Law and society scholars have argued that laws can have social consequences not only through their direct enforcement mechanisms such as fines and penalties but also through

more indirect or "symbolic" channels (Berkowitz & Walker, 1967). From this perspective, laws have "expressive" or "symbolic" effects by making implicit normative statements or "sending a message" about forbidden behaviors, which influence individuals' moral assessments of them (Berkowitz & Walker, 1967; Sunstein, 1996). Hence, rather than acting in accordance with the law out of fear of legal punishment, as rational actor approaches would have it, individuals internalize the moral code that is implicit within the spirit of the law (Suchman, 1997). Such moral internalization is more likely when the laws' messages are clear and unambiguous, when they are widely publicized in the media, and when they are endorsed by public figures (Sunstein, 1996).

Using this theoretical framework, we would expect that local anti-immigrant ordinances could have tangible social consequences even if they lack enforcement mechanisms because they send a message about the illegitimacy and undesirability of immigrants, they are widely publicized in the media, and they are typically proposed and promoted by politicians themselves. By defining immigrants as an illegitimate group that drains local resources and augments social problems, these ordinances could negatively influence people's moral assessments of both immigrants and Hispanics, since these categories often overlap. At the same time, it is not entirely clear that these policies will be perceived as targeting all immigrants or Hispanics. In fact, oftentimes the authors of these laws state that these policies are not meant to single out any specific ethnic or racial group but only those individuals lacking proper documentation (Kruse, 2011; Menjívar & Abrego, 2012; O'Neil, 2011).

Laws and Group Boundaries

Can laws affect the configuration of boundaries around minority groups? Local anti-immigrant laws could harden the ethnic boundaries around immigrants by legitimizing their outside position and by signaling residents that there is a general consensus about their illegitimacy.

Lamont and Molnár (2002) argued that there are symbolic and social boundaries that separate different groups in every society. Whereas symbolic boundaries are "conceptual distinctions made by social actors . . . [that] separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership," social boundaries come into existence only

when there is wide agreement about the character of a social division and, thus, they take a constraining character, for example, citizenship laws. The transformation of symbolic boundaries into social ones, a process often referred to as *institutionalization*, reflects ongoing struggles to define the nature of such division, and hence to regulate access to privilege and status, between social groups (Lamont & Molnár, 2002).

The nature of the native-immigrant boundary is crucial since it "fundamentally affects the processes by which individuals gain access to the opportunities afforded by the majority" (Alba, 2005, p. 22). Alba argued that whereas "blurry" or ambiguous boundaries permit for "ambiguous locations with respect to the boundary" (p. 22) and more inclusion in the mainstream, "bright" boundaries are unambiguous and harder to cross and, therefore, have higher costs associated with boundary crossing. These costs include growing distance from peers, feelings of disloyalty, and concerns about acceptance. In this sense, local anti-immigrant laws could potentially brighten the boundary between natives and immigrants, affecting the capacity of immigrants, and more generally of Hispanics, to cross it to join mainstream society.

Data and Methods

Hazleton, Pennsylvania, is a working-class city of about 25,000 in northeastern Pennsylvania largely populated by the descendants of Southern and Eastern European miners who arrived in the area in the 19th and 20th centuries (Fleury-Steiner & Longazel, 2010). The town gained nationwide visibility in July 2006 when its mayor, Lou Barletta, proposed the Illegal Immigration Relief Act (Esbenshade et al., 2010).

To understand these developments, I collected ethnographic and interview data in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, in the summers of 2007 and 2011. This data collection strategy allowed me to ascertain how the proposal of the anti-immigrant ordinance shaped social relations in the short and medium terms. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 103 local residents of different ethnic backgrounds: 65 non-Hispanic whites, 33 Latino immigrants, and 5 non-Hispanic Blacks, which roughly correspond to the area's ethno-racial make-up in the late 2000s (see Table 1). My Latino informants included 15 Dominicans (including 6 second-generation Dominican Americans), 8 first-generation Mexican immigrants, 7 Puerto Ricans (including 3 U.S.-born Puerto Ricans), and 3 South

Americans. Although two of my Mexican informants were small business owners, none of my Mexican respondents had finished college. In contrast, all other Hispanic groups had more diverse socioeconomic profiles, including low-skilled manual workers but also professionals.

To recruit informants, I contacted residents who occupied public roles including elected officials, union officers, immigrant leaders, journalists, religious leaders, businessmen, and teachers. To obtain a wider set of respondents, I also approached non-elite respondents outside of local stores and churches, and also through canvassing different city neighborhoods. I also attended public rallies, city council meetings, and religious events. I returned to Hazleton in 2011. I re-interviewed several old contacts and made new ones.

Since I initially arrived to Hazleton months after the ordinance had been proposed, I had to rely on retrospective data, provided by my informants, to assess how the policy had shaped social relations in town. Hence, my respondents could have been influenced by their position on the ordinance when recalling their lives before the IIRA. To account for this, I did not mention the ordinance during my interviews but I would wait for my respondents to spontaneously bring it up. In addition, I asked my informants for specific details of their lives before and after the ordinance was proposed. I also used newspaper, archival, and census data to complement my analysis and corroborate these qualitative data. The quotes shown in this chapter were chosen because they represented the view of many of my informants. Nevertheless, sometimes I quote dissenting voices to offer a more balanced account.

The IIRA in Hazleton

On the night of July 13, 2006, the city council of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, debated whether or not to approve the IIRA. Mayor Lou Barletta, himself a third-generation Italian American, had proposed the ordinance in an effort to "eliminate illegal aliens" from Hazleton (Kroft, 2006). Since the city's founding, the population of Hazleton had been overwhelmingly non-Hispanic white. This began changing in the late 1990s, as an influx of Hispanic immigrants began settling in the area. By 2000, Hispanics amounted to 4.9% of the city's population, including 159 Mexicans, 271 Puerto Ricans, 11 Cubans,

and 691 immigrants from other Latin American countries (most of whom originated from the Dominican Republic), and African Americans made up 1.1%. Many of the new Hispanic arrivals, especially Dominicans, moved from urban areas in New York and New Jersey and were lured by the area's affordable housing prices and the availability of service jobs in distribution centers for Michael's, Amazon, and Office Max, along with a Cargill meat packing plant that opened in 2001 (Fleury-Steiner & Longazel, 2010).

The IIRA was proposed following two high profile crimes allegedly involving Dominican immigrants (Longazel, 2013). In an open letter to local residents, Mayor Barletta claimed that "illegal immigrants" were "destroying our neighborhoods and diminishing our overall quality of life" by bringing crime, overcrowding classrooms, and using up social services (Kruse, 2011). Barletta then promised that he would "get rid of the illegal people" by importing the IIRA, which had been originally created, but rejected, in Escondido, California (Jordan, 2006). "It's this simple," the mayor argued, "they must leave" (Powell & Garcia, 2006).

News of Hazleton's ordinance reverberated across the country (O'Neil, 2011). Within weeks, the ACLU sued the city of Hazleton to stop the implementation of the IIRA. Hence, the ordinance was not formally implemented. Nevertheless, its proposal had immediate consequences. As Figure 1 shows, the publication of immigration-related stories in the local paper, *The Standard-Speaker*, increased by 400% the year the ordinance was approved, going from 23 stories in 2005 to 92 in 2006. Such articles often concentrated on the perceived negative effects of Hispanic migration, especially crime and violence. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that the number of local newspaper articles linking immigrants with crime had a statistically significant increase of more than 10% in 2006.[1] Also shown is that despite the media's increased focus on crime, both the property and violent crime rates remained relatively stable since 1999. Further, undocumented immigrants were involved in only 20 felonies between 2000 and 2006 (Longazel, 2013).

In the following section, I argue, based on the qualitative data I collected, that the ordinance proposal led to several short-term social consequences in Hazleton: increased anti-immigrant activism by natives, an increased association between Hispanics and illegality and crime, and an increased sense of threat and fear among natives.

Anti-Immigrant Activism: "Taking Things Into Our Own Hands"

In recent years, many Hazleton residents had growing complaints about quality of life issues including garbage in the streets, neglected properties, loud music, prostitution, and drug dealing. The IIRA's proposal, however, focused the town's attention on immigrants and solidified the perception that, as Mayor Barletta argued, many of the town's problems were a direct result of illegal migration. As such, it energized local residents to find direct ways to oppose Hispanic immigrants and the problems "they were bringing with them," as Joanne,[2] a middle-age Polish American resident,[3] put it. Joanne, a public employee, was highly supportive of the IIRA.

> *René Flores*: Were you born in this area?
> *Joanne*: Yes, I was born in West Hazleton.
> *RF*: How did you like growing up here?
> *J*: Oh my God, it was a nice town. I loved living here. Now, I don't know. Our town is changing an awful lot lately. It is being turned into an industrial place, like a city.
> *RF*: What do you mean?
> *J*: There's a lot of people coming here from New York and New Jersey. I have a lot of Hispanics moving into my neighborhood. It is dirtier than it used to be. . . . There's a lot of music. I was just called a "fucking bitch" because my neighbors were playing loud music at 11:30 p.m. and I called the cops. I have been living here for 30 years and in the past 2 years I haven't been able to sit in my own backyard! You just can't enjoy it anymore because there is music and yelling! It is like New York City . . . and these people don't care about the laws. My neighbor told me, "I'm from New York and I'm Hispanic. I can play my music as loud as I want!"

Although some public officials were careful to distinguish between "Hispanics" and "illegals" in public declarations, many local residents such as Joanne often used both terms interchangeably in discussing their support for the IIRA, a topic I will explore further below. Joanne exemplifies white residents' frustrations with the perceived negative changes that Hazleton has experienced in the past few years and that many associated with Hispanic newcomers. These issues have little to do with economic competition, a common explanation for anti-immigrant sentiments. Instead, many residents complained about cultural changes, crime, and social disorder. She also exemplifies the increased willingness of local residents to "take things into our own hands and get things done," as a pro-ordinance activist, who urged the city council of a neighboring town to also adopt the IIRA, put it (Tarone, 2006). Joanne became politically

active. She supported the IIRA by attending city council meetings, writing letters to the editor, and talking with her coworkers about the problems she associated with Hispanic migration.

After the ordinance was made public, local residents created several anti-immigrant groups including "Voices of the People," composed of local youth (Fennick, 2007). This law also led to multiple town hall meetings, rallies, and demonstrations organized mostly by pro-ordinance groups but sometimes also by groups critical of the law (Birkbeck, 2007b). The general impression of my Hispanic informants, one of whom was confronted by native residents during a demonstration, was that the rallies generally increased the animosity between ethnic groups. As one Hispanic immigrant put it, "more rallies means more division."

Other times, this desire to "take action" would result in direct confrontation with Hispanics. Several of my Hispanic respondents, both documented and undocumented, reported being personally confronted in the street or at school about their legal status after the ordinance was proposed. When I asked Andrea, a 40-year-old lower-middle-class Colombian immigrant who had resided legally in the area since the late 1990s, about her life in Hazleton (without mentioning the ordinance), she told me, "Not good. There's always been animosity here, but before, it was more hidden. After they came up with the ordinance, a lot of people feel they have the right to say things . . . to yell from cars. . . . Random people that I don't even know have asked me if I'm legal!"

The Hardening of Ethnic Boundaries

Mayor Barletta continuously stressed that the IIRA was not conceived to target any specific ethnic group (Esbenshade et al., 2010; Tarone, 2006). A minority of my informants agreed with Barletta's assertion, including a representative of a large business enterprise in town. He was a middle-age non-Hispanic white man who said he was supportive of both Hispanic immigrants and the IIRA. "People in the outside are just hearing what they want to hear and they are saying people in Hazleton don't want Hispanics in the area, but all that Barletta is saying is whether you are Chinese, German, Mexican . . . be legal! That's it," he told me. Nevertheless, most of my informants, regardless of their ethnicity or position toward the ordinance, consistently believed it was

aimed at Hispanics. The IIRA, as a pro-ordinance non-Hispanic white woman told me, was intended to "run the Spanish out of town."[4] Other residents, including Romanian immigrants and African Americans, commonly referred to it as the "anti-Spanish law." It is interesting that I found African Americans to be generally sympathetic to Hispanics and critical of the ordinance (although I interviewed only a few of them). Shantelle, a middle-age African American who moved to Hazleton in the 1980s, told me,

> I think the mayor is wrong for saying he can get rid of all the Mexicans . . . of all the foreign people because they . . . they . . . to me . . . I get along with everybody and I have two Spanish cousins, and I think they are not the only ones doing it [crime]. On the news they say it is the foreigners tearing up this town, but I see white faces on TV robbing and stealing too!

This resident's statements reflect the general discourse on immigration that was used by city leaders and reproduced in the local media to justify the IIRA. This discourse included graphic descriptions of immigrants committing crimes and abusing social services (Longazel, 2013). Such negative representations hardened native views of immigrants and of Hispanics more generally.

Tony, a 39-year-old first-generation Dominican immigrant, moved to Hazleton from New York City in 2001 after he lost his job during the city's post-9/11 economic downturn. He remembers being welcomed by his native white neighbors when his family moved to Hazleton:

> I moved twice [within town] and my neighbors welcomed me with a cake. But after the ordinance [was proposed], everything changed. The same people that would bring you a cake before now look at you with suspicion wondering if you are illegal, and if you are, it doesn't matter if they already know you, you become a criminal.

Tony's story reflects the common belief among Hispanics that local views of Hispanics had significantly hardened even among some native whites they had previously befriended.

Perhaps the clearest evidence that the boundaries around Hispanic immigrants had hardened after the IIRA was proposed came when the owner of the Blues Brothers' bar, an establishment on Hazleton's main avenue, posted a large white sign with red letters above its front door that read, "All Legals Served." Although the owner had claimed the sign was not directed against Hispanics, on a Friday night in August 2007, I asked the

doorman about it and he responded, "We put it up because there's too many illegal Puerto Ricans in town. We are trying to keep them out." In this way, even Latinos who were U.S. citizens by birth were targets of this increased animosity.

The increased ethnic animosity and hardening of ethnic boundaries led to behavioral changes even among hitherto well-integrated Hispanic residents. Joe was a 30-year-old Puerto Rican man who was born in Ohio. He lived with his Italian American girlfriend in Hazleton. When I asked him about his life in Hazleton, he spontaneously mentioned the ordinance as a significant factor influencing his daily activities:

RF: Why did you move to Hazleton?
Joe: Because of my girlfriend. She is Italian from this area, from West Hazleton.
RF: Have you met her family?
J: Yeah, they are alright, I guess. They were ok with me until they found out I was Hispanic. People think I'm white or Italian because I'm light skinned, but when they find out I'm Puerto Rican, sometimes they change their attitudes. Her family has a thing especially against blacks. But they say they are Christian. . . . How can you be so racist and be a Christian? They won't get into heaven even if they bring a SWAT team with them! Do you know what I mean?
(*We both laugh but then he continues with a serious tone.*)
J: I think people here specially don't like blacks. Sometimes they just ignore them.
RF: Really?
J: Yeah, there's a lot of racism in this area, especially since the mayor came up with a law against Hispanics. Before, I used to go to white bars and they were cool with me. I don't go no more.

Although Joe acknowledges that blacks were traditionally the most stigmatized group in town, his answer also reflects the hardening of boundaries around Hispanics in Hazleton after the ordinance was made public. Indeed, his ability to "pass" and be accepted in "white" settings seemed to have diminished.

The hardening of public opinion toward immigrants may have affected the social standing of Hispanics to the point where it was no longer self-evident whether blacks or Hispanics were at the bottom of the area's racial hierarchy. When I asked a middle-age pro-ordinance white man whether he thought Hispanics or blacks were closer to whites, he unambiguously answered, "Blacks." Although this might be related to the historic low numbers of African Americans in the area, it also highlights how claims of illegality can profoundly affect how the general public perceives Hispanics. In contrast, African Americans were never suspected of being "illegal" or "un-American."

"Hispanic" Becomes "Illegal"; "Illegal" Becomes "Criminal"

Besides shaping the social boundaries around Hispanic immigrants, the ordinance also cemented the local perception that most Hispanic immigrants did not have legal documents. Although prior to the ordinance, locals suspected some Hispanics of being undocumented, especially those who spoke Spanish, such suspicion intensified during the ordinance debates. According to a middle-age Peruvian immigrant, "after the ordinance [was proposed], all Hispanics became illegal [in the eyes of white residents]." Indeed, even my Puerto Rican informants reported being increasingly suspected of illegally being in the United States. As native whites began conflating Hispanic immigrants with illegal immigration, they also increasingly associated illegal immigration with crime, disorder, and abuse of social services. This occurred as local politicians continuously connected illegal immigrants with criminal behaviors. Mayor Barletta directly charged illegal immigrants with increasing Hazleton's crime rates and presented the ordinance itself as a tool to combat crime (Kruse, 2011). During the public discussions around the IIRA in 2006, City Council President Joseph Yannuzzi was even more direct: "If you are illegal, you are a criminal; that is the gist here" (Longazel, 2013). A "gang expert," invited by the city, publicly declared that "the most violent gangs in the United States" had arrived to Hazleton. These gangs, he claimed, were mostly composed of illegal immigrants and practiced the "dismemberment of their victims" (Birkbeck, 2007a). These allegations, which were widely reported in the local media, found resonance among many locals who came to suspect most Latino households of gang involvement. Joanne, the Polish American resident, complained that Hispanics moving into her neighborhood were painting "historic" houses with bright colors such as blue and yellow. She said, "The kids told me it is a gang thing. I would have never imagined talking about gangs in my town!"

Even non-Hispanic residents who were generally supportive of Latino immigrants had come to internalize their association with illegality and crime. Lucio, a 67-year-old Italian immigrant, came to Hazleton as a teenager. He was a small business owner and was generally sympathetic toward Latino immigrants (many of whom would patronize his business):

RF: Do you think that many local residents support the ordinance?

Lucio: Yes, I can understand the ordinance, like I said, I immigrated myself, but I came here very legally. I had to wait 9 years before they let me pass, before they allowed me to come to America. So I went through the process and I became an American. I didn't jump the fence and come to America to do what they do. That's no good. That, I disagree. Legally, they come here, that's good. But if you are going to come here illegally and sell drugs and kill people like they do . . .
RF: So you think they are bringing the crime?
L: You know, from 1962 to 1980, we had no murders in Hazleton. Nobody was killed in Hazleton. That's why people don't like them because they do a lot of wrong things. It is not just the mayor that doesn't want them, it is the public.

Lucio exemplifies the extent to which locals came to reproduce the association between undocumented migration and crime advanced by pro-ordinance politicians and reproduced in the local media. He also offers insights into why the ordinance was popular in an area with a strong immigrant heritage where first-generation European immigrants were still relatively common. Although their own ancestors were immigrants, Hazletonians increasingly suspected Hispanics of being "illegals" and, thus, "criminals."

A Town Under Siege: Anxiety Grows

Most of my native white informants in 2007 believed that Hazleton was under siege by criminals. Although some residents acknowledged that the area had a long connection with organized crime,[5] most believed that, as city officials argued, Hispanic immigrants were laying siege to what used to be a "quiet little town" (Tarone, 2006). A 61-year-old local woman attending a pro-ordinance rally in 2007 told the local newspaper, "If it wasn't for him [Mayor Barletta], the city would be overrun with guns and gangs. This used to be a quiet city; now you can't leave your doors open" (Birkbeck, 2007b).

In reality, local per capita crime rates had remained stable over the years in spite of the city's demographic changes (as Figure 1 shows). However, during my interviews, local residents were skeptical of these statistics and often alluded to newspaper reports to justify their anxiety. Locals responded in different ways to this heightened sense of insecurity and fear. Some residents, especially older people, were clearly distraught by the possibility of having Hispanic neighbors. Some reported having deserted entire portions of the city, especially Wyoming Street, the area where Latino businesses were concentrated, which was generally considered the town's most dangerous section. Others told me they avoided downtown entirely.

Expectations about escalating tensions were widely shared among my informants in 2007. When I asked a pro-ordinance resident how she felt about the future of Hazleton, she responded, "If the ordinance fails [in reducing illegal immigration and crime], people are going to start to protect themselves. People are going to end up getting shot. This is not only Hazleton. It's all over the country." Some were already making preparations. Shannon was a 28-year-old non-Hispanic white single mother whose family moved from New Jersey in the late 1980s due to the area's affordable housing prices. After I asked her how she liked living in Hazleton, she responded, "Have you looked at the paper? The mayor is trying to help but it is freaking unsafe around here. That's why I'm getting a license to carry [a gun]. Having a 3-year-old with me all the time, I can't take chances." Her boyfriend had recently acquired a handgun out of security concerns.

4 Years Later: Calm After the Storm?

I returned to Hazleton in 2011. Mayor Barletta was elected to State Congress in 2010 after he gained nationwide notoriety through the IIRA. After his departure, Joseph Yannuzzi, a key political ally of Barletta, became the temporary mayor. It was somewhat surprising that my local informants consistently told me that ethnic tensions had declined considerably by 2011. A middle-class first-generation Hispanic immigrant, who was physically confronted during an anti-immigrant rally by native whites during the height of the ordinance debates, told me, "There's much less separation between the [Hispanic and Anglo] communities now. I don't see the same reactions from people. When the ordinance was approved and in the following months, people would stare at you on the street or they would yell at you. Now, those things are rare." Even local politicians perceived a change in the social environment: "If before, I went down and started shaking hands and knocking on doors of Latinos, that would have been . . . that would have been a death sentence. Right now, I don't think it is. I can go down and start intermingling with the Hispanics and I think that would be a good thing. We don't do that," a local non-Hispanic white politician told me.

Some residents believed that Barletta's departure from Hazleton contributed to this perceived decline in ethnic animosity since they argued that he would "instigate" local residents by telling graphic stories of immigrant wrongdoings that were picked up by the

local media.[6] Nevertheless, as can be seen in Figure 1, the decline in stories about immigration in the local paper preceded Barletta's departure in 2010. It is interesting that the decline in perceived ethnic animosity reported by local residents, both Hispanics and non-Hispanics, mirrors a similar reduction in local media attention on immigration. As Figure 1 shows, after an all-time peak in 2006 in the number of stories about immigration, the year the IIRA was proposed, the local newspaper published fewer stories about this topic over time. Moreover, the published stories were less likely to link immigrants with crime over time.

In the intervening years, Hazleton experienced a dramatic demographic transformation that may have contributed to the perceived decline in ethnic animosity. Table 1 shows that despite Barletta's expectation that Hispanics would flee due to the IIRA (Barry, 2006), the number of Hispanic residents actually increased by 297%, going from 3,175 to 9,454 between 2005 and 2010.[7] By 2010, the Hispanic population had grown to 37.3% of the total Hazleton population from less than 5% in 2000. Although all Hispanic groups posted gains, the Dominican population grew by leaps and bounds, going from 3% of the total city population in 2000 to 14% in 2005 and 27% in 2010. In contrast, the non-Hispanic white population shrank significantly. Although Table 1 shows that there was a significant loss of non-Hispanic white residents between 2000 and 2005, the decline in the non-Hispanic white population accelerated between 2005 and 2010. Whites went from representing 93.2% of all local residents in 2000 to about 80% in 2005 and finally 59% in 2010. Many of those white departees moved to smaller communities around Hazleton that locals collectively refer to as "the valley." One of those communities alone, Drums, gained 1,521 non-Hispanic white residents between 2000 and 2010 (a net increase of 23%). According to several residents, the white exodus to "the valley" accelerated around 2007. Local residents cited their concern with crime and lawlessness as their primary reasons for moving out along with their desire for a "quieter" environment. In addition, working-age white residents may have been influenced to emigrate by the 2008 financial recession, which affected many of the area's businesses.[8]

These changing demographic realities were slowly altering Hazleton's political landscape. In the wake of IIRA's proposal, several Latino candidates ran for public office. Although none of them was successful, there was an increasing local recognition

of the potential political power of Hispanic residents and the fact that Latinos could eventually "elect their own Spanish mayor just like Italians did" in the past, as an Italian American politician put it. Some Hispanic residents believed that local politicians were increasingly reluctant to antagonize the Latino community due to its growing political muscle. A middle-class Hispanic immigrant told me, "I think the [Latino] community grew too much for them to come out against us. Politicians want to get elected and they know that they need Latinos' support. They know it."

The perceived decline in ethnic animosity was also found among non-elite residents. Joanne, the Polish American woman, still lived in Hazleton but she and her husband were also searching for a house in the valley. Although Joanne still believed that Hispanics were abusing social services and committing crimes, she was no longer politically involved. When I asked her if she still wrote letters to the editor or attended city council meetings, she replied, "No, not anymore. What good is it going to do?" Mirroring the larger trend, Joanne and her husband now limited themselves to addressing issues in their vicinity such as calling the police when their Hispanic neighbors played their music too loud.

The perceived decline in ethnic animosity did not imply that white residents improved their opinion of Hispanics. Rather, many continued to have negative opinions of them. What changed was the manner in which they expressed their opposition. They no longer resorted to collective action or direct confrontation. Instead, they voted with their feet. Those who remained in Hazleton no longer expressed their views in the public arena but focused on their private sphere of influence.

Discussion and Conclusion

Local anti-immigrant ordinances, even if unenforced, can have tangible social consequences in the communities in which they are proposed. Using ethnographic and interview data collected in 2007 and 2011, I find that the proposal of the Illegal Immigration Relief Act in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, focused the town's attention on migration and cemented the perception that many of the local problems, including robberies, prostitution, gangs, and drug dealing, were caused by Hispanic immigrants, as the city leaders argued. The ordinance itself was presented as a tool to deal with all of

these problems. As a result, it energized whites' opposition to Hispanic immigrants. This resulted in increased anti-immigrant political activism and open confrontations with Hispanic residents. The policy thus hardened the symbolic boundaries around Hispanics, regardless of documentation status, and cemented the local association between Hispanics and criminality. In turn, this contributed to a growing sense of threat and insecurity among native residents, which may have fomented white flight. Nevertheless, by 2011, locals consistently reported that open racial antagonism had subsided. In addition, the Hispanic population of Hazleton continued to grow in the intervening years. These two developments highlight the limitations of exclusionary policies such as Hazleton's IIRA. Not only were the IIRA's social consequences seemingly temporary in nature, but the policy also failed to prevent further Hispanic immigration into Hazleton, although perhaps this was due to the policy being struck down by a federal court.[9] Thus, the longitudinal approach employed in this study revealed how this policy's social consequences evolved over time, which suggests that previous cross-sectional studies may have captured specific situational contexts and could have magnified the power of similar exclusionary laws.

This chapter makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. First, it shows the power of elected officials in local settings to significantly alter the context of reception for immigrants in the places where they spend most of their time and where their jobs, schools, and housing are located. Hence, my study highlights the need for migration and stratification scholars to consider political factors, as Kasinitz (2012) suggested, particularly within the micro contexts of reception where immigrants are intimately embedded, to explain immigrant outcomes. The increasing willingness of localities and states to legislate against immigrants implies that previous scholarly accounts of Hispanic immigrants' incorporation in new destinations might have been too optimistic (Marrow, 2009; Waters & Jiménez, 2005). Such research was often conducted before the wave of local and state anti-immigrant laws that began in 2006, and it obscures the increasingly coercive efforts of state actors to exclude those deemed to be "unacceptable residents" (Fassin, 2011; Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). In contrast to Marrow's (2009) finding that Hispanics are becoming integrated in the non-black side of the white-black color line in the U.S. South, I find that these laws contributed, at least in the short term, to the

deterioration of the social status of Hispanics, regardless of documentation status, to the point that some native whites expressed preference for African Americans over Hispanics. This finding highlights the continuous importance of immigration for Hispanics, as Jiménez (2010) has argued. Issues of citizenship and legal status, which do not affect African Americans, continue to affect the experiences of Hispanics at least in northeastern Pennsylvania. This evidence casts serious doubts on the assertion that Hispanic immigrants are "becoming Americans in much the same way that European immigrant groups did before them" (Waters & Jiménez, 2005, p. 106). The recent spread of subnational restrictionist immigration laws throughout the country may cast a shadow on Hispanics' prospects for successful incorporation, although these policies' effects may be temporary.

I also find that these exclusionary laws have consequences not fully predicted by their supporters. Just as Szkupinski Quiroga et al. (2014) found for the case of Phoenix, Arizona, I find that Hazleton's ordinance not only affected undocumented immigrants, their intended target, but also had an effect on native minorities and even non-Hispanic whites. Indeed, by cementing the link between immigrants and criminal behaviors, this policy affected not only how native whites viewed Hispanic immigrants but also how they evaluated their own neighborhoods. Hazleton residents increasingly viewed their neighborhoods as dangerous and disorganized, regardless of the actual crime statistics. Such increasingly negative assessments of their own communities may have contributed to the acquisition of firearms for self-protection, as I find in chapter 3 (Flores, 2014b), and to white flight.

Third, in accordance with theories developed by legal scholars (Berkowitz & Walker, 1967; Sunstein, 1996), my study provides evidence for the power of symbolic exclusionary laws to shape ethnic boundaries around minority groups even when they lack enforcement capabilities. After the anti-immigrant policy was proposed, the ethnic boundaries between natives and immigrants became "brighter" and harder to cross. Although some Hispanics reported being able to enter mainstream circles before, the policy seemed to have diminished their capacity to do so at least in the short term. It represented a step toward the institutionalization of ethnic boundaries around Hispanics transforming relatively fluid symbolic boundaries (for some) into more rigid social ones.

Last, although a large portion of the literature on attitudes toward immigrants explores economic competition and cultural threat as key mechanisms that trigger opposition to newcomers (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001), I find that fear of crime and concerns about personal safety are also crucial factors that shape native reactions to immigration. Such concerns can bolster social anxiety toward immigration, especially when immigrants become associated with criminality due to processes set in motion by the proposal of restrictive immigrant policies. This insight could offer new avenues of research for U.S. scholars interested in investigating when and why natives support anti-immigrant policies.

Some caveats are in order. Most of the data I used were collected through personal interviews. Hence, social desirability bias and interviewer effects could be a concern. Although many respondents could not readily identify my ethnicity, my identification as a Hispanic man may have influenced some of my respondents' answers. However, such bias would have been in the direction of censoring negative attitudes toward immigrants or Hispanics. To deal with this potential bias, when possible, I used other sources of information to corroborate my interview data including newspaper and ethnographic data. I also hired a local non-Hispanic white student to conduct some interviews for me. The answers she obtained were not markedly different from the ones I received. A related concern is that the retrospective data provided by my informants might have been influenced by their own position toward the ordinance. Although, as I described above, I took several steps to minimize this bias, I cannot fully discount it.

These caveats aside, this research has important implications for public policy as it provides compelling evidence for the unintended social consequences of symbolic laws. Hence, it is a cautionary tale about the implications of the endorsement of discourses by elected officials that scapegoat minority groups.

Chapter 2 Notes

1. The total number of stories published in *The Standard-Speaker* linking immigrants with crime increased to 23.9% in 2006 from 13.0% in 2005.
2. All individuals' names in this chapter are pseudonyms.
3. Many native "white" residents in the area described themselves as "ethnic" and often spontaneously identified their ethnic European ancestries.
4. Local residents, both Hispanics and non-Hispanics, commonly use *Spanish* as an ethnic term equivalent to *Hispanic* or *Latino*.
5. Historically, the Mafia has had a significant presence in Hazleton leading some locals to refer to the town as "Mob City" (Cooney, 2010).
6. Longazel (2013) makes a similar argument.
7. These estimates should be interpreted with caution given that the 2005 numbers are based on 2005-2007 statistical estimates performed by the U.S. Census and not actual census counts.
8. The 2008 economic downturn had a negative effect on the local economy. At least two of my respondents relocated out of the area in search of better economic prospects.
9. Another possibility is that the ordinance only slowed down the influx of undocumented immigrants. Nevertheless, even the local Mexican-origin population, whose members often lack documentation, grew in absolute numbers between 2000 and 2010.


Chapter 2: Tables and Figures

Table 1. Ethnic and Racial Composition of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, 2000-2010.

	2000		2005-2007		2010	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Total population	23,329	100	21,980	100	25,340	100
Non-Hispanic or Latino	22,197	95.1	17,864	81.2	15,886	62.7
Non-Hispanic White	21,741	93.2	17,200	78.2	14,955	59.0
Non-Hispanic Black	248	1.0	635	2.8	497	1.9
Hispanic or Latino (of any race)	1,132	4.9	4116	18.7	9,454	37.3
Mexican	159	0.7	224	1.0	886	3.5
Puerto Rican	271	1.2	706	3.2	1,699	6.7
Cuban	11	0	11	0.1	48	0.2
Other Hispanic or Latino	691	3	3,175	14.4	6,821	26.9

Source. U.S. Census; 2005-2007 figures are based on American Community Survey 3-year estimates.

Figure 1. Newspaper coverage and crime rates in Hazleton (1999-2012).



Source. Uniform Crime Reporting (Federal Bureau of Investigation), and *The Standard-Speaker*. The line labeled "'immigrant" indicates the number of articles published by Hazleton's local newspaper, *The Standard-Speaker*, related to immigrants. The line labeled "Immigrant and crime" shows the number of articles related to immigrants that linked immigrants with crime. On the right axis, the lines labeled "violent crime" and "property crime" represent the per capita violent and property crime rates in Hazleton, respectively.

Chapter 3: Taking the Law into Their Own Hands: Do Local Anti-immigrant Ordinances Increase Gun Sales?*

In Chapter 2, I assessed the impact of a local anti-immigrant policy on local inter-ethnic relations in the town of Hazleton, PA. In Chapter 3, I try to generalize beyond the case of Hazleton. I examine whether similar restrictionist immigration policies passed in other parts of Pennsylvania and South Carolina had a similar effect as in Hazleton and increased local concern about crime and disorder.

In the last few years, Hispanic immigrants have moved beyond traditional immigration gateways like New York and California to settle in small, rural communities that have little experience with migration (Marrow 2011; Massey et al. 2008; Parrado and Kandel 2008; Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005). This rapid geographic dispersion has often resulted in political opposition, and by 2009, more than 200 U.S. communities had considered anti-immigrant ordinances (O'Neil 2011). These laws include fines for employers and landlords of undocumented immigrants, bans on foreign flags, English-only declarations, and 287(g) provisions, which is a federal program that allows local police officers to enforce federal immigration laws. Although the determinants of these laws have been studied (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010), we still know little about their consequences.

In this chapter, I use interview, administrative, and newspaper data to show that politicians' proposals of local anti-immigrant policies set in motion changes in the social environment that result in increased handgun sales. I develop a theoretical model to explain the connection between these restrictionist laws and gun ownership by bringing together two academic literatures. First, scholars in the symbolic politics literature argue that politicians' use of threatening metaphors and images to portray "undeserving" groups,

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such as immigrants or welfare recipients, can have profound social consequences (Beckett 1997). Not only do they solidify popular support for restrictionist policies aimed at these groups, but they also help shape public perceptions of the targeted groups themselves (Calavita 1996; Chavez 2008; Santa Ana 2002).

Second, the literature on gun ownership has identified individual characteristics that predict firearms acquisition, including socialization experiences, gender, victimization episodes, and political ideology. In addition, scholars have found that socially grounded factors, such as perceptions of crime and disorder, perceived proximity to African-Americans, and the erosion of social trust, may also trigger self-defensive handgun ownership, as local residents seek protection from these perceived threats (Carlson 2013).

In this study, I argue that, as the symbolic politics approach would predict, when politicians propose restrictive immigration policies, they employ menacing portrayals of immigrants, which are widely reproduced in the media. In turn, such negative portrayals cement the association between immigrants and criminality, and they increase native anxiety about crime and disorder, leading to self-defensive behaviors like handgun acquisition, as the gun ownership literature would anticipate.

In a previous study, I found evidence for this theoretical model using ethnographic and interview data collected in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. The proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance in 2006 bolstered native residents' anxiety about immigration and solidified the association between Hispanics and crime and deviancy (XXXX 2013). As a result, many local residents began avoiding local areas associated with Hispanics and considered moving out of the city. Other residents reported acquiring handguns and applying for licenses to carry due to a perceived lack of safety.

This chapter builds on my prior qualitative work by quantitatively testing whether the proposal of local anti-immigrant ordinances led to similar consequences in two different "new destination" states, Pennsylvania and South Carolina. In recent years, the immigrant population has rapidly increased in both states, and multiple communities have proposed restrictive immigration ordinances. First, I analyze administrative data on gun sales in Pennsylvania, using fixed effects regression techniques, to test whether the proposal of local anti-immigrant laws was followed by significant surges in gun acquisition. Then, in order to shed light on the mechanisms that mediate this relationship, I

use newspaper data from Pennsylvania to analyze changes in the framing of immigrants, especially whether or not they were increasingly tied to criminal activities, and whether these changes in immigrants' media portrayals were themselves correlated with increased gun ownership. Lastly, as a robustness check, I test the impact of local anti-immigrant policies on concealed gun permits applications in South Carolina, a southern state that is culturally different from Pennsylvania, yet experiencing similar patterns of immigration and proposals of anti-immigrant laws.

SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND IMMIGRATION

An inter-disciplinary research literature documents the symbolic dimensions of political action (Beckett 1997; Calavita 1996; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Edelman 1964, 1977; Gusfield 1963; Sears 1993). According to the symbolic politics framework, through socialization early in life, individuals acquire affective predispositions, such as ethnocentrism, racial attitudes, and altruism, which guide their attitudes towards social and political issues (Sears 1993). Politicians employ symbols, images, and metaphors to evoke these predispositions and mobilize public sentiment about specific issues (Beckett 1997). For example, referring to anti-poverty programs as "welfare" reduces the public's approval of the programs, but framing those same programs as "helping the poor" increases popular support, since the latter label taps into an altruistic predisposition among the public.

Politicians often promote divisive public policies using symbolic language that implicitly identifies vulnerable groups, such as racial minorities, immigrants, and poor families, as the source of social ailments (Beckett 1997; Calavita 1996; Edelman 1977). When elites' symbolic appeals connect with people's emotional predispositions, the general public will often rally around controversial policies that target specific subgroups (Sears 1993). Calavita (1996:298) argues that California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 187, which was designed to limit undocumented immigrants' access to government social services, after its supporters deployed metaphors and images portraying immigrants as abusive of social services and as "stretching the (welfare) system beyond capacity." These images resonated with popular concerns over government's budget

deficits in the context of increasingly dire economic conditions faced by many U.S. workers, including declining wages and heightened job insecurity (Calavita 1996).

Besides encouraging popular support for exclusionary policies, such symbolic political discourse may also shape public views of the targeted group (Calavita 1996; Chavez 2008; Santa Ana 2002). Social linguist Otto Santa Ana (2002) argues that the metaphors and images used by politicians and scholars to frame debates about immigration, which are heavily publicized in the media, could have a lasting impact on the general public's worldview. According to him, California politicians' use of threatening metaphors like "brown tide rising," "army of invaders," and "burdens" to describe Latino immigrants hardened popular views of Latinos. In a similar vein, anthropologist Leo Chavez (2008) argues that there is a cohesive set of ideas and images in the way the media portrays Latino immigrants, which he refers to as the "Latino Threat Narrative." In this narrative, Latinos are portrayed as being unable or unwilling to integrate into U.S. culture, as being crime-prone, and as being abusive of medical care, education, and other social institutions (Chavez 2008). This narrative not only influences how Latinos are perceived, but it also generates further anti-immigrant activity, promoting "alarmist newspaper stories, anti-immigrant riots, restrictive immigration laws, forced internments, and acrimonious public debates over government policies" (Chavez 2008:2-3).

Although scholars have argued that individuals acquire certain predispositions, including racial prejudices, ethnic identities, and party identification early in life (Easton and Dennis 1969; Hyman 1959; Katz 1976), in other domains, people's attitudes may be much less "crystallized" and, thus, their opinions may be more readily influenced by elites' emotional pleas (Sears 1996). We would expect natives' opinions of Hispanic immigrants to be less crystallized than their opinions of African-Americans, especially in new areas of immigrant settlement, where immigrants may be a relative novelty. In these new destinations, racial and ethnic hierarchies may be less rigid and, thus, immigrants may have "more freedom to define their position" (Waters and Jiménez 2005:117). In such settings, a diversity of often-contradictory symbolic meanings may be initially associated with Hispanic immigrants. On the one hand, they could be perceived as "hard-working" and "family-oriented." On the other hand, locals may also think of them in more negative terms as "crime-prone" and "welfare-dependent." When politicians advance anti-

immigrant policies like Proposition 187 and employ threatening metaphors to describe immigrants, a more consistent set of negative symbolic meanings might become associated with Hispanics, which would trigger affective predispositions, such as racial animosity and perceptions of threat.

GUN OWNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT

Gun ownership has been a topic of interest among sociologists for decades (Carlson 2013). This is so not only because an estimated 40 percent of U.S. households possess a gun (Cook and Ludwig 1996), but also because gun ownership has been associated with increased rates of homicide, suicide, and other forms of violence[1] (Fontanarosa 1995; Killias 1993; Lester 1988). A vast literature shows that gun ownership is influenced by income (Marciniak and Loftin, 1991; Whitehead and Langworthy 1989), socialization experiences (Dixon and Lizotte 1987; Young, 1986), trust levels in criminal justice institutions (Young, McDowall, and Loftin 1987), political ideology (Kleck 1991), racial attitudes (Lizotte, Bordua, and White 1981; Kleck 1991; Whitehead and Langworthy 1989), and fear of crime (Smith and Uchida 1988).

Scholars in this literature have advanced the "fear and loathing" hypothesis, which posits that gun ownership is shaped by perceptions of crime and racial prejudice (Cao, Cullen, and Link 1997; Wright, Rossi, and Daly 1983). According to these scholars, individuals acquire guns as a self-defensive measure against perceived criminality in their communities. Such perceptions are often influenced by individuals' racial prejudice and their perceived proximity to racial minorities (Lizotte and Bordua 1980; Lizotte et al. 1981; Young 1985). Minorities, especially African Americans, often elicit perceptions of crime and disorder among white populations (Massey and Denton 2003; Quillian and Pager 2005; Young 1985).

Though the evidence for this hypothesis is not conclusive (Wright et al. 1983), a number of studies have found a correlation between fear of crime and gun ownership (Lizotte et al. 1981; Luxenburg, Cullen, Langworthy and Kopache 1994; Marciniak and Loftin 1991; Smith and Uchida 1988). Scholars have also found supportive evidence for the link between gun purchases, racial prejudice, and proximity to minorities (Kleck 1991; Lizotte et al. 1981; Whitehead and Langworthy 1989; but see Young 1985).

Based on this literature, I hypothesize that the proposal of anti-immigrant policies could influence gun purchases in two ways. First, it could cement in natives the idea that local Hispanic immigrants are associated with illicit activities. Elected officials invoke themes of threat around migration and characterize immigrants as criminals and lawbreakers, and these types of stories are heavily publicized in the media (Esbenshade et al. 2010; Longazel and Fleury-Steiner 2010). Indeed, despite the fact that social scientists have consistently found an insignificant or negative link between immigrant status and crime (Graif and Sampson 2009; Martinez and Lee 2000; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005), the proponents of these local policies commonly accuse undocumented immigrants of being "lawbreakers" by definition and of being engaged in drug dealing, criminal gangs, and robberies, among other criminal activities (Barletta 2006; Longazel 2013; Massey and Sanchez 2012; Santa Ana 2002). Second, the proposal of these laws could also heighten public anxiety about immigration by influencing local perceptions of the immigrant population size. The intense media attention these laws receive could magnify the perceived size of the immigrant population among local residents, regardless of its actual size. As a result of these two processes, local natives may acquire guns to seek protection against the perceived threat of the violent, magnified immigrant population.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LOCAL RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION LAWS

Migration scholars have long argued that the national context of reception, largely structured by federal government policies, is a crucial factor that shapes the life outcomes of immigrants (Gentsch and Massey 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Nevertheless, the recent willingness of towns and municipalities to legislate on immigration matters shows that social scientists must recognize and study the resulting local policies that immigrants increasingly encounter in many communities (Donato and Armenta 2011; Jones-Correa 2010). Although scholars have explored the determinants of these subnational policies (Hopkins 2010; O'Neill 2011; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010), we still know little about the consequences of anti-immigrant laws.

Journalists, however, have reported increasing social tensions following the proposal of these ordinances (Callas and Bahadur 2006; Pfister 2006) and an exodus of Hispanic

families from these communities (Barry 2006; Belson and Capuzzo 2007; Birkbeck 2007), although a recent study has questioned this claim (Parrado 2012).

Along with journalists, some researchers do argue that local ordinances have tangible social consequences (Furuseth and Smith 2010; Hagan, Castro and Rodriguez 2010; Longazel 2013). Furuseth and Smith (2010) contend that the proposal of several local anti-immigrant measures in Meckenburg County, North Carolina led Latino immigrants to change their lifestyles by "going underground" to be less visible. Similarly, Menjívar and Abrego (2012) argue that Central Americans immigrants living in Maricopa County, which signed a 287(g) agreement with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2007, live in a constant state of fear and anxiety, due to the prospect of deportation. Other scholars have argued that the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances often leads to demonstrations, community gatherings, and town hall meetings organized by proponents and detractors of the laws, which further increase local tensions (Esbenshade et al. 2010; Varsanyi et al. 2010).

While insightful, these previous studies are often based on media reports and anecdotes. To more systematically explore the social consequences of local anti-immigrant ordinances, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Hazleton, PA during the summers of 2007 and 2011. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 103 local residents of different class and ethnic backgrounds, including 65 white ethnics, 33 Latino immigrants, and five African Americans. I found that the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance in Hazleton in 2006 strengthened native residents' anxiety over immigration by solidifying the association between Hispanic immigrants and disorder and crime. This occurred as city officials charged undocumented immigrants with increasing Hazleton's crime rates and presented the ordinance as a tool to combat lawlessness and crime (Barletta 2006). Without the ordinance fining undocumented immigrants' landlords, the local Mayor argued that "anybody can walk into the city right now, give the landlord $400, put their bags in a room and go shoot somebody in the head tomorrow" (Longazel 2013). In a similar vein, during a highly publicized trial prompted by an ACLU lawsuit, "expert" witnesses described how some of "the most violent gangs in the United States," formed almost entirely by illegal immigrants who practiced the "dismemberment of their victims," had moved to Hazleton (Pilgrim, Tucker, Dobbs, and Sylvester 2007; Rubinkam

2007). Similarly, during a public meeting in 2006, City Council president Joseph Yanuzzi said, "If you are illegal, you are a criminal, that is the gist here" (Longazel 2013). These allegations, which were widely reported in the local media, found resonance among many locals, who came to suspect Latino households of gang involvement, robberies, homicides, and identity theft. In response, many residents I interviewed reported avoiding areas associated with Hispanics and considered moving out of the city altogether, although the local crime rate had actually remained stable over time (XXXX 2013). Other residents reported taking more active self-defensive steps, including acquiring handguns for self-protection. One of them, a 28-year-old non-Hispanic white woman, told me that she was afraid for her safety even though she had never been the victim of a crime. "Have you looked at the paper?" the woman said after I asked her how she liked living in Hazleton. "The mayor is trying to help, but it is freaking unsafe around here. That's why I'm getting a license to carry. Having a 3-year-old with me all the time, I can't take chances…" Her boyfriend had acquired a handgun a month earlier out of security concerns. According to her, her boyfriend's best friend, also a Hazleton resident, owned 15 guns.

In this study, I build on this prior qualitative work by assessing whether the proposal of similar anti-immigrant policies in other communities in Pennsylvania also resulted in an increase in gun sales, looking at handguns and long guns separately. First, I rely on administrative data from all Pennsylvania counties, collected before and after the policies were considered, to test these laws' impact on local gun sales. This allows me to document whether these policies were consequential only in a few highly publicized communities, whether the increase in sales occurred before or after the laws were proposed, and whether this surge in gun ownership was permanent or transitory. Then, to shed light on the social processes that link these policies with increased gun sales, I use newspaper data to explore the impact of local anti-immigrant ordinances on the framing of immigrants in the local media. Finally, I use administrative data on concealed gun permits in South Carolina to test this association in a different locality.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

MEASUREMENT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE

In this section, I use the total number of handgun and long gun sales per year for all 67 Pennsylvania counties, between 2004 and 2011, to test whether the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances led to measurable social consequences beyond Hazleton. I focus on Pennsylvania because this state contains some of the first communities that legislated against immigrants through local ordinances, including Hazleton, but also because local authorities release detailed yearly reports on gun sales by county. I isolate these years because they fully encompass the time period during which Hazleton and 23 other Pennsylvania communities proposed similar policies. I obtained gun sales data from the Pennsylvania State Police.[2] Unfortunately, such data is only available at the county level and not at the township level (where ordinances are proposed). As a result, my coefficient estimates may be downwardly biased.[3] However, I expect that the proposal of an ordinance in a given county will have enough of a repercussion countywide, due to heavy coverage by county newspapers, declarations by local politicians, and residents paying more attention to events occurring in other communities within the same county.[4]

Though gun ownership data is sometimes collected in surveys, I use administrative data to minimize concerns with self-reporting bias. Previous literature has shown that different factors may motivate the acquisition of handgun and long guns. More specifically, while handgun ownership is associated with a sense of threat and fear of crime, rifle ownership has also been linked to a subculture of sportsmanship and hunting (Lizotte and Bordua 1980; Lizotte et al. 1981). I include separate measures of both types of guns in the analysis to test whether handgun purchases increased separately from long gun purchases.

MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

My key predictor of local gun sales is the formal consideration of a local anti-immigrant ordinance in a Pennsylvania county between 2004 and 2011. I only include those ordinances that were formally proposed by an elected official, such as the mayor or a city council member in a given township (see Appendix A for a detailed list). Following the literature, I classify all measures that directly or indirectly target undocumented immigrants as “anti-immigrant" (O’Neill 2011). These include fines to employers or landlords of undocumented immigrants, deputization of local police officers to enforce

federal immigration laws, and the establishment of English as a locality's official language. I compiled a list of these laws through reports of civil rights groups, anti-immigrant organizations, and immigrant advocacy groups, and through searches in newspaper databases. Within this time period, 14 out of 67 Pennsylvania counties had communities that considered local anti-immigrant measures, starting with Hazleton in the summer of 2006. None of these measures was actually enacted. Some policies, like Hazleton's, were blocked in court by lawsuits from the ACLU and other civil rights groups. Others were debated but eventually tabled, as local politicians attempted to avoid costly lawsuits.

- Table 1 about here -

Gun sales could be affected by factors other than the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. Therefore, I control for several relevant time-varying factors that could influence the demand for guns. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables that I use in this analysis. I include controls for the percentage of Hispanics, of any race, and of African Americans by year. County-level estimates were obtained from the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey.[5] I also include yearly crime reports per county, obtained from the Uniform Crime Report and produced by the Pennsylvania State Police. Based on these data, I calculate the number of property and violent crimes per 1,000 residents by county. Property crimes include burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Violent crimes include murder/non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Data on the race and ethnicity of criminal perpetrators were provided by the Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To track changes in the age distribution of the population over time, I include the yearly median age of each county. I also include a yearly estimate of the sex ratio per county, defined as the number of males per 100 females. To account for socio-economic factors, I include a yearly estimate of the percentage of households living below the federal poverty line in each county, also obtained from the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey. I also include estimates of the unemployment level among the economically active population and the annual average individual income. Both of these estimates were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, to account for changing political factors, I obtained voter registration statistics, specifically the

percentage of voters registered as Republican per year, from the Pennsylvania Department of State.

Figure 1 shows the trends in handgun and long gun sales in Pennsylvania over the observation period. While the sale of long guns is roughly constant over the years (with a recent uptick since 2010), there is a significant upward trend in handgun sales.

- Figure 1 about here-

METHOD

My statistical analysis is based on panel data regressions of the form,

$$G_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{it} + \beta_2 X_{it-1} + \alpha_i + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where G_{it} is the rate of gun sales per 1,000 residents in county *i* at time *t*, D_{it} is a vector of ordinance proposal indicators (1/0), $D1_{it}$ is an indicator of whether county *i* considered an ordinance one year prior to G_{it}, $D2_{it}$ is an indicator of whether county *i* considered an ordinance two years prior to G_{it}, $D3_{it}$ is an indicator of whether county *i* considered an ordinance three years prior to G_{it}. (These vectors are included to test whether the statistical effect of anti-immigrant ordinances is immediate or delayed and whether it is permanent or transitory.) X_{it-1} are time-varying covariates, such as racial and ethnic diversity and crime rates (which I lag one period to capture their delayed effect on gun sales), α_i is a county fixed effect, and β_t is a year fixed effect. I lag the ordinance dummies because acquiring a gun can sometimes take several weeks in Pennsylvania[6] and because I expect ordinances to have a delayed effect on gun sales. To address serial correlation, I cluster the standard errors at the county level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).

The county fixed effects capture any unobserved county characteristics with little variation over time that could have influenced gun sales, such as geography and culture. Fixed effects models are not affected by potential differences across counties because they only rely on within-subject information to estimate the statistical influence of the independent variables on the outcome variable (Allison 2012). Hence, they provide relatively unbiased estimates at the cost of some efficiency. I employ year fixed effects to control for any time-specific macro effects that shift the level of gun sales for all counties. Such statewide or nationwide shocks could have included national or state elections,

changes in national or state gun laws, or high profile crimes reported by national or state media outlets.

Though year fixed effects account for any statewide shocks that could have affected gun sales, some regions in the state may be experiencing specific changes over time that may be correlated with restrictive ordinances and gun ownership. To take into account factors that could have varied over time at the regional level, I also include region-time trends in the regression models based on a commonly used division of Pennsylvania into six regions: northwest, southwest, north-central, south-central, northeastern, and southeastern.

Lastly, I control for a number of county-specific time-varying factors that could have affected gun acquisition levels, such as gender make up, age, crime, ethno-racial composition, population size, unemployment, income, poverty, and political partisanship.

RESULTS

Do anti-immigrant ordinances increase gun sales?

In this section, I test whether local anti-immigrant ordinances are associated with an increase in gun sales. Tables 2 and 3 show the results for the models predicting handgun and long gun sales for all Pennsylvania counties between 2004 and 2011. Handguns include pistols and revolvers. Long guns include rifles, shotguns, and muskets. As mentioned in the method section, in all models I cluster my standard errors at the county level to allow for arbitrary error

covariance across counties over any period of time. In Model 1, I introduce dummy variables to indicate whether an anti-immigrant ordinance was proposed in each county one year prior to G_{it}, two years prior to G_{it}, etc. Table 2 shows that counties where an anti-immigrant ordinance was proposed had higher than expected handgun sales for the next two years. In Model 2, I introduce regional time trends to account for region-specific changes, but results are robust to this. In Model 3, I introduce lagged yearly measures of the percentage of Hispanics (of any race) and African Americans living in each county. I also include other time-varying covariates including median age, sex ratio, log(annual income), unemployment level, and the percentage of households under the federal poverty line, to test whether the statistical effect of anti-immigrant ordinances on handgun sales

can be explained away by changes in these indicators. The coefficient for median age in handgun regression is positive and significant, suggesting that the aging of the local population is an important predictor of handgun acquisition. Nevertheless, the association between ordinances and handgun sales remain robust to the inclusion of these indicators.

- Table 2 about here-

Gun sales may also be influenced by local crime rates. So, in Model 5, I introduce lagged estimates of property and violent crimes. In addition, local residents may be especially sensitive to crimes committed by minorities. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on the number of crimes committed by Hispanics at the county level in Pennsylvania. However, the FBI does publish data on crimes committed by African Americans, Native Americans, and Asians. In Model 5, I include controls for the total number of property and violent crimes, and I include an indicator of crimes committed by minorities by grouping all non-white groups into a "minority" group. The results indicate that, as expected, violent crimes have a positive association with handgun sales, but they do not explain away anti-immigrant laws' positive association with handgun sales.

These results also indicate that ordinances seem to produce the largest bump in handgun sales the year after they are proposed. A coefficient of 2.830 indicates that the proposal of an ordinance is associated with an increase of about three handguns per 1,000 residents in the average Pennsylvania County the year after it is proposed, or about 530 handguns. This statistical effect decreases slightly but remains statistically significant in the second year, and further weakens and becomes non-significant when three years have passed since the ordinance proposal. This suggests that anti-immigrant ordinance proposals positively affect handgun sales for about two years.

Could the association between handgun sales and anti-immigrant policies be driven by political partisanship? A plausible story is that some counties become more Republican over time, perhaps as a response to demographic changes, resulting in higher number of Republican officials elected to office. These politicians could be more likely to both endorse anti-immigrant ordinances (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010) and also to promote and provide symbolic support for gun ownership. In this way, anti-immigrant ordinances and increased gun sales would be simultaneous outcomes of increased Republican control. To account for this possibility, I include an indicator of the percentage of voters registered

as Republican per year in Model 5. Results show that an increase in the percentage of Republican voters is associated with significant increases in handgun sales.[7] Nevertheless, this control does not explain away the relationship between ordinances and handgun sales.

In models not shown, I explore potential differences by ordinance type but find no significant differences in their relationship with gun sales. This suggests that local policies that target immigrants generally set into motion similar social processes.[8] In other models not shown, I verify the stability of the results to outliers by using subsamples that omit all observations from a single county. In other words, I exclude each county, one at a time, from my main regression specification. Substantive results are robust to this procedure. Therefore, I conclude that the results are not driven by outliers. In addition, I consider several functional forms of the dependent variable. A Box-Cox regression, which allows the dependent variable to have flexible functional form, does not show evidence for a log or reciprocal transformation. Indeed, likelihood ratio tests reject such transformations at the conventional five percent level. Nevertheless, the Box-Cox regression suggests that the best fitting transformation would be $\theta = .3$. Hence, in Model 6, I include a model with a square root transformation, the closest common transformation, in the dependent variable (for both hand- and long guns). Results show that my substantive results are robust to this transformation.

Another concern is that there could be a spatial dependency between some of the variables in the models. For example, perhaps the proposal of a local anti-immigrant ordinance in county A may draw significant media attention and affect gun sales in neighboring counties B, C, and D. Therefore, gun sales in county B, C, and D would be influenced by their geographic proximity with county A. Such spatial dependency would violate the assumption of independence of residuals and potentially lead to biased estimators (Pisati 2001). To account for spatial auto-correlation, I create a distance-based spatial weights matrix, based on the latitudes and longitudes of each county in Pennsylvania. In models not shown, I run a spatial lag model incorporating these spatial weights. My substantive results are robust to the inclusion of these weights.

- Table 3 about here-

Table 3 shows the results for the models predicting sales of long guns. While the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance is a positive predictor of long gun sales in the

first few models, the coefficient is smaller, and once other time-varying factors are accounted for, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. Further, unlike handgun sales, the acquisition of long guns is not correlated with violent crime. This suggests that, as the gun ownership literature has found, the acquisition of rifles and shotguns is not necessarily linked to fear and anxiety but is driven by cultural and lifestyle factors. The lack of a relationship between immigration policies and the sale of long guns provides additional evidence that the previous findings with handguns are not simply capturing random trends in gun acquisition.

Another concern could be that the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances did not necessarily result in higher gun sales, but that gun sales were already going up *before* the laws were proposed perhaps as a result of immigrant flows. If a spike in gun sales at the local level *preceded* the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance, the hypothesis that these ordinances led to increased social anxiety and, hence, to gun acquisition would be undermined. This could have occurred if residents of communities with growing ethnic tensions began buying more guns in response to other local factors, such as high profile crimes, that also influenced the later proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. To test this, I introduce an indicator of whether county *i* considered an ordinance a year after G_{it} (the measurement of gun sales). This allows me to test whether gun sales increased *before* the ordinances were proposed. In Table 4, Model 1, I use the same model as in Table 3, except due to data limitations I can only fit one time vector, which indicates that a county had an anti-immigrant ordinance proposed a year prior.[9] As was the case with Tables 2 and 3, this model predicts that counties where anti-immigrant ordinances are proposed will experience a significant increase in handgun sales the year *after*. In Model 2, I introduce an indicator of whether counties considered an ordinance a year into the future. Therefore, this model tests whether gun sales increased *before* the proposal of ordinances. This dummy is not statistically significant, which indicates that gun sales did not increase *before* local anti-immigrant laws were proposed. Instead, handgun sales only increased *after* anti-immigrant laws were proposed. This procedure also assuages concerns about potential serial correlation driving the main results since future ordinance proposals do not predict current gun sales.

- Table 4 about here-

To further verify the robustness of my findings I conduct a placebo test by using data from an earlier time period. Instead of using data from 2004-2011, as I do in my original analysis, I rely on Pennsylvania data from five years prior: 1999-2006. I apply the same model to these data except that I set back the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances by five years. For example, if Luzerne County considered an ordinance in 2006, I push it back to 2001 in this placebo study. Placebo tests are commonly used in the statistical and econometric literatures as a robustness check (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). In my case, finding that these placebo laws also predict higher handgun sales in this earlier time period would undermine my prior results since it would mean that findings are probably driven by random factors or by pre-existing trends in these counties that are unrelated to the immigration ordinances.

Table 5 reproduces tables 2 and 3 for this earlier time period. It shows that, just like in the 2004-2011 period, handgun sales are positively correlated with local crime rates and the number of local Republican voters. In addition, the proportion of Hispanic residents has a positive association with handgun acquisition. In the case of long gun sales, table 5 shows that they are responsive to changes in the local sex composition. As expected, an increasing number of males is associated with a higher demand for rifles and shotguns. Table 5 also shows that the placebo ordinances are correlated with neither hand nor long gun sales. Nor only are their coefficients small and not significant but these coefficients follow a random pattern. Therefore, my placebo study provides additional evidence on the robustness of my findings since significant increases in handgun acquisition only occurred in the years when anti-immigrant ordinances were actually proposed and not in an earlier time period.

- Table 5 about here-

RESTRICTIONIST IMMIGRATION LAWS AND MEDIA COVERAGE

In this section, I use newspaper data to illuminate the mechanisms through which anti-immigrant laws may motivate the acquisition of handguns. According to the symbolic politics framework, politicians promote anti-immigrant laws by making emotional appeals to the general public through the use of threatening images and metaphors to describe immigrants. As Hispanic immigrants become more closely associated with these negative symbolic meanings, an emotional response from the public is triggered (e.g. self-defense

impetus). If this is the path through which restrictive policies affect gun sales, we should detect an increased prevalence of threatening metaphors that describe immigrants in the local media following the proposal of anti-immigrant laws, as I found in Hazleton, PA.

To test this in a systematic manner, I use data from local Pennsylvania newspapers to assess whether the proposal of local anti-immigrant laws is associated with an increase in the number of stories that link immigrants with crime, as well as whether this growing association is in turn associated with increased handgun sales. I do not argue that newspaper articles cause people to acquire handguns. Rather, I argue that the statistical analysis of media coverage could reveal changes in how immigrants are portrayed by local actors following the proposal of anti-immigrant laws. If immigrants are increasingly portrayed in menacing terms, these portrayals could contribute to a general climate of fear and threat surrounding immigration, which would influence local residents to engage in self-defensive behaviors, including handgun acquisition.

In this analysis, I examine newspaper articles for all Pennsylvania counties that had a local newspaper between 2004 and 2011. Some counties do not have a local paper but are instead covered by regional newspapers, such as the *Philadelphia Enquirer*. Other papers do not keep electronic records of their articles or have considerable missing years. This reduced the number of counties with available newspaper data to 46 (69% of all Pennsylvania counties). I use fixed-effects regression analysis to test whether the proposal of anti-immigrant laws predicts an increase in the publication of newspaper articles that link immigrants with criminal behaviors. The dependent variable is the percentage of all immigration-related articles that depict immigrants as criminals.[10] Since newspapers vary in size and amount of coverage on immigration, I also include a control variable for the yearly number of immigration-related articles published in each paper.

- Table 6 about here-

Table 6 indicates that the consideration of local anti-immigrant policies is associated with a 5% increase in the number of immigrant-related articles that portray immigrants as lawbreakers. Such increase is also present a year after ordinances were proposed, suggesting these laws have both an immediate and a delayed impact on the framing of immigrants in the local media. In Models 2 and 3, I add a number of lagged control

variables, including crime, demographic, and economic indicators. Results are robust to the inclusion of these controls.

If changes in how the media frames immigration reflect shifting local discourses around immigration and contribute to the development of a climate of fear and anxiety, I would expect that these changes would also be correlated with an increase in handgun sales. In Table 7, I test this proposition. Using fixed-effects regression analysis, I predict handgun sales for all Pennsylvania counties between 2004 and 2011. As the key independent variable, I introduce the lagged percentage of all immigration-related articles that link immigrants with crime. In addition, I introduce a control for the number of articles related to immigration. Table 7 shows that the percentage of immigration-related articles that link immigrants with crime is a strong predictor of handgun sales. The positive and significant coefficient indicates that a growing association between immigrants and crime in local newspapers one-year prior is associated with increased handgun sales.

- Table 7 about here-

In Model 2, I include demographic and economic controls. In Model 3, I add crime and partisanship controls. The association between changes in the framing of migration and handgun sales remains positive and significant. These findings suggest that changes in the way immigrants are portrayed in public discourse may be an important mechanism through which local anti-immigrant policies shape the social environment and inspire self-defensive behaviors, like handgun acquisition.

FURTHER EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Was the positive impact of anti-immigrant ordinances on gun sales only prevalent in Pennsylvania? The social consequences of local anti-immigrant legislation in Pennsylvania could be exceptional, since this state includes some of the first communities that considered such laws, beginning with Hazleton in 2006. Perhaps similar laws did not result in increased local anxieties in other regions due to a "saturation effect," as many other municipalities and even state legislatures considered restrictionist policies and residents became used to them. To test this, I use administrative data from South Carolina, a southern state that is culturally different from Pennsylvania (Gastil 1971) and little

experience with immigration. Just like Pennsylvania, South Carolina has been a fertile ground for local anti-immigrant legislation in recent years. Ten out of 46 counties in South Carolina (22% of all counties) had communities that formally considered some form of anti-immigrant policy between 2006 and 2010 (see Appendix A for a complete list). Although South Carolina does not publish statistics on gun sales per county, the State Police does release information on applications for concealed gun permits. Residents apply to these permits to be able to carry a handgun with them. Hence, these data provide another behavioral indicator of whether local residents in communities that have considered an anti-immigrant law felt threatened enough to seek to carry a gun with them in their daily lives. Evidence suggests that concealed gun permits are associated with increases in the U.S. adult homicide rate (Ludwig 1998).

My statistical analysis is similar to the one used for the Pennsylvania data. Table 8 shows the results for fixed effects regressions predicting concealed gun permits in all South Carolina counties between 2006 and 2010. Model 1 shows that the proposal of an ordinance led to a significant increase in the number of these permits for the next two years. In Models 2 and 3, I adjust these estimates for time-varying covariates that could have influenced permit applications, such as racial and ethnic composition, crime rates, age and gender structure, and the proportion of households under the federal poverty rate. Nevertheless, the coefficients of anti-immigrant ordinances remain significant and positive, suggesting that these laws were associated with behavioral changes in South Carolina, similar to Pennsylvania.

- Table 8 about here-

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Local anti-immigrant ordinances have important consequences for the communities in which they are proposed. Using panel data analysis to examine Pennsylvania counties, I find that the proposal of anti-immigrant policies was associated with an increase in handgun sales. The first year after anti-immigrant policies were proposed, the respective counties saw an increase of approximately three handguns per 1,000 residents, or an average of 530 handguns. The effect decreased but remained statistically significant in the second year, and further weakened and became non-significant after three years had passed since the anti-immigrant law was proposed. Even as the handgun sales correlated

with anti-immigrant policy proposals in this three-year pattern, the sale of long guns was not affected by these policies.

Although the impact of these policies on handgun sales was transitory, lasting about two years, its magnitude was considerable. For a county to observe a similar increase in handguns sales as the one that occurred after the proposal of a restrictive immigration policy, the county's median age would have to increase by 3 years, its proportion of Republican voters would have to go up by 3%, or there would have to be about one more violent crime per 1,000 residents.[11]

I propose that local anti-immigrant policies may contribute to growing anxieties over crime and disorder by cementing the association between immigrants and criminal behaviors among local residents, triggering the self-defensive behaviors I observe. As public leaders make the case for anti-immigrant ordinances by linking immigrants with crime, illicit activities, and social disorder, these menacing portrayals of immigrants, reproduced in local media outlets, have the unintended effect of increasing social anxiety. Indeed, I find that, following the proposal of local anti-immigrant policies, local Pennsylvania newspapers published more articles in which immigrants were connected to criminal activities. As expected, this increased link between immigrants and crime in local newspapers was also correlated with an increase in handgun sales.

The use of panel data and fixed effects estimation techniques allows me to address common limitations inherent in cross-sectional data. Unlike cross-sectional analyzes, fixed effects regression models do not make comparisons across units of analysis. Instead, they make within-unit comparisons to calculate the statistical effect of the independent variables on the outcome variable over time (Allison 2009). In other words, Philadelphia County is not compared with other counties in this analysis, but it is compared with itself across time. This allows me to rule out any unobserved county characteristics that are fixed over time that could have affected gun ownership, including a pre-existing fear of minorities or a cultural predisposition towards gun ownership. Second, the inclusion of time fixed effects in my analysis accounts for any common shocks these counties may have experienced during the observation period including statewide changes in gun acquisition levels, national or statewide elections, or high profile crimes that were covered by national or state media. Third, my analysis also sheds light on the temporal sequence of

events. Though one concern could be that both the proposal of anti-immigrant policies and increased gun sales occurred concomitantly, perhaps as fear and anxiety about immigration in local communities grew, my findings show that handgun sales only increased, not before, but only *after* the policies were proposed.

The theoretical model shown in Figure 2 details the mechanisms through which restrictive immigration laws are linked to increased gun sales. First, anti-immigrant laws are proposed by local politicians. These laws trigger media coverage on immigration as both opponents and supporters of these policies publicly debate their merits. As the symbolic politics framework would predict, anti-immigrant activists, along with journalists and pundits, invoke themes of threat about immigration. Immigrants are often portrayed as crime-prone abusers of social services, who have no legitimate claim to the communities where they live. Such symbolic images are legitimized by the expressive power of laws and are repeated constantly in the media until "they attain the ring of truth" (Chavez 2008:23). Natives increasingly associate immigrants with crime and lawlessness, which bolsters native anxiety over safety and disorder. Such growing fear of crime and lawlessness then triggers several self-defensive behaviors, including avoidance of areas associated with Hispanic immigrants, out-migration, and, as I document in this chapter, handgun acquisition, which is consistent with the gun ownership literature.

- Figure 2 about here-

I do not argue that the proposal of local restrictive immigration policies can by itself generate this climate of increased anxiety about social disorder and migration. In actuality, these policies are sometimes the result of local residents putting pressure on elected officials to deal with perceived problems in their communities. Some of these residents may already perceive Hispanic immigrants to be contributing to social problems, such as crime and lawlessness. Nevertheless, my qualitative and quantitative findings suggest that the proposal of these exclusionary policies further contributes to heightened social anxiety by cementing the perception that immigrants are engaged in illegal activities, by magnifying media attention on immigrants and their alleged wrongdoings, and by polarizing local communities along racial and ethnic lines (Flores 2013).

This chapter makes three distinct theoretical and empirical contributions. First, it provides empirical evidence for the symbolic politics approach. I find that local media and

politicians increasingly use negative symbolic meanings to describe immigrants when restrictive immigration policies are proposed. Nevertheless, though scholars commonly argue that these policies have little impact on objective conditions and are merely used to appease the public (Calavita 1994; Edelman 1964), I find that the emotional arousal of local residents can have tangible social consequences, including an increased desire to own handguns and to obtain licenses to carry. The proliferation of handgun ownership in communities experiencing cultural and demographic transformations may have troubling public health consequences as gun ownership has been associated with homicide, suicide, and other forms of violence (Fontanarosa 1995; Killias 1993; Lester 1988).

Second, this study contributes to the gun ownership literature by providing evidence for the role of social and political factors in influencing gun ownership. I find that politicians' portrayals of immigrants in threatening ways after the proposal of restrictive immigration policies may increase residents' anxiety over crime and disorder, regardless of the actual crime rates, leading to rising levels of handgun ownership. Indeed, I find that the proposal of anti-immigrant policies was predictive of increased handgun sales, even after adjusting for actual crime rates. This finding resonates with my qualitative work in Hazleton, PA, where local residents seemed more responsive to perceptions of crime, rather than to crime statistics themselves (XXXX 2013). My findings are compatible with the literature on crime policy and public opinion, which suggests that local elites, such as politicians, activists, and journalists, can influence community perceptions of crime and disorder (Beckett 1997). Beckett (1997) argues that growing public concern about crime did not necessarily precede the punitive turn in criminal justice of the last few decades. Instead, she finds that politicians often drive public concern about crime by promoting anti-crime measures, which are then heavily covered in the media. I add to this literature by showing that these elite-led measures not only affect public opinion, as Beckett shows, but they also may lead to behavioral changes among the population.

Third, this chapter has shown the power of elected officials in local settings to significantly shape public perceptions of immigrants. Waters and Jiménez (2005) argue that in new destinations of settlement, such as Pennsylvania and South Carolina, natives' opinions of Hispanics may be less crystallized, and immigrants may have more freedom to

define their social position. At the same time, this relative flexibility also means that public opinion about Hispanics might be more susceptible to be defined in the short term by non-immigrants, as well. Local elites' proposals of exclusionary policies, along with accompanying pervasive media coverage, could then negatively affect how Hispanic immigrants are perceived in these communities. My study highlights the need for migration and stratification scholars to consider the role of local political actors and policies in shaping the experiences of immigrants and their families. If we study how local political actors, through policies, shape the micro contexts of immigrants' reception, we could better understand how political factors influence immigrant outcomes – a topic that has received relatively little attention from migration scholars (Kasinitz 2012). Menjívar and Abrego (2012) argue that restrictive subnational immigration policies constitute a form of "legal violence," due to their capacity to negatively affect immigrants, regardless of documentation status. In this chapter, I find evidence that the proposal of local restrictive ordinances may affect immigrants and natives alike, driving self-defensive behaviors that can impact entire communities. In addition, by polarizing ethnic relations and increasing social anxieties around immigrants, such ordinances may also trigger actual physical violence.

Some caveats are in order. Due to the aggregated nature of my data, I cannot examine whether there were differences in race, ethnicity, nativity or other differentiating characteristics of individuals who acquired guns following the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. One hypothesis could be that it is not only Anglos who turn to these self-defensive strategies but also Hispanics. Though this seems like a plausible story, Hispanics have the lowest rate of gun ownership among U.S. ethnic and racial groups. In addition, since many Hispanic immigrants do not possess legal documentation, they are barred from buying guns, at least from licensed sellers. In my own fieldwork in Hazleton, PA, none of my Hispanic informants reported wanting to acquire firearms. Instead, many of them reported keeping a low profile, and some considered leaving town out of concern for majority group hostility. Nevertheless, I cannot fully rule out the possibility that gun-ownership could also have increased among Hispanics and other minorities.

While I find that anti-immigrant policies were associated with similar behavioral outcomes in two different states, it is an empirical question whether the same patterns can

be found in other settings or in a different time period. Perhaps anti-immigrant policies may be less likely to influence natives' opinions of Hispanic immigrants in areas with an established Hispanic presence. Future work should also examine whether local policies directed towards other minority groups set into motion similar social processes. Such groups could include racial minorities, political groups, or religious sects.

These caveats aside, this research has important implications for public policy, as it shows the unintended social consequences of symbolic restrictive immigration laws. These findings tell a cautionary tale about the ramifications of elected officials and other opinion leaders endorsing discourses that scapegoat minority groups. The continuous dispersion of Hispanic immigrants across the United States increases the possibility that anti-immigrant legislation will be considered in the future as immigrants reach new areas of settlement.

Chapter 3: Tables and Figures

TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Within Std. Dev.	N
Hand guns	18.96	11.7	0.78	90.2	5.58	536
Long guns	30.69	19.91	0.65	130.5	4.50	536
% Hispanics	2.79	3.30	0.1	19	0.46	536
% Blacks	3.97	6.16	0.1	44	0.49	536
Property crimes	4.35	8.83	0.06	76.74	1.58	536
Violent crimes	0.74	2.62	0.00	22.88	0.27	536
% Minority property crimes	3.22	3.16	0	15.06	0.68	536
% Minority violent crimes	32.89	25.19	0	100	8.71	536
Log(population)	11.49	1.18	8.50	14.25	0.02	536
Median Age	40.62	2.72	27.4	49	1.11	536
Sex Ratio	98.48	11.89	86.3	184	1.23	536
% Below Poverty Level	12.22	3.63	3.5	27	1.15	536
Unemployment	6.25	1.96	3.1	16.9	1.76	536
Log(individual income)	10.43	0.17	10.03	10.99	0.07	536
% Republican	46.53	10.56	12.7	65.6	1.56	536

[a] Number of guns sold per 1,000 residents.

[b] Number of violent crimes per 1,000 residents. Violent crimes include murder/non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

[c] Number of property crimes per 1000 residents. Property crimes include burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

[f] Percentage of property crimes committed by minority individuals (including African Americans, Asians, and Native Americans).

[g] Percentage of violent crimes committed by minority individuals (including African Americans, Asians, and Native Americans).

[h] Number of males per 100 females.

[i] Percentage of households living below the federal poverty level.

[j] Percentage of economically active residents who are unemployed.

[k] Percentage of voters registered as Republican.

TABLE 2. Handgun sales per 1,000 residents in Pennsylvania counties: 2004-2011

VARIABLES	(1) Handguns	(2) Handguns	(3) Handguns	(4) Handguns	(5) Handguns	(6) sqrt(Hand)
Ordinance *(t-1)*	2.602**	2.737**	2.853**	3.138**	2.830*	0.208*
	(1.129)	(1.239)	(1.306)	(1.420)	(1.465)	(0.123)
Ordinance *(t-2)*	1.978*	2.240*	2.230*	2.360*	2.323*	0.179*
	(1.098)	(1.170)	(1.175)	(1.256)	(1.262)	(0.102)
Ordinance *(t-3)*	0.923	1.315	1.154	1.533	1.712	0.143
	(1.063)	(1.209)	(1.139)	(1.199)	(1.186)	(0.109)
Ordinance (*t-4)*	-0.926	-0.565	-0.747	-0.348	-0.503	-0.066
	(1.145)	(1.178)	(1.084)	(1.179)	(1.172)	(0.132)
Control Variables						
% Hispanic *(t-1)*			0.657	0.921	1.360	0.043
			(1.372)	(1.362)	(1.347)	(0.097)
% Black *(t-1)*			0.084	-0.191	-0.212	0.034
			(0.903)	(0.973)	(0.990)	(0.080)
Median Age *(t-1)*				1.140**	0.776	0.090**
				(0.439)	(0.500)	(0.044)
Sex Ratio *(t-1)*				0.326	0.257	0.015
				(0.292)	(0.275)	(0.016)
Log(income) *(t-1)*				-6.768	-10.08	-1.590
				(18.62)	(17.05)	(1.520)
Poverty Rate (*t-1)*				-0.044	-0.093	-0.006
				(0.249)	(0.242)	(0.022)
Unemployment *(t-1)*				-0.464	-0.691	-0.067
				(0.617)	(0.648)	(0.074)
Log(Pop) *(t-1)*				-5.150	-2.681	0.493
				(11.97)	(11.36)	(0.838)
Property Crime (*t-1)*					-0.102	-0.006
					(0.172)	(0.015)
Violent Crime *(t-1)*					2.208*	0.163*
					(1.122)	(0.093)
% Min Prop Crime *(t-1)*					-0.145	-0.013
					(0.250)	(0.026)
% Min Viol Crime *(t-1)*					-0.042*	-0.005**
					(0.023)	(0.002)
% Republican *(t-1)*					1.005**	0.066**
					(0.417)	(0.033)
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Region Time Trends	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	469	469	469	469	469	469
R-squared	0.901	0.904	0.904	0.910	0.915	0.939

Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable, local gun sales rates, was calculated by dividing the total number of handguns sold in each county by the county's population (which was previously divided by 1000). The data are for the 67 Pennsylvania counties for the period 2004-2011. See Appendix A1 for details on anti-immigrant ordinances proposed during this time period. Model 6 reproduces Model 5 except that the dependent variable is the square root of local gun sales rates.

TABLE 3. Long gun sales per 1,000 residents in Pennsylvania counties: 2004-2011

VARIABLES	(1) Long	(2) Long	(3) Long	(4) Long	(5) Long	(6) sqrt(Long)
Ordinance *(t-1)*	1.857**	1.975**	1.957*	2.271*	1.881	0.108
	(0.898)	(0.939)	(0.987)	(1.160)	(1.147)	(0.100)
Ordinance *(t-2)*	1.644	1.970	1.871	2.331	2.866	0.213
	(0.989)	(1.265)	(1.175)	(1.418)	(1.722)	(0.140)
Ordinance *(t-3)*	1.467	1.920	1.812	2.343	2.653	0.214
	(1.335)	(1.754)	(1.573)	(1.895)	(1.981)	(0.165)
Ordinance (*t-4)*	1.253	1.870	1.700	2.664	2.575	0.225
	(1.548)	(2.355)	(2.039)	(2.729)	(2.689)	(0.233)
Control Variables						
% Hispanic *(t-1)*			0.207	0.358	0.483	-0.007
			(1.490)	(1.460)	(1.420)	(0.096)
% Black *(t-1)*			0.561	0.123	0.264	0.079
			(1.136)	(1.038)	(1.191)	(0.095)
Median Age *(t-1)*				1.191	0.916	0.068
				(0.902)	(1.017)	(0.074)
Sex Ratio *(t-1)*				0.353	0.315	0.023
				(0.258)	(0.255)	(0.015)
Log(income) *(t-1)*				-14.39	-8.178	-0.898
				(26.46)	(20.88)	(2.016)
Poverty Rate (*t-1)*				-0.024	-0.081	0.001
				(0.260)	(0.244)	(0.021)
Unemployment *(t-1)*				0.569	0.683	0.046
				(0.840)	(0.952)	(0.091)
Log(Pop) *(t-1)*				3.550	5.737	0.513
				(18.28)	(18.88)	(1.575)
Property Crime (*t-1)*					-0.241*	-0.011
					(0.134)	(0.016)
Violent Crime *(t-1)*					0.278	-0.014
					(1.660)	(0.143)
% Min Prop Crime *(t-1)*					-0.560	-0.031
					(0.365)	(0.021)
% Min Viol Crime *(t-1)*					-0.096*	-0.008*
					(0.054)	(0.004)
% Republican *(t-1)*					0.202	0.019
					(0.547)	(0.045)
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Region Time Trends	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	469	469	469	469	469	469
R-squared	0.918	0.919	0.919	0.922	0.925	0.936

Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable, local gun sales rates, was calculated by dividing the total number of hand- and long guns sold in each county by the county's population (which was previously divided by 1000). The data are for the 67 Pennsylvania counties for the period 2004-2011. See Appendix A1 for details on anti-immigrant ordinances proposed during this time period. Model 5 reproduces Model 4 except that the dependent variable is the square root of local gun sales rates.

TABLE 4. Handgun sales in Pennsylvania counties: 2004-2011

VARIABLES	(1) Handguns	(2) Handguns
Ordinance *(t-1)*	2.204**	
	(1.022)	
Ordinance *(t+1)*		0.282
		(1.090)
Constant	-57.88*	-56.78*
	(26.51)	(26.70)
Year FE	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES
Observations	469	469
R-squared	0.907	0.906

Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Handgun sales rates were calculated by dividing the total number of handguns sold in each county by the county's population (which was previously divided by 1000). The data are for the 67 Pennsylvania counties for the period 2004-2011. See Appendix A1 for details on anti-immigrant ordinances proposed during this time period. All models include controls for the local percentage of African Americans, Hispanics (of any race), crime and property crime rates, median age, sex ratio, and the percentage of households below the poverty level.

TABLE 5. Hand- and long gun sales per 1,000 residents in Pennsylvania counties: 1999-2006

VARIABLES	(1) Handguns	(2) Handguns	(3) sqrt(Hand)	(4) Long	(5) Long	(6) sqrt(Long)
Ordinance *(t-1)*	0.004	0.035	0.010	-1.293	-1.232	-0.071
	(1.176)	(1.194)	(0.137)	(1.832)	(1.868)	(0.161)
Ordinance *(t-2)*	0.277	0.285	0.039	-0.313	-0.372	-0.034
	(0.969)	(0.967)	(0.109)	(1.370)	(1.379)	(0.121)
Ordinance *(t-3)*	-0.688	-0.697	-0.075	-1.643	-1.809	-0.193
	(0.750)	(0.760)	(0.089)	(1.772)	(1.814)	(0.149)
Ordinance (*t-4)*	-0.232	-0.218	-0.008	0.163	0.076	-0.069
	(0.710)	(0.710)	(0.092)	(1.789)	(1.801)	(0.141)
Control Variables						
% Hispanic *(t-1)*	1.332*	1.447**	0.175*	2.851	2.960	0.280
	(0.695)	(0.692)	(0.092)	(1.967)	(1.992)	(0.183)
% Black *(t-1)*	0.155	0.201	0.031	-0.457	-0.365	-0.019
	(0.419)	(0.418)	(0.056)	(1.150)	(1.131)	(0.092)
Median Age *(t-1)*	0.623	0.659	0.087	1.530	1.488	0.084
	(0.658)	(0.659)	(0.088)	(1.670)	(1.719)	(0.141)
Sex Ratio *(t-1)*	0.060	0.061	0.022	0.369*	0.360*	0.041**
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.014)	(0.220)	(0.214)	(0.019)
Log(income) *(t-1)*	-9.439	-8.282	-1.431	-53.31	-50.82	-3.772
	(14.41)	(14.41)	(1.817)	(39.78)	(39.43)	(3.115)
Poverty Rate (*t-1)*	0.056	0.078	0.007	0.043	0.081	-0.000
	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.018)	(0.483)	(0.481)	(0.034)
Unemployment *(t-1)*	-0.039	-0.013	-0.000	-0.263	-0.232	0.043
	(0.288)	(0.281)	(0.038)	(0.618)	(0.614)	(0.055)
Log(Pop) *(t-1)*	-12.98	-15.40	-2.403*	-25.75	-29.72	-3.183
	(9.577)	(9.515)	(1.376)	(20.80)	(22.44)	(1.988)
Property Crime (*t-1)*		0.299*	0.040*		0.402	0.0423
		(0.177)	(0.023)		(0.387)	(0.037)
Violent Crime *(t-1)*		-0.666	-0.068		0.043	-0.008
		(1.251)	(0.164)		(2.035)	(0.205)
% Republican *(t-1)*		0.062**	0.007*		0.017	-0.000
		(0.030)	(0.004)		(0.129)	(0.010)
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Region Time Trends	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	469	469	469	469	469	469
R-squared	0.921	0.922	0.932	0.928	0.929	0.945

Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable, local gun sales rates, was calculated by dividing the total number of handguns sold in each county by the county's population (which was previously divided by 1000). The data are for the 67 Pennsylvania counties for the period 1999-2006. Model 3 and 6 reproduces Model 2 and 5 except that the dependent variable is the square root of local gun sales rates.

TABLE 6. Percentage of immigration-related articles that link immigrants with crime

VARIABLES	(1) Crime-migration	(2) Crime-migration	(3) Crime-migration
Ordinance	5.562***	4.398**	4.659**
	(1.881)	(1.807)	(1.871)
Ordinance *(t-1)*	5.368*	4.738*	5.239*
	(2.773)	(2.608)	(2.712)
Ordinance *(t-2)*	2.369	1.536	2.155
	(2.475)	(2.437)	(2.548)
Ordinance *(t-3)*	-0.767	-1.351	-0.918
	(1.627)	(1.821)	(2.062)
Control Variables			
% Hispanic *(t-1)*		-0.796	-0.914
		(1.551)	(1.588)
% Black *(t-1)*		-1.271	-1.984*
		(1.173)	(1.083)
Property Crime (*t-1)*		0.594*	0.513
		(0.298)	(0.337)
Violent Crime *(t-1)*		1.677	2.075
		(1.089)	(1.325)
% Min Prop Crime *(t-1)*		0.223	-0.003
		(0.739)	(0.769)
% Min Viol Crime *(t-1)*		0.068**	0.085**
		(0.031)	(0.033)
Median Age *(t-1)*			-0.267
			(0.756)
Sex Ratio *(t-1)*			0.287
			(0.474)
Log(income) *(t-1)*			-93.91
			(93.78)
Poverty Rate (*t-1)*			-0.290
			(0.584)
Unemployment *(t-1)*			-0.104
			(2.134)
Log(Pop) *(t-1)*			-4.463
			(20.29)
% Republican *(t-1)*			-0.299
			(0.763)
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES	YES
Region Time Trends	YES	YES	YES
Observations	368	322	322
R-squared	0.441	0.501	0.524

Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable is the percentage of all newspaper items that link immigrants with crime. The data are for 46 Pennsylvania counties for the 2004-2011 period.

TABLE 7. Handgun sales per 1,000 residents in Pennsylvania counties: 2004-2011

VARIABLES	(1) Hand	(2) Hand	(3) Hand
Crime-migration *(t-1)*	0.045*	0.036*	0.042*
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Immig Articles *(t-1)*	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Control Variables			
% Hispanic *(t-1)*		-0.691	-0.089
		(1.023)	(0.906)
% Black *(t-1)*		0.505	0.434
		(0.796)	(0.736)
Median Age *(t-1)*		0.953**	0.739*
		(0.398)	(0.439)
Sex Ratio *(t-1)*		-0.181	-0.219
		(0.279)	(0.238)
Log(income) *(t-1)*		4.904	2.658
		(23.12)	(22.29)
Poverty Rate (*t-1)*		-0.291	-0.340
		(0.242)	(0.211)
Unemployment *(t-1)*		-1.657***	-1.988***
		(0.397)	(0.400)
Log(Pop) *(t-1)*		8.904	10.12
		(9.899)	(8.946)
Property Crime (*t-1)*			0.019
			(0.144)
Violent Crime *(t-1)*			1.365*
			(0.742)
% Min Prop Crime *(t-1)*			-0.089
			(0.306)
% Min Viol Crime *(t-1)*			-0.043
			(0.029)
% Republican *(t-1)*			1.015**
			(0.399)
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES	YES
Region Time Trends	YES	YES	YES
Observations	322	322	322
R-squared	0.920	0.930	0.935


Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable, local gun sales rates, was calculated by dividing the total number of hand- and long guns sold in each county by the county's population (which was previously divided by 1000). The data are for 46 Pennsylvania counties for the 2004-2011 period.

TABLE 8. Concealed Gun Permits in South Carolina: 2006-2010

VARIABLES	(1) Log(Permits)	(2) Log(Permits)	(3) Log(Permits)
Ordinance *(t-1)*	0.073**	0.067**	0.069**
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Ordinance *(t-2)*	0.066**	0.071**	0.066**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Ordinance *(t-3)*	0.033	0.060	0.063
	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Control Variables			
% Hispanic *(t-1)*		-0.074*	-0.081
		(0.042)	(0.050)
% Black *(t-1)*		-0.010	-0.016
		(0.036)	(0.038)
Median Age *(t-1)*			0.004
			(0.010)
Sex Ratio *(t-1)*			-0.005
			(0.005)
Poverty Rate (*t-1)*			0.001
			(0.004)
Property Crime (*t-1)*			-4.399
			(3.162)
Violent Crime *(t-1)*			2.242
			(4.382)
Constant	-5.061***	-3.015***	-3.302
	(0.0244)	(1.391)	(1.971)
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	184	184	184
R-squared	0.966	0.964	0.966


Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable, the logged rate of concealed gun permits, was calculated by dividing the number of concealed gun permits in each county by the county's population and taking its natural log. The data are for the 46 South Carolina counties for the 2006-2010 period. See Appendix A for details on anti-immigrant ordinances proposed during this time period.

FIGURE 1. Gun sales in Pennsylvania counties (2004-2011)



The graph shows the trends in handgun and long gun sales in Pennsylvania over the observation period.

FIGURE 2. Social consequences of local anti-immigrant ordinances.



Appendix A.

TABLE A1. Anti-immigrant policies considered in Pennsylvania (2004-2011)

County	*Year*	*Type*
Allegheny	2006	P
Blair	2006	H, E
Carbon	2006	H, L, E
Columbia	2006	H
Lackawanna	2006	H, L, E
Lancaster	2006	H, L, E
Lehigh	2006	H, L, E
Lebanon	2008	H, L, E
Lycoming	2009	H
Luzerne	2006	H, L, E
Montgomery	2006	H, E
Monroe	2006	H
Northumberland	2006	H, L, E
Schuylkill	2006	H, L, E

Note: H= housing, L=Language, E= Employment, P= Police enforcement

TABLE A2. Anti-immigrant policies considered in South Carolina (2005-2010)

County	*Year*	*Type*
Aiken	2007	L, E
Anderson	2008	R, E
Beaufort	2006	E
Charleston	2009	287(g)
Dorchester	2006	H, E
Greenville	2008	E
Horry	2006	H, E
Lexington	2006	E
Pickens	2008	L, E
York	2007	287(g)

Note: H= housing, L= Language, E= Employment, R= Resolution against illegal immigrants

Appendix A3. Negative Binomial regression predicting number of articles related to immigration in local Pennsylvania newspapers (2004-2011)

VARIABLES	(1) Immigrant	(2) Immigrant	(3) Immigrant	(4) Immigrant
Ordinance	0.460**	0.442**	0.455**	0.440**
	(0.223)	(0.211)	(0.215)	(0.211)
Ordinance *(t-1)*	0.485*	0.483*	0.491*	0.410
	(0.270)	(0.262)	(0.272)	(0.261)
Ordinance *(t-2)*	0.122	0.137	0.130	0.099
	(0.184)	(0.190)	(0.176)	(0.184)
Ordinance *(t-3)*	-0.014	0.020	0.057	0.090
	(0.207)	(0.198)	(0.185)	(0.177)
Control Variables				
% Hispanic *(t-1)*		-0.074	-0.103	-0.170*
		(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.090)
% Black *(t-1)*		-0.040	0.011	-0.021
		(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.082)
Property Crime (*t-1)*			52.11*	50.14**
			(28.54)	(25.18)
Violent Crime *(t-1)*			-216.0	-254.7
			(162.0)	(156.3)
Median Age *(t-1)*				0.155**
				(0.068)
Sex Ratio *(t-1)*				0.061**
				(0.029)
Poverty Rate (*t-1)*				-0.053
				(0.034)
% Republican *(t-1)*				-0.169***
				(0.051)
Constant	2.176***	2.597***	2.334***	0.859
	(0.096)	(0.488)	(0.534)	(5.042)
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
County FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	376	376	376	376

Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Notes

[1] However, other studies have found mixed or no evidence for this (Jung and Jason 1988; Kleck and Patterson 1993).

[2] Current laws mandate all registered gun vendors to report all gun sales to the Pennsylvania State Police. Only exceptions are individual transfers and guns acquired at private gun shows. Unfortunately, there is no data available for these kinds of transactions but they represent a minority of all transfers.

[3] In addition, the unavailability of data at the local level may result in increased uncertainty reflected in larger standard errors, which would make it harder to find statistically significant results.

[4] To assess this assumption more formally, I use data from Pennsylvania county newspapers to test whether anti-immigrant policies considered by local communities resulted in an increase in the number of articles related to migration in these news outlets between 2004 and 2011.[1] I find that, as expected, the formal consideration of local anti-immigrant ordinances resulted in a statistically significant increase in the number of such articles published by county newspapers (see results in the appendix).

[5] The American Community Survey does not produce yearly estimates for counties with small populations (due to increased sampling uncertainty). In those cases, I used three-year county estimates.

[6] Though some gun buyers are able to acquire guns almost immediately, a substantial number of buyers have to go through additional background checks that can take several weeks.

[7] The average change in the percentage of voters registered as Republican in all Pennsylvania counties between 2004 and 2011 was 3.30 with a standard deviation of 1.92.

[8] At the same time, the distinction between different types of ordinances is not so clear-cut. Towns would often consider several types of ordinances over time and would often gravitate away from those that attracted more legal scrutiny, such as language prohibitions.

[9] Since my gun sales data only go back to 2004 and several ordinances were proposed in 2006, I can only include one lagged indicator.

[10] To create this variable, I compiled a list of all immigration-related articles between 2004 and 2011 for the available counties. I obtained this list by searching for terms related to immigration including “immigrant," “immigration," etc. Then, using this list, I counted the number of articles in which immigrants were portrayed as lawbreakers or criminals by searching for terms such as “crime," “criminal," “law-breaker", etc. These articles included a variety of news items including newspaper editorials, interviews with politicians and other local leaders, coverage of crimes allegedly committed by immigrants, etc. Articles that portrayed immigrants as victims of crimes or that mentioned criminal activities without linking them to immigrants were not counted.

[11] Estimates based on regression results from Table 2.

[12] The same poll found large racial disparities among supporters of SB 1070. Though only thirty-four percent of non-Hispanic whites opposed the law, such number was 71 percent for Hispanics (CNN 2010).

Chapter 4: Do Anti-immigrant Laws Shape Public Opinion?: A Study of Arizona's SB 1070 using Twitter data*

In Chapters 2 and 3, I studied the social consequences of policies proposed in new immigrant destinations in the U.S. South and the East Coast. Nevertheless, states and municipalities in traditional areas of Hispanic settlement have also attempted to legislate on immigration matters in recent years (O'Neill 2012). Studying the social ramifications of these laws is of crucial theoretical importance since it is unclear whether anti-immigrant policies proposed in areas where Hispanic communities have existed for centuries and actually precede Anglo-American settlement will have similar effects. In addition, this last chapter moves away from the local level to analyze whether policies proposed by states are also socially consequential.

In the last few years, subnational actors, like states and municipalities, have increasingly attempted to legislate on immigration matters (Flores 2014a; Santos, Menjívar, and Godfrey 2013). In 2005, there were 300 immigration-related bills proposed by state legislatures. By 2007, the number of introduced immigration bills had grown by more than 500% (Hegen 2008).

Research has already shown that immigration policies enacted by the federal government can shape immigrants' outcomes (Donato and Armenta 2011; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Portes and Zhou 1993). Considering the increasing trend of states and municipalities legislating on immigration, scholars have called for research that examines the potential impact of these subnational policies on immigrants' experiences (Donato and Armenta 2011; Jones-Correa and Fennelly 2009; Tienda and Fuentes 2014; Varsanyi et al. 2010).

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In April 2010, the state of Arizona passed bill SB 1070, nicknamed the "show me your papers" law by the press, which required police to check the immigration status of those arrested or stopped, made it a crime to transport or harbor unauthorized immigrants, and fined landlords and employers of undocumented immigrants. Though a federal judge partially blocked this bill (Santos et al. 2013), it inspired more than a dozen states, including Alabama and Mississippi, to consider similar policies (Magaña 2013).

Migration scholars have theorized that restrictionist measures may not only reflect the hardening of public sentiment on immigration, but that these policies may actually increase ethnic animosity and harden public sentiment towards immigrants (Calavita 1996; Chavez 2008; Flores 2014b). In addition, given common associations between Hispanics and immigrants (Jiménez 2010), these laws could also affect public discourse towards native Hispanics. However, this contention has not been assessed systematically.

I address this gap in the literature by assessing the impact of SB 1070 on public sentiment towards immigrants and Hispanics in Arizona through the analysis of more than 300,000 immigration-related Twitter messages, called "tweets," posted by Arizona and Nevada residents. Given the substantial growth in social media use in recent years, past researchers have analyzed tweets to gauge public sentiment towards many topics, including political candidates (DiGrazia, McKelvey, Bollen, and Rojas 2014), consumer brands (Jansen, Zhang, Sobel and Chowdury 2009), and civil unrest (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, and Welpe 2010). I rely on sentiment analysis, an analytic tool first developed in computer science to classify the sentiment polarity of texts. To analyze these data I employed a difference-in-difference approach using tweets from Nevada, a neighboring state with similar characteristics, as a counterfactual case. This allowed me to address common limitations of cross-sectional analyzes, such as omitted variable bias and spuriousness, and provide a quasi-causal estimate of this policy's impact on public sentiment towards immigrants in Arizona.

I find that the implementation of SB 1070 negatively affected the sentiment of Twitter messages about immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics posted by Arizona residents. Nevertheless, despite the predictions of law and society scholars, this trend was not driven by changes in users' attitudes towards these groups. Instead, SB 1070 affected the composition of messages by inciting anti-immigrant users to post more messages and

by motivating a new group, which was also critical of immigrants, to start posting messages on Twitter. This study's method of examining Twitter data through sentiment analysis and a custom lexicon dictionary could provide inspiration for the further exploration of abundant social media data.

CAN LAWS SHAPE PUBLIC OPINION?

Many scholars have studied whether public opinion can influence the design and implementation of public policies (Gilens and Page 2004; Page and Shapiro 1983), but growing number of researchers have investigated the other side of the question: whether policies can affect public opinion (Beckett 1997).

Law and society scholars have argued that laws can have social consequences, not only through their direct enforcement mechanisms, such as fines and penalties, but also through more indirect or "symbolic" channels (Berkowitz and Walker 1967). According to these scholars, laws have "expressive" or "symbolic" effects by making implicit normative statements or "sending a message" about forbidden behaviors, which influence individuals' moral assessments of those behaviors (Berkowitz and Walker 1967; Sunstein 1996). Hence, rather than acting in accordance with the law out of fear of legal punishment, as the rational actor approach would have it, individuals internalize the moral code that is implicit within the spirit of the law (Suchman 1997).

Within this same vein, some scholars argue that laws have the potential to change social norms or "judgments of other people" by shifting the "reputational utility" of a particular behavior (Sunstein 1996:2021). For example, a law that penalizes indoor smoking will affect smoking behaviors, not only by imposing fines, but also by changing the social norms around smoking, which will impose a "shaming cost" in terms of a damaged reputation on smokers who break this law. In this way, laws can have social consequences, even if they do not have clear enforcement mechanisms, especially when their message is clear and unambiguous, when they are widely publicized through newspapers and magazines, and when they are endorsed by public figures such as politicians (Sunstein 1996). Nevertheless, the expressive effects of laws have seldom been empirically tested (but see Albiston, Correll, Tucker, and Stevens 2012; Berkowitz and Walker 1967).

Similarly, scholars have noted that when politicians promote divisive public policies, they often use symbolic language that implicitly identifies vulnerable groups, such as racial minorities, immigrants, and poor families, as the source of social ailments (Beckett 1997; Calavita 1996; Edelman 1977). When elites' symbolic appeals connect with people's emotional predispositions that are acquired early in life, such as ethnocentrism and racial attitudes, the general public will often rally around controversial policies that target specific subgroups (Sears 1993). Beyond merely encouraging popular support for exclusionary policies, such symbolic political discourses may also shape public views of the targeted group (Calavita 1996; Chavez 2008; Santa Ana 2002). Social linguist Otto Santa Ana (2002) argues that the metaphors and images used by politicians and scholars to frame debates about immigration, which are heavily publicized in the media, could have a lasting impact on the general public's worldview. According to him, California politicians' use of threatening metaphors like "brown tide rising," "army of invaders," and "burdens" to describe Latino immigrants hardened popular views of Latinos.

Using this theoretical framework of the symbolic functions of laws, we would expect that anti-immigrant laws could affect public opinion on immigrants, even if they are blocked by lawsuits, since they send a message about the illegitimacy and undesirability of immigrants. These laws commonly use symbols and metaphors that trigger social anxieties, are widely publicized in the media, and are typically proposed and promoted by politicians themselves. By defining immigrants as an illegitimate group that drains local resources and augments social problems, these policies could negatively influence people's moral assessments of immigrants and perhaps even Hispanics in general, since these categories may overlap. In short, the expressive functions of the law framework would expect to see that SB 1070 hardened citizens' negative perceptions of immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics, which this study will test empirically.

CAN LAWS INFLUENCE POLITICAL BEHAVIORS?

In addition to having attitudinal effects, policies could also arouse political actors and influence their behaviors (Campbell 2012; Skocpol 1992; Soss 2000). According to the policy feedback effects framework, laws do so by gathering a constituency that has an

incentive to protect the benefits granted by policies and programs (Pierson 1994). Researchers have identified three main pathways through which policies mobilize individuals to form such a constituency: modifying the availability of politically-relevant resources, influencing the feelings of political engagement, such as political efficacy and political interest, and shaping the probability of political mobilization by interest groups and other political actors (Campbell 2012).

Most researchers in this literature have studied the impact of policies on political elites because elites are assumed to possess more information, have clearer goals, and have the ability to influence policy (Soss and Schram 2007). Therefore, the policy feedback effects framework suggests that punitive immigration laws could trigger the mobilization of elites or interest groups with a direct interest in immigration matters, since these policies raise the stakes of their political participation and provide them with a specific target around which they can rally.

Some scholars, though, are beginning to study policy feedback effects on non-elites or "mass publics." These scholars have generally studied welfare policies, since these are some of the most salient laws for non-elites (Campbell 2012). For example, social security legislation helped to transform senior citizens, who were once the least politically active demographic group, into one of the most active groups. Social security legislation gave seniors financial resources and free time, increased their interest in political affairs, tied their well-being to a government program, and, lastly, created a social identity based on program participation, all of which facilitated the political mobilization of seniors (Campbell 2003).

Therefore, this study will investigate whether a restrictionist immigration law could increase the political mobilization of non-elites, especially those who have non-neutral dispositions towards immigration. On one hand, the law could help mobilize individuals who are already critical of immigrants, since these individuals may come to believe that the law would enhance their wellbeing by addressing immigration-related problems that are commonly cited by restrictionist politicians, like crime and abuse of social services (Calavita 1996; Flores 2014b). On the other hand, the law could also mobilize individuals with pre-existing, pro-immigrant attitudes, since they might feel

compelled to come to immigrants' defense when a punitive immigration policy is proposed.

The law could also have policy feedback effects on another group of individuals: those who had not voiced their opinion on immigration in public before the law was proposed. The common knowledge perspective argues that individuals may become politically active only when they believe others possess the same information as they do and share a symbolic system that allows them to know how to understand this information (Chwe 2013). This is so because "no one wants to act alone" (Sen 1967). A heavily advertised restrictionist law may signal to local residents that many others know about the law and the problems the law is meant to address. Therefore, this perceived shared understanding might motivate them to voice their opinion on immigration and become politically active.

In summary, the policy feedback effects literature suggests that anti-immigrant laws will mobilize three groups of people: 1) elites and activists with a direct interest on immigration policies, 2) individuals with pre-existing opinions about immigration, either positive or negative, might also become mobilized by these policies, and 3) individuals who had not previously discussed immigration matters publicly to start voicing their opinions about the topic as they come to perceive that others share the same information than they do.

Though research on policy feedback effects has amassed a wealth of insights about the social and political consequences of laws, it has some limitations. First, it is still not clear whether policies only affect their target populations or whether they can also affect the public at large, including people who are not directly affected by the policy's design (Campbell 2012). Second, past research has mostly consisted of rich case studies that have provided considerable insights but have not allowed researchers to draw causal inferences or to generalize from them (for an exception see Lerman and Onofrio 2011). Third, most examined policies provide tangible benefits to sectors of the population. It is not entirely clear whether policies that are punitive in nature would also have the power to mobilize either political elites or the mass public.

In this chapter, I address these shortcomings by examining the impact of a contentious punitive policy by using a potential outcomes research design to provide a

quasi-causal estimate of this law's impact on public opinion. I empirically assess whether the policy's impact was limited to elites or was also found in a wider segment of the general public, whether individuals with pre-existing attitudes became more prolific in their political behavior, and whether new users were incited to join the public discussion.

SUBNATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: SB 1070 IN ARIZONA

In the mid-1990s, federal immigration officers set up blockades in California and Texas to avert the entry of immigrants. As a result, Arizona became the new entry point for Latino immigrants into the U.S. (Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez, Hernandez, and Bailey 1999), which fueled a rapid increase in the local Latino population. By 2000, Hispanics amounted to 25.3% of Arizona's population, and by 2010 that figure would increase to 29.6%. In 2010, 30.2% of Latinos living in Arizona were born in Latin America (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010).

The growth of the Latino population has gone hand-in-hand with the implementation of a series of statewide restrictionist immigration policies in recent years. In 2004, a citizen's group called Protect Arizona Now (PAN) successfully placed a ballot initiative mandating government workers to report suspected undocumented immigrants seeking benefits and requiring an identification card at polling places (Avalos, Magaña, and Pantoja 2010). In 2006, Arizona passed a series of punitive laws, including Proposition 100, which denies undocumented immigrants the right to bail, Proposition 102, which forbids unauthorized immigrants from bringing lawsuits or winning damages, and Proposition 300, which prohibits undocumented students from receiving financial aid and in-state tuition (Magaña 2013).

In 2010, Arizona state senator Russell Pearce argued that the federal government was obstructing Arizona's immigration enforcement efforts and introduced the "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhood Act," or SB 1070. This bill was nicknamed the "show me your papers" law in the popular press because it makes the failure to carry immigration documents a crime and gives local authorities broad powers to detain anyone suspected of lacking documents (Magaña 2013). SB 1070 also makes it a crime to stop a vehicle to hire day laborers if it impedes traffic and prohibits Arizonans

from transporting, harboring, or concealing an unauthorized immigrant. In addition, it strengthens sanctions against employers of immigrants.

Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law in front of television cameras on April 23, 2010 (Santos et al. 2013). Brewer argued that the bill was necessary to deal with the "border-related violence and crime" caused by illegal immigration (Brewer 2010). Further linking immigrants with criminal behaviors she added, "We cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug cartels. We cannot stand idly by as drop houses, kidnappings and violence compromise our quality of life. We cannot delay while the destruction happening south of our international border creeps its way north" (Brewer 2010).

Despite concerns over potential racial profiling, which prompted a federal judge to partially block SB 1070, Brewer continuously argued that the law only targeted undocumented immigrants, not individuals of a certain "skin color, accent, or social status" (Brewer 2010).

Even considering Arizona's prolific history of local anti-immigrant legislation, SB 1070 was considered the "broadest and strictest immigration measure in generations" (Archibold 2010), and it set off a national and international controversy (Magaña 2013). Journalists documented heated demonstrations and bitter exchanges between bill supporters and immigrants (Archibold 2010; Robbins 2012). The Cardinal Roger M. Mahony of Los Angeles referred to the authorities' ability to demand documents as "Nazism" (Archibold 2010). In addition, the Mexican government, along with several other Latin American countries, criticized the bill and cited concerns over racial profiling of Latin Americans.

Migration researchers have found that the proposal of local anti-immigrant policies can negatively affect how immigrants are perceived, even when those laws are blocked by legal challenges. Flores (2014b) found that the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance by the town of Hazleton, PA solidified native whites' perceptions that local immigrants were "illegal" and that they were involved in criminal behaviors, such as drug dealing, robberies, and gang membership. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether statewide laws like SB 1070 could have a similar attitudinal effect in a southwestern state like Arizona, where Hispanic communities have existed for centuries and actually precede

Anglo-American settlement. In such a setting, public attitudes towards immigrants or Hispanics may have solidified long ago and may be less susceptible to short-term changes. Further, it is not entirely clear whether a restrictionist immigration policy like SB 1070 will be perceived as targeting only undocumented immigrants, as these laws' sponsors commonly argue (Barletta 2006; Menjívar and Abrego 2012; O'Neill 2011), or whether it will have a spillover effect and also affect other types of immigrants or even U.S.-born Hispanics.

There is some qualitative evidence that suggests that SB 1070's had a negative impact on the lives of Latino immigrants. Menjívar and Abrego (2012) find that Central Americans immigrants in post-SB 1070 Arizona live in a constant state of fear and anxiety. For these immigrants, "deportability is palpable in daily life, as even commuting between home and work or shopping for groceries involves 'anguish' and careful deliberation to avoid the possibility of being separated from loved ones" (Menjívar and Abrego 2012:1401). Szkupinski Quiroga and her collaborators (2014) found that after the passage of SB 1070, Arizona residents of Latino ancestry, even those who were U.S.-born, reported more negative experiences with authorities and employers. Similarly, there is some evidence that SB 1070 may have negatively affected local Latino children's self-esteem (Santos et al. 2013).

Aside from this qualitative evidence, polls have also documented a hardened public opinion towards immigrants in the post-SB 1070 period. A nationwide poll conducted in July 2010 found that a majority of U.S. residents (55%) supported SB 1070,[12] even though 54% believed that it would lead to discrimination against Hispanics. A majority of respondents also supported building a fence along the Mexican border and sanctions against employers who hire undocumented immigrants (CNN 2010). Nevertheless because such surveys were conducted only after the law was proposed, not before, we still lack systematic evidence about whether the law had an independent effect on public sentiment towards immigrants in Arizona or whether it was merely a reflection of growing public animosity against undocumented immigrants.

In the next section, I examine empirically whether SB 1070 affected public sentiment towards immigrants in Arizona. Then, I explore whether this perceived change in public opinion was the result of attitudinal changes of Arizona residents towards

immigrants, as predicted by the expressive functions of laws literature, or whether it was brought about by changes in the behaviors of specific Arizona residents, including elites and common residents, who may have became emboldened after learning about the law, as predicted by policy feedback effects scholars.

TWITTER, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND PUBLIC OPINION

Social researchers are only beginning to explore the recent explosion in the data generated by millions of users of social media sites like Twitter and Facebook. Twitter data, in particular, have been used to predict election outcomes (DiGrazia, McKelvey, Bollen, and Rojas 2014), influenza outbreaks (Culotta 2010), and even criminal activity (Wang, Gerber, and Brown 2012).

In this study, I analyze more than 300,000 Twitter messages, published by Arizona and Nevada residents, to investigate whether the passage of SB 1070 had an impact on public sentiment towards immigrants. Twitter is a micro-blogging website where users post text messages or "tweets" that are 140 characters or shorter. Twitter was founded in 2006 and has enjoyed a rapid expansion. By 2012, 500 million registered users across the world posted more than 300 million tweets per day. During the same year, 80% of all U.S. adults regularly used the Internet, and 15% of them were Twitter users (Smith and Brenner 2012).

Recent studies have uncovered a robust correlation between Twitter users' mood, as expressed in their messages, and traditional public opinion surveys (O'Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, and Smith 2010). In addition, Bollen, Pepe, and Mao (2009) found that public mood, as expressed in tweets, is highly responsive to stock market performance, oil price indices, and major political events, such as elections. This has led some scholars to argue that Internet text streams, like Twitter, could substitute or at least supplement traditional polling (DiGrazia et al. 2014; O'Connor et al. 2010).

In this chapter, I take a more agnostic approach. I consider tweets to be specific types of speech acts that are produced in an online public arena that is part of a larger public sphere, where opinions are exchanged between individuals and groups. As such, tweets may not necessarily be representative of all discursive acts that occur in society,

but could nonetheless provide vital information about Twitter users' attitudes towards specific topics.

Social media data, like the tweets published on Twitter, have several unique characteristics that could make them particularly appealing to social analysts. First, unlike traditional surveys and interviews, which are commonly designed based on researchers' own interests, social media data can provide analysts with spontaneous information generated by users themselves. Therefore, they could provide a unique insight into individuals' mindsets, the things they consider important, and the way they talk about them in a more inductive way. Second, the explosion of computational data via the Internet provides social researchers with large amounts of information on a growing number of people. Third, traditional media outlets, such as TV news, increasingly broadcast live tweets, which may augment Twitter's social impact, even among non-users.

One concern with Twitter data is that Twitter users are not representative of the entire U.S. population (DiGrazia et al. 2012), even if increasing numbers of U.S. residents use social media. Survey evidence shows that Twitter users are indeed somewhat selective. While 26% of Internet users between the ages of 18 and 29 use Twitter, such figure is only about 4% for senior citizens, age 65 and over. While 20% of urban Internet users tweet, only 8% of rural residents do. In addition, while 28% of African-American Internet users have Twitter accounts, this figure is 12% and 14% for non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics, respectively (Smith and Brenner 2012). Though such racial disparities are considerable, they are not a significant concern for this study, since this study compares the Twitter populations of Arizona and Nevada, both of which have small African-American populations (see Table 1). Nevertheless, the conclusions of this study are limited to the population that uses Twitter, who are generally younger, more urban, and more racially diverse than the U.S. population as a whole (Smith and Brenner 2012).

DATA AND METHODS

In this study, I compare all tweets related to immigrants published in the four-month period before April 2010, when SB 1070 was approved, with those posted in the

four-month period after, in order to estimate the impact of this law on public discourse on immigrants. In addition, since public discourse on immigration could have changed in Arizona for reasons other than the passage of SB 1070 during this time period, I use tweets from Nevada, a southwestern state with comparable characteristics, as a counterfactual case to estimate how would public discourse on immigrants would have looked like in the absence of SB 1070. This research design allows me to address some of the limitations that are commonly found in cross-sectional research designs, including omitted variable bias.

I acquired these historical tweets through Gnip, a subsidiary of Twitter. I obtained all geo-coded tweets that mentioned immigrants, Mexicans, Hispanics, Asians, and African-Americans published in Arizona and Nevada during the first few months of 2010, when SB 1070 was proposed (see Appendix for more details on the procedures for collecting tweets). Geo-coding is based on users' self reports. Therefore, this strategy may not capture Twitter users who visited Arizona or Nevada during the treatment period, since they likely listed their residency in a different state. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a drawback, since my population of interest is local Arizonans and Nevadans.[13] The total number of collected tweets was 327, 342. Since my primary interest is to detect the impact of SB 1070 on majority group members, English-speakers in Arizona, I excluded all tweets written in languages other than English, including Spanish, from my data set.

To analyze these tweets, I relied on a text analysis technique known as sentiment analysis, which is commonly used in computer science to estimate the sentiment polarity of texts, or whether a given text has a primarily negative or positive orientation. More specifically, I used a lexicon-based approach and incorporated the latest techniques in sentiment analysis from computational linguistics.

First, I created a lexicon, or a set of words, containing thousands of positive words such as "excellent" and "amazing," along with negative words such as "horrible" and "ugly." I relied on one of the most comprehensive sentiment lexicons available, Lui's dictionary, which contains 2,006 and 4,783 positive and negative words, respectively (Liu, Hu, and Cheng 2005). This lexicon contains many colloquial terms and misspelled words as they appear frequently in social media sites like "beutifully" and "achievible."

Although this lexicon is one of the most comprehensive dictionaries available, it has several drawbacks. First, lexicons are often domain-specific (Liu 2012). In other words, terms used in the academic medical literature might be very different from words used by young adults in online chat rooms. This is a concern, given that many Twitter users use many context-specific words, including colloquial terms and slang words. They also often use cusswords, emoticons, hashtags, and other symbols not included in formal Lexicons to express themselves.

In addition, Liu's dictionary does not capture differences in sentiment intensity but rates all negative and positive words as -1 and +1 respectively. Therefore, this lexicon could not capture differences between phrases such as: "I hate immigrants" and "I am skeptical of immigrants." Since both "skeptical" and "hate" are considered negative words, both sentences would receive exactly the same sentiment score, even if their sentiment intensities are clearly different. To address these shortcomings, I built a new lexicon that includes an intensity measurement for each word, which ranges from +4 (extremely positive) to -4 (extremely negative), provided by five native English speakers. It also includes many of the colloquial words and symbols used by Twitter users when talking about immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities (see Appendix for more information on how I constructed this lexicon).

A further challenge was that each tweet could contain multiple "opinion targets," which are defined as the entities about which the speaker has an opinion. For example, most sentiment scoring algorithms would rate the sentence: "My house is beautiful but sometimes I think that I am ungrateful" as neutral, since it contains a positive word (beautiful: +1) and a negative word (ungrateful: -1), resulting in a sentiment score of zero. Nevertheless, this sentence is more complex than that simple rating scheme implies. It contains a positive evaluation of "house" and a negative assessment of "I." In other words, this sentence contains two different opinion targets with different sentiments for each one of them.

To account for this, researchers are beginning to incorporate the identification of opinion targets into their scoring algorithms. Identifying opinion targets is a difficult task. One technique to do so is to use noun phrases as proxies for opinion targets (Jiang, Yu, Zhou, Liu, and Zhao 2011). In our example, identifying both nouns ("house" and "I")

would correctly identify the opinion targets present in the sentence, though this is not always the case.

Based on this strategy, I developed a scoring algorithm that searches each individual tweet for sentiment words and then weighs its score, based on the distance from the nearest opinion target. In this way, sentiment words that are farther away from an opinion target will carry less weight in the overall sentiment score of each tweet than those that are closest. More formally, the sentiment function for each opinion target o_i is obtained with the following scoring function:

$$score(sw_j, tweet) = \sum_{sw_j \in t} \frac{sw_j.so}{dist(sw_j, o_i)}, \quad (1)$$

where sw_j is a sentiment word included in s, $dist(sw_j, o_i)$ is the number of words between opinion target o_i and sentiment word sw_j in s. $sw_j.so$ is the sentiment score of sw_j. As mentioned before, this distance weight reduces the influence of sentiment words that are further away from o_i. Finally, to calculate the final sentiment score for each tweet, I weight $score(sw_j, tweet)$ by the number of words in each tweet or more formally:

$$score(tweet) = \frac{\sum_{sw_j \in t} score(sw_j, tweet)}{n(w, tweet)} \quad (2)$$

where *n(w,tweet)* is the number of words in each tweet. In the Appendix, I test the effectiveness of this scoring algorithm in predicting the sentiment classification of tweets.

Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics from the resulting data set and includes the number of tweets collected for every target group by state, along with the average sentiment score each group received during the examined time period.

- Table 1 about here –

RESULTS

A simple comparison of the average sentiment score towards immigrants in Arizona before and after SB 1070's proposal would be a problematic method of estimating the law's impact on public opinion because public sentiment on immigration in Arizona could have changed during this time period for reasons other than the passage

of the law. Similarly, comparing post-SB 1070 public sentiment towards immigrants in Arizona with public sentiment in a different state could also be problematic, since any observed changes in public sentiment between both states could have been driven by unobserved differences between the states.

Therefore, in this study, I relied on a difference-in-differences strategy. I used tweets from Nevada, a southwestern state with similar characteristics, as a counterfactual case to estimate how would public discourse on immigrants would have looked like in Arizona in the absence of SB 1070.

Table 2 shows basic sociodemographic, political, and economic indicators of the two states. Both states have many similarities, including an almost identical ethno-racial composition (with Hispanic populations ranging between 26.5% and 29%) and similar levels of foreign-born residents. In addition, both states were governed by Republican politicians in 2010, had comparable economic indicators, and similar levels of Internet connectivity and Twitter use. However, there are some differences. Nevada voters tend to vote somewhat more Democratic, though such gap decreased the in 2012 election, and the Hispanic population has grown at a faster rate in Nevada since 2000.

- Table 2 about here –

Still, Arizona and Nevada have many core demographic similarities, and no statewide anti-immigrant law was proposed or passed in Nevada during the relevant time period, which makes it a suitable counterfactual case. One of the requirements of the difference-in-differences approach is that the control case should not be contaminated by the treatment applied to the treated unit (Card and Krueger 1994; Imbens and Woolridge 2007). Nevertheless, it is entirely plausible that Nevada residents could also have been affected by SB 1070's proposal, given their geographic proximity to Arizona and the substantial news coverage the law received. To examine this potential source of bias, I searched the two largest newspapers in each state, *Las Vegas Sun* and *Arizona Daily Star*, for mentions of SB 1070. Graph 1 shows the number of news item published by each paper related to SB 1070 from April 2010, when the bill was voted on, to January 2011. As expected, Graph 1 shows that the bill produced substantial news coverage in Arizona

but very little coverage in Nevada. Therefore, though such cross-state contamination cannot be discarded completely, there is little evidence of it, at least via the written news media.

- Graph 1 about here-

Further, if such influence existed, it probably had a similar effect on Nevada residents as it did on their Arizona neighbors, given these states' relatively similar characteristics. If that were the case, such cross state influence would put a downward bias on my estimates and result in a conservative estimate of the true social effect of the law on Arizona residents. A possible way to address this cross-state influence would be to select a state that is further removed from Arizona. However, a more distant state would not be as comparable to Arizona.

Another potential concern is that there could have been some event that only occurred in Arizona and not in Nevada in the post-SB 1070 period. This would be a cause for concern if such event were also correlated with public sentiment on immigration since that would violate the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-difference model (Imbens and Woolridge 2007). A primary candidate for this event would be the number of immigrants living in each state. If the number of immigrants varied significantly in Arizona after SB 1070 was proposed, this could potentially bias my results by making Arizona and Nevada less comparable. However, using data from the United States Border Patrol, I did not find evidence for any significant change in the flow of undocumented immigrants into Arizona after SB 1070 was proposed (see Appendix).

Graph 2 shows the average sentiment score for tweets that mentioned immigrants before and after SB 1070 was considered in Arizona. A vertical red line indicates that the bill was discussed and approved in April by the Arizona legislature. The graph shows that the average sentiment for both states was negative for the entire period under examination, though the Arizona line was less negative than its Nevada counterpart for most of the pre-SB 1070 period. In March, one month before the law was considered, the average sentiment towards immigrants expressed by Twitter users was virtually identical in both states. However, such sentiment became significantly more negative in Arizona in April, when the law was passed. In contrast, the Nevada line was flatter and came down

more gradually. For most of the post-SB 1070 period, the Arizona line remained below Nevada's line and only increased to meet Nevada's higher line in July, three months after the bill was signed into law. This appears to give some descriptive evidence that public sentiment towards immigrants hardened in Arizona after SB1070 was considered.

- Graph 2 about here-

The difference-in-difference approach compares the difference in public sentiment after and before the policy intervention, the proposal of SB 1070 in Arizona, to the same difference for the control group, Nevada, which was not "treated" by a similar policy. Average changes over time in public sentiment in Nevada are then subtracted from average changes over time in Arizona. This difference-in-difference removes biases stemming from permanent differences between the two states, as well as biases resulting from changes over time in Arizona unrelated to SB 1070's proposal, thus significantly reducing the omitted variable bias that may afflict cross-sectional designs (Card and Krueger 1994; Parrado 2012). Formally, the specification is as follows:

$$\delta = (\overline{Y}_{C(Post)} - \overline{Y}_{C(Before)}) - (\overline{Y}_{T(Post)} - \overline{Y}_{T(Before)}), \quad (3)$$

where δ is the estimated causal effect of interest and $\overline{Y}$ is the average outcome in control (C) and treatment (T) groups in years after SB 1070 was proposed and before SB 1070 was proposed.

Table 3 shows the results for OLS models predicting changes in sentiment of tweets about immigrants using this model. It compares all tweets related to immigrants posted three months before SB 1070 was considered (January to March 2010) with tweets posted three months after SB 1070 was proposed (April to June 2010). It includes an interaction term, AZXpost, which captures the statistical effect of SB 1070's proposal in Arizona. A statistically significant coefficient of -0.025 indicates that tweets about immigrants posted by Arizona residents were 44% more negative than expected after the law's proposal. To provide a more qualitative intuition, the estimated impact of SB 1070 on public discourse on immigrants would be equivalent to saying, "The immigrants

moving to Arizona are *leeches*" instead of saying, "The immigrants moving to Arizona are *trespassers*." Though both terms were classified as negative by human raters, they considered "leeches" more negative, perhaps because besides signaling an illegitimate presence it also conveys abuse towards the host.

- Table 3 about here-

The fact that the composition of messages about immigrants became more negative in Arizona as a result of SB 1070 is perhaps not entirely surprising. After all, the bill explicitly targeted immigrants and portrayed them as a growing criminal threat that needed to be contained (Brewer 2010). In Model 2, I tested whether the bill had also spillover effects on messages about Mexicans. The bill's authors consistently argued it was not intended to target any specific ethnic or racial group, but only undocumented individuals (Brewer 2010). Nevertheless, in Model 2, I found that tweets mentioning Mexicans also became more negative after the bill was proposed. This finding directly contradicts the bill's drafters. Perhaps this could be explained by the fact that the majority of immigrants in Arizona are from Mexico, but did the bill also have a similar impact on public discourse towards Hispanics in general? I tested this in Model 3, which shows that tweets about "Hispanics" posted by Arizona Twitter users also became significantly more negative after SB 1070 was proposed.

One could argue that the increased negativity of Twitter messages regarding immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics in Arizona after SB 1070's proposal could be capturing a growing concern with immigration in general. Such concern would grow at a faster rate in Arizona than in Nevada, since the former is a border state that has become a major entry point for immigrants into the U.S. **(**Eschbach et al. 1999; Massey 2008). This is not very likely since, as Table 2 shows, the immigrant population has actually grown at a faster rate in Nevada than in Arizona since 2000. In addition, population changes take years to unfold, and Graph 2 shows a rapid hardening of public sentiment towards immigrants after the bill was considered. However, to further rule out any on-going trend in animosity towards all immigrants in Arizona, I conducted another test. In Model 4, I tested whether the average sentiment of tweets towards Asian immigrants also became

more negative in the post SB 1070 period. To do so, I analyzed all tweets related to the largest Asian immigrant groups in Arizona and Nevada. Model 4 shows that messages mentioning Asians were largely unaffected by the implementation of SB 1070.

Perhaps this is the case because majority group members do not commonly perceive Asians as a threatening group. In contrast, African-Americans are a native minority group that is more often perceived in threatening terms (Quillian and Pager 2001). Perhaps SB 1070 only affected public discourse regarding seemingly undeserving minority groups, such as Blacks and Mexican immigrants. I tested this in Model 5. I found that the implementation of SB 1070 did not affect how Arizona Twitter users talked about Blacks. These findings undermine the hypothesis that the hardening of tweets towards immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics following SB 1070's proposal was driven by a general trend of growing animosity toward all minority groups in Arizona, since the sentiment polarity of messages regarding Asians and Blacks did not change in the post-SB 1070 period.

These findings appear to support the hypothesis, advanced by some scholars and immigrant advocates, that this bill negatively affected Arizonans' views of immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanic residents. Though this seems like a plausible explanation, there are three other mechanisms that could explain this trend. First, this effect could have been driven by a small group of prolific activist users. Second, perhaps Arizona residents did not change their attitudes towards these groups, but residents who were already critical of immigrants became politically aroused and posted more messages after SB 1070 was made public. Third, new users, with a more negative attitude towards these groups, could have begun to post immigration-related tweets after the bill was proposed. In the next section, I assess each one of these four mechanisms.

Mechanism 1: SB 1070 affected Arizonans' attitudes towards immigrants

As discussed previously, law and society scholars argue that laws can have extra-legal or symbolic functions (Berkowitz and Walker 1967; Sunstein 1996). When laws target specific groups, such as smokers or undocumented immigrants, individuals might internalize the moral code that is implicit in the law. As such, individuals might become more hostile or critical towards the seemingly deviant groups that are targeted by the law.

If this is the case, we should detect a change in sentiment towards immigrants *within* users after the law was passed. In my data set, 5,170 Arizona users and 1,636 Nevada users posted messages regarding these groups before and after the law was implemented, which amount to 28.7% and 31.1% of each state's users' base, respectively. This allowed me to run a panel data model to estimate whether there were within-user changes in public sentiment towards immigrants.

To do so, I restricted my analysis to users who posted messages about these groups both before and after the law was implemented. I employed fixed effects models, which rule out potential differences across individuals because they only rely on within-subject information to estimate the statistical influence of the independent variables on the outcome variable (Allison 2012). By adding individual fixed effects, this model essentially demeans the sentiment scores of each user and removes the effect of any time-invariant unobserved characteristic such as political ideology, social class, race, sex, culture, etc. Detecting a within-user change in sentiment score after SB 1070 was considered would provide evidence that the law affected how people talked about the examined groups.

More formally my within-user model is:

$$s_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_{it} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

where s_i is the sentiment score for user *i* at time *t*, $Post_i$ takes a value of 1 during the post-SB 1070 period, α_i is a user fixed effect, and ε_{it} is a disturbance term. I first ran this model for all Arizona users who posted messages in both time periods and then I ran the same model for their Nevada counterparts.

- Table 4 about here –

Table 4 shows no significant change in the polarity of tweets about any of the groups, with the exception of tweets related to Mexicans in Arizona. Arizona residents who posted tweets about Mexicans before and after SB 1070 was proposed posted significantly more negative tweets about Mexicans after the law was approved. In

contrast, the sentiment of tweets related to Mexicans in Nevada did not change significantly. For the rest of the groups, no significant change in sentiment was detected. Once we take into account the initial attitude of users towards immigrants and Hispanics, the law did not appear to have hardened their views towards them.

Mechanism 2: SB 1070 influenced elites and interest groups

If individual users did not change their attitude towards immigrants, how can we explain our earlier findings, displayed on Table 3, which show that messages about immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics became significantly more negative in post-SB 1070 Arizona? The policy feedback literature suggests that policies could affect public opinion by influencing the activities of political elites or interests groups. These interest groups become politically aroused by the approval of a policy in which they believe they have a vested interest.

In this case, a plausible hypothesis is that SB 1070 affected the composition of tweets about immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics by influencing the behavior of activist individuals with a direct interest on immigration debates. Even a relatively small number of dedicated users could potentially make an impact on Twitter by posting multiple messages on the same topic. Indeed, the top five most prolific Twitter posters on the topic of migration are all from Arizona and include seemingly activist users such as "Border Action," which posted 2,351 tweets in the examined time period, "American Patrol" (2,559), "savetheusa" (2,704) and "US Citizen" (2,737). These numbers are significantly higher than the median number of immigration-related messages for all users in the same time period (127).

In this section, I test whether my previous results are robust to the exclusion of the most active Twitter users or whether a small minority of activist users is driving the changes in public sentiment I detected earlier. To do so, I ranked all Twitter users in my data set by the number of messages posted in this period to identify the most prolific Twitter users. In other words, in this section, I define those users who posted the highest number of immigration-related tweets as "activist users." In Table 5, I used the same regression specification as in Table 3, but I first excluded the top 1% and then the top 5% most active users from the regression equation.

- Table 5 about here-

In line with my previous results, Table 5 shows that Twitter messages regarding immigrants became more negative in Arizona after SB 1070's proposal, even after excluding the 1% most prolific users. This coefficient shrank slightly but remained significant when the top 5% of users were excluded. Similarly, the results for both Mexicans and Hispanics were equally robust to the exclusion of dedicated users, suggesting that the changes in public sentiment towards these groups after SB 1070 were more widespread and also involved posts by casual or non-activist Twitter users. Finally, as expected, the exclusion of the most active users did not have an impact on the sentiment scores of Asians or African-Americans.

Mechanism 3: Anti-immigrant users became more prolific

If the estimated effect of SB 1070 on the sentiment of immigration-related tweets was driven neither by activist users nor by attitudinal changes among users, how can we explain our original results, which show more negative messages about these groups in the post SB-1070 period? The policy feedback literature anticipates that policies could also shape the behaviors of non-elites or the mass public (Campbell 2012). SB 1070 could have influenced a wider segment of users to become more outspoken about their position vis-à-vis immigrants, especially those with non-neutral stances. While anti-immigrant users might be energized by SB 1070 to express their opposition to immigration, pro-immigrant users might seek to counter prevailing negative characterization of immigrants by becoming more vocal about immigrants' perceived positive contributions to society. If users who were already critical of immigrants were emboldened by SB 1070 to post more immigration-related messages than their neutral or pro-immigrant counterparts, this could have induced the negative correlation shown in Table 3 between public sentiment and this law's proposal.

To test this, I restricted my analysis to users who posted messages in both time periods, in order to compare the average number of messages posted by users before and after the law was proposed. Then, I divided all Twitter users in my dataset who posted

messages about immigrants into three groups, according to the average polarity of their tweets before the law was implemented. If the average polarity of a user's messages fell below the 33rd percentile, I classified her in the "anti-immigrant" or negative group, since most of her messages ranked in the lowest or most negative side of the sentiment spectrum. I classified a Twitter user as "neutral" when his average sentiment score lay between the 33rd and 66th percentiles. Lastly, if a user's average sentiment score was higher than the 66th percentile as "pro-immigrant" or positive, since most of her messages were in the higher or most positive side of the sentiment distribution. I created this classification scheme for each target group: immigrants, Mexicans, Hispanics, Asians, and Blacks. I then ran an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), predicting the number of messages posted about immigrants and included a dummy for each one of these groups by state.[14] I also interacted these dummies by period to assess whether the average number of messages posted by each group changed after SB 1070 was proposed. This results in twelve distinct terms: two states (Arizona and Nevada) X two time periods (before and after SB 1070) X three sentiment orientations (anti, neutral, and pro).

Full results, which include all twelve interaction terms, can be found in the Appendix. For simplicity, in Table 6, I summarize these results by using a difference-in-differences technique to estimate the likely impact of SB 1070 on each group of users. For example, to estimate the impact of SB 1070 on the number of messages about immigrants posted by anti-immigrant users, I used the following equation:

$$\delta = (\text{AZ Anti*Post} - \text{AZ Anti*Before}) - (\text{NV Anti*Post} - \text{NV Anti*Before}) \quad (5)$$

I calculate the variance of each difference by summing up the variances minus twice the covariance:

$$Var(X - Y) = Var(X) + Var(Y) - 2Cov(X,Y) \quad (6)$$

- Table 6 about here-

Table 6 shows difference-in-differences estimates that indicate the estimated impact of the law on the average number of messages posted by individuals from the

three different groups. It shows that users classified as "anti-immigrant" posted 36 more messages as a result of SB 1070's proposal. In contrast, neutral and pro-immigrant users posted fewer messages than expected, although these coefficients are not statistically significant. Model 2 shows that anti-immigrant users were also predicted to post one more message than expected about Mexicans. Model 3 also shows a positive coefficient for the number of messages posted about Hispanics for anti-immigrant users, but this coefficient cannot be distinguished from zero at the conventional significance levels.

Therefore, in line with Hypothesis 3, the evidence in this section shows that Twitter users who posted negative messages about immigrants and Mexicans in the pre-SB 1070 period became significantly more prolific after the law was proposed.

Mechanism 4: New Twitter users began discussing migration

Yet another way in which SB 1070 could have affected the average sentiment of immigration-related tweets is by motivating new users to start posting messages about migration. The common knowledge perspective states that knowing that others possess the same information as one does may embolden a user to become more outspoken since "no one wants to act alone" (Chwe 2013; Sen 1967). If this is the case, the law could have affected the overall composition of tweets about immigrants in Arizona, not by changing residents' minds about this topic, but by motivating residents to seek a public platform to voice concerns about immigration that are thought to be shared by many others.

In line with this proposition, the number of unique users posting on immigration matters grew at a faster rate in Arizona (440%), relative to Nevada (287%), after the law was proposed.

Were these new users more critical of immigrants? To test this proposition, I used regression analysis. First, I divided all Arizona users into three categories: users who posted only *before* the law, users who posted only *after* the law, and users who posted in *both* time periods. I did not include a dummy for Arizona users, since these three categories account for all Arizona users. I also did not interact these three dummies by period, since only the third group posted messages before and after the law was proposed.

Therefore, I only included an interaction term by period for this third group of users, which is labeled as "AZ Both X post" in Table 6.

- Table 7 about here -

The results, shown in Table 7, provide evidence for the selectivity of users who posted about these groups across time. It shows that Arizona users who only published messages about immigrants after the law was implemented posted significantly more negative tweets than those who only posted before the law was passed. In the case of tweets related to Mexicans, the coefficient for users who only posted after SB 1070 is also negative but cannot be distinguished from zero. Nevertheless, when it comes to messages about Hispanics, the model also predicted that those users who joined Twitter after SB 1070 was approved published more negative messages about this group than other users. No significant results were found in the case of Asians or Blacks, suggesting that there was no selectivity of users posting about these groups by time period. These results indicate that, as Hypothesis 4 states, new Arizona users who began to publish tweets about immigrants and Hispanics after SB 1070 was proposed were more critical of these groups than expected, which helps explain why the average tweet published in Arizona in the post-SB 1070 period was significantly more negative than in Nevada.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Using a difference-in-differences estimation technique on more than 300,000 tweets published in Nevada and Arizona in 2010, I find that the implementation of SB 1070 had a significant negative impact on the sentiment of messages regarding immigrants posted by Twitter users in Arizona. Further, though the bill's supporters consistently argued that the law only targeted unauthorized immigrants, I find that the law also shaped public discourse about Mexicans and, more generally, towards all Hispanics. In contrast, the passage of the bill did not affect public sentiment towards other immigrant groups, such as Asians, or other native minorities, such as African-

Americans. This evidence suggests that restrictive immigration policies were perceived by the general public to be targeting Mexicans and Hispanics. This also provides evidence to the casual observation that the terms "immigrant" and "Mexican" are often conflated, at least in Arizona.

Though scholars have argued that punitive immigration bills, such as Arizona's SB 1070, could harden natives' views of immigrants (Flores 2014b; Menjivar and Abrego 2013), I do not find much evidence for this assertion. Instead, I find that two alternative processes drove the apparent changes in public sentiment in post-SB 1070's Arizona towards immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics. First, Arizona residents who were already critical of these groups began posting many more messages about them after SB 1070 was implemented. Second, a new group of users began posting messages about these groups after the law was passed. These new users were significantly more likely to post negative messages. I show that these two processes account for the perceived negative effect of the proposal of SB 1070 on public discourse towards immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics in Arizona.

This chapter makes four distinct theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. First, despite the expectation of law and society scholars that punitive laws may shape people's attitudes towards the targeted group, in this study I do not find much support for this theoretical assertion (with the exception of tweets about Mexicans). Perhaps individuals' opinions towards immigrants are relatively stable in the short-run and punitive laws may only shape people's attitudes over a longer time period. This may partly explain why Arizonans' sentiments towards immigrants were already negative, even before SB 1070 was proposed, since these sentiments perhaps reflected the accumulated effect of previous anti-immigrant laws considered by this state.

Second, though I do not find that the law changed users' opinions towards immigrants, I do find that SB 1070 negatively affected public discourse towards immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics, even when it was blocked in court by a legal challenge. The law mobilized local residents through two different mechanisms. First, as predicted by the policy feedback effects literature, it influenced Arizonans who already had a negative attitude towards these groups to post more tweets. Second, it motivated

new users, who were more likely to be critical of immigrants, to start tweeting on the topic.

My findings contribute to this literature by showing that some laws can have policy feedback effects beyond their target populations and that they can do so even if these laws do not provide direct benefits but are instead of a restrictionist character. Indeed, while some politicians endorse punitive policies in an effort to placate the electorate, my findings suggest that these policies may actually stir the pot further and encourage individuals with pre-existing critical views to become more politically active. In turn, as the policy feedback effects literature would anticipate, the increased political participation of this dedicated group may raise the odds that a new round of punitive policies will be considered in the future, creating a self-feeding process that may explain why in recent years states like Arizona have implemented ever more punitive policies that target immigrants, racial minorities, and homosexual groups. Future research should assess whether the energizing effects of punitive laws may also influence other social and political behaviors, such as voting, protests, and membership in political groups.

My findings resonate with the literature on policy feedback effects, which has found that attitudes seem less responsive to the influence of policies than political behaviors (Morgan and Campbell 2011; Soss and Schram 2007) and has lead some scholars to argue that political attitudes may be more deeply ingrained (Campbell 2012).

Third, I find that Arizona's SB 1070 not only affected public discourse on immigrants, but it also had a spillover effect and affected the sentiment polarity of tweets about Mexicans and even Hispanics. This finding highlights the continuous importance of immigration for Hispanics, as Jiménez (2010) has argued. Issues of citizenship and legal status, which do not affect African-Americans or even Asian immigrants, continue to impact the experiences of Mexican immigrants and their U.S. born descendants, at least in Arizona.[15] This evidence casts serious doubts on the assertion that Mexican immigrants are "becoming Americans in much the same way that European immigrant groups did before them" (Waters and Jiménez 2005:106). The continuous use of subnational public policies by states and localities to target immigrants may hinder the capacity of Mexican immigrants and Hispanics to successfully incorporate into U.S. society (Tienda and Fuentes 2014).

Fourth, in this chapter I employ sentiment analysis, an innovative methodology developed in computer science, to analyze social media data, which is a novel source of data for sociologists. As large bodies of text become available via the Internet and computer-based data collection techniques (i.e. the digitization of entire libraries), this "big data" could be used to study social processes when traditional sources of data, like surveys or interviews, are not available or their implementation would not be feasible. Studying the short-term impact of certain social phenomena, such as policies, is difficult using surveys, since surveys require substantial preliminary planning and resources. Surveys have many advantages including a high degree of control over sampling characteristics, detailed socio-demographic information, and the availability of multiple questions to measure public opinion. Nevertheless, they are also limited in that they may also condition respondents to think about specific topics and express their opinion about them in unnatural or contrived ways. Therefore, social media data like Twitter can complement traditional sources of data and offer a spontaneous, unstructured, bottom-up source of data on a growing number of people.

Some caveats are in order. Though I do not find evidence that the law changed the attitudes of users who were already posting messages about immigrants, it is entirely plausible that the bill did affect how other groups of people viewed immigrants, including people who do not use Twitter. For example, I find that the law motivated a significant number of Arizona residents to start posting messages about immigrants for the first time. It is possible that the law hardened this group's views towards foreigners. Unfortunately, I do not have data on this group's attitudes for the pre-SB 1070 period.

Further, unlike traditional survey respondents, Twitter users choose the topics they want to discuss. Some Twitter users may choose not to tweet about politics or other controversial topics even if their underlying political attitudes are changing. Therefore, it is possible that certain types of attitudinal changes may go undetected in social media data, like Twitter.[16]

Using ethnographic data, Flores (2014b) found that the social effects of local restrictionist immigration policies depended on the race and ethnicity of local residents. A similar process could have occurred in Arizona. Unfortunately, racial and ethnic data are not available for my historical Twitter dataset. Though I excluded all non-English

language tweets from my sample, I cannot rule out the presence of Hispanics, immigrants, or Blacks in my dataset. Such ethnoracial diversity in my sample could have affected the estimated effect of SB 1070 on published tweets. One possibility is that Hispanics responded to the increasingly negative tone of post-SB 1070 immigration-related tweets by highlighting the positive contributions of immigrants in Arizona. If that were the case, the increasingly positive sentiment of tweets posted by Hispanics may have attenuated the estimated negative effect of SB 1070. Therefore, the estimated effect of this law on public discourse may be a conservative estimate of its true effect.

Further, though Twitter membership is becoming increasingly common, Twitter users may still not be representative of the general population (Smith and Brenner 2012). These differences may lead non-Twitter users to respond differently to restrictionist laws, which limits the generalizability of this study.

In addition, it is not entirely clear whether all punitive state laws will have similar social consequences. Hopkins (2010) argues that media attention plays a pivotal role in the consideration of anti-immigrant policies. As Graph 1 shows, the proposal of SB 1070 generated a high level of local media coverage in Arizona. In turn, such media attention may have magnified this law's social impact. Therefore, we would expect that heavily advertised punitive laws such as Arizona's SB 1070 might be more socially consequential than those that generate little media coverage. Future research should assess this possibility.

Future research should also examine how online discourses and behaviors are connected to off-line behaviors and attitudes. Though the proposal of SB 1070 had a significant impact on public discourse on immigrants on Twitter, it is not entirely clear whether this law also affected residents' everyday offline discourse and behaviors. Recent research suggests this could have been the case. McKelvey, DiGrazia, and Rojas (2014) argue that the online behaviors of non-elite Twitter users are correlated with offline political behaviors such as voting.

These caveats aside, this research has important implications for public policy, as it shows the unintended social consequences of punitive immigration laws. Rather than placating the electorate, this research shows that these policies may actually incite more animosity towards the targeted group and even affect ethnic minorities. Hence, my study

could help policy makers make more informed decisions on policies that affect both immigrants and native minorities.

Chapter 4: Tables and Figures

Table 1. Basic descriptives of Twitter messages

Target Group	**Arizona**	**Nevada**
Immigrants		
N	79,999	10,230
Sentiment score (SD)	-.083 (.166)	-.079 (.164)
Mexicans		
N	38,388	11,566
Sentiment score (SD)	.001 (.173)	.015 (.174)
Hispanics		
N	6,669	1,871
Sentiment score (SD)	.002 (.138)	.002 (.130)
Asians		
N	6,796	3,522
Sentiment score (SD)	.031 (.180)	.030 (.170)
African-Americans		
N	18,341	6,785
Sentiment score (SD)	.010 (.167)	.009 (.188)

Table 2. Basic characteristics of Arizona and Nevada

	Arizona	**Nevada**
Sociodemographic Characteristics		
Total Population	6,392,017	2,788,931
Median age	35.9	36.3
Percent non-Hispanic White	57.8	54.1
Percent non-Hispanic Black	3.7	7.7
Percent Asian	0.1	0.2
Percent Hispanic	29.6	26.5
Percent Mormon	6.3	6.4
Percent Foreign-born	13.4	19.2
Population Growth (2000-2010)	24.6	35.1
Hispanic Population Growth (2000-2010)	46.2	81.8
Married-couple family	48.1	46
Political Characteristics		
Party of Governor	Republican	Republican
Obama vote 2008	45	55.1
Obama vote 2012	44.6	52.4
Economic Characteristics		
Annual Unemployment Rate	10.4	13.8
Percent of Residents Below Poverty Line	17.4	14.9
Internet Connectivity Characteristics		
Percent Residents with broadband connection	64.0	64.4
Percent of Residents who use Twitter	11.5	11.1

Source: U.S. Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Smith and Brenner (2012). All data are from 2010 unless otherwise noted. Information on Twitter use was estimated by merging three different nationally representative surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center: Search, Social, Networks, and Politics (February 2012), Civic Engagement Survey (August 2012), and Online Dating (Omnibus) (May 2013).

Table 3. OLS regression predicting sentiment score of tweets

VARIABLES	(1) Immigrant	(2) Mexican	(3) Hispanic	(4) Asian	(5) Black
Arizona	0.011*	0.002	-0.006	0.001	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Post-SB 1070	-0.004	-0.007+	-0.001	-0.004	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
AzXpost	-0.025***	-0.020***	-0.019*	0.003	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Constant	-0.068***	0.016***	0.014*	0.035***	0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Observations	58,948	29,924	5,149	5,942	13,994
R-squared	0.004	0.005	0.008	0.000	0.000

Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. The data consists of all geo-coded immigration-related tweets published in Arizona and Nevada between January and June 2010.

Table 4. Fixed effects regression predicting within user change in sentiment score of tweets

	Immigrant		Mexican		Hispanic		Asian		Black	
VARIABLES	AZ	NV	AZ	NV	AZ	NV	AZ	NV	AZ	NV
Post SB 1070	0.000	0.000	-0.010**	-0.006	-0.013	-0.021	0.014	0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Constant	-0.075***	-0.071***	0.005*	0.010*	0.002	0.020**	0.029***	0.030***	0.015***	0.015***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.00241)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Observations	40,408	5,453	17,543	5,430	3,506	773	3,034	1,588	8,685	3,060
R-squared	0.159	0.169	0.337	0.310	0.451	0.500	0.466	0.438	0.285	0.271

Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. The data consists of all geo-coded immigration-related tweets published in Arizona and Nevada between January and June 2010 for users who published tweets about each group before and after SB 1070 was implemented in April 2010.

Table 5. OLS predicting sentiment score of tweets removing prolific Twitter users

VARIABLES	Top 1% immigrant	Top 5% immigrant	Top 1% Mexican	Top 5% Mexican	Top 1% Hispanic	Top 5% Hispanic	Top 1% Asian	Top 5% Asian	Top 1% Black	Top 5% Black
Arizona	0.012*	0.015**	0.002	0.003	-0.006	-0.006	0.001	0.001	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Post	-0.004	-0.004	-0.007+	-0.007+	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
AzXpost	-0.019***	-0.021***	-0.018***	-0.017***	-0.020*	-0.019*	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	-0.068***	-0.068***	0.016***	0.016***	0.014*	0.014*	0.035***	0.035***	0.018***	0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	55,771	54,291	29,587	29,484	5,117	5,115	5,936	5,936	13,987	13,987
R-squared	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.008	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. The data consists of all geo-coded tweets published about each group in Arizona and Nevada between January and June 2010.

Table 6. Estimated Effect of SB 1070 on Number of messages posted by group

	(1) Immigrant	(2) Mexican	(3) Hispanic	(4) Asian	(5) Black
Anti	36.015***	1.059+	0.930	-0.056	2.016+
	(8.880)	(0.650)	(1.098)	(0.368)	(1.206)
Neutral	-11.942	2.661	0.718	0.238	1.269
	(9.821)	(1.857)	(2.481)	(0.997)	(1.170)
Pro	-0.591	-0.105	0.173	1.399*	1.727
	(3.128)	(0.891)	(0.906)	(0.543)	(1.231)


Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Table shows the estimated impact of SB 1070's proposal on each user group for Twitter users who posted messages before and after SB 1070 was considered. These estimates were calculated using a difference-in-differences estimation technique for each group based on coefficients in table A1. The data consists of all geo-coded immigration-related tweets published in Arizona and Nevada between January and June 2010 for users who published tweets about each group before and after SB 1070 was implemented in April 2010.

Table 7. OLS regression predicting sentiment score of tweets by first message in Twitter

VARIABLES	(1) immigrant	(2) Mexican	(3) Hispanic	(4) Asian	(5) Black
Post	-0.004	-0.007+	-0.001	-0.004	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
AZ Only before	0.038***	0.017**	0.008	0.005	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.008)
AZ Only after	-0.032***	-0.002	-0.021**	0.000	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)
AZ Both	0.010+	0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
AZ Both X post	-0.016**	-0.023***	-0.019*	0.006	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Constant	-0.068***	0.016***	0.014*	0.035***	0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Observations	58,948	29,924	5,149	5,942	13,994
R-squared	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.000	0.000


Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. The data consists of all geo-coded immigration-related tweets published in Arizona and Nevada between January and June 2010 for users who published tweets about each group before and after SB 1070 was implemented in April 2010.

Graph 1. Newspaper coverage of Arizona's SB 1070 (April 2010 - January 2011)



Graphs shows the number of news items mentioning Arizona's SB 1070 published by the largest local newspapers in Arizona and Nevada, Arizona Daily Star and Las Vegas Sun, between April 2010 and January 2011.

Graph 2. Average sentiment score of tweets about immigrants



The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The vertical red line on April 2010 indicates when SB 1070 was considered and approved by the Arizona legislature.

Chapter 4 APPENDIX

A) Collecting tweets

I acquired these historical tweets through Gnip, a subsidiary of Twitter. I obtained all geo-coded tweets from Arizona and Nevada that mentioned immigrants, Mexicans, Hispanics, Asians, and African-Americans and were published during the first few months of 2010, when SB 1070 was proposed. Geo-coding is based on users' self reports. Therefore, this strategy may not capture Twitter users who visited Arizona or Nevada during the treatment period but who listed their residency in a different state.[17] Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a drawback, since my population of interest is local Arizonans and Nevadans. A more serious limitation is that my geocoding strategy cannot detect certain false positives. For example, Arizonans or Nevadans who travel to other states and tweet from those locations might be responding to their stimuli encountered in those states but would be coded as "Arizona" or "Nevada" tweets.

When searching for tweets about immigrants, I did not include any nationality term. Instead I searched for "immigrants," "illegal aliens," and other terms used to refer to immigrants without specifying an ethnic origin. For all ethnic or racial groups, I included the most common terms people use to refer to them.[18] For example, when searching for African-Americans, I also searched for "black people," "black ppl," "black guys," etc. In the case of Asians, I searched for mentions of any of the largest Asian immigrant groups in Arizona and Nevada, which include Filipino, Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese immigrants. I also include tweets that included panethnic references to "Asians." The total number of collected tweets was 327,342. Since my primary interest is to detect the impact of SB 1070 on majority group members, I excluded all tweets written in languages other than English, including Spanish, from my data set.

B) Lexicon construction

I built a new lexicon that includes an intensity measurement for each word and that includes many of the words used by Twitter users when talking about immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities. In addition, I added a list of common emoticons used by Twitter users in my dataset. Emoticons are symbols found in between 5 and 10% of all

tweets and are used to express emotions or moods (Brönnimann 2013). For example, while :) or =) express positive emotions, :(or >:(convey negative sentiments in western countries.

First, I took a random sample of 10,000 tweets from my data set and listed the 600 most common words or emoticons found in them. I then employed five native English speakers from the U.S., hired via Amazon's Mechanical Turk, to rate both the polarity (negative or positive) and also the intensity of each one of these words. The intensity scale included: +4 (extremely positive), +3 (very positive), +2 (positive), +1 (somewhat positive), 0 (neutral), -1 (somewhat negative), -2 (negative), -3 (very negative), and -4 (extremely negative). I then incorporated these words into Liu's lexicon, replacing duplicate values with my new values. In general, there was a high level of agreement between the human raters especially regarding the sentiment polarity of words. 90.4% of all words had a variance of less than 1.5. Nevertheless, there were a handful of words with high levels of disagreement such as "toughest" or "dope," whose polarity depends on context.

I combined these different ratings into a single scale. I assessed the reliability of this summative rating scale by using Cronbach's alpha. The resulting alpha reliability coefficient was .9552, which is extremely high and indicates that the separate ratings measure the same underlying phenomenon.

C) Scoring Algorithm

In this section, I verified the effectiveness of the scoring algorithm. Table A1 shows some examples of how this algorithm classified several tweets. Tweets talking about immigration in an objective and dispassionate manner were given a sentiment score of 0. In contrast, tweets containing ethnic slurs or negative words such as "hate" or "criminals" were given negative sentiment scores. Similarly, as expected, tweets containing positive words like "awesome" and "love" received positive sentiment scores.

At the same time, the algorithm has some limitations. First, it struggled to correctly classify sarcastic messages, which is a common limitation of sentiment analysis (Liu 2012). For example, "the greatest thing and genius behind sb1070 is that it self deports! win win solution! immigration arizona obama gop" was classified as positive

even if the author favors the 'self-deportation' of immigrants because the tweet contains several positive words like "win" and "greatest."

Second, the algorithm misclassified some messages that contain multiple opinion targets with contradicting sentiment evaluations. For example, the message "I hate SB 1070; support immigrants!" clearly implies that the Twitter user has a pro-immigrant stance. Nevertheless, my scoring algorithm would classify this message as having a neutral sentiment since the negative score of "hate" and positive score of "support" would cancel each other out. Nevertheless, such grammatical structures were not very common.

- Table A1 about here -

To have a more systematic assessment of how the algorithm performed in correctly classifying the sentiment polarity of messages, I randomly selected 100 messages from my data set. I then ran my algorithm using Liu's simple lexicon to classify their polarity. Then I employ my own lexicon, which weights distance from opinion targets and also incorporates a measure of sentiment intensity, to classify these messages' polarity. Finally, I employed human raters, hired via Amazon's MTurk, to also rate these tweets' sentiment. I found that Liu's lexicon correctly predicted 48 percent of the examined tweets. My own lexicon performed somewhat better accurately predicting the sentiment of 55 percent of these tweets, which is about average for this sentiment classification methodology (Liu 2012). Further, the large majority of classification discrepancies occurred between contiguous categories (positive-neutral and neutral-negative).

D) Immigrant population size

One potential concern about my research design is that there could have been some event that only occurred in Arizona and not in Nevada in the post SB-1070 period. This would be a cause for concern if such event were also correlated with public sentiment on immigration, since that would violate the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-difference model (Imbens and Woolridge 2007). A primary candidate for this event would be a significant change in the number of immigrants living in each state.

If the number of immigrants varied significantly in Arizona after SB 1070 was proposed, this could potentially bias my results by making Arizona and Nevada less comparable.

To test this proposition, I would ideally examine the total number of immigrants living in each state before and after the law was considered. Unfortunately, such data are not available, since the U.S. Census only produces yearly population estimates and my period of study only encompasses the first few months of 2010.

Another way I could test this is by using the number of arrests of undocumented immigrants conducted by immigration authorities in Arizona. Such figure could be a proxy for whether there was an increase in the size of the undocumented population in Arizona given than entry from Mexico is a primary source for this group.

Though no similar data exists for Nevada, since it is not a border state, the U.S. Border Patrol publishes monthly estimates of arrests conducted in Arizona, California, and Texas. Comparing undocumented flows to Arizona with those of neighboring states would tell us whether the flow into Arizona followed a different pattern after SB 1070 was considered.

Graph A1 shows the number of illegal alien arrests conducted by the U.S. Border Patrol in four different border areas between January 2008 and December 2010. To increase comparability, the data have been normalized to indicate changes in flows relative to January 2008. Overall, the graph shows that, as migration scholars have noted, the number of attempted crossings into the U.S. has decreased since the 2008 financial crisis (Massey and Sánchez 2010). More importantly, the number of attempted crossings through Arizona did not appear to have changed after SB 1070 was proposed. Indeed, the relative changes in undocumented immigrants' arrests in Arizona since 2008 follow a remarkably similar pattern as those in San Diego, CA and Laredo, TX. This provides some evidence that the number of undocumented immigrants going into Arizona from Mexico did not deviate from normal patterns during the examined period.

- Graph A1 about here -

Table A1. OLS predicting number of messages posted by group for users who posted both before and after SB 1070 was considered


VARIABLES	(1) Immigrant	(2) Mexican	(3) Hispanic	(4) Asian	(5) Black
AZ Anti	7.925***	2.546***	2.073***	1.590***	3.250***
	-1.878	-0.124	-0.182	-0.0725	-0.219
AZ Neutral	5.605***	6.260***	5.894*	2.688***	3.737***
	-0.881	-0.605	-2.521	-0.254	-0.43
AZ Pro	8.316+	2.794***	2.353***	2.229***	3.440***
	-4.524	-0.154	-0.293	-0.312	-0.285
AZ Anti*Post	55.18***	7.191***	5.712***	2.671***	7.980***
	-8.465	-0.495	-0.701	-0.223	-1.06
AZ Neutral*Post	33.95***	13.03***	9.387**	4.280***	7.694***
	-6.447	-1.97	-2.852	-1.001	-0.89
AZ Pro*Post	17.25***	5.865***	4.026***	4.329***	6.037***
	-3.605	-0.731	-0.454	-0.851	-0.721
NV Anti	5.535***	2.663***	1.840***	1.952***	3.040***
	-1.32	-0.246	-0.173	-0.188	-0.273
NV Neutral	5.661***	8.280***	5.143***	2.875***	4.665***
	-1.328	-1.871	-1.104	-0.316	-0.886
NV Pro	2.687***	3.936***	2.082***	2.464***	4.156*
	-0.343	-1.113	-0.267	-0.241	-1.785
NV Anti*Post	31.92**	6.365***	4.750***	3.092***	4.495***
	-10.79	-0.815	-0.829	-0.329	-0.486
NV Neutral*Post	33.60***	11.93***	16.12+	4.489***	8.118***
	-8.035	-2.92	-9.016	-0.724	-2.131
NV Pro*Post	12.16***	6.882***	3.850***	3.128***	4.382***
	-2.041	-1.672	-1.078	-0.333	-0.577
Observations	2,894	5,837	1,353	2,184	3,278
R-squared	0.078	0.137	0.224	0.245	0.149

Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. The data consists of all geo-coded tweets published about each group in Arizona and Nevada between January and June 2010.

Table A2. Examples of tweet sentiment classification

Sentiment Score	*Message*	*Polarity*
-1.65	URL illegal aliens are criminals...	Negative
-1.01	deport illegal aliens. what example are we setting our children? trespass invading robbery cheat murder rape get amnesty	Negative
-0.96	i hate playing soccer against beaners... dirty mexicans	Negative
0	immigration. trade with mexico. on both, arizona policymakers should consider the broader economic impact	Neutral
0	cronkite news service (via *@username*): immigration measures bring reactions from both sides, URL	Neutral
0	advocacy groups say obama remains committed to immigration overhaul, groups ... URL	Neutral
0.51	it is great to see young successful black people...yo check out awesome photographer *@username*	Positive
0.75	iloveimmigrants, i love soccer!	Positive
1.25	asians are awesome(:	Positive

Graph A1. Changes in Illegal Alien Apprehensions By Month (baseline = January 2008)



Source: United States Border Patrol. Graph shows the number of arrests of "illegal aliens" in four different border areas conducted by the U.S. Border Patrol between January 2008 and December 2010. Data have been normalized to represent percent change in the number of these arrests relative to arrests that took place in January 2008. The vertical red line indicates when SB 1070 was approved in Arizona.

Notes

[1] The same poll found large racial disparities among supporters of SB 1070. Though only thirty-four percent of non-Hispanic whites opposed the law, such number was 71 percent for Hispanics (CNN 2010).

[1] A more serious limitation is that my geocoding strategy cannot detect certain false positives. For example, Arizonans or Nevadans who travel to other states and tweet from those locations might be responding to their current stimuli but would be coded as "Arizona" or "Nevada" tweets.

[1] Since the outcome of interest, number of messages, is a count, the most appropriate model would be a negative binomial regression. Nevertheless, I use a simple OLS model since its coefficients are easy to interpret and because all significant results are robust to the choice of model.

[1] One possible explanation for the lack of an effect with regards to Asian immigrants is that the Asian community is still relatively small in Arizona. However, Latino immigrants have sometimes generated public opposition even in communities where their numbers are relatively small (O'Neill 2011).

[1] In addition, users who report their location may not necessarily be representative of the entire Twitter user base (Leetaru, Wang, Cao, Padmanabhan, and Shook 2013).

[1] Though some individuals may use pejorative terms to refer to specific ethnic groups, I did not use these terms when searching for tweets.

Conclusions

In the last few years, subnational actors, like states and municipalities, have increasingly attempted to legislate on immigration matters (Flores 2014; Santos, Menjívar, and Godfrey 2013). Although scholars have studied the determinants of these policies, we still know little about their social consequences. In this dissertation, I address this gap in the literature by conducting one of the first systematic analysis of the social implications of these subnational laws.

Many of these policies have been blocked in court by lawsuits from civil rights groups. Nevertheless, using multiple methodologies and data sources including in-depth interviews, ethnographic observations, administrative data, and social media messages, I find that these policies still had significant extra-legal implications in the communities in which they were considered.

In Chapter 2, I draw on ethnographic and interview data collected between 2007 and 2011 in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, which passed an anti-immigrant ordinance in 2006. I find that the law affected both immigrants and natives alike. It motivated anti-immigrant activism, hardened native views of Hispanics (regardless of documentation status), and increased native whites' fears of lawlessness and crime.

Chapter 3 examines whether similar restrictionist immigration policies also increased local concern about crime and disorder beyond Hazleton. I find that the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances was associated with a 6 percent increase in handgun sales in the Pennsylvania counties in which these policies were formally considered. I find that local newspapers increasingly published stories linking immigrants with crime following the proposal of these policies. I argue that these menacing portrayals of immigrants had the unintended effect of increasing social anxiety, which increased gun purchases. These results are replicated using concealed gun permits data from South Carolina.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine the impact of Arizona's SB 1070, a controversial law that required local authorities to verify the documentation of individuals suspected of being undocumented, on public sentiment towards immigrants. Using sentiment analysis and a difference-in-difference estimation technique to analyze more than 300,000 tweets published in Nevada and Arizona in 2010, I find that the implementation of SB 1070 had

a significant negative impact on the sentiment of messages regarding immigrants, Mexicans, and Hispanics posted by Twitter users in Arizona. In contrast, the bill did not affect public discourse on Asians or African-Americans.

Based on this evidence, I draw three main theoretical conclusions:

1. Subnational restrictionist immigration laws have tangible social consequences

My study provides evidence of the extra-legal implications of punitive laws. These restrictionist policies have the power to shape ethnic boundaries around minority groups even when they lack enforcement capabilities or are blocked by lawsuits. In my second chapter, I use a social boundaries' theoretical framework (Alba 2005; Lamont & Molnár 2002) and I find that after the anti-immigrant ordinance was proposed in the city of Hazleton, the ethnic boundaries between natives and immigrants became "brighter" and harder to cross. The law represented a step toward the institutionalization of ethnic boundaries around Hispanics transforming relatively fluid symbolic boundaries (for some) into more rigid social ones.

In addition, my research contributes to the literature on policy feedback effects by showing that even policies that do not provide direct benefits to any group, like punitive immigration policies, can still stimulate natives' political mobilization.

My work also shows that these exclusionary laws have consequences not fully predicted by their supporters. Though the authors of these laws commonly state that these policies are not meant to single out any specific ethnic or racial group but only undocumented immigrants (Kruse 2011; Menjívar & Abrego 2012; O'Neil 2011), I find that they also affect native minorities and even non-Hispanic whites. In my second chapter, I find that by cementing the association between immigrants and criminal behaviors, these policies affected not only how native whites viewed Hispanic immigrants but also how they evaluated their own neighborhoods. Hazleton residents increasingly viewed their neighborhoods as dangerous and disorganized, regardless of the actual crime statistics. Such increasingly negative assessments of their own communities may have contributed to the acquisition of firearms for self-protection, as I find in my third chapter.

Overall, in my dissertation I find more evidence for the capacity of restrictionist policies to shape behaviors rather than attitudes towards immigrants. Though in my second chapter immigrants reported that native residents appeared to have changed their attitudes towards them, it is unclear whether these apparent changes had been in the making for some time but were expressed behaviorally only after the ordinance was proposed. This highlights some of the limitations of social science data collection tools since it is easier to observe behaviors than to measure attitudes.

2. There are multiple micro contexts of immigrant reception

Although migration scholars have long argued that the national context of reception, largely structured by federal government policies, is a crucial factor that shapes the life outcomes of immigrants (Gentsch and Massey 2011; Portes & Rumbaut 1996), my dissertation project highlights the importance of local and state immigration policies for the process of immigrant incorporation. Therefore, my research shows that there is not a single context of reception but multiple micro contexts formed by different configurations of government policies crafted at the local, state, and federal levels.

The previous emphasis on national laws by immigration theorists is partly explained by the fact that local and state immigration policies are a relatively novel phenomenon. Nevertheless, sociological theories on immigrant adaptation need to be updated to reflect this new empirical reality. Similarly, empirical researchers interested on immigrant well-being should build more sophisticated statistical models that incorporate the local and state political contexts that immigrants inhabit.

Building more sophisticated models that take into account micro contextual factors is not an easy task. Many immigrants confront a complex constellation of immigration policies operating at different levels of government and that sometimes have opposing goals. For example, a young undocumented immigrant living in Fremont, Nebraska, may have trouble getting a job due to a local ordinance that penalizes immigrants' employers. This immigrant's job opportunities may be further hindered by the fact that federal immigration authorities have conducted extensive immigration raids in Nebraska. At the same time, she might be aided by a resolution passed by the Nebraska state government to provide College tuition breaks for undocumented students. Similarly,

the young immigrant may benefit from Obama's administration recent decision to provide work authorization to some unauthorized immigrants. Increasingly, immigrant outcomes will depend on immigrants' capacity to navigate this complex maze of discordant policies.

Immigration theorists have identified several contextual factors that shape immigrant incorporation. These factors or modes of incorporation consist of government policies, values and prejudices of the receiving society, and the characteristics of the coethnic community. By showing that subnational immigration laws can shape public opinion on immigration, my work reveals how two of these factors, government laws and social attitudes, are deeply interconnected and scholars cannot assume them to be independent.

3. Immigration continues to be relevant for Hispanics

My work also reveals the continuous importance of immigration for Hispanic immigrants and for their U.S. born descendants. Issues of citizenship and legal status, which do not significantly affect African-Americans or even Asian immigrants, continue to impact the experiences of Hispanic immigrants and their offspring, at least in Arizona and Pennsylvania. This evidence casts serious doubts on the assertion that Mexican immigrants are "becoming Americans in much the same way that European immigrant groups did before them" (Waters and Jiménez 2005: 106). The continuous use of subnational public policies by states and localities to target immigrants may hinder the capacity of Mexican immigrants and Hispanics to successfully incorporate into U.S. society (Tienda and Fuentes 2014).

Some scholars have been relatively optimistic about Hispanics' prospects for successful incorporation in the United States (Alba & Nee, 2003; Kasinitz et al., 2009; Marrow, 2009; Waters & Jiménez, 2005). Some of them believe that Hispanics are socially closer to whites than are blacks. As evidence, they cite Hispanics' lower levels of residential segregation (Wilkes & Iceland, 2004), higher rates of intermarriage (Qian & Lichter, 2007), and more fluid racial identities (Lee & Bean, 2007). Some even argue that Hispanics may follow in the footsteps of European immigrants and become "white" (Warren & Twine, 1997). In contrast, African Americans' highly racialized experiences make them an

exceptional case (Gans, 1999; Kasinitz et al., 2009). Such optimism has also extended to research on Hispanics' experiences in new immigrant destinations. Marrow (2009) used ethnographic data from rural North Carolina, a new destination in the South, and found that Hispanics, even those who are "dark-skinned, poor, and undocumented" (p. 2), are having relatively positive experiences with native whites. She then argued that Hispanics are becoming incorporated in the rural Southern racial structure in the advantaged side of the "black/non-black" color line (Marrow, 2009).

Nevertheless, in this dissertation I show that the recent proliferation of local and state anti-immigrant laws could potentially derail immigrants' prospects for successful incorporation. More especifically, as I show in Chapter 2, the proposal of these policies not only signals Hispanic immigrants' tenous position in U.S. society, but these laws also have the power to further deteriorate Hispanics' social status by solidifying their perceived association with illegality and deviant behaviors.

The passage of comprehensive immigration reform may diminish the power of subnational immigration policies to shape immigrants' experiences. However, given the current political climate, the passage of immigration reform seems unlikely at least in the short term. This implies that subnational actors may continue to legislate on immigration matters and also that the resulting policies will continue to be socially consequential.

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