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Black–White Relations in the Wake of Hispanic Population Growth

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Black–White Relations in the Wake of Hispanic Population Growth

Maria C. Abascal

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty
of Princeton University
in Candidacy for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

Recommended for Acceptance
by the Department of
Sociology
Adviser: Professor Edward Telles

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Abstract

For the first time in US history, three ethnoracial groups—Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics—each make up more than 10% of the total population. This represents a major departure from the binary, black–white system of race relations that historically characterized the United States. This dissertation examines how Hispanic growth—real and perceived—affects relations between Blacks and Whites. Previous research on intergroup relations is focused primarily on the case of two groups—Blacks and Whites, in-group and out-group, blue- and brown-eyed children—and provides few insights into whether or how the growth of a third group affects relations between two other groups. This dissertation attempts to move the theory and research of intergroup relations beyond the two-group paradigm by examining the impact of Hispanic growth on relations between Blacks and Whites.

Chapter 1 reviews the social psychological and sociological literature on intergroup relations, with special attention to the impact of group size and growth. I explain why research on diversity and its consequences falls short on its promise to shed light on multi-group relations. Chapter 2 is based on an original laboratory experiment that incorporates behavioral game and survey components. Results suggest Whites react to perceived Hispanic growth by prioritizing their racial identity and Blacks react to perceived Hispanic growth by prioritizing their national identity; patterns of identification mirror contributions in a dictator game. Chapter 3 draws on data from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) to examine whether the predictions of the lab experiment play out in non-Hispanic Whites' racial and racial policy attitudes and with respect to local levels of Hispanic growth. Chapter 4 uses an original, national survey experiment along with CCES data to examine whether educational attainment conditions the effect of Hispanic growth. Results reveal a non-monotonic relationship between education and reactions to growth. Chapter 5 highlights implications for theories of intergroup relations, raises questions for future research, and speculates about the future of the US racial order.

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Delia Baldassarri has long been an intellectual role model: her uncomprising commitment to creative, rigorous research is exceptional and inspiring. Working with Delia has consistently pushed me past the limits of my own perceived capabilities—theoretical, methodological, analytical. When she first approached me about working together on a project, I felt incredibly proud to be her collaborator; today, I feel equally proud to be Delia's friend.

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Para mi abuela preferida.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: The Theory and Research of Intergroup Relations

The United States is undergoing a radical demographic transformation driven largely by the growth of the Hispanic population.[1] Hispanics have already surpassed Blacks as the largest minority group, and by 2050 they are expected to reach 29% of the US population (Passel and Cohn 2008). These changes directly challenge the black-white system of US race relations.

An extensive line of research documents how the growth of one group affects attitudes and behaviors toward that group. We have yet to understand whether or how the growth of one group, like Hispanics, affects relations between other groups, like Blacks and Whites. Previous research on intergroup relations provides few insights into the dynamics of multi-group contexts, because this research continues to operate within a two-group paradigm rooted in an outdated vision of a binary racial order.

This dissertation pursues the following question: How does Hispanic population growth affect relations between Blacks and Whites? This question is motivated in part by Simmel's

[1] I use "Hispanic" and "Latino" interchangeably throughout. Both terms designate socially constructed categories that include people from diverse backgrounds. Although these labels may not match Hispanics' self-understandings, they generally match the categorizations used by Non-Hispanics.

intuition that the shift from two parties to three or more parties entails a transformation, not simply an extension, of the two-party case.

The Case of Hispanic Population Growth

Historically, the United States has been characterized by a rigid and relatively impermeable boundary, or color line, between Blacks and Whites (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; Omi and Winant 1994). The codification of the one-drop rule, combined with the institutionalization of race-based discrimination, meant symbolic boundaries more or less mapped onto the lived experiences of self-aware groups. Accordingly, research on ethnoracial relations specifically, and intergroup relations generally, has focused on encounters between two groups—for example, one in-group and one out-group, blue- and brown-eyed children (Peters 1971), or two groups of boys at summer camp (Sherif et al. 1961). "Prior theory and research thus provide little in the way of well-established guidance or expectations for situations as complex as those that exist" in the United States today (Bobo and Johnson 2000: 88, writing specifically about Los Angeles; see also Telles et al. 2011).

Today, and for the first time in US history, three ethnoracial groups—Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics—each make up more than 10% of the US population. Although Hispanics, like Asians, have a long history in the country, in recent decades they have experienced unprecedented growth.[2]

The rise of prismatic, multi-ethnic societies does not automatically necessitate a new paradigm for intergroup relations research. After all, the transition from two groups to three groups might entail an extension, rather than a fundamental transformation, of preexisting relations. If this were the case, we could simply rescale data collection efforts to include additional groups. This is Bobo and Johnson's (2000: 88) solution; they recommend researchers

[2]Even scholars who trace the history of Hispanics and Asians in the United States acknowledge that they made up a relatively small and regionally concentrated segment of the population prior to the passage of the Hart Celler Act in 1965 (see, for example, Fox and Guglielmo 2012).

ask "parallel questions of members of each racial group." In other words, researchers should inquire into Whites' attitudes toward Blacks and Latinos, Blacks' attitudes toward Whites and Latinos, and Latinos' attitudes toward Whites and Blacks.

Asking more survey questions may not be enough, however, if the dyadic relations implicated in such questions are shaped by the broader multi-group context in which groups are situated. Kim (1999: 129) makes this point in her study of Asian Americans' racialization:

> To go "beyond Black and White" in a rigorous sense, we need to do more than trace separate racial trajectories or elaborate a single hierarchy defined by the Black-White opposition ... Group racialization processes are mutually constitutive [and] they generate rankings along more than one dimension.

Kim goes on to describe how Asian Americans were simultaneously valorized along racial and national dimensions and vis-à-vis both Blacks and Whites. Her racial triangulation approach shares a deep affinity with Simmel's insight that the dynamics of three-party systems are qualitatively different from those of two-party systems.

In two essays on social geometry, Simmel (1950[1908]a; 1950[1908]b) contends that the number three is a critical threshold. Above this number, the introduction of an additional party does not have a similarly consequential impact on interactional dynamics, because in a three-way interaction, each party is for the first time confronted with a super-individual structure and not merely another party.[3] Stated differently, the presence of three parties enables the formation of alliances across previously salient boundaries.

The potential for such alliances means that in a three-party context, five distinct configurations are theoretically possible. Figure 1.1 illustrates the configurations that could emerge in the wake of Hispanic growth. In the first case, diversification leads Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics to withdraw into their respective groups. This scenario resembles Bonilla-Silva's

[3]Although Simmel implies his theory is equally applicable to coherent, self-interested groups or "parties," he does not consider the possibility that the boundaries between groups are socially constructed and therefore mutable.




Figure 1.1: US Race Relations Reconfigured: Possible Scenarios[4]

(2004) Latin Americanization thesis, according to which contemporary immigration will move the United States toward a tri-racial pigmentocracy.[5] In configurations II through IV, Whites and Blacks respond to Hispanic growth by seeking new allies rather than retreating into their own groups. In scenario II, white/non-white becomes the most consequential line of division. Craig and Richeson (1994) make this case based on their finding that Latinos primed to think about discrimination express more positive attitudes toward Blacks (see also Sanjek 1994). In the third scenario, Whites and Blacks coalesce around an American identity that excludes Hispanics on the basis of national and cultural differences, rather than racial ones. The fourth scenario depicts Hispanics successfully crossing the color line, much like European immigrants did in the first half of the twentieth century. Gans (1999) and Lee and Bean (2004) predict this outcome; according to them, black/non-black will become the most salient line of division. The final scenario corresponds to a more colorful and inclusive United States where race/ethnicity is no longer a consequential axis of social division. Although theoretically possible, it is telling that no scholars have predicted such a future.

Race and Nation in Crosshairs. Hispanic population growth has the potential to destabilize both racial and national orders, because Hispanics are viewed and portrayed as both Non-Whites/Non-Blacks and Non-Americans (Chavez 2008; see also Jiménez 2015). Hispanics

[4]B=Blacks; H=Hispanics; W=Whites.

[5]For a critique of Bonilla-Silva's portrayal of Latin American racial systems, see Sue (2009).

themselves acknowledge being excluded by virtue of their perceived foreignness, not simply their phenotype. As Marrow (2011: 157) explains,

> The contours of discrimination ... have now expanded to separate both Whites and Blacks from newcomers, drawing on differences more intimately related to citizenship and civic and cultural belonging than race or skin color alone.[6]

Accordingly, this dissertation considers race and nation jointly, as related categorization schemas on which Whites and Blacks can draw in response to Hispanic growth. This approach follows recent scholarship in the boundary-making tradition that calls for the integrated analytic treatment of ethnicity, race, and nationalism (Brubaker et al. 2004; Wimmer 2008, 2013).[7]

Theoretically, race and nation may be understood as expressions of the same general phenomenon. On the ground, however, racial and national boundaries can be experienced differently, particularly if they demarcate different and potentially cross-cutting groups of people. In the United States, for example, the nation can operate as a superordinate category that transcends ethnoracial divisions (Gaertner et al. 1999).[8] Just over 90% of the US public reports that "being white" should be "somewhat unimportant" or "very unimportant" for "making someone a true American" (Schildkraut 2011: 45). Similarly, over 86% of participants in the lab experiment described in Chapter 2 report that "being white" is "not very" or "not at all important" for "making someone a true American," with no significant difference between Blacks and Whites. This conception of American national identity has

[6]According to Marrow's Latino respondents, exclusion on the basis of nationality is meted out more often by African Americans than by Whites.

[7]To say that race and nation fall under the same theoretical umbrella is not to suggest that these various modes of categorization do not have different consequences "on the ground." As Wimmer reminds us, constructivism as an idea is not to be confused "with an ontological statement about the nature of empirical reality" (2013: 3).

[8]This observation seems to contradict the persistent, implicit association between whiteness and Americanness (see, for example, Devos and Banaji 2005). However, racial and national identity may be associated, without overlapping perfectly. Stated differently, Blacks may be blocked from fully claiming an American identity, but not to the same extent that they are blocked from claiming a white one.

consequences for other outcomes. For example, US Whites are more likely to support both a general and a race-specific tax increase if their national identity is first made salient (Transue 2007; see also Smith and Tyler 1996).

The Case for Studying Hispanic Growth

This dissertation focuses on the case of Hispanic population growth for several reasons. First, and most important, survey evidence indicates the US public believes Hispanics are more numerous than Asians, both in absolute numbers and in terms of percent growth[9] (despite the fact that Asians are currently the fastest growing group in the United States). Second, Hispanics make up a larger share of the US population than do Asians: according to the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS), self-identified Hispanics outnumber Asians by more than 3 to 1. Hispanics also account for a larger share of total population growth. Third, the racial triangulation approach advocated by Kim and rooted in Simmel's theory of triads implies that the transition from two to three groups entails the more fundamental change in intergroup dynamics. By elucidating the effect of Hispanic growth on relations between Blacks and Whites, this dissertation sets the stage for future research on intergroup relations in a truly prismatic United States.

What About Diversity?

Astute readers will question my claim that researchers have yet to tackle multi-group relations. A growing body of work on diversity and its consequences purports to do just this. Thus far, the evidence for and against diversity is mixed. On the one hand, several studies have identified a negative association between ethnoracial diversity and desirable outcomes, most famously Putnam (2007), who contends that diversity leads to lower generalized as well as localized trust (see also Alesina and La Ferrara 2000a; Delhey and Newton

[9]Calculations based on the 2000 General Social Survey as well as the experimental sample from Chapter 2.

2005; Glaeser et al. 2000; Karlan 2005). Studies have also identified a negative association between diversity and volunteering, membership/participation in voluntary associations, political interest, support for social spending and public goods provision, collective action, and economic growth (Alesina et al. 1999, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000b; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Andrews 2009; Costa and Kahn 2003; Easterly and Levine 1997; Vigdor 2004).

Other studies, however, have failed to substantiate the negative association between diversity and "social capital"[10] or have stumbled on a more nuanced relationship contingent on the measure of diversity, the unit of analysis, and/or the outcome of interest (Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004; Eckel and Grossman 2001; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Gil-White 2004; Guest et al. 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Leigh 2006; Sturgis et al. 2011; Willinger et al. 2003).

In a recent paper, Delia Baldassarri and I illustrate the methodological flaws—rooted in analytic sloppiness and theoretical misconceptions—that drive the first set of findings. We do this by reanalyzing Putnam's own data and showing that a different set of methodological choices leads to a different set of conclusions, with opposing implications for social policy (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015). Several of these flaws rest on the widespread use of diversity indices that mask precisely what they claim to measure: relationships between multiple groups. Variously referred to as indices of diversity/heterogeneity/fragmentation/fractionalization, Simpson's Diversity Index, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, these indices all measure the same thing: the probability that two individuals who are randomly chosen from a closed population belong to the same (ethnoracial) group (Haughton and Mukerjee 1995). There is no upper-bound on the number of groups that can enter into the equation[11], hence these indices are touted as neat measures of contact between multiple groups. These measures, however, critically obscure

[10]For a critique of popular theoretical and operational definitions of social capital, see Portes (1998).

[11]Provided there are at least as many individuals in the population as there are groups.




Figure 1.2: Two Neighborhoods with the Same Heterogeneity Score[12]

the nature and history of specific cleavages by treating groups like pieces on a checkers board.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the problem. A neighborhood that is 80% white and 20% black has exactly the same heterogeneity score as a neighborhood that is 80% black and 20% white. Along similar lines, a neighborhood that is 50/50 black/white has the same heterogeneity score as a neighborhood that is 50/50 black/Hispanic. In rendering these differences indistinguishable, heterogeneity indices flatten fundamentally asymmetrical relationships between ethnoracial groups. Instead, scholars of race and ethnicity widely argue ethnoracial relations are characterized by hierarchy and inequality (Desmond and Emirbayer 2009; Wacquant 1997).

[12]Reproduced from Abascal and Baldassarri (2015: 731).

The consequences of this methodological choice are decisive: analyzing group-specific responses to the local concentration of certain groups, Baldassarri and I find that not all people respond to "diversity" in the same way—or at all. In fact, only Whites exhibit an association between local demographic composition and levels of trust. Specifically, Whites who live in communities where Blacks or Hispanics make up a larger share of the population report lower levels of trust.

This dissertation steers clear of heterogeneity indices. In keeping with the approach of Abascal and Baldassarri (2015), the analyses separately consider the responses of specific groups toward specific groups.[13] For example, non-Hispanic Whites' attitudes and behaviors and non-Hispanic Blacks' attitudes and behaviors are modeled separately. Doing so leaves room for an interesting possibility: that Whites and Blacks react in different ways to Hispanic population growth.

Broadly speaking, the results of this dissertation do speak to the literature on diversity and its consequences. However, this claim comes with an important caveat: not all forms of diversity are created equal. Carrying these results beyond the US case, or even to other groups within the US case (say, Asian American growth), requires theoretical and empirical work. Future research should strive to identify the scope conditions that shape patterns of multi-group relations in other cases and contexts.

Intergroup Relations from a Social Identity Perspective

This dissertation draws heavily from social identity theory, which elucidates possible psychological and behavioral responses to the destabilization of a system of intergroup relations. The core premise of social identity theory is that humans universally desire to belong to a group that is positively evaluated and positioned with respect to other groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Often, mere awareness of an intergroup boundary prompts people to evaluate

[13]For more details on my use of the term "group," refer to "The Boundary-Making Tradition" (this chapter).

in-group members more positively than out-group members and distribute resources accordingly; this is the case even when the intergroup boundary is constructed by experimenters on the basis of some arbitrary criteria (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Through the accumulation of differential treatment, symbolic or perceived boundaries calcify into social boundaries that separate real people based on different opportunities and experiences (Lamont and Molnár 2002).

Because people's sense of self-worth is tied to their group, affronts to group members can be assimilated as affronts to the self. Accordingly, people sometimes pursue group enhancement strategies even when such strategies do not directly benefit their objective, or realistic, self-interests. As one example, McDermott (2011: 243) reports that upper-middle-class blacks in one new immigrant destination expressed hostility toward Hispanics because they "felt that their community rather than they themselves were losing out at the expense of Hispanics." Along similar lines, Wodtke (2012) finds that highly educated whites are among the most strongly opposed to racial preferences in hiring, and Bobo and Hutchings (1996) find that Whites with higher incomes are more likely to view blacks as zero-sum competitors for jobs and housing. The association between resources and bias, in short, has proved less straightforward than a realistic conflict perspective would predict, because people engage in symbolic—not simply material—competition.

Group enhancement strategies come in psychological and behavioral varieties (Ellemers and Haslam 2012). Psychological strategies involve the cognitive reinterpretation of the status quo; for example, members of a threatened group may disidentify with that group. Behavioral strategies involve actions taken to change objective conditions, such as hoarding resources. Which strategy (or strategies) people pursue depends on the arrangement of groups and the nature of the boundary between them. For example, members of low-status groups may seek to cross an apparently permeable boundary (Mummendey et al. 1999) but engage in competition when this boundary is viewed instead as impermeable or illegitimate (for a meta-analysis, see Bettencourt et al. 2001; see also Alba 2009).

Relative group size is among the most commonly studied moderators of intergroup relations. Some experimental studies find that numerical minorities exhibit greater in-group favoritism than do majorities (for a review, see Leonardelli and Brewer 2001), partly because minority-group members—along with members of lower-status groups—perceive intergroup boundaries to be more salient and thus identify relatively more strongly with their in-group (Jackson 2002; Mummendey et al. 1999). This might explain why Whites in the United States are less likely than Non-Whites to identify racially (Croll 2007), at least until their whiteness is made salient, for example, through interracial contact (McDermott and Samson 2005).

Changes in relative group size can heighten expressions of bias (for a meta-analysis, see Mullen et al. 1992). Out-group growth operates through at least two avenues. The first follows the realistic conflict position: out-group growth may threaten access to scarce resources, such as jobs or housing. To be effective, this threat need not be objective—merely perceived—nor directed at the self—merely members of one's in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Second, out-group growth may heighten the salience of boundaries by destabilizing them; people pursue group enhancement strategies to deal with the subjective uncertainty and attenuation of intergroup distinctiveness that accompany destabilization (Hogg and Mullin 1999; Hornsey and Hogg 2002). In a related vein, some scholars have argued that the impact of out-group growth is greater in contexts where the out-group is initially smaller and thus less familiar (Blalock 1967). The primary goal of this dissertation is not to disentangle the mechanisms through which out-group growth operates, but to document the spillover effects of such growth for relations between other groups.

Time and again, studies have verified the predictions of social identity theory among preexisting groups and with respect to real-world outcomes. Out-group size has been linked to an array of defensive reactions, including negative stereotypes (Taylor 1998), racial conservatism and opposition to desegregation (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994), lower education spending (Poterba 1996), lower support for welfare spending (Fox 2004), opposi-

tion to immigration (Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006; Stein et al. 2000), punitive attitudes (King and Wheelock 2007), felon disenfranchisement (Behrens et al. 2003), and the presence of the death penalty (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Along similar lines, Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz (2005) find that anti-immigrant and anti-black attitudes vary as a function of the perceived size of these groups.

Some of this work touches on the consequences of Hispanic immigration specifically. Hopkins (2010) finds that as immigration to a community accelerates, residents become more strongly opposed to immigration. Along similar lines, Enos (2014) finds that repeated, superficial exposure to Spanish-speakers triggers opposition to immigration.

Together, these studies paint a compelling picture of how the growth of one group affects attitudes and behaviors toward that group; however, this picture is incomplete in several ways. Along with intergroup relations research more broadly, these studies generally examine the attitudes and behaviors of dominant group members, most often Whites, toward subordinate group members, most often Blacks (see Krysan 2000). There is less research on Whites' attitudes toward other subordinate groups, including Hispanics, Asians, and immigrants in general. There is even less research on relations between subordinate groups like Blacks and Hispanics, despite the fact that they increasingly live in the same communities (Telles et al. 2011). Thus far, the limited record on black-Latino relations is murky. Blacks and Latinos hold negative stereotypes of each other, although Latinos hold more negative stereotypes of Blacks than vice versa (Marrow 2011; Mindiola et al. 2003; Oliver and Wong 2003). And whereas some studies find that Blacks regard Latinos as economic threats (McClain et al. 2011)[14], others find no association between the size or growth of the Hispanic population and Blacks' economic satisfaction or perceptions of job security (Taylor and Schroeder 2010).

Scholars of comparative ethnicity have also criticized prevailing research for its single-minded focus on the idiosyncratic US case (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999). As the United

[14]This is despite the fact that immigration has little or no demonstrated impact on employment or earnings for Blacks (for a review, see Bean et al. 2011).

States increasingly deviates from the black-white binary, however, a more serious critique needs to be made: prevailing theories of intergroup relations no longer apply even to the two-group context they were designed to explain.

The Boundary-Making Tradition

The cognitive/psychological perspective and the boundary-making perspective converge and diverge in significant ways. On the one hand, both approaches similarly treat race, ethnicity, and nation as related "ways of seeing" (Brubaker et al. 2004: 43). On the other hand, social psychological theories of intergroup relations can be accused of assuming "groupness," rather than treating the convergence between symbolic categories, identification and experiences as an empirical question.[15] This tendency is aggravated by the experimental methods social psychologists typically employ, which reify the premise that people belong to groups, are aware of belonging to groups, and act based on their group membership.

In a similar vein, Wimmer criticizes scholarship that takes "a society's division along ethnic lines as a starting point, rather than attempting to explain how this came about and why people identify with a specific category rather than another" (2013: 3). According to Wimmer, the task for researchers is to assess, rather than assume, whether individuals are indeed acting on their racial identity or whether observed patterns of behavior could be better explained on some other basis, such as national identity.

At least some of the disagreement between these approaches stems from a difference in emphasis. Boundary-making scholars are interested in understanding the emergence of categories and the process by which people come to recognize—and act on—their relation to others with respect to these categories. Social psychologists and sociologists of intergroup relations are interested in understanding how the categories to which people have plausible ties—whether through self-identification or external classification—are related to their atti-

[15]To paraphrase Loveman (1999: 892).

tudes and behaviors. To these scholars, the demand to scrutinize "groupness"—especially in the United States, where racial boundaries have long been rigid[16]—feels like taking the wheels off a bus in the process of going somewhere.

This dissertation straddles a fine line between these perspectives, because it considers both kinds of questions. On the one hand, I examine how attitudes and behaviors vary as a function of Hispanic population growth and self-identification as black or white. This question lends itself to the language of "groups," but to be clear, this term is used as shorthand for a collection of people who self-identify with the same racial category (when prompted). Racial categories are not the only factor shaping responses to Hispanic growth[17], but they *are* the subject of this dissertation.

Another set of questions asks whether attitudes and behaviors vary across people who self-identify with different racial categories—Whites versus Blacks—and whether people instead view nation as a more immediate basis of social division (and act accordingly). These questions fall squarely within the purview of the boundary-making literature, which has usefully drawn attention to the nested, multi-dimensional quality of identities. In Wimmer's terms, this dissertation takes US "society's division along ethnic lines as a starting point," but this strategy is deliberate: the ultimate goal is to understand whether the United States is bound to end up somewhere else.

Outline of the Dissertation

The following chapters draw on multiple sources of data to investigate the consequences of Hispanic growth, real and perceived.

[16]Saperstein and Penner (2012) challenge this view based on evidence that Americans identify in different ways over time and in response to life events. Recent findings from Hannon and Defina (2016), however, cast doubt on Saperstein and Penner's claims and reaffirm the rigidity of the US racial order.

[17]In Chapter 3, for example, I find that ideology is more strongly associated with such responses.

Chapter 2 asks how the perception of Hispanic growth affects Whites' and Blacks' behavior toward Whites and Blacks as well as their identification along national and racial dimensions.[18] The chapter relies on an original experiment that incorporated both behavioral game and survey components. In the dictator game, experimental participants were given the opportunity to split $10 with a black or white stranger. The results indicate that black lab participants responded to perceived Hispanic growth by making relatively more generous contributions to white versus black recipients and prioritizing their American (national) identity. White lab participants also responded to perceived Hispanic growth by making relatively more generous contributions to white versus black recipients, but this corresponded with Whites prioritizing their white (racial) identity.

Mapping out the edges of the lab experimental results is one goal of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 asks whether real—as opposed to perceived—Hispanic growth predicts Whites' racial resentment toward Blacks and their support for policies that disproportionately affect racial minorities. This chapter also considers the inverse question: whether Whites respond to black growth with more negative attitudes toward Hispanics, proxied by preferences for restrictive immigration policies. These analyses rely on the 2012 wave of the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), a nationally representative survey of 50,000+ US Americans.

Chapter 4 also uses original experimental data, in this case, from a survey experiment carried out among a nationally representative sample of Blacks and Whites. In addition to replicating the results of the lab experiment, this experiment also aims to uncover heterogeneous responses to Hispanic growth. Specifically, the analyses consider how Whites and Blacks with varying levels of education differ in their reactions to perceived Hispanic growth. Scholars agree that education plays a pivotal role in shaping prejudicial attitudes

[18] A version of this chapter was published as Abascal (2015). Prior to publication, the results were presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Network of Analytic Sociologists (June 2015) and the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (August 2014).

and behaviors, but they disagree on the nature of this role. The results indicate that the relationship between perceived Hispanic growth and behavior is non-monotonic across levels of education, driving at a possible culprit for the previous disagreement. In Chapter 4, experimental results are supplemented with results based on CCES data.

Chapter 2

Allocating Resources in Response to Hispanic Growth: Evidence from the Lab

This chapter examines how *perceptions* of Hispanic population growth affect Whites' treatment of Blacks versus Whites on the one hand and Blacks' treatment of Blacks versus Whites on the other. More broadly, the following analyses shed light on how Hispanic population growth affects how Blacks and Whites relate to each other vis-à-vis a social boundary.

At present, the sociological literature on intergroup contact (and its consequences) is dominated by studies of identification and attitudes. However, as Wimmer (2008; 2013) usefully reminds us, social boundaries emerge where cognitive schemas intersect with patterns of behavior. The unequal allocation of material and symbolic resources is both a cause and consequence of social boundaries (Tilly 1998). To this end, this chapter uses an innovative experimental methodology to evaluate the allocation of real resources—in this case, money—across boundaries.

The following analyses draw on data from an original experiment carried out with a non-student sample. The experiment deploys behavioral game and survey methods to inves-

tigate how exposure to information about Hispanic population growth affects attitudes and behaviors that reflect and reify the boundary between Blacks and Whites.

Using Behavioral Games to Study Intergroup Relations

In recent years, several sociologists have made a compelling case for using experimental methods to study prejudice and discrimination (Goar et al. 2013; Pager and Shepherd 2008). Experiments allow researchers to establish causal effects on observable behaviors with material consequences.

This cherapt relies on an experimental methodology that has been underutilized by sociologists: behavioral games. In behavioral games, participants allocate resources (typically money) between themselves and others. Games impose a monetary cost on behaving in socially desirable ways, because participants forgo any money they choose to allocate to recipients. Games are thus a promising tool for addressing race/ethnicity researchers' growing concerns about social desirability bias.[1]

Although games are widely associated with behavioral economics, they were originally developed and implemented by Gerald Marwell (see Marwell and Ames 1979), a sociologist, who envisioned that games would contribute to the debunking of rational choice theory by exposing the role of sociological factors, like identities, inequalities, and institutions, in the allocation of resources. Scholars have only just begun to investigate how allocators' and recipients' identities affect game behavior. Thus far, findings on the impact of ethnoracial identity are mixed. Several studies find that allocators make similar contributions to in-group and out-group recipients; this is the case among Eastern and Ashkenazi Jews in Israel (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001), Kazakhs and Torguuds in Mongolia (Gil-White 2004), ethnic groups in Uganda (Habyarimana et al. 2007), and Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia (Whitt and Wilson 2007). Other studies find that allocators contribute significantly more

[1]For a discussion of social desirability bias, see Schuman et al. (1997).

to in-group members than to out-group members when membership is defined in a variety of ways (Ben-Ner et al. 2009). Bias in favor of one's ethnoracial group has been documented in the United States (Simpson et al. 2007[2], Theiss-Morse 2009) and South Africa (Van Der Merwe and Burns 2008). More generally, Baldassarri and Grossman (2013) find that contributions increase as the social distance between allocators and recipients decreases.

The experiment that is the subject of this chapter is based on the simplest behavioral game, the dictator game, a nonstrategic, one-shot game in which an allocator is endowed with some amount and then asked to contribute any portion of that endowment to a recipient. Some scholars regard dictator game contributions as a measure of altruism, others as a measure of "nonreciprocal sharing" (Camerer 2011), and still others as a measure of "inequality aversion" (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or redistributive preferences (Van Der Merwe and Burns 2008). In this dissertation, I adopt Baldassarri and Grossman's (2013: 4) agnostic interpretation of dictator game contributions as a manifestation of "prosocial behavior." Despite the rational choice prediction that dictators should not contribute anything, there is now substantial evidence that allocators contribute nontrivial amounts to recipients (Camerer 2003; Henrich et al. 2001).

In one important respect, the dictator game described in this chapter differs from experiments traditionally used in the study of social identity theory: here, allocators split resources between themselves and either a black recipient or a white one. In previous experiments, participants typically split resources between an in-group member and an out-group member. I adopt a between-subjects design to avoid exacerbating social desirability pressures. The resulting between-subjects difference in contributions conforms to the conception of discrimination as the disparate treatment of otherwise identical individuals in the aggregate (Heckman and Siegelman 1993).

[2]To my knowledge, Simpson and colleagues (2007) were the first to use a behavioral game—in their case, the trust game—to study relations between US Whites and Blacks.

On the (External) Validity of Game Results

The principal critique of behavioral games has to do with the applicability of game results outside the laboratory, that is, their external validity (Levitt and List 2007). To date, game results have been successfully validated across diverse settings and situations, including farmer cooperatives (Baldassarri 2015), sports card trading, flea markets, communal fish ponds, proofreading, and grading (Camerer 2011). Previous studies have also successfully linked dictator game contributions to a variety of real-world prosocial behaviors, including volunteer fire-fighting (Carpenter and Myers 2010), charitable giving (Benz and Meier 2008), and returning misdirected envelopes (Franzen and Pointner 2013). In addition, dictator game contributions to in-group versus out-group recipients are consistent with preferences for working, sharing an office, and commuting with in-group versus out-group members (Ben-Ner et al. 2009).

Along these lines, results from this experiment suggest Whites' contributions to black recipients are associated with levels of implicit bias against members of this group.[3] As a group, white subjects whose contributions to black recipients fell below the median ($2.00) scored higher in terms of implicit bias than did those whose contributions to black recipients fell at or above the median ($p < 0.10$).[4] The results of subsequent chapters also build the case for the external validity of dictator game contributions, by validating their predictions against widely used measures of racial and policy attitudes.

[3]For this measure, developed by Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens (1997), half the subjects were presented with a list of three items and asked how many of the items make them angry, and the other half were presented with the same list plus an item about "black leaders pushing for affirmative action." Implicit bias was calculated as the aggregate difference between the scores of those who viewed the four-item versus three-item lists. Given the setup of the measure, the association between Blacks' contributions to Whites and implicit bias requires further investigation.

[4]All reported p-values correspond to two-sided tests.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The following analyses draw on a behavioral game and survey experiment to investigate how the perception of Hispanic population growth affects Blacks' and Whites' generosity toward black and white strangers as well as their identification along racial and national lines. My attention to both contributions and identification stems from the claim—advanced by social identity and boundary-making theorists—that social boundaries are reflected and reified through both attitudes and behaviors.

Previous research finds that members of minority groups discriminate more than members of majority groups (Leonardelli and Brewer 2001). I therefore expect Blacks in the baseline condition will contribute relatively more to same-race versus other-race recipients compared to Whites. This is not to say that Whites will contribute equivalent amounts to same-race and other-race recipients, simply that the gap in contributions will be smaller among Whites.

Research on identification also finds that Whites identify less strongly with their racial group than do Blacks and other minorities (Croll 2007), but they identify more strongly as Americans (Theiss-Morse 2009). More generally, members of low-status groups are less likely to identify exclusively with a superordinate category when the intergroup boundary is regarded as impermeable or stable (Mummendey et al. 1999). Accordingly, I expect Blacks in the baseline condition will identify more strongly with their racial group than with their national group, relative to Whites.

Predicting Blacks' and Whites' behavioral and attitudinal reactions to Hispanic population growth is less straightforward. On the one hand, Blacks and Whites may respond by hardening the racial boundary between them. If this is the case, participants in the experimental condition will identify relatively more strongly with their racial group than with their national group compared to those in the baseline condition. Under this scenario, I would expect to observe a larger gap in contributions to same-race versus other-race recipients.

On the other hand, Hispanic population growth may catalyze a national boundary that excludes Hispanics primarily on the basis of their perceived foreignness. Whites and Blacks

may coalesce around a shared American identity that accommodates people of different racial—but not national—backgrounds. Under this scenario, I would expect to observe a smaller gap in contributions to same- versus other-race recipients.

It is important to keep in mind that Whites and Blacks differ in terms of their racial groups' symbolic status, their exposure to the economic pressures posed by immigration, and their ability to claim membership in certain groups. Therefore, we should not expect Whites and Blacks to respond in the same way to Hispanic growth.

Data and Methods

Data for this chapter come from an original experiment conducted with 148 non-students (100 white, 48 black) in central New Jersey. The experiments were carried out through Princeton's Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) between October and December 2013. PLESS policy dictates that experiments conducted in the lab cannot involve deception.

Setup of Experiment

Participants arrived at the lab individually. The experimenter escorted the participant to a windowless room with a single desk and chair and instructed the person to draw a number from a cup. The numbers uniquely identified participants, thereby anonymizing their responses, and randomly assigned participants to experimental conditions.

Participants were then asked to read a story about a "current event affecting the United States." Participants assigned to the treatment condition received a story about Hispanic population growth; those assigned to the baseline condition received a story about iPhone market share growth. The experimenter left the room while the participant read the story and answered manipulation check-type questions.

The participant then played a one-shot dictator game. Each participant received $10 in one-dollar bills and two envelopes, one marked "Keep" and the other bearing a stamp[5], a return address for PLESS, and the name of a recipient. Participants were instructed to divide the bills between the two envelopes; they were informed that contributions would be coming from their earnings. The experimenter explained that the recipient was selected from whitepages.com and envelopes containing money would be mailed to recipients after the study's conclusion. Participants were assured that the recipient would never know who sent the money, nor would the researcher be able to identify participants in connection with their contributions. The experimenter again left the room while the participant completed the activity. Afterward, the participant was escorted across the hall to the main lab space. Here, the participant completed a computer-assisted survey with demographic and attitudinal questions.

Measuring Identification

The following analyses pay special attention to survey measures of national and racial identification. The questions engage the notion—from social identity theory—that "group identification entails having the group be part of one's self" (Theiss-Morse 2009: 45). The first, forced-choice question hails from the 21st-Century Americanism Survey and captures what Schildkraut (2011: 11) calls "identity prioritization." It reads, "Which one of these best describes how you think of yourself most of the time?" with the following answer choices: "White" and "American" (for participants who previously self-identified as white) or "Black/African-American" and "American" (for participants who previously self-identified as black).

This measure has several shortcomings. First, people identify simultaneously along multiple dimensions (Theiss-Morse 2009). Second, by forcing participants to choose between a racial and a national identity, we forgo information about how much more strongly partici-

[5]To avoid priming participants with an American identity, I used stamps with an image of flowers, rather than the more common flag or Liberty Bell designs.

pants identify with one versus the other. I therefore supplement results from the forced-choice measure with results from paired measures of strength of identification from Theiss-Morse (2009) (see Figure D.3 and Table D.4 in the Appendix). This second set of measures is based on summed responses to the following items: 1) "Do you ever describe yourself to others as [American/white/black]?" where 1 corresponds to "Yes" and 0 corresponds to "No," and 2) "Being [American/white/black] is important to the way I think of myself as a person," with answers on a four-point scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree."[6] Higher values represent stronger identification with the group in question.

Design Considerations

Sample Selection

Student samples are problematic for the study of racial attitudes, as young people—and college students especially—report less prejudice and are more aware of norms against expressing prejudice (Henry 2008). Accordingly, the experiment for this study was carried out among adult residents of Mercer County, New Jersey, and neighboring communities.

Mercer County is an advantageous research site because the share of Hispanics is comparable to the share in the country overall (15.5% versus 16.6%).[7] According to Blalock's (1967) racial threat curve, out-group growth has a larger impact when and where the out-group is initially small. Studies like Enos (2014) that evaluate the impact of Hispanic growth in communities where this population is relatively small therefore risk overestimating this effect. I avoid this problem by focusing on an area where Hispanics are well-represented.

PLESS's e-mail distribution list of non-student area residents had not been updated since 2008; I therefore recruited the vast majority of participants between July and December 2013

[6]Responses to the non-forced-choice measures confirm that participants identified simultaneously along national and racial dimensions: 64% of participants who "somewhat" or "strongly" agreed that being American is important to how they think of themselves also "somewhat" or "strongly" agreed that being black or white is important to how they think of themselves.

[7]Based on three-year estimates from the ACS (2010 to 2012).

specifically for the purpose of taking part in this experiment. Participants were recruited through various community blogs and websites, including Craigslist for central New Jersey and centraljersey.com, as well as in person and using flyers. I posted flyers in public spaces and on the bulletin boards of several local organizations, including the public library, the YWCA, a senior center, a soup kitchen, an adult school, and several churches. The study was advertised as dealing with "current events affecting the United States," and participants were informed they would receive "up to $20 (in cash) for one hour of [their] time."

Participants registered online through PLESS's website or, less commonly, by calling the lab. To register for the online subject pool, potential participants had to report their race/ethnicity. Only individuals who self-identified as either white or black/African American were eligible to sign up for the experiment. The final sample is restricted to the 148 participants who also identified as "White" or "Black/African-American" on the study survey. To accommodate employed participants, spots were made available across a range of times, including weeknights, weekday lunch-hours, and weekends.

Experimenter Effects

I administered the majority of the experiments; fewer than 10 experiments were administered by the lab manager or an undergraduate research assistant. Two kinds of experimenter effects are relevant: those due to the experimenter's identity and those due to the experimenter's preconceived expectations.

To assess participants' reactions to the experimenter's identity, a pilot test was carried out between July and October 2013 using 96 additional, non-student participants. A white man administered approximately one-half of these; a Hispanic woman (me) administered the other half. Pretest data confirmed that the experimenter's identity was not significantly associated with participants' perceptions of Hispanic growth[8] or their game contributions.

[8]Assessed using the following question: "Compared to 10 years ago, would you say [Hispanics/Latinos] make up a smaller share of the population in your community, the same share, or a larger share?"

Results of this pretest should not be interpreted as a general statement on the (non-)impact of experimenter identity, but a more modest account of participants' reactions to these experimenters' characteristics. These results also speak to expectancy concerns, as one of the pilot experimenters was a paid employee of the lab who was blind to the study's hypotheses.

Expectancy effects were further mitigated by a number of factors. From the start, I had no clear hypotheses regarding the effect of Hispanic growth; in fact, contradictory scenarios were plausible. Second, the number of participants was predetermined by means of power calculations based on a \$1 minimum detectable difference.[9] Third, experimenters memorized and closely followed a script for administering the dictator game and left participants alone to make their decisions. Fourth, the survey experiment was administered by a computer, not an experimenter.

Manipulating Perceived Growth

Participants in the treatment condition read a two-paragraph excerpt of an article about Hispanic population growth from the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ).[10] This story was published—in nearly identical form—on the WSJ website. Participants in the baseline condition read a two-paragraph excerpt about iPhone market share growth that was also based on a story from the WSJ website. Both stories were slightly modified to resemble each other; facsimiles of the primes are included in the Appendix (Figures D.1 and D.2). For information on the tests associated with the primes and what the primes do (and do not) affect, refer to Appendix A.

Results from the final experiment confirm that participants in the treatment condition were significantly more likely to agree with the following statements: "Immigrants increase crime rates" ($p < 0.10$) and "Immigrants make it harder to keep the country united" ($p < 0.10$). They were no more likely, however, to agree that "Immigrants are generally bad for

[9] Refer to Appendix C for more details.

[10] According to public opinion surveys, the US public perceives the WSJ to be less biased than other national newspapers (Ras 2007).

America's economy" or that "Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America." These responses suggest participants were sensitive to the social and symbolic—although not necessarily economic—pressures posed by immigration.

Manipulating Recipient's Race/Ethnicity

Numerous experimental studies use racially distinctive names to manipulate race/ ethnicity (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Correll et al. 2007; Fryer and Levitt 2004; Pedulla 2014; Van Der Merwe and Burns 2008).

As signals of race/ethnicity, names have the distinct advantage that they are subtle and implicit cues of racial difference. Due to strong social desirability pressures, racial primes must be both indirect and deniable to be effective. Although subtle, distinctive names are fairly unambiguous signals of race/ethnicity. In fact, previous studies find that US subjects correctly classify distinctively white and black names over 80% of the time.

Distinctive names, however, can signal more than just race; they can also signal religious and socioeconomic differences. This is especially true in the case of distinctively black names, which are associated with lower-class backgrounds, both objectively and in popular perceptions (Fryer and Levitt 2004). Researchers typically deal with this by analyzing vital statistics data and choosing the names of babies whose mothers have comparable levels of education (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004). However, distinctively black names that are objectively associated with higher-class backgrounds are not necessarily perceived as such. This study takes a different approach to choosing names. First, I drew a list of racially distinctive names from two sources: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and the New York City Bureau of Vital Statistics' (2012) baby names report. I pretested these names using an online experimental survey fielded in July 2013 and distributed through MTurk. All 114 respondents were located in the United States.

Based on the pretest results, I chose 16 first names and 8 surnames; these names were among the most strongly associated with perceived race/ethnicity and the least strongly

associated with perceived class. A manipulation check from the final experiment confirmed that the vast majority (over 81%) of participants correctly identified the race/ethnicity associated with each name.[11] Participants did, however, view black recipients as less affluent than white recipients ($p < 0.10$), which could have influenced game contributions, for example, through perceived need. Accordingly, recipient's perceived class is held constant in the multivariate models.

The first names included Aaliyah, Aisha, Jada, and Keisha (black females); Carrie, Jill, Laurie, and Sarah (white females); Jayden, Jermaine, Kareem, and Leroy (black males); and Brad, Greg, Jay, and Todd (white males). The surnames included Jackson, Jefferson, Washington, and Williams (black), and Cook, Long, Miller, and Murphy (white). First names were paired with racially appropriate surnames, for 64 distinct names. I confirmed that each name was listed on whitepages.com and that the number of listings was at least equal to the number of envelopes on which the name appeared.

Previous studies show that the presence of individuating information about recipients, such as a name, dampens in-group bias in game contributions (Tanis and Postmes 2005). We should therefore interpret the following results as conservative estimates of relative contributions to same- versus other-race recipients.

Additional Considerations

Privacy and credibility have been shown to affect game contributions. For example, participants make greater contributions when they suspect researchers will be able to identify them in connection with their offers (Hoffman et al. 1996) and smaller contributions when they suspect recipients do not exist or will never receive the money (Frohlich et al. 2001).

I borrowed several measures from Hoffman and colleagues (1996) to ensure privacy and participants' perceptions thereof. To ensure the researcher would not be able to ascertain the participant's contribution from the thickness or weight of the envelope, each participant

[11] Results are substantively similar among participants who correctly identified the recipient's race/ ethnicity (see Table D.1 in the Appendix).

received 10 paper slips in the size and shape of one-dollar bills. Participants were instructed to distribute these slips so that both envelopes ended up with 10 items, regardless of their contributions. Over 86% of participants correctly included 10 items in the stamped envelope, suggesting that 1) most participants understood and followed instructions, and 2) privacy was a pervasive concern.[12] The researcher also stepped out while participants made their decisions.

Credibility was achieved in several ways. First, participants who expressed doubts or concerns about the setup of the game were reminded that experiments conducted through PLESS cannot involve deception. Second, the dictator game used physical money and a stamped envelope with a return address. A manipulation check at the end of the experiment suggests these measures paid off: when prompted, only 16 participants reported that they did not believe the recipient would ever receive their contribution. Although contributions were lower for this group, the difference was not significant ($2.13 versus $3.27).[13]

Sample Description

In terms of income, participants were remarkably similar to all Whites and Blacks in the United States. Participants' mean household income was $76,395, compared to $74,630 for non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks overall; their median household income was $55,000, compared to $53,082 for non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks overall.[14] In terms of education, however, participants were more highly educated than the general public: 59.5% of participants had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to just 29.8% of non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks overall.[15] If highly educated people are less inclined to view Hispanics as competitors for objective resources (because Hispanics are overrepresented in the low-skilled labor

[12]Results are substantively similar among participants who correctly followed instructions (see Table D.2 in the Appendix).

[13]Results are substantively similar among participants who reported that recipients would receive the money contained in the envelopes (see Table D.3 in the Appendix).

[14]National figures are based on three-year estimates from the ACS (2010 to 2012).

[15]In terms of income and education, Blacks and Whites were also unrepresentative of their target population in different ways. Appendix B provides more details.

market), the overrepresentation of college-educated participants will downwardly bias the estimated effects.

	Mean	SD	Whites	Blacks	t-value
Black [0,1]	0.324	0.470			
Female [0,1]	0.608	0.490	0.650	0.521	1.508
Age [18,70]	41.054	17.286	43.950	35.021	3.022***
Household income [5K,175K]	76395	57238	83427	60750	2.109*
College educated [0,1]	0.595	0.493	0.700	0.375	3.938***
Party ID [1,3]	2.442	0.632	2.320	2.702	−3.554***

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample and by Participants' Race/Ethnicity[16]

The descriptive statistics also reveal that black and white participants differed in terms of age, income, education, and party identification (see Table 2.1). This is unsurprising given that participants' race could not be randomly assigned. To deal with these differences, I replicate bivariate results using multivariate models.

		Prime	
		Baseline	Hispanic Growth
Recipient	Same-Race	$N_{white} = 24$ $N_{black} = 13$	$N_{white} = 29$ $N_{black} = 11$
	Other-Race	$N_{white} = 24$ $N_{black} = 12$	$N_{white} = 23$ $N_{black} = 12$

Table 2.2: Distribution of 148 Respondents across Experimental Conditions

[16]Age was recorded on a 10-point scale, then mid-point coded using "70 years" for the final, open-ended category; household income is measured on a 12-point scale ranging from "less than $10,000" to "more than $150,000." For the analyses, the values were mid-point coded, and the final, open-ended category was coded as $175,000; the original education variable is measured on a six-point scale ranging from "less than high school" to "graduate or professional degree." The values were not normally distributed. Therefore, I recoded education as a dichotomous variable using the natural cut-point: four-year college degree and above; for party ID, 1 = Republican, 2 = independent or "something else," 3 = Democrat.

	Prime			Recipient		
	Baseline	Growth	t-value	Same-Race	Other-Race	t-value
Black	0.342	0.307	0.462	0.312	0.338	−0.340
Female	0.699	0.520	2.248*	0.597	0.620	−0.276
Age	39.507	42.560	−1.075	42.545	39.437	1.094
Household income	77950	75000	0.291	85461	67187	1.830+
College educated	0.575	0.613	−0.468	0.737	0.451	3.544***
Party ID	2.479	2.405	0.709	2.467	2.414	0.509

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition


Random assignment achieved a fairly uniform distribution of participants (see Table 2.2) and fair balance across conditions (see Table 2.3). In aggregate, participants in the treatment and baseline conditions were not significantly different, except in terms of gender. Specifically, women were overrepresented in the treatment condition. Evidence of an association between allocator gender and dictator game contributions is mixed (Dufwenberg and Muren 2006; Eckel and Grossman 1998). However, Hispanic growth might affect men and women differently—for example, by virtue of their different positions in the labor market. Consequently, I control for participants' gender in the multivariate models. Participants in the same- and other-race conditions were not significantly different, except in terms of education and household income. Specifically, college-educated and affluent participants were overrepresented among those paired with same-race recipients. Again, I control for these differences in the multivariate models.

Results


Patterns of Contributions

On average, participants contributed $3.14 to an unknown recipient; the modal contribution was $0 with a secondary mode at $5.00. These figures are consistent with those from previous studies, which find that dictators typically contribute between 20% and 30% of their endowments, with modes at 0% and 50% (Henrich et al. 2001). As expected, the mean contribution for this sample falls on the higher end, probably because participants received individuating information in the form of recipients' names.

Overall, white participants were more generous than black participants ($3.32 versus $2.77), but this difference does not reach statistical significance. Participants who first read a story about Hispanic growth were also more generous than those who first read a story about iPhone shares ($3.40 versus $2.88). Again, this difference fails to reach significance.



(a) Baseline



(b) Hispanic Growth

Figure 2.1: Game Contributions by Experimental Condition
$^{+}p<0.10$; $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$ (two-sided)

Contributions in Baseline

	White Allocators	Black Allocators
Hispanic growth	1.490^{+}	2.511^{+}
Black recipient	0.736	2.228^{+}
Hispanic growth x black recipient	-2.694^{*}	-2.970^{+}
Age	0.036^{+}	0.015
Female	1.399^{*}	0.471
College education[17]	0.295	1.678
Recipient's perceived class	-0.497	0.128
Constant	1.085	-0.506
R-squared	0.168	0.235
N	99	48

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 2.4: Predicting Contributions by White and Black Allocators

In the baseline condition (Figure 2.1a), Whites contributed similar amounts to white and black recipients ($3.08 versus $3.46), whereas Blacks contributed significantly more to black recipients than to white ones ($3.15 versus $1.00, $p < 0.01$). These patterns cannot be explained by the fact that Blacks viewed black recipients as more needy than white ones. Holding other differences constant, including perceived class, Blacks contributed $2.23 more to black recipients than to white ones (Table 2.4). Whites, on the other hand, contributed statistically indistinguishable amounts to black and white recipients, holding other differences constant. Interestingly, recipient's perceived class did not predict game contributions among Whites or Blacks; in other words, participants did not give according to perceived need.

Contributions in Hispanic Growth Condition

Whites and Blacks also behaved differently after reading about Hispanic growth (Figure 2.1b). Whites in the treatment condition contributed significantly more to white recipients

[17]To control for socioeconomic differences while conserving degrees of freedom, the multivariate models include a covariate for college education but not household income. Over 12% of respondents are missing data on household income; moreover, college education was more strongly correlated with game contributions than was household income.




Figure 2.2: American (versus Racial) Identification by Allocator's Race and Experimental Condition
$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

than to black ones ($4.34 versus $2.13, $p < 0.05$). Blacks in the treatment condition, however, gave comparable amounts to white and black recipients ($3.58 versus $3.36).

These results hold in a multivariate regression (Table 2.4). Holding other differences constant, Whites in the baseline condition contributed similar amounts to black and white recipients, whereas Blacks contributed $2.23 more to black recipients than to white ones. The interaction coefficients indicate that Whites in the treatment condition contributed $2.69 less to black recipients than to white ones, whereas Blacks contributed comparable amounts to white and black recipients.

Patterns of Identification

Group enhancement strategies can also manifest in attitudes. After playing the dictator game, participants answered survey questions gauging their identification along racial and national dimensions.

Identification in Baseline

Nearly 66% of Whites in the baseline condition reported that "American," rather than "White," best describes how they think of themselves. Only 4% of Blacks in the baseline condition, however, picked "American" over "Black/African-American" (Figure 2.2).[18] The difference between Blacks and Whites is highly significant ($p < 0.001$) and consistent with previous work, which finds that Whites identify less strongly with their racial group and more strongly as Americans than do Blacks.

This pattern is also consistent with contributions in baseline. Whites in the baseline condition were comparably generous toward black and white recipients, whereas Blacks gave significantly more to black recipients than to white ones. In other words, Whites behaved as if a racial boundary were not as salient as some superordinate identity that includes both Blacks and Whites, whereas Blacks identified and contributed along racial lines.

Identification in Hispanic Growth Condition

In terms of identification, Whites and Blacks again exhibited opposite patterns after reading about Hispanic growth (Figure 2.2). Only 41% of Whites in the treatment condition reported that "American," rather than "white," best describes how they think of themselves. Levels of "American" identification among Whites were significantly different between the baseline and treatment conditions ($p < 0.05$).

[18]Recall that these figures are based on a forced-choice measure of identity in which participants must choose whether "American" or "[White/Black]" "best describes" how they think of themselves. By extension, 34% of Whites chose "White" and 96% of Blacks chose "Black" as the term that best describes them.

By contrast, nearly 29% of Blacks in the treatment condition reported that "American," rather than "Black/African-American," best describes how they think of themselves. Compared to Whites in the treatment condition, Blacks in the treatment condition still identified relatively more strongly with their racial group than with their national group; compared to Blacks in the baseline condition, however, Blacks in the treatment condition were significantly less likely to identify with their racial group than their national group ($p < 0.05$).

These results hold up in a multivariate logistic regression that controls for participants' background characteristics (Table 2.5). Specifically, a white participant in the treatment condition was 27% less likely to identify as American than a comparable participant in the baseline condition, holding other values constant at their means. The interaction coefficient indicates, however, that a black participant in the treatment condition was 22% more likely to identify as American than a black participant in the baseline condition.

These results are substantively similar using non-forced-choice measures of national and racial identification (see Figure D.3 and Table D.4 in the Appendix). Results from Table D.4 reveal that racial identification in particular drives observed patterns of identity reprioritization among Whites and Blacks. Whites in the treatment condition were more likely than Whites in the baseline condition to report that their white racial identity is important to the way they think of themselves ($p < 0.05$). By contrast, Blacks in the treatment condition were less likely than Blacks in the baseline condition to report that black racial identity is important to the way they think of themselves ($p < 0.10$).

Again, these patterns mirror game contributions. Whites exposed to the Hispanic growth article contributed significantly more to white recipients than to black ones. In other words, Whites apparently responded to Hispanic growth by distancing themselves from all Non-Whites; this is consistent with either of the first two scenarios depicted in Figure 1.1. Blacks exposed to the Hispanic growth article were relatively more likely to identity foremost as Americans, and they behaved accordingly. Recall that Blacks in the treatment condition contributed nearly identical amounts to black and white recipients, effectively treating both

as in-group members. This is consistent with the third racial configuration depicted in Figure 1.1.

	Log odds
Hispanic growth	-1.088^{*}
Black	-3.463^{**}
Hispanic growth x black	3.016^{*}
Age	0.040^{**}
Female	-0.279
College education	0.331
Recipient's perceived class	0.440
Constant	-1.950
Pseduo R-squared	0.233
N	140

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 2.5: Predicting National (versus Racial) Identification

The Shrinking Boundaries around Americanness

Blacks in the Hispanic growth condition made comparable contributions to black and white recipients and identified relatively more strongly as Americans. These patterns suggest Blacks may respond to Hispanic growth by allying themselves with Whites on the basis of an American identity Hispanics presumably do not share.

Additional evidence suggests Blacks are not simply shielding themselves behind a national boundary, they are also using this boundary to reinforce the exclusion of Hispanics. Blacks in the experimental condition were significantly less likely to stand by principles consistent with an "incorporationist" view of American identity (Schildkraut 2011: 47), such as "respecting other people's cultural differences" and "seeing people of all backgrounds as American" ($p < 0.05$).[19] In other words, Blacks exposed to the Hispanic growth article were less likely to value an outlook that counts people of different cultural backgrounds, like Hispanics, as

[19]This measure captures summed responses to the following items, based on Schildkraut (2011): 1) "Respecting other people's cultural differences," 2) "Seeing people of all backgrounds as American," 3) "Carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors, such as

Americans. This finding undermines the claim that Blacks are prioritizing an American identity that includes (rather than excludes) Hispanics.

American Identification and Equitable Giving

Previous research finds that Whites for whom an American identity is salient are more to likely support both a general and a race-specific tax increase (Transue 2007). In addition, Whites who identify more strongly as Americans are more likely to cite fairness and representation—as opposed to self-interest—as rationales for affirmative action (Smith and Tyler 1996). Along similar lines, Croll (2007) finds that racial identification among Whites is associated with lower support for societal assistance to Blacks.

Given the setup of the experiment, it is not possible to determine whether identification motivated behavior.[20] An exploratory cut at the experimental data suggests that racial identifiers were more generous overall and more equitable in terms of contributions to same- versus other-race recipients (see Figure D.4 in the Appendix). More work is needed, however, to further our understanding of the relationship between American identification and differential treatment across ethnoracial boundaries. In particular, future research should investigate the consequences of American identification among Blacks, as prior studies focus largely on Whites.

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language and food," and 4) "Blending into the larger society" (reverse-coded) "are important in making someone a true American."

[20]First, identification is a post-treatment variable in the sense that it, too, was affected by the experimental prime; in general, one should not predict the effect of a treatment (like contributions) using post-treatment variables (like identification). More fundamentally, the relationship between identification and behavior likely runs both ways: people who identify strongly with a group are more likely to act in ways that benefit the group, and acting in ways that benefit the group reinforces identification. Rather than positing a unidirectional causal relationship from attitudes to behavior, I treat them as parallel attitudinal and behavioral manifestations of an underlying boundary schema.

Discussion

White and black experimental participants reacted in opposite ways to Hispanic population growth. Compared to those in the baseline condition, Whites in the treatment condition contributed relatively more to white recipients than to black ones. This pattern was reversed among Blacks, who contributed more to black recipients than to white ones in the baseline condition, but similar amounts to black and white recipients in the treatment condition. Identification mirrored contributions: compared to Whites in the baseline condition, Whites in the Hispanic growth condition identified relatively more strongly with their racial group. Compared to Blacks in the baseline condition, Blacks in the Hispanic growth condition identified relatively more strongly with their national group. Participants who prioritized their national identity were, on average, more generous and more equitable in terms of contributions.

Together, these patterns converge on one testable proposition: individuals respond to the growth of a third group by prioritizing a more privileged identity to which they can plausibly lay claim and which also excludes members of the growing group. By privileged, I have in mind something akin to Posner's (2005: 4) minimum winning coalition, or the best-positioned group "that contains the fewest members with whom the spoils of power will have to be shared." Of course, individuals are not free to claim belonging in any group; their choice set is constrained by individual characteristics, like phenotype, and contextual ones, like identity documents. Identity, Jenkins (1997) reminds us, is a matter of internal as well as external classification.

What exactly constitutes a privileged, plausible identity depends on context-specific characteristics, including the arrangement of groups and the nature of the boundaries between them. For Whites in the United States, the smallest, best-positioned group likely contains other Whites, that is, is defined along racial lines. For Blacks, this group likely contains other Americans, that is, is defined along national lines. Both kinds of groups are presumably exclude the growing out-group, Hispanics.

Limitations and Next Steps

The results of this chapter are based on a laboratory experiment carried out among a sample of Blacks and Whites. This sample was, by necessity, geographically concentrated. In addition, participants were more highly educated than all Blacks and Whites in the United States, though here, too, patterns were group-specific (refer to Appendix B). If individual characteristics, like educational attainment, or contextual ones, like local demographic composition, condition the impact of Hispanic growth on black–white relations, then the conclusions based on the lab experiment might not translate immediately to more heterogeneous populations.

The lab experiment presents another limitation: first, the durability of the effects identified, and second, their generalizability across time periods. From start to finish, each experiment took about one hour to complete. It remains to be seen whether reading about Hispanic growth influenced participants' attitudes and behaviors days, weeks, or even months after they left the laboratory. Underlying this question is a concern that an effect that lasts one hour is not substantively important. We would do well to remember, however, that the Latino threat narrative is ubiquitous, and the US public is regularly besieged by more insidious messages than the fairly benign prime used in this chapter (Chavez 2008). The 2016 primary cycle is no exception.

The following chapters speak to these issues by examining whether and how the impact of Hispanic growth varies as a function of differences between people and the communities where they live. In the process, the analyses also validate the results of the lab experiment with respect to real—as opposed to perceived—levels of Hispanic growth.

Chapter 3

Local Demographics and Racial and Policy Attitudes

The results of the previous chapter suggest Blacks and Whites react to perceived Hispanic growth by prioritizing a more privileged identity that excludes Hispanics. For Whites, this strategy manifests in relatively more generous contributions to Whites and stronger identification with their racial group. For Blacks, this strategy manifests in comparable contributions to Blacks and Whites and stronger identification with their national group. As with other lab experimental work, however, an outstanding question concerns the extent to which the results generalize beyond the sample and lab setting. To address this question, I leverage demographic heterogeneity within the United States.

Hispanics and Blacks are not evenly distributed within the United States. Hispanic growth in particular varies substantially across US communities, due in part to patterns of immigration (Massey and Capoferro 2010[2008]). The primary goal of this chapter is to understand whether real—as opposed to perceived or manipulated—Hispanic population growth is associated with Whites' attitudes toward Blacks, as well as their support for race-targeted policies that have come to be associated with this group. Another goal involves understanding whether the inverse holds true, i.e., whether black population growth is associ-

ated with Whites' attitudes toward Hispanics, as proxied by immigration policy preferences. By attending to policy preferences, the following analyses aim to shed light on the political ramifications of ongoing demographic changes, in addition to advancing the cause of external validity. One dimension of external validity concerns the ability to extend findings to conceptually related but distinct outcomes.

The following analyses are based on the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), a large-scale ($N > 50,000$) survey of US adults. The CCES includes questions that gauge attitudes toward Blacks, preferences for affirmative action, and preferences for restrictive immigration policies. The CCES also includes information about respondents' places of residence, down to the county level, making it possible to assess how local demographic factors are associated with individual attitudes and preferences.

The Role of Out-group Size and Growth

Experimental studies have identified a link between the relative size of an out-group and attitudes toward that group (see Mullen et al. 1992 for a meta-analysis). Many of these studies come out of social psychology and rely on manipulating perceptions of both group membership and group size in lab settings. More recently, Enos (2014) examined the impact of perceived group size in a field setting by assigning Spanish-speakers to ride trains with unsuspecting Boston commuters. He finds that commuters who were exposed to Spanish-speakers held relatively more conservative attitudes toward immigration policies at the end of the study period. Inside or outside the lab, experimental studies repeatedly show that the perceived size of an out-group predicts negative attitudes toward that out-group.

Consistent with the experimental record, a number of observational studies find that the relative size of an out-group is associated with negative out-group attitudes. Fossett and Kiecolt (1989) and Taylor (1998) find that the black population share in a metropolitan area predicts anti-black prejudice, perceived status threat, and opposition to race-targeted policies among Whites. The size of the Hispanic population has similarly been linked to

everything from anti-miscegenation beliefs (Taylor and Schroeder 2010) to political partisanship (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). In the European context, Quillian (1995) finds that the country-level share of non-European immigrants predicts racial prejudice, and Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky (2006) find that the relative size of the foreign-born population predicts anti-foreigner sentiments.

Other studies complicate this picture. Fox (2004), for example, finds that the relative size of the Latino population is a double-edged sword: the share of Latinos is negatively associated with Whites' negative stereotypes about Latinos; in heavily Latino contexts, however, positive stereotypes about Latinos' work ethic predict lower support for race-coded redistribution among Whites. And Schneider (2008) finds that anti-immigrant prejudice is associated with the share of immigrants who pose a symbolic, not economic, threat. In other words, the characteristics, and not just relative size, of an out-group matter.

According to another set of studies, change and growth, not size or share, are responsible for the effect on out-group attitudes. Both Hopkins (2010) and Taylor and Schroeder (2010) find that an influx of Hispanics is associated with negative attitudinal responses ranging from coldness toward Hispanics to opposition to immigration. In a similar vein, King and Wheelock (2007) find that an increase in the size of the local black population predicts more punitive attitudes.[1]

The notion that a *change* in population composition, not just population composition itself, affects attitudes dates back to Blalock's (1967) research on intergroup relations and his now-famous racial threat curve. Why might people respond to changes in out-group size? For one, people's perceptions of local and national population composition are notoriously inaccurate (Alba et al. 2005). For cognitive reasons, though, people are attentive to change (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). As Hopkins explains, "While *levels* of ethnic heterogeneity

[1]The impact of out-group size and growth does not stop with attitudes: capital sentencing is more prevalent in jurisdictions with larger minority populations (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), and felon disenfranchisement policies were more likely to be enacted in states with larger non-white populations (Behrens et al. 2003).

might escape notice, *changes* are less likely to do so" (2010: 42). In addition, change heightens subjective uncertainty, which can in itself be viewed and treated as threatening (Hogg and Mullin 1999).

Empirically, the effects of share and growth are hard to disentangle. The experiment described in the previous chapter, for example, highlights the difficulty of manipulating one without the other (also see Appendix A). And though some observational studies pit size against growth, studies that control for both simultaneously are the exception rather than the rule. Among the handful that do, some come down in favor of size (e.g., Abrajano and Hajnal 2015), others come down in favor of growth (e.g., Hopkins 2010), and still others find support for both (Taylor and Schroeder 2010). Share and growth might both affect attitudes, possibly in ways that depend on the attitude in question; to that end, I consider measures of both in the same analyses. By interacting the two, I also allow for the possibility that size and growth reinforce one another.

This chapter presents two additional methodological improvements over prior work: first, the same models simultaneously control for the size and share of multiple groups. Doing so helps distinguish the effects of exposure to Hispanics from the effects of exposure to Blacks, particularly in light of the fact that Hispanics and Blacks increasingly live in the same communities (Telles et al. 2011). Second, I explore the possibility that the timing of growth matters by including measures of both past growth and ongoing growth. Prior studies typically measure growth in a previous decade (e.g., Hopkins 2010; Taylor and Schroeder 2010). To be sure, demographic changes are correlated over time. Analytically, however, past and present growth might have distinct effects. My first set of models follows in the footsteps of prior work by controlling for growth in the past decade. My second set of models considers the differential effects of past versus present growth.

Despite nuanced disagreements about size versus change and symbolic threats versus material ones, the broader picture is clear: exposure to an out-group is associated with attitudes and behaviors toward *that out-group*. A primary goal of this dissertation is to understand

whether and to what extent the growth of an out-group is associated with attitudes (and behaviors) toward *other out-groups*. In this chapter, I again approach this question through the lens of black–white–Hispanic relations.

Measuring Racism with Surveys: Resentment and Policy Attitudes

Racial attitudes researchers typically draw a distinction between abstract racial principles and support for practical applications of those principles (Jackman and Muha 1984). Abstract principles include out-group stereotypes and preferences for intergroup contact (e.g., "Would you yourself have any objections to sending your children to a school where [a few/half/more than half] of the children are Black/African-American?"); practical applications include policies designed to address existing inequalities and separation (e.g., "Do you favor or oppose the busing of Black/African-American and white school children from one school district to another?").[2] White Americans' attitudes toward the former have grown steadily more progressive in recent decades; attitudes toward the latter, however, have not kept pace (Bobo et al. 2012).

To account for this discrepancy, scholars have turned to the concept of symbolic racism. The concept comes out of the work of social psychologists P. J. Henry and David Sears, who describe symbolic racism as a new, more subtle form of racism. Symbolic racism rests on the following, core belief: subordinate group members', particularly Blacks', disadvantages stem from their failure to take responsibility for their own actions and shortcomings, rather than from structural forces or ongoing discrimination (2002: 254).

This belief is a prerequisite for "racial resentment," which Bobo and his colleagues describe as "the extent to which [out-group members] are perceived as trying to advance themselves unfairly by a different set of rules than those putatively followed by [in-group members]" (2012: 39).[3] Measures of racial resentment make up the widely used Symbolic

[2]Questions from the General Social Survey.

[3]Scholars disagree about whether such beliefs in fact reflect racial animus or a commitment to non-racial principles, like personal responsibility (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; also see

Racism Scale developed by Henry and Sears (2002); they have also appeared on major social surveys for decades, making temporal comparisons possible.

The General Social Survey (GSS), for example, first asked respondents about the sources of Blacks' disadvantage in 1977. Since then, non-Hispanic Whites have consistently endorsed lack of "motivation or willpower" as the primary reason for Blacks' disadvantage (Bobo et al. 2012: 61–62). A related item asks respondents whether and to what extent they agree with the following statement:

> Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors.

Responses to this question yield two notable patterns: first, the vast majority of Whites agree with this statement. In the 2014 GSS, for example, 71.2% of non-Hispanic Whites reported that they "somewhat" or "strongly" agreed. My own research suggests responses to this question are more closely tied to agreement with the second statement ("Blacks should do the same without special favors") than the first ("Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up").[4] Second, levels of agreement have remained remarkably stable since the item first appeared on the GSS in 1994 (Bobo et al. 2012: 67).

Reported racial resentment is closely linked to experiences of (perceived) positional threat. For example, in a series of online experiments, Wetts and Willer (2015) find that Whites report higher levels of racial resentment toward Blacks when they are first exposed to information about a decline in Whites' population share or a decline in Whites' relative

Krysan 2000 for a review). In this chapter, I refer to these attitudes by their common name, "racial resentment," though I am agnostic about the latent motivations that drive them. Attitudes and behaviors need not be motivated by prejudice per se to differentially impact people who identify—and are identified—with different racial categories.

[4]This conclusion is based on an online experiment I carried out in April 2014 with Marcus Johnson, a PhD candidate in Princeton's Politics Department.

incomes.[5] Understanding patterns of racial resentment is therefore key to understanding the consequences of Hispanic size and growth for black–white relations.

Scholars have long questioned the link between self-reported racial attitudes and real-world behaviors (e.g., LaPiere 1934; Pager and Quillian 2005). When behavioral measures are not available, some scholars recommend looking to racial *policy* attitudes, because these attitudes "have political consequences in and of themselves" (Krysan 2000: 139). In the contemporary US context, affirmative action is the paradigmatic racial policy, and support for affirmative action policies across a range of sites—from the labor market to higher education—has received considerable empirical attention. Whites have consistently and overwhelmingly opposed preferences for Blacks in hiring and promotion (Bobo et al. 2012). Data from the most recently released GSS (2014), for example, indicate 87.4% of Whites "oppose" or "strongly oppose" such preferences.

That reported opposition to affirmative action, like racial resentment, has remained consistently high over time suggests these measures are fairly immune from social desirability pressures, which have grown throughout the same time period. By comparison, Whites' support for abstract racial principles has declined throughout this period, and the decline has gone hand-in-hand with a decline in the variance of support.[6] Measures of symbolic racism, like racial resentment, as well as racial policy attitudes are the exception to this trend, which in part explains why social psychologists and sociologists still look to them as meaningful measures of out-group attitudes in the modern era.

[5]When primed with a relative income decline, Whites be more likely to agree with the racial resentment items because they think Blacks no longer need special government treatment. Likely, this is not the only process at play: the treatment prime specifically mentioned a decline in Whites' incomes, yet Whites exposed to this prime also reported lower support for welfare. Their reaction brings to mind the adage, "Cutting off your nose to spite your face."

[6]As a result, some of these measures no longer appear on major social surveys. The GSS, for example, hasn't asked about support for anti-miscegenation laws since 2002.

External Validity: An Empirical Question

According to countless introductory methods textbooks, laboratory experiments lack external validity (e.g. Babbie 2010: 249–250). However, external validity refers not just to the ability to generalize *to* a specific population—which can be achieved, for example, through probability sampling; it also refers to the ability to generalize *across* populations, settings, and measures (Lucas 2003). In the social sciences, measures are often proxies for the theoretical constructs we seek to understand. This is true whether we are observing contributions to black recipients in an "abstract" dictator game or self-reported preferences for "sending your children to a school where half of the children are black." In both cases, we are interested in capturing a form of out-group treatment, and the question of whether our measure reflects this construct has implications for the external validity of our findings.[7] Answering this question is no less demanding whether we have 148 respondents from one community or thousands of respondents sampled randomly from a national population.

Hence, while it is certainly true that researchers in the lab make sacrifices in the name of experimental control—most notably, they sacrifice the ability to immediately generalize to a target population—lab experiments are not distinct from other data generating processes in being beholden to the following question: Do the findings generalize to *other* contexts, samples, and measures? For experiments and surveys alike, answering this empirical question requires replicating the research in different settings, among different groups of people, and using alternative operationalizations of the constructs of interest. The task of establishing external validity, in short, is a task for multiple studies.

This is an important goal of this chapter: to replicate the results of the lab experiment among a nationally representative sample of survey respondents and with respect to racial attitudes and policy preferences. In pursuing this goal, the following analyses also shed light on the broader political ramifications of the reactions identified in the lab experiment.

[7]See Morton and Williams (2010: 275) for a discussion of external validity in relation to internal validity.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The following analyses seek to shed light on three questions:

Q1. Are local levels of Hispanic share or growth associated with Whites' racial resentment toward Blacks?

Q2. Are local levels of Hispanic share or growth associated with Whites' support for policies that have come to be associated with Blacks?

Q3. Are local levels of black share or growth associated with Whites' support for policies that have come to be associated with Hispanics?

The results of the previous chapter lead me to expect that Whites in communities where the Hispanic population is large or growing will report relatively more racial resentment toward Blacks and relatively less support for policies associated with them. In addition, if my proposition about racial triangulation is symmetric, Whites in communities where the black population is large or growing will report relatively more negative attitudes toward Hispanics and relatively less support for policies associated with them. Unfortunately, the 2012 CCES did not ask about attitudes toward Hispanics; as a proxy, I rely on preferences for restrictive immigration policies, a decision I discuss in more detail under "Data and Methods."

The expected findings would vouch not only for the external validity of the lab experiment, but also for the external validity of behavioral game methods more generally. To recap: the most common critique of behavioral games concerns the extent to which game contributions capture motivations that operate outside the laboratory. In recent years, scholars have linked game contributions to a wide range of real-world outcomes (Camerer 2011). For example, dictator game contributions have been shown to predict altruistic behaviors like volunteer fire-fighting (Carpenter and Myers 2010) and charitable giving (Benz and Meier 2008), and public goods game contributions have been shown to predict cooperative behaviors like selling crops through a farmer cooperative (Baldassarri 2015). One piece of the

puzzle is still missing, however: the extent to which games are sensitive and valid instruments of intergroup dynamics. The following analyses speak to this question, because patterns of racial resentment and policy preferences will reflect patterns of dictator game contributions insofar as game contributions accurately reflect group biases.

Why Whites? This dissertation aims to shed light on Whites' and Blacks' reactions to Hispanic growth. Unfortunately, I cannot evaluate Blacks' reactions in the context of this chapter. For one, the CCES subsample of non-Hispanic Blacks ($N = 6,618$) is substantially smaller than the subsample of non-Hispanic Whites ($N = 39,427$). However, 6,000+ respondents is a respectable sample, and in any case, multiple waves of the CCES make it possible to construct a pooled sample. The primary obstacle to including Blacks in the analyses is that the CCES *does not include measures of attitudes toward Whites*; nor does the CCES include measures of racial identification, national identification, or nationalist attitudes.

Data and Methods

To examine these questions, I rely on data from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), the most recent, publicly available wave of the survey. The CCES is a national stratified sample survey of US adults; it is administered online by YouGov/Polimetrix. In election years, like 2012, the survey is administered in two waves: a pre-election wave in October and a post-election wave in November.

YouGov/Polimentrix employs a two-stage, sample matching method to select respondents. In the first stage, YouGov/Polimetrix constructs a stratified random sample of US citizens from the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS); in the second stage, they match each ACS respondent to one or more cases from their pool of opt-in respondents.[8]

[8]The response (41.5%) and cooperation rates (93.0%) are very comparable to those from other major national surveys, like the ANES. For more information on the sampling and survey methods, refer to Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2013).

The final, weighted sample of 54,535 respondents is representative of US adults.[9] The following analyses are limited to the subsample of 39,427 self-identified non-Hispanic Whites. Individuals who are missing responses on relevant variables are omitted from the analyses.

Outcome Variables

I investigate responses to three types of questions: 1) those that measure racial resentment toward Blacks, 2) those that measure preferences for a policy that is associated with Blacks, and 3) those that measure preferences for policies that have come to be associated with Hispanics. The racial resentment measure is based on two questions that capture agreement with the following statements:

> The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
>
> Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Both statements appear on the popular and widely validated 8-item Symbolic Racism Scale (Henry and Sears 2002). Agreement with each statement is measured on a 5-point scale that ranges from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree." Responses to the second statement were reverse-coded such that higher values represent more racial resentment. The items exhibit a moderately high degree of internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.77$), so the following analyses consider a composite measure based on summed responses. Results for the separate measures appear in the Appendix (Table E.8) and are briefly discussed.

These measures were included on the post-election survey, which was completed by 45,018 of all respondents, 35,557 of them non-Hispanic Whites. The analyses that consider these measures are therefore based on the smaller, post-election sample.

[9]Despite the survey's association with election periods, CCES respondents are not limited to eligible voters.

The measure of preferences for race-targeted policies deals specifically with affirmative action. The item is worded as follows:

> Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities in employment and college admissions in order to correct for past discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action?

Responses to this question are measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from "Strongly support" to "Strongly oppose"; for consistency, higher values represent greater opposition to affirmative action.

Together, the two items about racial resentment and one item about affirmative action make up the full roster of CCES measures on attitudes toward Blacks and policies that are associated with them.

The 2012 CCES did not ask about attitudes toward Hispanics. The pre-election survey did, however, include a series of questions about preferences for restrictive immigration policies. Given that the average Non-Hispanic thinks the vast majority of Hispanics are immigrants—as I touch on below—I treat preferences for immigration policies as a proxy for attitudes toward Hispanics. These preferences are captured by agreement (1) or disagreement (0) with each of the following policies:

> Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.
>
> Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border.
>
> Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally.
>
> Fine US businesses that hire illegal immigrants.
>
> Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency hospital care and public schools.
>
> Deny automatic citizenship to American-born children of illegal immigrants.

I recoded responses to the first statement so that higher values represent more restrictive attitudes toward immigration. The items exhibit a fairly high degree of internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.80$), so the following analyses consider a composite measure based on summed responses.[10] Support for the first four items might indicate commitment to the rule of law, rather than opposition to immigration. Hence, models predicting the measures separately are included in the Appendix (Table E.9) and are briefly discussed in the text.

Key Explanatory Variables

The CCES includes information on respondents' places of residence, down to the county level. Using available county codes, I linked CCES respondents with county-level data from the 2000 Census, the 2010 Census and ACS, 2004 and 2012 election data from Congressional Quarterly (CQ) Press, and 2003 rural/urban classification codes from the Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture (ERS-USDA). The key explanatory variables—county Hispanic share and growth as well as county black share and growth—hail from these geographic datasets.

The share and growth figures are based on population estimates from the US Census. I include both share and growth measures in the models because some studies examine out-group size and link it to out-group attitudes, whereas others examine out-group growth and link it to out-group attitudes. By including both measures in the mutlivariate models, I can evaluate both the interaction between and independent statistical effects of local out-group share and growth.

Hispanic share represents the percent of the total county population that identified as Hispanic/Latino in 2010. Black share represents the percent of the total county population that identified as non-Hispanic black in 2010. I take the natural logarithm of these estimates for two reasons: 1) the distributions of Hispanic and black share are highly right-skewed,

[10] In the tables and figures, "opposition to immigration" is shorthand for this measure, which is, more accurately, a measure of support for restrictive immigration policies.

and 2) conceptually, the change in out-group share should be multiplicative, rather than additive. For example, the difference between a community that is 0% Hispanic and one that is 10% Hispanic should be larger than the difference between a community that is 50% Hispanic and one that is 60% Hispanic.

Hispanic growth represents the change in percent Hispanics between 2000 and 2010. Black growth represents the change in percent non-Hispanic Blacks between 2000 and 2010. By relying on estimates of percent Hispanics and percent Blacks to construct the growth measures, the models implicitly control for overall changes in county population size. For example, a county where the population grew evenly across ethnoracial subgroups between 2000 and 2010 did not experience a change in relative group sizes; the values for Hispanic and black growth would therefore be 0. In the final set of models, I also include a measure of ongoing Hispanic and black growth (2010–2014) in order to shed light on differences based on the timing or recency of growth.

In addition to being interesting predictors in their own right, Black share and growth are also important control variables: as the size of the Hispanic population grows in a community, the relative size of the black population shrinks, *ceteris paribus*. To make the case that Hispanic share or growth is associated with racial resentment toward Blacks, I must address the possibility that the association is in fact driven by the size of the black population or changes therein. I rule out multicollinearity as a concern by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) between Hispanic share, Hispanic growth, black share, and black growth: in all cases, the VIFs fall within an acceptable range (< 4).

Ideally, I would be able to isolate the effects of living among Hispanics who differ in terms of nativity, country of origin, and legal status. Unfortunately, these data are not available at the county level. And although the Hispanic population is heterogeneous in terms of national background, immigrant status, and phenotype (among other characteristics), my own research suggests they are not viewed this way by Non-Hispanics. The survey experiment

that is the subject of the Chapter 4, for example, reveals the average non-Hispanic White thinks 71.5% of all Hispanics are immigrants.[11]

Additional Controls

At the individual level, I control for a host of variables that have been linked—theoretically or empirically—to racial and policy attitudes. These variables include respondent age, gender, educational attainment, household income, news interest, political ideology, and generation since immigration.

Age is associated with political attitudes and partisanship through cohort, life course, and period mechanisms (Stoker and Bass 2011). For example, much of the post-Civil Rights liberalization in integration attitudes is attributed to cohort replacement, as younger cohorts came to replace older, less progressive ones (Schuman et al. 1997). In the mutlivariate analyses, age is measured in years.

Gender is also associated with racial and policy attitudes. On average, women are more likely to support social welfare spending and to identify with the Democratic Party (Huddy and Cassese 2011). And with few exceptions, white women are more likely than white men to hold positive attitudes toward Blacks and to support policies designed to address racial inequalities (Schuman et al. 1997). In the multivariate models, gender is measured using a dummy variable, where 1 corresponds to female respondents and 0 corresponds to male ones.

Class is also associated with racial and policy attitudes, though the precise character of the association depends heavily on 1) the outcome measure, and 2) the operationalization of class. In general terms, people with higher incomes are more likely to hold progressive attitudes toward social policies, like abortion, and less progressive attitudes toward economic ones, like redistribution (McCall and Manza 2011). In the multivariate analyses that follow, income is measured using family income. Responses to this question were measured on a

[11]In fact, only 35.5% of Hispanics are immigrants (Brown and Patten 2014). By the same token, the average non-Hispanic white respondent thinks 35.3% of all Hispanics are undocumented immigrants; the real figure is about 11.1% (Pew 2015).

16-point scale then mid-point coded. The value of the final, open-ended category ($540,000) was derived via linear extrapolation.

The effect of education on racial and policy attitudes is harder to summarize. In some cases, the association between education and progressive attitudes is non-monotonic; for example, individuals with less than a high school education and those with a graduate education are most likely to support redistribution (McCall and Manza 2011: 561). And in terms of racial attitudes, the picture is even more complex. Among Whites, education is associated with more progressive attitudes with respect to abstract *principles* but unassociated—or even negatively associated—with preferences for practical *policies* designed to address racial inequality (Schuman et al. 1997). For the following analyses, education is measured on a 6-point scale that ranges from "Less than high school" (1) to "Postgraduate" (6). Supplementary analyses discussed in the text rely on a set of dummies to capture non-linearities in the effect of education.

The multivariate models also include a control for political ideology, measured on a 3-point scale from "Liberal" and "Very liberal" (1) to "Conservative" and "Very conservative" (3). Recent experiments described by Brooks and Manza (2015) suggest ideology is an important moderator of immigrant acceptance. However, in the domain of civil rights issues—including racial policy preferences—Americans increasingly sort along partisan lines (Baldassarri and Park 2016). I therefore replicate the main models controlling for respondent party identification, rather than ideology (Appendix Tables E.2 and E.3). For consistency, party identification is also measured on a 3-point scale where 1 corresponds to Democrats, 2 corresponds to Independents and others, and 3 corresponds to Republicans. These supplementary models are substantively similar to those discussed in the text.

The models also include a control for interest in news and public affairs to account for the fact that some respondents may be more attuned than others to demographic figures and trends. Responses to the question "Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...?" range from "Hardly at all" (1) to "Most of the time" (4).

Finally, I control for generation since immigration, because proximity to immigrant background might be associated with differences in social and policy attitudes, particularly with respect to immigration. Immigrant generation is represented by five binary variables for non-citizen immigrants, citizen immigrants, respondents with immigrant parent(s), respondents with immigrant grandparent(s), and respondents in the 4th generation since immigration or greater (the reference category).

At the contextual level, I control for a host of county characteristics. Though some of these variables have not been explicitly linked to racial or policy attitudes in prior studies, I include them in the models because they are plausible predictors of intergroup relations generally. Counties are of course a rough approximation for communities as they are perceived and experienced by people. Practically speaking, however, the county is the smallest geographic unit to which CCES respondents are linked. The fact that communities may be clustered within counties or transcend county boundaries introduces noise in the county-level estimates, likely inflating standard errors.

A second challenge arises from analyzing cross-sectional geographic data: the people most likely to move out of diversifying communities are those most averse to diversification itself (Schachter 2015). An overrepresentation of tolerant Whites in high-growth counties would downwardly bias the estimated effects. We can test this by replicating the analyses on a sample of longterm residents, i.e., residents who did not move spurred by recent demographic considerations. The results of these models are reported in Appendix Tables E.4 and E.5. As predicted, the coefficients of interest are equal to or greater than the coefficients reported in the main text. This suggests we should interpret the following results as conservative estimates of responses to community composition and changes therein.

The first set of county controls captures community affluence and includes median household income (dollars), unemployment rate, and the Gini coefficient of income inequality. The rationale for including these predictors is as follows: inter-group competition might be higher in counties where resources are scarce and/or unequally distributed (see, e.g., Staerklé et al.

2010). These measures are based on 5-year estimates from the ACS (2008–2012). The ACS also contains a proxy for residential stability: the percent of residents who lived in the same house during the previous year.

I include a control for ambient political culture in the form of the percent of total votes cast for the Democratic candidate (Barack Obama) in the most recent presidential election. Given the documented link between racial animus and opposition to Obama (Stephens-Davidowitz 2014), this seems a particularly stringent control for political culture, one that most likely captures prejudice as well as partisanship. I therefore replicate the main models controlling for the percent of total votes cast for Democratic candidate John Kerry in the 2004 election, the most recent presidential election in which Obama was not running (Appendix Tables E.6 and E.7); these supplementary models are substantively similar to those discussed in the text. Data for the 2004 and 2012 elections come from CQ Press.

I control for urbanization using two binary variables that correspond to suburban and rural counties, as opposed to urban ones. The variables were constructed using rural/urban classification codes from the USDA. I also include a binary variable for the South, defined as former member states of the Confederacy. The South's legacy of troubled race relations is manifest in the racial and policy attitudes of many residents, though Southern exceptionalism can be explained, in part, by regional demographic traits (Taylor 1998).

Analytic Strategy

The data exhibit a hierarchical, or multilevel, structure with individual respondents clustered in counties. As a result, the responses of individual respondents might be similarly affected by unobserved, county-level differences. This violates the independence assumption of simple linear regressions, producing deflated standard errors and heightening the threat of type I errors (Gelman and Hill 2007).

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Racial resentment	7.376	2.400	2.000	10.000
No special favors	3.902	1.263	1.000	5.000
Not discrimination/slavery	3.474	1.391	1.000	5.000
Affirmative action opposition	3.071	0.938	1.000	4.000
Immigration opposition	3.144	2.057	0.000	6.000
No amnesty	0.589	0.492	0.000	1.000
More border patrols	0.608	0.488	0.000	1.000
Police questioning	0.466	0.499	0.000	1.000
Fine businesses	0.688	0.463	0.000	1.000
Ban from schools/hospitals	0.367	0.482	0.000	1.000
No birth citizenship	0.426	0.494	0.000	1.000
Age	55.050	15.494	18.000	94.000
Female	0.516	0.500	0.000	1.000
Education	3.635	1.480	1.000	6.000
Family income ($)	67960	59131	5000	540000
News interest	3.402	0.871	1.000	4.000
Liberal	0.257	0.437	0.000	1.000
Moderate	0.300	0.458	0.000	1.000
Conservative	0.443	0.497	0.000	1.000
4th+ generation	0.647	0.478	0.000	1.000
Immigrant grandparent(s)	0.264	0.441	0.000	1.000
Immigrant parent(s)	0.061	0.239	0.000	1.000
Citizen immigrant	0.022	0.148	0.000	1.000
Non-citizen immigrant	0.006	0.075	0.000	1.000
Hispanic share (%)	12.050	12.594	0.000	91.900
Hispanic growth (2000–2010, %)	2.745	2.020	−8.911	14.500
Hispanic growth (2010–2014, %)	1.306	0.928	−10.690	9.455
Black share (%)	9.997	11.013	0.000	86.140
Black growth (2000–2010, %)	0.568	1.637	−7.290	24.570
Black growth (2010–2014, %)	0.309	0.794	−10.390	8.286
Median household income ($)	55140	13972	20280	122800
Unemployment rate (%)	9.097	2.553	0.171	24.530
Gini coefficient	0.446	0.034	0.344	0.599
Share in same residence (%)	84.640	4.126	56.830	96.810
Democratic vote share (%)	48.440	14.231	5.773	91.450
Urban	0.817	0.387	0.000	1.000
Suburban	0.133	0.340	0.000	1.000
Rural	0.050	0.218	0.000	1.000
South	0.283	0.451	0.000	1.000

Table 3.1: Unweighted Summary Statistics, Non-Hispanic Whites

To address this, I employ hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques to model attitudes as a function of individual and county predictors, as well as a random, or un-modeled, county intercept. This estimation strategy yields information about the nature of the clustering itself; in the tables, I present this information as the standard deviation of the county intercept, or random effect. In general, the larger the standard deviation, the more attitudes are explained by unobserved differences across counties. Likelihood ratio tests confirm that including a random intercept for counties produces significant ($p < 0.001$, all cases) improvements in model fit.

The multivariate models do not adjust for sampling weights, because the data do not meet the conditions, like endogenous sampling, that necessitate the use of sampling weights to estimate causal effects (Solon et al. 2013). I nevertheless replicate the following analyses using the available weights; the weighted analyses yield substantively similar results, unless otherwise noted.

Finally, to facilitate the interpretation of regression coefficients, the variables in the multivariate models are centered at their means.

Results

Table 3.1 provides unweighted, summary statistics for the final sample of non-Hispanic Whites. Table E.1 in the Appendix provides weighted, summary statistics for this sample.

A few things are worth noting: non-Hispanic Whites are more likely to agree than disagree with racial resentment items and more likely to oppose than support affirmative action programs and restrictive immigration policies.[12] Certainly, white CCES respondents are more likely than black respondents to 1) agree that Blacks should overcome prejudice and work

[12]Support varies between specific policies, however, with a minority of respondents supporting police questioning, bans from schools and hospitals, and doing away with birth citizenship.

their way up without special favors ($p < 0.001$), 2) disagree that slavery and discrimination have made it hard for Blacks to work their way up ($p < 0.001$), and 3) oppose affirmative action programs in employment and college admissions ($p < 0.001$). Blacks, on the other hand, are significantly more likely to support restrictive immigration policies, on the composite measure ($p < 0.001$) as well as each of the six individual items ($p < 0.001$, all cases).

We also get a sense of the kind of community in which the average non-Hispanic white respondent lives. In broad strokes, the community tends to be urban, stable, and politically moderate. The average White lives in a community where Hispanics and Blacks are underrepresented relative to national figures[13], and Hispanics outnumber Blacks (12.05% vs. 10.00%). In addition, the average White lives in a community where Hispanics grew more as a share of total county population than did non-Hispanic Blacks, between 2000 and 2010 (2.75% vs. 0.57%). Average growth between 2010 and 2014 is lower, which makes sense because the figure is based on a shorter time period. Here again, Hispanics grew more than did Blacks (1.31% vs. 0.31%). These estimates are virtually identical adjusting for sampling weights (Table E.1).

Share and Growth: Preliminary Evidence

I start by exploring whether racial and policy attitudes vary across respondents in counties characterized by different demographic configurations. Table 3.2 reports average levels of racial resentment, affirmative action opposition, and support for restrictive immigration policies among non-Hispanic Whites and with respect to the Hispanic and black share and growth in their counties. To facilitate comparisons, share and growth are represented by binary variables, defined at the mean values for all non-Hispanic Whites in the sample.[14]

[13]According to the 2010 Census, Hispanics made up 16.35% of the US population, and non-Hispanic Blacks made up 12.28%.

[14]In the case of Hispanic share, "low share" corresponds to counties where Hispanics make up 12.05% of the total population or less, and "high share" corresponds to counties where Hispanics make up more than 12.05% of the total population. In the case of black share,

	Resentment		Affirmative Action Opposition		Immigration Opposition	
	Low share	High share	Low share	High share	Low share	High share
Hispanic population						
Low growth	7.440 (7.406, 7.475)	6.815 (6.701, 6.929)	3.081 (3.068, 3.094)	2.938 (2.896, 2.980)	3.170 (3.142, 3.198)	2.841 (2.751, 2.931)
High growth	7.452 (7.386, 7.519)	7.330 (7.283, 7.378)	3.086 (3.061, 3.110)	3.070 (3.052, 3.088)	3.169 (3.115, 3.223)	3.141 (3.103, 3.180)
Black population						
Low growth	7.319 (7.283, 7.356)	7.375 (7.310, 7.439)	3.060 (3.046, 3.073)	3.055 (3.031, 3.079)	3.140 (3.110, 3.170)	3.076 (3.024, 3.128)
High growth	7.422 (7.3646, 7.479)	7.474 (7.417, 7.531)	3.091 (3.070, 3.112)	3.092 (3.070, 3.113)	3.217 (3.170, 3.264)	3.137 (3.090, 3.183)

Note: 95% confidence intervals enclosed in parentheses

Table 3.2: Average Racial and Policy Attitudes across Levels of Subgroup Share and Growth

A few patterns are worth noting. With respect to Hispanic share and growth, racial and policy attitudes are most progressive in counties with relatively large Hispanic populations that have seen little growth. In addition, in counties with relatively small Hispanic populations, attitudes do not appear to be associated with the level of Hispanic growth. By contrast, among counties with relatively large Hispanic populations, attitudes are less progressive in those that have also experienced recent Hispanic growth. In counties with relatively large Hispanic populations, the patterns for racial resentment and affirmative action in particular are consistent with the results of the previous chapter, i.e., Hispanic population growth predicts more negative attitudes toward Blacks among Whites. Results of a factorial ANOVA confirm that the interaction of Hispanic share and growth is significantly associated with reported resentment ($p < 0.001$), affirmative action opposition ($p < 0.001$), and support for restrictive immigration policies ($p < 0.001$).

With respect to black share and growth, the patterns are slightly different: average racial resentment and opposition to affirmative action are higher in counties that have recently seen greater growth in the black population. Racial resentment is also higher in counties with relatively large black populations; opposition to affirmative action is not. Results of a factorial ANOVA confirm that black share ($p < 0.01$) and growth ($p < 0.001$) are significantly associated with reported resentment, and black growth is significantly associated with affirmative action opposition ($p < 0.001$). With respect to restrictive immigration policies, support is highest in counties with relatively small black populations that have recently grown, and lowest in counties with relatively large black populations that have seen little growth. Results of a factorial ANOVA confirm that black share and black growth are

"low share" corresponds to counties where Blacks make up 10.00% of the total population or less, and "high share" corresponds to counties where Blacks make up more than 10.00% of the total population. Hispanic growth and black growth are similarly defined at the mean value of total percent growth between 2000 and 2010 (2.75% and 0.57%, respectively). Some combinations are more common than others; for example, low-share, low-growth counties outnumber other types of counties for the sample. However, every county is well-represented, and in no case are there fewer than 2,146 respondents in each cell. The confidence intervals convey information about cell sizes.

independently, significantly associated with reported resentment and support for restrictive immigration policies ($p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.001$, respectively). The interaction between them, however, is not.

Of course, county Hispanic share and black share are associated with other characteristics of counties and the people who live in them. These characteristics in turn predict racial and policy attitudes. In fact, the Rs-squared of two simple linear regressions suggest Hispanic growth and black growth are more variable than Hispanic share and black share with respect to other contextual characteristics.[15] The task of the following sections is to evaluate whether and how Hispanic share and growth as well as black share and growth are associated with racial and policy attitudes once these other characteristics are taken into account.

Predicting Racial Resentment

Does racial resentment vary as a function of local demographic composition and changes therein? Table 3.3 reports the results of three multilevel, multivariate linear regressions predicting agreement with (1) overall racial resentment, (2) opposition to affirmative action, and (3) support for restrictive immigration policies.

The results of Model 1 indicate that Whites in counties where the black population is relatively large or has recently grown report significantly higher levels of resentment toward Blacks, controlling for a range of individual and contextual characteristics. This unsurprising finding is consistent with previous research linking the size and growth of an out-group with attitudes toward that out-group. In keeping with the bivariate analyses, the interaction between black share and black growth is not significant, suggesting the effects of share and growth do not reinforce each other.

[15]Other contextual characteristics account for nearly one-third (32.85%) of the variance in Hispanic share and over half the variance in black share (51.54%). By comparison, they account for only 24.59% of the variance in Hispanic growth and 9.14% of the variance in black growth.

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic share (ln)	0.066*	0.033**	0.064*
Hispanic growth (%)	−0.026+	−0.014**	−0.029*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth	0.020*	0.008*	0.023**
Black share (ln)	0.128***	0.030***	0.033*
Black growth (%)	0.038*	0.005	0.020
Black share x Black growth	−0.012	0.002	−0.016+
Individual Controls			
Age	−0.005***	−0.002***	0.007***
Female	−0.080***	−0.063***	−0.263***
Education	−0.240***	−0.051***	−0.142***
Family income ($)	0.000	0.000**	0.000
News interest	−0.192***	−0.015*	0.047***
Ideology	1.627***	0.586***	1.255***
4th+ generation (ref.)			
Immigrant grandparent(s)	0.003	0.007	−0.032
Immigrant parent(s)	−0.006	−0.014	−0.102*
Citizen immigrant	0.170*	−0.037	−0.270***
Non-citizen immigrant	−0.002	−0.109+	−0.386**
County Controls			
Median household income ($)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Unemployment rate (%)	0.013*	0.012***	0.016**
Gini coefficient	−1.677***	−0.325+	−1.395**
Share in same residence (%)	0.013***	0.005***	0.002
Democratic vote share (%)	−0.010***	−0.004***	−0.006***
Urban (ref.)			
Suburban	0.069+	−0.018	0.032
Rural	0.036	−0.023	−0.017
South	0.110**	0.029*	0.062+
Constant	7.378***	3.091***	3.238***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.120	0.039	0.130
σ_{ϵ}	1.920	0.791	1.709
Log likelihood	−58586	−37030	−61235
N	28220	31149	31236

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 3.3: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies

Does the size or growth of one out-group, like Hispanics, affect attitudes toward another out-group, like Blacks? In a nutshell, the results of the previous chapter suggest the more Hispanics, the more hostility Whites will express toward Blacks. The results from Model 1 point to a similar conclusion. Whites in counties where *Hispanics* make up a larger share of the population report significantly higher levels of average resentment toward *Blacks*, controlling for a range of individual and contextual characteristics.

Specifically, in counties where the share of Hispanics is 10% greater[16], Whites' agreement with the racial resentment items is two-thirds of a point higher, on average. Putting this in terms of the effect of education—the "great liberalizer"—the statistical effect of 10% more Hispanics is comparable to the effect of a nearly three-point increase on a six-point education scale, e.g., the difference between a high school graduate and a 4-year college degree.

The main effect of Hispanic growth, however, is negative and marginally significant. According to the bivariate analyses, among counties at are below the mean in terms of Hispanic share, resentment is neither higher nor lower in relation to Hispanic growth. However, according to the multivariate model that accounts for other differences between respondents and their counties of residence, Hispanic growth is negatively associated with resentment in counties that are at the mean in terms of Hispanic share.

Finally, the interaction coefficient suggests the effect of Hispanic share does vary across levels of recent growth. Specifically, in counties where the Hispanic population grew relatively more between 2000 and 2010, the size of the Hispanic population is associated with greater resentment toward Blacks. Figure 3.1 sheds light on the nature of this interaction.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the statistical effect of Hispanic share in counties where Hispanic growth fell at the 10th percentile (+0.59%, "low growth") versus the 90th percentile (+5.59%, "high growth"). Hispanic share is positively associated with racial resentment, regardless of whether the respondent lives in a county that experienced low or high Hispanic growth in the previous decade. The positive association between Hispanic share and resentment,

[16]In terms of both Hispanic share and black share, a 10% difference corresponds to (slightly less than) a one standard deviation difference.




Figure 3.1: Resentment by Hispanic Share and Hispanic Growth (2000–2010)

however, is stronger for respondents who live in counties that experienced high Hispanic growth. In fact, in counties that experienced growth at the 10th percentile, the statistical effect of Hispanic share is almost non-existent. Figure E.1 in the Appendix illustrates how the estimated coefficient of Hispanic share varies across values of Hispanic growth.

Dimensions of Racial Resentment. The discussion thus far has focused on agreement with a composite measure of resentment. Table E.8 in the Appendix reports the results of similar models predicting agreement with each of the two constitutive items: (1) on the view that Blacks should work their way up "without special favors," and (2) on the view that structural forces have made it difficult for Blacks to work their way up (reverse-coded). In both models, the interaction coefficients between Hispanic share and Hispanic growth are positive and significant. As with the composite measure, Hispanic share is associated with higher levels of resentment in counties where the Hispanic population recently grew.

Consistent with the results of Model 1 (Table 3.3), the interactions between Hispanic share and growth are positive and significant in both cases. In addition, Hispanic growth is negatively associated with each of the constitutive items.

Interestingly, Hispanic share is positively associated with responses to the first racial resentment question ("No special favors"), but not the second ("Not discrimination"). In other words, Whites who live in counties where Hispanics make up a larger share of the population are more likely to endorse the view that Blacks should overcome prejudice and work their way up without any special favors, as the "Irish, Italian, Jews, and many other minorities" presumably did. One possibility is that with exposure to more Hispanics, Whites become increasingly optimistic about Hispanics' ability to achieve social mobility. By comparison, they become increasingly pessimistic about Blacks' ability (or willingness) to do the same. This interpretation is consistent with Fox's (2004) finding that local Hispanic share is associated with more positive stereotypes about Latinos' work ethic.

To summarize, even controlling for individual and county characteristics, county demographic configuration is associated with racial resentment toward Blacks among Whites. However, the ways in which Hispanic share and Hispanic growth relate to racial resentment are both different from the bivariate patterns and more nuanced than the relationship identified in the previous chapter. Hispanic share predicts greater resentment toward Blacks, but the relationship between Hispanic growth and resentment varies across levels of Hispanic share.

Predicting Preferences for Affirmative Action

Do demographic factors similarly translate to preferences for policies that disproportionately affect Blacks and have come to be associated with this group? More specifically, do Whites' preferences for affirmative action vary as a function of the size and share of the Hispanic and black populations? Model 2 (Table 3.3) reports the results of a multilevel, multivariate linear regression predicting opposition to preferences for "racial minorities in employment and

college admissions." With few exceptions, the results mirror those from Model 1, predicting racial resentment.

Whites in counties where Blacks make up a larger share of the population report significantly greater opposition to affirmative action, controlling for a range of individual and contextual characteristics. Growth in the black population, on the other hand, is not significantly associated with affirmative action preferences, either alone or in interaction with black share.

Regarding the role of the local Hispanic population: Whites in counties where Hispanics make up a larger share of the population report significantly greater opposition to affirmative action. Specifically, in counties where the share of Hispanics is 10% greater, Whites' opposition to affirmative action is about one-third of a point higher, on average. Once again, it's useful to compare the size of this statistical effect with that of education, a well-documented predictor of racial attitudes and policy preferences. A 10% larger county Hispanic share corresponds to a *6-point increase on a 6-point education scale*. This is a sizable difference, equivalent to the difference between someone with less than a high school education and someone with a postgraduate degree.[17]

Hispanic growth is significantly, negatively associated with opposition to affirmative action once other individual and contextual characteristics are taken into account. In other words, Whites in counties where the Hispanic population is growing are more likely to support preferential hiring and admissions for minorities, not less. But once again, the interaction between Hispanic share and growth is critical: in counties where Hispanics make up a relatively large share of the population, Hispanic growth predicts greater opposition to affirmative action.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the statistical effect of Hispanic share in counties where Hispanic growth falls at the 10th percentile versus the 90th percentile. Hispanic share is positively

[17]A non-linear relationship between education and attitudes would, however, depress the magnitude of the estimated effect. I explore this possibility under "An Alternative Measure of Education," this chapter.




Figure 3.2: Opposition to Affirmative Action by
Hispanic Share and Hispanic Growth (2000–2010)

associated with racial resentment, regardless of whether the respondent lives in a county that experienced low or high Hispanic growth in the previous decade. Overall, resentment is relatively lower among respondents in counties that experienced high Hispanic growth, and the positive association between Hispanic share and resentment is relatively stronger for respondents in these counties. Figure E.2 in the Appendix illustrates how the estimated coefficient of Hispanic share varies across values of Hispanic growth.


Predicting Opposition to Immigration

The lab experiment did not explore whether the patterns observed with respect to Whites' treatment of Blacks in response to Hispanic growth apply to Whites' treatment of Hispanics in response to black growth. The expectation, however, is familiar: the more Blacks, the more hostility Whites should express toward Hispanics. As a proxy for attitudes toward Hispanics, I marshal a composite measure of immigration policy preferences.


Model 3 (Table 3.3) reports the results of a multilevel, multivariate linear regression predicting support for restrictive immigration policies. Whites in counties where Hispanics make up a larger share of the population report significantly greater support for such policies. As with affirmative action, Hispanic growth is significantly, negatively associated with opposition to immigration. In other words, Whites in counties where the Hispanic population has recently grown are less, not more, likely to support restrictive immigration policies. Again, however, the interaction coefficient complicates the story: those Whites most likely to support restrictive immigration policies live in communities where the Hispanic population is both large and has recently grown.

Figure 3.3a illustrates the statistical effect of Hispanic share in counties where Hispanic growth fell at the 10th percentile versus the 90th percentile. Hispanic share is positively associated with support for restrictive immigration policies, regardless of whether the respondent lives in a county that recently experienced low or high Hispanic growth. The positive association between Hispanic share and support, however, is relatively stronger for respondents who live in counties that experienced high Hispanic growth. The figure also suggests that in counties where Hispanics make up less than a third of the population (or approximately 30%), respondents in high-growth counties are relatively less likely to support restrictive policies, whereas in counties where Hispanics make up more than a third of the population, respondents in high-growth counties are relatively more likely to support restrictive policies. Figure E.3a in the Appendix illustrates how the estimated coefficient of Hispanic share varies across values of Hispanic growth.

Broadly, these patterns conform to those of previous studies, which find that the size or growth of the Hispanic and immigrant populations is associated with more negative attitudes toward these groups. However, the interaction between size and growth brings something else into focus: it is the combination of size and growth that proves critical for predicting attitudes.



(a) By Hispanic Share and Growth



(b) By Black Share and Growth

Figure 3.3: Predicting Opposition to Immigration: Interaction between Hispanic Share and Hispanic Growth

What about black population composition and support for restrictive immigration policies? Black share is significantly associated with greater support for restrictive immigration policies. Specifically, in counties where the share of Blacks is 10% greater, about one third of Whites are expected to agree with an additional restrictive immigration policy (of six total). Putting this in terms of the effect of education, the statistical effect of 10% more Hispanics is comparable to the effect of a two-point increase on a six-point education scale, e.g., the difference between less than a high school education and some college.

If preferences for restrictive immigration policies proxy for anti-Hispanic attitudes, however imperfectly, this suggests that the relative size of the local black population predicts more negative attitudes toward Hispanics among Whites. This is the mirror image of the finding that the relative size of the Hispanic population predicts more negative attitudes toward Blacks among Whites.

The interaction coefficient between black share and black growth, however, suggests that the impact of black share is tempered by recent growth in this population. Figure 3.3b illustrates the statistical effect of black share in counties where black growth fell at the 10th percentile (up -0.75%, "low growth") versus the 90th percentile ($+1.98\%$, "high growth"). Black share is positively associated with racial resentment, regardless of whether the respondent lives in a county that experienced low or high black population growth in the previous decade. The positive association between black share and support, however, is stronger for respondents who live in counties that experienced high black population growth. In fact, in counties that experienced growth at the 10th percentile—or, more accurately, a decline—the statistical effect of black share is almost non-existent. Figure E.3b in the Appendix illustrates how the estimated coefficient of black share varies across values of black growth.

Specific Immigration Policies. Table E.9 in the Appendix reports the results of similar models predicting endorsement of each of the following policies: (1) amnesty for undocumented immigrants (reverse-coded), (2) heightened border security, (3) sanctioning police question-

ing, (4) fines for businesses that hire undocumented immigrants, (5) barring undocumented immigrants from hospitals and schools, and (6) abolishing birthright citizenship.[18]

A detailed discussion of the differences between these policies and their demographic predictors is beyond the scope of this paper. I will only note that barring undocumented immigrants from hospitals and schools (5) and abolishing birthright citizenship (6) are the policies most strongly associated with Hispanic share and growth. These are arguably the most drastic policies in that they both challenge constitutionally protected rights.[19] Agreement with these statements is also least likely to be motivated by a commitment to the rule of law. It therefore makes sense that preferences for these policies are especially sensitive to the (changing) size—and hence, perceived threat—of the Hispanic population.

By contrast, support for amnesty (1) and heightened border security (2) are the policies most strongly associated with black share and growth. Perhaps black share and growth trigger perceptions of criminality and lawbreaking[20], thereby heightening concerns about the rule of law. Understanding what sets these policies apart from the others is a promising avenue for future work.

Disentangling the Timing of Growth

The CCES results are consistent with those of earlier studies that identify a link between relative group size and racial and policy attitudes. However, the results also raise a puzzle: Why is Hispanic growth associated with *less*, not *more*, negative attitudes toward out-group members?[21] Hispanic growth is associated with less resentment toward Blacks and with lower support for restrictive immigration policies. In short, the association runs up against not

[18]To achieve convergence, non-binary predictor variables were standardized.

[19]The US Supreme Court drew the link between undocumented immigrants' right to an education and the Fourteenth Amendment in the Plyler v. Doe decision (1982).

[20]See, for example, Eberhardt et al. (2004).

[21]With caveats: 1) the association only appears in multivariate models that control for other individual and contextual characteristics, and 2) the interaction between Hispanic share and growth largely mitigates this effect.

only the findings of the laboratory experiment from the previous chapter, but an extensive body of work, from both sociology and social psychology, on out-group size and growth.

One possible explanation has to do with the timing of growth. The previous analyses, like those of earlier studies (e.g., Hopkins 2010; Taylor and Schroeder 2010), look at growth in an earlier decade. Recall that the survey was administered in 2012, whereas the measures of Hispanic and black growth are based on demographic differences between 2000 and 2010. These measures may not capture ongoing or perceived growth—as was primed in the laboratory experiment—but rather cumulative exposure to the out-group.

Consider the following example. Lee County, North Carolina experienced extensive Hispanic population growth between 2000 and 2010. In 2000, Hispanics made up 11.65% of the total population; by 2010, however, the Hispanic population in Lee County had grown to 17.30% of the total, slightly higher than the figure for the United States as a whole (16.3% in 2010). By 2010, Lee County's Hispanic composition had come to resemble that of another county far away: Archuleta County, Colorado. In 2010, Hispanics made up 17.00% of Archuleta's total population, a figure that had barely grown since 2000, when Hispanics made up 16.76% of the population. Whereas the residents of Archuleta lived among an above-average share of Hispanics throughout the entire time period, the residents of Lee County only came to experience something similar as the period progressed. In 2000, in fact, the Hispanic concentration in Lee County fell just below the national figure (12.5%). As a result, when 2010 share is held constant, growth in the period preceding 2010 captures "exposure" to the Hispanic population. If the effect of exposure is cumulative, it makes sense that less exposure would translate to lower threat.

To evaluate this possibility, I rerun the models from Table 3.3 with two predictors that represent ongoing growth in the Hispanic and black populations. The predictors are equivalent to the earlier growth variables, but they capture percent change between 2010 and 2014, i.e., around the 2012 survey period. Table 3.4 reports the results of these multilevel, multivariate linear regressions predicting agreement with (1) overall racial resentment, (2)

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic composition			
Hispanic share (ln)	0.028*	0.027*	0.033*
Hispanic growth (00–10)	−0.032**	−0.040***	−0.022+
Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.018+	0.022**	−0.009
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10)	0.025**	0.022**	0.019*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (10–14)	−0.009	−0.003	0.009
Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.000	−0.005	−0.006
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	−0.002	0.000	0.003
Black composition			
Black share (ln)	0.054***	0.028***	0.015+
Black growth (00–10)	0.016	0.016	0.016
Black growth (10–14)	0.023*	0.003	0.006
Black share x Black growth (00–10)	−0.009	0.006	−0.016
Black share x Black growth (10–14)	−0.009	−0.009	−0.009
Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	−0.001	−0.007	−0.002
Black share x Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	0.002	0.004	0.002
Constant	0.062***	0.225***	0.147***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.046	0.034	0.064
σ_{ϵ}	0.781	0.748	0.827
Log likelihood	−33230	−35300	−38572
N	28220	31149	31236

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Note: Models include controls for age, gender, education, family income, news interest, ideology, and generation since immigration (individual), as well as median household income, unemployment, income inequality, share in same residence, Democratic vote share, urbanism, and region (county).

Table 3.4: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies

opposition to affirmative action, and (3) support for restrictive immigration policies. I include three-way interaction terms to allow for the possibility that the effect of ongoing growth hinges on the initial size of the out-group population, the level of growth in a previous period, or a combination of the two.

Regarding Whites' attitudes toward Blacks in the context of Hispanic growth, the results are clear: Whites in counties where the Hispanic population is currently growing report greater racial resentment toward Blacks and greater opposition to affirmative action policies, controlling for other individual and contextual characteristics. This is consistent with the results of the laboratory experiment from the previous chapter which finds that priming Whites with ongoing Hispanic population growth produces relatively less generous behavior toward Blacks. The inclusion of the predictor for ongoing Hispanic population growth, moreover, does not substantially alter the relationships between 2010 Hispanic share or 2000–2010 Hispanic growth with respect to resentment or opposition to affirmative action. The magnitude of the Hispanic share coefficient *is* reduced in both models, suggesting ongoing growth accounts for at least some of the association between Hispanic share and racial and policy attitudes.

Interestingly, ongoing Hispanic growth is not significantly associated with support for restrictive immigration policies, controlling for other individual and contextual characteristics. Perhaps Hispanic growth became decoupled from immigration as immigration from Latin America stalled following the Great Recession? Testing this hypothesis requires additional evidence.

Whites' attitudes toward Hispanics—or, more accurately, immigration policies—are not significantly related to ongoing black population growth. It is entirely possible, however, that the lack of significance stems from limited variation across counties in terms of black growth. The relative size of the black population in 2010 continues to be a positive, albeit marginally significant, predictor of support for restrictive immigration policies. The relative size of the black population is also a significant, positive predictor of racial resentment and

opposition to affirmative action. In addition, ongoing black population growth significantly predicts greater racial resentment toward Blacks.

Finally, it is worth noting that none of the interaction terms that include Hispanic and black growth in the 2010–2014 period are significant. In other words, the effect of ongoing growth does not seem to depend either on the initial size of these populations or levels of growth in the earlier period.

Why do attitudes toward Blacks vary in relation to ongoing black population growth (2010–14) whereas attitudes toward immigrants vary in relation to past Hispanic population growth (2000–2010)? Are the results an artifact of the mismatch between the variable of interest (attitudes toward Hispanics) and the operational measure (immigration policy preferences)? Is there something unique about the 2000–2014 interval that altered the relationship between growth in one period and growth in another, for example, the Great Recession? Answering these questions would require additional, possibly original data, and is beyond the scope of this chapter. These questions do nevertheless point to fruitful directions for future research.

Triangulation or Conflation?

The results are consistent with my hypothesis that Whites triangulate from ongoing Hispanic growth to their treatment of Blacks. The results are also consistent with a different explanation, however: non-Hispanic Whites view Hispanics and Blacks as members of the same, non-white group. Maybe Whites fold Hispanic growth into the growth of a larger non-white group, and they respond with more hostile attitudes toward members of this group (e.g., resentment) and policies that benefit them (e.g., affirmative action). Though this mechanism would manifest in a similar way in the data, it would carry different implications for generalizing to other contexts and for policy interventions.

Two facts undermine this alternative explanation, however. First, Whites tend to think Hispanics are more likely to be white than black: according to the average non-Hispanic White, 33.27% of Hispanics are racially white and 26.49% are racially black ($p < 0.001$).[22]

Second, Table E.10 in the Appendix reports the results of three models that differ from the most fully elaborated models (Table 3.4) in one important way: they include variables for white population share and growth (past and present). These variables automatically control for the share and growth of the non-white population in respondents' counties of residence. If Whites were reacting to Hispanic growth due to non-white growth more generally, the coefficients for Hispanic growth (Models 1 and 2) should be fully mediated by the inclusion of these new variables. Instead, ongoing Hispanic growth remains a positive, significant predictor of anti-black resentment (1) and opposition to affirmative action (2). As in Model 3 Table (3.4), ongoing black growth remains a positive, albeit non-significant, predictor of support for restrictive immigration policies (3).

How Important is the Out-group?

The above models show that Hispanic share and growth as well as black share and growth are associated with reported racial resentment, opposition to affirmative action, and preferences for restrictive immigration policies. Statistical significance, however, does not automatically translate to substantive significance (see Abascal and Baldassarri 2015 for an example), and an important, outstanding question concerns how much variation in individual attitudes is accounted for by Hispanic share and growth.

To answer this question, I calculate F-ratios for the models presented in Table 3.4. F-ratios represent the ratio of the variance explained by a variable over the residual variance, once all other variables are included in the model. First, let's look at Model 1, which predicts racial resentment. Democratic vote share is the contextual predictor that accounts for the

[22]Based on the survey experiment described in Chapter 4.

single greatest reduction in variance.[23] Next in terms of predictive power are black share and growth, followed closely by Hispanic share and growth. It makes sense that black share and growth perform well accounting for racial resentment toward Blacks. More interesting is the fact that Hispanic share and growth also perform well accounting for racial resentment toward Blacks. For example, Hispanic share and growth account for more variance than county unemployment rate, income inequality, share of residents in the same house, and US region[24], all significant contextual predictors of racial resentment. In fact, Hispanic share and growth account for 71.43% more variance than being a woman, a significant, individual-level predictor of racial resentment and a well-documented determinant of social and policy attitudes more generally (Huddy and Cassese 2011).

Hispanic share and growth also perform well with respect to affirmative action opposition (Model 2). Among contextual predictors, only Democratic vote share, black share and growth, and unemployment rate account for a greater reduction in variance. To be sure, black share and growth explain slightly more variance than do Hispanic share and growth (20.00% more, specifically), which is consistent with my argument, and others', that affirmative action policies are more commonly associated with black beneficiaries. Finally, with respect to support for restrictive immigration policies (Model 3), Hispanic share and growth account for a larger reduction in variance than any other contextual predictor, with the exception of Democratic vote share. This lends some support to my assumption that immigration policy preferences are a proxy for attitudes toward Hispanics.

[23]In fact, for all three outcomes, Democratic vote share was the county-level variable responsible for the greatest reduction in residual variance, and ideology was the individual-level variable responsible for the greatest reduction in residual variance. Together, these findings lend support to Sniderman and Piazza's (1993) claim that non-racial political beliefs are in large part responsible for racial and policy attitudes (see also Brooks and Manza 2015 on the role of ideology in out-group attitudes).

[24]For all three outcomes, the predictive power of Hispanic share and growth either falls in the same ballpark or exceeds the predictive power of living in the South. Living in the South is one of the most extensively studied and frequently validated determinants of racial and policy attitudes (see Cooper and Knotts 2010; Taylor 1998 for reviews), which comes as little surprise given the region's legacy of race relations.

I also calculated the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a measure of relative goodness of fit, for models predicting racial resentment, opposition to affirmative action, and support for restrictive immigration policies (from Table 3.4), both with and without measures of the county Hispanic population. In all three cases, the AIC is minimized in a model that includes Hispanic share and growth; in other words, the additional variance explained by these measures outweighs the concomitant reduction in parsimony.

An Alternative Measure of Education

Some studies find a non-linear relationship between education on the one hand and social and policy attitudes on the other (e.g., McCall and Manza 2011). To explore this possibility, I re-run the models from Tables 3.3 and 3.4, replacing the ordinal measure of educational attainment with six dummies. In each case, education exhibits a non-linear relationship with attitudes. Figures E.4, E.5, and E.6 in the Appendix illustrate the statistical effect of varying levels of education on racial resentment, opposition to affirmative action, and support for restrictive immigration policies, respectively.[25]

In the case of both racial resentment (Figure E.4) and support for restrictive immigration policies (Figure E.6), Whites with a high school education report significantly *less* progressive attitudes than Whites without a high school education. In the case of affirmative action, Whites with a high school education, those with some college, and those with 2-year degrees report significantly greater opposition to such programs than Whites without a high school education. Consistent with the "education as englightenment" hypothesis (Wodtke 2012), the most highly educated Whites—those with postgraduate degrees and, to a lesser extent, with 4-year degrees—hold more progressive attitudes than the least educated Whites—those with less than a high school education. However, Whites with low to middling levels of

[25]Based on variants of Models 1, 2, and 3 from Table 3.3. To enable comparisons, the outcomes have been standardized ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

education hold the least progressive attitudes, controlling for individual and county characteristics.

Overall, racial resentment seems to vary more across levels of education than do preferences for affirmative action or restrictive immigration policies. This is consistent with the findings of other researchers (e.g., Schuman et al. 1997), who speculate that support for abstract racial principles—as opposed to practical applications of those principles—is "cheap talk," and education leads to greater awareness about the kind of "talk" that is socially desirable (see also Wodtke 2012). The relationship between education, Hispanic growth, and intergroup relations is the subject of the next chapter. For now, it is worth noting that allowing for a non-linear relationship between education and racial and policy attitudes does not alter the results with respect to Hispanic share and growth, black share and growth, and racial and policy attitudes.

Discussion

This chapter marshaled pre-existing survey data to shed light on the relationship between local demographic factors and non-Hispanic Whites' racial and policy attitudes. Specifically, I examined the link between Hispanic share and growth on the one hand and attitudes and policies directed toward Blacks on the other. I also looked at a proxy measure of anti-Hispanic attitudes—support for restrictive immigration policies—to gain insight on the inverse question: the relationship between black share and growth and attitudes toward Hispanics.

The resulting analysis generally support previous findings regarding the impact of out-group size on attitudes toward that group as well as my own findings, highlighted in the previous chapter, regarding the impact of out-group size on attitudes toward a third group. Table 3.5 summarizes the expected and observed associations between ongoing out-group growth—whether due to Blacks or Hispanics—and Whites' attitudes. To further ease in-

terpretation, Table E.11 in the Appendix reports the results of three pared-down models predicting resentment and opposition to affirmative action using only Hispanic share and growth (past and present), as well as support for restrictive immigration policies using only black share and growth (past and present).[26]

		Attitudinal Outcome		
		Anti-black Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
Growing Group	Blacks	Expected: + Observed: +	Expected: + Observed: *n.s.*	Expected: + Observed: *n.s.*
	Hispanics	Expected: + Observed: +	Expected: + Observed: +	Expected: + Observed: *n.s.*

Table 3.5: Associations between Out-group Growth and Attitudes

With respect to the literature on two-group relations: county black share consistently predicts greater racial resentment toward Blacks along with greater opposition to affirmative action, among Whites. Ongoing black population growth, moreover, independently predicts greater racial resentment toward Blacks. With respect to racial attitudes toward Blacks, in short, I find evidence for the importance of both relative size *and* growth, factors which have been pitted against each other in earlier studies.

County Hispanic share similarly predicts greater support for restrictive immigration policies among Whites, and this association is especially pronounced in counties that recently experienced Hispanic growth. Overall, however, the link between Hispanic growth and immi-

[26]The coefficients for ongoing Hispanic growth and ongoing black growth—the main variables of interest—are similar to the coefficients from the fully elaborated models (Table 3.4). The coefficients for Hispanic share and black share as well as past Hispanic growth and past black growth, however, are not, which suggests that the interaction between them and/or mediation from other variables are critical.

gration policy preferences is harder to interpret. Ongoing Hispanic growth is not associated with immigration policy preferences, once other individual and county characteristics are accounted for. Past Hispanic growth is, but the main association is negative, i.e., controlling for Hispanic share, living in a county that recently experienced relatively more Hispanic growth is associated with lower support for restrictive immigration policies. Before we rush to conclude that anti-Hispanic attitudes and anti-black attitudes are different, though, research needs to address the following issues: the disconnect between the proxy measure and the outcome of interest and the recent decoupling of Hispanic population growth and Latin American immigration.

The results also support those of the previous chapter: ongoing, local Hispanic growth predicts greater racial resentment toward Blacks along with greater opposition to affirmative action among Whites. These results prop up the external validity of the laboratory experimental results in several directions: first, among a different sample of larger geographic scope; second, with respect to real Hispanic growth, as opposed to perceived growth; third, in relation to preferences for a practical policy that disproportionately affects Blacks. This last point is critical: the proponents of behavioral games assert their ability to predict consequential, real-world phenomena. Their claim has long been contested and validation is ongoing. The results of my analyses suggest a link is likely to exist between the dictator game and policies geared toward addressing existing inequalities; this link should be explored further.

Whereas the CCES results support the predictions of Chapter 2 with respect to Hispanic growth and Whites' treatment of Blacks, they do not immediately support my symmetry hypothesis. Given that Hispanics and Blacks are distinct from Whites in terms of race—or at least are perceived to be—and given that Hispanics and Blacks similarly occupy subordinate positions in the US racial hierarchy, I expected to see black growth associated with stronger anti-Hispanic attitudes, just as Hispanic growth is associated with stronger anti-black attitudes.

Instead, I find that the relative size of the black population predicts stronger opposition to immigration, but past and ongoing growth do not. The finding is in line with the broader racial triangulation perspective, but not my prediction regarding the specific form racial triangulation is likely to take. However, it is difficult to trust the findings for anti-Hispanic attitudes for two reasons: first, preferences for restrictive immigration policies might be too distant a proxy of anti-Hispanic attitudes; second, counties did not vary substantially in terms of black population growth. Additional data and analyses will shed light on whether this finding is a methodological artifact or indeed nuances my theoretical interpretation of third-group growth.

Chapter 4

A Little Learning is a Dangerous Thing: Education and Reactions to Hispanic Growth

In this chapter, I turn to a more direct replication of the lab experiment described in Chapter 2, consisting of an original survey experiment carried out among a national sample of Blacks and Whites. The goal of this chapter, however, is not simply to replicate the earlier results; the greater goal is to understand population heterogeneity *within* the black and white categories and with respect to Hispanic growth. Specifically, the following analyses consider whether and how educational attainment conditions individual reactions to perceived demographic changes.

People differ in terms of their background characteristics, their social networks, and the communities they inhabit; the national survey experiment described in this chapter captures heterogeneity across multiple dimensions. Why, then, do the following analyses focus on differences in terms of educational attainment? There are two main reasons for this, one practical, the other substantive.

On the practical front, the representativeness of the lab sample was limited in two ways: first, lab participants were more highly educated than the target population. To recap, 59.5% of lab participants had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to just 29.8% of all Whites and Blacks in the United States. Unrepresentativeness was especially pronounced among white participants, 70.00% of whom had a bachelor's degree or higher (compared to just 37.50% of black participants).[1] Second, random assignment did not achieve a balanced distribution of participants with regard to education, and participants with a bachelor's degree or higher were overrepresented among those who were paired with a same-race recipient. The original survey experiment addresses these issues.

On the substantive front, education is broadly considered a determinant of out-group antipathy and threat. The exact nature of the association, however, is the subject of substantial contradiction and confusion. On the one hand, the claim that education is associated with more progressive outlooks—and, by extension, out-group treatment—is so ubiquitous that it is rarely accompanied by empirical justification. On the other hand, some studies identify a null or even negative association between education and progressive racial and racial policy attitudes (e.g., Schuman et al. 1997). Adding to the confusion, some studies find that Whites with middling levels of education hold the least tolerant attitudes toward out-group members (e.g., Wodtke 2012); others find that Blacks with middling levels of education hold the most tolerant attitudes toward out-group members (e.g., Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

If education shapes out-group treatment, then responses to Hispanic growth likely differ across Blacks and Whites with varying levels of educational attainment. The following analyses explore this possibility. That the lab sample was unrepresentative in the ways described above (see also Chapter 2) lends added importance to this task. The analyses also speak to the ongoing debate about the relationship between education and intergroup relations, a debate that has been fueled by pervasive assumptions and modeling choices.

[1] Also refer to Appendix B.

This chapter relies on two sources of data: 1) an original survey experiment with a behavioral component, and 2) the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). I designed the survey experiment to closely resemble the dictator game described in Chapter 2; it was fielded among a nationally representative sample of US-born non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks. An explicit goal of the replication, as spelled out in the project proposal, was to evaluate whether and how individual socioeconomic differences—particularly with respect to education—moderate the effects of Hispanic growth identified in Chapter 2.

I start by reviewing the relationship between education and out-group threat, as this relationship has been theorized and examined in prior research.

Education and (Racial and Racial Policy) Attitudes

Studies on the relationship between education and intergroup relations reach one of two general conclusions: 1) more educated people[2] are more tolerant toward out-group members, or 2) more educated people do not differ from less educated people in terms of their tolerance toward out-group members, but education equips people to mask their unsavory opinions.

Education Liberalizes

The notion that education is associated with more progressive attitudes is a "cultural axiom" in the United States, to paraphrase Wodtke (2012: 82). Theoretical support for this notion comes in two flavors: the argument that education liberalizes people, and the argument that education insulates them from competition.

Hyman and Wright neatly sum up the first argument in a seminal treatise on the "enduring effects of education": "formal education has long been an important force throughout America in molding characters well as intellect" (1979). Education, the authors argue, in-

[2]A caveat: By and large, these studies examine the attitudes of dominant group members, most often Whites, toward subordinate group members, most often Blacks, though there are important exceptions (e.g., Bobo and Hutchings 1996; McDermott 2011; Wodtke 2012).

stills in people the value of diverse ideas and rational discourse; these factors in turn promote tolerance.

The second argument takes a less rosy view of education's role. According to this argument, education is associated with greater tolerance because it insulates people—especially dominant group members—from competition with the out-group. Immigration to the United States is characterized by a bimodal occupational distribution, with professionals and entrepreneurs on one end and low-skilled laborers on the other; members of the second group make up the vast majority of contemporary immigrants in the United States, especially those from Latin America (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Blacks are similarly overrepresented in the low-skilled labor market. As a result, educated Whites are simply less likely to compete directly with Non-Whites for jobs. According to one influential theory of intergroup relations, intergroup conflict stems from competition over scarce resources (Sherif et al. 1961).

A large body of empirical work supports the predictions of the "education-as-enlightenment" hypothesis (as Wodtke 2012 refers to it).[3] People with more formal education are more likely to hold progressive views on a range of issues, including freedom of speech and due process, abortion rights, marijuana legalization, contraception education, and capital punishment (Page and Shapiro 1992; see also McCall and Manza 2011). In recent years, people with more formal education have also been more likely to support the Democratic Party (Gelman 2008).

With respect to racial and racial policy attitudes, Whites with more formal education historically have been more willing to support school and residential integration and a hypothetical black presidential candidate and less willing to support anti-miscegenation laws (Schuman et al. 1997). More educated Whites were also relatively less likely to attribute Blacks' disadvantage to lower in-born ability or lack of motivation. These associations have changed over time, however, as I discuss in the next section. In a related vein, more educated Blacks are also relatively more likely to attribute Blacks' disadvantage to discrimination

[3]I borrow this term for brevity, though, in fact, it collapses two distinct hypotheses with similar predictions (for Whites): 1) education enlightens, and 2) education insulates.

(Schuman et al. 1997); for Blacks this question refers to members of their own group, hence, we should not immediately interpret their responses as evidence of more "tolerant" attitudes.

Educational attainment is also associated with attitudes toward immigration. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), for example, find that more educated Europeans are more accepting of immigration from all sources[4]; they are also more likely to believe immigration generates benefits for the host economy and less likely to believe immigration worsens crime.

Education Refines

The education-as-enlightenment hypothesis has met with considerable theoretical and empirical resistance. On the theoretical front, some scholars contend that education does not liberalize so much as it refines, providing highly educated people with a language of individual rights and responsibilities that allows them to articulate their opposition to progressive positions in socially acceptable ways. As Jackman and Muha (1984: 752) explain,

> Education cannot be seen as a liberating agent, since it does not release people from the concerns and interests imposed by the social fabric, nor does it render people insensible to those interests. An advanced formal education does, however, provide extended intellectual training and a broader and more sophisticated mastery of information. In this way it equips its recipients to promote their interests more astutely—indeed, to become the state-of-the-art apologists for their group's social position.

Wodtke takes a similar view: "Education allows dominant group members to articulate a more refined legitimizing ideology based ... on the ostensibly race-neutral values of individu-

[4]The authors take this to mean that education works by enlightening rather than insulating: if competition is at play, they argue, more educated Europeans should be less likely to support immigration from richer countries. The authors do not, however, convincingly demonstrate that immigrants from "richer countries" are perceived to be highly skilled and hence, in direct competition with more educated Europeans.

alism and meritocracy" (2012: 83). Wodtke terms this perspective "education as ideological refinement."

With others, Wodtke also points out that the education-as-enlightenment perspective naïvely assumes out-group antipathy is rooted in ignorance. As with Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis, it follows that the "solution" to intergroup conflict is to dispel ignorance, whether through exposure, à la the contact hypothesis, or through education, à la the education-as-enlightenment hypothesis. The critique leveled at both hypotheses is the same: intergroup conflict does not stem entirely from ignorance; conflict stems, at least in part, from competition over scarce material and symbolic resources, like group status.

Even highly educated people experience and respond to perceived group-level threats. More affluent people may be personally insulated from the material effects of some of these threats—for example, job losses due to a growing low-skilled labor force. However, as social identity theorists argue, even affluent people derive some portion of their self worth from their perceived belonging in a group that is well-positioned; as a result, people defend their group's interests even when doing so does not directly benefit—or even harms—their personal wellbeing.

The education-as-enlightenment hypothesis has also met challenges on empirical grounds. Jackman (1978) and Jackman and Muha (1984) find that education is not consistently, positively associated with support for race-based policies. Instead, Jackman and Muha observe that highly educated Whites are no more likely to support government actions to ensure 1) "blacks and whites go to the same schools," 2) "blacks can buy any house on the market that they can afford," and 3) "blacks have the same job opportunities as whites" (1984: 767). What is striking is that these statements refer to policies that promote equality of opportunities, rather than equality of results. Unlike, for example, preferential hiring policies, making sure that "blacks can buy any house ... they can afford" involves nothing more nor less than enforcing an individual right for which there is broad-based support, at least in the abstract.

Schuman and his colleagues uncover similar patterns in their seminal tome on historical trends in racial attitudes (1997). To start, they find that highly educated Whites are no more likely to attribute Blacks' disadvantage to structural forces or to support the implementation of anti-discrimination policies[5], and that the most educated Whites are less likely than the least educated Whites to support preferential treatment for Blacks in hiring and promotion. In addition, the authors provide evidence that the liberalizing force of education has diminished over time. In 1972, for example, General Social Survey (GSS) respondents with a college education were more than twice as likely to attribute Blacks' disadvantage, at least in part, to "slavery and discrimination"; by 1994, such attribution had dropped among all groups, but especially among the most highly educated. At that point, respondents with a college education were no more likely than those without a college education to blame structural forces for Blacks' disadvantage (1997: 165).

Wodtke (2012) contends that the role of education hinges on the nature of the attitude in question. Over time, Whites have come to increasingly support abstract racial principles, but not concrete policies designed to address racial inequality (refer to Chapter 3). In a similar vein, Wodtke finds that more educated Whites are less likely to hold negative stereotypes of out-group members, but no more likely to support racial preferences in hiring. From this, he concludes that education "promotes a heightened commitment to the dominant legitimizing ideologies of individualism and meritocracy" (100).

To sum up, these authors assert the education-as-enlightenment hypothesis has overstayed its welcome. Outside the realm of racial and racial policy attitudes, scholars have long known that education, as a proxy for social class, is associated with less progressive views on some issues, particularly economic issues like redistribution (McCall and Manza 2011). Within the realm of racial and racial policy attitudes, however, the view that education may be associated with less progressive views is still met with skepticism. Researchers'

[5]Again, the measures in question refer to the enforcement of individual rights for which there is (purportedly) broad-based support, e.g., "A homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color."

tendency to dismiss their own findings on the subject is both a cause and consequence of this skepticism (Jackman and Muha 1984).

Is the Relationship Linear? Is it Symmetric? The education-as-enlightenment and education-as-refinement hypotheses have something in common: they both posit a linear relationship between education and attitudes. According to the first hypothesis, more education corresponds to more progressive attitudes; according to the second, more education corresponds to more ideological sophistication.

Neither perspective satisfactorily addresses the fact that, when appropriately modeled, the association between education—and, by extension, class—and attitudes often emerges as non-monotonic.[6] Some noteworthy examples include:

> Whites with middling levels of education report the greatest levels of perceived competition with Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (Bobo and Hutchings 1996).
>
> Whites with a high school education report lower support for racial preferences in hiring and promotion than *either* Whites with more than a high school education *or* Whites with less than a high school education, at least in recent years (Schuman et al. 1997).
>
> Whites with middling levels of education report the strongest opposition to racial preferences targeting Blacks (Wodtke 2012).
>
> White high school graduates report greater agreement with racial resentment items than Whites with less than a high school education; Whites with some college education report greater opposition to affirmative action than Whites with less than a high school education (Chapter 3).
>
> Blacks with some college education are the most likely to oppose affirmative action in hiring (Schuman et al. 1997).

[6] A fact that McCall and Manza (2011) point out with respect to economic policy preferences.

> In one new immigrant destination, working class and upper-middle-class Blacks report the most hostility toward Hispanic immigrants; lower-middle-class Blacks, the least (McDermott 2011).

On its own, the education-as-refinement hypothesis is no better equipped to explain these patterns than the education-as-enlightenment hypothesis: if education provides people with a socially appropriate language for expressing out-group antipathy, why are the most educated people not the most likely to use that language? (Assuming, of course, that all group members have a stake in bolstering their group's position, as social identity theorists claim.) The answer might have to do with the interplay between a person's interests and the perceived interests of his/her group. The empirical takeaway, at least, is clear: modeling the relationship between education and intergroup outcomes requires allowing for a non-linear association of the two.

The previous results, and especially the findings for Blacks, point in another tantalizing direction: Whites in the middle of the socioeconomic hierarchy express the most out-group antipathy, whereas Blacks in the middle of the socioeconomic hierarchy express the least.[7] Chapter 2 already identified how Whites and Blacks react in different ways to Hispanics; it's possible that the way in which education conditions these reactions is itself group-specific. With the notable exceptions of Bobo and Hutchings (1996) and Wodtke (2012), few previous studies examine the role of education in shaping the intergroup strategies of Non-Whites. This is one contribution of this chapter.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The following analyses seek to shed light on two questions:

Q1. Do Whites' reactions to Hispanic population growth differ across levels of education?

[7]Bobo and Hutchings (1996) also find mild evidence for a non-monotonic association between education and perceived competition with Hispanics, among Blacks. Less ambiguous is the fact that Blacks with the lowest levels of education report relatively greater competition with Hispanics.

Q2. Do Blacks' reactions to Hispanic population growth differ across levels of education?

On the one hand, the education-as-enlightenment hypothesis leads us to expect that the least educated Whites and Blacks will have the most defensive reactions to perceived Hispanic growth. For both Whites and Blacks, this would manifest itself in relatively more generous contributions to Whites than Blacks in response to Hispanic growth, among the least educated.

On the other hand, the education-as-refinement hypothesis leads us to expect that the most educated Whites and Blacks will have reactions that are as defensive—or even more defensive—than those of less educated Whites and Blacks in response to Hispanic growth. If education serves to mask unsavory intergroup outlooks, that mask should be less effective in a decision-making context that renders the intergroup dimension ambiguous and deniable, like a between-subjects dictator game. This would manifest itself as equally generous or relatively more generous contributions to Whites versus Blacks in response to Hispanic growth, among the most educated.

Neither hypothesis will perfectly capture the patterns we observe if the relationship between educational attainment and Hispanic threat is, in fact, non-monotonic, as some studies imply. In addition, the relationship between educational attainment and Hispanic threat might differ across Blacks and Whites, as McDermott's (2011) findings suggest.

Data and Methods

The present study draws on two sources of data: an original survey experiment carried out among a nationally representative sample and the 2012 wave of the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). I briefly review the data and methods associated with the CCES before describing the survey experiment.

CCES: A Review

The CCES is a national stratified sample survey of US adults. The following analyses rely on the subsample of 35,557 non-Hispanic Whites in the post-election survey. The post-election survey included the resentment items that are the outcomes of interest. For more information on the measurement and coding of the resentment items and other individual and county-level covariates, the sampling design, and the analytic methods, refer to Chapter 3.

The following analyses replicate the final set of multivariate analyses presented in Chapter 3 in every way except one: they include interaction terms for low, medium, and high education on the one hand and ongoing Hispanic growth and share on the other.

To allow for a non-linear effect of education and for consistency with the survey experiment, I measure education using three dummy variables: low education respondents are those with a high school education or less, medium education respondents are those with some college or an associate's degree, and high education respondents have a bachelor's degree or higher.

To review, Hispanic share is represented by the natural logarithm of the percent of the total county population that identified as Hispanic/Latino in 2010; Hispanic growth refers to the change in percent Hispanics between 2010 and 2014.[8] Both measures are based on population estimates from the US Census Bureau.

The Survey Experiment

The survey experiment was fielded in May and June 2015 by Gfk, a survey research company that maintains a national, probability-based online panel of respondents. The panel was built through a combination of random-digit dialing and address-based sampling methods. As a

[8] I exclude a covariate for past growth (2000–2010) because the analyses of the previous chapter suggest this measure confounds growth with length of exposure to the Hispanic population.

result, Gfk's sampling frame includes households with unlisted numbers and those without landlines. If a household lacks a computer or internet access, GfK provides those resources. In other words, Gfk administers surveys online, but these surveys are not limited to a sample of internet users.

This survey is based on a race-stratified sample ($N = 781$) that contains US-born, non-Hispanic Whites ($N = 396$) and US-born, non-Hispanic Blacks ($N = 385$). The completion rate for this survey was 56.8%, which is comparable to other surveys fielded by Gfk (Gfk 2013). Completion rates vary in response to factors like survey length and incentives; completion also varies across different kinds of respondents. The data include sample weights constructed by Gfk to address differential non-response rates across demographic profiles. The following analyses do not use these sampling weights; unless otherwise noted, however, the weighted analyses yield substantively similar results.

Study Registration and Data Availability. Funding for this survey came from Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), a collaborative project funded by the National Science Foundation. Like all TESS-funded studies, the proposal and data associated with this study will be posted online (tessexperiments.org) one year after the data were delivered to the principal investigator, in this case, June 2016.

Experimental Design

The survey experiment relied on a 2x2, between-subjects design. Survey respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: baseline versus Hispanic growth and white recipient versus black recipient. Random assignment achieved a fairly uniform distribution of respondents across conditions (Table 4.1).

Respondents in the baseline condition first read an excerpt of an article about the growth of iPhone market share; those in the Hispanic growth condition first read an excerpt of an article about the growth of the Hispanic population. The articles were altered to include more recent publication dates; otherwise, they were identical to the ones used in the lab

experiment described in Chapter 2 (see Figures F.1 and F.2). For more information on the background and pre-tests associated with these primes, refer to the earlier chapter as well as the discussion in Appendix D.

		Prime: Baseline	Prime: Hispanic Growth
Recipient	Same-Race	$N_{white} = 96$ $N_{black} = 99$	$N_{white} = 103$ $N_{black} = 95$
	Other-Race	$N_{white} = 94$ $N_{black} = 96$	$N_{white} = 103$ $N_{black} = 95$

Table 4.1: Distribution of 781 Respondents across Experimental Conditions

After reading the story, respondents participated in an online version of the dictator game in which they were asked to split ten dollars with either a white or black recipient.[9] Again, recipient race was signaled using racially distinctive names. Distinctively white names included Carrie, Jill, Laurie, Sarah (female) and Brad, Greg, Jay, Todd (male); distinctively black names included Aaliyah, Aisha, Jada, Keisha (female) and Darnell, Jamal, Jermaine, Kareem (male).

The names used in the survey experiment were the same names used in the lab experiment with two exceptions: the names Jayden and Leroy were replaced by the names Darnell and Jamal. I did this because pre-test data indicate that the rate of correct identification for the names Jayden and Leroy was unacceptably low when these names were not paired with a racially appropriate surname (60.0% and 65.5% respectively). The IRB protocol for the TESS experiment stipulated that I should include only recipients' first names, and racial classification is more accurate for first names that are paired with surnames than for first names alone (Gaddis 2015). Pre-test data indicate that each name used in the survey experiment was accurately classified no less than 76% of the time.

[9]See Figure F.3 for details.

Gfk respondents were less successful in accurately classifying names than were Mturkers or lab participants: 63.38% of respondents correctly identified white names and 50.26% of respondents correctly identified black names.[10] Unlike lab respondents, they did not have access to recipients' surnames, and unlike pre-test respondents they had a cognitive incentive to deny knowing the racial background of a recipient with whom they had split resources.[11] To address misclassification, I replicate the analyses in this chapter among the subset of respondents who correctly classified recipients in terms of racial background; unless otherwise noted, these analyses yield substantively similar results.

Another cause for concern was the proportion of respondents who did not trust the experimental setup. When prompted, 34.57% of respondents agreed with the statement, "I don't think [the recipient] is real or will ever receive the money," a belief endorsed by just 10.88% of lab participants (Chapter 2). Most likely, the absence of a last name for recipients and the online interface without physical money or a stamped envelope contributed to respondent skepticism. Cognitive distancing from out-group members may also have been a factor: whereas Whites were more likely than Blacks to report skepticism (37.63% versus 31.43%), Whites paired with black recipients where slightly more likely to report skepticism than those paired with white recipients (38.07% versus 37.63%), and Blacks paired with white recipients were slightly more likely to report skepticism than those paired with black recipients (31.79% versus 30.89%).

Privacy represents a final shortcoming of the survey experiment. GfK's online survey infrastructure made it impossible to ensure participants that no one—not even GfK employees—would be able to identify them in connection with their game contributions,

[10]Notably, just 10.39% of respondents classified a recipient with a distinctively white name as "most likely black/African-American" and just 19.01% of respondents classified a recipient with a distinctively black name as "most likely white." The rest were classified as "most likely something else."

[11]In support of the cognitive denial/distancing explanation, classification of black names was least accurate among Whites who gave nothing to black recipients. Of these respondents, only 41.3% correctly identified recipients as "most likely black/African-American," compared to 52.3% of those who gave a positive contribution.

though as the researcher, *I* did not have access to participants' personally identifying information. Pervasive skepticism, inaccurate recipient classification, and privacy concerns introduced considerable noise around the experimental estimates. This is one of the reasons I validate survey experimental results with CCES data. In addition, the following results would benefit from empirical replication.

Variables of Interest and Analytic Strategy

Dictator game contributions are the primary outcome of interest. The key explanatory variables include the experimental manipulations—Hispanic growth versus baseline prime and black versus white recipient—along with education. Education is represented by three dummy variables: low education respondents are those with a high school education or less, medium education respondents are those with some college or an associate's degree, and high education respondents have a bachelor's degree or higher. I chose this classification scheme for two reasons: first, the cutoffs roughly resemble the associations between educational attainment and attitudes identified in Chapter 3. More practically, this scheme achieves the most uniform distribution of respondents—Blacks and Whites, separately and together—across categories.

The multivariate analyses also control for a host of individual characteristics. The coding of these characteristics was done to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, consistency with the CCES. Age is measured in years, gender is measured using a dummy variable (1 = female), and ideology is measured on a 3-point scale (1 = liberal; 3 = conservative). Household income was recorded on a 19-point scale ranging from "less than $5,000" to "$175,000 or more." I recoded values at the midpoint of each interval, and used linear extrapolation to assign a dollar value to the final, open-ended category ($194,500).

In addition, I control for a host of county characteristics, including Hispanic share (natural log), black share (natural log), median household income, unemployment rate, Gini coefficient of income inequality, share in same residence, Democratic vote share in the most

recent presidential election, urbanization, and US region (South/non-South). Gfk provided me with information on respondents' counties of residence. I used this information to link respondents with county-level data from the 2010 Census and ACS, 2012 data from CQ Press, and 2003 rural/urban classification codes from the ERS-USDA. These are the same county-level variables I used in Chapter 3; for more specific information on how these variables were constructed, refer to this earlier chapter

The survey data are structured hierarchically, with individual respondents nested within counties. To address this, I again use hierarchical linear modeling methods. A random intercept accounts for un-modeled variation between counties; the following tables report the standard deviation of these intercepts. Likelihood ratio tests confirm that a random intercept for counties produces significant ($p < 0.01$, all cases) improvements in model fit.

Respondent Characteristics

One goal of the survey experiment was to replicate the lab experiment on a more heterogeneous sample. Table 4.2 provides unweighted descriptive statistics for the full sample, and separately for white and black respondents. Whites and Blacks are significantly different across a range of characteristics, from average age to the propensity to live in an urban county. Most relevant for my purposes, Blacks are significantly overrepresented among respondents with low levels of education and Whites are significantly overrepresented among respondents with high levels of education.

Table 4.3 provides unweighted descriptive statistics by 1) experimental condition, and 2) recipient's race. In general, respondent characteristics are well-balanced across experimental conditions. In other words, respondents who read a neutral story were similar to those who read the story about Hispanic population growth, and those paired with a same-race recipient were similar to those paired with an other-race recipient. One exception is worth noting: respondents with low levels of education were significantly more likely to be represented in the Hispanic growth condition. Because education is one of the hypothesized explanatory

	Mean	SD	Whites	Blacks	t-value
Age	49.735	17.079	51.610	47.810	3.131***
Female	0.522	0.500	0.535	0.509	0.734
Low education	0.412	0.493	0.371	0.455	−2.370*
Medium education	0.298	0.458	0.278	0.320	−1.272
High education	0.289	0.454	0.351	0.226	3.892***
Household income ($)	62763	47164	74220	50980	7.102***
Liberal	0.323	0.468	0.256	0.392	−4.086***
Moderate	0.364	0.481	0.324	0.405	−2.341***
Conservative	0.314	0.464	0.420	0.204	6.707***
Hispanic share (%)	14.168	14.013	13.330	15.030	−1.700+
Black share (%)	17.757	16.252	9.385	26.370	−17.013 ***
Median household income ($)	51680	13094	52890	50440	2.625**
Unemployment rate (%)	9.834	2.796	9.161	10.530	−7.033***
Gini coefficient	0.452	0.038	0.441	0.464	−8.827***
Share in same residence (%)	84.679	3.957	85.110	84.240	3.083**
Democratic vote share (%)	52.234	15.281	47.920	56.930	−8.396***
Urban	0.816	0.388	0.773	0.860	−3.159**
Suburban	0.143	0.351	0.179	0.179	0.000
Rural	0.041	0.198	0.048	0.034	1.004
South	0.392	0.488	0.278	0.278	0.000

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 4.2: Unweighted Descriptive Statistics for
Full Sample and by Participants' Race/Ethnicity

variables, the following multivariate analyses account for systematic differences between respondents and the communities where they live.

Results

On average, respondents gave $4.04 to an unknown stranger. This is significantly more than the average contribution in the laboratory experiment ($3.14, $p < 0.01$). Privacy concerns and differences in the setup of the dictator game are likely responsible for the gap. In the laboratory, participants made decisions with physical money, and immediately took home their earnings. Online, respondents made decisions by typing their contributions into a box; their earnings were disbursed as points, which respondents could later request in the form

		Prime			Recipient	
	Baseline	Growth	t-value	Same-Race	Other-Race	t-value
Age	49.800	49.670	0.101	49.320	50.150	−0.681
Female	0.509	0.535	−0.734	0.497	0.547	−1.395
Low education	0.374	0.450	−2.146*	0.418	0.407	0.320
Medium education	0.322	0.275	1.429	0.295	0.302	−0.211
High education	0.304	0.275	0.881	0.287	0.292	−0.135
Household income ($)	63420	62120	0.386	62770	62760	0.004
Liberal	0.326	0.320	0.171	0.314	0.331	−0.487
Moderate	0.365	0.363	0.047	0.363	0.364	−0.020
Conservative	0.310	0.317	−0.221	0.322	0.305	0.512
Hispanic share (%)	14.640	13.710	0.934	13.400	14.930	−1.527
Black share (%)	18.680	16.860	1.561	18.250	17.270	0.844
Median household income ($)	51280	52080	−0.854	51180	52180	−1.067
Unemployment rate (%)	9.860	9.809	0.254	10.010	9.658	1.766+
Gini coefficient	0.452	0.452	0.033	0.451	0.453	−0.585
Share in same residence (%)	84.720	84.640	0.290	84.680	84.670	0.031
Democratic vote share (%)	52.650	51.830	0.739	52.260	52.210	0.041
Urban	0.823	0.808	0.551	0.828	0.803	0.905
Suburban	0.140	0.146	−0.247	0.139	0.148	−0.393
Rural	0.036	0.045	−0.641	0.033	0.049	−1.075
South	0.400	0.384	0.462	0.395	0.389	0.175

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 4.3: Unweighted Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition

of a check. This setup likely interfered with the immediacy of the game decision. Just as people spend more when they pay with a credit card than with cash (Prelec and Simester 2001), time, effort, and the conversion to points created distance between the game decision and payoff, boosting generosity.


On average, white respondents gave more to white recipients than black ones ($4.41 versus $4.32), and white respondents who first read a neutral story as well as those who first read a story about Hispanic growth gave similar amounts ($4.37 versus $4.36); neither difference was significant at a conventional level. Furthermore, Whites' contributions to white and black respondents did not differ significantly between respondents who read a neutral story and those who read a story about Hispanic growth.

On average, black respondents gave slightly more to white recipients than black ones ($3.81 versus $3.60), and black respondents who first read a neutral story gave slightly more than those who first read a story about Hispanic growth ($3.79 versus $3.62); neither difference was significant at a conventional level. Blacks' contributions to white and black respondents did not differ significantly between respondents who read a neutral story and those who read a story about Hispanic growth.

If, as I hypothesize, education conditions reactions to Hispanic growth, population heterogeneity may mask patterns at the aggregate level. I now turn to this question, considering first the case of Whites, then the case of Blacks.

Education and Hispanic Growth: The Case of Whites

To assess the extent to which education moderates, or conditions, the effect of perceived Hispanic growth, I classified respondents by educational attainment: "low," "medium," and "high." To review, respondents with no more than a high school diploma fell in the first category, those with some college or an associate's degree fell in the second, and those with a four-year degree or higher fell in the third.



(a) Baseline

(b) Hispanic Growth

Figure 4.1: Whites' Average Contributions by Experimental Condition and Education

Figure 4.1a illustrates average game contributions among white respondents in the baseline condition, and Figure 4.1b illustrates average game contributions among white respondents in the Hispanic growth condition. First, let's consider the case of Whites with the lowest levels of education. Those who first read a neutral story gave more, on average, to white recipients than black ones ($5.10 versus $3.97), whereas those who first read a story about Hispanic growth gave less, on average, to white recipients than black ones ($3.44 versus $4.11). This is the inverse of the pattern observed in the lab experiment, where white respondents where relatively more generous toward Whites than Blacks in the Hispanic growth condition, as opposed to the baseline.

By contrast, the patterns for medium and high education Whites resemble the pattern identified in the lab experiment. In both cases, white respondents are relatively more generous toward Whites than Blacks in the Hispanic growth condition, as opposed to the baseline. Absolute contributions, however, vary by education. The consistency makes sense, given that the average white lab participant was more highly educated than the average white American (or, for that matter, the average black lab participant).

Among white respondents in the medium education category, those who first read a neutral story gave similar amounts to white and black recipients ($4.30 versus $4.10), whereas those who first read a story about Hispanic growth gave more to white recipients than black ones ($5.20 versus $3.95). Among white respondents in the high education category, those who first read a neutral story gave slightly less to white recipients than black ones ($4.03 versus $4.71). Those who first read a story about Hispanic growth also gave slightly less to white recipients than black ones ($4.68 versus $4.92), though the gap was smaller.

A simple linear regression confirms Hispanic growth was a significant predictor of contributions to Whites ($p < 0.05$), as were the interactions between Hispanic growth and medium education ($p < 0.05$) and Hispanic growth and high education ($p < 0.05$). In other words, not only did Whites' contributions to white versus black recipients vary based on whether

they first read a neutral story or a story about Hispanic growth, but this variation depended on the respondent's level of education.

Model 1 in Table 4.4 reports the results of a multilevel linear regression predicting Whites' contributions in terms of three factors: experimental condition, recipient's race, and educational attainment (medium and high education versus low education).[12] The constant ($5.12) corresponds to the predicted contribution to a white recipient in the baseline condition for a typical white respondent with a low level of education. In the baseline condition, contributions to Blacks and Whites were statistically indistinguishable for respondents with low, medium, and high levels of education, just as they were for respondents in the lab experiment.

The effect of Hispanic growth on contributions hinges on the respondent's level of education. For low education respondents, contributions in the Hispanic growth condition were significantly lower to white recipients, but not to black ones. For medium education respondents, contributions in the Hispanic growth condition were significantly higher to white recipients *and* significantly lower to black ones. Finally, for high education respondents, contributions in the Hispanic growth condition were significantly higher to white recipients, but not to black recipients.

Model 2 accounts for other differences between respondents; Model 3 additionally accounts for differences between the counties where respondents live. Both models tell the same story. Only age is a consistently significant predictor of contributions, with older respondents giving more than younger ones. No other individual- or county-level characteristic is significant across the relevant models, not even recipient's perceived class. In other words, and in keeping with the results of the lab experiment, white respondents did not give ac-

[12]The bivariate patterns for medium and high education respondents resemble each other and diverge from that among low education respondents. Therefore, and to facilitate interpretation, low education respondents serve as the reference category.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic growth	-1.616^{+}	-1.555^{+}	-1.686^{*}
Black recipient	-1.097	-1.128	-0.916
Hispanic growth x black recipient	1.771	1.840	1.701
Medium education	-0.899	-0.921	-0.938
Hispanic growth x medium education	2.650^{*}	3.120^{*}	3.011^{*}
Black recipient x medium education	1.041	1.312	1.042
Hispanic growth x black recipient x medium education	-2.957^{+}	-3.587^{*}	-3.325^{+}
High education	-1.031	-1.210	-1.446^{+}
Hispanic growth x high education	2.242^{+}	2.165^{+}	2.483^{*}
Black recipient x high education	1.778	1.615	1.660
Hispanic growth x black recipient x high education	-2.226	-2.243	-2.487
Individual Controls			
Age		0.026^{**}	0.028^{**}
Female		0.310	0.182
Household income ($)		0.000^{+}	0.000
Ideology		-0.260	-0.265
Perceived recipient class		-0.182	-0.167
County Controls			
Hispanic share (ln)			-0.059
Black share (ln)			0.178
Median household income ($)			
Unemployment rate (%)			0.057
Gini coefficient			-6.054
Share in same residence (%)			-0.020
Democratic vote share (%)			-0.017
Urban (ref.)			
Suburban			0.161
Rural			1.254
South			-0.285
Constant	5.119^{***}	5.038^{**}	5.141^{**}
$\sigma_{(1)}$	1.025	1.398	1.340
σ_{ϵ}	3.293	3.126	3.163
Log likelihood	1040.549	1036.934	1028.881
N	396	391	384

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 4.4: Predicting Whites' Contributions by Experimental Condition and Education

cording to perceived need, but according to the perceived racial background of the recipient and with respect to demographic perceptions.[13]


To understand what these patterns mean in terms of contributions, refer to Figure 4.2, which illustrates Whites' contributions with respect to experimental condition, recipient's racial background, and education, and based on the results of the most comprehensive model (3). The patterns are very similar to the ones from Figure 4.1 (based on bivariate analyses), which makes sense because the experimental manipulations were assigned randomly, i.e., independently of individual and county characteristics.

A few patterns are worth noting: first, the pattern of contributions for Whites with medium levels of education closely resemble the results of the lab experiment: Whites who read a neutral story gave similar amounts to white and black recipients, whereas those who read a story about Hispanic growth gave more to white recipients than black ones. This is also roughly consistent with the earlier finding that Whites with middling levels of education are most sensitive to intergroup threat (e.g., Wodtke 2012).


In terms of relative contributions to white and black recipients across conditions, the patterns for high education Whites also resemble the results of the lab experiment: Whites who read a story about Hispanic growth are relatively less generous toward black than white recipients, compared to Whites in the baseline condition. The specific form these contributions take, however, is slightly different. High education Whites who read a neutral story are actually more generous toward Blacks than Whites; those who read a story about Hispanic growth, by contrast, are slightly more generous toward Whites than Blacks.

The pattern for low education Whites diverges from those of the lab experiment, however. Those who read a neutral story gave slightly more to white recipients than black ones, whereas those who read a story about Hispanic growth gave more to black recipients than white ones. In relative terms, low education Whites in the Hispanic growth condition are relatively more generous to black recipients than white ones, compared to respondents in

[13]This result also holds up for black respondents (Table 4.5).



(a) Baseline



(b) Hispanic Growth

Figure 4.2: Whites' Predicted Contributions by Experimental Condition and Education[†]
[†]Whiskers report standard errors


the baseline condition. Next, I consider whether Blacks' reactions to Hispanic growth are similarly conditioned by education.

Education and Hispanic Growth: The Case of Blacks

Figure 4.3a illustrates average game contributions among black respondents in the baseline condition, and Figure 4.3b illustrates average game contributions among black respondents in the Hispanic growth condition. First, let's consider the case of Blacks with the lowest levels of education. Low education Blacks who first read a neutral story gave more, on average, to black recipients than white ones ($3.62 versus $3.22), whereas those who first read a story about Hispanic growth gave more, on average, to white recipients than black ones ($3.82 versus $3.06). This is similar to the pattern among Blacks with the highest levels of education, though absolute contributions were higher for this group. High education Blacks who first read a neutral story gave more, on average, to black recipients than white ones ($4.43 versus $3.80), whereas those who first read a story about Hispanic growth gave more, on average, to white recipients than black ones ($4.47 versus $4.10).

For low and high education Blacks, patterns of relative contributions resemble those observed among Blacks in the lab experiment, i.e., black respondents were relatively more generous to Whites than Blacks in the Hispanic growth condition, as opposed to the baseline. For medium education Blacks, however, we see a different pattern: those who first read a neutral story gave more, on average, to white recipients than black ones ($4.43 versus $3.43), whereas those who first read a story about Hispanic growth gave slightly more to black recipients than white ones ($3.63 versus $3.35).

A simple linear regression confirms that the interaction between Hispanic growth and low education was a significant predictor of contributions to both Whites ($p < 0.05$) and Blacks ($p < 0.10$). In short, Blacks' contributions to white versus black recipients varied based on whether respondents first read a neutral story or a story about Hispanic growth, and this variation depended on the respondent's level of education.



(a) Baseline

(b) Hispanic Growth

Figure 4.3: Blacks' Average Contributions by Experimental Condition and Education

Model 1 in Table 4.5 reports the results of a multilevel linear regression predicting Blacks' contributions in terms of three factors: treatment, recipient's race, and educational attainment (low and high education versus medium education).[14] The constant ($4.35) corresponds to the predicted contribution to a white recipient in the baseline condition among a black respondent with a medium education. Model 2 accounts for other differences between respondents, and Model 3 additionally accounts for differences between the counties where respondents live.

Once more, the effect of Hispanic growth on contributions hinges on the respondent's level of education. For low education respondents, contributions in the Hispanic growth condition were significantly lower to white recipients, but not to black ones. For medium education respondents, contributions in the Hispanic growth condition were not significantly associated with Hispanic growth, recipient's race, or a combination of the two. By contrast, both low education and high education Blacks were significantly less generous toward black recipients in the Hispanic growth condition. In addition, the results of Model 3 indicate that low education respondents gave significantly less overall.

To better understand these patterns in terms of contributions, it is again useful to refer to predicted contributions. Figure 4.2 illustrates Blacks' contributions with respect to experimental condition, recipient's racial background, and education, and based on the results of the most comprehensive model (3). Again, and as expected, the patterns are similar to the ones from Figure 4.3 (based on bivariate analyses).


A few results are worth noting: first, the pattern of contributions for Blacks with low levels of education resembles the results of the lab experiment: low education Blacks who read a story about Hispanic growth were relatively more generous to white than black recipients, compared to those who read a neutral story. A similar, but more muted reaction can be observed among high education Blacks. The pattern for medium education Blacks diverges

[14]The bivariate patterns for low and high education respondents resemble each other and diverge from that among low education respondents. Therefore, and to facilitate interpretation, medium education respondents serve as the reference category.


	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic growth	−1.017	−1.013	−1.069
Black recipient	−0.895	−0.973	−1.210
Hispanic growth x black recipient	1.394	1.426	1.734
Low education	−1.215	−1.164	−1.451^{+}
Hispanic growth x low education	1.727	1.599	1.873
Black recipient x low education	1.364	1.309	1.834
Hispanic growth x black recipient x low education	−2.631^{+}	−2.489	−3.074^{+}
High education	−0.422	−0.638	−0.582
Hispanic growth x high education	1.697	1.803	1.873
Black recipient x high education	1.379	1.641	1.972
Hispanic growth x black recipient x high education	−2.295	−2.659	−3.428^{+}
Individual Controls			
Age		0.005	0.009
Female		0.413	0.129
Household income ($)		0.000	0.000
Ideology		0.266	0.231
Perceived recipient class		−0.310	−0.212
County Controls			
Hispanic share (ln)			−0.317
Black share (ln)			0.066
Median household income ($)			0.000
Unemployment rate (%)			−0.001
Gini coefficient			−6.741
Share in same residence (%)			0.000
Democratic vote share (%)			−0.007
Urban (ref.)			
Suburban			−1.368^{+}
Rural			−0.779
South			0.158
Constant	4.353***	4.361***	4.733***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	1.007	1.073	1.155
σ_{ϵ}	3.118	3.117	3.074
Log likelihood	−990.740	−985.484	−920.742
N	385	377	350

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table 4.5: Predicting Blacks' Contributions by Experimental Condition and Education



(a) Baseline



(b) Hispanic Growth

Figure 4.4: Blacks' Predicted Contributions by Experimental Condition and Education†
†Whiskers report standard errors

from the lab experiment, however. Those who read a neutral story gave more to white recipients than black ones, whereas those who read a story about Hispanic growth gave slightly more to black recipients than white ones.

Anti-Black Resentment as a Function of Education and Hispanic Growth

Are these patterns limited to the dictator game context, or do we observe something similar among a different population and with respect to an alternative measure of out-group treatment? To address these questions, I turn once again to the CCES and, specifically, the subsample of non-Hispanic white respondents.[15]

For analytic consistency, I again divide respondents into three categories: 1) low education, 2) medium education, and 3) high education. Next, I look at average levels of anti-black resentment across levels of education and ongoing Hispanic growth (Table 4.6). Low growth counties are those that fall at or below the median (1.11%) in terms of 2010–2014 Hispanic growth; high growth counties are those that fall above the median. Recall that the goal of the Hispanic growth prime was to manipulate perceptions of ongoing Hispanic growth, as opposed to Hispanic share or past Hispanic growth.

	Low Hispanic growth	High Hispanic growth
Low education	7.951	7.879
	(7.899, 8.003)	(7.823, 7.935)
Medium education	7.661	7.647
	(7.603, 7.719)	(7.589, 7.705)
High education	6.644	6.774
	(6.579, 6.708)	(6.712, 6.837)

Note: 95% confidence intervals enclosed in parentheses

Table 4.6: Average Resentment across Education and Levels of Hispanic Growth

[15]Recall, from Chapter 3, that we cannot perform equivalent analyses for Blacks because the CCES does not ask about respondents' attitudes toward Whites.

Table 4.6 reports average resentment across levels of education. Low education Whites in high growth counties reported lower racial resentment toward Blacks than did low education Whites in low growth counties. This is consistent with the survey experimental finding that low education respondents gave relatively more to black versus white recipients in the Hispanic growth—as opposed to baseline—condition.

Medium education respondents in low and high growth counties reported comparable levels of resentment. However, high education respondents in high growth counties reported more resentment than high education respondents in low growth counties. A simple linear regression confirms that the interaction between Hispanic growth and education was significant ($p < 0.01$).

These patterns are roughly consistent with those observed for Whites in the TESS data: greater levels of education were associated with stronger anti-black reactions in response to Hispanic growth. In the TESS data, however, medium education respondents—rather than high education respondents—reported the strongest reactions. Education is, of course, associated with a range of exogenous characteristics—including household income and place of residence. To explore to what extent education moderates the statistical effect of Hispanic growth independently of these other factors, I turn to a multivariate regression.

Table 4.7 reports the results of multilevel, multivariate linear regressions predicting agreement with (1) a composite measure of resentment, (2) the view that Blacks should work their way up "without any special favors", and (3) the view that slavery and discrimination are responsible for Blacks' disadvantage (reverse-coded).

Table 4.7: Resentment by Hispanic Share, Growth, and Education

	Resentment	No favors	No discrim
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic share (ln)	0.098^{*}	0.066^{**}	0.032
Hispanic growth (%)	-0.062	-0.022	-0.042^{+}
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth	0.032	0.021	0.014
Medium education	-0.180^{***}	-0.126^{***}	-0.053^{*}

Continued on next page

Continued from previous page

	Resentment	No favors	No discrim
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic share x medium education	−0.143**	−0.068**	−0.073*
Hispanic growth x medium education	0.104*	0.035	0.070*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth x medium education	−0.043	−0.026	−0.019
High education	−0.803***	−0.451***	−0.351***
Hispanic share x high education	−0.074	−0.031	−0.042
Hispanic growth x high education	0.102*	0.031	0.073*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth x high education	−0.023	−0.008	−0.017
Black share (ln)	0.128***	0.056***	0.071***
Black growth (%)	0.078**	0.047***	0.031*
Black share x black growth	−0.028	−0.017+	−0.011
Individual Controls			
Age	−0.005***	−0.001+	−0.004***
Female	−0.084***	−0.052***	−0.033*
Family income ($)	0.000+	0.000***	0.000+
News interest	−0.201***	−0.127***	−0.074***
Ideology	1.631***	0.816***	0.815***
4th+ generation			
Immigrant grandparent(s)	−0.005	−0.010	0.005
Immigrant parent(s)	−0.009	0.031	−0.042
Citizen immigrant	0.178*	0.188***	−0.011
Non-citizen immigrant	−0.023	0.114	−0.137
County Controls			
Median household income ($)	0.000+	0.000*	0.000
Unemployment rate (%)	0.014*	0.007*	0.007*
Gini coefficient	−1.617***	−0.606*	−1.057***
Share in same residence (%)	0.014***	0.009***	0.004*
Democratic vote share (%)	−0.010***	−0.005***	−0.005***
Urban (ref.)			
Suburban	0.058	0.007	0.051*
Rural	0.041	0.047	−0.005
South	0.103**	0.034+	0.070**
Constant	7.754***	4.131***	3.622***
Log likelihood	−58621	−41032	−45210
N	28229	28264	28261

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)




Figure 4.5: Resentment by Hispanic Growth and Education

Most of the coefficients are similar between these analyses and the analyses of Chapter 3 in terms of magnitude, direction, and significance. The earlier analyses did not, however, consider the moderating role of education. Here, I focus on the statistical effects of ongoing Hispanic growth and education, separately and in combination.

First consider Model 1, which predicts the composite measure of resentment. Among low education Whites, Hispanic growth was not significantly associated with reported resentment, holding other individual and community differences constant. Medium and high education Whites reported lower racial resentment than low education Whites, but among these respondents, Hispanic growth was significantly associated with greater resentment toward Blacks. In terms of magnitude, the statistical effect of Hispanic growth on anti-black resentment was greatest among medium education Whites, which is consistent with the results of the TESS survey experiment. Education did not moderate the effect of Hispanic share, nor did the moderating effect of education on Hispanic growth vary across levels of Hispanic share.

Figure 4.5 illustrates the character of this interaction. Low education Whites generally reported the highest levels of anti-black resentment, but greater Hispanic growth was actually associated with lower resentment. Medium education Whites were a notch below low education Whites in terms of anti-black resentment, but for them, greater Hispanic growth was associated with greater resentment. Consistent with the TESS results, medium education Whites in high growth counties expressed the most hostile reaction to Blacks. Finally, high education Whites reported by far the lowest levels of anti-black resentment, but for them, too, Hispanic growth was associated with greater, not lower, resentment.

Models 2 and 3 reveal something else. Beliefs about the sources of Blacks' disadvantage account for most of the story. Medium and high education Whites were significantly less likely than low education Whites to endorse the views that Blacks should work their way up without special favors (2) and slavery and discrimination are not responsible for Blacks' disadvantage (3).

Hispanic growth, however, was only a significant predictor of the second view, either alone or in combination with education. Specifically, low education Whites in high growth counties were relatively more likely to attribute Blacks' disadvantage to structural factors like discrimination or slavery, whereas medium and high education Whites in high growth counties were relatively less likely to attribute Blacks' disadvantage to such factors. The results suggest that well-educated Whites' reactions to Hispanic growth are more closely tied to beliefs about the sources of Blacks disadvantage than an implicit comparison with past (or present?) immigrants.

Discussion

The patterns that emerged from the survey and survey experimental data add nuance both to the results of Chapter 2 and the predictions of prior research.

White TESS respondents with medium and high levels of education (some college education or a college degree) most closely resembled white lab participants in terms of reactions to Hispanic growth. These respondents were relatively more generous to white than black recipients if they first read a story about Hispanic growth, as opposed to a neutral story. White TESS respondents with low levels of education exhibited a very different reaction: these respondents were relatively more generous to black than white recipients if they first read a story about Hispanic growth.

These patterns cast doubt on the assumption that the lab results for Whites (Chapter 2) represent an upper bound on the effects of Hispanic growth. Low education Whites, it turns out, react to Hispanic growth by behaving relatively more generously toward Blacks. A simple application of the education-as-enlightenment hypothesis, however, would predict that these are the Whites with the greatest interest in protecting in-group resources and distancing themselves from Non-Whites.

The education-as-refinement hypothesis is not fully equipped to explain these patterns, either. The most defensive behavior—in terms of relative contributions to Blacks—was exhibited by Whites with middling levels of education who were primed to perceive Hispanic growth. Similarly, the highest levels of anti-black resentment were reported by white CCES respondents with middling levels of education in counties with growing Hispanic populations.

Black TESS respondents with low and high levels of education (high school or less or college degree) most closely resembled black lab participants in terms of reactions to Hispanic growth. These respondents were relatively more generous to white than black recipients if they first read a story about Hispanic growth, as opposed to a neutral story. Black TESS respondents with middling levels of education had a different reaction: these respondents were relatively more generous to black than white recipients if they first read a story about Hispanic growth.

If we shift our lens from contributions to in-group versus out-group members (as opposed to Blacks versus Whites), the patterns for Blacks and Whites across levels of education are

similar: those with middling levels of education are relatively more generous to in-group versus out-group members in response to Hispanic growth. What is it about people with middling levels of education that leads them to circle the wagons, so to speak, around their own group? Do they feel especially marginalized by ongoing demographic changes? Are they more likely to interpret intergroup threat in terms of a black–white binary? Are they more strongly attached to their racial identity by virtue of their own liminal class status (not working class, not highly educated)? These and other questions merit further research.

Chapter 5

Conclusion: Beyond the Two-Group Paradigm

Broadly, the results of the previous chapters indicate that the growth of one group—real or perceived—affects relations between other groups. Individual reactions to out-group growth hinge on both meso-level factors, like group membership, and micro-level ones, like educational attainment.

To review, Chapter 2 is based on an original laboratory experiment carried out among a sample of Blacks and Whites from central New Jersey. The laboratory experiment incorporated both behavioral game and survey components; results suggest Whites and Blacks react in different ways to the perception of Hispanic population growth. Whites who first read a story about Hispanic growth were relatively more generous to Whites than Blacks, compared to those who first read a neutral story; they were also relatively more likely to identify as "white" as opposed to "American." Blacks who first read a story about Hispanic growth were relatively more generous to Whites than Blacks, compared to those who first read a neutral story; they were also relatively more likely to identify as "American" as opposed to "black." The results imply that Hispanic growth catalyzes 1) a national identity for Blacks

that allies them with Whites on the basis of a shared Americanness and 2) a racial identity for Whites that reaffirms their distance from all Non-Whites, including Blacks.

Chapter 3 draws on the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) to examine whether and how actual levels of local Hispanic growth are associated with Whites' racial and racial policy attitudes. Three sets of results emerge: first, Whites in counties where the Hispanic population was growing more reported significantly greater resentment toward Blacks. Second, Whites in counties where the Hispanic population was growing more reported significantly more opposition to affirmative action. Finally, preliminary evidence based on a proxy measure of attitudes toward Hispanics suggests Whites' reactions to black share mirror their reactions to Hispanic growth. Whites in counties where the black population was relatively larger reported significantly more support for restrictive immigration policies.

Chapter 4 examines whether the impact of Hispanic growth is conditioned by individual educational attainment. Attention to educational attainment is motivated by two factors: first, the lack of representativeness and balance in terms of education that characterized the lab sample (Chapter 2), and second, the contradictory theoretical stances and empirical findings that populate the literature on education and out-group attitudes. Results from an original survey experiment reveal a non-monotonic association between education and reactions to Hispanic growth among both Whites and Blacks. Whites with medium and high levels of education were relatively more generous to Whites than Blacks in the Hispanic growth condition, consistent with the lab experiment; these results were further validated by CCES data on Whites' resentment toward Blacks. Blacks with low and high levels of education were relatively more generous to Whites than Blacks in the Hispanic growth condition, consistent with the lab experiment. Patterns of contributions for low-education Whites and medium-education Blacks—two groups that were relatively underrepresented in the lab sample—diverged from expectations. For these respondents, high levels of resource-

hoarding in the baseline condition were met with relatively generous contributions to out-group members in the Hispanic growth condition.

The Future of the US Color Line, Reconsidered

Scholars continue to speculate about the future of the US color line in the wake of ongoing diversification. Three general possibilities have been proposed. According to the first, Blacks and Hispanics will form a "rainbow coalition" based on common experiences as non-Whites (see, e.g., Craig and Richeson 2012). According to the second, black/non-black will replace black-white as the most consequential intergroup boundary (Gans 1999; Lee and Bean 2004). Finally, Bonilla-Silva (2004) contends the country will move toward a tri-racial pigmentocracy where light-skinned Hispanics and Asians occupy a tenuous, intermediate position as "honorary whites." The findings of this dissertation serve as a reminder that members of different ethnoracial groups may seek to realize incompatible social configurations, hence the location of the future US color line—or lines—remains to be negotiated.

This possibility raises the question: What happens if groups disagree on the most important line of social division? A few considerations are worth keeping in mind. First, the ability to impose one's vision of social division is reserved for those, like Whites, who possess greater political, economic, and symbolic resources. If Whites are determined to preserve their dominant position in the racial order, they are likely to succeed. Second, even if Whites were to assert an American identity, this would not guarantee that Blacks could lay claim to this identity. We need look no further than the Birther Movement to suspect that whiteness and Americanness continue to be deeply intertwined.

A mismatch between Whites' and Blacks' categorization schemas may not only leave Blacks vulnerable to continued domination by Whites, it may also impede an alliance with Hispanics on the basis of common subordination. Collective action presupposes the mutual awareness of shared interests and identities (Calhoun 1991). Even if Blacks pursue an alliance with Hispanics, there is, of course, no guarantee Hispanics will meet them halfway. Craig and

Richeson's research (2012) on intraminority relations suggests a way forward: making salient shared experiences of discrimination at the hands of Whites. Ultimately, to make predictions about the future of the US color line, future research will need to elucidate Hispanics' (and Asian Americans') identity strategies.

Research on Intergroup Relations Moving Forward

The goal of this dissertation was to make theoretical headway into the realm of multi-group relations by examining the case of Hispanic growth and its impact on relations between Blacks and Whites. The findings point both toward a general understanding of multi-group relations and toward the specificity of the US case.

First, the findings provide compelling evidence that the introduction of a third group affects relations between two other groups. Early clues for this possibility can be found in Simmel's work on social geometry (1950[1908]a; 1950[1908]b) and Kim's work on the historic reception of Asian Americans in the United States (1999). However, empirical research on intergroup relations had yet to establish that the growth of one group has "spillover effects" for other groups, much less illustrate the shape spillover takes.

The results also suggest individual reactions to a third group take different forms depending on meso- and micro-level factors. At the meso level, group membership conditions responses to Hispanic growth, as illustrated by the different behavioral and attitudinal strategies employed by Blacks versus Whites. At the micro level, educational attainment shapes responses to Hispanic growth in ways that vary across Blacks and Whites.

Broader, macro-level factors likely explain what it is about group membership—or, for that matter, educational attainment—that shapes responses to Hispanic growth. Possible factors include:

Available categorization schemas. Blacks and Whites drew on national and racial categorization schemas, first and foremost, because these were cognitively available to them. In the

United States today, race and nation are recognized as legitimate bases of social division. In another context, tribe, language, or any number of alternative organizing principles might be consequential.

The characteristics of the third group. Of the schemas that are cognitively available, only some can be used to distinguish and exclude members of the growing group. In the case of Hispanics, race and nation represent the two most widely drawn-on schemas (Chavez 2008). On the flip side, Hispanics are not good candidates for exclusion on the basis of religion because they are predominately Christian.[1] A study that considers communities where the Muslim population is growing, for example, might instead find action around religious boundaries.

The nature of relations between the two original groups. In the United States, Whites are both a dominant group and a majority; Blacks are both a subordinate group and a minority. Members of both groups have an interest in defending a positive social identity, according to social psychologists. At the same time, Blacks and Whites must take different considerations into account in pursuing such an identity. For example, Whites need to reinforce their dominance in ways that are discrete and deniable; Blacks need to pursue an alliance with a more privileged group without completely sacrificing intergroup distinctiveness. These asymmetries are reflected in the finding that people respond to perceived threat by denigrating members of lower status groups, but not higher status groups (Cadinu and Reggiori 2002).

To further this research program, and to pinpoint *which* factors at the macro level shape responses to out-group growth (and *how*), we need to look at the growth of other groups in other contexts. Another case—or cases—would shed light on what it is about the US system

[1]Hispanics are also predominately US citizens. (Nearly two-thirds of US Hispanics were born in the United States.) In this case, though, popular perceptions do not match reality (Chapter 3).

of race relations and the Hispanic population that drives the specific patterns I document in this dissertation.

Several considerations should be brought to bear on future research: First, the interplay between individual status and group status, which is critical in this case, is likely to be critical in others. Blacks and Whites not only respond in different ways to Hispanic growth, but educational attainment moderates their responses in different ways. The literature on intergroup relations, however, has yet to fully consider how individual and group characteristics interact to shape individual strategies. How does a high-status member of a low-status group pursue a positive social identity? How about a low-status member of a high-status group?

Second, future work needs to consider the broad range of identities people draw on to classify themselves and others. The decision to focus on race and nation was motivated by prior work on the Latino threat narrative (Chavez 2008). Ultimately, educational attainment also emerged as an important factor shaping in-group versus out-group treatment along with responses to Hispanic growth. We would do well to heed Wimmer's (2013) call to assess, rather than assume, whether ethnoracial boundaries are in fact the operative organizing principle.

Finally, the results anticipate what social identity theorists stand to gain from considering the multi-group case. Scholars in this tradition have long stressed "salience" as a critical variable shaping intergroup interactions. The assumption underlying such discussions is that salience is simply a matter of degree. This assumption makes sense in a two-group setting, where one out-group becomes more or less salient as a function of contextual factors like proximity and competition. In a multi-group setting, however, the salience of one group hinges on the salience of other groups. The findings of this dissertation suggest that to identify the "relevant comparison group,"[2] researchers must first determine which of multiple identities are available in specific contexts (see also Craig and Richeson 2012).

[2]This term comes from Tajfel and Turner (1986: 377).

Additional Questions for Future Research

The findings of the previous chapters also raise a number of outstanding questions related to ongoing diversification in the United States. One line of inquiry concerns how Hispanics view their relationship to Blacks and Whites. An immediate contribution of such a project would be validating the predictions of this dissertation with the lived experiences of Hispanics. For example, preliminary analyses of the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) uncover several relevant facts: among Hispanics who report experiences of discrimination 1) most cite differences related to race/ethnicity (e.g., skin color) or national background (e.g., "being an immigrant") as the main reason, 2) the tendency to cite differences related to race/ethnicity versus national background varies based on proximity to Blacks versus Whites. Specifically, attributing unfair treatment to ethnoracial differences is more common in counties with a relatively larger share of Whites, and attributing unfair treatment to national differences is more common in counties with a relatively larger share of Whites *and* in counties with a relatively larger share of Blacks. Hispanics, it seems, are aware of the regrouping processes playing out in this dissertation.

Additional questions for future research concern the reactions of Hispanics to demographic changes as well as heterogeneity within the Hispanic, white, and black categories. For example:

How do Hispanics respond to the growth of the Hispanic population or other groups? Hispanics also have stake in shaping the US racial order. European immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century were not merely passive observers of the existing order; in pursuing a more advantageous position for themselves, they altered the order itself (Roediger 2005). How do Hispanics respond to ongoing demographic changes? What behavioral and attitudinal strategies do they adopt to protect their positive social identity?

How does Asian American growth affect relations between Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics? Asian Americans are currently the fastest growing group in the United States, outpacing

Hispanics; since the Great Recession, in fact, net migration from Mexico has been slightly negative (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015). These facts seem to have escaped the notice of non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks (Chapters 2 and 4). As Asian Americans continue to grow, however, they will exert greater pressure on the US racial order. Reactions to Asian American population growth (and Asian Americans' own responses to demographic changes) are rife for investigation.

Are responses to Hispanic growth affected by differences among Hispanics? If so, how? The panethnic Hispanic category lumps together individuals from different national origins, nativity backgrounds, and legal statuses (Massey and Bartley 2005). Additionally, the labels "Hispanic" and "Latino/a" often do not match people's self-understandings. Due to data and resource limitations, I did not manipulate or evaluate different sources of Hispanic growth. In the abstract, non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks tend to have a very specific kind of person in mind when they think about Hispanics (Chapter 4); in real-world interactions, however, people pick up on differences between individual Hispanics, differences that condition their interpersonal interactions (Jiménez 2015; Jiménez et al. 2015). Future research should relax the assumption of perceived homogeneity, because reactions to Mexicans and Central Americans likely differ from reactions to, say, citizen Puerto Ricans or to white Cuban-Americans.

An even more immediate set of questions has to do with patterns of identification in the survey experiment (Chapter 4) and the relation between identification, game contributions, and educational attainment. As in the lab experiment, the decision to prioritize one's racial or national identity was different between Blacks and Whites in the national survey experiment. However, the results also revealed substantial heterogeneity by level of educational attainment.

Briefly, among Whites, the tendency to prioritize a white identity in response to Hispanic growth was most pronounced among those with low educational attainment (high school or less). Among Blacks, the tendency to prioritize an American identity was most pronounced among those with middling levels of education (some college or associate's degree).

A clue to the source of these patterns lies in the different understandings of Americanness held by people with varying levels of education. The 2004 21st Century Americanism Survey (CAS) includes a series of questions about what traits "should be ... important ... in making someone a true American." People differ in terms of which traits they select, and these differences are associated with differences in educational attainment. For example, Whites with higher levels of education are less likely to agree that "carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors" should be important for making someone a true American. In other words, highly educated Whites are more likely to hold an assimilationist view of American identity. Such a view might allow these Whites to exclude Hispanics without appealing to a less socially acceptable racial identity.

Attending to the heterogeneous meanings of American identity could also give purchase on an apparent paradox in the empirical literature on American identity. On the one hand, experiments have identified an implicit association between whiteness and Americanness (Cheryan and Monin 2005; Devos and Banaji 2005), an association rooted in Whites' historical hegemony over the US nation and its symbols (Doane 1997). On the other hand, Americanness sometimes operates as a superordinate identity that transcends ethnoracial divisions (Gaertner et al. 1999). Evidence for this includes the finding that US Whites express more progressive attitudes toward redistribution and race-targeted policies if their national identity is first made salient (Transue 2007; Smith and Tyler 1996), and the finding that contributions to same- versus other-race recipients are more comparable among the group of participants who prioritize their American identity (Chapter 2).

The apparent contradiction is likely fueled by the assumption that American identification predicts racial attitudes in the same way, across all people, and independently of exogenous factors. In fact, cross-national research suggests the association between ethnic identification and national identification differs across majority- versus minority-group members and with respect to country-level characteristics, like ethnic diversity and economic inequality (Staerklé et al. 2010). Staerklé and colleagues' research raises additional questions,

including 1) Are other attitudes, like racial and racial policy attitudes, related to national identification? and 2) Do other contextual characteristics, like out-group size and growth, condition the clustering of attitudes and identification? The second question is especially pressing as Staerklé et al. (2010) rely on a diversity index that obscures more than it reveals about differences in the number of ethnic groups, the distribution of people across groups, and the hierarchical arrangement of groups.

In a future research project, I plan on advancing Staerklé et al.'s (2010) agenda using relational class analysis—a technique to identify classes of people characterized by similar relationships between attitudes (Goldberg 2011)—to investigate whether the association between American identification and out-group attitudes varies across people and with respect to demographic characteristics of the communities where they live. For example, do Whites in areas where Blacks are overrepresented exhibit a negative association between American identification and support for redistribution? Do Whites in areas where Blacks are underrepresented exhibit a positive association between American identification and support for redistribution?

Political Ramifications of Diversification

> "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists ... It's coming from more than Mexico. It's coming from all over South and Latin America." Donald Trump, announcing 2016 presidential bid on June 16, 2015.

For better or worse, the 2016 election season has validated the concerns that motivated this dissertation. Trump's rhetoric in particular reflects (and likely reinforces) two popular impressions: first, the US Hispanic population is growing and this growth is driven in part

by ongoing immigration from Latin America, particularly Mexico. Second, Hispanic growth poses a threat to Americans' safety and way of life. By omitting Asian Americans, Trump is feeding the implicit perception that Asian American growth is not as consequential as Hispanic growth, whether in terms of size or threat.

From the conservative perspective, Trump's strategy is a smart one. Research shows that the size of the Hispanic population in a state predicts Republican Party identification among residents (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Along similar lines, making ongoing diversification salient is known to heighten conservatism (Craig and Richeson 2014) and Tea Party support (Willer et al. 2015). The results of the previous chapters hint at a possible mechanism for the observed effects: intergroup relations as expressed through out-group attitudes, identification choices, and policy preferences.

Likely, ideology and party identification also feed back into racial and racial policy attitudes. Recall that personal political ideology and ambient political context were among the factors most strongly associated with racial and racial policy attitudes (Chapter 3). The results of this dissertation hint at the multiplex ties between demographic diversification, ideology, party identification, and racial and racial policy attitudes, ties that merit further investigation, especially in the current political climate.

Appendix A

Priming Hispanic Growth

The primes were initially pretested using an online experimental survey fielded in September 2013 and distributed through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website. All 95 pretest respondents were located in the United States. Results from bivariate and multivariate analyses confirm that respondents in the Hispanic growth condition were significantly more likely than those in the baseline condition to report attitudes consistent with perceived Hispanic growth. For example, 100% of respondents in the Hispanic growth condition reported that Hispanics/Latinos are the fastest growing group in the United States, compared to 87% of respondents in the baseline condition ($p < 0.01$). A manipulation check from the lab experiment (Chapter 2) confirmed that participants in the treatment condition were more likely than those in the baseline condition to report that Hispanics/Latinos are the fastest growing group in the United States ($p < 0.10$).

Discriminant validity remained a source of concern: Did the article excerpts inadvertently prime participants' perceptions of analytically distinct phenomena, most notably, the *size* of the Hispanic population? I assessed this using the TESS-funded survey experiment (Chapter 4). I included an item that was closely modeled after an item from the 2000 GSS; it read "Below are several groups that reside in the United States. Just your best guess—what percentage of people in the United States belong to each group? Note: 100% means you

think everyone in the United States belongs to that group; 0% means you think no one in the United States belongs to that group." Groups included "Whites," "Blacks/African-Americans," "Hispanics/Latinos," and "Immigrants" (in randomized order). Respondents indicated their responses using a slider scale ranging from 0% to 100%.[1]

The results of the survey experiment confirm that respondents did not believe Hispanics made up a significantly larger share of the total US population after reading a story about Hispanic growth versus a neutral story (37.56% versus 37.39%). Perceptions of white, black, and immigrant shares were similarly unaffected by the prime.

Another question raised by TESS reviewers was whether the primes affected perceptions of the subgroup composition of Hispanics, rather than perceptions of Hispanics as a share of the total population. To this end, I included the following item on the survey experiment: "People who identify as Hispanic/Latino may come from different racial and national groups. Below are several of these groups. Just your best guess—what percentage of all Hispanics/Latinos in the United States belong to each group? Note: 100% means you think all Hispanics belong to that group; 0% means you think no Hispanics belong to that group." Groups included "Whites," "Blacks," "Mexican-origin," "US citizens," "Documented immigrants," and "Undocumented immigrants" (in random order). Again, respondents used a slider scale to record their responses. The results of the survey experiment indicate that respondents' perceptions of subgroup shares were not significantly affected by the prime.

To sum up, the evidence suggests that the Hispanic growth prime effectively manipulated perceptions of Hispanic growth, as intended, but not perceptions of Hispanic size or Hispanic subgroup composition.

[1]The slider was originally set at 50%; in some cases, respondents did not change the position of the slider. For the analyses reported here, these values are coded as 50%; supplementary analyses reveal substantively similar results if these values are coded as missing and omitted.

Appendix B

Educational Representativeness of Lab Sample

White and black lab participants (Chapter 2) differed from each other in terms of educational attainment. In addition, white lab participants differed from all US Whites in a way that was different from the way in which black lab participants differed from all US Blacks. Table B.1 reports the educational distribution of US Whites, US Blacks[1], white lab participants, and black lab participants.

White lab participants and black lab participants were significantly less likely to be represented in the lowest education category than US Whites and Blacks, respectively. White lab participants and black lab participants were also significantly more likely to be represented in the highest education category than US Whites and Blacks, respectively. The discrepancy was larger for white lab participants, however, who were also significantly more likely to be represented in the highest education category than black participants. At middling levels of education, white and black lab participants were unrepresentative in different ways: white lab participants were significantly underrepresented compared to their target group, whereas black lab participants were significantly overrepresented compared to their target group.

[1]Based on 3-year estimates from the ACS (2010–2012).

	US Whites	US Blacks	White Participants[a]	Black Participants[a]	z-value[b]
High school or less	40.65	48.95	11.00^{***}	16.67^{***}	-0.965
Some college or associate's	29.37	32.69	19.00^{*}	45.83^{+}	-3.414^{***}
College or more	29.97	18.36	70.00^{***}	37.50^{***}	3.770^{***}

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

[a]Significance tests based on comparison with target group

[b]Significance tests based on comparison between white and black lab participants

Table B.1: Educational Distribution of Target Populations and Experimental Sample

Appendix C

Calculating Experimental Sample Sizes

To predetermine the size of the lab experiment and survey experiment samples, I relied on the following formula for calculating the minimum sufficient sample size for a t-test of two independent samples:

$$N = \frac{4\sigma^2(z_\beta + z_{\alpha/2})^2}{(\mu_2 - \mu_1)^2}$$

For the lab sample, I first estimated the proportion of the minimum detectable differences to the within-group variance, $\frac{(\mu_2-\mu_1)^2}{\sigma^2}$ using responses to the following question from the 2012 GSS: "Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving the conditions of Blacks?" The rationale for using this question was that, like dictator game contributions, responses presumably reflect a willingness to share resources with members of a specific group.

A \$1 minimum detectable difference (out of \$10) roughly corresponds to a 0.3- or 0.4-point difference on a 3-point scale. My estimate of the sufficient sample size was based on a desired statistical power (β) of 80% and an alpha level of 0.05. Using the variance estimates for black GSS respondents (0.243) and white GSS respondents (0.470) yielded a minimum sufficient sample size of 92 Whites and 48 Blacks.

In calculating the minimum sufficient sample size for the survey experiment, I had the benefit of real dictator game data from the earlier lab experiment. Again using $1 as the minimum detectable difference, the calculations yielded a minimum sufficient sample of 636 respondents. I proposed a final sample of 750 respondents to address the fact that around 10% of lab participants reported suspicion regarding the setup of the game.

Appendix D

Chapter 2

	White Allocators	Black Allocators
Hispanic growth	0.942	3.779*
Black recipient	1.464	1.996
Hispanic growth x black recipient	−2.317+	−3.385
Age	0.036+	0.000
Female	1.745*	1.062
College education[1]	−0.469	1.290
Recipient's perceived class	0.860	−1.061
Constant	−1.148	1.791
R-squared	0.179	0.290
N	82	38

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table D.1: Predicting Contributions by Allocators Who Correctly Identified Recipient Race

	White Allocators	Black Allocators
Hispanic growth	1.861^{+}	2.521^{*}
Black recipient	0.881	1.438
Hispanic growth x black recipient	-3.178^{*}	-2.396
Age	0.035^{+}	-0.009
Female	1.593^{*}	0.644
College education^2	0.401	2.684^{*}
Recipient's perceived class	-0.240	0.805
Constant	0.339	-1.487
R-squared	0.198	0.370
N	85	42

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table D.2: Predicting Contributions by Allocators Who Followed Instructions

	White Allocators	Black Allocators
Hispanic growth	1.414	2.843^{+}
Black recipient	1.179	1.986
Hispanic growth x black recipient	-3.125^{*}	-2.902
Age	0.032	0.011
Female	1.135	0.512
College education^3	0.399	1.590
Recipient's perceived class	-0.568	0.434
Constant	1.528	-0.891
R-squared	0.169	0.248
N	88	43

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table D.3: Predicting Contributions by Allocators
Who Believed Recipient Would Receive Envelope

	American Identification	Black/White Identification
Hispanic growth	0.040	0.583*
Black recipient	0.043	1.268***
Hispanic growth x black recipient	−0.027	−0.814+
Age	0.007	−0.011+
Female	−0.186	−0.181
College education[4]	0.211	0.220
Recipient's perceived class	0.188	−0.130
Constant	2.042**	2.530***
R-squared	0.023	0.202
N	143	132

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)


Table D.4: Predicting National and Racial Identification, Non-Forced-Choice Items




Figure D.1: Baseline Prime: PLESS



Figure D.2: Treatment Prime: PLESS



(a) White Allocators



(b) Black Allocators

Figure D.3: National (versus Racial) Identification by Allocator's Race and Experimental Condition, Non-Forced-Choice Items
$^{+}p<0.10$; $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$ (two-sided)




Figure D.4: Game Contributions by National and Racial Identifiers
$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Appendix E

Chapter 3

Table E.1: Weighted Summary Statistics, Non-Hispanic Whites

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Racial resentment	7.385	2.305	2.000	10.000
No special favors	3.922	1.214	1.000	5.000
Not discrimination/slavery	3.463	1.364	1.000	5.000
Affirmative action opposition	3.055	0.914	1.000	4.000
Immigration opposition	3.033	2.005	0.000	6.000
No amnesty	0.579	0.494	0.000	1.000
More border patrols	0.590	0.492	0.000	1.000
Police questioning	0.443	0.497	0.000	1.000
Fine businesses	0.674	0.469	0.000	1.000
Ban from schools/hospitals	0.352	0.478	0.000	1.000
No birth citizenship	0.395	0.489	0.000	1.000
Age	48.543	16.802	18.000	94.000
Female	0.519	0.500	0.000	1.000
Education	3.284	1.517	1.000	6.000
Family income ($)	62781	55534	5000	540000
News interest	3.266	0.930	1.000	4.000
Liberal	0.245	0.430	0.000	1.000
Moderate	0.335	0.472	0.000	1.000
Conservative	0.420	0.494	0.000	1.000
4th+ generation	0.690	0.463	0.000	1.000
Immigrant grandparent(s)	0.218	0.413	0.000	1.000
Immigrant parent(s)	0.052	0.222	0.000	1.000
Citizen immigrant	0.025	0.156	0.000	1.000
Non-citizen immigrant	0.015	0.121	0.000	1.000

Continued on next page

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Hispanic share (%)	11.770	12.410	0.000	91.900
Hispanic growth (2000–2010, %)	2.702	2.016	−8.911	14.500
Hispanic growth (2010–2014, %)	1.292	0.938	−10.690	9.455
Black share (%)	9.934	11.053	0.000	86.140
Black growth (2000–2010, %)	0.551	1.588	−7.290	24.570
Black growth (2010–2014, %)	0.305	0.790	−10.390	8.286
Median household income ($)	54891	13782	20280	122800
Unemployment rate (%)	9.107	2.559	0.171	24.530
Gini coefficient	0.446	0.034	0.344	0.599
Share in same residence (%)	84.678	4.106	56.830	96.810
Democratic vote share (%)	48.272	14.456	5.773	91.450
Urban	0.813	0.390	0.000	1.000
Suburban	0.137	0.344	0.000	1.000
Rural	0.050	0.218	0.000	1.000
South	0.278	0.448	0.000	1.000

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic share (ln)	0.059^{+}	0.036^{**}	0.056^{*}
Hispanic growth (%)	-0.030^{*}	-0.019^{***}	-0.030^{*}
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth	0.024^{**}	0.012^{***}	0.024^{**}
Black share (ln)	0.169^{***}	0.041^{***}	0.054^{**}
Black growth (%)	0.027	0.005	0.017
Black share x Black growth	−0.003	0.003	−0.012
Individual Controls			
Age	0.002^{**}	0.001	0.013^{***}
Female	-0.194^{***}	-0.107^{***}	-0.354^{***}
Education	-0.289^{***}	-0.067^{***}	-0.179^{***}
Family income ($)	0.000	0.000^{*}	0.000
News interest	-0.174^{***}	−0.006	0.034^{**}
Party ID	1.340^{***}	0.498^{***}	1.066^{***}
4th+ generation (ref.)			
Immigrant grandparent(s)	0.000	0.005	−0.038
Immigrant parent(s)	−0.018	−0.016	-0.122^{**}
Citizen immigrant	0.133	−0.028	-0.268^{***}
Non-citizen immigrant	−0.115	-0.160^{**}	-0.433^{***}
County Controls			
Median household income ($)	0.000^{***}	0.000^{+}	0.000^{+}
Unemployment rate (%)	0.010	0.011^{***}	0.014^{**}
Gini coefficient	-2.249^{***}	-0.505^{**}	-1.688^{***}
Share in same residence (%)	0.017^{***}	0.006^{***}	0.007^{*}
Democratic vote share (%)	-0.014^{***}	-0.005^{***}	-0.008^{***}
Urban (ref.)			
Suburban	0.074^{+}	−0.017	0.046
Rural	0.019	−0.027	−0.051
South	0.080^{*}	0.019	0.048
Constant	5.382^{***}	2.337^{***}	1.509^{***}
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.120	0.045	0.146
σ_{ϵ}	1.894	0.827	1.786
Log likelihood	−63558	−40669	−66274
N	29753	32953	33061

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table E.2: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Controlling for Party Identification

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic composition			
Hispanic share (ln)	0.034**	0.037***	0.035**
Hispanic growth (00–10)	−0.031*	−0.046***	−0.019
Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.013	0.018*	−0.013
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10)	0.025**	0.027**	0.020*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (10–14)	−0.007	−0.002	0.009
Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.010	0.0001	−0.001
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	−0.010*	−0.005	−0.002
Black composition			
Black share (ln)	0.074***	0.041***	0.028**
Black growth (00–10)	0.011	0.016	0.013
Black growth (10–14)	0.025**	0.007	0.010
Black share x Black growth (00–10)	0.001	0.012	−0.008
Black share x Black growth (10–14)	−0.012	−0.011	−0.010
Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	−0.005	−0.010+	−0.002
Black share x Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	0.003	0.004	0.001
Constant	0.045***	0.204***	0.134***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.055	0.039	0.071
σ_{ϵ}	0.829	0.783	0.864
Log likelihood	−36821	−38838	−42284
N	29753	32953	33061

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Note: Models include controls for age, gender, education, family income, news interest, party identification, and generation since immigration (individual), as well as median household income, unemployment, income inequality, share in same residence, Democratic vote share, urbanism, and region (county).

Table E.3: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Controlling for Party Identification

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic share (ln)	0.071*	0.039**	0.078**
Hispanic growth (%)	−0.025	−0.016**	−0.028*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth	0.023*	0.008*	0.023**
Black share (ln)	0.131***	0.038***	0.039*
Black growth (%)	−0.005	0.000	−0.017+
Black share x Black growth	−0.005	0.0002	−0.017+
Individual Controls			
Age	−0.007***	−0.002***	0.006***
Female	−0.079**	−0.061***	−0.290***
Education	−0.235***	−0.056***	−0.148***
Family income ($)	0.000+	0.000*	0.000*
News interest	−0.177***	−0.017*	0.056***
Ideology	1.714***	0.618***	1.320***
4th+ generation (ref.)			
Immigrant grandparent(s)	0.001	0.009	−0.041
Immigrant parent(s)	0.040	−0.003	−0.099*
Citizen immigrant	0.192*	−0.005	−0.230**
Non-citizen immigrant	−0.246	−0.180*	−0.422*
County Controls			
Median household income ($)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Unemployment rate (%)	0.014*	0.014***	0.016**
Gini coefficient	−1.315*	−0.520*	−1.501**
Share in same residence (%)	0.014***	0.005***	−0.0004
Democratic vote share (%)	−0.009***	−0.004***	−0.005***
Urban (ref.)			
Suburban	0.103*	0.000	0.052
Rural	0.003	−0.023	0.062
South	0.104*	0.010	0.071+
Constant	7.377***	3.091***	3.269***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.096	0.038	0.116
σ_{ϵ}	1.889	0.774	1.691
Log likelihood	-41459	-25629	-42892
N	20122	21929	21992

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table E.4: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Subsample of Longterm Residents

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic composition			
Hispanic share (ln)	0.027*	0.029*	0.032*
Hispanic growth (00–10)	−0.033*	−0.049***	−0.026+
Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.018+	0.030**	−0.002
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10)	0.027*	0.028**	0.027*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (10–14)	−0.007	−0.010	0.004
Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	−0.004	−0.008	−0.018+
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.002	0.002	0.010+
Black composition			
Black share (ln)	0.055***	0.036***	0.018+
Black growth (00–10)	0.010	0.024+	0.013
Black growth (10–14)	0.023*	0.000	0.008
Black share x Black growth (00–10)	0.002	0.007	−0.007
Black share x Black growth (10–14)	−0.015	−0.009	−0.009
Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	−0.001	−0.007	0.004
Black share x Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	0.000	0.002	−0.004
Constant	0.065***	0.226***	0.167***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.038	0.031	0.057
σ_{ϵ}	0.769	0.732	0.818
Log likelihood	−23386	−24409	−26940
N	20122	21929	21992

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Note: Models include controls for age, gender, education, family income, news interest, party identification, and generation since immigration (individual), as well as median household income, unemployment, income inequality, share in same residence, Democratic vote share, urbanism, and region (county).

Table E.5: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Subsample of Longterm Residents

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic share (ln)	0.050^{+}	0.027^{*}	0.054^{*}
Hispanic growth (%)	-0.025^{+}	-0.014^{**}	-0.027^{*}
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth	0.018^{*}	0.007^{*}	0.022^{**}
Black share (ln)	0.106^{***}	0.022^{**}	0.017
Black growth (%)	0.033^{*}	0.006	0.018
Black share x Black growth	-0.007	0.001	-0.014
Individual Controls			
Age	-0.005^{***}	-0.002^{***}	0.007^{***}
Female	-0.083^{***}	-0.062^{***}	-0.262^{***}
Education	-0.241^{***}	-0.051^{***}	-0.143^{***}
Family income ($)	0.000	0.000^{**}	0.000
News interest	-0.193^{***}	-0.014^{*}	0.052^{***}
Ideology	1.626^{***}	0.585^{***}	1.257^{***}
4th+ generation (ref.)			
Immigrant grandparent(s)	0.002	0.005	-0.036
Immigrant parent(s)	-0.001	-0.015	-0.101^{*}
Citizen immigrant	0.154^{*}	-0.036	-0.267^{***}
Non-citizen immigrant	-0.004	-0.110^{+}	-0.424^{***}
County Controls			
Median household income ($)	0.000^{+}	0.000	0.000
Unemployment rate (%)	0.012^{*}	0.012^{***}	0.016^{**}
Gini coefficient	-1.446^{**}	-0.189	-1.243^{**}
Share in same residence (%)	0.015^{***}	0.006^{***}	0.003
Democratic vote share (2004, %)	-0.011^{***}	-0.004^{***}	-0.005^{***}
Urban (ref.)			
Suburban	0.060	-0.017	0.026
Rural	0.029	-0.019	-0.015
South	0.139^{***}	0.033^{*}	0.081^{*}
Constant	7.861^{***}	3.286^{***}	3.482^{***}
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.126	0.043	0.133
σ_{ϵ}	1.922	0.792	1.710
Log likelihood	-59963	-37918	-62638
N	28866	31855	31944

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table E.6: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Controlling for 2004 Election Results

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic composition			
Hispanic share (ln)	0.022^{+}	0.022^{*}	0.029^{*}
Hispanic growth (00–10)	-0.032^{**}	-0.040^{***}	-0.021
Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.018^{+}	0.024^{**}	-0.008
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10)	0.022^{*}	0.020^{*}	0.017^{+}
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (10–14)	-0.008	-0.004	0.010
Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.001	-0.004	-0.004
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	-0.003	-0.001	0.002
Black composition			
Black share (ln) Black share (ln)	0.048^{***}	0.021^{**}	0.009
Black growth (00–10)	0.013	0.019^{+}	0.014
Black growth (10–14)	0.022^{*}	0.002	0.004
Black share x Black growth (00–10)	0.000	0.007	-0.009
Black share x Black growth (10–14)	-0.006	-0.010	-0.005
Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	0.000	-0.008	-0.001
Black share x Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)	-0.002	0.004	-0.001
Constant	0.062^{***}	0.225^{***}	0.147^{***}
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.049	0.038	0.065
σ_{ϵ}	0.782	0.749	0.827
Log likelihood	-34025	-36147	-39461
N	28866	31855	31944

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Note: Models include controls for age, gender, education, family income, news interest, ideology, and generation since immigration (individual), as well as median household income, unemployment, income inequality, share in same residence, Democratic vote share (2004), urbanism, and region (county).

Table E.7: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Controlling for 2004 Election Results

	No favors	No discrim
	(1)	(2)
Hispanic share (ln)	0.047^{**}	0.019
Hispanic growth (%)	-0.011	-0.015^{+}
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth	0.009^{*}	0.011^{*}
Black share (ln)	0.056^{***}	0.071^{***}
Black growth (%)	0.018^{*}	0.019^{*}
Black share x Black growth	-0.003	-0.009
Individual Controls		
Age	-0.001	-0.004^{***}
Female	-0.051^{***}	-0.030^{*}
Education	-0.132^{***}	-0.108^{***}
Family income ($)	0.000^{***}	0.000^{*}
News interest	-0.125^{***}	-0.068^{***}
Ideology	0.813^{***}	0.814^{***}
4th+ generation		
Immigrant grandparent(s)	-0.005	0.009
Immigrant parent(s)	0.033	-0.041
Citizen immigrant	0.184^{***}	-0.015
Non-citizen immigrant	0.126	-0.128
County Controls		
Median household income ($)	0.000^{+}	0.000
Unemployment rate (%)	0.006^{+}	0.007^{*}
Gini coefficient	-0.601^{*}	-1.130^{***}
Share in same residence (%)	0.009^{***}	0.004^{+}
Democratic vote share (%)	-0.005^{***}	-0.005^{***}
Urban (ref.)		
Suburban	0.011	0.057^{*}
Rural	0.041	-0.005
South	0.035^{+}	0.075^{***}
Constant	3.916^{***}	3.461^{***}
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.069	0.049
σ_{ϵ}	1.026	1.192
Log Likelihood	-40987	-45184
N	28255	28252

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table E.8: Predictors of Racial Resentment




Figure E.1: Estimated Statistical Effect on Racial Resentment of Hispanic Share by Hispanic Growth





Figure E.2: Estimated Statistical Effect on Opposition to Affirmative Action of Hispanic Share by Hispanic Growth



(a) Effect of Hispanic Growth by Hispanic Share

(b) Effect of Black Growth by Black Share

Figure E.3: Estimated Statistical Effect on Opposition to Immigration of Subgroup Growth by Subgroup Share

Table E.9: Predictors of Immigration Policy Preferences

	Amnesty	Border	Police	Fines	Ban	Citizen
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hispanic share (ln)	0.028	0.033	0.039	−0.008	0.115***	0.130***
Hispanic growth (%)	−0.047	−0.055+	−0.016	−0.032	−0.071*	−0.058*
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth	0.050**	0.030	0.035+	0.029	0.066***	0.032+
Black share (ln)	0.046*	0.066**	0.025	0.020	0.027	−0.001
Black growth (%)	0.009	0.051+	0.022	0.040	0.023	0.027
Black share x Black growth	−0.016	−0.037+	−0.018	−0.013	−0.037+	−0.037+
Individual Controls						
Age	0.063***	0.055***	0.233***	0.051***	0.125***	0.081***
Female	−0.243***	−0.183***	−0.215***	−0.257***	−0.209***	−0.230***
Education	−0.180***	−0.203***	−0.235***	−0.084***	−0.247***	−0.112***
Family income ($)	−0.021	−0.022	−0.001	−0.001	−0.007	0.017
News interest	−0.061***	0.105***	0.066***	0.142***	−0.107***	0.044**
Ideology	0.898***	0.875***	1.009***	0.495***	0.686***	0.850***
4th+ generation (ref.)						
Immigrant grandparent(s)	−0.094**	0.068*	−0.086**	−0.008	−0.020	−0.014
Immigrant parent(s)	−0.118*	−0.039	−0.039	−0.133*	−0.113*	−0.057
Citizen immigrant	−0.216*	−0.245**	−0.270**	−0.461***	−0.069	−0.068
Non-citizen immigrant	−0.518**	−0.544**	0.060	−0.383*	−0.386*	−0.236
County Controls						
Median household income ($)	0.031	0.017	−0.028	0.017	−0.018	0.019
Unemployment rate (%)	0.048**	0.050**	0.013	0.056**	0.020	0.026
Gini coefficient	−0.054**	−0.010	−0.047*	−0.064***	−0.045*	−0.035+
Share in same residence (%)	0.012	0.037*	0.035*	−0.049**	0.011	0.007
Democratic vote share (%)	−0.028	−0.111***	−0.079***	−0.070***	−0.060**	−0.099***
Urban (ref.)						
Suburban	0.045	0.016	0.019	0.020	0.030	0.019

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	Amnesty	Border	Police	Fines	Ban	Citizen
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rural	0.054	−0.085	−0.032	−0.043	−0.008	0.012
South	0.009	0.045	0.162***	0.015	0.017	0.044
Constant	0.420***	0.479***	−0.296***	0.928***	−0.648***	−0.392***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.141	0.126	0.113	0.115	0.153	0.112
Log likelihood	−18135	−17892	−17517	−18139	−18423	−18515
N	31236	31236	31236	31236	31236	31236

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table E.10: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Controlling White Share and Growth

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic composition			
Hispanic share (ln)	-0.032^{+}	0.001	
Hispanic growth (00–10)	-0.022	-0.050^{**}	
Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.025^{*}	0.027^{**}	
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10)	0.011	0.017^{+}	
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (10–14)	-0.014	-0.008	
Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.003	-0.003	
Hispanic share x Hispanic growth (00–10) x Hispanic growth (10–14)	-0.006	0.000	
Black composition			
Black share (ln)			0.005
Black growth (00–10)			0.025
Black growth (10–14)			0.011
Black share x Black growth (00–10)			-0.023^{+}
Black share x Black growth (10–14)			-0.009
Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)			0.001
Black share x Black growth (00–10) x Black growth (10–14)			0.000

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	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
White composition			
White share (ln)	−0.048**	−0.022	−0.032**
White growth (00–10)	−0.022	−0.026*	0.011
White growth (10–14)	−0.007	−0.004	0.006
White share x White growth (00–10)	−0.011	−0.005	0.008
White share x White growth (10–14)	0.009	0.007	0.010
White growth (00–10) x White growth (10–14)	−0.001	−0.004	−0.003
White share x White growth (00–10) x White growth (10–14)	−0.010+	−0.002	−0.006
Constant	0.071***	0.229***	0.165***
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.055	0.036	0.065
σ_{ϵ}	0.781	0.748	0.827
Log likelihood	−33245	−35304	−38571
N	28220	31149	31236

+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Note: Models include controls for age, gender, education, family income, news interest, party identification, and generation since immigration (individual), as well as median household income, unemployment, income inequality, share in same residence, Democratic vote share, urbanism, and region (county).

	Resentment	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Immigration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic share (ln)	-0.359^{***}	-0.082^{***}	
Hispanic growth (00–10)	0.112^{***}	0.027^{***}	
Hispanic growth (10–14)	0.046^{*}	0.021^{**}	
Black share (ln)			-0.035^{**}
Black growth (00–10)			0.016^{+}
Black growth (10–14)			0.053^{**}
Constant	7.786^{***}	3.148^{***}	3.186^{***}
R^2	0.008	0.003	0.001
N	35444	39270	39417

$^{+}$p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided)

Table E.11: Predicting Racial Resentment, Opposition to Affirmative Action, and Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies: Simple Models




Figure E.4: Standardized Statistical Effect of Education on Racial Resentment




Figure E.5: Standardized Statistical Effect of Education on Affirmative Action Opposition




Figure E.6: Standardized Statistical Effect of Education on Immigration Opposition

Appendix F

Chapter 4



Figure F.1: Baseline Prime: TESS



Figure F.2: Treatment Prime: TESS

Dictator Game.

[DISPLAY]

Q3. For this next activity, you are going to receive 10 dollars. You are also going to be paired with a person you do not know, and you will have an opportunity to share all, some, or none of these 10 dollars with this person. For example, if you choose to give this person 5 dollars, you will receive 5 dollars for this activity. In the next week, you will receive the money you choose to keep in the form of Survey Complete Points. Any money you choose to give will be mailed to the other person after the study is over.

This person will never know who you are, or that it was you who did or didn't give him or her money. In addition, the researchers of this study will not have access to any identifying information about you (such as your name). As a result, they will never be able to identify you in connection with how much you give. Please continue to the next screen to learn more about the person you have been paired with and to make your decision.

[NUMBER BOX]
[NUMBER BOX RANGE: 0-10, WHOLE NUMBERS ONLY]
[IF XTESS187=1 (EXPERIMENT – WHITE NAME) OR 3 (CONTROL – WHITE NAME) RANDOMLY SELECT ONE OF THESE NAMES: CARRIE, JILL, LAURIE, SARAH, BRAD, GREG, JAY, TODD]
[IF XTESS187=2 (EXPERIMENT – BLACK NAME) OR 4 (CONTROL – BLACK NAME) RANDOMLY SELECT ONE OF THESE NAMES: AALIYAH, AISHA, JADA, KEISHA, DARNELL, JAMAL, JERMAINE, KAREEM]
[PROGRAMMING: CREATE "DOV_INSERT _NAME" RECORDING THE SPECIFIC NAME USED FOR THE INSERTED TEXT]
[PROMPT]

Q4. The person you have been paired with is named **[INSERT RANDOMLY SELECT "DOV_INSERT_NAME" IN BOLD]**. **[INSERT "DOV_INSERT_NAME" IN BOLD]** was identified through whitepages.com, an online directory of publicly listed names and addresses. S/he lives somewhere in the United States. To protect this person's privacy, we have chosen not to share his or her surname or mailing address with you.

Below, please indicate how much money you would like to give **[INSERT "DOV_INSERT_NAME" IN BOLD]**.

[NUMBER BOX, VALUES 0-10]
$ [ ]

[SHOW ON SAME SCREEN AS Q4]
[PROGRAMMING NOTE: PLEASE LEAVE THE SENTENCE BELOW VISIBLE DURING THE ENTIRE QUESTION PRESENTATION (RIGHT NOW IT IS ONLY BEING SHOWN AFTER THE RESPONDENT ENTERS AN AMOUNT IN THE TEXT BOX). CAN WE SHOW THE SENTENCE WITH "$10" VISIBLE AT THE INITIAL QUESTION PRESENTATION AND THEN DYNAMICALLY UPDATE IT AS THE RESPONDENT ENTERS VALUES IN THE NUMBER BOX?]

You will receive **[DYNAMIC INSERT: SUBTRACT RESPONDENTS ANSWER (I.E. $1) FROM THE TOTAL OF $10 (I.E. $10-$1=$9; THEREFORE, INSERT "$9"; UPDATE ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT RESPONDENT ANSWER, SHOULD BE DYNAMIC]** for this activity in the form of Survey Complete Points.

[DISPLAY]

Figure F.3: Setup of Online Dictator Game

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